Divine Platon

7/30/2019 Divine Platon

1/35

Platonic JusticeAuthor(s): Hans KelsenSource: Ethics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Apr., 1938), pp. 367-400Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2988996 .

Accessed: 19/04/2013 21:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEthics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.26.133.57 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 21:12:00 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2988996?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2988996?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE'HANS KELSEN

IHE markof Platonicphilosophys a radicaldualism.The Platonic world is not one of unity; and the abysswhich in many ways results from this bifurcation ap-

pears in innumerable forms. LJt is not one, but two worlds,which Plato sees when with the eyes of his soul he envisagesa transcendent, spaceless, and timeless realm of the Idea, thething-in-itself, the true, absolute reality of tranquil being, andwhen to this transcendent realm he opposes the perceptible,space-time sphere of his sensuous perception-a sphere whichappears to us only as a domain of illusory semblance, of becom-ing in motion, a realm which in reality is not-being. If one ofthese worlds is taken as the subject-indeed, the only possiblesubject of valid rational cognition, of pure thought and trueknowledge, of episteme-then the other world is the extremelydoubtful object of sensuous perception, of mere opinion, doxa.

This is the same antithesis which appears in the Platonicdoctrine of finite and infinite. In the sphere of determination,or of the forms, the principle of freedom prevails, subject tofinal or normative law. In the sphere of uncertainty or materi-ality, compulsion rules according to the law of cause and effect.A modern philosopher might speak of this as the contrast be-tween spirit and nature, between value and actuality. It is theantithesis of art and experience, of thought and feeling, of activecreativity and passive receptivity, of poetry and imitation, ofunity and plurality, of totality and sum-total. Expressed in itsmost general terms, it is the antithesis of the Same and theOther. As concerns human affairs, however, it is the antithesisof the immortal soul which strives for reason and divinity as

ITranslated from the German by Glenn Negley.367

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/35

368 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSagainst the mortal body imprisoned in the senses, a conflictwhich was of the greatest significance in the Platonic doctrine.Finally, it is the comprehensive opposition which exists inPlatonic metaphysics between the celestial, divine beyond andthe earthly, human world of the present.

This multiform, protean dualism, which makes use of thespace-time symbolism of over and under, right and left, beforeand behind, sooner and later, is, in the final analysis and inits most primitive sense, the opposition of good and evil. Thisethical connotation is not the only one possible; but it is theprimary aspect of the Platonic dualism; it is the deepest layerof Platonic thought in which all others take root as in a nourish-ing soil. The ethical dualism of good and evil is, as it were,an inner ring which is enveloped by the dualism of epistemologyand ontology which grew out of and beyond the ethical dualismitself.It is evident that the key to all the oppositions in whichPlatonic thought moves, the real meaning of Platonic dualism,is to be found in the basic treatment of good and evil; but thisis true not merely because of the fact that, whenever this oppo-sition between the two worlds occurs in Plato's thought, itappears as an opposition of values, as a separation between ahigher and a lower world, between a realm of value and a realmwithout value. The situation is evident first of all in the factthat the ethical maintains a position of unmistakably primaryimportance in the Platonic philosophy. It is only in the sphereof ethics, wherein the good is freed from all the material ofsensuous experience, that the notion of pure thought is possible.Throughout all the manifold speculations concerned with sucha variety of objects as is met with in the Platonic dialogues,through the many deviations from the main subject under con-sideration, the moral idea remains every steady, fixed as apolestar. It alone points the way through the frequent involvedtrains of thought to the final goal; and this goal of the entirePlatonic philosophy, the goal toward which Plato strives from



4/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 369the most diversepoints of view and with the greatest energyfromthe firstto the last of his works-that goal is the absolutegood. The good, however, s inconceivable,apartfrom evil. Ifgood is to be the object of cognition,then cognitionmust alsorecognizeevil;andthis is truein the Platonicphilosophy,whichis by nomeansa doctrineof thegoodas it is usuallyrepresented,but a speculationconcerninggood-evil.It is truethat the ideaof the goodin the Platonicrepresenta-tion stands out more clearly than the conceptionof evil; thereflectionsconcernedwith good are developedwith moreforceand claritythan are thosewhichhave evil as theirobject. It isnatural that the will as well as the thought of the moralistshouldbe directedupon the good. Evil would not be thoughtof at all were it not for the necessity of conceivingit as theantithesisof the good; but it remainsas subordinate-merelytoleratedin the gloriousapotheosisof the good. As it is onlya shadowin the light of the good, it must remain a shadowinall representations f the good. Onlyin the last of the Platonicwritingsdoes evil assumea more solidform and become estab-lishedlike the goodin the formof a particular ubstance. Onlyin a late periodof his creativity did evil become for Plato areality, a being, and then only after he had been forced torecognizethat the representationof evil as becomingn onto-logicaldualismwas, in fact, an indicationof being.This is thereasonwhy the originalconceptionof Platonic dualismholdsthat only the worldof the Idea partakesof real existence;theworld of the Idea is the worldof the good simplybecausethegood is the centralidea-in fact, the Idea. Onthe other hand,theworldof things,of becoming,must be regardedas not-being,becausethisworldofbecoming, he empiricalworldof sensuous,perceptiblereality, the temporalworld of factual events-thisis the world of evil, in so far as it is in oppositionto the worldof the good. It can be none other thanaworld of evil, althoughPlato did not explicitlydesignate t as such. By definition,onlythe good shall be; evil shall not be; and for this reason,evil is

This content downloaded from 200.26.133.57 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 21:12:00 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions


5/35

370 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSnot-being, and only the good is being. For ethical thought,shallimpliesbeing;because the moralistintendsthat evil shallnot be, it becomes orhimnot-being. In this mannerhe satisfieswill by cognition;and this primacyof the will over cognition,which is decisivefor moralcharacter,appearsas the primacyof obligation(shall) over existence (being), of value over ac-tuality.In the puresystemof the goodthereis no placeforevil. Thisis expressed n the Platonic speculationconcerninggood-evil,as well as in othersuchspeculations,by denyingthe qualityofbeing to evil or its ontologicalrepresentation.What shall be,is; it has "real"existenceeven though-or because-that whichappears o us as being,shallnot be. For this reason, t is neces-sary that a distinctionbe madebetweentrue or realbeing andapparentbeing; that which has being from an ordinarypointof view must be reducedto the status of a meresemblanceofbeing. Thought which is directedtowardtrue being must beplacedabovethe sensuousperceptionof thissemblance fbeing;ethics must take precedenceover naturalsciencein orderthatthe good, that which shallbe, can be asserted as reallybeing.On the other hand, that which appearsas being for ordinaryperceptionshall not be, becauseit is not the good; it is evil,and as evil it is not-being. Similarly,every attempt to explainthe worldin ethical terms, every speculationconcerninggoodand evil, has doneviolenceto the naturalisticconception.Theworld-viewwhichis baseduponthe realityof sensuousexperi-ence,i.e., knowledgeaffordedby nature,is directlyinvertedbythe view whichhasits origin n the ethical justificationof valueand spirit.Becauseevil is the completenegationof good, ethical dual-ism in its originalsense is absolute. The tendencyto give ab-solute form to conceivableoppositions s a rathersure sign ofnormative ethics, of contemplationdirected finally to valuerather hanuponreality,to the transcendentalhallratherthanupon empiricalbeing. In contrastto normativeethics, empiri-

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


6/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 37Ical investigation will if possible avoid working with opposites.Rather will it endeavor to relate whatever oppositions are pre-sented, i.e., to assume degrees of difference, gradual passagesfrom one to another, arranging the abundance of phenomenain a series according to quantitative differences so that eachpasses over into the other. It is, therefore, concerned above allwith the notion of evolution. Even the history of Greek thoughtshows us how the cognition of nature undertook to free itselfof religious and ethical speculation by making relative the oppo-sites upon which such speculative views of the world are based.In general, all such opposites of religious and ethical specula-tion are derived from the fundamental opposition between goodand evil. Thus, the process of making relative this fundamentalopposition of good and evil is one of the bridges by means ofwhich ethics passes over into natural science. The decisive pointin this process is this: Not only the good, but evil also, is con-ceived as being, as reality; conversely, empirical reality is per-ceived not only as evil, but also as good, as a mixture of goodand evil. This process of making relative the opposition be-tween good and evil is the first step toward the self-dissolutionof speculation concerning good and evil; that speculation isdriven backward in favor of the cognition of empirical reality.

