Università degli Studi di Cagliari

DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN STORIA, ISTITUZIONI E

RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI DELL’ASIA E

DELL’AFRICA MODERNA E CONTEMPORANEA

XXVI Ciclo

Power and Dams in Central Asia

Settore scientifico disciplinare di afferenza

SPS/14

Presentata da: Dott. Filippo Menga

Coordinatore Dottorato: Prof.ssa Bianca Maria Carcangiu

Tutor/Relatore Prof.ssa Annamaria Baldussi

Esame finale anno accademico 2012 – 2013

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to analyse and understand the role of state power in

transboundary water relations, providing an in–depth analysis of the evolution of interstate

relations in Central Asia in the field of water in the period 1991-2011. Taking as a case

study the planned construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan, the research looks at the various forms of overt and covert power shaping

interstate relations and at the way hegemonic and counter-hegemonic measures are put in

place in an international river basin. The overarching hypothesis driving this study is that

the intimate correlation between the concepts of power and hegemony can offer key

insights to the analysis and understanding of transboundary water relations. While, on the

one hand, the analytical focus is placed on state power, on the other hand, hegemonic and

counter-hegemonic tactics represent the ways in which power is wielded and observed.

This research makes an original contribution to the literature on hydropolitics in Central

Asia, offering fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of power and counter-

hegemony in the Aral Sea basin and presenting the original “circle of hydro-hegemony”, an

analytical framework in which the various forms of power are “connective” in the function

of hegemony. A further value is added by three timelines expressly created for the research

and that represent, at the time of writing, the most detailed reference-supported collection

of events of this kind for the Central Asian region in the period 1991-2011.

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Для Ахмета

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Table of contents

Illustrations .......................................................................................................................... vi

List of abbreviations .......................................................................................................... viii

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... x

Chapter 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1

1.1. The politics of international waters ...................................................................................... 2

1.1.1. The Neo-Malthusian approach and the water-war theory ......................................... 5

1.1.2. The Cornucopian or neoliberal approach .................................................................... 9

1.1.3. Critical hydropolitics .................................................................................................... 10

1.1.4. Hydraulic infrastructures and political power .......................................................... 12

1.2. Choice of the case studies .................................................................................................... 14

1.3. Aim of the thesis and research questions ........................................................................... 18

1.4. Outline of the dissertation ................................................................................................... 20

1.5. Originality and scientific value of the research ................................................................. 23

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and methodology ..................................................... 25

2.1. Constructivism ..................................................................................................................... 25

2.1.1. Constructivism and hydropolitics ............................................................................... 27

2.2. Power..................................................................................................................................... 29

2.2.1. Three dimensions of power .......................................................................................... 30

2.2.2. From hard to soft power .............................................................................................. 34

2.3. Hegemony ............................................................................................................................. 36

2.3.1 Hegemony applied to IR ............................................................................................... 38

2.4. The framework of hydro-hegemony ................................................................................... 41

2.5. Hydro-hegemony revisited .................................................................................................. 46

2.5.1. Counter-hegemonic strategies: a neglected concept .................................................. 48

2.5. The TWINS framework ...................................................................................................... 50

2.5.1. Conflict intensity ........................................................................................................... 51

2.5.2. Cooperation intensity ................................................................................................... 52

2.5.3. Application of TWINS to this study ............................................................................ 53

2.6. Data collection and methods of analysis ............................................................................ 54

Chapter 3. Water relations in Central Asia ..................................................................... 56

3.1. Background on transboundary waters and international water law .............................. 56

3.1.1. Defining transboundary waters ................................................................................... 57

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3.1.2. Principles of international water law .......................................................................... 59

3.1.3. Principles of Soviet water law ...................................................................................... 62

3.2. Hydrological and geographical aspects of the Aral Sea basin ......................................... 64

3.2.1. The meaning of water for Central Asian people ........................................................ 67

3.3. The Soviet hydraulic mission .............................................................................................. 69

3.3.1. Bringing water to the desert ........................................................................................ 69

3.4. The water/energy nexus ....................................................................................................... 73

3.5. A weak institutional framework ......................................................................................... 75

3.6. Twenty years of water relations .......................................................................................... 80

3.6.1. Coexisting conflict and cooperation ............................................................................ 80

3.6.2. Three stages of regional relations ................................................................................ 83

3.6.3. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ........................................................................................... 88

3.6.4. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan ......................................................................................... 92

3.7. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 95

Chapter 4. The Rogun Dam ............................................................................................... 97

4.1. Overview of the Rogun dam ................................................................................................ 97

4.1.1. Independent Tajikistan and the Rogun dam.............................................................. 99

4.2. Expected impact of the Rogun dam ................................................................................. 100

4.2.1. A step towards energy independence ........................................................................ 101

4.2.2. A strong political symbol and a unifying element .................................................... 105

4.2.3. Potential threats to the reliability of water supplies and to the environment ....... 107

4.2.4. The ensuing debate ..................................................................................................... 108

4.3. Tajik counter-hegemonic tactics ....................................................................................... 109

4.3.1. Internal support: creation of a Rogun ideology ....................................................... 111

4.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources ........................................................................... 114

4.3.2.1. Involving countries… ........................................................................................... 115

4.3.2.1. …and financial institutions ................................................................................. 118

4.3.3. Internationalising Rogun ........................................................................................... 119

4.3.3.1. Rogun meets the UN (and a few more) ............................................................... 120

4.3.3.2. Water conferences ................................................................................................ 124

4.3.4. Knowledge construction ............................................................................................. 126

4.4. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 128

Chapter 5. The Kambarata Dam .................................................................................... 130

5.1. Overview of the Kambarata Dam .................................................................................... 130

5.1.1. Independent Kyrgyzstan and Kambarata ................................................................ 133

5.1.2. Between corruption and internal criticism............................................................... 135

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5.2. Expected impact of Kambarata ........................................................................................ 137

5.2.1. Boosting Kyrgyzstan’s energy production ............................................................... 137

5.2.2. Kambarata is good for Kyrgyzstan! ......................................................................... 139

5.2.3. Environmental problems and the setting of a precedent ........................................ 140

5.2.4. The ensuing debate ..................................................................................................... 142

5.3. Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics ................................................................................... 143

5.3.1. Promoting Kambarata at the domestic level ............................................................ 145

5.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources ........................................................................... 148

5.3.2.1. The international consortium and the involvement of Kazakhstan................. 149

5.3.2.2. The Russian loan and the Manas affair .............................................................. 150

5.3.3. International support ................................................................................................. 152

5.3.3.1. Proactive diplomacy ............................................................................................. 153

5.3.4. Knowledge construction ............................................................................................. 156

5.4. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 158

Chapter 6. Uzbek hegemonic tactics ............................................................................... 159

6.1. Perceiving a threat ............................................................................................................. 159

6.2. Seeking international support ........................................................................................... 162

6.2.1. Reactive diplomacy ................................................................................................. 163

6.2.2. Incentives to get allies ............................................................................................. 167

6.3. Knowledge construction .................................................................................................... 169

6.4. Recourse to international law ........................................................................................... 171

6.5. Beyond diplomacy: active stalling .................................................................................... 172

6.5.1. Issue linkage ............................................................................................................. 173

6.6. Resource capture ................................................................................................................ 175

6.7. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 176

Chapter 7. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 178

7.1. The two case studies compared ......................................................................................... 178

7.2. The research questions unwrapped .................................................................................. 180

7.3. Main contributions, limitations of the study and areas for future research ................. 182

Annex 1. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 187

1. Research process ............................................................................................................... 187

2. Creation of three chronologies ......................................................................................... 188

3. Speech acts ......................................................................................................................... 189

4. Discourse analysis .............................................................................................................. 190

Annex 2. Water relations in Central Asia 1991-2011 .................................................... 192

Annex 3. Timeline of the Rogun dam ............................................................................. 242

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Annex 4. Timeline of the Kambarata dam ..................................................................... 267

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 288

1. Monographs and edited books ......................................................................................... 288

2. Articles from academic journals, edited books and conference proceedings .............. 296

3. Doctoral and master theses ............................................................................................... 308

4. Reports and Policy Briefs from International Organizations, Governmental Agencies

and Think Tanks ....................................................................................................................... 308

5. Agreements, Legal Instruments and Resolutions ........................................................... 311

6. Speeches, Official Documents and Open Letters ............................................................ 314

7. News reports and newspaper articles .............................................................................. 318

Illustrations

List of Figures

Figure 1: Narrowing down the scope of the research ........................................................................ 19 Figure 2: Schematic overview of the thesis structure and of its research questions. ........................ 21 Figure 3: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power. ............................................ 35 Figure 4: The relationship of forces in an historical structure........................................................... 39 Figure 5: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping with hegemony 41 Figure 6: The pillars of hydro-hegemony ......................................................................................... 43 Figure 7: The circle of hydro-hegemony ........................................................................................... 47 Figure 8: The TWINS diagram ......................................................................................................... 50 Figure 9: Different types of rivers. .................................................................................................... 58 Figure 10: The four traditional principles of international water law ............................................... 60 Figure 11: The Aral Sea basin. .......................................................................................................... 65 Figure 12: Water flow generation and abstraction (average km3 per year) in the Aral Sea basin .... 66 Figure 13: Simplified overview of the organizational structure of IFAS .......................................... 78 Figure 14: Water issues in the Ferghana Valley................................................................................ 83 Figure 15: Trajectory of Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011) ............................................ 91 Figure 16: Trajectory of Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011) .......................................... 94 Figure 17: Tajikistan’s monthly electricity generation vs. demand in 2009 ................................... 102 Figure 18: Hydroelectric system of the Vakhsh river ..................................................................... 103 Figure 19: The Central Asian Electric Grid .................................................................................... 104 Figure 20: Building the Rogun dam: the four tactics forming the Tajik counter-hegemonic strategy

......................................................................................................................................................... 110 Figure 21: Overview of existing and projected power stations in the Naryn river ......................... 131 Figure 22: Building the Kambarata dam: the four tactics forming the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic

strategy ............................................................................................................................................ 144 Figure 23: Wielding power: the five tactics forming the Uzbek hegemonic strategy ..................... 162 Figure 24: Natural gas pipelines in Central Asia ............................................................................ 173 Figure 25: Timeframe of the research ............................................................................................. 187

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List of Tables

Table 1: The Rogun and Kambarata dams compared ....................................................................... 16 Table 2: Water Distribution Limits in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins according to Protocol

566 and Protocol 413. ....................................................................................................................... 72 Table 3: Key data on water availability and usage in Central Asia ................................................... 74 Table 4: Concise timeline of the Rogun project ................................................................................ 98 Table 5: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1999-2012.

......................................................................................................................................................... 122 Table 6: Concise timeline of the Kambarata project. ...................................................................... 132 Table 7: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1999-

2012. ................................................................................................................................................ 154 Table 8: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan, 1999-2012. .................................................................................................................. 164

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List of abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

AOA Annual Operation Agreement

ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

BVO River basin organizations, Basseynoe Vodnoe Obedinenie

CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization

CAPS Central Asia Power System

CASA-1000 Central Asia South Asia Electricity Trade and Transmission Project

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

EC IFAS Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea

GDP Gross Domestic Product

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EMU Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan

EP European Parliament

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FHH Framework of hydro-hegemony

GoK Government of Kyrgyzstan

GoT Government of Tajikistan

GoU Government of Uzbekistan

HPP Hydro Power Plant

HPS Hydro Power Station

HST Hegemonic stability theory

ICAS Interstate Council on the Aral Sea Basin

ICG International Crisis Group

ICWC Interstate Commission for Water Coordination

IFAS International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea

ILO International Labour Organization

IPO Initial Public Offering

KM3

Cubic kilometre

kWh Kilowatt hour

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MP Member of Parliament

MW Megawatt

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PM Prime Minister

SSR Soviet Socialist Republic

TFDD Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

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UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNRCCA United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB World Bank

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Acknowledgements

While many scholars tend to compare their PhD journey to mountain climbing, I would

rather see this as a tennis tournament, both because being born near the sea I haven’t had

much experience ascending peaks, and also because I wanted to find a way to quote Andre

Agassi’s book Open in my thesis without going too much out of topic. Indeed, as Agassi

pointed out, tennis is a sport in which you are by yourself. If you win you get all the glory,

but if you lose you get all the shame. Yet, for as much fascinating (or frustrating) this might

sound, one thing is more important than winning or losing a tournament: your entourage.

They are the ones that support you, and they are also the ones that help you improve your

game. Likewise, although I bear responsibility for the content of this thesis, many people

have helped me to make it more solid and improve “my game”, and I will try to thank all of

them in the lines below.

My supervisor, Prof. Annamaria Baldussi, for her advice and support and for the lengthy

and stimulating discussions about power and hegemony that we had during the last three

years in her studio. I also owe a great deal to Prof. Sally Cummings, who has been an

outstanding source of support and inspiration. I am profoundly grateful to her for sharing

with me her time and knowledge, and our talk under a boiling sun in Calamosca remains a

turning point in the development of this research. In the same way, I have greatly benefited

from numerous thought-provoking discussions with Dr. Naho Mirumachi, who I would also

like to thank for her exceptional availability and generosity.

Others have contributed to the realisation of this thesis by discussing with me its content,

theoretical framework and methodology, by pointing me in the right direction or towards

the right person (or book), or more simply by believing in me. They are (in alphabetical

order): Richard Bater, Barbara Bompani, Andrea Corsale, Esther Delbourg, Ariel Dinar,

Shlomi Dinar, Ines Dombrowski, Lawrence Dritsas, Aide Esu, Birte Förster, Matteo

Fumagalli, Rico Isaacs, Frédéric Lasserre, Alex Loftus, Nate Matthews, François Molle,

Laura Movilla Pateiro, Tekeste Negash, Paul Nugent, Mariya Pak, Abel Polese, Giovanni

Sistu, Isabella Soi, Max Spiegelberg and Wolfgang Zeller.

Furthermore, my thanks go to the University of Cagliari for funding this research and to

Prof. Bianca Maria Carcangiu for her work coordinating the activities of our doctorate. The

administrative staff of King’s College London and of the University of St Andrews also

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deserve my gratitude, as they have managed to make my stay in these two wonderful

universities pleasant and uneventful. Similarly, I am grateful to the organisers of the

EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School on Management of International Water for

inviting me to participate, and for giving me the opportunity to spend a week in the island

of San Servolo with such a stimulating group of people.

On a personal note, I would like to thank my family, and particularly my parents, for

their continuous support and for bearing the discomfort of having a son that sometimes

forgets that hegemony and counter-hegemony are not necessarily a thrilling conversation

topic. In the same way, my friends Alessandra, Francesca, Giorgia, Klara, Marcella, Marisa,

David, Federico, Filippo, Irene, Lawrence, Mario, Matteo, Michele, Michele and Nicola

deserve my gratitude and perhaps my apologies for the poor social life I have been leading

during these last years. I also thank Heather, for having me in that delightful little house in

Kingsbarns, Daniele, for running to a library in Bologna and get me “that” book on such a

short notice, and Davide, for helping me with a project that means a lot to me.

Finally, I thank Anna, my safe haven, my source of inspiration and love. Without her this

whole project wouldn’t exist.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Water does not resist. Water flows. When you plunge your hand into it, all

you feel is a caress. Water is not a solid wall, it will not stop you. But water

always goes where it wants to go, and nothing in the end can stand against it.

Water is patient. Dripping water wears away a stone. Remember that, my

child. Remember you are half water. If you can't go through an obstacle, go

around it. Water does.

Margaret Atwood, The Penelopiad, 2005

The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 was one of the crucial events of

the twentieth century. Never before in history had an event of this social and political

magnitude emerged with almost no violence (Kramer, 2003). Besides its global impact, that

marked the end of the Cold War and of the bipolar international system of superpowers1

(Huntington, 1999), the vanishing of the last multinational empire gave birth to fifteen

countries, as the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR all in a sudden acquired the

status of sovereign states2. Among them, the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which never existed before as

distinct states, were the less prepared to manage an unexpected and not necessarily sought

independence (Mandelbaum, 1994).

These five countries were literally thrust out of the USSR when Russia, Belarus and

Ukraine decided to re-form themselves as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

1 The bipolar system of the Cold War had two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, whose relations

were central to international politics. According to Samuel Huntington (1999), with the breakdown of the

USSR a new “uni-multipolar” system emerged, populated by one “lonely superpower”, the United States, and

several major powers, such as Germany, France, China and Brazil. It is worth noting that Stanley Hoffmann,

the eminent liberal politologist, acknowledged the end of the postwar bipolar world already in 1972, based on

his conception of world politics in terms of distinct issue areas, that he defined alternative chessboards

(Hoffmann, 1972) 2 The three predominantly Slavic countries, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, were joined by the Baltic republics,

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Caucasian ones, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the five Central

Asian states.

2

in December 1991 (Olcott, 1996: 4). One of the implications of this premature birth was

that the old economic and political ties established by the USSR ceased to exist, and with

them the centralised Soviet resource distribution system that managed the exchange and

allocation of water, energy and food supplies among the republics. A whole new set of

international relations emerged, and the newly formed Central Asian governments had to

redefine the policies related to the exchange and sharing of their natural resources. The

interconnections and interdependence that emerged from this complex scenario, and the

related power dynamics in interstate relations in Central Asia3, are the subject of this thesis.

This chapter first provides a literature review of the recent academic debate on the

politics of transboundary waters and of large dams, to then introduce the two case studies

adopted for this research. Subsequently, it illustrates the research questions driving this

study, its main objectives, and the structure adopted to carry out this analysis. Finally, it

outlines the originality of the research, explaining where it stands in relation to

hydropolitics and Central Asian Studies.

1.1. The politics of international waters

This section reviews hydropolitics literature, presenting different views on how water

resources can affect interstate relations. After a discussion of the two main approaches, the

Neo-Malthusian and the Cornucopian, critical hydropolitics will be introduced and

subsequently linked with the main studies that delved on the relation between water

management and the distribution of power within states. This digression is relevant to the

understanding of the political rationale behind the construction of large dams such as the

Rogun and Kambarata, and also to outline where this study stands in relation to the

hydropolitical debate.

3 To avoid ambiguity, throughout this study the term Central Asia refers to the region formed by the five

former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan. The current understanding of Central Asia as the region formed by these five countries comes

predominantly from the common past that these countries share as territorial colonies of the Russian Empire

and, after 1917, of the Soviet Union (although, as John Heathershaw noted, “it is not universally accepted

when or to what extent Central Asia was, is or will be historically postcolonial”) (Heathershaw, 2010: 88). On

the geographical delimitations of Central Asia, Frederick S. Starr (2008) called for the revamp of the

historical idea of a “Greater Central Asia”, a broader region that also includes the Chinese Autonomous

region of the Xinjiang and Northern Afghanistan. An even wider Central Asian region includes the Khorasan

province of Iran, the northern part of Pakistan, inner Mongolia, the Russian area of Tatarstan, Kashmir, Tibet,

Qinghai and Gansu (Cowan, 2007).

3

Water is a quintessential component for life and for the development of societies. Water

is also an irreplaceable and transient resource, which crosses political boundaries in the

form of rivers, lakes and groundwater aquifers. Freshwater resources account for only 2.5

% of the total world water4, and this relative scarcity further increases their political and

economic relevance.

While Peter Mollinga (2001: 733) concisely observed that “[a]t a general level, the

statement that “water is politics” hardly needs any defence”, initially, the study of

international transboundary waters has been linked primarily with security studies. In this

regard, the end of the Cold War set a milestone causing the falling-off of the traditional

security threats and the development of a new global political agenda. Problems that

disregard national borders, such as global warming, water scarcity and heavy pollution,

emphasized the world's growing environmental interdependence, redefining the concept of

national sovereignty and stressing the need for regional rather than national solutions. A

crucial contribution to the debate was brought by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School

(Buzan et al., 1998), which stretched the classic notion of security within the field of

international relations to include the new key concepts of “securitization”, “sectors” and

“regional security complexes”. As Buzan observed, “something is designated as an

international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than

other issues and should take absolute priority (…) and it is presented as an existential

threat”. This applies also to the environment and to current water challenges, that “reflect

the larger struggles among states to secure their boundaries and establish control over their

territories” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Hence, as explained by Turton (2003), the association

between security concerns and water management brought to the “securitization of water

resource management”.

Towards the end of the 80s, with a ground-breaking article published in the review

Foreign Affairs, Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989) called for a redefinition of the concept

of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues5. A few

4 Of this 2.5 %, only 0.3 % (around 105 000 km

3) is constituted by freshwater lakes and rivers.

5 Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989: 164) argued that an important paradox has to be taken into consideration

when examining natural resources: nonrenewable resources (such as coal and oil) are in fact inexhaustible,

while renewable resources can be finite. On the one hand, humankind will find substitutes and alternative

technologies to nonrenewable resources as they become scarce and more expensive. On the other hand, this

4

years later, in 1994, Robert Kaplan’s pessimist and highly debated article “The Coming

Anarchy” (1994) defined the environment as the key national-security issue of the early

twenty-first century, the one that will set the tone for international relations in the years to

come. It is in this context that water management became associated with security issues,

and a new debate emerged among those who saw the use of shared international

watercourses as a vector of conflict or cooperation, initiating a new field of IR called

hydropolitics.

