Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 06

Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

Benoît CAMPAGNE et Aurélien POISSONNIER

Document de travail

Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES

Série des documents de travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

JUILLET 2016

The authors would like to thank Jean-Guillaume SAHUC for his fruitful discussion and advice on a first version of this paper, as well as all participants to the D2E seminar at the Insee and to the 2015 ICMAIF conference.

_____________________________________________

* Département des Études Économiques - Division « Études Macroéconomiques » Timbre G220 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX Crest - LMA

** Commission européenne. L’auteur était en poste à l’Insee et affilié au Crest-LMA et École Polytechnique au moment de la rédaction de ce document.

Département des Études Économiques - Timbre G201 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX - France - Tél. : 33 (1) 41 17 60 68 - Fax : 33 (1) 41 17 60 45 - CEDEX - E-mail : d3e-dg@insee.fr - Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr

Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l’Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs. Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.

G 2016 / 06

Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

Benoît CAMPAGNE* et Aurélien POISSONNIER**

2

Courbes de Laffer et multiplicateurs budgétaires à partir du modèle Mélèze

Résumé

Cet article utilise une modélisation DSGE de la zone euro développée à l’Insee dans un but d’évaluation ex ante de réformes budgétaires. Les principales caractéristiques de ce modèle sont comparables aux modèles standards utilisés dans les principales organisations internationales et banques centrales. À l’aide de courbes de Laffer généralisées, nous constatons que les niveaux effectifs de taxation sont en deçà de ceux maximisant les revenus du governement. Toutefois, ce résultat dépend du niveau de compétition monopolistique sur le marché des biens. Nous étudions aussi les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court- et long-terme pour divers instruments budgétaires. Nos résultats sont comparables avec ceux obtenus dans d’autres modèles DSGE mais aussi avec ceux obtenus dans le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange. Néanmoins, selon le comportement des autorités monétaires et budgétaires et l’instrument considéré, les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court-terme varient substantiellement de 0,2 à 1 point autour du multiplicateur moyen dans les cas les plus extrêmes. De manière plus générale, il existe une marge de manœuvre importante pour des politiques budgétaires dites mixtes.

Mots-clés : multiplicateur budgétaire, courbe de Laffer, modèle DSGE, union monétaire

Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

Abstract

We use the two country DSGE model of the Euro area Meleze developed at Insee to perform ex ante fiscal reforms evaluations. The main features of the model compare with standard tools developed in international institutions and central banks. In practice, tax rates are below the government revenues maximizing rate identified by generalized equilibrium Laffer curves in the model. The extent of this result nevertheless depends on the degree of monopolistic competition on the goods market. We also analyse short and long term multipliers for numerous fiscal tools. These compare to standard DSGE simulations as well as to the macroeconometric model Mésange. However, depending on the behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities, short-term fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case. All in all, there exists room of manoeuvre for so called mixed-strategies fiscal policy.

Keywords: fiscal multiplier, Laffer curve, DSGE model, monetary union

Classification JEL : E10, E62, F45

1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the great recession, fiscal policy has either been investigated as a short term

solution out of the crisis or now through the scope of fiscal consolidation.

Fiscal reforms or consolidation have already been assessed through DSGE models. In the European

context many works were conducted on the Quest III model (D’Auria et al., 2009; Roeger and in’t Veld,

2010; Vogel, 2012; Annicchiarico et al., 2013; in’t Veld, 2013). Coenen et al. (2008b) investigate fiscal con-

solidation in the New Area Wide Model (NAWM). Clinton et al. (2011) provide similar insights in the

case of an international model (GIMF). Coenen et al. (2012) give an extensive review of the size of fiscal

multipliers in the main institutional models.

Most of these papers plead in favour of so called mixed strategies. Actually, they advocates for fiscal

consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in taxes along with a permanent

but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simultaneously ensure a permanent and

immediate decrease in public deficits but also minimize the negative impact on activity, both in the

short and long run.

However, they also highlight that the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a

straightforward task. Factors such as the monetary environment, the competition level, the international

setting or the heterogeneity of households influence the success of consolidation or stimulation policies.

However, the large number of available fiscal tools allows for some room of manoeuvre in the design

of programs, and fiscal authorities and policy-makers must rely on detailed evaluations of all possible

reform scenarios.

In the present paper, we aim to give a French outlook and compare the effect of transitory or perma-

nent fiscal reforms in a standard feature DSGE model for France within the Euro Area.

First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Con-

trary to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find re-

sponsible for a sizeable increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. Also, French

tax rates are below the revenue maximizing rates.

In a second step, we simulate increases in public spending, transfers or decreases in various tax

rates calibrated to 1% of pre-stimulus output. The resulting fiscal multipliers are compared to the main

existing DSGE models based on the results provided in Coenen et al. (2012), and to the French macroe-

conometric model Mésange developed at Insee (Klein and Simon, 2010). We find that our model gives

comparable multipliers for transitory shocks but highlight that these measures of the fiscal multipliers

crucially depend on their timing and the way both fiscal and monetary authorities commit or react to

3

the stimulus. Short-term fiscal multipliers variations range from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline

in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications in terms of policy-making.

It is noteworthy that for transitory measures, public spending fiscal multipliers can range from 0.7 to

1.3; cuts on distorting tax rates provides lower multipliers; coordination across countries in a monetary

union leads to larger fiscal multipliers. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending

multiplier as presented in Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and

following a one quarter shock, they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding

simulation.

The model Meleze used in this paper stems from Campagne and Poissonnier (2016) and features the

standard modelling choices of the two country monetary union literature. The modelling elements are

those generally embedded in large scale models developed in central banks and international institu-

tions among which are GEM at the IMF (Bayoumi et al., 2004), NAWM at the ECB (Coenen et al., 2008a)

or in open economy EAGLE (Gomes et al., 2012), QUEST III at the European Commission (Ratto et al.,

2009) and its R&D version (Roeger et al., 2008).

Regarding the behaviour of fiscal authorities, the government uses public spending to stimulate and

monitor economic activity. It can also exogenously modify its fiscal policy along different axes: lump-

sum transfers and taxes on consumption, labour, capital income or dividends. As detailed below, we

implement a traditional budget rule with government expenditures reacting to the output gap and past

deficits. We also propose an alternative to traditional budget rules used in the literature, and derive a

forward-looking optimizing behaviour for the government.

In Meleze, we replicate two different settings: France against the rest of the Eurozone, and a sym-

metric calibration for the Euro area.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a short presentation of the model and its

calibration. Section 3 analyses long term fiscal properties of the model through Laffer curves. Section 4

and 5 study transitory and permanent fiscal reforms respectively. The technical reader may refer to the

companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).

2 Outline of the model: Meleze

This section gives a short presentation of the main features of the model, namely: a model of two

countries in monetary union, comparing with standard tools developed in international institutions

and central banks (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003). A more detailed description of the

model, the first order conditions, their steady state and linearisation is given in the companion paper

(Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).

4

2.1 General framework

The model consists of two countries where continuum of firms and households interact on the goods,

labour and capital market. Both firms and households are consider immobile across countries.

As advocated by Mankiw (2000) in the context of fiscal analysis, we distinguish between two types

of households. A fraction of these households is Ricardian, that is not financially constrained. They hold

financial asset (or debt), own capital which they lend to firms in their country (once installed capital

is assumed to become immobile) and also own financial intermediation firms. Therefore, they receive

interests and dividends. These Ricardian households also choose their investment each period by arbi-

trating between capital and the risk free asset. Non Ricardian households on the contrary are financially

constrained and do not hold any asset.

Both types of households also provide labour on a monopolistically competitive market. For this

reason, households are paid with a mark-up over their marginal disutility. Wage rigidities are added

over the cycle following Erceg et al. (2000), and each household can only reset its wage in adequateness

with his optimal consumption-leisure arbitrage with an exogenous probability. In this framework, there

is no involuntary unemployment and labour adjusts only at the intensive margin (hours worked).

Households finally consume both domestic and imported goods which are also partial substitutes.

For the Ricardian households, being non financially constrained allows them to smooth their consump-

tion over time. Non Ricardian households on the contrary cannot. Once their wage level is set, their

labour supply is given by firms demand, their income ensues which they consume entirely within the

same quarter.

Firms produce partially substitutable goods from a standard constant returns to scale production

function. Production factors are labour and capital. Total factor productivity is exogenous and growing

at the same pace across countries. At each period firms optimize their relative demand in capital and

labour to minimize their production cost, taking the aggregate wage and capital rental cost as given.

Partial substitutability across goods allows firm to price a mark-up over their marginal cost. Over the

cycle, with an exogenous probability each firm can reset its price to maximize its expected discounted

profits, while internalising its market power. Those price rigidities lead to a New Keynesian Phillips

curve.

The modelling of governments’ behaviour is conducted along two lines. First, we implement a tradi-

tional budget rules with government consumption reacting to the output gap and past deficits. Second,

and as an alternative to these rules, we also consider here forward-looking optimizing governments.

Their objective is to maximize households’ intertemporal utility derived from public spending in partial

information as an approximation for the exact Ramsey problem. We consider public consumption as

a proxy for actual public spendings, public investment, public employment and production of public

5

services altogether. For this reason public spendings are purchased from domestic producers only. In

a discretionary manner, governments collect taxes on wages, capital interests, dividends, consumption

and investment. They can distribute transfers to both types of households. They also hold debt both at

the steady state and over the cycle.

In addition to the production of real goods by the firms, a union wide financial market produces

financial intermediation services for both households and governments. Financial intermediaries deduct

from the interest rate set by the central banker a fee under the form of a debt elastic spread which is

akin to fisim. There are no risk or agency issues in our model so that this fee is not to be interpreted as

a risk premium of any kind. In practice, these financial intermediaries ensure the closing of the model

as exposed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and have a very small production compared to NFCs.

2.2 A focus on fiscal authorities

By and large, the purpose of governments is to stimulate domestic production, labour and individual

consumption, as well as to provide with public and collective goods and services. In the real world,

fiscal policy is implemented through a large number of instruments summarized here into exogenous

taxes on consumption, labour and capital incomes, exogenous lump-sum transfers to households and

endogenous public expenditures encompassing all dimensions of public intervention in the absence of

public production or employment in the present model.1

Lump-sum transfers are endogenised in Section 5.2 to ensure the long-run convergence of public

debt when public consumption does not.

Public consumption dimmed endogenous is modelled in two alternative ways. We either follow

a traditional modelling with the implementation of budget rules or we propose an alternative to the

Ramsey problem and model a welfare-optimizing government under bounded rationality.

2.2.1 Budget rule

Budget rules can be implemented in different ways all relying on the ad hoc description of govern-

ments’ spendings as a function of observable endogenous variables. Following Corsetti et al. (2010), we

implement a resembling contra-cyclical budget rule in the following form:

Git = 0.9Gi

t−1 −0.01gyi yi

t−1 + 0.02pai

gyi pait−1 (2.1)

where Git, pai

t and yit respectively denote the deviation of public consumption, the public asset to GDP

ratio, and production from their steady state value. In addition, pa denotes the long-term debt to GDP

1A complete and detailed description of fiscal authorities is given in Campagne and Poissonnier (2016)

6

ratio target and gy the share of public consumption in GDP.2 This approach is standard in the institu-

tional modelling literature and taken on in models such as Quest III, GIMF, NAWM, etc.

2.2.2 Optimizing government: a simplified approach to the Ramsey problem

Rationale The introduction of rationality in DSGE models historically and naturally leads to the defini-

tion of an optimal government behaviour as a normative benchmark, namely the Ramsey policy. Indeed,

in a internally consistent DSGE approach, governments seek to maximize the welfare of their domestic

households, and it is therefore natural to define the objective of fiscal authorities as the maximization

of the utility of households. In the presence of rationality, this maximisation is indeed subject to the

public budget constraint but also to the full set of model constraints. In particular, when choosing the

optimal level of public expenditures Gt, the government internalizes its indirect impact on households’

consumption and labour supply, and therefore households’ utility. One strength of this standard Ram-

sey approach is its robustness to the Lucas critique as it defines a structural behaviour consistent with

the hypotheses of the model. In addition, as we introduce government spending in the utility function

in MELEZE, this Ramsey approach appears to be even more strongly justified.

However, solving a Ramsey problem is both analytically and numerically complex (when not infea-

sible) in large models, especially within the business cycle, as well as unrealistic as it does not embody

political choices observed in the real world that may depart from optimality. This reason underlies the

classical choice of ad hoc budget rules in DSGE models.

As an alternative to these rules, we propose a new approach based on a simplified version of the

Ramsey problem where the government still maximizes households’ utility subject to its transfers/tax

revenues budget constraint, however not taking into account all other constraints. Concretely, the gov-

ernment solves the Ramsey problem taking endogenous variables other than public expenditures (such

as CiT(τ) and Li

T(τ) here) as given. As a result, such a government focuses only on the utility derived

by households through the direct action of the government rather than through second turn effects on

other endogenous variables. As for budget rules, this remains inconsistent with the DSGE approach of a

full knowledge of economic mechanisms by agents. However, this may also be interpreted as a difficulty

for fiscal authorities to exactly assess the impact of its policies on the economy.

Closer to the full Ramsey problem, we believe this approach to be more robust to the Lucas critique

than traditional budget rules as it partially micro-found the behaviour of the government. However, both

approaches suffer from the same paradoxes when embedded in a general equilibrium model solved

under rational expectations. First, in order to solve for such a model, expectations of all agents are

assumed formed through the entire model. It is then paradoxical to assume that either the government

maximizes its objective under a subset of constraints or maximizes an implicit objective through a rule

2As pa, the long-term value of the public asset to GDP ratio, is negative, this indeed implies that public spendings decreasewhen public debt increases so as to ensure the long-term solvency of the government.

7

defined outside the model. Second, both modelling are only simple descriptions of fiscal authorities

and do not encompass real-world phenomena such as the will of authorities to get reelected that may

induce sub-optimal behaviours.3

Program and objective of the government As the government now seeks to maximise the intertem-

poral flow of utility of households, the analytical government’s program at date t is as follows:

maxGi

T ,PAiT

Et

∞

∑T=t

βig

T−tU (CR,iT , CNR,i

T , LR,iT , LNR,i

T , GiT) (2.2)

s.t. PAit =

(Rt−1 − ψg(

PAit−1

Pit−1YiTrt−1

)

)PAi

t−1 + νw,it Wi

t Lit + νk,i

t rk,it CPIi

tKit−1

+ νc,it CPIi

t(Cit + Ii

t) + νD,it Di

t + νFD,it FDi

t − Pit Gi

t −Φit

(2.3)

where U is a weighted average of households’ utility based on Ricardian (CR,i) and non Ricardian house-

holds (CNR,i) consumptions, labour supplies (LR,i and LNR,i) and public consumption (Gi). In addition,

PAit denotes the nominal public assets of country i at the end of period t, Ri

t the nominal interest rate,

Wit real hourly wages, ri,k

t the interest rate paid on physical capital, Kit−1 the capital stock available

at the end of period t− 1, CPIit the relative price of consumption, Ci

t consumption, Iit investment, Di

t

dividends paid by non financial firms, FDit financial intermediation dividends, Pi

t the production price,

and Φit are nominal transfers to households. νc,i, νw,i, νk,i, νD,i and νFD,i respectively denote the tax rate

level on consumption, wages, capital revenues, dividends and financial dividends. βig is the government

discount factor and ψg is a financial intermediation spread paid by the government depending on its

real past net financial position.

Solving for the previous program yields a Euler equation for government consumption that define

the behaviour of fiscal authorities in MELEZE.

2.3 Steady state and calibration

In the present quarterly model, growth is exogenous. In the long run, all real variables grow at the same

rate, that of TFP common to both countries. A full description of the steady state, the associated rela-

tionships and the calibration is also given in the companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).

Taking into account all these relationships imposes crucial restrictions on structural parameters,

endogenous ratios to GDP, as well as on endogenous variables in level. We calibrate our model as to

match the situation of France within the Eurozone over the period 1995-2007, and as to stay coherent

with the traditional DSGE literature4 for structural parameters. Tables 1 and 2 in the companion paper

3See for instance, the public choice theory literature.4Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), Roeger et al. (2008), Martin and Philippon (2014), Smets and Wouters (2002), Annicchiarico et al.

(2013), Vogel (2012), Coenen et al. (2012), Eggertsson et al. (2014), Ratto et al. (2009), Everaert and Schule (2008), Bayoumi et al.(2004), Hø j et al. (2007), Kaplan et al. (2014), Bussiere et al. (2011), European Commission’s Quest III R&D model for France

8

present actual data for France and the Euro Area and their corresponding values at steady state, along

with the values of the corresponding structural parameters.

3 Laffer curves

First highlighted by Laffer at the end of the 70’s, the homonymous curves linking financial revenues

to the level of taxation appear as a good outlook of the room for manoeuvre for raising tax revenues

in order to reduce indebtedness. As such, we perform a standard analysis of the Laffer curves gener-

ated by the model in line with the general equilibrium approach of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) (T&U

henceforth). Their general equilibrium approach has the advantage of taking into account the full model

setting when computing tax revenues.

More precisely, to allow comparability with T&U, variations in one tax rate are conducted at con-

stant public transfers. In Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), this type of simulations is referred as g-Laffer curves

(as opposed to s-Laffer curves where tax variations are conducted at constant government spending).

Meanwhile, other tax rates are left unchanged, and therefore, the clearing of the government budget

constraint is ensured through endogenous public expenditures and debt level modelled in a budget

rule. This choice corresponds to the standard behaviour of our model.