In the original Platonic conception of world-structure, thereis clearly present an inclination to make absolute this funda-mental dualism of good and evil. Between the two worlds intowhich the whole universe is split, between the realms of opinionand knowledge, Plato assumes an unmitigated opposition. Ifthe path which leads from the world of mere appearance to theperception of true being is to be followed, it is necessary thatthere be a complete liberation from the world of sensuous ex-perience, a radical "about-face"; but this complete turning-away from the world of sensuality to the spiritual world wouldbe incomprehensible if it did not at the same time signify aturning-away from evil and a turning-toward the good. WhatPlato means by the famous image of the cave is:- That the



7/35

372 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICStrue analogy for this indwellingpower in the soul and the in-strumentwherebyeach of us apprehends s that of an eye thatcouldnot be converted o the light from the darknessexceptbyturningthe whole body. Even so this organof knowledgemustbe turnedaround romthe worldof becoming ogetherwith theentire soul, until the soul is able to endurethe contemplationof essenceand the brightest regionof being. And this, we say,is the good, do we not? In this connection,however, we aretold that the soul, although possessinggood power of percep-tion, cannot completely achieve this "turning-around";t is"forciblyenlistedin the serviceof evil, so that the sharper tssight the more mischief it accomplishes"; t is burdenedby"the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth and becoming,which ... turndownwardshevisionof the oul."12 Onlyf thesphere of sensuousperceptionsignifies the evil, and that ofthought indicates the good, can one understand he refusal tounite perceptionand thought. In this doctrineof completere-versal thereis expressedneithera psychologicalnor an episte-mological nsight. Only the ethical experienceof a sinnerwhohas becomea saint can approachawarenessof the typical ad-ventureof such an overwhelming onversion.It is the specula-tion on goodandevil which co-ordinateshe oppositesof sensu-ous perceptionandthoughtwith thoseof the particularand theidea, respectively;and thus the opposition s maintainedrightinto the absolute itself.On the otherhand, thereis evidencein Plato's doctrineof atendency to make these oppositesrelative. His thought is asdividedas the worldwhichit reflects. Thusoneseesin hisworka ruggeddualismwhich toleratesno bridgesover whichcogni-tion mightproceed romone worldto the other,and a profoundpessimismwhichdenies this worldand the possibilityof know-ing it in orderto affirm hat other worldin beingand knowing.Plato expressesa pessimisticdualism which is as extreme asany ever dared by a genius who scornednature and natural

2 Republic i8-i9 (Shorey).



8/35

PLATONICJUSTICE 373science. It is extreme in that he denies the possibility of em-pirical science and proclaims the only object of true perceptionto be that which lies beyond experience. At the same time, heis obviously striving to fill up in some manner the chasm be-tween the two worlds by shoving in a middle term-a mediatorfor the implacable opposition of these products of dualisticspeculation. This doctrine of mediation appears in many forms;but always it is the symptom of a turning-away from pessimisticdualism to an attitude which recognizes also the reality of theempirical world.

IIThe intellectual activity of great moralists is rooted in theirpersonal life to a greater extent than is true of other thinkers,because all speculation of good and evil arises out of profoundmoral experience. So the compelling pathos which appears inthe work of Plato, his tragic dualism and the heroic effort toovercome it, are deeply grounded in the particular character ofPlato as an individual, as well as in circumstance and in theconditioning of his personal attitude toward life by these factors.

The course of Plato's life is essentially determined by thepassion of love, the Platonic Eros. The image of Plato's lifewhich can be made out from the documents left by him does notpicture the cold, contemplative nature of a scholar who is con-tent to look upon the world merely as an object of knowledge.Here is no philosopher whose meditation and endeavor aredirected solely to the observation and penetration of the ma-chinery of human and external phenomena merely to the endof attaining an explanation of the perplexities of experience.Rather, there appears here a soul shaken by the most violentpassions, a soul in which there lives, in intimate and inextricableunion with his Eros, an indomitable will to power, the powerovermen. To love men and at the same time to shape them, tolove them in the very shaping itself, and to make their com-munity into a community of love-this is the aspiration ofPlato's life. His aim was to form men and to reform their



9/35

374 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICScommunity. Thus, there is nothing with which his thought ismore concernedthan with educationand the state; and, as aconsequence,his greatest problembecomes that of the good orjustice, whichin itself constitutes the only justification or thegovernmentof men over men, the only legitimate aspect ofeducationand the state. The pedagogicalandpolitical passionof Plato, however,has its origin n his Eros. Having once recog-nized that this Eros is the dynamicsourceof the Platonic phi-losophy, we cannot then ignorea considerationof the peculiarnatureof that Eros,forit is the natureof the Eros which deter-minesPlato's personalrelationto society in generaland to thedemocraticsociety of Athens in particular. It is likewise theexplanationof his flightfromthe veryworldhe desires o domi-nate, in orderthat he may the better modelit according o hisown desire.LThis Eros, the love of youths, set Plato in oppositiontosociety and to the world in general,for it does not appearinhim as an extensionand enrichmentof the normal sex life aswas the case in the aristocraticAthenian society (but only inthis, and not in the lower social levels). Plato excludes thenormalsex life. As a rule, thosewholoved beautifulyouthshadalso a wife and child at home, as did Socrates;but no womanplayed any partin Plato's life. Marriage,whichwas surroundedwith a haloof sanctity by Greekreligion,and the family,whichwasa fundamental lementof the Greekstate, remained oreignto Plato, who spent his life in a circle of men. He felt himselfunableto fulfilthe most importantpatrioticduty-that of pro-viding the state with new citizensby begetting legitimateoff-spring;and this must have been all the morepainful to himbecause his entire intellectualattitudewas directedagainstthe

moraldeclineof the time and aimedat the re-establishment fancestralmorality. In this completesingularity ies the dangerof a.profoundconflict with socialreality, the laws of which arestrange to the philosophictemperament.Outsideof culturedDorian circles,and especially n Athens, pederastywas looked



10/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 375uponwith contempt;perhaps because of its very prevalencein certain circles it was considered an unnatural vice. Notrace of it is to be found in Homer. The great tragedians,Aeschylusand Sophocles, n spiteof theirpersonal nclinations,appearnot to havedared o declare hemselvespublicly n favorof it. Euripidesdirectly disapprovedof it; comedy, especiallythe worksof Aristophanes, courged t with the sharpestscornand irony; the Sophistsattackedit decisively. Even the Athe-nian penal law shows a cleartendencyof oppositionto peder-asty.