If, on the one hand, the connection between water and politics had already been studied

in 1957 by Karl August Wittfogel (see paragraph 1.1.4), on the other hand, the term

hydropolitics appeared for the first time in the title of a book by John Waterbury (1979) that

discussed tensions originating from diverging interests in the use of the river Nile. Since

then, many scholars have used it as a keyword in their research (e.g. Ohlsson, 1995; Wolf,

1995; Elhance, 1999; Trottier, 1999; Allan, 2001; Turton and Henwood, 2002). As defined

by Elhance (1999: 3), hydropolitics is “the systematic study of conflict and cooperation

between states over water resources that transcend international borders”. Starting from this

dual dimension of the discipline, marked by conflict and cooperation, two main branches of

thought can be distinguished: a Neo-Malthusian school, which sees water as a potential

reason for conflict, and a Cornucopian ramification, which underlines the cooperative

potential of water. These two branches correspond to the two main discourses forming the

rationalist paradigm of IR, realism and liberalism, that since the late 1980s have been

theoretically countered by the constructivist approach to IR6 (Katzenstein et al., 1998).

will not be possible for renewable resources, since an overfished fishery will not recover, extinct species will

not reappear and eroded topsoil cannot be replaced. 6 As Katzenstein et al. noted, rationalist theories of IR take into consideration a world formed by “rational

actors with unproblematically specified interests, competing in a situation characterized by scarce resources”.

Conversely, “constructivist theories look to the humanities and sociology for insights into how ‘‘reality,’’

including the interests that partially constitute the identity of actors, is socially constructed” (Katzenstein et

al., 1998: 646).

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1.1.1. The Neo-Malthusian approach and the water-war theory

In the neo-Malthusian7 conflict scenario, rapidly growing populations will cause

degradation and scarcity of natural resources, consequently increasing the risk of violent

conflict over scarce resources (Urdal, 2005: 418). Neo-Malthusian authors (among the

others, Falkenmark, 1992; Gleick, 1993; Gleditsch, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994 and 1999;

Toset et al., 2000; Klare, 2001; Russell and Morris, 2006) have observed that when

countries share a common resource such as water, if this resource becomes scarce

governments will take all necessary measures to defend it, including actions that lead to

conflict. According to these authors, scarcity exacerbates the interdependence of river

riparians and brings them to competition and disputes.

This leads us to the water-war thesis, that became particularly popular in the early 1990s

(Cooley, 1984; Starr, 1991; Villiers, 1999) with the emergence of the new and broadened

understanding of security. In a widely cited article, Joyce R. Starr (1991: 17) asserted that

“as early as the mid-1980s, U.S. government intelligence services estimated that there were

at least 10 places in the world where war could break out over dwindling shared water […]

into the perilous zone where all available fresh surface and groundwater supplies will be

fully utilized.” Similarly, Michael T. Klare (2002: 23) predicted military conflicts resulting

from freshwater needs and identified three main factors that will increase tensions: i)

escalating demand; ii) resource shortages and iii) the proliferation of ownership contests. In

an interview released in 20088, Klare also stated that between oil and water, “the more

likely conflicts will be over water”. Likewise, Leif Ohlsson (1995: 20) supported the water-

war theory, asserting that conflicts over water have already been a major contributing cause

of war and annexation of territories in at least one case: the 1967 Six-Days Arab-Israeli

War.

But what does exactly the term “water scarcity” mean? The Swedish hydrologist Malin

Falkenmark (Falkenmark at el., 1989) created the widely adopted “water stress index”, that

defined water scarcity as the condition when the amount of renewable freshwater available

for each person each year in a given country is below 1,000 cubic meters. When the amount

7 Modern Malthusianism or Neo-Malthusianism takes its name from Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle

of Population (1798), which predicted that demography-induced resource scarcity will eventually lead to

either famine or war. 8 Big Think Forum, “Which is More Likely: Oil Wars or Water Wars?”. Available from:

http://bigthink.com/ideas/1883 [Accessed 4 January 2012].

6

is below 1,700 cubic meter per person per year, a country is in a “water stress” situation,

and when it is below 500 cubic meter, the condition is of “absolute water scarcity”.

According to Falkenmark (1990), water problems such as water pollution, water scarcity,

and land degradation will be in the future exacerbated by population growth and this “water

barrier” to success will limit the security of livelihood, socioeconomic development, and

quality of life in developing countries. On obstacles to development, Phillips (2006: 19)

added that “conflict arises over water resources when riparian States feel constrained in

their ability to realize their national goals and objectives, generally as a result of one or

more coriparians unilaterally using the resource”. It is worth noting that Malin Falkenmark

(2007) later revisited and expanded the concept of scarcity focusing not only on physical

scarcity but also on issues related to power structures and social contexts.

Water being a finite resource, Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) from the Toronto Group

made a distinction among non-renewable and renewable resources, identifying for the latter

three main sources of scarcity: unequal social distribution, environmental change and

population growth. Through the analysis of numerous water disputes around the planet,

Homer-Dixon concluded that “the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate

resource war is river-water” (1994: 19), since environmental scarcity causes violent

conflicts both at the internal and (to a lesser extent) at the international level. A few years

later, however, Homer-Dixon (1999) revised his position and questioned the often-cited

statement of the World Bank’s Vice President for Environmentally Sustainable

Development, Ismail Serageldin, that in 1995 had declared that “the wars of the next

century will be fought over water” (Crossette, 1995). Homer-Dixon (1999: 139) countered

that “in reality, wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are

likely only in a narrow set of circumstances [and] There are, in fact very few river basins

around the world where all these conditions hold now or might hold in the future.”

Some of the most well-known water-war declarations9 were also quoted by Peter Gleick

(1993: 79) to affirm that “water and water-supply systems are increasingly likely to be both

9 In 1979, the then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared that “the only matter that could take Egypt to

war again is water”. Likewise, in 1988 the then-Egypt’s foreign minister, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who later

became the UN Secretary-General) declared that “The next war in our region will be over the waters of the

Nile, not politics”. Gleick also cited Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol's speech at Tiberias in 1965, in which the

politician stated that “Water is a question of life for Israel," and that therefore "Israel would act to ensure that

7

objectives of military action and instruments of war as human populations grow, as

improving standards of living increase the demand for fresh water, and as global climatic

changes make water supply and demand more problematic and uncertain”. Gleick

supported his assertions with a detailed chronology in which he classified 54 historical and

ongoing disputes and conflicts over freshwater resources10

(1998: 25–31). Additionally,

Gleick (1993) argued that there are four factors or characteristics that make water likely to

be a source of strategic rivalry: 1) the degree of scarcity; 2) the extent to which the water

supply is shared by more than one region or state; 3) the relative power of the basin states

and 4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources11

.

Linking water and politics, Miriam Lowi examined the Jordan River basin and the

dispute between Israel and Palestine to explain how problems related to water have to be

analysed in the context of “low politics” of water, and “high politics” of war and diplomacy

(Lowi, 1993: 9). In other words, the solution of water problems is closely linked and

subordinated to the solution of broader political issues (such as territory or statehood). Her

realist approach is then the exact opposite of the functionalist belief that collaboration in the

water sector will have a positive spillover effect on larger political issues. Lowi also adapts

the neo-realist Hegemonic Stability Theory to the water sector, arguing that when the

upstream riparian is also the hegemon (i.e. the most powerful state in the basin), the

chances that cooperation takes place are low since it has no interest or incentive in doing

so. Cooperation is more probable when the hegemon is located downstream and it has a

critical need of water. However, Dinar et al. (2007: 150) efficiently contradicted Lowi’s

argument, taking as an example the Colorado River salinity issue between the United States

and Mexico. In this case, the former – being both the hegemonic and the upstream state –

the waters continue to flow" (Gleick, 1993: 85-86). For more declarations prospecting water-wars see also

Toset et al. (2000: 972-973). 10

In all these cases, water was an instrument or a target of war, not the cause. In the website of the Pacific

Institute “The Wolrd’s Water”, Gleick provides an even larger chronology of 265 water conflicts

(http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ [Accessed 21 November 2013]) stretching from 3000 B.C. to 2012,

in which water was either a military goal, a military target, a military tool, a political tool, a development

dispute or a terrorism target. 11

Moreover, according to Gleick (1998) it is in particular the mismanagement and misallocation of water

resources that hampers the resolution of water conflicts in various regions in the world.

8

not only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid the high costs of desalinating

the waters flowing downstream12

.

Several researchers associated with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in

Oslo also contributed to the debate. Toset et al. (2000) confirmed the link between scarcity

and conflict, adding that probabilities for conflict rise when a river crosses a border rather

than when it forms it, as “the upstream/downstream relationship appears to be the form of

shared river most frequently associated with conflict” (2000: 972). However, they seem less

convinced than other authors in establishing a connection between water and conflict. For

instance, they comment the work carried out by Malin Falkenmark and Peter Gleick stating

that “these authors have not demonstrated that problems of water-sharing have actually

played an important role in escalating conflicts to war” (2000: 978), concluding that “we do

not have much solid evidence for saying that sharing a river provides a major source of

armed conflict, or that water scarcity is the only or even the main issue in whatever such

conflicts do occur” (2000: 993).

Further exploring the relation between water and conflict, Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998:

382-383) included water in a list of five resources considered as worth fighting for, the

remaining four being territory, strategic raw materials, energy and food. Gleditsch based his

arguments on a causal chain of events that sees population growth leading to deteriorated

environmental conditions, increasing resource scarcity and a subsequent harsher

competition for resources that thus augments the risk of violence. A few years later

however, Gleditsch et al. (2006: 362) wrote that “support for a scarcity theory of water

conflict is somewhat ambiguous”. According to this study, it is the size of the basin – larger

basins reduce the probabilities of having a conflict – and not the number of river crossings

or the share of the basin upstream that is associated with conflict. Thus, the authors share

neo-Malthusian concerns but they do not find evidence for water wars, as, in their opinion,

shared waters resources can stimulate low-level interstate conflict but also be an important

incentive for more cooperation. And indeed, a large end expanding epistemic community

has stressed the cooperative sides of water rather than the conflictual ones, as outlined in

the following paragraph.

12

The United States government decided to cooperate because it wanted to preserve a good regional and

international image, and also because by doing so it hoped that Mexico would encourage a similar

cooperation on other sensible matters such as drug trafficking and immigration.

9

1.1.2. The Cornucopian or neoliberal approach

The gloomy scenario predicted by Neo-Malthusianism clearly diverges with the

optimistic perspective often referred to as Cornucopian13

. Detractors of the water-war

theory argue that such predictions are too alarmist and that there is no historical evidence to

support them. Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008: 298) observe that such view was propagated

in part by sensationalist media articles and declarations released by various UN Secretary-

Generals, recalling pessimistic statements from Boutros Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan14

.

Towards the end of the 1990s, numerous studies started to emphasize the cooperative

aspect of water resources (e.g. Deudney and Mattew, 1999; Elhance, 1999; Wolf and

Hamner, 2000; Allan, 2001; Jägerskog, 2003; Phillips, 2006; Wolf et al., 2006;

Dannreuther, 2007; Hamner, 2008; Dinar et al., 2011). This shift towards cooperation led to

a “desecuritization of water resource management” (Turton, 2003: 96), bringing issues

related to water back to the sphere of political negotiations, and out of crisis mode where

threat perceptions impede a constructive dialogue. Marwa Daoudy (2010) viewed this

“desecuritization” of transboundary water resources as a factor that could both facilitate

negotiated agreements between states and contribute to the diffusion of the concept of

benefit sharing, that, according to Phillips (2006: 53) “needs to be significantly developed,

if it is to become of real utility in the debate on trans-boundary water resource

management”.

In 2000, a ground-breaking study carried out at the Oregon State University by a team of

scholars led by Aaron Wolf (Wolf, 2000 and later) produced a decisive paradigm shift

towards a discourse of cooperation15

. Based on 1,831 instances of conflict and cooperation

13

Named after the cornucopia, the horn of plenty, a symbol of abundance in ancient Greek mythology. 14

More recently, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon underlined the potential that water has in fueling

wars and conflicts (Lewis, 2007). However, in 2011 Ban Ki Moon shifted the focus from scarcity to

mismanagement, urging “governments to recognize the urban water crisis for what it is – a crisis of

governance, weak policies and poor management, rather than one of scarcity” (United Nations Secretary-

General, 2011). 15

Significantly, in 2006 during the highly influential World Water Week (an event organized yearly by the

Stockholm International Water Institute) this move towards a cooperative discourse was reflected in the

statements released by participants. Among the others, Arunabha Ghosh, co-author of the 2006 Human

Development Report, declared that “Water wars make good newspaper headlines but cooperation

[agreements] don't […] and there are plenty of bilateral, multilateral and trans-boundary agreements for

watersharing - all or most of which do not make good newspaper copy”. Likewise, Asit K. Biswas declared

10

occurred within an international river basin of the world from 1948 to 1999, the

“Freshwater Transboundary Dispute Database” (FTDD) shows that riparians are more

inclined to cooperate rather than entering into conflicts. The analysis demonstrated that

during the last 4,500 years there have been 3,600 water related treaties and only one known

water war between nations, happened in 2,500 B.C. between the Sumerian states of Lagash

and Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin (Wolf 2007: 20). The reason for this

predominance of cooperation is that water is too important to fight over it. At the sub-

national level, water can exacerbate existing tensions and even cause conflicts, but at the

inter-state level things go differently (Wolf et al., 2006).

With an approach that recalls the functionalist perspective, water negotiations are seen

as a vector that bring countries together building trust and prevent conflicts also at the

“higher” political level. As stated by Wolf, a comprehensive approach to water-based

conflicts is needed as well as more research aimed at understanding how an “international,

indispensable, and emotional” resource as water (Wolf et al., 2006: 5) best contributes to

cooperation and peace among nations. Corroborating Wolf’s findings, Hamner (2008: 93)

asserts that “there is a global history of water-related violence, but at the sub-national

level”. Tensions connected to water are thus acknowledged, along with the fact that

existing tensions between countries cannot be attributed to the only issue of water sharing

but also to broader pre-existing sources of conflict (Lasserre, 2009; Phillips, 2006).

1.1.3. Critical hydropolitics

In juxtaposition with this dichotomous approach to water politics, the latest tendency in

the hydropolitics debate has been to analyse the connection between conflict and

cooperation (Postel and Wolf, 2001; Wolf et al., 2003) and the coexistence of these two

phenomena (Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Earle, Jägerskog

et al., 2010; Zeitoun et al., 2011).

Furthermore, a critical approach to hydropolitics emerged in contrast to mainstream

rationalist studies of water politics, to delve on underdeveloped aspects of transboundary

water conflicts and cooperation. Sneddon and Fox (2006) sketched the outlines of a critical

that water wars are “absolute nonsense because this is not going to happen - at least not during the next 100

years” (Inter Press Service, 2006).

11

hydropolitics, to examine the ways in which discursive strategies influence interactions

among basin riparians, identify nodes of water conflict (e.g., a large dam), and explore how

images and representations of political actors shape particular geopolitical orders. Along a

similar line, Warner and Zeitoun (2008) brought forward a new approach that mixes IR

critical theory to transboundary water issues16

to understand political processes and power

relations in international river basins. The aim of this new framework of analysis it to apply

“critical and Realist IR theory to hydropolitics in a way that avoids ‘water wars’ or ‘water

peace’ discourses and, by pointing at the layered nature of hegemonic struggles, opens up

the scope to consenting and non-consenting victims of water deals between states” (Warner

and Zeitoun, 2008: 809).

Based on the assumption that transboundary water management is a political process,

and that the unit of analysis is not the watershed but the “problemshed” (Allan, 2001), the

critical hydropolitics approach adopted by several scholars associated with the London

Water Research Group17

is aimed at developing a more robust understanding of key

political factors in transboundary water interactions. Overt and covert forms of power,

discursive processes and social constructions are here used to bring a new perspective to the

study of water relations.

Most of all, the main tenets of constructivism and the concepts of power and hegemony

form the theoretical core of critical hydropolitics and also of this thesis, as it will be

outlined in Chapter 2 that presents the analytical framework informing this research.

However, before concluding this literature review and moving to the presentation of the

two case studies, the following illustrates how scholars have linked large hydraulic

infrastructures to the distribution and control of political power within the nation. While

this area of study does not traditionally pertain to the hydropolitical scholarship, I argue

that a connection between these two disciplines can offer useful and yet unexplored insights

to the study of how state power is wielded in an international river basin.

16

Warner and Zeitoun (2008) articulated their article as a response to a paper in which Kathryn Furlong

(2006) dismissed the IR approach to analyse transboundary water issues, as in her opinion it obfuscates many

crucial factors of transboundary watercourses. 17

Based at King's College London and the University of East Anglia, the London Water Research Group

refers to a global network of academics, researchers and professionals committed to the promotion of critical

water research. As stated in the group’s website (http://lwrg.org/about-us.html), active members of the group

include Professor Tony Alan, Dr Dave Phillips, Dr Mark Zeitoun, Dr Jeroen Warner, Dr Ana Cascão, Dr

Naho Mirumachi and Dr Mark Mulligan.

12

1.1.4. Hydraulic infrastructures and political power

Major dams18

are among the largest structures built by humans and are perhaps the most

spectacular way to tame water resources. Apart from serving practical purposes (e.g.

generating electricity, controlling water flows and allowing irrigated agriculture), dams are

also powerful political symbols that can be used to build and reinforce national identities

(Mitchell, 2002: 44). Massive dams not only physically alter the landscape, but also shape

perceptions and ideas as they symbolize the might of the state that built them, often

becoming a favourite of nation-builders around the world (McCully, 2001: 237).

The nexus between the construction of large hydraulic infrastructures and political

power has long been studied, and in this regard the work of Karl August Wittfogel has

become a classical entry point. In his seminal book Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (1957)

introduced the concepts of hydraulic society and hydraulic despotism, arguing that those

who control water in arid or semi-arid regions also control political power. The so-called

“hydraulic regimes” might increase their grip on power by building and managing

hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and network of canals, which would allow

bureaucrats to exert control over people and rivers. While Wittfogel’s study was originally

interpreted as one that linked water management with authoritarian political regimes (both

ancient ones, like Mesopotamia and the pre-Columbian societies, and modern ones like the

USSR and China), Erik Swyngedouw (2006: 16) noted that the Wittfogelian perspective

has also been used to understand power relationships in modern capitalist forms of

development.

For instance, Donald Worster (1985) placed the control of water resources at the centre

of the development of the arid West in the USA in the early 1900s, identifying a small

group of technocrats from the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) that detained most of the

political and social power. As Worster noted, the decisions taken by the IID appeared “so

utterly rational, so perfectly wise, that ordinary citizens did not challenge them, did not feel

confident enough in their own knowledge to question or oppose them. […] Water had

indeed made this desert bloom, and the crop was oligarchy” (Worster, 1985: 206). Also

18

The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a major dam as a dam with a height of 150

meters or more from the foundation, a reservoir storage capacity of at least 25 cubic kilometres and an

electrical generation capacity of at least 1000 megawatts.

13

Marc Reisner examined water politics in the American West, tracing the story of William

Mulholland and of other powerful engineers in 20th

century Los Angeles19

, that “tended to

view themselves as a godlike class performing hydrologic miracles for grateful simpletons

who were content to sit in the desert and raise fruit” (Reisner, 1993: 119).

Likewise, Swyngedouw (1999) investigated how ruling political elites can increase their

influence and preserve social control through large hydraulic projects, in the so-called

“hydraulic mission” to control nature and conquer the desert. Based on Wester (2009), the

hydraulic mission can be defined as the belief that the state should develop hydraulic

infrastructure to capture as much water as possible for human uses, since all water flowing

to the ocean is considered wasted. Behind the hydraulic mission there is the hydrocracy, “a

group of actors such as ministries or governmental organizations mandated to plan, design

and implement various features of water resources management” (Mirumachi 2013, 8).