VAT Labour income tax Capital income anddividend tax

Tax base (= TB) RPC(C + I) RPC(1+ νc)(1+ νw)RWL RPCrkK + dYTax revenues νcTBVAT νw

1+νw TBLabourνkTBCapital

∗ Tax on financial dividends are in practice negligible as the tax base is very small.Real values are expressed with respect to the deflator of public consumption that is the production price.X indicates steady state values and TBX the steady state tax base for tax X. RPC stands for relative price of consumption, C andI for consumption and investment, RW for purchasing power of wages VAT included, L for hours worked, K for the capital stock,Y for production and d for the profit ratio (non financial dividends). νc corresponds to the consumption tax rate, whereas νw andνk are the labour and capital revenues tax rates.

Table 1: Tax bases and associated tax revenues at steady state

Analytically, at the steady state, tax bases and their associated tax revenues are given by Table 1.

Note that as VAT, our model allows the labour tax rate νw to be higher than 100%. This directly reflects

the fact that νw is actually paid by firms and represents the tax rate on net wages.5 In terms of compen-

sation of employees RPC(1 + νw)(1 + νc)RWL, the labour tax rate will therefore be νw

(1+νw)and indeed

strictly lower than one. To allow comparison with T&U, labour income tax Laffer curves plotted below

are expressed on compensation of employees.

5That is after-tax wages paid by firms and actually received by households.

9

Initial tax rates in both models are given in Table 2, showing comparable calibrations. The large

difference in capital income tax rate between the two models is a consequence of different tax bases.

Actually, we choose to tax profits in MELEZE as we are unable to distinguish between dividends (D)

and revenues from physical capital (rKK) in the data. Absent of dividends in T&U, their capital tax base

is therefore smaller and requires a higher tax rate to match data.

MELEZE Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)Consumption tax 20.3% 18.0%Labour income tax 39.1% 46.0%Capital income tax 21.0% 35.0%

Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on compensation of employees. In MELEZE, this rate is given by νw/1 + νw.

Table 2: Tax rates in France

Figure 1 and Table 3 present and describe the steady state Laffer curves in MELEZE. Our calibration

shows that France is evolving far from the maximum of the Laffer curves. All tax rates stand on the

left side of the maximum, that is increasing the tax rate will yield higher tax revenues. The Laffer max-

imum threshold on the labour tax rate on compensation of employees is around 72%, with additional

revenues up to 17%. For capital income taxes, the maximum tax rate is 43% with potential additional tax

revenues of 3%. For VAT, as demand for goods persists even at high tax-included prices, tax bases de-

crease at a moderate pace so that the Laffer curve does not reach a maximum for reasonable values of νc.

Comparing with Laffer curves derived for France in T&U’s neoclassical exogenous growth model,

they find a flatter labour Laffer curve with maximum additional revenues of 5% corresponding to a

threshold tax rate of 44%. On the contrary, for capital income tax, their calibration shows a maximum

tax threshold with additional revenues close to zero.

These differences across models may arise from two different potential causes, namely the choice of

calibration and the structure of the model.

Calibration of the models First, the authors stress the importance of the Frisch elasticity, that is the

elasticity of hours worked to the wage rate, on the shape of the Laffer curves. They show that a de-

creased Frisch elasticity, that is a more inelastic labour supply, leads to higher potential maximum tax

rates. In MELEZE, the Frisch elasticity is equal to 1/2, that is equal to T&U baseline calibration. As such,

this cannot explain the differences across models.

Similarly, T&U explicit a, yet minor, influence of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of con-

sumption. Recalibrating our model as to match σc = 1 as in T&U does not lead to major changes in our

results.

10

(a) Consumption tax (b) Consumption tax

(c) Labour income tax on gross wages (d) Labour income tax on gross wages

(e) Capital income tax (f) Capital income tax

Figure 1: Laffer curves - Tax bases and revenues in France

11

Model Variation Maximumtax rate

Maximumadditionalrevenues

Labour income tax

T&U baseline 63% 5%

MELEZE

baseline 72% 17%θ1 = ∞ 77% 27%θ1

w = ∞ 72% 17%µ1 = 0 72% 16%σ1

c = 1 75% 17%

Capital income tax

T&U baseline 44% 0%

MELEZE

baseline 43% 3%θ1 = ∞ 24% 0%θ1

w = ∞ 43% 3%µ1 = 0 43% 4%σ1

c = 1 43% 3%

T&U refers to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).In both models, the inverse Frisch elasticity (σl) is equal to 2. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption iscalibrated to σc = 1 in T&U against 1.13 in MELEZE.Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on gross wages. In MELEZE, this rate is given by νw/1 + νw.The maximum tax rate and additional revenues correspond to the rate at the maximum of the Laffer curve, and to the revenuesat this maximum in comparison to initial calibration revenues.The case θ1 = ∞ (resp. θ1

w = ∞) corresponds to the absence of real rigidities on prices (resp. on wages), that is the absence ofmark-ups. The case µ1 = 0 corresponds to a zero share of non Ricardian agents.

Table 3: Laffer curves comparison for changes in the structure of MELEZE

(a) Labour income tax on gross wages (b) Capital income tax

Figure 2: Laffer curves - Revenues’ sensibility to the structure of the model

12

Concerning the rest of the calibration, MELEZE and T&U compare in terms of the share of public

consumption or transfers in GDP, the depreciation rate, the inflation rate, the TFP growth rate, the

interest rate and the share of capital in the production function. Debt to GDP ratios differ substantially

but are explicitly not identified by T&U as a factor influencing the Laffer curves.

Structure of the models One differentiation between MELEZE and T&U is the introduction of a fully-

fledged open economy framework. T&U introduce open economy effects in a simplified way and stress

themselves the weakness of their model in this regard. However, Auray et al. (2011) extends T&U

framework in a two country setting and show no major differences in Laffer curves induced by trade

openness.6

An other point of differentiation is the neoclassical structure of T&U model. T&U model is a neo-

classical framework with firms trading on perfectly competitive markets. In Meleze, the neo-Keynesian

structure with the introduction of monopolistic competition leads to a distorted steady state.

As depicted on Figure 2a, the existence of price mark-up distorsions at steady state in MELEZE

implies considerable changes for the Laffer curves, increasing observed differences with T&U. With

perfectly substitutable goods (θi = ∞), price mark-ups disappear and we observe an increase in the

maximum labour income tax rate and additional revenues, as well as a decrease for the maximum

capital income tax rate and additional revenues. Indeed, as distortions decrease, profits and dividends

disappear resulting in a smaller tax base for capital and therefore a lower tax potential. Simultaneously,

labour supply increases leading to higher fiscal labour income tax revenues.

On the contrary, monopolistic competition on the labour market (wage mark-up), and the presence

of non Ricardian agents are of minor influence on the results.

One should also be cautious about the interpretation of these Laffer curves for policy analysis. In-

deed, in our model, (installed) capital is considered immobile across countries and therefore no tax

base evasion and international fiscal competition takes place. Though to a lower extent, the same phe-

nomemon for labour is also excluded from our model. In addition, DSGE models including MELEZE

rarely model tax evasion to the grey economy. In all, these Laffer curves may reflect more favourable

tax environments than reality with larger maximum thresholds and potential tax revenues.

Lastly, Fève et al. (2013) highlight the importance of market completeness for the previous results

to hold. Indeed, in an incomplete market setting with heterogeneous agents and a government budget

constraint adjusted through debt, they obtain S-shaped Laffer curves arising for crowding out effects

of private assets by public ones. In this case, identical tax revenues can be associated to up to three

different tax rates with concrete implications for policy decisions.6Note that this is mainly conditional to the fact that both MELEZE and Auray et al. (2011) models assume internationally

immobile factors of production.

13

4 Transitory stimuli and fiscal multipliers

We perform a second standard policy exercise, namely the simulations of fiscal reforms focusing in

particular on the size of fiscal multipliers. To better understand the mechanisms at work, we compare

our model to other institutional DSGE models for Europe developed at the IMF, the OECD, the ECB and

the European Commission. Based on these models, Coenen et al. (2012) implement and compare various

fiscal stimulus packages and measure instantaneous fiscal multipliers for these models, concluding to

strong similarities across models. However, and although our model is in line with these benchmarks,

this section aims at giving a deeper understanding of factors influencing the size of fiscal multipliers.

4.1 Fiscal multipliers dependency to the model class

We implement a two-years increase in public spendings amounting to 1% of ex-ante output, with no

monetary accommodation. Classically, we define the instantaneous fiscal multiplier as the ratio of the

change in output to the 1% increase ex ante.

Following this stimulus, we find that the fiscal multiplier is lower than one both for our model and

the R&D version of QuestIII (Figure 3a). This result is in line with other DSGE models (Figure 3b) with

multipliers ranging from 0.8 to 0.9 in all European models (namely OECD’s Fiscal, EC’s Quest, ECB’s

NAWM and IMF’s GIMF).

With the macroeconometric model Mésange (Klein and Simon, 2010) however, the instantaneous fis-

cal multiplier is larger than one making this model more Keynesian than the otherwise neo-Keynesian

DSGEs. First of all, the smaller size of the fiscal multiplier in DSGE models compared to Mésange model

comes from the central bank’s response (interest rates being exogenous in Mésange). In traditional DSGE

models, an increase in final demand by the government represents a potentially inflationary pressure

and the central bank’s Taylor rule advocates an increase in the nominal interest rate that mitigates the

favourable effects of the public spendings stimulus. As we show in the next section, in the presence

of monetary accommodation, that is when the nominal interest rate is kept temporarily constant, fiscal

multipliers increase further in our model (and in other DSGE models) and compare to the size observed

in the Mésange model.

More generally, the backward structure of macroeconometric models7 does not allow the design of

complex Taylor rules based on inflation expectations. However one can implement rules similar to the

one in Meleze based on contemporary inflation. In the case of Mésange and as France shares a common

monetary policy with other Eurozone members, the absence of economic spillovers and feedbacks with

other members limits the impact of a Taylor rule as France represent only a fifth of the Eurozone.

7With the exception of a few hybrid models such as the FRB-US at the FED including expectations.

14

(a) ... in Meleze, QuestIII R&D, and Mésange

(b) ... in QuestIII, NAWM, GIMF and OECD’s Fiscal

Government spendings increase for 2 years by 1 percent of ex ante output. In the upper figure, fiscal multipliers are plotted forFrance only in Meleze and Mésange, and both France and the Euro Area for QUEST III R&D. The lower figure is taken fromCoenen et al. (2012). Note that for Quest III, responses are annualized in the bottom panel.

Figure 3: Instantaneous fiscal multipliers for a two-year increase in government consumption

15

4.2 Policy implementation sensitivity of fiscal multipliers

We now turn to a sensitivity analysis of the size of fiscal multipliers with respect to the policy imple-

mentation of the shock. In particular, we focus on the dependency to the duration of the shock and the

behaviour of both the government and the central bank.

Monetary and fiscal accommodation Fiscal multipliers depend on the way both the fiscal and mone-

tary authorities respond to the stimulus, that is the way they are modelled. We consider three different

variants for a two years increase in public spendings equal to 1% of pre-stimulus output:(i) the bench-

mark case where the government and the central bank set their decisions as usual (no accommodation),

(ii) the case where monetary policy accommodates the fiscal authority’s decision by keeping its interest

rate at the steady state level and (iii) the case where the government also commits to its decision by not

reacting to the transitory increase in public debt. We run these simulations with either our forward look-

ing optimizing government or with an acyclic budget rule taken from Corsetti et al. (2010) (Figure 4a).

Monetary accommodation, by not raising the interest rate following an inflationary increase in fi-

nal demand, magnifies the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4a). Indeed, as the nominal interest rate remains

unchanged, the increase in inflation expectations lowers the real interest rate therefore fostering pri-

vate consumption and investment. When the government commits to the increase in public spendings

and the central bank is accommodative, the fiscal multiplier is now larger than one with an order of

magnitude comparable to the Mésange model but with a different timing likely due to the absence of

expectations in Mésange In particular, and up until the end of the transitory shock, the fiscal multiplier

remains high in Mésange, whereas it decreases before the end of the shock in Mélèze due to the antici-

pated recession by households.

Moreover, when the government is modelled as forward looking and with our calibrations, it com-

pensates its own spending shock through the endogenous level of public spending more rapidly than

with a budget rule, which mitigates the fiscal multiplier. It does so by anticipation of higher future debt.

Duration The duration of the shock mitigates the size of the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4b). With a one

quarter (unexpected) increase in public spendings, the fiscal multiplier is larger than one. The longer

is the fiscal stimulus, the smaller is the multiplier and the larger is the after effect when the reform is

abrogated. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending multiplier as presented in

Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and following a one quarter shock,

they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding simulation.

This stems from both the need for the government to decrease spendings after the end of the stim-

ulus to reimburse past deficits, and from today’s expectations of households about this changes in the

fiscal stance.

16

Coenen et al. MELEZEUS EU EA FR

Government consumption 1.55 1.52 1.66 0.99Targeted Transfers (to non Ricardians) 1.30 1.12 1.58 0.68Consumption taxes 0.61 0.66 0.46 0.53General transfers 0.42 0.29 0.66 0.27Corporate income taxes 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.04Labour income taxes 0.23 0.53 0.59 0.58

We assume that fiscal stimuli of 1 percent of ex ante output are implemented for 2 years. The first two columns correspond toCoenen et al. (2012, Table 3).

Table 4: Average first-year instantaneous multipliers from different types of fiscal stimulus

All in all, we stress that one should be particularly cautious to identify the underlying policy im-

plementation when referring to fiscal multipliers. Indeed, the mere quantification of fiscal multipliers

is hard to directly transpose into policy evaluations, timeliness and the political context being crucial

determinants of their size.

4.3 Fiscal multipliers of other policy instruments

We evaluate the fiscal multipliers of other fiscal stimulus with the same method as for government

spendings: we implement a fiscal stimulus (decrease in tax rate or increase in transfers) equal to 1% of

ex ante output for two years. Results presented in Table 4 are compared with equivalent simulations for

Europe presented in Coenen et al. (2012). As Coenen et al. did, we average out the fiscal multipliers

of the first year over the different simulations we have run (accommodative fiscal and/or monetary

policy, budget rule or forward looking optimizing government). We also perform equivalent stimulus

in the Euro Area as a whole by implementing the same shock in the two countries of our symmetric

calibration. The comparison of the fiscal multipliers in this case and in the France only case measure

the benefits of coordination of fiscal stimuli in a monetary union.8

By and large, fiscal multipliers for the Euro Area computed with Meleze compare with the results

from Coenen et al. (2012) presented in the Table, as well as with Roeger and in’t Veld (2010). A first

result robust through the models is that only the fiscal multipliers to government spendings or transfers

can be larger than one. This is only the case when the central banker accommodates the demand shock

by temporarily keeping its interest rate unchanged. An other robust result is the low impact of fiscal

stimuli targeted on capital (corporate income tax) relative to other stimuli directly affecting households.

When implemented in the Euro Area as a whole (closed economy) the fiscal multipliers are systemat-

ically larger than when the fiscal stimulus is implemented only in France (except for VAT). Coordination

is thus an important aspect of fiscal policies to improve their efficiency.

8The results remain conditional to the immobility of labour and capital throughout the monetary union.

17

(a) ... depending on monetary policy accommodation and government’s behaviour

(b) ... lasting from one quarter to 3 years

We assume that government spendings are increased by 1 percent of ex ante output. In the upper figure, we compare the fiscalmultiplier in Meleze for France, in the cases where the ECB maintain its interest rate constant or not and whether the governmentis forward looking or follows a budget rule. We also consider a transitory perfect commitment to public expenditures in whichcase the government does not react to its spending shock. In the lower figure, we compare the fiscal multiplier in our model forFrance for 1 quarter, 1,2 or 3 years stimuli.

Figure 4: Instantaneous fiscal multiplier to a transitory increase in government spending by 1% of initialoutput

18

However these numbers hide large disparities across simulations. Without considering a deeper

sensitivity analysis (with respect to elasticity parameters in particular) there is already a 0.2 to 1 point

variability around the baseline for each multiplier.

5 Permanent fiscal reforms

Having looked at transitory fiscal stimuli, we now turn to the effect of permanent fiscal reforms on the

economy.

5.1 Tax hikes

In this first part, we look at three different tax hikes, namely, permanent increases in the labour income

tax rate, the value added tax rate and the capital income tax rate. We calibrate the reforms to an increase

in ex ante tax receipts of 1% of initial GDP. In order to allow comparison with the standard macroecono-

metric model for France Mésange, simulations are conducted at constant public expenditures.9

Labour income tax In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the labour income tax of

1% of initial GDP. In MELEZE, we name labour income tax, the only taxation that applies to labour

and paid by firms. As such, unable to actually distinguish between income tax, or social contributions,

we compare the results to a weighted combination of four different simulations obtained in Mésange

regarding permanent increases in the labour income tax, employers’-, employees’- or generalized social

security contributions. Results are presented in Table 5.

Following the increase in the labour income tax, households’ revenues decrease and therefore pri-

vate consumption. This decrease affects production and decrease imports relatively more than exports

as foreign demand is only affected by second round price effects. As such, the trade balance temporar-

ily improves. Moreover, this increased taxation of compensations paid by firms to workers transmits

negatively to wages, decreases labour supply, and further weights on production.

In the long run, the increased taxation of labour revenues permanently distorts the consumption-

leisure arbitrage and depletes labour supply, consumption and production. Spillover effects are negligi-

ble.

All in all, the impact on the economy compares with the econometric model Mésange. Nevertheless,

we observe differences in the magnitude of responses with stronger recessionary effects in the short run

but weaker ones in the long run.