The severeattitudeof condemnationwhichAtheniansocietytook against this Eros is indicated, althoughindirectly,in thePlatonicdialoguesSymposiumandPhaedrus,whereinPlato de-fended this boy-lovingErosagainstthe officialview, confessingto it himself, althoughonly in its spiritualized orm. But theEros was characterizedby the old Plato in his last work asdangerous or the state, as the sourceof "countlesswoes bothto individualsand to whole States."3This was undoubtedlywrittenat a time whenPlato had been freedfromthe tyrannyof this Eros. As a youth andas a manhe avoidedopen conflictonly by the endeavorwhich he made from the very beginningwithunparalleled nergyandgreatmoralstrength o spiritualizethis Eros. BecausePlato regulateshis Erosin the serviceof hisphilosophy,the vision of belovedboys is explainedas the firststep on the road to knowledgeof the good. In doing this hestripshis Eros of the sensualitywhich is its very nature,com-pletely sublimating t under the pressureof socialviews and hisownmoralconvictions. He therebyachievesforhimselfthe de-siredjustificationof the Eros. It is in the Symposium, hat su-preme song of Platonic love, that the philosopher ustifies hisEros (fromwhich he may have sufferedmore than the dialogueindicates), thereby justifying himself, and at the same timejustifying the world tself. To Socrates'questionconcerning hereal nature of the Eros, Plato has the prophetess Diotima

3 Laws 836.



11/35

376 INTERNATIONAL OURNALOF ETHICSanswer: "He is a great spirit [daemon],and like all spirits he isintermediate between the divine and the mortal .... the medi-ator who spans the chasm which divides them, and thereforein him all is bound together."4 What had originally split thePlatonic world unites it once again. Eros produced the separa-tion; Eros is responsible for the reunion.

With this the Platonic dualism takes an optimistic turn.With the tendency to make the opposition of good and evilrelative, the Platonic philosophy turns its attention to thisworld and aims at a unified world-view which will comprisenature. The nature which it comprises will not be consideredmerely as ethical, but will be conceived as itself being becauseit is no longer conceived as positively evil. This new directionof his thought leads him back to society and the state. In thisconnection it is of the greatest importance to note that Plato, inthe speech of Diotima-as in the speeches of all the guests at thebanquet-emphasizes the social nature of his Eros as a defenseagainst the usual reproach that it is inimical to society anddangerous to the state. Plato affirms repeatedly that the boy-loving Eros, if it is spiritualized (and it is the only love capableof spiritualization), will propagate itself. Through the proph-etess he makes it known that the most beautiful children propa-gated by this spiritual Eros include not only poetry and theworks of sculpture but also the arts of social order, of constitu-tions, laws, and works of justice. Among these "immortal chil-dren," who are more valuable than mortal offspring, Platonames the laws of Solon, and the children "Lycurgus left be-hind him to be the saviour, not only of Lacedaemon, but ofHellas."s This is a great confession for Plato, for these are thechildren which his Eros desired: the best laws, the just orderof the state, the right education of youth. Here is revealed mostclearly the inner connection which existed between the PlatonicEros and his will to power over men, between his erotic and hispedagogico-political passions.

4 Symposium 202 (Jowett). 5Ibid. 209.



12/35

PLATONICJUSTICE 377III

Recent investigation of Plato has to a great extent shaken theopinion that Plato was a theoretical philosopher whose aim wasthe establishment of a rigorous science. Today it is known thatPlato was by temperament more a politician than a theorist.One considers him today as a Herrenmenschenof an imperioustemperament; one sees in him primarily the educator and found-er. Whether he really was such a person, whether he actuallypossessed the characteristics which accompany the will topower, whether he had the capacity of a genius of action, onemay perhaps doubt. We can be certain only that his personalideal lay in this direction: He desired what for reasons of ex-ternal circumstance was forever denied to him. His entire intel-lectual position is less a view of being than a regard for theshall which always is directed to will rather than to cognition;and since his ethical political will was thoroughly grounded inmetaphysics and is consequently expressed in an outspokenreligious ideology, his works give not so much the impression ofa learned system of moral science as of a prophecy of the idealstate. Plato is revealed less as a psychologist or a sociologistconcerned with social reality than as a preacher of justice.

Testimony of this is to be found primarily in Plato's auto-biography, the so-called Epistle VII, in which the now old man,in one of his most serious moments, gives to the world an ac-count of his life. Here Plato confesses that his real desire, fromyouth onward, has been politics, and that he has waited all hislife for the opportune moment to act. But even if we did nothave this confession of Plato, it is nonetheless clear from hisdialogues themselves that there existed for him this primacy ofpolitical will over theoretical knowledge. The fact that the prin-cipal problem of his philosophy to which all others are sub-ordinated is the question concerning justice betrays the factthat above all he is interested in finding a moral foundation foractivity. From an abundance of detail in Plato's writings it ap-pears that the keynote in the explication of this great political



13/35

378 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSpassion is his ardent desire for mastery of the state. Eventhough it had not been expressed in direct and indirect intima-tions, yet he is betrayed by the principal theme of the Platonicphilosophy that it is to be the task of the philosophers to rule.He is stubborn in this demand that all power in the state bevested in philosophy, but not in just any philosophy. Power isto reside in the one true philosophy which alone leads to theperception of justice and makes legitimate the claim of mastery.The Platonic doctrine is this true philosophy.

Further, it is not only in Plato's work that indications are tobe found of this political passion but likewise in his very life.His life stands in the shadow of a political undertaking thatdated from his first journey to Sicily, when he was about fortyyears old, an undertaking which concerned him almost until hisdeath, and which made unhappy the latter days of his life.This was the effort of Plato to win over to his ideas the tyrant ofSyracuse, Dionysius II. Plato was driven to this fatal step byhis demonic Eros and by his passionate love for Dion, a youngrelative of the tyrant. Dion, animated perhaps by the best ofintentions, perhaps only to realize the political ideals of Plato,attempted to seize control of Syracuse. This effort however onlysucceeded in involving the Platonic Academy, or at least itsmost prominent members, in a bloody civil war, in the course ofwhich was destroyed the great Sicilian empire founded original-ly by Dionysius the First-one of the strongest state organiza-tions achieved by Hellenism, and perhaps its last stronghold inthe ancient world. The name of the Platonic Academy was notexactly covered with honor in this catastrophe.

The role which the Platonic Academy played in the ques-tionable undertaking of Dion-a role which Plato tacitly toler-ated-is not the only ground for suspecting that the Academywas not, as it has so long been considered, merely a school oflearning, peaceful, withdrawn from the cares of the world, anddevoted to pure science. The Academy which Plato hadfounded soon after his return from his first voyage to Sicily, and



14/35

PLATONICJUSTICE 379which received encouragement especially from aristocratic cir-cles, was not, as recent investigation has shown, merely a schoolof learning, but a community patterned upon the Pythagoreansociety, a community founded upon the Platonic religion andthe Platonic Eros. It is particularly in the political function ofthe Academy, in its character as a preparation for the vocationof statesmanship, that one recognizes its primary object. Thedecided anti-democratic, aristocratic tendencies of the Academymade it a stronghold of reactionary thought; but it was notonly the center of conservative politics, being likewise thecenter of political activity as is indicated by the adventure inSyracuse. The attitude of the Academy corresponded to thefundamental intellectual position of Plato; and this Platonicphilosophy was for the school at once the compensation forpolitics and the virtual cell of its ideal state. The literary workof the Academy was not directed so much upon exact science asupon ethical and mystical speculation. Thus the school has cor-rectly been termed a "metaphysical sect"; it indicates the finalconclusion of the Platonic attitude as exemplified in the lastyears of Plato's life. This position is marked by a completeturning-away from Socratic rationalism through a continuallyincreasing insight into the transcendental nature of the objectof all ethical cognition, together with a conviction of the impos-sibility of representing its result rationally. Because the irra-tional does not lend itself to rational expression, Plato resortsmore and more to myths when he wishes to explain that whichhe considers essential. No man of science would do that.Plato discovers something higher and more important thanexact theory lying close to his heart, and in attempting to giveit expression he speaks in dark prophetic words like a seer of theworld beyond, rather than as a scientist of this world.