During the twentieth century, hydraulic missions were launched worldwide, and some of

the largest and most iconic dam projects were realized around the world, becoming highly

symbolic both within the nation and outside (Frey, 1993). Examples are the Marathon dam,

hailed as the greatest achievement of Greece after the Parthenon (Kaika, 2006: 297), and

the massive Hoover Dam in Nevada, that led US Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to

declare that with its completion “pridefully, man acclaims his conquest of nature” (McCool,

2012: 23). Similarly, in 1954, at the inauguration of the high Bhakra dam, Prime Minister

Jawahar Lal Nehru audaciously described dams as the “temples of modern India”20

(Sharma, 1989). In Nasser’s Egypt, the gigantic Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971 with

Soviet support, became “the centrepiece of postwar nation making” in a country in which

“large dams offered a way to build not just irrigation and power systems, but nation-states

in themselves” (Mitchell, 2002: 44-45). John Waterbury observed that as relations between

Egypt and Britain deteriorated in the 1950s, “Nasser and his associates could no longer

regard the dam as simply a big engineering project, but rather came to hold it up as the

symbol of Egypt’s will to resist imperialist endeavors to destroy the revolution”

(Waterbury, 1979: 108). If, on the one side, those who supported the Aswan High Dam

19

The struggle for power and the conflicts between different water users in California in the early 1900s (also

known as California Water Wars) have also been narrated by Roman Polanski in his 1974 movie Chinatown. 20

However only four years later, in 1958, Nehru seemed to have changed his opinion on the matter, deploring

the quest for big dams as a “disease of gigantism” (D’Souza 2008, 112).

14

were treated as patriots, on the other side, those who criticized it were “thought of as

subversive or even treasonous” (Waterbury, 1979: 117). Indian activist Arundhati Roy

identified a similar correlation between patriotism and dams on her analysis of the Sardar

Sarovar Dam project in India21

, and McCully noted that critics of the planned Castanho

Dam in Brazil were accused by the local governor Tasso Jereissati of using “wicked

insinuations and unfounded and unpatriotic criticisms” (McCully, 2001: 264).

Therefore, having acknowledged that large dams can have an important political value, I

argue that a critical approach to their study – one that recognizes both their performative

and discursive impacts – can bring useful and unexplored insights to the analysis of

transboundary water relations. This is because large dams also have a foreign dimension, as

they often are at the origin of regional conflicts and controversies. If a dam is portrayed as a

symbol of the nation, those who question it become the enemies of the nation. The

hydrocracy can thus portray the construction of a dam against the will of a neighbouring

country as a symbol of internal cohesion that incarnates the nation’s right to self-

determination. This link between the symbolic meaning of dams and transboundary water

relations appears to be relevant to the analysis of the two case studies adopted in this

research, as it will be illustrated in the following paragraph.

1.2. Choice of the case studies

The two case studies selected for this research can be considered case studies within a

case study, with the latter being the Aral Sea basin and the former being the Rogun dam in

Tajikistan and the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, while the main area of

analysis is the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia and interstate relations among the upstream –

(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and downstream (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)

countries, the specific focus is on the political confrontation around the construction of

these two major dams and its power dynamics.

The decision to focus on the issue of major dams rather than on other questions (such as

the desiccation of the Aral Sea or water pollution of the Amu Darya or Syr Darya) comes

from several considerations. First, water issues in Central Asia have traditionally been

centred around water quantity rather than water quality, thus making the construction of 21

See for instance the 2002 documentary “Dam/age”, directed by A. Seth and produced by First Run/Icarus

Films.

15

large dams (that can considerably impact on the water flow) particularly relevant. Secondly,

the impact of major dams is such that they are equally important both at the national and at

the regional level. Thirdly, it can be argued that the revitalisation of the two dam projects in

the 2000s has become the key to understand Central Asian water politics, strongly

influencing all matters related to the distribution and sharing of regional water resources22

.

At present, the resolution of regional water problems seems subordinated to the resolution

of the ongoing dam dispute. Fourthly, the analysis of major dams in Central Asia allows

touching upon a number of central issues in regional water politics, such as the revision of

Soviet water allocation, sovereignty over natural resource and the assertion of national

interests.

As for the choice of these two particular dams (see also Table 1), they were selected as

they present a number of common features that make them comparable and particularly

suitable to carry out a comprehensive study of power dynamics in the Aral Sea basin. In

particular, both projects:

i. are being built by the furthest upstream country of the river basin (Tajikistan in

the Amu Darya river basin, and Kyrgyzstan in the Syr Darya river basin) and will

have an impact on downstream countries (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the

Amu Darya river basin, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the Syr Darya river

basin);

ii. are major dams that will create a massive water reservoir on top of a cascade

system made of several downstream reservoirs;

iii. are extremely costly and cannot be funded by national resources alone, and

therefore, both proposing countries need to find external investors willing to

participate in the project;

iv. would generate large amounts of hydroelectricity in countries with significant

energy deficits;

v. would give to the upstream countries full control of the water flow, allowing

them to use water as a strategic tool (for example by pressuring downstream

riparian states to pay for water releases);

22

This consideration comes, among other things, from the author’s professional experience gained working

on high-level regional water negotiations for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy

for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, from January until December 2009.

16

vi. are strongly opposed by downstream countries and in particular by Uzbekistan;

vii. are highly politicized, and favouring or impeding their realization has become a

matter of primary importance for both upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and

to downstream Uzbekistan.

Table 1: The Rogun and Kambarata dams compared. Source: Schmidt, 2007; Tetra Tech, 2011.

Rogun Kambarata

Location River Vakhsh, Tajikistan River Naryn, Kyrgyzstan

River basin concerned Amu Darya Syr Darya

Basin riparians concerned Tajikistan Afghanistan,

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, Kazakhstan

Estimated Cost (US$

billion) 2.9 2 – 4.9*

Height (meters) 335 275

Water reservoir volume

(km3)

13.8 4.65

Electricity generation

(MW) 3.600 1900

Average annual

performance

(billion kWh)

13.1 5.1

Genesis of the project

(period) 1960s 1970s

Beginning of construction

works 1982 1986

*While the cost estimated by the Kyrgyz government is US$ 2 billion, a report prepared by the consultant

Tetra Tech ES Inc. for USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, assessed the cost to

amount to US$ 4.9 billion (Tetra Tech, 2011: 64).

What is perhaps the most relevant aspect is that if these dams are completed they would

change the status-quo in regional water management. Each of them could be the first major

dam ever finalized in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus reversing a

situation in which the upstream countries of the Aral Sea basin have not been able to tap

their significant hydroelectric potential.

17

Moreover, the dams are extremely controversial, since there seems to be a fundamental

disagreement on the way government officials in the upstream and downstream countries

frame the management of shared water resources. Framing of environmental issues reveals

differences in how stakeholders form interpretations of what is at stake and what should be

done (Dewulf et al., 2005), implying that the dominant framing will bring highly

differential benefits to the actors involved. For instance, as Brugnach at al. observed

(2008), a water shortage situation can be framed by one actor as a problem of “insufficient

water supply”, and by another as one of “excessive water consumption”. The former will

focus on the amount of water available, and will possibly oppose the realisation of

infrastructures that might disrupt the water flow (e.g., a dam), while the latter is more likely

to suggest a change in the water use (e.g., switching to a less water-intensive crop). The

dominant framing forms the “sanctioned discourse”, that, as it was defined by Anthony

Turton, “is the prevailing or dominant discourse that has been legitimised by the discursive

élite within the water sector at any one moment in time. It represents what may be said,

who may say it and how it may be interpreted, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant

belief system or paradigm” (Turton, 2002: 39).

For what concerns the Aral Sea basin, while regional hegemony is disputed between

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Deyermond, 2009), regional hydro-hegemony (i.e. hegemony

over water politics) is detained by Uzbekistan. This is because the Uzbek government has

successfully managed to impose its sanctioned discourse on regional water issues keeping

its advantageous Soviet water allocation unchanged, effectively thwarting the hydropower

ambitions of upstream countries, thus continuing to practice the water-intensive cotton

monoculture whose income is needed by the Uzbek political elites to support the existing

system of social, political, and economic control (Weinthal, 2006).

Conversely, it is manifest that both upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are

nor hydro nor regional hegemons, being the economically and politically weaker countries

among the five Central Asian republics. However, through the construction of the Rogun

and Kambarata dams the two countries are challenging a status-quo in which they have not

been able to take advantage of their upstream position and exploit their hydroelectric

potential. If completed, the two dams could give the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments almost

18

total control of the regions’ water resources, thus significantly challenging the current

power setting.

1.3. Aim of the thesis and research questions

This thesis takes a critical hydropolitical approach and applies it to interstate relations in

the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia. The aim of this thesis is to analyse and understand the

role of state power in transboundary water relations, and to provide an in–depth analysis of

the evolution of interstate relations in Central Asia in the field of water in the period 1991-

201123

. The study looks at the various forms of overt and covert power that shape interstate

relations and at the way hegemonic and counter hegemonic measures are put in place in an

international river basin.

The main research question that the thesis aims to answer is:

How state power is wielded in transboundary water relations?

Two sub-questions, that will help answering the main question, will also be addressed.

Namely, i) how did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011?, and ii)

which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour and

obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?.

The overarching hypothesis driving this study is that the intimate correlation between

the concepts of power and hegemony can offer key insights to the analysis and

understanding of transboundary water relations. Discursive and social constructions

influence interactions among basin riparians, and help explaining the conflictive or

cooperative nature of transboundary water relations. As it will be thoroughly discussed in

Chapter 2, power is seen as a multifaceted concept, one that can be defined as the ability, or

capacity, of one actor to get the desired outcome through coercive, bargaining and

ideational/discursive means. The success in getting the desired outcome leads to hegemony,

that from a critical neo-Gramscian perspective can be defined as an expression of widely-

based consent supported by material resources and institutions.

23

These two dates, 1991 and 2011, represent respectively the year in which the Central Asian countries

gained independence and the year in which this doctoral research started. Most of the data were collected in

2012, and so 2011 seemed the most appropriate cut-off point for this analysis.

19

While, on the one hand, the analytical focus is placed on state power, on the other hand,

hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics represent the ways in which power is wielded

and observed. Therefore, based on the assumption that the construction of the Rogun and

Kambarata dams would irreversibly change the status-quo of water politics in the Aral Sea

basin, the ways in which these projects are being supported and opposed can be categorised

as counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures, meaning respectively measures that are

put in place to contest and maintain a certain hegemonic order.

Figure 1: Narrowing down the scope of the research

Within this analytical framework, three states are thereby examined in particular detail,

the hegemonised ones, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the hegemon, Uzbekistan. Although

more in general, events in the rest of the region are discussed and illustrated, since

understanding and explicating the evolution of water relations in Central Asia seems a

20

necessary step to carry out a comprehensive analysis of power dynamics in an international

river basin.

Narrowing down the scope of the research (as shown in Figure 1), the general focus of

this study is placed on hydropolitics (or the politics of international waters), a branch of IR.

Within this disciplinary area, the basin of the Aral Sea is used as a background and as a

platform to discuss the two case studies, which can be considered the empirical foundation

for a study that essentially focuses on the analysis of power and hegemony. The ways in

which this research has been designed to answer its research questions is outlined in the

following section.

1.4. Outline of the dissertation

As it was mentioned, this study aims to explore how power is wielded in an international

river basin and what measures states put in place to contest and maintain hegemony. To

carry out such analysis, the thesis has been divided into seven chapters and four annexes

(see Figure 2).

21

Figure 2: Schematic overview of the thesis structure and of its research questions.

This first Chapter introduces the research, its objectives and its research questions. It

also provides a literature review of the academic debate on hydropolitics, outlining the two

main branches of the discipline, the Neo-Malthusian (or neorealist) and the Cornucopian

(or neoliberal). It then briefly sketches the main traits of a critical approach to

hydropolitics, and links it with studies exploring the connection between large hydraulic

infrastructures and the distribution and control of political power. It finally illustrates the

originality of this research and its main contributions to IR literature and to Central Asian

studies.

Chapter 2 defines the theoretical, analytical and methodological framework used in this

study. After an introduction on critical hydropolitics, the key concept of power is reviewed,

focusing on the different facets and interpretations of the term that emerged from multiple

disciplinary angles. Three dimensions of power are identified and included in the two

macro categories of hard and soft power, that are then connected with the concept of

22

hegemony and its two main approaches in IR theory. Subsequently, the analytical tools

adopted in this research – the “circle of hydro-hegemony” (a conceptual redefinition of the

framework of hydro-hegemony) (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) and the TWINS matrix

(Mirumachi, 2007; 2010) – are presented, explaining how they help addressing the research

questions and describing how data were collected and analysed.

Following these two introductory and explanatory chapters, the empirical analysis

begins in Chapter 3, which serves as a background to introduce water relations in Central

Asia and the two case studies, and to answer the first sub-question of this research. The

chapter is organised in three sections. Initially, it provides some key definitions and

delineates the main principles of international water law. The second section introduces the

Aral Sea basin and the ways in which water has been perceived by the Central Asian

peoples and managed by the Soviet Union. The third section outlines the evolution of

interstate water relations in Central Asia, providing a general analysis of coexisting conflict

and cooperation and identifying three stages in regional water relations. The focus is finally

narrowed down to examine bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Chapters 4 and 5 present and analyse the two case studies, respectively the Rogun dam

in Tajikistan and the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. Both chapters begin with an overview

of the dam and of its objective impact at the national and regional level. Successively, the

dispute around the dams is used to examine how state power is wielded in international

transboundary water relations, and to identify and categorise the various counter-

hegemonic tactics that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have put in place to favour the realisation

of the projects and fulfil their hydraulic mission.

Chapter 6 concludes the empirical analysis, presenting and examining Uzbek hegemonic

tactics, which offer an alternative and opposing perspective with respect to that offered by

the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments. As the Uzbek government tends to treat the Rogun

and Kambarata dams as a nearly unique entity, hegemonic tactics aimed at opposing the

realisation of both projects and at maintaining the status-quo unchanged are merged and

discussed in a single chapter.

Chapter 7 concludes, assessing and comparing the two case studies and their impact on

regional water relations. The research questions are reviewed and answered, and

23

successively an analytical summary is provided. The chapter ends illustrating the

contributions of this study to the hydropolitical debate and identifying areas for future

research.

Four Annexes complete this thesis. Annex 1 delves into some methodological aspects

that were deliberately skipped to make Chapter 2 more concise. The rationale and the

methods behind the creation of the three chronologies are explained in greater detail, along

with speech acts theory and some notions of discourse analysis. Finally, Annex 2, 3, and 4

contain the three chronologies in their entirety.

1.5. Originality and scientific value of the research

The topic of this research is narrow and at the same time broad. Narrow, because it looks

specifically at how states employ power in transboundary water relations. Broad, because it

touches upon at least two different disciplinary fields and one geographical area of study.

Such approach originated from the decision to adopt a critical hydropolitics perspective to

examine water politics in the Aral Sea basin. This implies delving on aspects that relate to

political geography, such as geographical configurations, transboundary issues and water

distribution and use, but also to critical IR theory, such as power analysis, discursive and

social constructions. Insights from Central Asian Studies, both at the governmental level

(concerning the nature and structure of national political systems) and at the societal level

(regarding among other things ideologies and political cultures) have also informed this

research and offered precious understandings of regional hydropolitics.

For instance, the fact that with independence the Central Asian governments had to re-

evaluate or reconstruct their pasts (Roy, 2000), in what seems a continuous quest for

legitimacy (Mellon, 2010; Matveeva, 2009) aimed at maintaining power (Cummings, 2002)

with the support of symbols and images (Cummings, 2010), appears relevant to an analysis

of power and hegemony in transboundary water relations. Likewise, the review of literature

exploring how the construction of large dams can be linked to the distribution and control

of political power within the nation, made a valuable contribution to the examination of the

two case studies.

The research brings a contribution to knowledge at several levels. As Grix noted, a

“substantial contribution to knowledge” implies that “you must have produced original

24

research on a given topic and embedded it firmly in the ‘received wisdom’ of a particular

field” (Grix, 2001: 108). The originality of this research lies in its interdisciplinary

approach to water politics in Central Asia. There are, to the author's knowledge, no studies

that carried out a comprehensive analysis of transboundary water relations in Central Asia

using insights from critical IR theory and placing the focus on the issue of large dams. The

only contributions on power dynamics in the Aral Sea basin are an article on the journal

“Water Policy” written by Kay Wegerich (2008), which examines hydro-hegemony in the

Amu Darya basin, and a partial analysis of water relations using the TWINS matrix carried

out by Sojamo (2008).

At a conceptual level, this research brings to the fore an original theoretical contribution,

as it revisits the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony, proposing a redesign of the

structure of hydro-hegemony, which has been named the “circle of hydro-hegemony”.

Furthermore, besides a few contributions (see paragraph 2.5.1), little attention has been

paid to how the hegemonised attempts to reverse the status-quo in an international river

basin. Hence, this research will also provide an original contribution to the literature on

hydropolitics in Central Asia, offering fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of

power and counter-hegemony in the Aral Sea basin.

A further value is added by the three timelines expressly created for the research (see

Annex 2, 3, and 4). The aim is to publish them after discussing this thesis, and to make

them widely available for research and other suitable uses. They represent, at the time of

writing, the most detailed reference-supported collection of events of this kind for the

Central Asian region in the period 1991-2011.

25

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and

methodology

If you beat your head against the wall, it is your head that breaks and not the

wall.

Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, 1930

This chapter delineates the theoretical, analytical and methodological framework used in

this study. The first section goes back to critical hydropolitics and illustrates more in detail

a constructivist approach to the discipline. It then outlines the notions of power and

hegemony and how these two are correlated. The key insights of the framework of hydro-

hegemony (FHH, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006), namely the acknowledgement of the role that

power and power asymmetries play in interstate water relations are used to answer the main

research question, how state power is wielded in transboundary water relations?, and one

of the two sub-questions, which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures have been put

in place to favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?. The remaining sub-question, how did water relations in

Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011?, which is considered propaedeutic to

approach the two former questions, is answered with the support of a hermeneutic tool, the

TWINS matrix (Mirumachi, 2007; 2010). The final section clarifies the operationalization

of the research, explaining how data were collected and analysed.

2.1. Constructivism

Initially associated with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), constructivism is a

theoretical approach to social sciences that was developed after the end of the cold war as

an alternative to the two dominant paradigms, the realist and the liberal. According to

constructivism, “people make society, and society makes people” (Onuf, 1998: 59). Social

26

relations make or construct people into what they are and people construct the world what it

is. Consequently, countries are social constructions, and order between societies is socially

constructed, and not merely determined by objective material conditions. Although many

strands of constructivism can be identified due to a significant growth of constructivist

literature during the 1990s, an overall distinction can be made between modern

(conventional) and postmodern (critical) constructivism, On the one hand, as Thierry

Balzacq (2009) explains, postmodern constructivism – which is sceptical towards the core

positivist notions of truth, objectivity and reason – aims to study world politics stressing

how the social discourse shapes and gives meaning to actions. The focus of postmodern

constructivism is to understand, not to explain. On the other hand, modern constructivism,

which does not reject positivist conventions, “while expecting to uncover differences,

identities, and multiple understandings, still assumes that it can specify a set of conditions

under which one can expect to see one identity or another” (Hopf, 1998: 183).

Nevertheless, conventional and critical constructivism share the same theoretical

fundamentals, as both wants to study how human agency – being agency the ability of

actors to act and think independently – and social constructions produce identities and

institutions.

According to Wendt (1999: 1), a modernist systemic constructivist24

, the two basic

tenets of constructivism are: “1) that the structures of human association are determined

primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and 2) that the identities and interests

of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”.

Thus, Wendt outlines a reflexive relationship, where the actors influence the structures and

the structures influence the actors. Agency and structures are mutually constituted through

intersubjective understandings: agency influences structural continuities and processes of

change and it is influenced by the social spatial and historical context (Klotz and Lynch,

2007: 3-12). For constructivists, normative or ideational structures, or in other words,

norms and ideas, are just as important as material structures, such as military and economic

power, and therefore “systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural

characteristics and exert a powerful influence on social and political action (Reus-Smit,

2001: 216-217). 24

Following the neo-realist Waltzian third-image level of analysis, systemic constructivism concentrates on

how States relate to one another in the international domain. (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219)

27

Realities and identities in constructivism are created through speech acts, which are “the

most important way that we go about making the world what it is” (Onuf, 1998, 59).

Speech act theory was originally developed by a philosopher of language, Austin (1975), in

his seminal book How to do things with words. The main assumption behind speech act

theory is that different uses of language, by their utterance, perform an action. If I say to a

friend that “I will buy a house”, or “I do” during a marriage ceremony, I am promising that

I will do something by just saying it. This is a performative utterance, one through which I

am performing an act. Austin identified five categories of performative acts (1975: 151-2):

verdictives (giving a verdict or an appraisal), exercitives (the exercising of powers, rights

and influence), commissives (commiting to do something by declaring or announcing it),

behabitives (relating with social behaviours, e.g. apologizing, congratulating or cursing),

and expositive (they put an utterance in a context, as in “I reply”, “I assume” or ”I argue”).

Further elaborating on this, Searle (1975) introduced the following categories of speech

acts: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarations. Subsequently, Nicholas

Onuf (1998) analysed speech acts from a constructivist point of view, considering them as

acts that perform an action and establish a relationship when they encounter a response or a

reaction from the audience towards which they were directed. Onuf (1998: 66) reduced the

categories of speech acts to the following three: 1) assertive, through which something is

asserted, as in “our country is experiencing a difficult situation”; 2) directive, through

which something is demanded, as in “we need more water”; and 3) commissive, through

which something is promised, as in “I will pay my debts”.