9This corresponds to simulations in the budget rule version of MELEZE, where the budget rule is shut down for a large numberof period. As a consequence of this choice, we approach permanent shocks by the No Terminal Condition method described inRoeger (1999). Indeed we simulate a quasi permanent shock to allow intermediary convergence to the new after reform steadystate.

19

in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR

MELEZEGDP (France) -0.95 -1.05 -0.82 -0.62 -0.60 -0.62GDP (RoE) 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02Consumption -1.47 -1.60 -1.36 -1.23 -1.25 -1.29Net real wages -0.88 -1.47 -1.73 -1.89 -1.92 -1.95Hours worked -1.44 -1.52 -1.06 -0.66 -0.60 -0.59Return on capital -0.44 -0.94 -0.59 -0.16 -0.07 0.00Investment -1.38 -2.16 -1.85 -1.04 -0.74 -0.69Euribor 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Inflation 0.08 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00Trade balance 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17

MésangeGDP (France) -0.36 -0.74 -0.89 -0.98 -1.04 -1.27Consumption -0.72 -1.49 -1.73 -1.75 -1.73 -1.92Net real wages -0.86 -1.08 -1.25 -1.40 -1.50 -1.79Investment -0.49 -0.90 -1.04 -1.08 -1.05 -1.34Trade balance 0.19 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.10

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.SSC stands for Social Security Contributions.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is notensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.Some lines are kept unreported for Mésange as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with MELEZE (e.g.labour supply).In MELEZE, the distinction between labour income taxes, employers’, employees’ and generalized social contributions beingimpossible, we report a linear combination of all the corresponding simulations in Mésange. Weights are as follows: employer’sSSC (44.4%), employees’ SSC (23.7%), generalized SC (15.3%) and labour income tax (16.6%), corresponding to their share in totalrevenues in 2007. Disaggregated simulations results for Mésange are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).

Table 5: Responses to a permanent labour income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP

20

VAT In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the value added tax of 1% of initial GDP.

Comparison with Mésange is here straightforward. Results are presented in Table 6.

As VAT increases, households’ revenues decreases as net real wages drop. Hence, private consump-

tion, labour supply and production decreases. The VAT hike also negatively affects imports (relatively

to exports) and therefore the trade balance improves in the short and long term.

In the long run, the reform remains recessionary as labour supply, consumption and investment are

permanently decreased. Spillover effects are negligible.

Again, the results compare qualitatively to Mésange. More generally, the recessionary impact of the

reform is stronger in MELEZE.

in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR

MELEZEGDP (France) -0.76 -0.58 -0.50 -0.53 -0.63 -0.93GDP (RoE) 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03Consumption -1.41 -1.10 -0.97 -1.03 -1.14 -1.51Net real wages -1.12 -1.29 -1.39 -1.50 -1.58 -1.85Hours worked -1.14 -0.77 -0.52 -0.39 -0.36 -0.29Return on capital -1.10 -0.70 -0.34 0.04 0.31 1.12Investment -1.71 -2.62 -2.65 -2.43 -2.31 -2.13Euribor 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00Inflation -0.28 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00Trade balance 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.24

MésangeGDP (France) -0.33 -0.54 -0.76 -0.96 -0.95 -0.84Consumption -0.54 -0.94 -1.25 -1.39 -1.43 -1.45Net real wages -0.81 -0.65 -0.99 -1.43 -1.88 -1.98Investment -0.61 -0.80 -0.99 -1.21 -1.13 -1.18Trade balance 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.25

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is notensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.Some lines are kept unreported for Mésange as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with MELEZE (e.g.labour supply).Simulations results for Mésange are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).

Table 6: Responses to a permanent VAT increase for 1% of initial GDP

Capital income tax In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the capital income tax of

1% of initial GDP. No comparison with Mésange is conducted due to the absence of such a simulation

21

in Klein and Simon (2010). Results are presented in Table 7.

Following an increase in the taxation of capital, investment is logically strongly penalized both in the

short and long run. In the short run, the increase in the capital income tax translates into consumption

and labour supply decreases. Given sluggish adjustments in wages and in the stock of capital, this fall

in the labour (supply) implies a fall in the return on capital (as the marginal productivity of capital

falls). All in all, labour, consumption, investment and output decrease.

Moreover, the decrease in investment implies a permanent decrease in revenues for Ricardian house-

holds. As such, in the long run, consumption decreases and labour supply stagnates. As a result the

impact of the reform is strongly recessive. Spillover effects are still small but stronger than for labour

income tax and VAT hikes.

in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR

MELEZEGDP (France) -0.83 -0.82 -0.79 -0.98 -1.27 -2.26GDP (RoE) 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.07Consumption -1.04 -0.69 -0.53 -0.72 -1.07 -2.24Net real wages -0.11 -0.45 -0.71 -1.02 -1.27 -2.12Hours worked -1.21 -0.95 -0.59 -0.30 -0.21 0.00Return on capital -1.22 -0.83 -0.13 0.90 1.75 4.34Investment -4.06 -6.89 -7.48 -7.28 -6.99 -6.46Euribor -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00Inflation -0.41 -0.21 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00Trade balance 0.36 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.28

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence isnot ensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.

Table 7: Responses to a permanent capital income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP

5.2 Increase in public spendings

We now turn to the response of the economy to a permanent increase in government spendings by

1% of ex ante output. Contrary to a transitory fiscal stimulus financed by debt (but leaving the long

term debt target unchanged), a permanent stimulus raises the question of long-term financing. This

can be achieved either by raising taxes, increasing the long-term debt to GDP ratio or decreasing lump-

sum transfers to households. In the present section and to allow comparison with Coenen et al. (2012),

the long-term additional cost induced by higher public spendings is financed through lower lump-

sum transfers. These transfers adjust following an ad hoc rule inspired by Quest III (R&D) model, and

22

in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR

MELEZEGDP (France) 0.80 0.51 0.44 0.54 0.78 0.77GDP (RoE) -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01Consumption -0.12 -0.52 -0.78 -1.02 -0.84 -0.62Net real wages -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 0.07Labour supply 1.24 0.79 0.69 0.81 0.88 0.75Return on capital 1.16 0.74 0.60 0.58 0.23 0.00Investment -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.91 1.56 0.82Euribor 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04Inflation -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04Trade balance -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures (increase included) are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. Debtconvergence is ensured through endogenous public transfers such as specified in the text.

Table 8: Responses to a permanent increase in public expenditures for 1% of initial GDP

respond to changes in the debt gap from its long-term target and changes in growth rate of deficit.10

φ1(φ1t − φ1

t−1) =0.01pa1 pa1

t−1 +0.1pa1 ( pa1

t − pa1t−1) (5.1)

where pat represents public assets, and φt lump-sum transfers to households, deviations from their

steady-state values. φ and pa respectively are the steady state transfers to GDP and public assets to

GDP ratios.

Responses of the economy are given in Table 8, whereas instantaneous and cumulative11 fiscal mul-

tipliers computed in Coenen et al. (2012) are given in Figure 5.

Following an increase in government spendings, production increases. The mechanism is identical

to the one presented in Baxter and King (1993). Indeed, as government expenditures increases, transfers

are reduced creating a negative wealth effect. This in turn creates an incentive for households to con-

sume less and to supply more labour. As labour supply increases, so does both labour and the marginal

productivity of capital, also leading to an increase in investment/capital. In the long-run, output de-

mand increases as government demand increases more than households consumption decreases (in

part due to the shape of the marginal utility of consumption). Also, as labour and capital also increase,

output supply increases. All in all, at equilibrium, this implies a permanent increase in production.

10However, and contrary to Quest III, we do not include an additional adjustment through endogenous variations in the labourincome tax rate.

11See Uhlig (2010).

23

As exposed in Baxter and King (1993), this mechanism crucially relies on the financing of govern-

ment spendings. Indeed, in the present case, as expenditures are financed through lump-sum taxes,

the decrease in transfers only leads to a wealth effect but does not distort the economy. Financing ex-

penditures by increases in the income tax rate, as is also common in the DSGE literature, introduces

distortions in the labour supply that decrease employment. As such, labour can decrease at equilibrium,

but also investment and capital as the marginal productivity of capital will be lower. All in all, the effect

on output can turn to be negative in the long-run.

Quantitatively, we obtain an instantaneous first quarter fiscal multiplier of 0.9, close to that of a two-

year stimulus (see Figure 4a). However, due the previously mentioned negative wealth effect induced

by lower transfers in the medium and long-run, the average first-year multiplier decreases to 0.8. In the

long-run, a positive fiscal multiplier of 0.77 remains. Those results are close to simulations for Europe

presented in Coenen et al. (2012) and for France presented in Kilponen et al. (2015) with a long-run

multiplier of 0.82.

Additional simulations financing public expenditures with an increase in the income tax rate leads

to an adverse outcome with a long-run multiplier of -1.30 close to -1.28 obtained for France in Kilponen

et al. (2015). In addition, the presence of public consumption in the utility function tends to mitigate

the short-run multiplier but with no effect on the long-run one.

5.3 Implications for fiscal consolidation

As public debt levels remain high in the Eurozone, one can naturally wonder what are the implications

of previous simulations for the design of fiscal consolidation programs. Indeed, we can easily compare

Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 and see that different fiscal adjustment tools have different short-term and long-term

effects. For instance, increasing labour income taxes is more detrimental to short- and medium-term ac-

tivity than a consumption tax increase.12

More generally, a large number of papers shows short-term weaker but long-term stronger reces-

sionary effect of distortionary tax increases in comparison to expenditure-based fiscal consolidations.

As such, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in’t Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Coenen et al. (2008b),

Annicchiarico et al. (2013), D’Auria et al. (2009) all plead in favour of so called mixed strategies. Actu-

ally, they advocate for fiscal consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in

taxes along with a permanent but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simulta-

neously ensure a permanent and immediate decrease in public deficits (and therefore long-term debt)

but also minimize the negative impact on activity. On top of that such a design allows to benefit from

the long-term positive impact of debt service reduction, without the detrimental effect of permanent

12However, in MELEZE and as opposed to larger models, this results is inverted after 10 years. This relies to the fuzzy definitionof labour taxes in our model that are ultimately borne by both firms and households. Larger models usually introduce a distinctionbetween households and firms labour taxation. As such, an increase in labour taxes fully weights on households with a strongerrecessionary effect.

24

(a) Instantaneous multipliers

(b) Cumulative multipliers

Coenen et al. (2012) assume a permanent increase in government spendings by 1 p.p. of ex ante output. The increase in governmentexpenditures is financed through either a decrease in lump-sum transfers to households or labour taxes depending on theadjusting fiscal tool in each model.

Figure 5: Fiscal multiplier for a permanent increase in government expenditures

25

higher distortionary taxes.

However, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in’t Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013) also insist on the

importance of government credibility for the implementation of mixed strategies. Indeed, fiscal consol-

idation packages relying on transitory increase in taxes need to be perceived as such, and households

must expect a decrease in taxation in the long-run. However, data tends to show that this might not

always be the case, and the potential lack of public commitment might severely hinder the benefits of

mixed strategies.

As an additional and concluding remark, the two country setting of MELEZE also shows that

spillovers from fiscal consolidation within the Eurozone are relatively small, corroborating Forni et al.

(2010) results. However, these results might differ when considering a full international model as in

Clinton et al. (2011) extended to non-euro countries, as global reduction in public debt levels can lead

to a permanent decrease in the real interest rate generating strong spillovers. As such, the international

dimension of policy coordination should not be overlooked.

6 Conclusion

In a neo-Keynesian model for France within the Euro-Area, we analyse the impact of fiscal reforms.

Our model includes the traditional ingredients of modern large-scale institutional DSGE models such as

real and nominal rigidities, capital adjustment costs, non Ricardian agents, and a detailed public finance

block, and therefore easily compares to the existing literature.

First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).

Contrary to their paper, our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find responsible for

a slight increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. In the end, French tax rates

are found to be below the revenue maximizing rates.

In a second step, we simulate both transitory and permanent shocks for various fiscal instruments.

The fiscal multipliers are comparable to existing institutional DSGEs as summarized in Coenen et al.

(2012) but also to the macroeconometric model Mésange (Klein and Simon, 2010). However, depending

on the specification of fiscal and monetary authorities, fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from

0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications

in terms of policy-making.

All in all, the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a straightforward task. The

monetary environment, the competition level, the international setting or the heterogeneity of house-

holds are only a few of the factors influencing the success of different policies. However, the large

26

number of fiscal tools within the scope of policy-makers allows for some room of manoeuvre in the

design of better programs, as advocated in the mixed strategies literature.

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29

G 9

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101

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G 9

102

J.L.

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lles

G 9

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G 9

104

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tern

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G 9

105

H. R

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G 9

106

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G 9

107

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MA

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et D

. GU

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n pa

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ma

des

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cro

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G 9

108

M. G

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DE

et M

. MO

UT

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R

Une

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luat

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du c

oût d

irect

de

l'enf

ant d

e 19

79

à 19

89

G 9

109

P. R

ALL

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F

ranc

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mag

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perf

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s éc

onom

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s co

mpa

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G 9

110

J.L.

BR

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T

Mic

ro-D

MS

N

ON

PA

RU

G 9

111

A. M

AG

NIE

R

Effe

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en F

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puis

197

0 : q

uelq

ues

résu

ltats

em

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G 9

112

B. C

RE

PO

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UR

EA

U

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déve

lopp

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anal

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de c

ausa

lités

dan

s un

mod

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d'ac

célé

-ra

teur

gén

éral

isé

G 9

113

J.L.

BR

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T,

H.

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KE

L-R

OU

SS

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J. T

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JAS

-B

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ranc

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plée

s" -

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onom

ies

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G 9

201

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. A

DA

MS

, B

. C

RE

PO

N,

D.

EN

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OU

A

Cho

ix te

chno

logi

ques

et s

trat

égie

s de

dis

suas

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d'en

trée

G 9

202

J. O

LIV

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A-M

AR

TIN

S,

J.

TO

UJA

S-B

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NA

TE

Mac

ro-e

cono

mic

impo

rt fu

nctio

ns w

ith im

perf

ect

com

petit

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- A

n ap

plic

atio

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the

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. Tra

de

G 9

203

I. S

TA

PIC

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s éc

hang

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tern

atio

naux

de

serv

ices

de

la

Fra

nce

dans

le c

adre

des

nég

ocia

tions

mul

tila-

téra

les

du G

AT

T

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n 19

92 (

1ère

ver

sion

) N

ovem

bre

1992

(ve

rsio

n fin

ale)

G 9

204

P. S

EV

ES

TR

E

L'éc

onom

étrie

sur

don

nées

indi

vidu

elle

s-te

mpo

relle

s. U

ne n

ote

intr

oduc

tive

G 9

205

H. E

RK

EL-

RO

US

SE

Le

com

mer

ce e

xtér

ieur

et l

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ironn

emen

t in-

tern

atio

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ans

le m

odèl

e A

MA

DE

US

(r

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imat

ion

1992

)

G 9

206

N. G

RE

EN

AN

et D

. GU

ELL

EC

C

oord

inat

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with

in th

e fir

m a

nd e

ndog

enou

s gr

owth

G 9

207

A. M

AG

NIE

R e

t J. T

OU

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-BE

RN

AT

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and

trad

e: e

mpi

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es fo

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e m

ajor

five

indu

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lized

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ntrie

s

G 9

208

B.

CR

EP

ON

, E

. D

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UE

T,

D. E

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UA

et

P. M

OH

NE

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non

coo

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tive

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D a

nd o

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al

pate

nt li

fe

G 9

209

B. C

RE

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nova

tion:

an

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of p

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um

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G 9

301

J. T

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r-fa

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lopp

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t im

plic

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com

mer

cial

e

G 9

302

Ch.

CA

SE

S

Dur

ées

de c

hôm

age

et c

ompo

rtem

ents

d'o

ffre

de

trav

ail :

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rev

ue d

e la

litté

ratu

re

G 9

303

H. E

RK

EL-

RO

US

SE

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nion

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nom

ique

et m

onét

aire

: le

déb

at

écon

omiq

ue

G 9

304

N. G

RE

EN

AN

- D

. GU

ELL

EC

/ G

. B

RO

US

SA

UD

IER

- L

. M

IOT

TI

Inno

vatio

n or

gani

satio

nnel

le, d

ynam

ism

e te

ch-

nolo

giqu

e et

per

form

ance

s de

s en

trep

rises

G 9

305

P. J

AIL

LAR

D

Le tr

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de

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stric

ht :

prés

enta

tion

jurid

ique

et

hist

oriq

ue

G 9

306

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

Mic

ro-D

MS

: pr

ésen

tatio

n et

pro

prié

tés

G 9

307

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

Mic

ro-D

MS

- v

aria

ntes

: le

s ta

blea

ux

G 9

308

S. J

AC

OB

ZO

NE

Le

s gr

ands

rés

eaux

pub

lics

fran

çais

dan

s un

e pe

rspe

ctiv

e eu

ropé

enne

G 9

309

L. B

LOC

H -

B. C

ŒU

RE

P

rofit

abili

té d

e l'i

nves

tisse

men

t pro

duct

if et

tr

ansm

issi

on d

es c

hocs

fina

ncie

rs

G 9

310

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- B

. C

OLI

N-S

ED

ILLO

T

Les

théo

ries

sur

la s

truc

ture

opt

imal

e du

cap

ital :

qu

elqu

es p

oint

s de

rep

ère

List

e de

s do

cumen

ts d

e tr

avail de

la

Direc

tion

des

Étu

des

et S

ynth

èses

Éco

nomique

s ii

G 9

311

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- B

. C

OLI

N-S

ED

ILLO

T

Les

déci

sion

s de

fina

ncem

ent d

es e

ntre

pris

es

fran

çais

es :

une

éval

uatio

n em

piriq

ue d

es th

éo-

ries

de la

str

uctu

re o

ptim

ale

du c

apita

l

G 9

312

L. B

LOC

H -

B. C

ŒU

RÉ

Q

de

Tob

in m

argi

nal e

t tra

nsm

issi

on d

es c

hocs

fin

anci

ers

G 9

313

Équ

ipes

Am

adeu

s (I

NS

EE

), B

anqu

e de

Fra

nce,

M

étric

(D

P)

Pré

sent

atio

n de

s pr

oprié

tés

des

prin

cipa

ux m

o-dè

les

mac

roéc

onom

ique

s du

Ser

vice

Pub

lic

G 9

314

B. C

RE

PO

N -

E. D

UG

UE

T

Res

earc

h &

Dev

elop

men

t, co

mpe

titio

n an

d in

nova

tion

G 9

315

B. D

OR

MO

NT

Q

uelle

est

l'in

fluen

ce d

u co

ût d

u tr

avai

l sur

l'e

mpl

oi ?