Plato has perplexed his readers by the repeated and un-equivocal declaration that his published works are not to betaken as expressing his true thought, that in fact they are noteven to be considered as his own work. If one may consider



15/35

380 INTERNATIONAL OURNALOF ETHICSEpistle II as genuine, then Plato has said that he wrote nothingupon the real subject of his philosophy nor upon the ultimateor highest problem thereof. In this letter, the statement is madethat: "No treatise by Plato exists or will exist, but those whichnow bear his name belong to a Socrates become fair andyoung."6 This is not the attitude of a scholar whose thought isdirected to scientific knowledge; it is not the act of a man ofscience defending his theory simply to shake off the responsi-bility for works published over a period of years and to refuseto rise in their defense. That is rather the way of a politicianfor whom the theory is not an end in itself, but the means toan entirely different end: namely, to an end which seeks, notto quench man's thirst for knowledge, but rather to determinehis will, to form his character, to educate and to govern him.We must then admit that there is no specific Platonic theoryanywhere, i.e., there is no doctrine which is inseparably con-nected with the name of Plato, at least none of which we haveknowledge. This is as Plato wished.

There is a profound significance in the peculiar fact thatPlato never appears as the representative of the opinions de-veloped in the works which bear his name; he first presentsthese views through the person of Socrates, later through an-other, the Athenian Stranger. That is the real reason why hechose the dialogue form. Doubtless this literary form appealedto his disunited nature, torn as it was with a tragic conflict; itwas more appealing to him than the monologue form of ascientific treatise in which only one opinion appears, and whichthus can present only one side of a given problem. Who couldfeel more keenly than Plato the necessity of allowing his adver-sary as well as himself an opportunity to speak? Plato had thisvery adversary in his own breast, and it was only by allowinghim to speak that Plato could be delivered of his internal con-flict.

Plato found, however, another and even greater value than6EpistleII 314 (Bury).



16/35

PLATONICJUSTICE 38ithat of catharsis in the dialogue form; he discovered in this kindof presentation a possible escape from the necessity of identi-fying himself positively with any theory, however well foundedit might be. The dialogues are dramatic, and in drama noneof the opinions expressed by the persons acting can positivelybe taken as the opinion of the dramatist; and this is true eventhough the dramatist allows the actor to develop an opinionwith all the force of persuasive rhetoric, or even to attest it byhis activity. In the same manner Plato is unwilling in the lastresort to take upon himself the doctrine which he expressesthrough Socrates. Because the non-rational nature of this doc-trine precludes its statement, he will not even agree that whatSocrates has said is the substance of his thought. It has re-peatedly been said that Plato is not only a philosopher, butalso, indeed even more, a poet; and that many of his workspresent beautiful dramas rather than the results of scientificresearch. Indeed, Plato is a poet in the sense that he is littleconcerned with what his characters say; whether their declara-tions are more or less true is a matter of little consequence tohim. That to which Plato does attach the utmost importance isthe effect produced by these speeches, their dialectical move-ment to a breath-taking climax, and the descending relief ofdissent; but this technique is not productive of scientific con-clusions. Plato is indeed a dramatist, except that his desiredeffect is not aesthetic, but of a religious and moral nature.Plato's knowledge is therefore not an end in itself. Science forhim, as for the Pythagoreans, is only a means to an end. Manneeds knowledge in order to act rightly; and just for this reason,the only real knowledge is that of the good, of divinity.

A world separates this Platonic conception from that ofmodern science, which rests upon the fundamental presupposi-tions that knowledge is to be sought for its own sake, thatscience be not directed toward any object outside itself, that itsconclusions are not to be determined by the necessities of willand activity, i.e., by ruling and being ruled, namely, by politics.



17/35

382 INTERNATIONAL OURNALOF ETHICSScience is therefore primarily natural science; but it is likewisetrue that the science of man's will and activity and of the rela-tion of men in society, even the modern science of the state, oflaw, and of society, rests upon an inexorable postulate of com-plete independence from politics and from religion. To knowthe world, either as nature or as society, is an entirely differentend than that of determining the world by will, of forming orreforming it, of educating or dominating it. It is the vital lawof all pure knowledge that it be carriedon for its own sake. Thislaw applies especially to the social sciences, for when thesesciences are placed in the service of politics they can no longerserve the ideally objective truth but must become an ideologyof power. How great was the tendency of Platonic philosophyin this direction is indicated by Plato's conception of truth.This doctrine of truth, which is so characteristic of his thought,together with his conception of love, can be taken as symbolicof the Platonic thought.

IVThe Platonic conception of truth set forth in the Republic isthe doctrine which justifies, even necessitates, the lie as the

means to the best government; and this implies the further dis-tinction of bad and "true" lies. A "true" lie is wholesome, astate truth, the raison d'etat. Plato says that in the ideal state(which is the state governed by Platonic philosophy), govern-ment must use many frauds and deceits for "the welfare of thegoverned."

The necessity for lies on the part of government appears, tocite but one example, in the state regulation of birth control.The couples selected under state guidance for the purpose ofpropagation must be deceived in order that they will not con-sider themselves merely as instruments in the hands of the gov-ernment. They must believe that fate has destined them for oneanother; and for this purpose, Plato devises an ingenious sys-tem. According to his plan, parents whose children are notreared because of their inferior quality will be inclined to put



18/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 383the blame upon chance ratherthan upon government.7Platoexcludesthe painter, and also the poet who merely imitates,from his ideal state becausethese arts are "delusions"and notstrictly true;8yet he has not the least scrupleabout this mon-strousinfringementuponthe mostintimate realmof man'slife.In this personal phere iesa vital state interest,and the interestof the state, which in the ideal state coincideswith justice, isabove all elsein importance-even abovetruthitself. The max-im that "the end justifiesthe means" stands out quite clearlyas a principleof Platonic political theory;and this maximis adirect consequenceof the primacyassumedby will over knowl-edge, by justice over truth. From the political point of view,whichis of greater mportance han all others,it is not so essen-tial to know whetherwhat the subjects believe is true as it isto knowwhetherwhat they believe is usefulto the state,wheth-er it is to the interest of maintaininga just orderin society.Therefore,Plato claimsthe right of governmentto determinethe opinionof its citizensby any meanswhich appear appro-priate. In the dialogueLaws, Plato makes a numberof sur-prisingproposals n this connection To cite but one example,it will be remembered hat Plato, in order to engenderandguaranteea suitable attitude on the part of the citizens, pro-posesto divide them into three choruses: one forboys, one foryouths, and one for old men. These chorusesshall be requiredto sing the songs which are prescribedby the government-songs embodying eachingswhichareof use to the state; aboveall, they mustproclaim he teachingthat justice is conducive ohappiness, njusticeto unhappiness. Thus the belief is propa-gated.In this connection,Plato says: "And even if the state of thecase weredifferent rom what it has now proved to be by ourargument,could a lawgiverwho was worth his salt find anymore useful fiction than this .... or one more effective in per-suadingall men to act justly in all things willinglyandwithout