2.1.1. Constructivism and hydropolitics

Chapter 1 illustrated that just like constructivism was developed as an alternative to the

two dominant paradigms in IR, a critical constructivist approach to hydropolitics emerged

in contrast to mainstream rationalist studies of water politics. This is the case also for this

study, which adopts a critical hydropolitics approach to examine hydropolitics in Central

Asia. This is partially due to the dissatisfaction with the two mainstream theories of the

discipline, neo-realism and neo-liberalism (see Chapter 1), that tend to see water whether as

a source of conflict or cooperation, overlooking the fact that conflict and cooperation can

indeed coexist. Most importantly, neither of the two “neo” approaches can provide a

28

plausible justification to the diversity of water water-related interstate relations around the

globe (Julien, 2012: 45), and explain, for instance, why basins with similar levels of water

scarcity or similar geographical configurations may have very different levels of conflict

and cooperation. Le Billion observes that the two mainstream schools of thought provide a

somewhat deterministic explanation of conflictive and cooperative relations over water, one

that “fail to take into account the socially constructed nature of resources” (Le Billion,

2001: 565). As Julien explicates (2010: 10, note 17), it took a constructivist study

(Kalpakian, 2004), to demonstrate that the Indo-Pakistani wars were caused by issues

related to identity and not to water scarcity, as previous mainstream hydropolitics had

hypothesized. To the same extent, several studies (Smith, 1995: 356; Wegerich; 2003: 256;

IWMI, 1998) have noted that water in Central Asia is indeed abundant25

and not scarce as it

is often stated (recently: US Senate, 2011), thus supporting an approach that goes beyond

mainstream hydropolitical analysis, to look at other factors beyond scarcity to understand

regional water relations, as “hydropolitics is what societies make of it” (Julien, 2012).

Water is a multidimensional resource that besides its strategic and economic dimension,

bears also a strong social, environmental and cultural significance (Rahaman & Varis:

2005). It thus seems simplistic to consider water only as a source of conflict or cooperation.

A constructivist approach to hydropolitics allows acknowledging the importance of the

strategic and economic dimensions of water, while also trying to understand how the social

constructions of water influence interstate relations.

Recognizing the coexistence of structural conflict and cooperation, many scholars

associated with the London Water Research Group have taken a constructivist approach to

hydropolitics (Warner and Zeitoun, 2008: 807), studying how formally equal basin

riparians may be in fact caught up in control relations, thus acknowledging the role that

asymmetries of riparian power play in influencing transboundary water relations. If, on the

one hand, the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict or the presence of peace

25

Water in Central Asia is certainly unevenly distributed and used inefficiently, but overall the region cannot

be considered as water scarce. The Aral Sea basin has a total renewable water flow of 115.60 km3

per year

(http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/fussr/index8.stm), on which around 64 million

people rely. For instance, there is a striking difference between the Aral Sea basin and the Nile river basin –

generally considered water scarce – which has a total renewable water flow of 80 km3 per year to sustain more

than 200 million people (http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/attachments/article/145/5%20-%20Summary%20-

%20The%20State%20of%20the%20Nile%20River%20Basin%202012.pdf). For more information on water

distribution in the Aral Sea basin see Chapter 3.

29

(Zeitoun and Warner, 2008: 807), on the other hand, the signing of a treaty does not mean

that cooperation is actually happening (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). A critical

hydropolitics approach is aimed at developing a deeper understanding of key political

factors in transboundary water interactions, recognizing the relevance of overt and covert

forms of power, discursive processes and social constructions to the study of water

relations.

It is based on these assumptions – and taking inspiration from the Copenhagen concept

of the construction of security – that the two frameworks employed in this study, TWINS

and the FHH, were conceived. Both frameworks acknowledge the importance of the role of

power and power asymmetries in international transboundary water relations, and both also

utilise the constructivist notion of speech acts. Before reviewing the FHH and TWINS in

detail and explaining how they will be used in this research, the next section illustrates the

two central concepts of this study, power and hegemony.

2.2. Power

Power is an essentially contested concept in politics, one that can be given different

interpretations and meanings (Lukes 1974; Berenskoetter, 2007), and its appropriate

definition remains a controversial matter (Waltz, 1986: 333). The first modern analysis of

political power can be traced back to the work of Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince, 1513)

and Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651). Machiavelli’s realist and pessimistic ideas on the

separation of ethics and politics, created the image of a Prince that would rather be feared

than loved, that would often use military force, violence and cunning to guarantee the

prosperity of his kingdom and to possibly get total power. According to Machiavelli, power

is not to be considered as a means to an end but as the end itself, thus making of The Prince

an handbook on how power can be acquired, retained and expanded. Conversely, in

Hobbes’ view power is linked to sovereignty and consent. State power is centralised and

absolute but originates from a contract through which people – which are egoistic and

violent – voluntarily confer their power to a man or to an assembly of men, that will act in

their interest guaranteeing peace and stability. Two centuries later, Karl Marx (The

Communist Manifesto, 1848), who to a certain extent can be associated to the realist

thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes, theorised a political system in which political power is

30

based on economic power, or in other terms, on the possession of the means of production,

through which a dominant social class would obtain its supremacy.

The end of the Second World War and the progress of political science brought an

increasing interest to the study of power in the social sciences. In particular, Max Weber’s

Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947) had a strong impact on future

theorisations on power. According to Weber, power is the capacity of one actor to realize

its will in a social relationship, despite the opposition of other actors. The concept of power

is therefore associated to that of domination. In Weber’s view, political power is not based

on social and economic factors but on three different sources of legitimation: charismatic

authority (of a particular leader or of a certain institution, as in the case of dictatorial

regimes during the last century); traditional authority (based on tradition and longevity,

typical of pre-modern societies); and rational-legal authority (typical of modern societies

and based on the belief that rationally established rules are legal). Following up on Weber’s

ideas, Robert Dahl, who implicitly considered power as a relation among people from a

behavioural science perspective, defined it as the ability of A “to get B to do something that

B would not otherwise do”26

(Dahl, 1957: 203). In his study of power dynamics in the city

of New Haven (1961), Dahl noted how political power in the United States is pluralistic,

being distributed among a number of competing groups and not to a single ruling-elite, as it

was argued for instance by American sociologists Floyd Hunter (1953) and Charles Wright

Mills (1956).

2.2.1. Three dimensions of power

Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) partially agreed with Dahl in his critique to

elitists, but further expanded the concept of power and developed a new theoretical model

to include “what does not happen” in decision-making processes. They argued that none of

the two main notions of power given by sociologists and political scientists of the time –

which respectively saw power as highly centralised (elitist) and widely diffused (pluralist) –

provided the “whole truth of the matter” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 947), and presented

their central thesis of the two faces of power. The first face of power, or overt, is related

26

Dahl brings the example of a professor that threatens to fail a student if he doesn’t’ read a particular book.

In this case, the amount of power that the professor exerts can be calculated as the difference between the

chance that the student would read the book before and after receiving the threat.

31

with Dahl’s idea of A imposing its will to B, and is directly observable in the decision

making process, where a group makes decisions that directly affect another group.

However, they observed that:

Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B.

But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social

and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to

public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the

extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from

bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s

set of preferences? (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 948)

This introduces the second face of power, which involves the dynamics of the non-

decision making process, and resides in the ability to create and reinforce “barriers to the

public airing of policy conflicts” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 949). Otherwise stated, the

second dimension of power consists in the use of influence to limit the breadth of a

discussion and to avoid conflicts from even being bought up to the political forum. Just

because something did not happen, it doesn’t mean that nothing happened.

Using as a starting point the work carried out by Dahl and by Bachrach and Baratz,

Steven Lukes (1974, 2005b) further developed the study of power. According to Lukes, the

two-dimensional view of power is inadequate as it relies on the supposition that power –

when associated with conflict – can actually be observed. Moreover, previous

interpretations of power did not consider the ability of an actor to influence the norms and

values accepted by others. For instance, “A may exercise power over B by getting him to

do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing,

shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes, 2005b: 27). Since power can be hidden and

not always visible, Lukes ideated a theoretical framework with three dimensions of power.

The first, overt or hard dimension of power, is similar to Dahl’s idea of power, and it is

represented by the material capacity of A having B doing something against his will. The

second dimension of power is less visible, covert, and refers to Bachrach and Baratz’s

second face of power: it is the ability to control the political agenda and to create barriers

that would impede certain issues to be discussed. But the original contribution that Lukes

brings to the debate is the third dimension of power, which he considers as the most

effective among the three. This third dimension, power through domination, is hidden and

32

goes beyond the domains of decision-making and setting of the political agenda, to

encompass the area in which the preferences and perceptions of others are formed and

shaped. As Lukes put it:

A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also

exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is

it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want

them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?

(Lukes, 1974: 23)

This is the ideological dimension of power, which can be defined as power over ideas or

ideational, inspired by the Gramscian concept of hegemony (see paragraph 2.3) to explain

how the powerful secures the willing compliance of those they dominate (Lukes, 2005b:

12). Subsequently, in the second edition of his book published in 2005, Lukes included two

new chapters that reveal the influence of two French thinkers on power, Michel Foucault

and Pierre Bourdieu.

Foucault’s vision of domination framed in Discipline and Punish, is seen by Lukes as

helpful in understanding how domination can be secured through acquiescence, as well as

Foucault’s ideas on the link between power and knowledge and on power as a productive

force. In the History of Sexuality (1998), Foucault introduced the popular concept of

power/knowledge, to explain how power is formed by accepted forms of knowledge and

truths. Power is ubiquitous, and it cannot be wielded but it is rather part of discourses.

Power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations within the context in which

it operates. According to Foucault, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces

everything, but because it comes from everywhere....power is not an institution, and not a

structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one

attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1998:

93). This notwithstanding, Lukes considered the work of Foucault as too radical and

misleading.

For what concerns the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Lukes used his ideas on symbolic power

to examine how power as domination is enhanced by its normalization, from the moment

that unequal and arbitrary conditions may appear to actors as fair and normal (Swartz,

2007). As a result of his analysis, Lukes finally defined an actor’s power as “his ability to

33

avoid or resist performing positive actions” (Lukes, 2005a: 480), bringing the example of

how the US under the Bush Administration showed its power by not performing certain

actions, such as ratifying the Kyoto protocols or joining the International Criminal Court.

In relation with the work of Lukes and Foucault, and therefore with the connection

between knowledge, ideas and power, it is worth noting that also English scholar Susan

Strange (1994) recognised the existence of a third dimension of power, which originates in

the “knowledge structure”. This third level of power, is the level at which power is

exercised by the strong over the weak in the realm of ideas, to the extent that the weak

“believe that the value-judgments of the strong really are the universally right and true

ones” (Strange, 1994: 176). In her study of power relations in the field of finance, Strange

made an interesting distinction between structural power and relational power. She noted

how in the postwar period, the United States have used their structural power “to extend or

restrict the range of options open to others” (Strange, 1990: 259), while Japan have used its

relational power thanks to its global position as a major creditor and aid donor. If, on the

one hand, relational power is clearly seen by Strange as “the ability of A to get B by

coercion or persuasion to do what B would not otherwise do” (Strange, 1989: 145), on the

other hand, the definition of structural power is less straightforward. Structural power,

which has four dimensions – security, production, finance and knowledge – is eventually

defined as:

The power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within

which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their

scientists and other professional people have to operate. […] Structural power in short

confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks

within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises.

(Strange, 1998: 24-25)

It seems then that structural power, seen as the ability to shape and influence relational

frameworks, can be associated with Lukes’ ideational power and the Gramscian notion of

hegemony.

In an attempt to identify conditions that might lead to hegemony, Gill and Law (1988)

drew from the work of Lukes to identify three dimensions of power. If the first two

dimensions (open or overt and covert power) are in line with those already observed in this

analysis, it is with the third, structural power – which derives from Lukes’ third dimension

34

– that they brought a fresh contribution to the debate. According to Gill and Law, structural

power is the “definite attraction and limitation systems with the physical and normative

aspects to shape the relations of parties” (Gill and Law, 1988: 74). This dimension of power

encompasses both material and normative aspects, that work together in the creation of a

system of incentives and constraints.

2.2.2. From hard to soft power

What emerges from this overview is that power is not a single entity but it represents a

variety of concepts and ideas. One aspect nevertheless appears clear. As Haugaard and

Clegg noted, “power as domination, which is linked to (the capacity for) violent agency, is

the dominant perception of power in everyday speech […]. However, if we look to the

academic social science literature, increasingly the conception of power as essentially

grounded in coercion represents a minority view” (Haugaard and Clegg, 2009: 3). Thus, it

seems that the focus has moved from “hard” to “soft” power, the first being visible and

concrete, and the latter being hidden and more sophisticated. On the one hand, hard power

corresponds to Dahl’s definition of power, or to Lukes’ first dimension, and is the ability to

coerce, which derives from a country’s military, economic and technological might and,

especially in hydropolitics, from a country’s geographical position, (i.e. being upstream or

downstream). On the other hand, soft power, as it was originally defined by Joseph Nye:

Is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.

When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on

sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Soft power arises from the attractiveness

of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate

in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. (Nye, 2004: 256)

A few years later, Nye added to his analysis a new form of power, “smart power”, which

he defined as “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy” (Nye,

2007). Nye’s concept of soft power can here be revised and used as a concept to represent

the second and third dimensions of power analysed previously, as it proves efficient in

encapsulating power in its more abstract dimension, especially if compared with hard

power. Moreover, Nye’s soft power is partly corresponding to Bachrach and Baratz second

face of power. Thus, based on the analysis of power carried out so far, it is possible to

35

attempt an initial schematization (Figure 3) of the different dimensions (or faces) of power

observed, that will be subsequently adapted to the more specific application of the concept

of power to water relations.

Figure 3: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power (source: Author).

As it was observed, defining power in politics can be challenging, as it is a concept that

can be associated to different interpretations and meanings, based on different perspectives

and epistemologies, and to this day, there is not a universally accepted definition of power.

Jonathan Gaventa observed that “power is often assumed, rather than defined or addressed

or used in a coherent manner” (Gaventa, 2003: 12).

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, power needs to be somehow defined, or at

least the definition needs to be narrowed from the many available in the literature. Without

aspirations of being definitive or absolute, the following working definition serves to frame

the concept of power within this research. Based on the assumption that power is indeed a

multifaceted concept, power is here seen as the ability, or capacity, of one actor to get the

desired outcome through coercive, bargaining and ideational/discursive means. These three

36

aspects are intimately correlated and overlap with the Gramscian definition of hegemony

based on force and consent, as it will be shown in the next paragraph.

2.3. Hegemony

The term hegemony (from Greek hēgemonia, “to lead”), defined by the Oxford English

Dictionary as “leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over

others”, originally indicated the predominance of a city state over another in ancient

Greece. In modern times, however, the revamp and first modern definition of the term

hegemony can be attributed to the Italian philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti, that in his work

Del rinnovamento civile d’Italia (1851) (that was widely cited in the writings of Antonio

Gramsci) defined it as “that sort of supremacy, pre-eminence, superiority, not legal nor

juridical in the strict sense of the word, but morally efficient, that among several

congeneric, unilingual and compatriot provinces, one exercises over the others” (Gioberti,

1851, vol. II: 203, translated by the author from the original Italian). This definition became

progressively popular and successfully penetrated the political language, with an increasing

association of the term hegemony to the term leadership, notably as it was done by The

Times in 1860 with reference to the Prussian hegemony/leadership over the German

Confederation. In that occasion the newspaper stated that “it is a glorious ambition which

drives Prussia to assert her claim to the leadership, or as that land of professors phrases it,

the “hegemony” of the Germanic Confederation” (The Times, 1860). This last point calls

for a distinction between the orthodox realist usage of the term in IR – which refers to the

dominance of one state over one or more other states through the exertion of the Weberian

“power over” (Gill and Law, 1989: 476) – and the usage originating from the work of the

Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci, which is the one adopted in this research and that

inspired Lukes’ third dimension of power.

Gramsci developed the theory of hegemony in his monumental work Quaderni del

carcere (1975), that he wrote between 1929 and 1935 while imprisoned by the Italian

Fascist regime. The Gramscian concept of hegemony refers to the relations between classes

and between the State and the civil society. In the struggle for hegemony in the civil society

(“società civile”) a political party, for instance, needs to get ideological and cultural

consent. Once the consent from the civil society is obtained, the party can act as State and

37

use its force to create a new historical bloc. Thus ideologies, for Gramsci, are assessed for

their social effects rather than on their effective value (Fairclough, 2010: 62). Hegemony

denotes the success of a dominant class in presenting its view of the world and its ideology,

in achieving an intellectual and moral leadership in a way that the other classes accept it

and consider it common sense27

.

As Ekers and Loftus noted, Gramsci's development of hegemony has two related facets.

The first refers to “the maintenance of one social group's dominance over subordinate

groups, accomplished through relations of consent and coercion” (Ekers and Loftus, 2008:

702). The second refers to how hegemony can be maintained, and this is done reproducing

“the social relations that are foundational to a given social formation” (Ekers and Loftus,

2008: 702). More specifically, the State consolidates its hegemony and creates in people

certain expectations and behaviours through a set of “private institutions” usually

considered outside of the State, such as the Church, trade unions, schools and the

intellectuals. The latters, are considered an efficacious instrument to affirm hegemony, such

as the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, described by Gramsci as a “lay Pope” for his

influence on Italian politics (Gramsci, 1975a: letter 210). If a government is not able to

create its own class of intellectuals, it will only exercise dictatorship and not hegemony.

Coercion and consent come together, and they are, in the function of hegemony,

“connective” (Gramsci, 1975: Q12§1). Although both force and consent are necessary for a

hegemonic order to survive, it is primarily on consent that a State needs to base its relations

with the civil society. It is based on these assumptions that Gramsci criticizes the Italian

Fascist regime, which in his view represents an element of weakness of the bourgeoisie, as

it is a regime based on force rather than on consent (Mordenti, 1996: 51). Machiavelli’s

image of the Prince, half beast (lion, fox and centaur) and half man – the metaphorical

representation of a good ruler – is revisited by Gramsci as the combination of consent and

coercion necessary to govern, “to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the

forefront, hegemony prevails” (Cox, 1983: 165). To say it with the words of Gramsci:

27

While Gramsci ideated theories on how to get hegemony from a disadvantageous situation (for example

through a revolution), Gaetano Mosca (1923) – a main thinker in elite theory and an early political antagonist

of Gramsci – developed the doctrine of the “political class”, in which he explained how a small minority can

maintain power.

38

The 'normal' exercise of hegemony in the classic ground of the parliamentarian system, is

characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other variously, in

a way that force does not stand above consent, on the contrary, force should appear as if it

is sustained by the consent of the majority. (Gramsci, 1975: Q13§37, 1638, translated by

the author from the original Italian)

When the State dominates instead of directing, the result is dictatorship without

hegemony (Gramsci, 1975: Q15§59), or, in other words, domination and not hegemony.

2.3.1 Hegemony applied to IR

Now that the concept of hegemony has been outlined, it is possible to introduce how this

concept can be applied to IR. The notion of hegemony adopted in this study does not refer

to the dominance of one state over another but rather to the Gramscian notion of coercion

and consent, which was originally conceived and applied at the State level (referring to

“internal” hegemony in the era of Italian city-states or in Fascist Italy).

In IR theory, two main approaches to hegemony can be identified, a conventional realist

one and a critical neo-Gramscian perspective. As Bieler and Morton observed,

“conventional IR theory, reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on

the economic and military capabilities of states” (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 87). This idea

of hegemony – that can be linked to the first dimension of power, “hard power”, as it refers

to domination through coercion – is at the origin of the hegemonic stability theory (HST),

conceived by Robert Keohane (1984). HST is based on two central propositions: i) “Order

in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power. Since regimes constitute

elements of an international order, this implies that the formation of international regimes

normally depends on hegemony”; ii) “The maintenance of order requires continuous

hegemony” (Keohane, 1984: 31). Hence, according to Keohane, cooperation, order and

stability can be achieved through the activities of a hegemonic power (as in the cases of the

pax Britannica in the nineteenth century and the pax Americana after the Second World

War), which “must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international

political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile adversaries” (Keohane,

1984: 39).

In contrast with this approach, the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony developed

by Canadian scholar Robert Cox, broadens the domain of hegemony going back to the

39

Gramscian theorisations, and defines it as an expression of widely-based consent supported

by material resources and institutions. As in the Gramscian thought, “dominance by a

powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony” (Cox, 1981:

139). For Cox, hegemony is based on three spheres of activity: 1) the social forces

engendered by the production process; 2) the forms of state; 3) world orders (Cox 1981;

137-8). In addition, within each sphere of activity Cox (1981; 136) identified three

categories of forces (or potentials) that interact: material capabilities/power (as industries

and armaments), ideas (intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order held

by different groups of people) and institutions (a particular amalgam of material power and

ideas which help maintaining stability). These three forces act together in a reciprocal

relationship to constitute an historical structure.