G 9

316

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

- C

. BR

OU

SS

E

Deu

x ét

udes

sur

l'âg

e de

la r

etra

ite

G 9

317

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

R

épar

titio

n du

trav

ail d

ans

une

popu

latio

n hé

té-

rogè

ne :

deux

not

es

G 9

318

D. E

YS

SA

RT

IER

- N

. PO

NT

Y

AM

AD

EU

S -

an

annu

al m

acro

-eco

nom

ic m

odel

fo

r th

e m

ediu

m a

nd lo

ng te

rm

G 9

319

G.

CE

TT

E -

Ph.

CU

NÉ

O -

D.

EY

SS

AR

TIE

R -

J. G

AU

TIÉ

Le

s ef

fets

sur

l'em

ploi

d'u

n ab

aiss

emen

t du

coût

du

trav

ail d

es je

unes

G 9

401

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

Le

s st

ruct

ures

par

âge

impo

rten

t-el

les

?

G 9

402

J. G

AU

TIÉ

Le

chô

mag

e de

s je

unes

en

Fra

nce

: pro

blèm

e de

fo

rmat

ion

ou p

héno

mèn

e de

file

d'a

ttent

e ?

Que

lque

s él

émen

ts d

u dé

bat

G 9

403

P. Q

UIR

ION

Le

s dé

chet

s en

Fra

nce

: élé

men

ts s

tatis

tique

s et

éc

onom

ique

s

G 9

404

D. L

AD

IRA

Y -

M. G

RU

N-R

EH

OM

ME

Li

ssag

e pa

r m

oyen

nes

mob

iles

- Le

pro

blèm

e de

s ex

trém

ités

de s

érie

G 9

405

V. M

AIL

LAR

D

Thé

orie

et p

ratiq

ue d

e la

cor

rect

ion

des

effe

ts d

e jo

urs

ouvr

able

s

G 9

406

F.

RO

SE

NW

ALD

La

déc

isio

n d'

inve

stir

G 9

407

S. J

AC

OB

ZO

NE

Le

s ap

port

s de

l'éc

onom

ie in

dust

rielle

pou

r dé

finir

la s

trat

égie

éco

nom

ique

de

l'hôp

ital p

ublic

G 9

408

L. B

LOC

H, J

. B

OU

RD

IEU

,

B.

CO

LIN

-SE

DIL

LOT

, G

. LO

NG

UE

VIL

LE

Du

défa

ut d

e pa

iem

ent a

u dé

pôt d

e bi

lan

: les

ba

nqui

ers

face

aux

PM

E e

n di

fficu

lté

G 9

409

D. E

YS

SA

RT

IER

, P.

MA

IRE

Im

pact

s m

acro

-éco

nom

ique

s de

mes

ures

d'a

ide

au lo

gem

ent -

que

lque

s él

émen

ts d

'éva

luat

ion

G 9

410

F.

RO

SE

NW

ALD

S

uivi

con

jonc

ture

l de

l'inv

estis

sem

ent

G 9

411

C. D

EF

EU

ILLE

Y -

Ph.

QU

IRIO

N

Les

déch

ets

d'em

balla

ges

mén

ager

s : u

ne

anal

yse

écon

omiq

ue d

es p

oliti

ques

fran

çais

e et

al

lem

ande

G 9

412

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- B

. C

ŒU

RÉ

-

B.

CO

LIN

-SE

DIL

LOT

In

vest

isse

men

t, in

cert

itude

et i

rrév

ersi

bilit

é Q

uelq

ues

déve

lopp

emen

ts r

écen

ts d

e la

théo

rie

de l'

inve

stis

sem

ent

G 9

413

B. D

OR

MO

NT

- M

. PA

UC

HE

T

L'év

alua

tion

de l'

élas

ticité

em

ploi

-sal

aire

dép

end-

elle

des

str

uctu

res

de q

ualif

icat

ion

?

G 9

414

I. K

AB

LA

Le C

hoix

de

brev

eter

une

inve

ntio

n

G 9

501

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- B

. C

ŒU

RÉ

- B

. S

ED

ILLO

T

Irre

vers

ible

Inve

stm

ent a

nd U

ncer

tain

ty:

W

hen

is th

ere

a V

alue

of W

aitin

g?

G 9

502

L. B

LOC

H -

B. C

ŒU

RÉ

Im

perf

ectio

ns d

u m

arch

é du

cré

dit,

inve

stis

se-

men

t des

ent

repr

ises

et c

ycle

éco

nom

ique

G 9

503

D. G

OU

X -

E. M

AU

RIN

Le

s tr

ansf

orm

atio

ns d

e la

dem

ande

de

trav

ail p

ar

qual

ifica

tion

en F

ranc

e

Une

étu

de s

ur la

pér

iode

197

0-19

93

G 9

504

N. G

RE

EN

AN

T

echn

olog

ie, c

hang

emen

t org

anis

atio

nnel

, qua

-lif

icat

ions

et e

mpl

oi :

une

étud

e em

piriq

ue s

ur

l'ind

ustr

ie m

anuf

actu

rière

G 9

505

D. G

OU

X -

E. M

AU

RIN

P

ersi

stan

ce d

es h

iéra

rchi

es s

ecto

rielle

s de

sa-

laire

s: u

n ré

exam

en s

ur d

onné

es fr

ança

ises

G 9

505

D. G

OU

X -

E. M

AU

RIN

B

is

Per

sist

ence

of i

nter

-indu

stry

wag

es d

iffer

entia

ls: a

re

exam

inat

ion

on m

atch

ed w

orke

r-fir

m p

anel

dat

a

G 9

506

S. J

AC

OB

ZO

NE

Le

s lie

ns e

ntre

RM

I et c

hôm

age,

une

mis

e en

pe

rspe

ctiv

e N

ON

PA

RU

- ar

ticle

sor

ti da

ns É

cono

mie

et

Pré

visi

on n

° 12

2 (1

996)

- pa

ges

95 à

113

G 9

507

G.

CE

TT

E -

S.

MA

HF

OU

Z

Le p

arta

ge p

rimai

re d

u re

venu

C

onst

at d

escr

iptif

sur

long

ue p

ério

de

G 9

601

Ban

que

de F

ranc

e -

CE

PR

EM

AP

- D

irect

ion

de la

P

révi

sion

- É

rasm

e -

INS

EE

- O

FC

E

Str

uctu

res

et p

ropr

iété

s de

cin

q m

odèl

es m

acro

-éc

onom

ique

s fr

ança

is

G 9

602

Rap

port

d’a

ctiv

ité d

e la

DE

SE

de

l’ann

ée 1

995

G 9

603

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- A

. DR

AZ

NIE

KS

L’

octr

oi d

e cr

édit

aux

PM

E :

une

anal

yse

à pa

rtir

d’in

form

atio

ns b

anca

ires

G 9

604

A. T

OP

IOL-

BE

NS

AÏD

Le

s im

plan

tatio

ns ja

pona

ises

en

Fra

nce

G 9

605

P.

GE

NIE

R -

S.

JAC

OB

ZO

NE

C

ompo

rtem

ents

de

prév

entio

n, c

onso

mm

atio

n d’

alco

ol e

t tab

agie

: pe

ut-o

n pa

rler

d’un

e ge

stio

n gl

obal

e du

cap

ital s

anté

?

Une

mod

élis

atio

n m

icro

écon

omét

rique

em

piriq

ue

G 9

606

C. D

OZ

- F

. LE

NG

LAR

T

Fac

tor

anal

ysis

and

uno

bser

ved

com

pone

nt

mod

els:

an

appl

icat

ion

to th

e st

udy

of F

renc

h bu

sine

ss s

urve

ys

G 9

607

N. G

RE

EN

AN

- D

. GU

ELL

EC

La

théo

rie c

oopé

rativ

e de

la fi

rme

iii

G 9

608

N. G

RE

EN

AN

- D

. GU

ELL

EC

T

echn

olog

ical

inno

vatio

n an

d em

ploy

men

t re

allo

catio

n

G 9

609

Ph.

CO

UR

- F

. R

UP

PR

EC

HT

L’

inté

grat

ion

asym

étriq

ue a

u se

in d

u co

ntin

ent

amér

icai

n : u

n es

sai d

e m

odél

isat

ion

G 9

610

S.

DU

CH

EN

E -

G.

FO

RG

EO

T -

A.

JAC

QU

OT

A

naly

se d

es é

volu

tions

réc

ente

s de

la p

rodu

cti-

vité

app

aren

te d

u tr

avai

l

G 9

611

X. B

ON

NE

T -

S. M

AH

FO

UZ

T

he in

fluen

ce o

f diff

eren

t spe

cific

atio

ns o

f wag

es-

pric

es s

pira

ls o

n th

e m

easu

re o

f the

NA

IRU

: the

ca

se o

f Fra

nce

G 9

612

PH

. C

OU

R -

E.

DU

BO

IS,

S.

MA

HF

OU

Z,

J.

PIS

AN

I-F

ER

RY

T

he c

ost o

f fis

cal r

etre

nchm

ent r

evis

ited:

how

st

rong

is th

e ev

iden

ce?

G 9

613

A. J

AC

QU

OT

Le

s fle

xion

s de

s ta

ux d

’act

ivité

son

t-el

les

seul

e-m

ent c

onjo

nctu

relle

s ?

G 9

614

ZH

AN

G Y

ingx

iang

- S

ON

G X

ueqi

ng

Lexi

que

mac

roéc

onom

ique

Fra

nçai

s-C

hino

is

G 9

701

J.L.

SC

HN

EID

ER

La

taxe

pro

fess

ionn

elle

: él

émen

ts d

e ca

drag

e éc

onom

ique

G 9

702

J.L.

SC

HN

EID

ER

T

rans

ition

et s

tabi

lité

polit

ique

d’u

n sy

stèm

e re

dist

ribut

if

G 9

703

D. G

OU

X -

E. M

AU

RIN

T

rain

or

Pay

: D

oes

it R

educ

e In

equa

litie

s to

En-

cour

age

Firm

s to

Tra

in th

eir

Wor

kers

?

G 9

704

P. G

EN

IER

D

eux

cont

ribut

ions

sur

dép

enda

nce

et é

quité

G 9

705

E. D

UG

UE

T -

N. I

UN

G

R &

D In

vest

men

t, P

aten

t Life

and

Pat

ent V

alue

A

n E

cono

met

ric A

naly

sis

at th

e F

irm L

evel

G 9

706

M.

HO

UD

EB

INE

- A

. T

OP

IOL-

BE

NS

AÏD

Le

s en

trep

rises

inte

rnat

iona

les

en F

ranc

e : u

ne

anal

yse

à pa

rtir

de d

onné

es in

divi

duel

les

G 9

707

M. H

OU

DE

BIN

E

Pol

aris

atio

n de

s ac

tivité

s et

spé

cial

isat

ion

des

dépa

rtem

ents

en

Fra

nce

G 9

708

E. D

UG

UE

T -

N. G

RE

EN

AN

Le

bia

is te

chno

logi

que

: une

ana

lyse

sur

don

nées

in

divi

duel

les

G 9

709

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

Ana

lyzi

ng a

sm

all F

renc

h E

CM

Mod

el

G 9

710

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

For

mal

izin

g th

e tr

ansi

tion

proc

ess:

sce

nario

s fo

r ca

pita

l acc

umul

atio

n

G 9

711

G.

FO

RG

EO

T -

J.

GA

UT

IÉ

Inse

rtio

n pr

ofes

sion

nelle

des

jeun

es e

t pro

cess

us

de d

écla

ssem

ent

G 9

712

E. D

UB

OIS

H

igh

Rea

l Int

eres

t Rat

es: t

he C

onse

quen

ce o

f a

Sav

ing

Inve

stm

ent D

iseq

uilib

rium

or

of a

n in

-su

ffici

ent C

redi

bilit

y of

Mon

etar

y A

utho

ritie

s?

G 9

713

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

irect

ion

des

Étu

des

et S

ynth

èses

Éco

nom

ique

s -

1996

G 9

714

F.

LEQ

UIL

LER

D

oes

the

Fre

nch

Con

sum

er P

rice

Inde

x O

ver-

stat

e In

flatio

n?

G 9

715

X. B

ON

NE

T

Peu

t-on

met

tre

en é

vide

nce

les

rigid

ités

à la

ba

isse

des

sal

aire

s no

min

aux

?

Une

étu

de s

ur q

uelq

ues

gran

ds p

ays

de l’

OC

DE

G 9

716

N. I

UN

G -

F.

RU

PP

RE

CH

T

Pro

duct

ivité

de

la r

eche

rche

et r

ende

men

ts

d’éc

helle

dan

s le

sec

teur

pha

rmac

eutiq

ue

fran

çais

G 9

717

E. D

UG

UE

T -

I. K

AB

LA

App

ropr

iatio

n st

rate

gy a

nd th

e m

otiv

atio

ns to

use

th

e pa

tent

sys

tem

in F

ranc

e -

An

econ

omet

ric

anal

ysis

at t

he fi

rm le

vel

G 9

718

L.P

. PE

LÉ -

P. R

ALL

E

Âge

de

la r

etra

ite :

les

aspe

cts

inci

tatif

s du

rég

ime

géné

ral

G 9

719

ZH

AN

G Y

ingx

iang

- S

ON

G X

ueqi

ng

Lexi

que

mac

roéc

onom

ique

fran

çais

-chi

nois

, ch

inoi

s-fr

ança

is

G 9

720

M. H

OU

DE

BIN

E -

J.L

. SC

HN

EID

ER

M

esur

er l’

influ

ence

de

la fi

scal

ité s

ur la

loca

li-sa

tion

des

entr

epris

es

G 9

721

A. M

OU

RO

UG

AN

E

Cré

dibi

lité,

indé

pend

ance

et

polit

ique

mon

étai

re

Une

rev

ue d

e la

litté

ratu

re

G 9

722

P. A

UG

ER

AU

D -

L. B

RIO

T

Les

donn

ées

com

ptab

les

d’en

trep

rises

Le

sys

tèm

e in

term

édia

ire d

’ent

repr

ises

P

assa

ge d

es d

onné

es in

divi

duel

les

aux

donn

ées

sect

orie

lles

G 9

723

P. A

UG

ER

AU

D -

J.E

. CH

AP

RO

N

Usi

ng B

usin

ess

Acc

ount

s fo

r C

ompi

ling

Nat

iona

l A

ccou

nts:

the

Fre

nch

Exp

erie

nce

G 9

724

P. A

UG

ER

AU

D

Les

com

ptes

d’e

ntre

pris

e pa

r ac

tivité

s -

Le p

as-

sage

aux

com

ptes

- D

e la

com

ptab

ilité

d’

entr

epris

e à

la c

ompt

abili

té n

atio

nale

- A

pa

raîtr

e

G 9

801

H. M

ICH

AU

DO

N -

C. P

RIG

EN

T

Pré

sent

atio

n du

mod

èle

AM

AD

EU

S

G 9

802

J. A

CC

AR

DO

U

ne é

tude

de

com

ptab

ilité

gén

érat

ionn

elle

po

ur la

Fra

nce

en 1

996

G 9

803

X. B

ON

NE

T -

S. D

UC

HÊ

NE

A

ppor

ts e

t lim

ites

de la

mod

élis

atio

n «

Rea

l Bus

ines

s C

ycle

s »

G 9

804

C. B

AR

LET

- C

. DU

GU

ET

-

D. E

NC

AO

UA

- J

. PR

AD

EL

The

Com

mer

cial

Suc

cess

of I

nnov

atio

ns

An

econ

omet

ric a

naly

sis

at th

e fir

m le

vel i

n F

renc

h m

anuf

actu

ring

G 9

805

P. C

AH

UC

- C

h. G

IAN

ELL

A -

D

. G

OU

X -

A.

ZIL

BE

RB

ER

G

Equ

aliz

ing

Wag

e D

iffer

ence

s an

d B

arga

inin

g P

ower

- E

vide

nce

form

a P

anel

of F

renc

h F

irms

G 9

806

J. A

CC

AR

DO

- M

. JL

AS

SI

La p

rodu

ctiv

ité g

loba

le d

es fa

cteu

rs e

ntre

197

5 et

19

96

iv

G 9

807

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

irect

ion

des

Étu

des

et

Syn

thès

es É

cono

miq

ues

- 19

97

G 9

808

A. M

OU

RO

UG

AN

E

Can

a C

onse

rvat

ive

Gov

erno

r C

ondu

ct a

n A

c-co

mod

ativ

e M

onet

ary

Pol

icy?