7 Republic459. 8Ibid. 602. 9 662-66.



19/35

384 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSconstraint?"Io It is conceivable that there will be opposition tothis program from the old men, for it is natural that with in-creasing years one feels a growing timidity about singing anddancing in public; thus it will be necessary to see that the mem-bers of the third orDionysian chorus are induced to intoxicationunder the direction of a government official. In this drunkenstate they may be as easily managed as children. These state-ments are the more remarkable because Plato is clearly awareof the dangers of alcoholism and desires that the consumption ofwine by the rest of the population be severely limited. He stateshere the famous simile of men as puppets in the hands ofdivinity; the divine operator of the puppet-show." In like man-ner government, which is the representative of divinity, maymanipulate the wires while keeping itself invisible as far as pos-sible. The only justification of this procedure is that it is forthe best interests of man-that only in this manner can justicebe realized. Plato makes other proposals of the same sort,namely: that science, poetry, and religion are exclusively theservants of the state in their function as producers of ideologies.Indeed, he goes so far as to propose the suppression of all libertyof thought by instituting a state monopoly upon ideology-construction under a dictatorship to which not only the will andactivity of men must submit, but also their opinions and beliefs.

It is perhaps not surprising to find that Plato as a politicianor theorist of politics takes a position similar to that of pragma-tism, namely, that which declares that what is useful for thestate, and therefore constitutes justice, likewise constitutestruth. In his capacity as an epistemologist and psychologist,however, one cannot escape the occasional impression thatPlato is making the reservation of a possible duality of truth,although he does not say so directly. How else can we explainthe fact that he develops, on the one hand, his theory of ideaswith a pronounced monotheistic tendency, and, at the sametime, affirms the official religion of the people which with its

IOIbid. 663 (Bury). II Ibid. 643.



20/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 385multiplicity of anthropomorphic gods was quite incompatiblewith this monotheism? Again in his theory of ideas, only theuniversal has eternal being, which is generally denied to par-ticulars; yet the Platonic conception of the immortality of thesoul attributes eternal being to the individual personality ofman in its most particular form. Further, why is it that in awork which is so extremely personal in nature as is the Sympo-sium, no reference whatever is made to the immortality of thesoul in the sense of a continuation of an individual soul-sub-stance, but only reference in a figurative sense to the continua-tion of name and glory?

One hesitates to suggest that only simple contradictions areto be found in the thought of such a powerful intellect as that ofPlato. The inclination is rather to admit that Plato was wellaware of these differences in his doctrine; that they representedfor him different degrees of truth analogous to the differentdegrees of the Eros; that there appeared for Plato in particulara pedagogic, political, religious truth in addition to scientificrational truth. Plato considered the political religious truth tobe the more important, and it therefore occupies a position ofprimacy in relation to rational truth. In describing how thesoul reaches the other world after death, Plato says:

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that thedescription I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true.But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal,he mayventure to think, not improperlyor unworthily, that something of thekind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comforthimself with wordslike these, whichis the reasonwhy I lengthen out thetale.12When Plato teaches in the Meno that knowledge depends uponthe recollection by the soul of what it has seen in the otherworld before its birth, he adds: "Some things I have said ofwhich I am not altogether confident."I3 The decisive argumentwhich he adduces in opposition to the sophistic teaching of the

I2 Phaedo II4 (Jowett). I3 Meno 86 (Jowett).



21/35

386 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSimpossibilityof any knowledge s that the Platonic doctrineisto be preferredbecausethat of the Sophists"will makeus idle,andis sweetonlyto the sluggard;but the othersayingwillmakeus active and inquisitive."I4Plato establishesthe truth of hisdoctrineby referenceto its vital utility. It is a pedagogicalpolitical truth which he characteristicallysupports, not byscientificexplanation,but by reference o ancientteachingsofreligion.This is the presuppositionwhichonemust understandbeforehis doctrineof justice can be fully comprehended.

VThe dialogueswrittenby Plato in his youth whilehe was yetunderthe influenceof Socrates,whereinhe treatseitherdirectlyor indirectly of the problemof justice, lose themselves in asterileanalysisof concepts, n emptytautologies; hey aremoreor lesswithoutresult. Especiallycharacteristic f this earlyand

wholly rationalisticperiodof Plato's creativity is the Thrasy-machus,a work probablybegun after Plato's first voyage toSyracuse.It was not entirely finished,at any rate it was notseparatelypublished;but it was later incorporatedn the firstbook of the Republic.After a rather protracteddiscussion nwhich Socrateshas tried by every availablemeans to reachadefinitionof justice, this sectionof the Republic inallyends inSocrates'declaration hat for him the result of the entire dis-cussionis merely the informationthat he knows nothing, forthe real and decisivequestionas to the essenceof justice hasnot beendiscussed.As longas one doesnot knowwhat the justis, one canhardlyarriveat a decisionas to whetheror not it isa virtue, or whetherthe just man is happy. If the assumptionjust madeconcerninghe originof the first bookof the Republicbe correct, hen the last words constitutea transitionby meansof whichPlato has insertedthe thoughtof a much earlierperiodinto a workof his adult matureyears. These wordsrevealto14Ibid. 8 i.



22/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 387us the reason why the Thrasymcachusremained unfinished:Socrates, with all his rationalistic speculation upon concepts, hadnot been able to lead Plato to a knowledge of the nature ofjustice. When Plato left his Thrasymachusunfinished, he stoodat the turning-point of his life, on the eve of a journey tosouthern Italy, where he became acquainted with the politicaland religious metaphysic of the Pythagorean school. Thispythagoreanism became a new guide for him, a guide to whichhe remained faithful throughout the rest of his life. He believedthat in pythagoreanism he had found the answer to the mostburning question-the mystery of justice.

The essence of the Pythagorean doctrine, which on this pointagrees with the wisdom of the Orphic mysteries, is the beliefthat after death the soul of man will be punished for evil doneand rewarded for the good. This punishment and reward maybe accomplished in another world or by means of reincarnationin this world. The implication of this ethical religious con-ception, and it is the same wherever found, is a justification ofthe world as given, and especially of social phenomena. Thisresults from the conviction that good will finally triumph overevil. From a political point of view, this metaphysic of a futureworld of souls, or metempsychosis, indicates a doctrine of jus-tice whose essence is retribution. In so far as this retribution isnot realized in this world in the lives of good and bad men, itwill be put off to the other world or to a second life in thisworld. This is the doctrine presented by Plato in his dialogueGorgias, which was written either during his first voyage orimmediately thereafter. The principal moral theses of this workare: that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, andthat it is better to submit to legal punishment than to evade it.The final proof of these theses does not rest upon the ratherdoubtful demonstration of Socrates, the principal figure in thisdialogue also; rather, they depend upon the splendid mythwhich Plato relates in conclusion, wherein he describes how thegood are rewarded and the evil punished in the other world.