Figure 4: The relationship of forces in an historical structure. Adapted from Cox, 1981: 136.

In the world order, world hegemony is a “social structure, an economic structure, and a

political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three” (Cox,

1983: 172). Therefore, also when hegemony is studied at the world level, it appears as a

complex of universal norms and institutions which create rules of behaviour for states and

for the different forces operating within the civil society. The hegemon is the first amongst

equals, as for example the United States at the UN General Assembly in comparison with

Canada. Both countries have one vote and are formally on the same level, but the vote of

the Unites States has a different weight in terms of influence than that of Canada (Zeitoun

and Allan, 2008: 9). This is the fundamental difference between hegemony and other forms

of control such as imperialism or mere domination: hegemony can manipulate inter-state

40

relations without a superior body, while, on the contrary, imperialism is based on formal

rule and military imposition (Keohane, 1991). The key requirement for a hegemonic order

to survive is that the hegemon has to convince the hegemonised that they are also serving,

at least in part, their own interests. When consent vanishes and order starts being contested,

as in the case of Arab states in 2011 for instance, there is not anymore hegemony and

power can be toppled (Keucheyan, 2012).

Further contributing on this neo-Gramscian perspective, the Belgian political theorist

Chantal Mouffe (2008) conceived hegemony and a hegemonic order as something fixed

through nodal points of power:

As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic

struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and

to define the symbolic parameters of social life. Hegemony is obtained through the

construction of nodal points, which discursively fix the meaning of institutions and social

practices and articulate the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is

established. (Mouffe, 2008)

Whether the notion of hegemony is approached from a realist or from a neo-Gramscian

perspective, in both cases it is clear how this concept is intimately correlated to that of

power (see Figure 5). The main difference is that for the former approach, the focus is on

hard power, for the latter is on a combination of hard (coercion) and soft (consent) power.

Considering hegemony only as a form of domination based on material capabilities, seems

somewhat reductive. On the subject of consent, in particular, it can be observed how, over

the last five centuries, many thinkers have converged on one point: hard power alone is not

enough to maintain supremacy.

For Machiavelli, a Prince had to be respected to obtain obedience, as in the ideal case of

Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who “possessed many qualities which earned him great

respect, all his life he succeeded in holding both of these [the soldiers and the populace] in

check and he was never hated or scorned” (Machiavelli, 1958: 108). Gramsci, as it was

widely observed, thinks that force should appear as sustained by consent. Nye, similarly,

sees the effects of soft power, intended as the power to persuade and to co-opt people rather

than coerce them, as more effective than those of hard power: “if I can get you to want to

do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye,

41

2002: 9). The reciprocal relationship between material capabilities, ideas and institutions

devised by Cox, further confirms the idea of several forces acting together in a structure.

Thus, there appears to be an intimate connection between material power and the invisible

soft power of persuasion which is at the basis of the concept of hegemony.

Figure 5: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping with hegemony

(source: Author).

It can be argued, therefore, that with respect to hegemony power can be considered as

the means to an end, with the end being the achievement and maintain of hegemony. Power

cannot be understood as the end itself (as for instance Machiavelli argued), as it is always

wielded to get a desired outcome.

2.4. The framework of hydro-hegemony

Now that the key concepts of power and hegemony have been illustrated, it is possible to

address more in detail the subject of power and hegemony in water relations. The first

42

attempts to study how control of water resources is indeed related to power dynamics and

not to the idea of water-wars, can be traced back to Frey (1993), Gleick (1993) and Lowi

(1993). Among the four factors or characteristics that make water likely to be a source of

strategic rivalry, Gleick identifies “the relative power of the basin states” (Gleick, 1993:

84)28

. Lowi (1993), adapts Keohane’s HST to the water sector, arguing that when the

upstream riparian is also the hegemon (in her acceptation of the term, hegemon stands for

the most powerful state in the basin), the chances that cooperation takes place are low since

it has no interest or incentive in doing so; cooperation is more probable when the hegemon

is located downstream and it has a critical need of water29

. The theory of Hegemonic

Stability was of inspiration also for Frederick Frey, who was the first to present a power-

analytic framework. Frey reached the conclusion that the least stable situation in an

international river basin, is obtained when a powerful nation downstream is in need of

water and compete for it with weaker nations upstream (Frey, 1993: 62). Although Zeitoun

and Warner (2996: 436) noted that Frey’s assumption contradicts with the stability of

Egypt’s water relations with other Nile co-riparians, they recognise the utility of Frey’s

framework, especially for what concerns the intuition of creating an analytical framework

based on power to analyse water relations.

The FHH gives emphasis to power and to the role that asymmetries of riparian power

play in influencing transboundary water relations. Power relations are seen as a dynamic

reality, since in international river basins “power and power asymmetry, are constantly

being contested and challenged” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010: 30) in a quest to change the

status-quo. As described by Zeitoun and Warner, the FHH is aimed at analysing

hydropolitics avoiding the traditional “water wars” and “water peace” discourses (Zeitoun

and Warner, 2008: 809). Applying the Gramscian concept of hegemony and Lukes’s three

dimension of power to hydropolitics, the FHH looks at how the basin state with more

relative power, the hydro-hegemon, “can establish the form of interation [sic] over

transboundary waters that it prefers” (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 455). The FHH is the first

28

The other three being the degree of scarcity, the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than

one region or state and the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources (Gleick, 1993: 84). 29

Dinar et al. (2007: 150) efficiently contradict Lowi’s argument taking as an example the Colorado River

salinity issue between the United States and Mexico, where the former – being both the most powerful and the

upstream state – not only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid the high costs of desalinating

the waters flowing downstream.

43

structured study in the field of hydropolitics that takes power as a key to understand

riparian relations, and this is where its importance resides.

The FHH is based on three pillars (see Figure 6), that are at the origin of power

asymmetries in a river basin. The first and third pillars, are respectively riparian position

(i.e. being upstream, midstream or downstream of a river course) and exploitation potential

(the capacity to exploit existing hydraulic infrastructures and to create new ones. Riparian

position, or geographical power, refers to the advantage that the geographical position can

give to a country. More precisely, the upstream country – the country where water

originates – can alter the flow of water in several ways (i.e. building a dam, diverting a

river, or polluting the water going upstream) affecting the countries that are further

downstream. Nevertheless, the common example of how being upstream or downstream

has only a relative influence in power configurations, is that of Egypt in the Nile river

basin: Egypt is the furthest downstream country, and thus the most geographically

disadvantaged, but is also the hydro-hegemon in the basin (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010: 192).

Geographic position can be particularly beneficial if it is combined with exploitation

potential, which refers to the technical and financial capacity to carry out hydraulic projects

such as the construction of a dam or the diversion of a river. But the innovative contribution

of the FHH is its second pillar, which is the one centred on power.

Figure 6: The pillars of hydro-hegemony (source: Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 451).

44

Lukes’s three dimensions of power are thus applied to hydropolitics to define

respectively material, bargaining and ideational power. The first and most recognizable

form of power is material power, which can be associated with the riparian’s position, its

size, military might and economic strength. A classic example of wielding this form of

power, consists in the mobilization of troops at the border. The second form of power,

bargaining, relates to control over the rules of the game and the ability to set the agenda.

Bargaining power is “measured by the impact that one’s own options and alternatives may

have on the other” (Woodhouse and Zeitoun 2008: 111). An example of this form of power

is the ability to block an issue form being discussed in regional talks, as Uzbekistan does

when it comes to discuss the issue of labour migration at regional meetings (Marat, 2009:

29) or water allocation. Finally, ideational power – which form the broader category of

discursive power along with bargaining – is the power over ideas, the power to impose a

sanctioned discourse and narratives or a particular ideology. It is the most effective form of

power, as it legitimates and stabilises the existing situation in such a way that the

dominated do not seek to challenge it. Through ideational power the hegemon convinces

the hegemonised that the current situation is right and proper. Ideational power can be

wielded, for instance, by bringing a particular issue at an international forum, such as the

UN General Assembly (UNGA), to impose a certain discourse and gain international

support. Ideational power, and the way knowledge or a discourse are constructed, can also

be associated with the Copenhagen concept of securitisation, to explain why certain issues

become non-negotiable and how the overturn of normal rights and rules of engagement is

legitimised (Zeitoun and Warner, 2008: 807).

Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 445) outlined a series of strategies and tactics – expression

of the various forms of power – that basin riparians can adopt to control water resources.

Among them, they list: coercive compliance-producing mechanisms (military force, covert

actions and coercion through threats); utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms

(incentives to cooperate); normative compliance-producing mechanisms (treaties); and

hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms (securitization, knowledge construction,

sanctioned discourse, coercive resources, international support, financial mobilisation and

riparian position).

45

These forms of power act concurrently to determine who the hegemon is in an

international river basin, or the hydro-hegemon (HH). The HH is the basin riparian whose

leadership is buttressed by authority, one that carries an hegemonic strategy based on

cohesion and compliance and sustained by attraction rather than intimidation, although the

two elements indeed coexist (Zeitoun and Allan 2008: 9). Force and consent, together with

the imposition of ideas and dominant discourses, are more relevant in determining water

use and allocation than other instruments such as international water law, water sharing

ethics or riparian position (Zeitoun and Allan, 2008: 10). HHs can be both upstream and

downstream, and conversely the weaker states, non-hegemons, can be both upstream and

downstream. A few examples of HHs are Egypt (downstream) in the Nile river basin,

Turkey (upstream) in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, Israel (midstream) in the Jordan

river basin, India (upstream) in the Ganges and Indus river basins and the US (upstream) in

the Colorado river basin. The HH is the riparian that may have interest in maintaining the

status-quo, as it is most likely satisfied by the existing situation. Further reflecting on this,

the HH can be seen as the basin riparian that is able to impose a certain discourse – for

instance, insisting on the principle of absolute integrity of a river, which states that

upstream nations cannot affect in any way the quantity or quality of the water flowing

downstream – while being also able to secure control of water resources.

Hydro-hegemony is not necessarily a negative concept. In cases where the HH has

negotiated a water-sharing agreement that is positively perceived by the other riparians,

there is a “positive/leadership” form of hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 444).

On the opposite end, when the HH tries to achieve maximum control of water resources

through unilateral actions, there is a “negative/dominative form of hydro-hegemony. This

latter setting can lead to unstable water relations, particularly when the riparians are

approximately equal in power, as it is more likely that the status-quo will be contested with

an increasing competition among countries. This situation, as it will be shown in Chapter 3,

seems to be the one that better represents water relations in the Aral Sea Basin, that are

marked by open confrontation among basin riparians.

46

2.5. Hydro-hegemony revisited

The above discussion on power, hegemony and hydro-hegemony provides the elements

to make an argument for a partial re-theorization of the FHH. The FHH offers extremely

useful insights to the understanding of interstate relations, but does not explicitly shows that

hegemony and not power is its central element. This is because its current structure based

on pillars does not seem to be the most appropriate to represent the intimate connection that

these two elements have. As it was widely observed, an analysis of power can benefit from

the understanding that power is the means to hegemony, and not vice versa.

Since the focus is being placed on hegemony and on the ways in which it can be

maintained or contested, why not placing hegemony at the centre of an analytical structure?

Moreover, the pillars in the FHH have been used to give estimates of the various levels of

power (see for instance Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010: 33) in various river basins. While this

can prompt interesting debates and give an intuitive representation of who is considered the

hydro-hegemon in a selected river basin, it can somehow be misleading, in the sense that it

can lead to think that there is something that can be defined as “half-hegemony”.

Furthermore, since each specific river basin has its own “problemshed”, the relative value

of a certain form of power can change according to the basin and to the actors involved, and

this cannot be shown in this schematic representation30

.

Therefore, I argue that representing power through pillars and measuring it, even if

through estimates, does not really benefit the analysis of hegemony. I propose a redesign

(see Figure 7) of the structure of hydro-hegemony, one that takes into consideration the

forms of power in a similar way than that adopted by the FHH, but that presents them as

interconnected, since they are – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci (1975: Q12§1) –

“connective” in the function of hegemony, or, in this case, of hydro-hegemony.

30

This seems to recall Hoffmann’s (1972) conception of world politics in terms of distinct issue areas placed

on alternative chessboards, each with a different weight.

47

Figure 7: The circle of hydro-hegemony (source: Author)

The “circle of hydro-hegemony” illustrated in Figure 7, embodies the theoretical

rationale behind the schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping

with hegemony, as it was showed in Figure 5. It also takes inspiration from Cox’s concept

of the relationship of forces in an historical structure (Cox, 1981) (Figure 4), to display how

the three forms of power interact and act together to constitute a hydro-hegemonic setting.

While the circle of hydro-hegemony might primarily appear as a cosmetic change of the

original FHH, it sets the basis for a different understanding of the complex relationship of

forces in interstate relations.

Hydro-hegemony is here defined as the success of basin riparian in imposing a

discourse, preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status-quo. This

definition combines elements from the conventional Gramscian definition of hegemony –

which denotes the success of a dominant class in presenting its view of the world and its

ideology – with aspects related to the management and control of shared water resources.

The three forms of power adopted in the circle of hydro-hegemony are not particularly

different from those of the FHH. Material power include the riparian’s position, its size,

military might, economic strength and structural capacities. The latter refer to the capacity

Hydro-hegemony

Material

Power

Ideational (discursive)

Power

Bargaining Power

48

of realising large hydraulic infrastructures (such as dams) and to freely exploit those

already existing. Bargaining power relates to the ability to set a political agenda and to shift

the balance in negotiations limiting the options and alternatives of the counterpart.

Ideational (discursive) power refers to the ability to impose a sanctioned discourse or a

particular ideology. While this last form of power appears indeed as the most effective of

the three towards the achievement of hydro-hegemony, the relative value of each of the

three forms of power can vary depending on the situation in which the basin riparians find

themselves31

. Accordingly, rather than measuring the relative weight of each form of

power, what seems analytically relevant is to observe which forms of power are more used

by each riparian, and trying to understand the reasons behind such choice.

2.5.1. Counter-hegemonic strategies: a neglected concept

Along with hegemony comes the possibility for counter-hegemony. In his seminal book

Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance, James C. Scott (1985)

observed how resistance forms a continuous, almost invisible flux, which can be difficult to

be observed but also extremely powerful. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) noted in their

theoretical analysis of hegemony, micro-strategies of resistance are always possible, even

in the most totalising hegemonic setting.

While a relevant body of hydropolitics literature focuses on how a hydro-hegemon can

use power to influence water relations (among the others, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006;

Daoudy, 2008; Turton and Funke, 2008; Zeitoun, 2008; Zeitoun, 2011; Chellaney, 2013),

the ways in which hegemony can be countered and contested have not been studied with

equal attention. Although Zeitoun and Warner have listed a few strategies – all within the

bargaining face of power – that non-hegemons can adopt, such as “recourse to morality and

international law, delay, de-securitization, issue linkage, economic development, alternative

funding sources, negotiations and generation of positive-sum outcomes” (2006: 454), they

31

A clear example is that of a weaker upstream country that cannot exploit its hydroelectric potential, as

Tajikistan in the Amu Darya river basin or Ethiopia in the Nile river basin. In this case, their relative material

power is considerably lower than that of the downstream countries, Tajikistan and Egypt, although the latter

are geographically disadvantaged by their position. This is because even if they are upstream, the status-quo is

such that they cannot take advantage of their position, since the downstream countries successfully impede

their hydraulic ambitions. Conversely, the relative material power of a hydro-hegemon in an upstream

position, like Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, is considerably higher than that of the downstream

states, Iraq and Syria.

49

also noted that there is the need for more work in this field. Ana Cascão (2008) has

explored how, in the Nile river basin, hegemonised Ethiopia has used counter-hegemonic

strategies – such as reactive and active diplomacy, the mobilisation of international funding

and construction of knowledge and expertise – to expand its influence on the Nile’s water

management. Warner (2010), has illustrated how Turkey’s hegemony in the Tigris-

Euphrates basin has been challenged both internally, with domestic opposition, and

externally, through an action carried out by downstream countries, NGOs and

archaeologists, that criticized the Turkish Ilisu dam linking its construction with the

unresolved and controversial issue of repression of Kurdish identity. This action, that

sullied the image of the Ilisu dam, was successful in influencing international backers to

pull out of the project. Also, Marwa Daoudy has noted how the process of issue linkage can

be an effective source of bargaining power, in particular for the weaker party (Daoudy,

2009: 366), as in the case of Syria’s use of issue-linkage in its water interactions with

Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin32

.

Hence, the ways in which counter-hegemonic strategies are put in place in an

international river basin could benefit from further analysis, since the research to date has

tended to focus on how hegemony is maintained rather than countered. For the purposes of

this study, counter hydro-hegemony (hereinafter “counter-hegemony”) can be defined as

the process through which a dominant discourse and a disadvantageous status-quo is

contested and challenged. Counter-hegemony is a continuous process aimed at altering and

reversing an existing hydro-hegemonic configuration.

The two case studies – the Rogun and the Kambarata dams – will therefore be used to

examine how hegemony is countered and contested. As it was noted in Chapter 1, the dams

are well suited to the analysis of a counter-hegemonic process. Their realization epitomises

a change in regional water issues, reversing a situation in which the upstream countries are

not able to develop their hydroelectric potential. More specifically, the focus will be placed

on the analysis and categorization of the various strategies and tactics that the Tajik and the

32

An interesting point in Daoudy’s work (2009) is the idea that time can be a source of bargaining power.

Time, patience and delay, constitute in her opinion an important source of power that may be used both by the

hegemon and the hegemonised. This aspect, as it will be shown in Chapter 6, appears to be of relevance also

in the Aral Sea basin.

50

Kyrgyz governments have put in place to favour the realisation of the two projects, that will

serve as a platform to the analysis of power dynamics.

The analysis of the two case studies will be preceded by an overview of the evolution of

interstate water relations in Central Asia. This will be done with the support of the TWINS

matrix.

2.5. The TWINS framework

The TWINS framework is used to answer one of the sub-questions of this thesis, how

did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011, which is propaedeutic

to the analysis of power and hegemonies in the two case studies, Rogun and Kambarata.

Conceived by Naho Mirumachi (2007, 2010), the TWINS framework is a hermeneutic tool

that allows to draw trajectories of the evolution of inter-state relations over time. The

framework is informed by constructivism, in the sense that “interaction between states is

worthy of detailed analysis for its reality-creating effects” (Mirumachi, 2010: 49). The

TWINS diagram, formed by the axis of cooperation intensity and the axis of conflict

intensity, allows drawing trajectories that outline the evolution of bilateral interstate

relations over time.

Figure 8: The TWINS diagram (Mirumachi 2010)

51

2.5.1. Conflict intensity

To categorise conflict intensity, TWINS “applies securitization theory to the issues of

hydraulic development and control over international transboundary waters” (Mirumachi,

2010: 57). In securitization theory – developed by the Copenhagen school – “security is the

move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issues

either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). In this view,

security is a self-referential practice, and the focus needs to be placed not on what is a real

existential threat to national security, but on what is intersubjectively constructed as being

an existential threat to national security. Three types of unit are involved in security

analysis: i) referent objects, which represent what is seen as an existential threat; ii)

securitizing actors, who securitize issues by declaring the referent object existentially

threatened; and iii) functional actors, who affect the dynamics of a sector (for instance

dams, through their capacity of changing the water flow, can be a functional actor in a

water dispute, with water being the referent object and governments being the securitizing

actors). Thus, securitisation theory is particularly suitable for a constructivist hydropolitics,

as the emphasis is on how an issue like transboundary water management “gets

(de)politicised, (de)securitised or (de)violised” (Julien, 2012: 59).

Correspondingly, in TWINS the four levels of conflict are non-politicization,

politicization, securitization-opportunization and violization and they correspond to the

stages of the securitization process. In their book Security: a new framework for analysis,

Buzan, Waever and De Wilde explain that public issues can range from three logic of

actions. At first, an issue can be nonpoliticized, meaning the state does not deal with it and

the issue is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision. Secondly, the

issue can be politicized, meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government

decision and resource allocation or, more rarely, some other form of communal

governance. Water, for instance, is a politicized issue in Central Asia context, as it is dealt

with directly by governments. Thirdly, an issue can be securitized, meaning the issue is

presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions

outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). Together with

this third dimension, a conflict could be opportunized, when “the issue offers such a great

52

chance to improve a situation that it justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political

procedure (Warner, 2004: 3). Finally, the fourth and highest level is violized, where “an

already securitised issue such as identity becomes a casus belli over which blood must run”

(Neumann 1998). However, as it was shown by Wolf and his team at Oregon State

University (Yoffe, Wolf and Giordano, 2003), it is very uncommon that states will engage

into violized interactions over water at the international level. Thus, when the perception of

a certain issue by the state changes, conflict intensity over transboundary waters varies

accordingly.