G 9

809

X. B

ON

NE

T -

E. D

UB

OIS

- L

. FA

UV

ET

A

sym

étrie

des

infla

tions

rel

ativ

es e

t men

us c

osts

: t

ests

sur

l’in

flatio

n fr

ança

ise

G 9

810

E. D

UG

UE

T -

N. I

UN

G

Sal

es a

nd A

dver

tisin

g w

ith S

pillo

vers

at t

he fi

rm

leve

l: E

stim

atio

n of

a D

ynam

ic S

truc

tura

l Mod

el

on P

anel

Dat

a

G 9

811

J.P

. BE

RT

HIE

R

Con

gest

ion

urba

ine

: un

mod

èle

de tr

afic

de

poin

te à

cou

rbe

débi

t-vi

tess

e et

dem

ande

él

astiq

ue

G 9

812

C. P

RIG

EN

T

La p

art d

es s

alai

res

dans

la v

aleu

r aj

outé

e : u

ne

appr

oche

mac

roéc

onom

ique

G 9

813

A.T

h. A

ER

TS

L’

évol

utio

n de

la p

art d

es s

alai

res

dans

la v

aleu

r aj

outé

e en

Fra

nce

reflè

te-t

-elle

les

évol

utio

ns

indi

vidu

elle

s su

r la

pér

iode

197

9-19

94 ?

G 9

814

B. S

ALA

NIÉ

G

uide

pra

tique

des

sér

ies

non-

stat

ionn

aire

s

G 9

901

S. D

UC

HÊ

NE

- A

. JA

CQ

UO

T

Une

cro

issa

nce

plus

ric

he e

n em

ploi

s de

puis

le

débu

t de

la d

écen

nie

? U

ne a

naly

se e

n co

mpa

-ra

ison

inte

rnat

iona

le

G 9

902

Ch.

CO

LIN

M

odél

isat

ion

des

carr

ière

s da

ns D

estin

ie

G 9

903

Ch.

CO

LIN

É

volu

tion

de la

dis

pers

ion

des

sala

ires

: un

essa

i de

pro

spec

tive

par

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n

G 9

904

B. C

RE

PO

N -

N. I

UN

G

Inno

vatio

n, e

mpl

oi e

t per

form

ance

s

G 9

905

B. C

RE

PO

N -

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

W

ages

ineq

ualit

ies

in F

ranc

e 19

69-1

992

An

appl

icat

ion

of q

uant

ile r

egre

ssio

n te

chni

ques

G 9

906

C. B

ON

NE

T -

R. M

AH

IEU

M

icro

sim

ulat

ion

tech

niqu

es a

pplie

d to

inte

r-ge

nera

tiona

l tra

nsfe

rs -

Pen

sion

s in

a d

ynam

ic

fram

ewor

k: th

e ca

se o

f Fra

nce

G 9

907

F.

RO

SE

NW

ALD

L’

impa

ct d

es c

ontr

aint

es fi

nanc

ière

s da

ns la

dé-

cisi

on d

’inve

stis

sem

ent

G 9

908

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

ES

E -

199

8

G 9

909

J.P

. ZO

YE

M

Con

trat

d’in

sert

ion

et s

ortie

du

RM

I É

valu

atio

n de

s ef

fets

d’u

ne p

oliti

que

soci

ale

G 9

910

C

h. C

OLI

N -

Fl.

LEG

RO

S -

R. M

AH

IEU

B

ilans

con

trib

utifs

com

paré

s de

s ré

gim

es d

e re

trai

te d

u se

cteu

r pr

ivé

et d

e la

fonc

tion

publ

ique

G 9

911

G. L

AR

OQ

UE

- B

. SA

LAN

IÉ

Une

déc

ompo

sitio

n du

non

-em

ploi

en

Fra

nce

G 9

912

B. S

ALA

NIÉ

U

ne m

aque

tte a

naly

tique

de

long

term

e du

m

arch

é du

trav

ail

G 9

912

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

B

is

Une

est

imat

ion

de l’

élas

ticité

de

l’em

ploi

peu

qu

alifi

é à

son

coût

G 9

913

Div

isio

n «

Red

istr

ibut

ion

et P

oliti

ques

Soc

iale

s »

Le m

odèl

e de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n dy

nam

ique

D

ES

TIN

IE

G 9

914

E. D

UG

UE

T

Mac

ro-c

omm

ande

s S

AS

pou

r l’é

cono

mét

rie d

es

pane

ls e

t des

var

iabl

es q

ualit

ativ

es

G 9

915

R. D

UH

AU

TO

IS

Évo

lutio

n de

s flu

x d’

empl

ois

en F

ranc

e en

tre

1990

et 1

996

: une

étu

de e

mpi

rique

à p

artir

du

fichi

er d

es b

énéf

ices

rée

ls n

orm

aux

(BR

N)

G 9

916

J.Y

. FO

UR

NIE

R

Ext

ract

ion

du c

ycle

des

affa

ires

: la

mét

hode

de

Bax

ter

et K

ing

G 9

917

B.

CR

ÉP

ON

- R

. DE

SP

LAT

Z -

J. M

AIR

ES

SE

E

stim

atin

g pr

ice

cost

mar

gins

, sca

le e

cono

mie

s an

d w

orke

rs’ b

arga

inin

g po

wer

at t

he fi

rm le

vel

G 9

918

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

- P

h. L

AG

AR

DE

P

rodu

ctiv

ity o

f hou

rs in

the

aggr

egat

e pr

oduc

tion

func

tion:

an

eval

uatio

n on

a p

anel

of F

renc

h fir

ms

from

the

man

ufac

turin

g se

ctor

G 9

919

S.

AU

DR

IC -

P. G

IVO

RD

- C

. PR

OS

T

Évo

lutio

n de

l’em

ploi

et d

es c

oûts

par

qua

li-fic

atio

n en

tre

1982

et 1

996

G 2

000/

01

R. M

AH

IEU

Le

s dé

term

inan

ts d

es d

épen

ses

de s

anté

: un

e ap

proc

he m

acro

écon

omiq

ue

G 2

000/

02

C. A

LLA

RD

-PR

IGE

NT

- H

. GU

ILM

EA

U -

A

. Q

UIN

ET

T

he r

eal e

xcha

nge

rate

as

the

rela

tive

pric

e of

no

ntra

bles

in te

rms

of tr

adab

les:

theo

retic

al

inve

stig

atio

n an

d em

piric

al s

tudy

on

Fre

nch

data

G 2

000/

03

J.-Y

. FO

UR

NIE

R

L’ap

prox

imat

ion

du fi

ltre

pass

e-ba

nde

prop

osée

pa

r C

hris

tiano

et F

itzge

rald

G 2

000/

04

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

ES

E -

199

9

G 2

000/

05

B. C

RE

PO

N -

F.

RO

SE

NW

ALD

In

vest

isse

men

t et c

ontr

aint

es d

e fin

ance

men

t : le

po

ids

du c

ycle

U

ne e

stim

atio

n su

r do

nnée

s fr

ança

ises

G 2

000/

06

A. F

LIP

O

Les

com

port

emen

ts m

atrim

onia

ux d

e fa

it

G 2

000/

07

R. M

AH

IEU

- B

. SÉ

DIL

LOT

M

icro

sim

ulat

ions

of t

he r

etire

men

t dec

isio

n: a

su

pply

sid

e ap

proa

ch

G 2

000/

08

C. A

UD

EN

IS -

C. P

RO

ST

D

éfic

it co

njon

ctur

el :

une

pris

e en

com

pte

des

conj

onct

ures

pas

sées

G 2

000/

09

R. M

AH

IEU

- B

. SÉ

DIL

LOT

É

quiv

alen

t pat

rimon

ial d

e la

ren

te e

t sou

scrip

tion

de r

etra

ite c

ompl

émen

taire

G 2

000/

10

R. D

UH

AU

TO

IS

Ral

entis

sem

ent d

e l’i

nves

tisse

men

t : p

etite

s ou

gr

ande

s en

trep

rises

? in

dust

rie o

u te

rtia

ire ?

G 2

000/

11

G. L

AR

OQ

UE

- B

. SA

LAN

IÉ

Tem

ps p

artie

l fém

inin

et i

ncita

tions

fina

nciè

res

à l’e

mpl

oi

G20

00/1

2 C

h. G

IAN

ELL

A

Loca

l une

mpl

oym

ent a

nd w

ages

v

G20

00/1

3 B

. CR

EP

ON

- T

h. H

EC

KE

L -

Info

rmat

isat

ion

en F

ranc

e : u

ne é

valu

atio

n à

part

ir de

don

nées

indi

vidu

elle

s -

Com

pute

rizat

ion

in F

ranc

e: a

n ev

alua

tion

base

d on

indi

vidu

al c

ompa

ny d

ata

G20

01/0

1 F

. LE

QU

ILLE

R

- La

nou

velle

éco

nom

ie e

t la

mes

ure

d

e la

cro

issa

nce

du P

IB

- T

he n

ew e

cono

my

and

the

mea

sure

men

t of

GD

P g

row

th

G20

01/0

2 S

. AU

DR

IC

La r

epris

e de

la

croi

ssan

ce d

e l’e

mpl

oi p

rofit

e-t-

elle

aus

si a

ux n

on-d

iplô

més

?

G20

01/0

3 I.

BR

AU

N-L

EM

AIR

E

Évo

lutio

n et

rép

artit

ion

du s

urpl

us d

e pr

oduc

tivité

G20

01/0

4 A

. BE

AU

DU

- T

h. H

EC

KE

L Le

can

al d

u cr

édit

fonc

tionn

e-t-

il en

Eur

ope

? U

ne

étud

e de

l’h

étér

ogén

éité

de

s co

mpo

rtem

ents

d’

inve

stis

sem

ent

à pa

rtir

de

donn

ées

de

bila

n ag

régé

es

G20

01/0

5 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- P

. BIS

CO

UR

P -

N

. F

OU

RC

AD

E -

O.

LOIS

EL

Tes

ting

the

augm

ente

d S

olow

gro

wth

mod

el:

An

empi

rical

rea

sses

smen

t usi

ng p

anel

dat

a

G20

01/0

6 R

. MA

HIE

U -

B. S

ÉD

ILLO

T

Dép

art à

la r

etra

ite, i

rrév

ersi

bilit

é et

ince

rtitu

de

G20

01/0

7 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

-

2000

G20

01/0

8 J.

Ph.

GA

UD

EM

ET

Le

s di

spos

itifs

d’

acqu

isiti

on

à tit

re

facu

ltatif

d’

annu

ités

viag

ères

de

retr

aite

G20

01/0

9 B

. CR

ÉP

ON

- C

h. G

IAN

ELL

A

Fis

calit

é, c

oût

d’us

age

du c

apita

l et

dem

ande

de

fact

eurs

: un

e an

alys

e su

r do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

G20

01/1

0 B

. CR

ÉP

ON

- R

. DE

SP

LAT

Z

Éva

luat

ion

des

effe

ts

des

disp

ositi

fs

d’al

lége

men

ts

de c

harg

es s

ocia

les

sur

les

bas

sala

ires

G20

01/1

1 J.

-Y. F

OU

RN

IER

C

ompa

rais

on d

es s

alai

res

des

sect

eurs

pub

lic e

t pr

ivé

G20

01/1

2 J.

-P. B

ER

TH

IER

- C

. JA

ULE

NT

R

. C

ON

VE

NE

VO

LE -

S.

PIS

AN

I U

ne

mét

hodo

logi

e de

co

mpa

rais

on

entr

e co

nsom

mat

ions

int

erm

édia

ires

de s

ourc

e fis

cale

et

de

com

ptab

ilité

nat

iona

le

G20

01/1

3 P

. BIS

CO

UR

P -

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

S

ubst

itutio

n an

d co

mpl

emen

tarit

y be

twee

n ca

pita

l, sk

illed

an

d le

ss

skill

ed

wor

kers

: an

an

alys

is

at

the

firm

le

vel

in

the

Fre

nch

man

ufac

turin

g in

dust

ry

G20

01/1

4 I.

RO

BE

RT

-BO

BE

E

Mod

ellin

g de

mog

raph

ic b

ehav

iour

s in

the

Fre

nch

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n m

odel

D

estin

ie:

An

anal

ysis

of

fu

ture

cha

nge

in c

ompl

eted

fert

ility

G20

01/1

5 J.

-P. Z

OY

EM

D

iagn

ostic

su

r la

pa

uvre

té

et

cale

ndrie

r de

re

venu

s :

le

cas

du

“Pan

el

euro

péen

de

s m

énag

es »

G20

01/1

6 J.

-Y.

FO

UR

NIE

R -

P.

GIV

OR

D

La

rédu

ctio

n de

s ta

ux

d’ac

tivité

au

x âg

es

extr

êmes

, une

spé

cific

ité fr

ança

ise

?

G20

01/1

7 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- P

. BIS

CO

UR

P -

N. R

IED

ING

ER

E

xist

e-t-

il un

e as

ymét

rie d

ans

la t

rans

mis

sion

du

prix

du

brut

aux

prix

des

car

bura

nts

?

G20

02/0

1 F

. M

AG

NIE

N -

J.-

L. T

AV

ER

NIE

R -

D. T

HE

SM

AR

Le

s st

atis

tique

s in

tern

atio

nale

s de

P

IB

par

habi

tant

en

st

anda

rd

de

pouv

oir

d’ac

hat

: un

e an

alys

e de

s ré

sulta

ts

G20

02/0

2 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

- 2

001

G20

02/0

3 B

. SÉ

DIL

LOT

- E

. WA

LRA

ET

La

ces

satio

n d’

activ

ité a

u se

in d

es c

oupl

es :

y a-

t-il

inte

rdép

enda

nce

des

choi

x ?

G20

02/0

4 G

. BR

ILH

AU

LT

- R

étro

pola

tion

des

série

s de

FB

CF

et

calc

ul d

u ca

pita

l fix

e en

S

EC

-95

dans

le

s co

mpt

es

natio

naux

fran

çais

-

Ret

ropo

latio

n of

the

inv

estm

ent

serie

s (G

FC

F)

and

estim

atio

n of

fix

ed

capi

tal

stoc

ks

on

the

ES

A-9

5 ba

sis

for

the

Fre

nch

bala

nce

shee

ts

G20

02/0

5 P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

- B

. C

RÉ

PO

N -

T.

HE

CK

EL

- N

. R

IED

ING

ER

H

ow

do

firm

s re

spon

d to

ch

eape

r co

mpu

ters

? M

icro

econ

omet

ric e

vide

nce

for

Fra

nce

base

d on

a

prod

uctio

n fu

nctio

n ap

proa

ch

G20

02/0

6 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- J

. DE

RO

YO

N -

N. F

OU

RC

AD

E

L’im

pact

de

s no

uvel

les

tech

nolo

gies

de

l’i

nfor

mat

ion

et

de

la

com

mun

icat

ion

sur

l’éco

nom

ie

fran

çais

e -

un

bouc

lage

m

acro

-éc

onom

ique

G20

02/0

7 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- B

. SÉ

DIL

LOT

- E

. WA

LRA

ET

É

valu

atio

n de

tro

is r

éfor

mes

du

Rég

ime

Gén

éral

d’

assu

ranc

e vi

eille

sse

à l’a

ide

du

mod

èle

de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n D

ES

TIN

IE

G20

02/0

8 J.

-P. B

ER

TH

IER

R

éfle

xion

s su

r le

s di

ffére

ntes

not

ions

de

volu

me

dans

les

com

ptes

nat

iona

ux :

com

ptes

aux

prix

d’

une

anné

e fix

e ou

au

x pr

ix

de

l’ann

ée

préc

éden

te, s

érie

s ch

aîné

es

G20

02/0

9 F

. H

ILD

Le

s so

ldes

d’o

pini

on r

ésum

ent-

ils a

u m

ieux

les

ré

pons

es

des

entr

epris

es

aux

enqu

êtes

de

co

njon

ctur

e ?

G20

02/1

0 I.

RO

BE

RT

-BO

BÉ

E

Les

com

port

emen

ts

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

dans

le

m

odèl

e de

m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

Des

tinie

-

Une

co

mpa

rais

on

des

estim

atio

ns

issu

es

des

enqu

êtes

Je

unes

et

C

arriè

res

1997

et

H

isto

ire

Fam

ilial

e 19

99

G20

02/1

1 J.

-P. Z

OY

EM

La

dyn

amiq

ue d

es b

as r

even

us :

une

ana

lyse

des

en

trée

s-so

rtie

s de

pau

vret

é

G20

02/1

2 F

. H

ILD

P

révi

sion

s d’

infla

tion

pour

la F

ranc

e

G20

02/1

3 M

. LE

CLA

IR

Réd

uctio

n du

tem

ps d

e tr

avai

l et

ten

sion

s su

r le

s fa

cteu

rs d

e pr

oduc

tion

G20

02/1

4 E

. WA

LRA

ET

- A

. VIN

CE

NT

-

Ana

lyse

de

la r

edis

trib

utio

n in

trag

énér

atio

nnel

le

dans

le s

ystè

me

de r

etra

ite d

es s

alar

iés

du p

rivé

- U

ne a

ppro

che

par

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n -

Intr

agen

erat

iona

l di

strib

utio

nal

anal

ysis

in

th

e fr

ench

pr

ivat

e se

ctor

pe

nsio

n sc

hem

e -

A

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n ap

proa

ch

vi

G20

02/1

5 P

. CH

ON

E -

D. L

E B

LAN

C -

I. R

OB

ER

T-B

OB

EE

O

ffre

de

trav

ail

fém

inin

e et

ga

rde

des

jeun

es

enfa

nts

G20

02/1

6 F

. MA

UR

EL

- S

. GR

EG

OIR

Le

s in

dice

s de

co

mpé

titiv

ité

des

pays

: in

ter-

prét

atio

n et

lim

ites

G20

03/0

1 N

. RIE

DIN

GE

R -

E.H

AU

VY

Le

coû

t de

dép

ollu

tion

atm

osph

ériq

ue p

our

les

entr

epris

es f

ranç

aise

s :

Une

est

imat

ion

à pa

rtir

de

donn

ées

indi

vidu

elle

s

G20

03/0

2 P

. BIS

CO

UR

P e

t F.