23/35

388 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSThis prophetic belief is first set out in the Gorgias,a belief thatjustice is retribution, and indeed that essentially it is retribu-tion in the other world. This conviction dominates the work ofPlato from this point until his death; it constitutes the leitmotifof the second great dialogue devoted to the problem of justice,the Republic, the masterpiece of Plato which stands at the verycenter of his entire creativity.

This work begins and ends with the myth of retribution in theother world;"5 and this conception serves as the frame of refer-ence for all that is to be said in the Republic about justice. Itmight appear that it is precisely in this dialogue that Platoshows an inclination to separate the idea of justice from that ofretribution, for it is here that one of the speakers, Adeimantus,supports the view that justice is not adequately praised if onecontinues to refer only to the reward of good and the punish-ment of evil. If one is to commend justice sufficiently, he mustrepresent it without any reference whatever to retribution.Socrates does not contradict this assertion at the time; but atthe end of the dialogue he expressly repudiates this earlier tacitadmission. Plato closes the Republicwith an account of a storyby a mysterious stranger risen from the dead, who reports thethings which his soul has seen in the other world. It is the samevision, with certain digressions, as is contained in the final mythof the Gorgias, namely, the realization of divine justice as retri-bution in the other world. Plato remained faithful to this con-ception even in his last dialogue, the Laws.

The acceptance of a retribution in the other world necessarilyimplies a belief in the soul. In searching for justice in the otherworld Plato found the soul in this world, indeed found it withinman. The soul must continue to live after death in a transcen-dental sphere in order that it be the object of retribution. Theintimate connection between Plato's doctrines of the soul and ofjustice is obvious, not only in the fact that he always presentsthe one in conjunction with the other, especially in his principal

is Republic330-3i. This passages generally verlooked.



24/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 389work on the doctrine of the soul, the Phaedo, but likewise in themodifications through which the doctrine of soul passes. This isindicated by the transition of the conception of soul as a unityto the conception of the tripartite soul; and this transition isparallel to corresponding modifications in the doctrine of jus-tice. As the problem of justice inevitably leads to the doctrineof the soul, so this latter leads to the doctrine of ideas. The be-lief in the realization of justice in the other world compels theconception of a future existence of the soul; the necessity of acognition of the nature of justice leads to the conception of apre-existence of the soul, to the theory of knowledge as reminis-cence by the soul of what it has been in the other world beforeits birth to this world. This theory is developed for the firsttime in the Meno; and here lies the germ of the doctrine ofideas. What the soul has seen in its pre-existence is ideas, andabove all, the idea of justice.

While Plato identifies justice with retribution, he does notmerely take over the Orphic, Pythagorean doctrines, but headduces as the basis of his view the notion of the Greek peoplewhich has come down from antiquity. It might appear, and itmay so have seemed to Plato when he wrote the Gorgias, thatwith the formula of retribution he has given the answer to thequestion concerning the nature of justice. But this answer isonly an apparent answer; it gives no real information as to thenature of justice. Fundamentally it describes only the actualfunction of positive law, which merely connects the facts ofinjustice in one of the deeds conceived as evil with the com-pulsory consequences of that injustice. It only reflects the ex-ternal structure of the existing social order which is a system ofsanctions; and this order is justified by representing the mecha-nism of guilt and punishment as a special case of the generallaw of retribution, i.e., as the will of divinity. Taken by itselfthe concept of retribution is just as meaningless as is that ofequality, which is usually considered to be the characteristicof justice. Indeed, justice is itself the formula of equality, since



25/35

390 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSit says nothingmore than that the good will be for the good,evil for the evil; that like is for like, which, in its primitivemeaning,amountsto saying"To each hisdue." But what is thegood,whatexactlyis the natureof that goodof whichevil mustbe the negation?This decisive questionremainsunanswered.The questionas to the natureof justice thus resolvesinto thequestionconcerning he natureof the good.Thisis exactlythe turn takenby the problemof justicein thedoctrineof ideas;for the centralidea-the idea from which allotherideasderive their illumination, he idea which lies beyondthe sphereof all other ideas in a realmof pure being-is theidea of the good. It appears hus in everyrepresentation f thedoctrineof ideasgivenby Plato in his greatdialogueon justice,the Republic.Here the relationbetweengood andjustice is in-dicated by the determinationof justice accordingto its "use-fulness"orpracticability,whichis to say that the ideaof justicederivesits only value fromthe idea of the good.'6The good isthus the substance of justice, and for this reason Plato fre-quently identifiesthem. If these two be separated,then jus-tice, as retribution, s merelythe techniquefor the realizationof the good. Then justice, in so far as it refersto earthlymat-ters, is the state, functioningas the apparatusof retribution.Itis the state whichmustguarantee he triumphof goodover evilin this world. Since the good is strictly a social category, itfollowsthat it is onlyin the state that mancan act in conformitywith the good; indeed, it is only in the state that man as itsorgancan even know the good. Therefore, t appearsthat thedialoguewhich names itself "the State" is designedto furnishan answerto the questionconcerning he substanceof justice.Therefore, he centralpoint of the Republics in the explicationof the problemof thegood;andit is forthis reason hat the cul-minationof this work on the state is the theory of ideas, thehighestof whichappears o be the idea of the good.What the good actually is, however,one doesnot learnfrom

16 Ibid. 505.



26/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 391this dialogue,which confines tself to the affirmation hat thegood exists. The whole grandioseheaven of ideas which iserectedbeyond the earthlyworld is but the philosophicalandpoetical expressionof this affirmation.Thus this constructionof the ideal state which Plato outlines in the Republic s nosolution of the material problems concerningthe nature ofjustice. It is a misapprehensiono assumethat Plato's accountof the true state furnishesthe finishedplan of a state order.Nor is this what Plato intended-at least in the beginning.The descriptionof an idealstate is not the principalproblemofthe Republic;ndeedonly a smallpartof the workis devoted tothis subject. If Plato does presenta state "arising n thoughtbeforeoureyes,"it is becausehe presumesan analogybetweenthe state and man,andbelievesthat man can be understood heeasierif viewedin the largerproportionsof the state. Thus heseeks the good constitution, the suitablerelationshipbetweenthe individualpartsof the soul;andthis, as laterappears, s notitself justice, but the presuppositionof man acting justly.Plato mainly represents he state as just this constitutionandorganization,not as a completelyregulatedorder of materialhumanrelations. In the life of society,he showsonly the condi-tionsof organizationunderwhichlife willpresumablybe shapedto the ends of justice; but he does not explicate this justlyregulated life itself, nor does he indicate the multiplicity ofnormswhich regulatehumanrelationships, ndthemselvescon-stitute the essenceof justice. Further,the constitution of theideal state, from a legal point of view, is scarcelymore than afragmentwhichleaves all decisivequestions n doubt. Especial-ly is thereno traceto be foundof a solutionof thesocial-politicalproblem. The measureconcerning he community of goods, ofwomenand children,which is applicableonly to the compara-tively small social strata of warriorsand philosophers,has sig-nificanceonly as an organizing actor. This measurehas as itspurposethe educationand selectionof leadersand has nothingat all to do with economicor politicalcommunism.No norm is



27/35

392 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSto be found for the regulation of the people who submit to thetwo reigning classes. Here everything is left to the individualdecisions and decrees of the government, which consists of thephilosophers who, because of their education, know the goodand therefore will it. But in what does this good consist that isto be realized in government? What is the substance of the actsof governing? Only from the answer to these questions can onelearn the constitution of justice.