2.5.2. Cooperation intensity

If, on the one hand, the categorisation of conflict intensity in TWINS draws from

securitization theory, on the other hand, the categorisation of cooperation intensity takes a

direct constructivist approach, and draws upon the work of Wendt (1999) and Tuomela

(2000). Through its emphasis on ideas and norms, constructivism allows to examine

cooperation emphasizing the process of socialization between actors (Mirumachi, 2010:

59). Using Tuomela’s theory (2000) on how collective actions contribute to the formation

of collective identities, Mirumachi (2010: 60) applies the elements of collective action –

joint action, intention of collective action and common goals – to the study of cooperation

in international transboundary waters, classifying five levels of cooperation intensity:

confrontation of issue, ad-hoc joint action, common goal formation, common norm

formation and collective identity formation. When the level is confrontation of the issue,

“the issue is acknowledged but there is no specific joint action or identification and sharing

of goals”. The next level of cooperation is ad hoc joint action, which happens once there is

“joint action but no shared goals”. In other words, two States may want to perform the same

action, as for instance cleaning a shared river bed, but with a different objective. The third

level of cooperation is common goal formation, which happens when two States share a

goal but have divergent ideas on the type of action that might be taken to reach it. This

happens, for example, when two countries want a clean shared river, but for different

purposes (i.e., to stimulate tourism or to decrease pollution levels). The difference between

the second and third intensities of cooperation is that in the former, two actors act together

but with a different objective, in the latter, the objective is the same but the actions and

53

policies undertaken to reach it may be dissimilar. When there is joint action, shared goals

and identification of common norms, the level of cooperation is common norm formation.

In water relations, this is often the case when treaties and agreements on water resources

management are signed. Finally, the highest level of cooperation is collective identity

formation, when collective identity is completely formed. At this level of cooperation, the

internal interests of a State correspond to the collective international interest.

In TWINS, the social construction of international transboundary hydropolitics is

studied through the analysis of different types of speech acts. Based on this analysis, certain

events of importance in interstate relations will be outlined and used to draw a trajectory of

the interaction between States, that provides a clear image of the state of transboundary

relations at a point in time and through different phases of a relationship and that help in

emphasizing the various discourses that guided water relations.

2.5.3. Application of TWINS to this study

As mention in the Introduction, Chapter 3 will outline the evolution of interstate

relations in Central Asia in the field of water, to be able to position Rogun and Kambarata

in the wider Central Asian context. This is done using the TWINS matrix that is

accompanied by an account of the evolution of bilateral relations. The main reason behind

the decision of using the TWINS matrix in this thesis is that it provides an overview of the

state of transboundary relations at a specific point in time and through different phases of a

relationship. This ability of tracing the state of a relationship at a specific point in time, it is

of importance as it facilitates an analysis of the impact that these dams have had on general

water relations. If, on the one hand, the analysis of broader water relations covers a

timespan of twenty years (1991-2011), on the other hand, the debate around Rogun and

Kambarata gained prominence in Central Asian water politics only in the 2000s, when both

projects have been revamped respectively by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This discrepancy

offers the opportunity for a compared analysis aimed at observing how these two dams

have impacted on broader water relations, to see if changes in interstate relations can be

directly linked with developments on the dam dispute and if the launch of these projects

can be associated with the general conflictual/cooperative relation as it was outlined with

the TWINS.

54

Although potentially this study could have analysed all bilateral relations in the Aral Sea

basin, it has been decided to limit the scope of the analysis to two bilateral relations, that

have been selected for their relevance in relation to the projected Rogun and Kambarata

dams, and that cover the two main Central Asian river basins.

For what concerns the Amu Darya river basin, the selected interaction is that between

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the former being the country where the Rogun dam is located,

and the latter being its most vocal opponent. Likewise, the selected interaction in the Syr

Darya river basin is that between Kyrgyzstan, where the Kambarata dam is being built, and

Uzbekistan, that also in this case is the most vocal dam opponent.

Similarly to the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony, TWINS is based on the

assumption that asymmetries in power distribution among basin riparians play a significant

role in influencing water relations (Mirumachi, 2010: 62). In this research, the TWINS is

used as a platform to outline a trajectory in the interaction between two countries, and then,

the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony serves to understand – through the study of

power dynamics and power asymmetries – why interstate relations followed a certain

direction. This is why the TWINS will be used to illustrate the evolution of water relations

in the Aral Sea basin and to set the broader political context, to be then followed by the

more specific analysis on the debate around the construction of Rogun and Kambarata and

the analysis of power dynamics, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies.

2.6. Data collection and methods of analysis

The following section summarizes the methods that were used to collect information and

to analyse them. For more details on the methodology, please refer to the Annex 1.

The first step of the study has been to create three detailed chronologies (one for general

interstate relations and one each for Rogun and Kambarata) of relevant speech acts

representative of cooperative and conflictive interactions. In this research, speech acts are

studied within Onuf’s three categories, assertive, directive and commissive (see paragraph

2.1), with the clarification that speech acts can be both verbal and nonverbal facts, as stated

by Duffy and Frederking (2009) in their speech acts analysis of the end of the Cold War. A

nonverbal speech act is a physical, concrete action that conveys a meaning, such as

mobilizing troops at the border, which is an example of a directive speech act. In water

55

relations, an assertive speech act can be for instance a public speech or an official statement

through which sovereignty on water resources is stated. A directive speech act can be a cut

in water resources to obtain, for instance, resumption in supplies of another natural

resource. Finally, a commissive speech act can be the signing of a treaty or a joint

declaration, commissive.

Speech acts have been analysed using grounded theory and principles of discourse

analysis. Being this a study on power and hegemony, it is important to focus on the

capacity of one actor to impose or control a certain discourse, as the management of social

representations can be associated with the control over the minds and perceptions of other

people and thus to hegemony (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). Discourse analysis in this study is

used in the analysis of speech acts, to ascertain whether they are assertive, directive or

committive, connecting them with particular periods of water relations in the Aral Sea

basin, and analysing the audience towards which they were addressed and the meaning that

wanted to be conveyed. The way discourse analysis is carried out is inspired by techniques

developed in grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodology for developing theory

that is grounded in data gathered and analysed systematically (Strauss and Corbin, 1994:

273). In this methodology originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), theory may

be generated directly from the data or, if other theories on the area of investigation already

exist, theory may be further elaborated and modified using the data gathered. The former

approach, applies to the study of counter-hegemonic strategies, which have not been

theorised in detail and therefore theory will be generated directly from the data. The latter

approach, on the other hand, will be used for hegemonic strategies. In this case, the data

gathered will be confronted with the existing theorisation from Warner and Zeitoun (2006),

confirming or further expanding the categorisation of hegemonic strategies. The data

collected in the three timelines, is coded and categorised (and sub-categorised) looking for

relationships, patterns of action and interaction (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 278) between

the various basin riparians. As Birks and Mills note, grounded theory is usually derived

from data sources of a qualitative and interpretive nature (Birks and Mills, 2011: 6), as it is

also the case for this research.

56

Chapter 3. Water relations in Central

Asia

Consider the water you drink – was it you who brought it down from the

rain-cloud or We? If We wanted, We could make it bitter: will you not be

thankful?

Qur'an, 56: 68-70

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of transboundary water relations in

the Aral Sea basin for the period 1991-2011. The chapter is divided into three main

sections. The first, provides some key definitions and delineates the main principles of

international water law. The second introduces the basin, its geographical and hydrological

characteristics, the legacy left by the Soviet Union and the setting that emerged after

independence. The third section outlines the evolution of interstate water relations among

the Central Asian countries, initially presenting the general picture and later narrowing

down the focus on bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan

and Uzbekistan. This will serve as a background for the examination of the two case-

studies of this research, the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan

and in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the analysis carried out in this chapter will allow to answer

the first sub-question, “how did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-

2011?”, and will also be useful to place the two dams in the appropriate context, and to

understand how their revitalisation has impacted on broader interstate relations.

3.1. Background on transboundary waters and international water law

This section lays out some of the basic definitions that will be used throughout this

chapter. Furthermore, the key principles of international water law and of Soviet water law

will be illustrated.

57

3.1.1. Defining transboundary waters

Water covers about 70 % of the Earth's surface. As UN Water (a UN inter-agency

coordination mechanism for all freshwater and sanitation related issues) reports, the volume

of freshwater resources is around 35 million km3, that represents 2.5 % of the total volume

of water on Earth. Of these freshwater resources, 70 % is in the form of ice and permanent

snow cover in mountainous regions, while around 30 % is stored in underground aquifers.

The remaining 0.3 %, equal to 105,000 km3, is contained in freshwater lakes and rivers (or

watercourses), that thus represent only a tiny amount (around 0.01 %) of total water

resources. This, however, does not diminish the importance that freshwater rivers and lakes

have for humans. On the contrary, they become even more crucial, also because the water

that they store is the one that can be more easily accessed.

But what exactly is a watercourse? According to Article 2 of the 1997 UN Convention

on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter, the

“UN water convention”), a watercourse can be defined as “a system of surface waters and

groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and

normally flowing into a common terminus”. Also, an international watercourse is a

“watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States”.

Watercourses form river basins, which can be defined as “the area that contributes

hydrologically (including both surface-and groundwater) to a first order stream, which, in

turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea”. When

a perennial tributary of a basin crosses the political boundaries of two or more nations, such

basin can be defined an international river basin (Wolf, 2007: 245).

Additionally, there are various types of rivers. When a river forms a border (such as the

Shatt-al-Arab river, that separates Iran and Iraq) the river is called contiguous, and when it

crosses a border and generates an upstream-downstream configuration (such as the Tigris

river, that flows from Turkey through Iraq), is called successive (LeMarquand, 1977: 8).

Finally, when a river forms a border and also crosses it (as in the case of the Mekong river,

that forms part of the border between Laos and Thailand and then runs through Cambodia),

it is referred as mixed (Toset et al., 2000). For what concerns the two largest Central Asian

rivers, the Amu Darya is a mixed river that flows along and across33

the borders of

33

Until 1991 the Amu Darya marked the border between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

58

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while the Syr Darya is a successive

river that flows from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Figure 9: Different types of rivers. Figure constructed by the author based on LeMarquand (1977) and

Toset et al. (2000).

Overall, 263 rivers around the world cross the boundaries of two or more nations, and

their basin areas comprise about 47 % of the land surface of the earth and include 40 % of

the world’s population (Wolf, 2007). Some of these international river basins did not exist

until 1978 (when their number was 214), while some other disappeared as a result of major

political changes that transformed national boundaries in international ones, and vice versa.

For instance, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, or the 1999 war in the former

Yugoslavia created new states and numerous new international river basins. Conversely,

the unification of East and West Germany and of Southern and Northern Yemen, led to the

vanishing of various international river basins (Dinar et al., 2007: 10-11).

59

The sheer number of international river basins, led to the development of some general

principles to govern shared freshwater resources that form the core of international water

law.

3.1.2. Principles of international water law

As defined by Akehurst, “International law consists of rules and principles of general

application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with

their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural

or juridical” (Akehurst and Malanczuk, 1997: 1).

International water law (or international watercourse law) is the branch of international

law that deals with the use and protection of transboundary watercourses34

. The sources of

international law and international water law are identical, and they consist of agreements

(such as treaties and conventions), decisions of intergovernmental organizations that

acquire binding force by treaty, and customary international law (Hodgson, 2010: 3).

Nevertheless, and similarly to other environmental resources, there is not a comprehensive

legal framework that regulates and ensure the application of the principles of international

water law, and since there is nothing such an “international water police”, its greatest

limitation is the lack of enforcement (Gleick, 1993; Waterbury, 1997).

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), between 80535

and

1984 over 3,600 acts (declarations, bilateral and multilateral treaties) relating to

international water resources were negotiated and signed (FAO, 1978; FAO, 1984). Until

recent times, international water law focused mostly on aspect related to the navigational

uses of a river and to the generation of hydroelectricity. Starting in the second half of the

1900s, other matters such as river pollution, water sharing and flood control acquired an

increasing importance in the treaties that were being negotiated and signed around the

world (Sironneau, 1996).

Traditionally, the use of international rivers has been guided by four, universally

recognized, principles: i) the Harmon doctrine or absolute territorial sovereignty; ii)

34

For a comprehensive overview of the principles of international water law and their evolution over time in

different societies, refer to the volume Principles of water law and administration, edited by Dante Caponera

(2007). 35

The first treaty, that concerned the Rhine river in France, was in the form of a unilateral declaration by

Charlemagne in 805 that granted freedom of navigation to a monastery (Verzijl et al., 1970: 126).

60

absolute territorial integrity; iii) the community theory; iv) limited territorial sovereignty or

equitable utilization theory (LeMarquand, 1977: 12-13).

Figure 10: The four traditional principles of international water law. Figure constructed by the

author based on LeMarquand (1977).

The Harmon doctrine – that takes its name from US Attorney General Judson Harmon –

is considered the most notorious theory in all of international resources law, and it is today

identified with the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. It is based upon an opinion

issued by Harmon in 1895 concerning a dispute between Mexico and the US for the use of

a shared river, the Rio Grande. The doctrine basically states that “a country is absolutely

sovereign over the portion of an international watercourse within its borders. Thus, that

country would be free to divert all of the water from an international watercourse, leaving

none for downstream states” (McCaffrey, 1996: 549). Although the US, and more generally

upstream countries, tended to spouse such an extreme principle, the doctrine was later

rejected by the US and it lost relevance as a principle of international water law (Wolf,

1999a).

Conversely, the principle of absolute territorial integrity (or absolute integrity of the

river), guarantees the use of the river in an unaltered state, both in terms of water quantity

and quality, to the lower riparian. The third principle, the community theory, sets the

Absolute territorial

sovereignty (Harmon doctrine)

Absolute territorial integrity

Community theory

Limited territorial

sovereignty

61

obligation to consult the other basin riparians before taking any decision that might affect a

river. Finally, the fourth principle, limited territorial sovereignty, gives riparians the right to

use a river’s water to the extent that no harm is done to the other riparians.

More recently, the International Law Association started to formulate and codify

customary international water law, and in 1966 drafted the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of

International Rivers (Dellapenna, 2001). In 1972, the United Nations Environment

Programme (UNEP), adopted the very broad and general Declaration of the United Nations

Conference on the Human Environment36

, while twenty years later, in Dublin, the non-

binding Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development – a series of principles

focusing on the economic value of water – was put together by a team of experts on water

issues.

But the key document, adopted in 1997, is the UN Water Convention, which is today

considered the most authoritative legislative instrument concerning international water law

(Phillips, 2006: 11), Nevertheless, the Convention has not entered into force, since to

become legally binding at least 35 nations must ratify it, and as of December 2013 it has

received only 33 ratifications37

(UN Treaty Collection [no date]).

The Convention sets three key principles of international water law: i) equitable and

reasonable use of shared freshwater resources (United Nations, 1997: Article 5 and 6); ii)

the avoidance of significant harm to other states through activities related to an

international watercourse (United Nations, 1997: Article 7); iii) prior notification of works

which may affect co-riparians in trans-boundary watercourses (United Nations, 1997:

Articles 11-19).

36

Whose Principle 21 seems to have relevance also for the general principles of international water law, as it

recognizes that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of

international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental

policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage

to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” (United Nations

Conference on the Human Environment, 1972). 37

Upper riparians view the Convention as biased in favor of downstream riparians, since they perceive the

prior notification principle as an instrument that gives downstream countries a veto power over projects

planned upstream (Salman, 2007). For instance, among the only three countries that voted against the

Convention, two (China and Turkey) are upper riparians. For what concerns the countries of the Aral Sea

basin, only Uzbekistan ratified it (in 2007), with the clear intent of hampering the construction of hydraulic

infrastructures in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as it will be outlined more in detail in Chapter 6.

62

Figure 3: The three principles of international water law set by the 1997 UN Water Convention.

Figure constructed by the author.

However, and unsurprisingly for comprehensive and broad legal instruments such as this

one, the Convention is considered too vague and ambiguous (Biswas, 2001; Lasserre,

2009), and countries still prefer to regulate the utilization of transboundary waters through

bilateral or multilateral regional agreements (Phillips, 2006). This seems to be the case also

for the countries of the Aral Sea basin, that have tended to solve regional water issues at the

bilateral and (more reluctantly) at the multilateral level. Over twenty years after their

independence, the Central Asian countries have yet to sign a long-term framework

agreement for the sustainable management and sharing of their water resources, and (as it

will be shown in the second section of this Chapter) they have coped with transboundary

water issues through short-term (usually annual) ad-hoc agreements. In this regard, despite

the dissolution of the Soviet Union the key principles of Soviet water law appear to still

have a relevance for the Central Asian governments and their attitude towards water

resources.

3.1.3. Principles of Soviet water law

Unsurprisingly, Soviet water law was designed to facilitate the accomplishment of the

centralised and planned socialist economy. As Fox noted (1971), however, Soviet water

law was not flexible enough to facilitate a compromise among the interests of the various

water users in the USSR (i.e. the hydroelectric and the agricultural sector), as it did not

foresee a consultation mechanism.

Equitable and reasonable

use

Causing no harm

Prior notification

63

The centrality of water in the socialist ideology was already remarked by Karl Marx in

the Capital: “The soil (and this, economically speaking, includes water) in the virgin state

in which it supplies man with necessaries or the means of subsistence ready to hand, exists

independently of him, and is the universal subject of human labour” (Marx, 1867: 125).

Therefore, being water the universal subject of human activities, the Soviet water law

envisaged the use of a water body for different purposes at the same time, closely binding

water law to land law. Article 11 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution (also known as the

Brezhnev Constitution), recognised that “The land, its minerals, waters, and forests are the

exclusive property of the state” (Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1977). Thus, private

ownership of water was not allowed, as the state (i. e. the Soviet people) had an exclusive

right of water ownership.

The basic principles for governing the utilization and protection of rivers, lakes,

reservoirs and other surface and underground water resources were contained in the

Fundamentals of Water Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics38

, adopted on 10

December 1970. Also this regulation provides that all waters are under state ownership but

it interestingly draws a distinction between the notions of “water” and “water resources”.

The former is a natural element, a substance in continuous motion that cannot be property

of the state. The latter may become a property as a result of lawful activities, such as

drinking water administered by the municipalities (Food and Agriculture Organization of

the United Nations, 1983: 103). All water resources in the USSR were considered as

“integrated”, meaning that their ownership devolved to a sole entity, the USSR, and not to

the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) or the Soviet Socialist Republics

(SSRs).

Overall, the two main principles of Soviet water law, namely that i) water remained the

exclusive property of the state and that ii) water was inalienable, contrast with the three

main principles set by the UN water Convention (equitable and reasonable use of shared

freshwater resources, causing no harm and prior notification) (Weinthal, 2004: 254). With

the collapse of the USSR, each of the new republics adopted new water laws and water

38

Two other important acts were the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On Strengthening

State Control of the Use of Groundwater and on Measures for Its Conservation” of 1959, and that “On

Measures for Regulating the Use of and for Strengthening the Conservation of the Water Resources of the

USSR” of 1960 (Kolbasov, 1987).

64

codes. These legal instruments represent a compromise between the state-centric socialist

system, and the new trend in water law that recognizes an increasing participation of the

public in the management of water resources. This seems relevant, considering that the new

national water laws are resource-development oriented and focus on the maintenance of the

status-quo, rather than on changes towards integrated water resources management

(Caponera, 2007: 82).

3.2. Hydrological and geographical aspects of the Aral Sea basin

Among the basins that emerged recently and as a consequence of a political disarray,

there is the one of the Aral Sea (see Figure 11), an international river basin formed by the

two largest rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The basin includes

the territories of the five former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – which by convention constitute

the Central Asian region –, the territory of Afghanistan and a small part of the territory of

Iran39

. In ancient times, the two rivers attracted the first Central Asians civilisations.

Settlers, who cultivated fertile soils and introduced irrigation techniques, gathered around

the Amu Darya (known as the Oxus in ancient Greek chronicles), while nomadic and semi-

nomadic people from the steppe lived around the Syr Darya. It is in this area, known as

Transoxiana (the area between the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers), that between the

sixth and the third centuries B.C. the early protostates and urban centres of Central Asia

(such as Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan, Balkh in Afghanistan, Merv in

Turkmenistan and Khojand in Tajikistan) were created (Abazov, 2008: 6).

Ecologically, the basin has three distinct zones: i) the mountains, that consist mainly of

the Tyan Shan and Pamir ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the highest peaks

above 7000 meters40

and average precipitation (concentrated in spring and winter) varying

between 600–800 mm per year; ii) the deserts, that are formed by the Kara-kum and the

39

Although they are part of the basin, Afghanistan and Iran will not be taken in consideration in this thesis.