KR

AM

AR

Z

Cré

atio

n d’

empl

ois,

de

stru

ctio

n d’

empl

ois

et

inte

rnat

iona

lisat

ion

des

entr

epris

es

indu

strie

lles

fran

çais

es :

une

anal

yse

sur

la

pério

de

1986

-19

92

G20

03/0

3 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

- 2

002

G20

03/0

4 P

.-O

. B

EF

FY

- J

. D

ER

OY

ON

-

N.

FO

UR

CA

DE

- S

. G

RE

GO

IR -

N.

LAÏB

-

B.

MO

NF

OR

T

Évo

lutio

ns d

émog

raph

ique

s et

cro

issa

nce

: un

e pr

ojec

tion

mac

ro-é

cono

miq

ue à

l’ho

rizon

202

0

G20

03/0

5 P

. AU

BE

RT

La

situ

atio

n de

s sa

larié

s de

plu

s de

cin

quan

te

ans

dans

le s

ecte

ur p

rivé

G20

03/0

6 P

. AU

BE

RT

- B

. CR

ÉP

ON

A

ge, s

alai

re e

t pro

duct

ivité

La

pro

duct

ivité

des

sal

arié

s dé

clin

e-t-

elle

en

fin

de c

arriè

re ?

G20

03/0

7 H

. B

AR

ON

- P

.O.

BE

FF

Y -

N.

FO

UR

CA

DE

- R

. M

AH

IEU

Le

ral

entis

sem

ent

de l

a pr

oduc

tivité

du

trav

ail

au

cour

s de

s an

nées

199

0

G20

03/0

8 P

.-O

. B

EF

FY

- B

. M

ON

FO

RT

P

atrim

oine

des

mén

ages

, dy

nam

ique

d’a

lloca

tion

et c

ompo

rtem

ent d

e co

nsom

mat

ion

G20

03/0

9 P

. BIS

CO

UR

P -

N. F

OU

RC

AD

E

Peu

t-on

m

ettr

e en

év

iden

ce

l’exi

sten

ce

de

rigid

ités

à la

ba

isse

de

s sa

laire

s à

part

ir de

do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

? Le

cas

de

la F

ranc

e à

la

fin d

es a

nnée

s 90

G20

03/1

0 M

. LE

CLA

IR -

P. P

ET

IT

Pré

senc

e sy

ndic

ale

dans

les

firm

es :

quel

im

pact

su

r le

s in

égal

ités

sala

riale

s en

tre

les

hom

mes

et

les

fem

mes

?

G20

03/1

1 P

.-O

. B

EF

FY

-

X.

BO

NN

ET

-

M.

DA

RR

AC

Q-

PA

RIE

S -

B.

MO

NF

OR

T

MZ

E: a

sm

all m

acro

-mod

el fo

r th

e eu

ro a

rea

G20

04/0

1 P

. AU

BE

RT

- M

. LE

CLA

IR

La

com

pétit

ivité

ex

prim

ée

dans

le

s en

quêt

es

trim

estr

ielle

s su

r la

situ

atio

n et

les

per

spec

tives

da

ns l’

indu

strie

G20

04/0

2 M

. DU

ÉE

- C

. RE

BIL

LAR

D

La

dépe

ndan

ce

des

pers

onne

s âg

ées

: un

e pr

ojec

tion

à lo

ng te

rme

G20

04/0

3 S

. RA

SP

ILLE

R -

N. R

IED

ING

ER

R

égul

atio

n en

viro

nnem

enta

le

et

choi

x de

lo

calis

atio

n de

s gr

oupe

s fr

ança

is

G20

04/0

4 A

. NA

BO

ULE

T -

S. R

AS

PIL

LER

Le

s dé

term

inan

ts d

e la

déc

isio

n d’

inve

stir

: un

e ap

proc

he

par

les

perc

eptio

ns

subj

ectiv

es

des

firm

es

G20

04/0

5 N

. RA

GA

CH

E

La d

écla

ratio

n de

s en

fant

s pa

r le

s co

uple

s no

n m

arié

s es

t-el

le fi

scal

emen

t opt

imal

e ?

G20

04/0

6 M

. DU

ÉE

L’

impa

ct d

u ch

ômag

e de

s pa

rent

s su

r le

dev

enir

scol

aire

des

enf

ants

G20

04/0

7 P

. AU

BE

RT

- E

. C

AR

OLI

- M

. RO

GE

R

New

Tec

hnol

ogie

s, W

orkp

lace

Org

anis

atio

n an

d th

e A

ge S

truc

ture

of

the

Wor

kfor

ce:

Firm

-Lev

el

Evi

denc

e

G20

04/0

8 E

. DU

GU

ET

- C

. LE

LAR

GE

Le

s br

evet

s ac

croi

ssen

t-ils

les

inc

itatio

ns p

rivée

s à

inno

ver

? U

n ex

amen

mic

roéc

onom

étriq

ue

G20

04/0

9 S

. RA

SP

ILLE

R -

P. S

ILLA

RD

A

ffilia

ting

vers

us S

ubco

ntra

ctin

g:

the

Cas

e of

Mul

tinat

iona

ls

G20

04/1

0 J.

BO

ISS

INO

T -

C. L

’AN

GE

VIN

- B

. MO

NF

OR

T

Pub

lic D

ebt

Sus

tain

abili

ty:

Som

e R

esul

ts o

n th

e F

renc

h C

ase

G20

04/1

1 S

. AN

AN

IAN

- P

. AU

BE

RT

T

rava

illeu

rs â

gés,

nou

velle

s te

chno

logi

es

et c

hang

emen

ts o

rgan

isat

ionn

els

: un

rée

xam

en

à pa

rtir

de l’

enqu

ête

« R

EP

ON

SE

»

G20

04/1

2 X

. BO

NN

ET

- H

. PO

NC

ET

S

truc

ture

s de

rev

enus

et

prop

ensi

ons

diffé

rent

es

à co

nsom

mer

-

Ver

s un

e éq

uatio

n de

co

nsom

mat

ion

des

mén

ages

pl

us

robu

ste

en

prév

isio

n po

ur la

Fra

nce

G20

04/1

3 C

. PIC

AR

T

Éva

luer

la r

enta

bilit

é de

s so

ciét

és n

on fi

nanc

ière

s

G20

04/1

4 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- B

. SÉ

DIL

LOT

- E

. WA

LRA

ET

Le

s re

trai

tes

du

sect

eur

publ

ic :

proj

ectio

ns

à l’h

oriz

on

2040

à

l’aid

e du

m

odèl

e de

m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

DE

ST

INIE

G20

05/0

1 S

. BU

FF

ET

EA

U -

P. G

OD

EF

RO

Y

Con

ditio

ns d

e dé

part

en

retr

aite

sel

on l’

âge

de f

in

d’ét

udes

: an

alys

e pr

ospe

ctiv

e po

ur

les

géné

ratio

ns 1

945

à197

4

G20

05/0

2 C

. AF

SA

- S

. BU

FF

ET

EA

U

L’év

olut

ion

de l’

activ

ité fé

min

ine

en F

ranc

e :

une

appr

oche

par

pse

udo-

pane

l

G20

05/0

3 P

. AU

BE

RT

- P

. SIL

LAR

D

Dél

ocal

isat

ions

et r

éduc

tions

d’e

ffect

ifs

dans

l’in

dust

rie fr

ança

ise

G20

05/0

4 M

. LE

CLA

IR -

S. R

OU

X

Mes

ure

et u

tilis

atio

n de

s em

ploi

s in

stab

les

da

ns le

s en

trep

rises

G20

05/0

5 C

. L’A

NG

EV

IN -

S. S

ER

RA

VA

LLE

P

erfo

rman

ces

à l’e

xpor

tatio

n de

la F

ranc

e

et d

e l’A

llem

agne

- U

ne a

naly

se p

ar s

ecte

ur e

t de

stin

atio

n gé

ogra

phiq

ue

G20

05/0

6 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de l

a D

irect

ion

des

Étu

des

et

Syn

thès

es É

cono

miq

ues

- 20

04

G20

05/0

7 S

. RA

SP

ILLE

R

La

conc

urre

nce

fisca

le :

prin

cipa

ux

ense

igne

-m

ents

de

l’ana

lyse

éco

nom

ique

G20

05/0

8 C

. L’A

NG

EV

IN -

N. L

AÏB

É

duca

tion

et c

rois

sanc

e en

Fra

nce

et d

ans

un

pane

l de

21 p

ays

de l’

OC

DE

vii

G20

05/0

9 N

. FE

RR

AR

I P

révo

ir l’i

nves

tisse

men

t des

ent

repr

ises

U

n in

dica

teur

de

s ré

visi

ons

dans

l’e

nquê

te

de

conj

onct

ure

sur

les

inve

stis

sem

ents

da

ns

l’ind

ustr

ie.

G20

05/1

0 P

.-O

. BE

FF

Y -

C. L

’AN

GE

VIN

C

hôm

age

et b

oucl

e pr

ix-s

alai

res

: ap

port

d’u

n m

odèl

e «

qual

ifiés

/peu

qua

lifié

s »

G20

05/1

1 B

. HE

ITZ

A

tw

o-st

ates

Mar

kov-

switc

hing

mod

el o

f in

flatio

n in

F

ranc

e an

d th

e U

SA

: cr

edib

le

targ

et

VS

in

flatio

n sp

iral

G20

05/1

2 O

. BIA

U -

H. E

RK

EL-

RO

US

SE

- N

. FE

RR

AR

I R

épon

ses

indi

vidu

elle

s au

x en

quêt

es

de

conj

onct

ure

et p

révi

sion

mac

roéc

onom

ique

s :

Exe

mpl

e de

la

pr

évis

ion

de

la

prod

uctio

n m

anuf

actu

rière

G20

05/1

3 P

. AU

BE

RT

- D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

D. B

LAU

The

lab

our

mar

ket

afte

r ag

e 50

: so

me

elem

ents

of

a F

ranc

o-A

mer

ican

com

paris

on

G20

05/1

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

T.

DE

BR

AN

D -

P

. D

OU

RG

NO

N -

P.

PO

LLE

T

L’en

quêt

e S

HA

RE

: pr

ésen

tatio

n et

pr

emie

rs

résu

ltats

de

l’édi

tion

fran

çais

e

G20

05/1

5 M

. DU

ÉE

La

m

odél

isat

ion

des

com

port

emen

ts

dém

ogra

-ph

ique

s da

ns

le

mod

èle

de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n D

ES

TIN

IE

G20

05/1

6 H

. RA

OU

I - S

. RO

UX

É

tude

de

sim

ulat

ion

sur

la p

artic

ipat

ion

vers

ée

aux

sala

riés

par

les

entr

epris

es

G20

06/0

1 C

. B

ON

NE

T -

S.

BU

FF

ET

EA

U -

P.

GO

DE

FR

OY

D

ispa

rités

de

re

trai

te

de

droi

t di

rect

en

tre

hom

mes

et f

emm

es :

quel

les

évol

utio

ns ?

G20

06/0

2 C

. PIC

AR

T

Les

gaze

lles

en F

ranc

e

G20

06/0

3 P

. AU

BE

RT

- B

. CR

ÉP

ON

-P

. ZA

MO

RA

Le

ren

dem

ent

appa

rent

de

la f

orm

atio

n co

ntin

ue

dans

les

ent

repr

ises

: ef

fets

sur

la

prod

uctiv

ité e

t le

s sa

laire

s

G20

06/0

4 J.

-F. O

UV

RA

RD

- R

. RA

TH

ELO

T

Dem

ogra

phic

cha

nge

and

unem

ploy

men

t:

wha

t do

mac

roec

onom

etric

mod

els

pred

ict?

G20

06/0

5 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

J.-

F. O

UV

RA

RD

In

dica

teur

s d’

enga

gem

ents

im

plic

ites

des

syst

èmes

de

re

trai

te :

chiff

rage

s,

prop

riété

s an

alyt

ique

s et

ré

actio

ns

à de

s ch

ocs

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

type

s

G20

06/0

6 G

. B

IAU

- O

. B

IAU

- L

. R

OU

VIE

RE

N

onpa

ram

etric

For

ecas

ting

of t

he M

anuf

actu

ring

Out

put G

row

th w

ith F

irm-le

vel S

urve

y D

ata

G20

06/0

7 C

. AF

SA

- P

. GIV

OR

D

Le

rôle

de

s co

nditi

ons

de

trav

ail

dans

le

s ab

senc

es p

our

mal

adie

G20

06/0

8 P

. SIL

LAR

D -

C. L

’AN

GE

VIN

- S

. SE

RR

AV

ALL

E

Per

form

ance

s co

mpa

rées

à

l’exp

orta

tion

de

la

Fra

nce

et d

e se

s pr

inci

paux

par

tena

ires

Une

ana

lyse

str

uctu

relle

sur

12

ans

G20

06/0

9 X

. BO

UT

IN -

S. Q

UA

NT

IN

Une

m

étho

dolo

gie

d’év

alua

tion

com

ptab

le

du

coût

du

capi

tal d

es e

ntre

pris

es f

ranç

aise

s :

1984

-20

02

G20

06/1

0 C

. AF

SA

L’

estim

atio

n d’

un c

oût

impl

icite

de

la p

énib

ilité

du

trav

ail c

hez

les

trav

aille

urs

âgés

G20

06/1

1 C

. LE

LAR

GE

Le

s en

trep

rises

(in

dust

rielle

s)

fran

çais

es

sont

-el

les

à la

fron

tière

tech

nolo

giqu

e ?

G20

06/1

2 O

. B

IAU

-

N.

FE

RR

AR

I T

héor

ie d

e l’o

pini

on

Fau

t-il

pond

érer

les

répo

nses

indi

vidu

elle

s ?

G20

06/1

3 A

. KO

UB

I - S

. RO

UX

U

ne

réin

terp

réta

tion

de

la

rela

tion

entr

e pr

oduc

tivité

et

in

égal

ités

sala

riale

s da

ns

les

entr

epris

es

G20

06/1

4 R

. RA

TH

ELO

T -

P. S

ILLA

RD

T

he

impa

ct

of

loca

l ta

xes

on

plan

ts

loca

tion

deci

sion

G20

06/1

5 L.

GO

NZ

ALE

Z -

C. P

ICA

RT

D

iver

sific

atio

n, r

ecen

trag

e et

poi

ds d

es a

ctiv

ités

de s

uppo

rt d

ans

les

grou

pes

(199

3-20

00)

G20

07/0

1 D

. SR

AE

R

Allè

gem

ents

de

co

tisat

ions

pa

tron

ales

et

dy

nam

ique

sal

aria

le

G20

07/0

2 V

. ALB

OU

Y -

L. L

EQ

UIE

N

Les

rend

emen

ts n

on m

onét

aire

s de

l’é

duca

tion

: le

cas

de

la s

anté

G20

07/0

3 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

T.

DE

BR

AN

D

Asp

iratio

n à

la r

etra

ite,

sant

é et

sat

isfa

ctio

n au

tr

avai

l : u

ne c

ompa

rais

on e

urop

éenn

e

G20

07/0

4 M

. BA

RLE

T -

L. C

RU

SS

ON

Q

uel

impa

ct d

es v

aria

tions

du

prix

du

pétr

ole

sur

la c

rois

sanc

e fr

ança

ise

?

G20

07/0

5 C

. PIC

AR

T

Flu

x d’

empl

oi e

t de

mai

n-d’

œuv

re e

n F

ranc

e :

un

réex

amen

G20

07/0

6 V

. ALB

OU

Y -

C. T

AV

AN

M

assi

ficat

ion

et

dém

ocra

tisat

ion

de

l’ens

eign

emen

t sup

érie

ur e

n F

ranc

e

G20

07/0

7 T

. LE

BA

RB

AN

CH

ON

T

he

Cha

ngin

g re

spon

se

to

oil

pric

e sh

ocks

in

F

ranc

e: a

DS

GE

type

app

roac

h

G20

07/0

8 T

. C

HA

NE

Y -

D. S

RA

ER

- D

. TH

ES

MA

R

Col

late

ral V

alue

and

Cor

pora

te In

vest

men

t E

vide

nce

from

the

Fre

nch

Rea

l Est

ate

Mar

ket

G20

07/0

9 J.

BO

ISS

INO

T

Con

sum

ptio

n ov

er

the

Life

C

ycle

: F

acts

fo

r F

ranc

e

G20

07/1

0 C

. AF

SA

In

terp

réte

r le

s va

riabl

es

de

satis

fact

ion

: l’e

xem

ple

de la

dur

ée d

u tr

avai

l

G20

07/1

1 R

. RA

TH

ELO

T -

P. S

ILLA

RD

Z

ones

F

ranc

hes

Urb

aine

s :

quel

s ef

fets

su

r l’e

mpl

oi

sala

rié

et

les

créa

tions

d’

étab

lisse

men

ts ?