Plato himself says that the description of the tripartite divi-sion of the social organism as the constitution of the true stateshall in no wise be taken as an answer to the question concerningthe nature of justice. This demonstrates the particularity of hismethod, the continual postponement of the solution of prob-lems. At the very beginning of the conversation, Plato allowsSocrates, who is to give the solution, to make a statement whichin itself precludes all finality and certainty in anything thatmay follow: "Why how, my dear fellow, could anyone answer,if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess toknow, and secondly, even if he had some notion of the matter,he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any ofhis suppositions as an answer?"'7 This is not merely a statementdictated by modesty. The mysterious intimation of an obliga-tion to silence means that what Plato might say concerningjustice-apart from the refutation of false opinion-would notpossess final truth, that his exposition could not penetrate toreality. That this is its meaning is confirmed by the content ofthe dialogue.

After the constitution of the ideal state and its three classesis set out, there is no statement that: This is the justice forwhich we have been searching. The general principle which re-sults from this constitution, namely, that each shall do only hisown work, the principle of the division of labor (which is suit-able here as in every constitution which distributes competenceaccording to different organs)-this principle is not admitted

17 Ibid. 337 (Shorey).



28/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 393unreservedly to be the principle of justice. Rather, there is pro-posed an examination as to whether this principle may be ap-plied to a comparison between the state and the individual soul."But if not," it is said, "then we will look for something else."'8It is apparent that Plato is aware from the beginning that theattempt to arrive at the nature of justice by means of ananalogy between state and individual will not succeed, at leastnot completely. This is indeed the case. After the parallel hasbeen established and the three parts of the soul which corre-spond to the three parts of the state have been found, one mightbelieve that the answer to the question of the nature of justiceis obvious, even though not particularly significant. This an-swer would be that the three parts of the soul-the rational, thespirited, and that which is imprisoned in the appetite-each ofthese shall exercise its proper function and none other. In thisconnection Socrates declares: "In my opinion, we shall neverin the world apprehend this matter from such methods as weare now employing in discussion. For there is another longerand harder way that conducts to this."'9 As a matter of fact hedoes not take this other way; he is satisfied for the present tocontinue with his inexact method. This leads to the conclusionthat just action results in the true state when the philosophers,with the help of the warriors, rule over the artisan class in thesame manner in which the individual man arrives at just actionby governing his passions with the rational part of the soul, inwhich he is assisted by the spirited element. Just action thusresults from activity which is accompanied by reason. Thequestion of the substance of justice is referred to the substanceof reason. There follows a comparison of justice with the well-being of the soul, which means nothing more than the rightconstitution of the soul, and is therefore not enlightening as tothe analogy between the soul and state constitutions. Aftera rather long digression from the proper subject of justice,Socrates returns to his observation that actually a longer and

I8lbid. 434. i91lbid.35.



29/35

394 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSmoredetailedwayisnecessarynorder o understand he natureof justice. Thus at a somewhat advanced stage of the dialogue(wearealready n thesixthbook), theknowledgewhichhas thusfar been attained concerning he natureof justice is again dis-avowed.The peculiarityof the methodwhich Plato usesin treating ofthe problemof justice appearsclearlyhere. Just as one appearsto have arrived at an answerto the question, the position at-tainedis abandoned; he result obtained s withdrawnas inexactor erroneous,and the end is again postponed. At this point ofthe discussionPlato makes use of his peculiar echniqueby sub-stituting for the conceptof justice that of the good, as he hadearlier ubstitutedthe conceptof reason. The questionas to thenatureof justicebecomes then the questionas to the nature ofthe good; but when Socratesfinds it necessaryto answer thequestion"How do you accountfor the good?",he repeatstheplay begunat the beginningof the discussionwhen he was firstasked the questionas to the natureof justice. He declaresagainthat he knowsnothing,andseeksto evadethe question,so thathis companion n the discussion,Glaucon,exclaims: "In heav-en's name, Socrates,do not drawback, as it were,at the verygoal. For it will content us if you explainthe good even as youset forth the nature of justice, sobriety,and the other virtues."Again the expected result is discredited as not final; andSocrates makesfertileuse of the admission hat the goodcan bedefinedonly inexactly,for he declares:"Let us dismissfor thetime beingthe natureof the Goodin itself; for to attain to mypresent surmiseof that seems a pitch above the impulsethatwings my flighttoday.' 20 Plato hasleft "the natureof the Goodin itself" in this unsatisfactorystate, not only for the present,but for eternity, and not only in the Republic,but in all theotherdialogues.He never answersthe question.Insteadof speakingof the good, Socrateswill only talk aboutthe offspringof the good, of the son who is "mostnearlymade

20 Ibid. 5o6.



30/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 395in its likeness." So the son takes the placeof the fatherjust asreasontook the place of justice and was itself replacedby thegood. This methodof substitutionhas as its purposethe eleva-tion of the object of the discussion, justice, to a degree ofdivinity in orderthat the questionconcerning ts essentialna-turemay therebybe evaded. Indeed, it appears n this passagethat the good is for Plato the highest invisible divinity. Intruth, that which we seek is Divinity. Thereforequestionsabout its essentialnature are vain and impious. Discussionisthus cut short and the issue piously evaded. At the most, wecan only speakof the visible son and thus perhapsgain an in-sight into the natureof the father. This son of the good is thesun,and as suchis itselfa god. Plato cansay nothingof thisgodother than that he represents n the realmof the visible whatthe idea of the good represents n the realmof the conceivable.Again,nothingis saidas to the natureor substanceof the good,but only somethingconcerning ts position as the supremeau-thority. The goodis, and the highestof all. Whatit is, of whatit consists, what is its criterion,how it can be recognized nhuman activities or in the social order,and thus what is itsdecisivenaturefor social theory and practice- these questionsremain unanswered. The philosopherwho rules in the idealstate will know the good. Othersmust be content to worshipand obey.To be sure, Plato prescribesa plan for the educationof thephilosophersappointedto rule. Under the proposeddisciplinedialectic is accordedthe most importantposition. Dialectic ischaracterizedby Plato as an art abstractedfrom all sensuousexperience,which separatesand relates concepts. It will leadthe philosophero the veryboundary,but only to theboundary,of the knowable; t will not lead him to his specificgoal-theideaof the good. The ideaof the goodlies beyondallbeing,andthereforebeyondall rationalor scientificknowledge.The reali-zation of the good is reservedto another power of the soul.Consideringwhat Plato has said in the Symposium,in the



31/35

396 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSPhaedrus, and especially in Epistle VII, one must represent thevision of the highest idea of the good as an intuitive act ofsudden illumination which occurs in a moment of ecstasy.Plato describes the experience as follows: "As a result of con-tinued application to the subject itself and communion there-with, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light thatis kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes it-self."12I What Plato here describes is a religious experience. Therational speculation about concepts affords no direct access tothis experience; dialectic is rather to be understood as a spiritualexercise similar to that of prayer. The knowledge of the gooddoes not follow as a logical conclusion of the dialectical process;but it is an allotment of grace to the soul which has purifieditself of all sensuality by meditation.