This is because both countries were not part of the Soviet Union and have not been included in the regional

water dialogue over the last decades. While the reasons of this exclusion from regional negotiations are

understandable for Iran, whose territory only constitutes 2 % of the basin area, they are more controversial for

what concerns Afghanistan, that contributes 8 % of flow generated in the Amu Darya river basin but has

never been included in multilateral water agreements and negotiations (Horsman, 2008). 40

Including what was the highest mountain in the former Russian Empire and later in the Soviet Union, the

7,495 meter tall Ismail Somoni Peak in Tajikistan (previously known as Stalin Peak, and, after the de-

Stalinization process, as Communism Peak).

65

Kyzil-kum, and that cover most of the basin area, with average precipitation between 80–

150 mm per year; iii) the Aral Sea with its deltas (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 2).

Figure 11: The Aral Sea basin. Source: Micklin (2007).

The Amu Darya river flows along and across the borders of Tajikistan, Afghanistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while the Syr Darya river flows from Kyrgyzstan through

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Amu Darya is the largest river in the region in terms of

water volume, and the Syr Darya is the longest. Both rivers terminate their course in the

Aral Sea. In hydrological terms, these rivers are called exotic, which means that their flow

originate in well-watered and cool mountains (the Pamir and Tyan Shan) and then

continues to arid areas (the Kara-kum and Kyzil-kum deserts), where the volume of water

is substantially diminished by evaporation, transpiration and bed filtration (Micklin, 2000:

7). Therefore, even prior to the modern age of irrigation, the average inflow of the Amu

Darya river to the Aral Sea decreased to around 40 km3

from the 62 km3

coming out of the

Pamir mountains, while the already considerable lesser flow of the Syr Darya, declined to

66

around 15 km3

from the initial 37 km3. Some other smaller but still important rivers form

the basin, such as the Chu, Talas, Assa and Bugun in the Syr Darya basin, and the Tedjen,

Zerafshan and Kashkadarya in the Amu Darya basin. All of these former tributaries no

longer flow into the Amu Darya and Syr-Darya rivers (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 3).

Figure 12: Water flow generation and abstraction (average km3 per year) in the Aral Sea basin. Graph

constructed by author based on data from cawater-info.net [no date].

As outlined in Figure 12, upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are water-rich, and supply

respectively 55 and 25 % of average annual basin river flow, for an aggregate contribution

of 80 %, that exceeds by far their water withdrawals. While these countries are net donors

to basin water supplies, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are large net consumers,

and due to their vast irrigated areas they withdraw 83 % of the basin water, despite the fact

that they contribute to only 14 % of the Aral Sea basin river flow (Micklin, 2000: 8-9). In

addition, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have insignificant oil and gas resources, the

downstream countries are in the opposite situation, and for instance Turkmenistan has 4.3

% of the world’s gas reserves and Uzbekistan has 0.9 %, while Kazakhstan has 3.2 % of the

world’s proven oil reserves (Olcott, 2010: 258).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Km

3 o

f w

ate

r

Flow generation

Water withdrawal

67

Such difference in water usage between upstream and downstream countries is partly

due to the geographical characteristics of the Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan are largely mountainous, and therefore not particularly suitable to extensively

practice irrigated agriculture), but most of all, to the water management practices that were

set under the Soviet Union, and that the newly born Central Asia republics have inherited.

Nevertheless, before outlining the Soviet hydraulic mission, it is worth delving into the

meaning of water for the Central Asians people and to the tradition that the Soviets have

attempted to alter, since this seems to influence the way water is framed and dealt with by

present-day Central Asian leaders.

3.2.1. The meaning of water for Central Asian people

In the ancient world the Central Asian region was known with the Greek word

Transoxiana, which defines the area between the two “darya” (sea or river in Persian), the

Amu and the Syr. In the Muslim world, the region was known as Mawarannahr, which in

Arabic means the area beyond the river (Roy, 2000: 1). Water has thus been used to

identify a region where, for centuries, generations of people have associated their existence

and well-being with water. Besides sustaining livelihood, water has also been used to

delineate and separate territories within the region, leading to the creation of three main

hydro-historic centres, the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand, which correspond to

the three oases of Khorezm, Sogdiana and Ferghana (Balland, 1997: 98-99).

The management of water resources is tied with the traditions of Central Asian peoples,

and with the use of particular irrigation techniques that allowed the formation of

Wittfogelian hydraulic societies in the Mesopotamia of Central Asia (Dolukhanov, 1994).

Most notably, the development of the Karez (known in Arabic as Qanat) system over 2000

years ago, made it possible to easily access water and make land arable in hostile

environments. The Karez is a system of inclined tunnels that, thanks to gravity, allows

bringing underground water to the surface (for more information on the Karez system, see

Beaumont et al., 1989). The management of this crucial and sustainable irrigation system

has its roots in ancient traditions that have been passed on from one generation to another.

The social organization behind the Karez had an important role in defining communal

structures in villages, as irrigation systems and water rights have been crucial both to

68

agricultural production and to social life in the Central Asian society (Eickelman, 1998).

However, this was not compatible with the massive Soviet irrigation structures, and

eventually, the knowledge necessary to run the Karez was lost and the system was left in a

state of abandon.

Moreover, as both Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov (2003) and Allouche (2005) observe, water

has also been historically connected with the two main religions of Central Asia,

Zoroastrianism and Islam. Followers of Zoroastrianism41

worship fire and water (adar and

aban), and the Videvdat (the main source for Zoroastrian law) utters the sanctity of water

and regulates its uses.

Likewise, also for Islam and its sacred text, the Qur'an, water is at the origin of all life on

Earth. From water every living thing was made (Qur'an, 21:30), and the throne of God was

laying upon water (Qur'an, 11:7). Water is a God-given gift, one for which humans should

be grateful and respectful (Qur'an, 56:68-70). The Islamic law, the Sharia (which in Arabic

means the way or path to water, or the law of water), sets some guiding principles on water

management based on communal ownership (since water is a gift from God it cannot be

owned), and on the fact that everyone should equally benefit from a watercourse

(Wickström, 2010). As pointed out by Cummings (2012: 110), while Sharia has no official

status in the Central Asian countries and the five regional leaders have declared their states

secular, they have nevertheless used Islam as a legitimation tool, integrating it (each one

differently) in their state ideologies.

Although the Soviets have attempted to instil among the Central Asian people faith in

modernism and in the superiority of Communism (Pearce, 2007), after the collapse of the

Soviet Union this effort proved ephemeral. As the Uzbek President Islam Karimov sums it

up, “After a period of more than a century of totalitarian dependence, this process [the

revival of spiritual values and national self-awareness] initially took quite naturally the

shape of the rejection of the recent past” (Karimov, 1997: 85-86). And indeed, the

revitalisation of the spiritual values and traditions that were frustrated by the Soviets, such

as Islam for instance, led the Central Asian Presidents to often use religion to underline the

41

Although the number of Zoroastrians in Central Asia declined, Zoroastrianism has been revived in

Tajikistan by the President Emomali Rahmon, that refers to Zoroaster as “the first prophet of the Tajiks,

whose trace on earth has not been erased by the dust of millennia and the ashes left by countless bloody wars”

(Rahmon, 2002: 14). Rahmon thus put Zoroastrianism (along with the cult of Ismail Somoni and the Aryan

myth) at the center of an ideological production aimed at reinforcing Tajik nationalism (Marat, 2008a).

69

pure and sacred nature of water, and consequently present it as a non-negotiable matter, as

it will be illustrated throughout this study.

3.3. The Soviet hydraulic mission

While more than twenty years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet

water management practices still have a great influence on Central Asian water politics.

From the 1940s until the 1960s, Stalin’s Great Plan for the Transformation of Nature

(Stalinskiy Plan Preobrazovaniya Prirody) and Krushev’s Virgin Lands Campaign

radically changed agricultural practices in the Soviet Union to meet the growing needs of

its population. If, on the one hand, the Soviets managed to bring water and electricity in

most of their territory (in line with Lenin’s insight “Communism is Soviet power plus the

electrification of the whole country), on the other hand, their environmental irresponsibility

has been the cause of countless ecological disasters. As Feshbach and Friendly noted (1992:

1), “[w]hen historians finally conduct an autopsy on the Soviet Union and Soviet

Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide. […] No other great industrial

civilization so systematically and so long poisoned its land, air, water and people”. And

indeed, the desiccation of the Aral Sea is possibly the worst man-made environmental

disaster of the twentieth century. The times are long gone since Alexey Butakoff, a

Commander of the Imperial Russian Navy, was reporting on his Caspian Tiger sightings in

the vicinity of Aralsk (Butakoff, 1853), as today the Aral Sea turned into the Aral-kum, a

desert whose soil is known as solonchak, a mixture of salt deposits, sand and dust polluted

with agricultural chemicals.

The Soviets have not been the first to be fascinated by the ability to dominate nature and

use its power to serve the needs of society. Powerful ancient empires, such as the Chinese,

Mesopotamian, Egyptian or Maya, used rivers to develop large-scale irrigated areas which

contributed to their growth and expansion (Wittfogel, 1957; Molle et al., 2009).

3.3.1. Bringing water to the desert

Thus, between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1970s, hydraulic missions were

launched worldwide, including the Soviet Union, where the plan was to make “mad rivers

sane” (Gorky, quoted in McCully, 2001: 17). Through its hydraulic mission, the Soviet

70

hydrocracy pursued mostly two objectives: increase agricultural and electricity production,

through respectively large-scale irrigation projects and massive hydropower plants. In

Central Asia, the hydraulic mission engendered the construction of large dams and water

reservoirs in the mountainous areas of the upstream republics (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)

which, together with a complex network of canals, made it possible to practice irrigated

agriculture in the plains of the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan), where water intensive agricultural crops such as cotton, rice, and wheat were

grown (Rakhmatullaev et al., 2010: 308). This is because the Central Asia climate is

excellent for growing cotton and other heat-loving crops, and its thermal conditions (that

allow a growing season of 204 to 288 days per year) were the best of anyplace in the Soviet

Union (Klotzli, 1994: 6). Moreover, through the construction of dams and canals, the

Soviet administrators created a situation that would ensure competition between upstream

and downstream countries, thus reinforcing the national distinctiveness of the republics and

maintaining a role for Moscow as a dispute settler (O’Hara, 2000: 430).

The first major irrigation projects began in 1939, with the construction of 45 canals,

such as the Great, the North and the South Ferghana canals in the Ferghana Valley (Matley,

1967: 294-295). Thanks also to the momentum gained with the Virgin Lands Campaign

(launched in the 1950s by Krushev), the total irrigated area in Central Asia increased from

4.5 million hectares in 1965 to 7 million hectares in 1991 (Wegerich, 2008: 73). Overall,

over 60 canals divert water from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, including the Kara-

kum Canal, one of the longest (1,400 km) irrigation canals in the world that taps into Amu

Darya to bring water in the Kara-kum desert in Turkmenistan. The expansion of irrigation

diminished the inflow from the two rivers into the Aral Sea, eventually leading to the

desiccation of what in the 1960s was the fourth’s largest inland water body42

(Micklin,

2007).

During the same period, the largest Central Asian hydro-electric dams were designed

and built, most notably the Toktogul dam on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan, and the Nurek

42

On this regard, Decree 1110 (“Measures for Radical Improvement of Ecological and Sanitary Situation in

the Region of the Aral Sea, Enhancing the Efficiency and Use to Strengthen the Protection of the Water and

Land Resources in its Basin”) adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1988, can be

considered as a formal recognition of the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Although too late have any relevant

effect, the document specifies annual minimum inflow quota to the deltas of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya in

the Aral Sea to try to reverse its desiccation.

71

dam in Tajikistan. Other projects were started but never concluded, such as the large Rogun

and Kambarata dams, whose revitalisation in the 2000s provoked the two regional conflicts

that are the centre of this study. These abandoned dam projects were not, however, the only

legacy left by the Soviet Union to the new-born republics. As Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov

noted:

While Tsarist Russia left local water law unchanged, especially as it applied to

communal participation in works related to the operation, maintenance, renovation, and

rehabilitation of irrigation nets. The institution of “aryk aksakals” and “mirabs” – water

managers elected by communities – was put on a sound basis. Seventy years of Soviet

power changed these principles by creating a strict and rigidly controlled system of

centralized water management that worked in a top-down manner. […] This system

made it possible to deliver and allocate water successfully by means of a huge water

infrastructure with vast operational costs, covered at the expense of the federal

government at inter-farm and up to on-farm levels, and which also included drainage.

But this water system suffered from two immense shortcomings. First, the opinions of

water users and consumers were not taken into consideration; as a result, the transition

of agriculture and the Central Asian economy in general to market principles showed

many water users to be insolvent and not self-sufficient. Second, environment

considerations were largely ignored in favor of the needs of water users; hence

ecological and sanitary requirements, along with the environmental needs of deltas,

Priaralye, and the Aral Sea itself, were ignored and the scale of the problems was

understated. (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 9)

Besides creating a huge water distribution and irrigation structure, the Soviets also

imposed a centralised system to manage the region’s natural resources that had the

downstream countries providing the upstream states with oil and gas, in exchange for water

releases in summer to irrigate their cotton fields. These regional schemes – centrally

managed by the Soviet Ministry of Water Management (USSR Minvodkhoz) – regulated

seasonal water requirements and distribution among the Republics (Vinogradov and

Langford, 2001), while allowing the upstream countries to keep water in their reservoirs in

winter, instead of using it to produce hydroelectricity, as their energy needs were already

met. Water allocation arrangements were based on two complementary components: i)

centrally controlled water allocation quotas for each SSR, and ii) centrally planned

deliveries of oil and gas to the Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs in winter (Libert et al., 2008: 11).

More precisely, the Ministry of Water Management of the Soviet Union allocated the

water resources of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya through the adoption of two internal

72

decisions: Protocol 56643

for the Amu Darya, and Protocol 41344

for the Syr Darya (see

Table 2). Giving priority to the cultivation of cotton, fodder, fruits and vegetables in the

downstream countries (The World Bank, 2004: 8), Protocol 56645

allocated 48 % of the

total surface flow of the Amu Darya river to Uzbekistan, 36 % to Turkmenistan, 15 % to

Tajikistan and 0.6 % to Kyrgyzstan, while Protocol 413 allocated 46 % of the total surface

flow of the Syr Darya river to Uzbekistan, 44 % to Kazakhstan, 8 % to Tajikistan and 2 %

to Kyrgyzstan. To make sure that water allocation were respected, in 1986 the Minvodkhoz

also created two river basin organizations, the BVO Syr Darya and the BVO Amu Darya.

Water distribution limits in the

Amu Darya basin (Protocol 566)

Water distribution limits in the

Syr Darya basin (Protocol 413)

Billion cubic

meter per year Share %

Billion cubic

meter per year Share %

Kazakhstan - - 10 44

Kyrgyzstan 0.4 0.6 0.5 2

Tajikistan 9.5 15.4 1.8 8

Turkmenistan 22 35.8 - -

Uzbekistan 29.6 48.2 10.4 46

Total 61.5 100 22.7 100

Table 2: Water Distribution Limits in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins according to Protocol 566

and Protocol 413.

Unsurprisingly, when such a centralised and interconnected system vanished along with

the Soviet Union, tensions arose between the new-born independent republics over the

management and sharing of their natural resources (O’Hara, 2000).

43

Protocol 566: Improvement of the Scheme on Complex Use and Protection of Amu-Darya Water Resources

by Scientific & Technical Council, Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management of the Soviet

Union, September 10, 1987. 44

Protocol 413: Improvement of Scheme of Complex Use and Protection of Water Resources of Syr-Darya

Basin, February 7, 1984. 45

With the Protocol 566, the Soviets deliberately left Afghanistan out of water allocation in the Amu Darya,

although the country is part of the river basin. As Horsman (2008: 66) observed, Afghanistan – that in 1977

had sent, with no results, a delegation to Tashkent to arrange a water sharing agreement – was not consulted

in this occasion. Therefore, the 1987 distribution limits ignored Afghanistan’s claims, and assigned to the

country a quota that was less than what it was using in 1965 (3,850 million m³) .

73

3.4. The water/energy nexus

Water being not scarce but unevenly distributed (Thorez and Thorez, 2004), the matter

of discontent among the countries of the Aral Sea basin is on water quantity rather than on

water quality. Driven by the need to cooperate on water issues (and perhaps still under-

shock for an independence that was not expected nor wanted46

), in February 1992 the

Central Asian leaders hurriedly47

signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Joint

Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate Water Resources (also known as the

“Almaty Agreement”). This agreement is significant because its main effect was to leave

Soviet water allocation unchanged, thus continuing to favour the downstream republics.

Besides preserving the allocations contained in Protocol 566 and Protocol 413, the Almaty

Agreement also maintained the two BVOs originally created by the Soviets. What changed,

though, was that with independence the upstream states began paying market prices for the

oil and gas that they imported from the downstream countries, while before, their energy

needs were met by the low-cost imports centrally administered by Moscow. Therefore,

instead of operating their large water reservoirs in irrigation mode, the upstream states now

had an interest in storing their water in summer and use it to produce cheap hydroelectricity

in winter48

(McKinnney 2004; Allouche, 2004), thus leading to water shortages in the

downstream countries during summer, and to flooding in winter (as for instance in the

Arnasai depression in Uzbekistan), since water was released when it was not needed.

Moreover, Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s inability to pay for gas and oil imports resulted in

frequent energy cuts and in recurrent energy crises.

46

As Mandelbaum noted, the five Central Asian countries had independence thrust upon them; they were not

ready nor particularly satisfied with the political earthquake caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. “In

none had there been popular agitation for secession. None of their leaders sided, during the abortive coup of

August 1991, with the forces of Boris Yeltsin, whose victory in the confrontation with the coup’s perpetrators

was the deathblow of the Soviet Union (Mandelbaum, 1994: 2). 47

The Almaty Agreement was the first international multilateral agreement over water signed in the Soviet

successor states (Weinthal, 2006: 8). 48

Also, since fossil fuel prices quickly increased after independence, households in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

switched from fossil fuel fired heating to electric heating, thus increasing winter electricity demand.

74

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Population, total

(million) (2012) 16.8 5.6 7.6 5.1 29.8

Surface area (sq.

km) 2,724,900 199,949 142,550 488,100 447,400

Renewable internal

freshwater

resources, total

(billion cubic

meter) (2011)

64 49 63 1 16

Renewable internal

freshwater

resources per

capita49

(cubic

meter) (2011)

3,886 8,873 8,120 275 557

Annual freshwater

withdrawals, total

(billion cubic

meter) (2011)

21.1 10.1 11.5 28 56

Annual freshwater

withdrawals,

agriculture (% of

total freshwater

withdrawal) (2011)

66 94 91 94 90

Electricity

production from

hydroelectric

sources (billion

kWh) (2011)

7.9 14.1 16 n.d. 10.2

Electricity

production from

hydroelectric

sources (% of total)

(2011)

9.1 93.3 98.8 0 19.5

Table 3: Key data on water availability and usage in Central Asia. Table constructed by author based

on data from http://data.worldbank.org.

49

To put this in the global context, in 2011 the amount of renewable internal cubic meter of freshwater

available per person per year in Canada was 82,647, in the United States 9,044, in Italy 3,005, in India 1,184,

in Morocco 905, in Libya 115, in Israel 97 and in Egypt 23.

75

The incompatibility between water demands of irrigation and hydropower, also known

as the water/energy nexus, gave rise to a tense confrontation between upstream and

downstream states on the use and control of the region’s water resources (Bohr, 2004),

leading David Smith to write that “nowhere in the world is the potential for conflict over

the use of natural resources as strong as in Central Asia” (1995: 351). Similarly, several

scholars have framed regional water issues in Central Asia as a predominantly conflictual

matter (Klotzli, 1994; Shalpykova, 2002; Sievers, 2002; Spoor and Kutrov, 2003; Allouche,

2004; Abbink et al., 2009; Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012), and the International Crisis

Group has repeatedly warned that the countries’ tendency to view water/energy issues as a

zero-sum game is a constant source of tension (ICG 2002; 2007; 2011). And indeed,

Central Asian leaders have often portrayed water as an almost non-negotiable matter, as a

God-given gift with a nationalistic-charged meaning (Allouche, 2005). Politicians in the

Aral Sea basin have tended to securitize water issues, “taking them out of the normal

domain of technical management and placing them in the secret and closed domain of

security officials” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24).

Yet, before moving to the analysis of interstate relations in the field of water, it is useful

to further delve on the institutional setting that emerged after 1991 and on the main

agreements that have been signed by the Central Asian governments to manage their shared

resources. Since regional institutions and agreements have not been successful in solving

water problems in Central Asia, it seems useful to understand the reasons of this failure.

3.5. A weak institutional framework

More than two decades have passed since the Central Asian states gained independence

and became responsible for the management of their natural resources. However, as of

2013, a long-term sustainable solution to deal with regional water management issues has

yet to be found. Nevertheless, soon after independence50

the Central Asian countries began

50

It is worth noting that, as successor states of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics also inherited the

legal obligations of the agreements previously concluded by the Soviet administration with other countries,

such as for instance, Afghanistan or Iran. According to the 1978 “Vienna Convention on Succession of States

in respect of Treaties”, a succession of States does not as such affect “rights and obligations relating to the use

of any territory, or to restrictions upon its use” (Art. 12), nor “[a] boundary established by a treaty; or (b)

obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary” (Art. 11).