G20

07/1

2 V

. ALB

OU

Y -

B. C

RÉ

PO

N

Alé

a m

oral

en

sa

nté

: un

e év

alua

tion

dans

le

ca

dre

du m

odèl

e ca

usal

de

Rub

in

G20

08/0

1 C

. PIC

AR

T

Les

PM

E

fran

çais

es :

rent

able

s m

ais

peu

dyna

miq

ues

viii

G20

08/0

2 P

. BIS

CO

UR

P -

X. B

OU

TIN

- T

. V

ER

GÉ

T

he E

ffect

s of

Ret

ail R

egul

atio

ns o

n P

rices

E

vide

nce

form

the

Loi G

alla

nd

G20

08/0

3 Y

. BA

RB

ES

OL

- A

. BR

IAN

T

Éco

nom

ies

d’ag

glom

érat

ion

et

prod

uctiv

ité

des

entr

epris

es :

est

imat

ion

sur

donn

ées

indi

vidu

elle

s fr

ança

ises

G20

08/0

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

F. L

E G

ALL

O

Les

proj

ectio

ns

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

: pr

inci

paux

m

écan

ism

es e

t ret

our

sur

l’exp

érie

nce

fran

çais

e

G20

08/0

5 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

F. T

OU

TLE

MO

ND

E

Évo

lutio

ns

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

et

défo

rmat

ion

du

cycl

e de

vie

act

ive

: que

lles

rela

tions

?

G20

08/0

6 M

. BA

RLE

T -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

- L

. CR

US

SO

N

Inte

rnat

iona

lisat

ion

et f

lux

d’em

ploi

s :

que

dit

une

appr

oche

com

ptab

le ?

G20

08/0

7 C

. LE

LAR

GE

- D

. SR

AE

R -

D. T

HE

SM

AR

E

ntre

pren

eurs

hip

and

Cre

dit

Con

stra

ints

-

Evi

denc

e fr

om

a F

renc

h Lo

an

Gua

rant

ee

Pro

gram

G20

08/0

8 X

. BO

UT

IN -

L. J

AN

IN

Are

Pric

es R

eally

Affe

cted

by

Mer

gers

?

G20

08/0

9 M

. BA

RLE

T -

A. B

RIA

NT

- L

. CR

US

SO

N

Con

cent

ratio

n gé

ogra

phiq

ue

dans

l’i

ndus

trie

m

anuf

actu

rière

et

dans

les

ser

vice

s en

Fra

nce

: un

e ap

proc

he p

ar u

n in

dica

teur

en

cont

inu

G20

08/1

0 M

. BE

FF

Y -

É. C

OU

DIN

- R

. RA

TH

ELO

T

Who

is

co

nfro

nted

to

in

secu

re

labo

r m

arke

t hi

stor

ies?

Som

e ev

iden

ce b

ased

on

the

Fre

nch

labo

r m

arke

t tra

nsiti

on

G20

08/1

1 M

. RO

GE

R -

E. W

ALR

AE

T

Soc

ial

Sec

urity

and

Wel

l-Bei

ng o

f th

e E

lder

ly:

the

Cas

e of

Fra

nce

G20

08/1

2 C

. AF

SA

A

naly

ser

les

com

posa

ntes

du

bien

-êtr

e et

de

son

évol

utio

n

Une

ap

proc

he

empi

rique

su

r do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

G20

08/1

3 M

. BA

RLE

T -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

-

T.

LE B

AR

BA

NC

HO

N

Mic

rosi

mul

er le

mar

ché

du tr

avai

l : u

n pr

otot

ype

G20

09/0

1 P

.-A

. PIO

NN

IER

Le

par

tage

de

la v

aleu

r aj

outé

e en

Fra

nce,

19

49-2

007

G20

09/0

2 La

uren

t CLA

VE

L -

Chr

iste

lle M

INO

DIE

R

A

Mon

thly

In

dica

tor

of

the

Fre

nch

Bus

ines

s C

limat

e

G20

09/0

3 H

. ER

KE

L-R

OU

SS

E -

C. M

INO

DIE

R

Do

Bus

ines

s T

ende

ncy

Sur

veys

in

Indu

stry

and

S

ervi

ces

Hel

p in

For

ecas

ting

GD

P G

row

th?

A

Rea

l-Tim

e A

naly

sis

on F

renc

h D

ata

G20

09/0

4 P

. GIV

OR

D -

L. W

ILN

ER

Le

s co

ntra

ts t

empo

raire

s :

trap

pe o

u m

arch

epie

d ve

rs l’

empl

oi s

tabl

e ?

G20

09/0

5 G

. LA

LAN

NE

- P

.-A

. P

ION

NIE

R -

O.

SIM

ON

Le

par

tage

des

fru

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e la

cro

issa

nce

de 1

950

à 20

08 :

une

appr

oche

par

les

com

ptes

de

surp

lus

G20

09/0

6 L.

DA

VE

ZIE

S -

X.

D’H

AU

LTF

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Fau

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O

u l’é

tern

elle

qu

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l’é

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re c

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G20

09/0

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AN

TIN

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SP

ILLE

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S. S

ER

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C

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et

prix

de

tr

ansf

erts

: un

e an

alys

e su

r do

nnée

s fr

ança

ises

G20

09/0

8 M

. CLE

RC

- V

. MA

RC

US

É

last

icité

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ix d

es c

onso

mm

atio

ns é

nerg

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ues

des

mén

ages

G20

09/0

9 G

. LA

LAN

NE

- E

. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N -

O.

SIM

ON

P

rix d

u pé

trol

e et

cro

issa

nce

pote

ntie

lle à

lon

g te

rme

G20

09/1

0 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

J. L

E C

AC

HE

UX

-

V. M

AR

CU

S

Adj

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ving

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d ot

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to

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ome

theo

retic

al b

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roun

d

G20

09/1

1 V

. B

ELL

AM

Y -

G.

CO

NS

ALE

S -

M.

FE

SS

EA

U -

S

. LE

LA

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R -

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AY

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ne d

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posi

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du c

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e de

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e la

co

mpt

abili

té

natio

nale

pa

r ca

tégo

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de

mén

age

en 2

003

G20

09/1

2 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- F

. T

ALL

ET

D

etec

ting

Eco

nom

ic

Reg

imes

in

F

ranc

e:

a Q

ualit

ativ

e M

arko

v-S

witc

hing

In

dica

tor

Usi

ng

Mix

ed F

requ

ency

Dat

a

G20

09/1

3 R

. A

EB

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HA

RD

T

- D

. F

OU

GÈ

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-

R.

RA

TH

ELO

T

Dis

crim

inat

ion

à l’e

mba

uche

: co

mm

ent

expl

oite

r le

s pr

océd

ures

de

test

ing

?

G20

09/1

4 Y

. BA

RB

ES

OL

- P

. GIV

OR

D -

S. Q

UA

NT

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Par

tage

de

la

va

leur

aj

outé

e,

appr

oche

pa

r do

nnée

s m

icro

écon

omiq

ues

G20

09/1

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BU

ON

O -

G. L

ALA

NN

E

The

Effe

ct o

f th

e U

rugu

ay r

ound

on

the

Inte

nsiv

e an

d E

xten

sive

Mar

gins

of T

rade

G20

10/0

1 C

. MIN

OD

IER

A

vant

ages

com

paré

s de

s sé

ries

des

prem

ière

s va

leur

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es

et

des

série

s de

s va

leur

s ré

visé

es -

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exer

cice

de

prév

isio

n en

tem

ps r

éel

de la

cro

issa

nce

trim

estr

ielle

du

PIB

en

Fra

nce

G20

10/0

2 V

. ALB

OU

Y -

L. D

AV

EZ

IES

- T

. D

EB

RA

ND

H

ealth

Exp

endi

ture

Mod

els:

a C

ompa

rison

of

Fiv

e S

peci

ficat

ions

usi

ng P

anel

Dat

a

G20

10/0

3 C

. KLE

IN -

O. S

IMO

N

Le m

odèl

e M

ÉS

AN

GE

rée

stim

é en

bas

e 20

00

Tom

e 1

– V

ersi

on a

vec

volu

mes

à p

rix c

onst

ants

G20

10/0

4 M

.-É

. CLE

RC

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. CO

UD

IN

L’IP

C,

miro

ir de

l’é

volu

tion

du c

oût

de l

a vi

e en

F

ranc

e ?

Ce

qu’a

ppor

te

l’ana

lyse

de

s co

urbe

s d’

Eng

el

G20

10/0

5 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- P

.-A

. CH

EV

ALI

ER

Le

s se

uils

de

10,

20 e

t 50

sal

arié

s :

impa

ct s

ur la

ta

ille

des

entr

epris

es fr

ança

ises

G20

10/0

6 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- J

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UG

ET

N

atio

nal

Orig

in

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Wag

es

and

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vide

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on F

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h F

ull-

Tim

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Wor

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fro

m a

mat

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Em

ploy

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Em

ploy

ee D

atas

et

G20

10/0

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. BLA

SC

O -

P. G

IVO

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Le

s tr

ajec

toire

s pr

ofes

sion

nelle

s en

déb

ut d

e vi

e ac

tive

: que

l im

pact

des

con

trat

s te

mpo

raire

s ?

G20

10/0

8 P

. GIV

OR

D

Mét

hode

s éc

onom

étriq

ues

pour

l’é

valu

atio

n de

po

litiq

ues

publ

ique

s

ix

G20

10/0

9 P

.-Y

. CA

BA

NN

ES

- V

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PÈ

GU

E -

E

. P

OU

LIQ

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N -

M.

BE

FF

Y -

M.

GA

INI

Que

lle

croi

ssan

ce

de

moy

en

term

e ap

rès

la

cris

e ?

G20

10/1

0 I.

BU

ON

O -

G. L

ALA

NN

E

La r

éact

ion

des

entr

epris

es fr

ança

ises

à

la b

aiss

e de

s ta

rifs

doua

nier

s ét

rang

ers

G20

10/1

1 R

. RA

TH

ELO

T -

P. S

ILLA

RD

L’

appo

rt d

es m

étho

des

à no

yaux

pou

r m

esur

er la

co

ncen

trat

ion

géog

raph

ique

-

App

licat

ion

à la

co

ncen

trat

ion

des

imm

igré

s en

Fra

nce

de 1

968

à 19

99

G20

10/1

2 M

. B

AR

AT

ON

- M

. B

EF

FY

- D

. F

OU

GÈ

RE

U

ne é

valu

atio

n de

l’e

ffet

de l

a ré

form

e de

200

3 su

r le

s dé

part

s en

re

trai

te

- Le

ca

s de

s en

seig

nant

s du

sec

ond

degr

é pu

blic

G20

10/1

3 D

. B

LAN

CH

ET

- S

. B

UF

FE

TE

AU

- E

. C

RE

NN

ER

S

. LE

MIN

EZ

Le

m

odèl

e de

m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

Des

tinie

2

: pr

inci

pale

s ca

ract

éris

tique

s et

pre

mie

rs r

ésul

tats

G20

10/1

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

E. C

RE

NN

ER

Le

blo

c re

trai

tes

du m

odèl

e D

estin

ie 2

:

guid

e de

l’ut

ilisa

teur

G20

10/1

5 M

. B

AR

LET

-

L.

CR

US

SO

N

- S

. D

UP

UC

H

- F

. PU

EC

H

Des

se

rvic

es

écha

ngés

au

x se

rvic

es

écha

n-ge

able

s : u

ne a

pplic

atio

n su

r do

nnée

s fr

ança

ises

G20

10/1

6 M

. B

EF

FY

- T

. K

AM

ION

KA

P

ublic

-priv

ate

wag

e ga

ps:

is c

ivil-

serv

ant

hum

an

capi

tal s

ecto

r-sp

ecifi

c?

G20

10/1

7 P

.-Y

. C

AB

AN

NE

S

- H

. E

RK

EL-

RO

US

SE

-

G.

LALA

NN

E -

O.

MO

NS

O -

E.

PO

ULI

QU

EN

Le

mod

èle

Més

ange

rée

stim

é en

bas

e 20

00

Tom

e 2

- V

ersi

on a

vec

volu

mes

à p

rix c

haîn

és

G20

10/1

8 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- L

. DA

VE

ZIE

S

Con

ditio

nal

Logi

t w

ith o

ne B

inar

y C

ovar

iate

: Li

nk

betw

een

the

Sta

tic a

nd D

ynam

ic C

ases

G20

11/0

1 T

. LE

BA

RB

AN

CH

ON

- B

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RLI

AC

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. SIM

ON

Le

s m

arch

és d

u tr

avai

l fra

nçai

s et

am

éric

ain

face

au

x ch

ocs

conj

onct

urel

s de

s an

nées

19

86

à 20

07 :

une

mod

élis

atio

n D

SG

E

G20

11/0

2 C

. MA

RB

OT

U

ne

éval

uatio

n de

la

ré

duct

ion

d’im

pôt

pour

l’e

mpl

oi d

e sa

larié

s à

dom

icile

G20

11/0

3 L.

DA

VE

ZIE

S

Mod

èles

à

effe

ts

fixes

, à

effe

ts

aléa

toire

s,

mod

èles

mix

tes

ou m

ulti-

nive

aux

: pr

oprié

tés

et

mis

es

en

œuv

re

des

mod

élis

atio

ns

de

l’hét

érog

énéi

té d

ans

le c

as d

e do

nnée

s gr

oupé

es

G20

11/0

4 M

. RO

GE

R -

M. W

AS

ME

R

Het

erog

enei

ty

mat

ters

: la

bour

pr

oduc

tivity

di

ffere

ntia

ted

by a

ge a

nd s

kills

G20

11/0

5 J.

-C.

BR

ICO

NG

NE

- J

.-M

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OU

RN

IER

V

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PÈ

GU

E -

O.

MO

NS

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De

la

cris

e fin

anci

ère

à la

cr

ise

écon

omiq

ue

L’im

pact

des

per

turb

atio

ns f

inan

cièr

es d

e 20

07 e

t 20

08 s

ur la

cro

issa

nce

de s

ept p

ays

indu

stria

lisés

G20

11/0

6 P

. C

HA

RN

OZ

- É

. C

OU

DIN

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. G

AIN

I W

age

ineq

ualit

ies

in F

ranc

e 19

76-2

004:

a

quan

tile

regr

essi

on a

naly

sis

G20

11/0

7 M

. CLE

RC

- M

. GA

INI -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

R

ecom

men

datio

ns

of

the

Stig

litz-

Sen

-Fito

ussi

R

epor

t: A

few

illu

stra

tions

G20

11/0

8 M

. BA

CH

ELE

T -

M. B

EF

FY

- D

. BLA

NC

HE

T

Pro

jete

r l’i

mpa

ct d

es r

éfor

mes

des

ret

raite

s su

r l’a

ctiv

ité d

es 5

5 an

s et

plu

s :

une

com

para

ison

de

troi

s m

odèl

es

G20

11/0

9 C

. LO

UV

OT

-RU

NA

VO

T

L’év

alua

tion

de

l’act

ivité

di

ssim

ulée

de

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tre-

pris

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ur l

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se d

es c

ontr

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fis

caux

et

son

inse

rtio

n da

ns le

s co

mpt

es n

atio

naux

G20

11/1

0 A

. SC

HR

EIB

ER

- A

. VIC

AR

D

La

tert

iaris

atio

n de

l’é

cono

mie

fr

ança

ise

et

le

rale

ntis

sem

ent

de l

a pr

oduc

tivité

ent

re 1

978

et

2008

G20

11/1

1 M

.-É

. C

LER

C -

O.

MO

NS

O -

E. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N

Les

inég

alité

s en

tre

géné

ratio

ns d

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s le

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y-bo

om

G20

11/1

2 C

. M

AR

BO

T -

D.

RO

Y

Éva

luat

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de l

a tr

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n de

la

rédu

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impô

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cré

dit

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pôt

pour

l'em

ploi

de

sala

riés

à do

mic

ile e

n 20

07

G20

11/1

3 P

. GIV

OR

D -

R. R

AT

HE

LOT

- P

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LAR

D

Pla

ce-b

ased

ta

x ex

empt

ions

an

d di

spla

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ent

effe

cts:

A

n ev

alua

tion

of

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Zon

es

Fra

nche

s U

rbai

nes

prog

ram

G20

11/1

4 X

. D

’HA

ULT

FO

EU

ILLE

-

P.

GIV

OR

D

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. B

OU

TIN

T

he E

nviro

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tal

Effe

ct o

f G

reen

Tax

atio

n: t

he

Cas

e of

the

Fre

nch

“Bon

us/M

alus

”

G20

11/1

5 M

. B

AR

LET

-

M.

CLE

RC

-

M.

GA

RN

EO

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V.

LAP

ÈG

UE

- V

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AR

CU

S

La

nouv

elle

ve

rsio

n du

m

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e M

ZE

, m

odèl

e m

acro

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omét

rique

pou

r la

zon

e eu

ro

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11/1

6 R

. A

EB

ER

HA

RD

T -

I.

BU

ON

O -

H. F

AD

ING

ER

Le

arni

ng,

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mpl

ete

Con

trac

ts

and

Exp

ort

Dyn

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s:

The

ory

and

Evi

denc

e fo

rm

Fre

nch

Firm

s

G20

11/1

7 C

. KE

RD

RA

IN -

V. L

AP

ÈG

UE

R

estr

ictiv

e F

isca

l Pol

icie

s in

Eur

ope:

W

hat a

re th

e Li

kely

Effe

cts?

G20

12/0

1 P

. G

IVO

RD

- S

. Q

UA

NT

IN -

C. T

RE

VIE

N

A L

ong-

Ter

m E

valu

atio

n of

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Firs

t G

ener

atio

n of

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Fre

nch

Urb

an E

nter

pris

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ones

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12/0

2 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- V

. CO

TT

ET

P

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que

sala

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et p

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ce d

es e

ntre

pris

es

G20

12/0

3 P

. FÉ

VR

IER

- L

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NE

R

Do

Con

sum

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Cor

rect

ly

Exp

ect

Pric

e R

educ

tions

? T

estin

g D

ynam

ic B

ehav

ior

G20

12/0

4 M

. GA

INI -

A. L

ED

UC

- A

. VIC

AR

D

Sch

ool

as a

she

lter?