Since Plato rejects all experience acquired through the outersenses as giving comprehension of the highest idea of the divinegood, he must attain this comprehension through some experi-ence other than that of the senses. It is not possible to haveeven an inner knowledge without any experience whatever; andthere must therefore be an inner sense which makes this specificreligious experience possible. This inner experience is specifical-ly distinguished from the outer in that not everyone is capableof it as everyone is capable of the outer experience. Innerknowledge is possible only to a very small elite, perhaps only toa single person blessed by God. Such a person will value thisexperience because it brings him closer to divinity, elevatinghim above other men. For this reason the religious experiencederived from such a rare inner sense cannot be expressed ra-tionally in concepts as can the experience of the outer senses;nor can it be conveyed to others. Here it becomes self-evidentthat Plato can give no answer to the question concerning theabsolute good which is the object of his religious experience.The essence of his God remains inexpressible. Thus may weunderstand Plato's statement in Epistle VII that there have

21 Epistle VII 34I (Bury).



32/35

PLATONIC JUSTICE 397beenno writingsfrom him on these questions,nor will there beany, "for it does not at all admit of verbalexpression ike otherstudies."

It is not surprisingthat a philosophershould conceal hisknowledgeof the absolute good as inexpressible,or place itwithin the frame of an esoteric philosophy. Can this be ad-mitted though when the philosopher s called upon to rule overthe state and to be the makerof laws? Plato, however,does notshrink from the consequenceswhich this involves. As it isneither possible nor permissibleto write anything concerningmatters of final importance,so one must assume that the law-giver has not put into the laws all that is of supreme mportanceto him, but that he has kept this in the most sacred shrineofhis heart.22The secret of justice cannotbe disclosed, not evenin the laws of the best of law-givers.The final conclusionofPlatonic wisdom, the answergiven againand again throughoutthe dialogues o the questionof the natureof justice,is this: Itis the divine mystery.Because there is no answer, the questionitself must finallybe rejected as inadmissible.If one may rely upon EpistleII asa source,Plato has written a reply to the question concerningthe natureof the good or divinity. He says herethat the ques-tion as to the highest good is a questionas to its qualities,anddivinity has no qualities. This very question,Plato suggests,isthe sourceof all unhappinessbecauseof the pain it causes tothe soul. Man must deliverhimselffromthis queryif he hopesto participate n truth. This is the finalconsequencewhichre-sults from the transcendentalismof the good and from itselevation to divinity; even the questionconcerning ts naturebecomes meaningless.

The Sophists had skeptically denied the existence of an ab-solute justice; Socrates had asserted it passionately and dog-matically, but was finally forced to confess that he did not knowwhat it really was. Plato declares that one may attain this

22 Ibid. 344.



33/35

398 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSknowledge through his philosophy; but he also says that theresult will be inexpressible, hat the question will remainun-answered, ndeed, that the question s not even valid. Thus theroadwhichwas to lead fromrationalistic elativism o the meta-physical absolute ends in religiousmysticism.It has been disputed that Plato was a mystic, and it may infact be doubted. His philosophyhas a pronounced ocial char-acter; his doctrine of ideas, which culminates in the idea ofjustice, clearly has a political orientation. Genuinemysticism,on the other hand, is asocial; the mystical experience solatesthe individual rom all others. In as much as God and the worldare absorbed n the subjective experienceof an isolated indi-vidual, the presuppositionof all society is lost, namely, theopposition of I and You. There remainsin the mystical expe-rience only the all-embracing which has been raised to thestatus of divinity. Therein lies the individualsalvationsoughtby the mystic. He has no desire to reformthe world, and espe-cially not the social world, but endeavors to deliver himselffrom it. He must extinguish all will, and especially the will topower, n order hat he may be enabledto receive divinitywith-in himself. The experiencewhich he seeks, coalescenceof the Iwith God, is for him the final goal-not the meansto a socialend.In fact, Plato's teachingis a genuine mysticismat its mostdecisive point, for the vision of highest being is inexpressible,i.e., it is an experiencewhich is not communicableand not theproductof rational mediation. He who has seen the good, thechosenone, the object of grace,is isolatedfrom the many whoneitherhave, norevercan,beholdthis vision. Just at the pointin Plato's philosophy when one expects an objective solution,thereappearsmerelya formula orpersonalsalvation.The aspect of Plato's thought which carriesit beyond theframe of mystical speculation, raisingit above the limits of amere individual salvation, is the aim or goal of his mysticalexperience.Plato seeksthe truthconcerninggoodandevil; jus-



34/35

PLATONICJUSTICE 399tice is the object of the vision which penetratesthe mystery;and this vision, whichmakesits appearanceonly to the philos-opher,is the justificationof the philosopher's xclusiverighttorule. In Epistle VII, Plato so energetically emphasizes the eso-teric character of his doctrine and the mystical nature of itsmysteriesthat it appearshe must deny to it any social functionwhatever. Yet here againhe maintains his formerdemandthatthe philosopher,and only the philosopher,be appointedto rule.That appearsto be a completecontradiction. How can a long-ing for individualsalvation and a claimof recognitionas rulerfind a place in the same system? Well, they obviouslyfoundaplace in the same breast, indicating a mutual enduranceinsome kind of rational compromiseeffected between their op-position.The salvationof the chosenone-he whois blessedby grace-will be accomplishedby the vision of the good; but this, thesecretof the ruler,will also accomplishsalvationfor all others,i.e., for those who are ruled. These cannot follow their ruleralongthe path of salvationto a vision of the good, and for thisreasonthey arecompletelyexcluded romruling. They canfindsalvation only in completesubmission o the authorityof therulerwho alone knows the goodand whothus willsit. Sincetheruling philosopher has a knowledge of the divine good and isunique in the possession of this secret, he is entirely differentfrom other men. The mass of the people, who have no politicalrights, are not allowed to observe divinity directly; they haveno choice but to believe in the wisdom and grace of the ruler.This belief is the groundof the unconditionalobedienceof sub-jects upon which the authority of the Platonic state rests.Plato's mysticism, the most complete expression of the irra-tional, is the justificationof his antidemocraticpolitic; it is theideologyof every autocracy.This philosophy,which has led from Platonic love throughPlatonic truth to Platonicjustice, andwhichoperatesunderthecompulsionof an immanent legality, shows us that rational



35/35

400 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICSscience can nevergive an answer o the questionconcerninghenatureof justice. Philosophynot only fails to give an answerbut leadsto the conclusion hat the questionitself is not valid.The final position it will take in all its differentforms is thatthere is no such thing as absolutejustice: it cannot be deter-mined conceptionally.Such an ideal is an illusion. There areonly interestsand conflictsof interests,which are either com-promised nto harmony or left in a state of strife. Within thesphereof reason the idea of justice vanishes,leaving only theidea of peace. The concept which can stand the scrutiny ofreason s not justice but peace.Justice resides, nevertheless, despite all reason, in man'sheart. The needand the desireof manfor a justicethat is morethan compromiseand more than mererestrainingof potentialenemiesdefy the attempts of reason to exorcisethe ideal ofjustice as a dangerous llusion. Man'sbeliefin a higher aw andin a supremegood remainsforeverunshaken. History is a wit-ness to the actual indestructibilityof this belief. If the beliefbe an illusion,then is illusionindeedstronger han reality. Formostmen-perhaps forallmen-there aresomeproblemswhichcannot be translatedinto theoreticalpuzzles to be solved byanalysisof concepts,someissueswhichcannotbe posed as ques-tions to be answeredby reason. That menwill ever be satisfiedwith the answerof the Sophists s not likely. Men will continueto searchout the religious road along which Plato struggled,even thoughit be a roadof blood and tears.

GENEVA

Documents

Divine Platon