Sch

ool

leav

ing-

age

and

the

busi

ness

cyc

le in

Fra

nce

G20

12/0

5 M

. GA

INI -

A. L

ED

UC

- A

. VIC

AR

D

A s

carr

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atio

n? F

renc

h ev

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n yo

ung

peop

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into

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ugh

labo

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12/0

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. AU

BE

RT

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. BA

CH

ELE

T

Dis

parit

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tant

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12/0

7 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- P

GIV

OR

D -

C. M

AR

BO

T

Spi

llove

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ffect

of

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Min

imum

Wag

e in

Fra

nce:

A

n U

ncon

ditio

nal Q

uant

ile R

egre

ssio

n A

ppro

ach

x

G20

12/0

8 A

. EID

ELM

AN

- F

. LA

NG

UM

IER

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. VIC

AR

D

Pré

lève

men

ts

oblig

atoi

res

repo

sant

su

r le

s m

énag

es :

des

can

aux

redi

strib

utifs

diff

éren

ts e

n 19

90 e

t 201

0

G20

12/0

9 O

. BA

RG

AIN

- A

. VIC

AR

D

Le

RM

I et

son

suc

cess

eur

le R

SA

déc

oura

gent

-ils

cer

tain

s je

unes

de

trav

aille

r ?

Une

ana

lyse

sur

le

s je

unes

aut

our

de 2

5 an

s

G20

12/1

0 C

. MA

RB

OT

- D

. R

OY

P

roje

ctio

ns

du

coût

de

l’A

PA

et

de

s ca

ract

éris

tique

s de

ses

bén

éfic

iaire

s à

l’hor

izon

20

40 à

l’ai

de d

u m

odèl

e D

estin

ie

G20

12/1

1 A

. MA

UR

OU

X

Le

créd

it d’

impô

t dé

dié

au

déve

lopp

emen

t du

rabl

e : u

ne é

valu

atio

n éc

onom

étriq

ue

G20

12/1

2 V

. CO

TT

ET

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. QU

AN

TIN

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GN

IER

C

oût

du t

rava

il et

allè

gem

ents

de

char

ges

: un

e es

timat

ion

au

nive

au

étab

lisse

men

t de

19

96

à 20

08

G20

12/1

3 X

. D

’HA

ULT

FO

EU

ILLE

-

P.

FÉ

VR

IER

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L. W

ILN

ER

D

eman

d E

stim

atio

n in

the

Pre

senc

e of

Rev

enue

M

anag

emen

t

G20

12/1

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

S. L

E M

INE

Z

Join

t m

acro

/mic

ro e

valu

atio

ns o

f ac

crue

d-to

-dat

e pe

nsio

n lia

bilit

ies:

an

ap

plic

atio

n to

F

renc

h re

form

s

G20

13/0

1-

T.

DE

RO

YO

N -

A. M

ON

TA

UT

- P

-A P

ION

NIE

R

F13

01

Util

isat

ion

rétr

ospe

ctiv

e de

l’e

nquê

te

Em

ploi

à

une

fréq

uenc

e m

ensu

elle

: ap

port

d’

une

mod

élis

atio

n es

pace

-éta

t

G20

13/0

2-

C. T

RE

VIE

N

F13

02

Hab

iter

en

HLM

: qu

el

avan

tage

m

onét

aire

et

qu

el im

pact

sur

les

cond

ition

s de

loge

men

t ?

G20

13/0

3 A

. PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R

T

empo

ral

disa

ggre

gatio

n of

sto

ck v

aria

bles

- T

he

Cho

w-L

in m

etho

d ex

tend

ed to

dyn

amic

mod

els

G20

13/0

4 P

. GIV

OR

D -

C.

MA

RB

OT

Doe

s th

e co

st o

f ch

ild c

are

affe

ct f

emal

e la

bor

mar

ket

part

icip

atio

n? A

n ev

alua

tion

of a

Fre

nch

refo

rm o

f chi

ldca

re s

ubsi

dies

G20

13/0

5 G

. LA

ME

- M

. LE

QU

IEN

- P

.-A

. P

ION

NIE

R

In

terp

reta

tion

and

limits

of

sust

aina

bilit

y te

sts

in

publ

ic fi

nanc

e

G20

13/0

6 C

. BE

LLE

GO

- V

. DO

RT

ET

-BE

RN

AD

ET

La p

artic

ipat

ion

aux

pôle

s de

com

pétit

ivité

: qu

elle

in

cide

nce

sur

les

dépe

nses

de

R&

D e

t l’a

ctiv

ité

des

PM

E e

t E

TI ?

G20

13/0

7 P

.-Y

. CA

BA

NN

ES

- A

. MO

NT

AU

T -

P

.-A

. P

ION

NIE

R

É

valu

er

la p

rodu

ctiv

ité g

loba

le d

es f

acte

urs

en

Fra

nce

: l’a

ppor

t d’

une

mes

ure

de l

a qu

alité

du

capi

tal e

t du

trav

ail

G20

13/0

8 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- C

. MA

RB

OT

Evo

lutio

n of

In

stab

ility

on

th

e F

renc

h La

bour

M

arke

t Dur

ing

the

Last

Thi

rty

Yea

rs

G20

13/0

9 J-

B. B

ER

NA

RD

- G

. CLÉ

AU

D

O

il pr

ice:

the

nat

ure

of t

he s

hock

s an

d th

e im

pact

on

the

Fre

nch

econ

omy

G20

13/1

0 G

. LA

ME

Was

the

re a

« G

reen

span

Con

undr

um »

in

the

Eur

o ar

ea?

G20

13/1

1 P

. CH

ON

É -

F. E

VA

IN -

L.

WIL

NE

R -

E.

YIL

MA

Z

In

trod

ucin

g ac

tivity

-bas

ed p

aym

ent

in t

he h

ospi

tal

indu

stry

: E

vide

nce

from

Fre

nch

data

G20

13/1

2 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

Nat

ural

Dis

aste

rs: E

xpos

ure

and

Und

erin

sura

nce

G20

13/1

3 P

.-Y

. C

AB

AN

NE

S -

V.

CO

TT

ET

- Y

. D

UB

OIS

-

C.

LELA

RG

E -

M.

SIC

SIC

F

renc

h F

irms

in th

e F

ace

of th

e 20

08/2

009

Cris

is

G20

13/1

4 A

. PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R -

D. R

OY

Hou

seho

lds

Sat

ellit

e A

ccou

nt f

or F

ranc

e in

201

0.

Met

hodo

logi

cal

issu

es

on

the

asse

ssm

ent

of

dom

estic

pro

duct

ion

G20

13/1

5 G

. CLÉ

AU

D -

M. L

EM

OIN

E -

P.-

A. P

ION

NIE

R

W

hich

si

ze

and

evol

utio

n of

th

e go

vern

men

t ex

pend

iture

mul

tiplie

r in

Fra

nce

(198

0-20

10)?

G20

14/0

1 M

. BA

CH

ELE

T -

A. L

ED

UC

- A

. MA

RIN

O

Le

s bi

ogra

phie

s du

mod

èle

Des

tinie

II

: re

basa

ge

et p

roje

ctio

n

G20

14/0

2 B

. GA

RB

INT

I

L’ac

hat

de l

a ré

side

nce

prin

cipa

le e

t la

cré

atio

n d’

entr

epris

es s

ont-

ils f

avor

isés

par

les

don

atio

ns

et h

érita

ges

?

G20

14/0

3 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- P

. CH

AR

NO

Z -

M. G

AIN

I

Évo

lutio

n de

la v

olat

ilité

des

rev

enus

sal

aria

ux d

u se

cteu

r pr

ivé

en F

ranc

e de

puis

196

8

G20

14/0

4 P

. AU

BE

RT

Mod

alité

s d’

appl

icat

ion

des

réfo

rmes

des

ret

raite

s et

pré

visi

bilit

é du

mon

tant

de

pens

ion

G20

14/0

5 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

- A

. KA

TO

SS

KY

The

Im

pact

of

Haz

ardo

us I

ndus

tria

l F

acili

ties

on

Hou

sing

Pric

es:

A C

ompa

rison

of

Par

amet

ric a

nd

Sem

ipar

amet

ric H

edon

ic P

rice

Mod

els

G20

14//0

6 J.

-M. D

AU

SS

IN-B

EN

ICH

OU

- A

. MA

UR

OU

X

Tur

ning

th

e he

at

up.

How

se

nsiti

ve

are

hous

ehol

ds

to

fisca

l in

cent

ives

on

en

ergy

ef

ficie

ncy

inve

stm

ents

?

G20

14/0

7 C

. LA

BO

NN

E -

G. L

AM

É

Cre

dit

Gro

wth

and

Cap

ital R

equi

rem

ents

: B

indi

ng

or N

ot?

G20

14/0

8 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

et C

. TR

EV

IEN

T

he I

mpa

ct o

f H

ousi

ng S

ubsi

dies

on

the

Ren

tal

Sec

tor:

the

Fre

nch

Exa

mpl

e

G20

14/0

9 M

. LE

QU

IEN

et A

. MO

NT

AU

T

Cro

issa

nce

pote

ntie

lle

en

Fra

nce

et

en

zone

eu

ro :

un

tour

d’

horiz

on

des

mét

hode

s d’

estim

atio

n

G20

14/1

0 B

. GA

RB

INT

I -

P. L

AM

AR

CH

E

Les

haut

s re

venu

s ép

argn

ent-

ils d

avan

tage

?

G20

14/1

1 D

. AU

DE

NA

ER

T -

J. B

AR

DA

JI -

R. L

AR

DE

UX

-

M.

OR

AN

D -

M.

SIC

SIC

W

age

Res

ilien

ce

in

Fra

nce

sinc

e th

e G

reat

R

eces

sion

G20

14/1

2 F

. A

RN

AU

D -

J.

BO

US

SA

RD

- A

. P

OIS

SO

NN

IER

-

H. S

OU

AL

Com

putin

g ad

ditiv

e co

ntrib

utio

ns t

o gr

owth

and

ot

her

issu

es fo

r ch

ain-

linke

d qu

arte

rly a

ggre

gate

s

G20

14/1

3 H

. F

RA

ISS

E -

F.

KR

AM

AR

Z -

C.

PR

OS

T

Labo

r D

ispu

tes

and

Job

Flo

ws

xi

G20

14/1

4 P

. G

IVO

RD

-

C.

GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

-

H.

NA

EG

ELE

H

ow

does

fu

el

taxa

tion

impa

ct

new

ca

r pu

rcha

ses?

A

n ev

alua

tion

usin

g F

renc

h co

nsum

er-le

vel d

atas

et

G20

14/1

5 P

. AU

BE

RT

- S

. RA

BA

TÉ

D

urée

pa

ssée

en

ca

rriè

re

et

duré

e de

vi

e en

re

trai

te :

que

l pa

rtag

e de

s ga

ins

d'es

péra

nce

de

vie

?

G20

15/0

1 A

. PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R

The

wal

king

dea

d E

uler

equ

atio

n A

ddre

ssin

g a

chal

leng

e to

m

onet

ary

polic

y m

odel

s

G20

15/0

2 Y

. D

UB

OIS

- A

. M

AR

INO

In

dica

teur

s de

ren

dem

ent

du s

ystè

me

de r

etra

ite

fran

çais

G20

15/0

3 T

. M

AY

ER

- C

. TR

EV

IEN

T

he

impa

cts

of

Urb

an

Pub

lic

Tra

nspo

rtat

ion:

E

vide

nce

from

the

Par

is R

egio

n

G20

15/0

4 S

.T.

LY -

A. R

IEG

ER

T

Mea

surin

g S

ocia

l Env

ironm

ent M

obili

ty

G20

15/0

5 M

. A. B

EN

HA

LIM

A -

V. H

YA

FIL

-SO

LELH

AC

M

. K

OU

BI

- C

. R

EG

AE

RT

Q

uel

est

l’im

pact

du

sy

stèm

e d’

inde

mni

satio

n m

alad

ie s

ur l

a du

rée

des

arrê

ts d

e tr

avai

l po

ur

mal

adie

?

G20

15/0

6 Y

. D

UB

OIS

- A

. M

AR

INO

D

ispa

rités

de

rend

emen

t du

sys

tèm

e de

ret

raite

da

ns

le

sect

eur

priv

é :

appr

oche

s in

terg

énér

a-tio

nnel

le e

t int

ragé

néra

tionn

elle

G20

15/0

7 B

. CA

MP

AG

NE

- V

. ALH

EN

C-G

ELA

S -

J.

-B.

BE

RN

AR

D

No

evid

ence

of f

inan

cial

acc

eler

ator

in F

ranc

e

G20

15/0

8 Q

. LA

FF

ÉT

ER

- M

. PA

K

Éla

stic

ités

des

rece

ttes

fisca

les

au

cycl

e éc

onom

ique

: é

tude

de

troi

s im

pôts

sur

la p

ério

de

1979

-201

3 en

Fra

nce

G20

15/0

9 J.

-M.

DA

US

SIN

-BE

NIC

HO

U,

S.

IDM

AC

HIC

HE

, A

. LE

DU

C e

t E

. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N

Les

déte

rmin

ants

de

l’attr

activ

ité d

e la

fon

ctio

n pu

bliq

ue d

e l’É

tat

G20

15/1

0 P

. AU

BE

RT

La

mod

ulat

ion

du m

onta

nt d

e pe

nsio

n se

lon

la

duré

e de

car

rière

et

l’âge

de

la r

etra

ite :

que

lles

disp

arité

s en

tre

assu

rés

?

G20

15/1

1 V

. DO

RT

ET

-BE

RN

AD

ET

- M

. SIC

SIC

E

ffet

des

aide

s pu

bliq

ues

sur

l’em

ploi

en

R&

D

dans

les

petit

es e

ntre

pris

es

G20

15/1

2 S

. G

EO

RG

ES

-KO

T

Ann

ual

and

lifet

ime

inci

denc

e of

the

val

ue-a

dded

ta

x in

Fra

nce

G20

15/1

3 M

. PO

ULH

ÈS

A

re

Ent

erpr

ise

Zon

es

Ben

efits

C

apita

lized

in

to

Com

mer

cial

Pro

pert

y V

alue

s? T

he F

renc

h C

ase

G20

15/1

4 J.

-B. B

ER

NA

RD

- Q

. LA

FF

ÉT

ER

E

ffet

de l’

activ

ité e

t de

s pr

ix s

ur le

rev

enu

sala

rial

des

diffé

rent

es c

atég

orie

s so

ciop

rofe

ssio

nnel

les

G20

15/1

5 C

. G

EA

Y -

M.

KO

UB

I -

G d

e LA

GA

SN

ER

IE

Pro

ject

ions

de

s dé

pens

es

de

soin

s de

vi

lle,

cons

truc

tion

d’un

mod

ule

pour

Des

tinie

G20

15/1

6 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- J

.-C

. B

RIC

ON

GN

E -

B

. C

AM

PA

GN

E -

G.

GA

ULI

ER

C

ompa

red

perf

orm

ance

s of

Fre

nch

com

pani

es

on th

e do

mes

tic a

nd fo

reig

n m

arke

ts

G20

15/1

7 C

. BE

LLÉ

GO

- R

. DE

NIJ

S

The

red

istr

ibut

ive

effe

ct o

f on

line

pira

cy o

n th

e bo

x of

fice

perf

orm

ance

of

A

mer

ican

m

ovie

s in

fo

reig

n m

arke

ts

G20

15/1

8 J.

-B. B

ER

NA

RD

- L

. BE

RT

HE

T

Fre

nch

hous

ehol

ds

finan

cial

w

ealth

: w

hich

ch

ange

s in

20

year

s?

G20

15/1

9 M

. PO

ULH

ÈS

Fe

nêtre

sur

Cou

r ou

Cha

mbr

e av

ec V

ue ?

Le

s pr

ix h

édon

ique

s de

l’im

mob

ilier

par

isie

n

G20

16/0

1 B

. G

AR

BIN

TI

- S

. G

EO

RG

ES

-KO

T

Tim

e to

sm

ell t

he r

oses

? R

isk

aver

sion

, the

tim

ing

of in

herit

ance

rec

eipt

, and

ret

irem

ent

G20

16/0

2 P

. CH

AR

NO

Z -

C. L

ELA

RG

E -

C. T

RE

VIE

N

Com

mun

icat

ion

Cos

ts

and

the

Inte

rnal

O

rgan

izat

ion

of M

ulti-

Pla

nt B

usin

esse

s: E

vide

nce

from

the

Impa

ct o

f the

Fre

nch

Hig

h-S

peed

Rai

l

G20

16/0

3 C

. B

ON

NE

T -

B.

GA

RB

INT

I -

A. S

OLA

Z

Gen

der

Ineq

ualit

y af

ter

Div

orce

: T

he F

lip S

ide

of

Mar

ital

Spe

cial

izat

ion

- E

vide

nce

from

a F

renc

h A

dmin

istr

ativ

e D

atab

ase

G20

16/0

4 D

. B

LAN

CH

ET

-

E.

CA

RO

LI

- C

. P

RO

ST

-

M.

RO

GE

R

Hea

lth c

apac

ity to

wor

k at

old

er a

ges

in F

ranc

e

G20

16/0

5 B

. C

AM

PA

GN

E -

A.

PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R

ME

LEZ

E:

A D

SG

E m

odel

for

Fra

nce

with

in t

he

Eur

o A

rea

G20

16/0

6 B

. C

AM

PA

GN

E -

A.

PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R

Laffe

r cu

rves

and

fis

cal

mul

tiplie

rs:

less

ons

from

M

élèz

e m

odel