76

negotiating a large number of agreements on the management of transboundary waters,

both of a binding and of a semi-formal nature51

.

The key agreement is the abovementioned 1992 Almaty Agreement, whose main effect

was to continue allocating water resources as set by Soviet Protocols 566 and 41352

(see

Table 2). This decision was important, because the Almaty Agreement is still the main

reference for what concerns water allocation, which since then were never renegotiated nor

readjusted, as they became an almost untreatable topic in high-level water negotiations. The

Almaty Agreement also established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination53

(ICWC), a technical authority set to ensure the implementation of quotas and to control the

activities of the two river basin organizations (BVO Syr Darya, based in Tashkent, and

BVO Amu Darya, also based in Uzbekistan, in Urgench). The Agreement, however, lacks

an effective dispute resolution mechanism. While Article 13 states that “All disputable

matters are solved by the heads of water management agencies of the Republics (i.e.

Ministers of Water), and, if needed, with participation of a representative of the party

concerned”, it does not specify which measures should be taken if such disputes could not

be solved (Vinogradov and Langford, 2001: 13).

Under the changing geopolitical and economic conditions that marked the post-

independence period, observance of the water allocation proved unfeasible, and the

republics ended up signing annual ad-hoc bilateral or trilateral barter agreements regarding

water and energy exchanges. These barter agreements, which aimed at compensating water

release from upstream countries in summer with imports of electricity, natural gas, fuel oil

51

Declarations and statements constitute an additional instrument that the Central Asian Presidents use to

define general principles and directions of water cooperation. Although of a non-binding nature, these “soft-

law” tools have a high political value. Several declarations and statements were issued between 1995 and

2009 regarding the improvement of the environmental, economic and social conditions in the basin. The

Nukus Declaration (September 1995), focused on sustainable development of the Aral Sea Basin and on

financial obligations of the states to ICAS and IFAS. The Almaty declaration (February 1997), declared 1998

as the Environmental Protection Year in Central Asia and introduced the idea of proclaiming Central Asia a

nuclear-free zone. The Ashgabat Declaration (1999) stressed the importance of joint actions to address shared

environmental problems in the basin and promote better quality of life for people living in the Aral Sea Basin,

while the Dushanbe Declaration (2002) concentrated on improving information exchange on water and other

natural resources (Menga, 2012). 52

Another consequences of this agreement was that upstream countries’ plans to expand their irrigated land

(Kyrgyzstan wanted to increase its irrigated land total by over 400,000 hectares, Tajikistan by between

40,000-140,000 hectares) had to be downsized (Micklin, 2000: 44). 53

Whose full name is the “Interstate Coordinating Water Management Commission on the problems of

regulation, rational use and protection of water resources from interstate sources.

77

and coal from downstream countries in winter, often contained artificial and non-

transparent prices that hindered their efficiency (The World Bank, 2004: 8).

In 1993, the five countries signed the “Kyzyl-Orda Agreement”54

. Though the treaty was

non-binding and did not provide any dispute resolution mechanism, it is significant because

it created two bodies: the Interstate Council on the Aral Sea Basin (ICAS), with the task of

coordinating projects and set policies, and the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea

(IFAS), a political authority aimed at managing financial resources provided by member

states and donors (Dinar et al, 2007: 302). These newly established regional institutions had

to coordinate the Aral Sea Basin Programme (ASBP), an action program launched in

199455

to prepare a general strategy for water distribution, rational water use, and

protection of water resources in the Aral Sea Basin. ICAS and IFAS merged in 1997 under

the name of IFAS56

. The working body of IFAS is its Executive Committee (EC IFAS),

formed by two representatives for each of the five states. The mission of the EC IFAS –

that has gradually been enlarged, and particularly at the 2009 IFAS Summit in Almaty – is

to serve as a regional platform for dialogue and coordination on environmental issues

(including water) among the countries of the Aral Sea basin. The chairmanship of IFAS

rotates among the five Presidents, and the location of the EC IFAS varies accordingly57

.

54

“Agreement on joint activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone around the Sea crisis, improving the

environment, and ensuring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea region”. 55

In the following six years, the five Central Asian Presidents met at least once a year to further discuss and

develop the ASBP (Roll et al., 2006: 8). 56

Initially, the five member states were expected to contribute with 1 % of their annual state expenses to fund

the functioning of IFAS. However, since it became clear that none of the states was fulfilling its financial

commitments, contributions have been lowered to 0.3 % of their annual state expenses for the downstream

countries, and 0.1 % for the upstream ones (Sehring, 2012). 57

The EC IFAS has been located in Almaty (1993-1997), Tashkent (1997-1999), Ashgabat (1999-2002),

Dushanbe (2003-2009), Almaty (2009-2012) and currently in Tashkent. In 2005, the planned move to

Bishkek did not take place due to the political turmoil that led to the ousting of Askar Akaev.

78

This institutional framework seems however unfit to manage Central Asia’s water

resources. As Mosello (2008) noted, the main reasons for this inappropriateness are limited

mandates, interstate rivalries and disputes within the same institutions, lack of technical

expertise, insufficient financing and the absence of enforcement mechanisms. And indeed,

the inability to find a solution to the recurrent seasonal water/energy crises, and the Central

Asian Presidents’ tendency to take decisions unilaterally rather than discuss them at

multilateral forums, seems to confirm the failure of this framework, as it will be illustrated

in the second section of this chapter.

Another significant agreement is the 1998 “Syr Darya Agreement”58

, signed by all

countries except Turkmenistan (not part of the Syr Darya river basin). This treaty seems an

important improvement over the previous ad-hoc arrangements, as it shows a desire to

58

“Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of Kyrgyz Republic,

the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning

Use of Water and Energy Resources in the Syr Darya River Basin”.

BVO Amu Darya

BVO Syr Darya

CA States

President Council

on the problems of

the Aral Sea Basin

President of IFAS

Council of IFAS

ICWC Interstate

Commission for

Sustainable

Development

EC IFAS

Figure 13: Simplified overview of the organizational structure of IFAS. Constructed by author based on

information from http://www.ec-ifas.org.

79

adhere to international law and precedents, and recognizes the need to compensate

upstream Kyrgyzstan for its energy losses due to its unexploited hydroelectric production.

This compensation should be paid by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the form of equivalent

energy sources (bartering electricity, gas, coal and fuel), or in monetary terms. However,

implementation of the agreement is difficult, since it does not take into account water

variability in dry years (McKinney, 2004: 211-212). Since the riparians of the Syr Darya

had to annually negotiate the exact terms of the barter arrangements, including the actual

volumes of water releases and the amount of compensation (The World Bank, 2004: 10),

tension became the norm and cuts in gas deliveries from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan have

been frequent (Weinthal, 2006).

A similar approach was adopted with the “Chu and Talas Agreement”59

, signed by the

governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000. This arrangement is perceived by

some observers (Granit et al., 2010) as the way forward in Central Asian water politics, as

it is the only one that commits the downstream country (Kazakhstan) to pay upkeep costs

for the use of shared water facilities to the upstream country (Kyrgyzstan). Such

arrangement clearly contrasts with the traditional water management mechanisms in the Syr

Darya basin, and could signal a shift in favour of Kyrgyzstan’s requests (see paragraph

3.6.2) to receive a contribution from downstream countries to the maintenance of upstream

water installations (Weinthal 2006: 24). The Chu and Talas Agreement remains, however,

an isolated case, and the numerous deals signed so far by the five republics have not

managed to effectively cope with the exchange of natural resources in Central Asia, nor to

solve conflictual relations in what is an extremely interconnected setting.

Based on the critical aspects outlined so far, the following reviews in detail the evolution

of interstate water relations among the Central Asian countries in the period 1991-2011,

first providing the general picture and subsequently focusing on bilateral relations between

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as they reflect the debate on

the Rogun and Kambarata dams that will be analysed in the next chapters.

59

“Agreement between the Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic

on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas”.

80

3.6. Twenty years of water relations

The following is based on the chronology of general interstate relations in the field of

water in the Aral Sea basin. The chronology contains around 200 events (or speech acts),

but not all of them will be reported here, in an attempt of not making this section too

descriptive. The chronology is however available in full in Annex 2, while Annex 1

explains in detail how these data were put together and what were the reasons behind this

collection.

3.6.1. Coexisting conflict and cooperation

What immediately emerges is that relations among the countries of the Aral Sea basin

have been marked by a coexistence of conflict and cooperation. Over the years, the

numerous agreements and declarations of friendship issued by the Central Asian Presidents

have been flanked by extremely conflictual events, such as cuts in gas and water supplies or

the deployment of troops at the border. In terms of speech acts analysis, commissive speech

acts, through which the countries express a commitment to engage in future actions, are

thus sided by directive ones, through which something is demanded.

This seems to be in line with the latest tendency in hydropolitics, which takes conflict

and cooperation as two connected and coexisting phenomena (see among others, Postel and

Wolf, 2001; Wolf et al., 2003; Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008).

Cooperation is not necessarily associated with agreements or treaties and not all

cooperation is good, and on the same way, tensions may sometimes lead to reduction of

conflict and not to its exacerbation60

. The effectiveness of cooperation may be influenced

by a particular political context where there is a cooperation of tokenism, or where

cooperation is only happening at the technical level61

.

And indeed, besides the key agreements mentioned previously (the 1992 Almaty

Agreement, the 1993 Kyzyl-Orda Agreement and the 1998 Syr Darya Agreement), many

more have been signed in these two decades. Most of them are annual operation agreements

(AOAs), that are used by the regional governments to barter water for energy. The fact that

60

For instance, as Zeitoun (2007) notes, in the Jordan River basin there is evidence of both conflict and

cooperation happening simultaneously, or at least, where someone sees cooperation someone else may see

conflict, what he calls the ‘cooperation versus conflict paradox’. 61

This approach is clearly in contrast with the one of the UNDP, according to which “it makes sense to

promote and support cooperation of any sort, no matter how slight” (UNDP, 2006: 228).

81

the Central Asian countries resort to these short-term instruments (that solve the problem

only temporarily), is perhaps the best indicator of the mistrust that dominates interstate

relations, and of the absence of a genuine political will to reach a compromise. Moreover,

these AOAs are often hurriedly signed in the depths of winter and summer, as a response to

an on-going crisis, and not to prevent its occurrence.

As an example, in 2004 five AOAs were signed between January and July. In January,

representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met in Shymkent62

to discuss

measures to prevent flooding from the Chardara dam, a large water reservoir on the Syr

Darya River in Kazakhstan, which forms part of the Kazakh-Uzbek border. The parties

reached an agreement under which Kazakhstan committed to supply coal and fuel to

Kyrgyzstan, while Kyrgyzstan decided to reduce its hydroelectric production and

Uzbekistan agreed to use its nearby Arnasai Reservoir to lower the water level in the

Chardara dam (RFE/RL, 2004). A month later, also Tajikistan agreed to reduce its

discharges from the Qayraqqum reservoir, to ease pressure on the Chardara and put an end

(at least for the year) to the floods that were hitting several villages near the Kazakh-Uzbek

border (RFE/RL, 2004). Then, in July of the same year, when regions in Southern

Kazakhstan badly needed water for their irrigated crops, Kyrgyzstan agreed to increase

water discharges from the Toktogul reservoir, and in exchange Kazakhstan bought over 1

billion kWh of Kyrgyz hydroelectricity (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004a).

Additionally, also Uzbekistan agreed to increase water releases from the Syr Darya river to

the Chardara reservoir (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2004). Overall, around forty

AOAs were signed in the period 1991-2011.

In addition to these barter agreements, the Central Asian governments repeatedly

reaffirmed their friendship, issuing joint communiqués and holding talks (mostly at the

bilateral and trilateral level) to increase cooperation in the management and sharing of

natural resources. It is however clear that an unfriendly approach prevails in the relations

between the basin riparians and that these cooperative events are fundamentally ineffective,

as they only solve the most pressing matters while leaving the underlying conflict

unresolved. Frequently the AOAs were signed following situations of extreme tension, with

62

A city located in Southern Kazakhstan, not far from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

82

Uzbekistan – the country with the largest military apparatus of Central Asia – that often

threatened to use force, and the upstream countries that used water as a bargaining tool.

While over the last two decades cuts in water and gas supplies have been common, in

1997 regional relations reached one of their lowest points. In January, Kyrgyzstan reduced

the amount of flow leaving the Toktogul reservoir and entering into Uzbekistan (Hanks,

2010: 88; Muzalevsky, 2010). As a response, Uzbekistan cut off 70 % of the water flowing

in downstream Kazakhstan63

, threatening 100,000 hectares of irrigated corn and cotton

crops and prompting a riot by Kazakh farmers. Moreover, in an attempt to intimidate the

Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan deployed 130,000 troops near its border with Kyrgyzstan

in the Ferghana Valley (Hogan, 2000). The crisis was eventually averted following

negotiations among the countries, although later in 1997 Kyrgyzstan threatened to cut off

electricity and water supplies to Kazakhstan, which failed to honour agreed energy transfers

and pay for previous deliveries (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1998). These events

are emblematic of the profound intertwining of the water and energy sectors in Central

Asia, where a coordinated approach to the management of shared natural resources is

essential.

Similar tensions are also common in the Ferghana valley (see Figure 14), a region shared

by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that includes myriad enclaves and exclaves, and

that has the highest population density of Central Asia64

. Border negotiations in the

Ferghana Valley are extremely complicated, and so is the allocation of water resources. In

2008, 150 Tajik residents of Isfara (in Tajikistan’s Soghd province) crossed the border into

Kyrgyz Batken Region to try to destroy a dam erected by the Kyrgyz authorities that cut

them off from water sources. While the Tajiks complained that the dam was situated in an

area where the border was still unsettled, Kyrgyz authorities countered that the structure

was inside Kyrgyzstan, and they mobilised their border guards to prevent the demolition

attempt (Rosario, 2009). The potential bloodshed was eventually avoided thanks to a

provisional agreement to open the dam and replenish the Tajik canals (Khamidov, 2008).

63

For what concerns the Toktogul reservoir, Kyrgyzstan is the furthest upstream country, Uzbekistan the

midstream and Kazakhstan the furthest downstream. 64

Population density in the Ferghana Valley on average is 360 persons per square kilometer and reaches

550 in some areas, while the average density for the whole Central Asia is of 14 persons per square kilometer.

More than ten million people live in the Valley, a sixth of the entire population of Central Asia. For more

information on the Ferghana Valley see Starr et al. (2011).

83

Figure 14: Water issues in the Ferghana Valley. Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal

(http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/water-issues-in-the-ferghana-valley_108d).

3.6.2. Three stages of regional relations

What emerges from the data in the timeline is that, overall, regional relations in Central

Asia have had three different and evolving phases: i) the period 1991-1996, marked by the

signing of numerous multilateral agreements on water sharing; ii) the period 1997-2006, in

which the Central Asian countries have started to negotiate bilateral and trilateral AOAs

and adopted a more individualist attitude towards the management of shared water

resources; iii) the period 2007-2011, in which the revitalization of large-scale hydroelectric

projects in the upstream countries led to the gradual deterioration of interstate relations,

thus becoming the main source of regional tensions.

Though the evolution (and degradation) of regional water relations has mostly political

motivations, it is important to note that the high seasonal and yearly variability in the water

flow of both the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya seems related to this trend. While the water

flow was abundant in the period 1991-1997 (Rahimov, 2009), it started to diminish in the

following years, and for instance in 2000 and 2001 Central Asia was hit by the worst

84

drought over the last 95 years (Wegerich, 2002). However, the water flow is only a

fluctuating variable that can at most exacerbate existing problems, which have their roots in

ineffective regional agreements and with an unsatisfying water allocation scheme, as

demonstrated by the proliferation of AOAs.

Therefore, starting in 1997 the Central Asian republics changed their approach to the

management of shared water resources, opting for an individualistic rather than

collectivistic tactic. All Central Asian states have adopted internal laws that recognize

water as national asset and as a crucial resource to sustain social and economic

development. As Bektur Sakiev effectively sums it up:

According to clause 4 of Kazakhstan’s Water Code, “the State owns the water in

Kazakhstan”; clause 4 of Tajikistan’s Water Code states that “the State owns all water

in the Republic of Tajikistan in accordance with its Constitution”; as clause 3 of Uzbek

Law “On Water and Water Use” states “water is the state property – national treasure of

Uzbekistan. The water must be used rationally and is protected by the State”. Clause 5

of Kyrgyzstan’s water law declares that “the State owns the State water fund of

Kyrgyzstan”. (Sakiev, 2009: 85)

The 1997 Kyrgyz edict65

, in particular, was the first to demand compensation for

revenues lost from releasing water downstream to Uzbek farms instead of using it to

generate hydroelectricity (Hogan, 2000). This is significant, because the edict set a new

attitude towards water among the two upstream countries, which started to view the

resource as a commodity that can be traded and from which they can profit, also because

they are not well-endowed with other natural resources. Bishkek reiterated its intentions in

2001, through the adoption of the “Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Inter-State Use of

Water Objects, Water Resources and Water Economy Constructions”. For what concerns

Kyrgyz rivers that flow to other countries, Article 3 states that the following principles

apply:

Recognition of state property rights for water objects, water resources and water

economy constructions within its territory; Recognition of water as a type of natural

resources that has its economic value within all competitive types of use and it’s a

commodity; Chargeable water use within international water relations. (Legislative

Assembly of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2001)

65

Adopted by the then President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev in October 1997.

85

The Kyrgyz water law is inspired by Principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin Statement on Water

and Sustainable Development, which is titled “Water has an economic value in all its

competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (The Dublin Statement on

Water and Sustainable Development, 1992). As Heltzer (2003) observed, the

accompanying language of the law is such that rather than setting a water price, this legal

instrument seems intended to force cash payment for maintenance of infrastructures and the

loss of hydropower generation during the winter months. As the then Kyrgyz Prime

Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev commented, the 2001 water law has to be considered a

compensation for Kyrgyzstan’s losses, as the country uses less than 25 % of the water in its

reservoirs while its “neighbors don't pay anything for the water they get” (RFE/RL, 2001).

The law caused the prompt opposition of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, that argued that

international water law66

does not allow profiting from water nor charging for shared water

(Dinar, 2005: 152), which also goes against some of the basic tenets of Islam. Another

consequence of the water law was that a few months after its adoption, in October 2001, the

Uzbek government shut off natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan (Cagnat, 2001; Khamidov,

2001; Hanks, 2010), resulting in serious energy shortages for the remaining winter months.

Perhaps more importantly, the law lacked an implementation mechanism and became

contested also within Kyrgyzstan itself67

, thus resulting in no real efforts from the Kyrgyz

government to put it into action68

(Sehring, 2009). Thus, the Kyrgyz government stepped

back from its original position, asking the downstream countries to only share maintenance

costs for Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals (similar to the mechanism set out by the Chu and

Talas Agreements).

66

And indeed, while on the one hand Principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin Statement inspired the Kyrgyz water law,

on the other hand it also acknowledged that “Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right

of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to

recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the

resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use,

and of encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.” (The Dublin Statement on Water and

Sustainable Development, 1992). 67

As Jennifer Sehring (2009, 119-120) observed, within Kyrgyzstan the law was highly debated, and was

sometimes referred to as zakon gaspodina Usubalieva, the law of Mr. Usubaliev. This is because the law was

commonly associated with Turdakun Usubaliev, the former First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party

that actively lobbied for water pricing in independent Kyrgyzstan. 68

However, even if the Kyrgyz law did not enter into force, the legitimacy of compensation mechanisms has

been already acknowledged by the Kazakh government, that in 2000 agreed to share maintenance costs for

Kyrgyz reservoirs with the above mentioned Chu and Talas Agreement.

86

As the International Crisis Group observed (2002: 17), on this issue Kyrgyzstan has

more bargaining power than Tajikistan. This is because the flow of the Syr Darya being

more regulated by reservoirs than that of the Amu Darya, Kyrgyzstan is potentially in a

position to cut water supplies to the downstream countries for a considerably longer period

of time than Tajikistan. If Tajikistan wants to use water as a bargaining tool (and charge

downstream countries for the water it releases), it needs to complete the Rogun

hydroelectric plant (see Chapter 4), that with its massive reservoir would give the Tajik

government full control of the Amu Darya water flow.

On the other hand, the construction of large reservoirs can have significance also for the

downstream countries, and especially for those that are midstream: Turkmenistan on the

Amu Darya river basin, where the furthest downstream country is Uzbekistan and

Uzbekistan on the Syr Darya river basin, where the furthest downstream country is

Kazakhstan. Through the construction of large reservoirs, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

can use water as a strategic tool increasing their bargaining power towards the furthest

downstream states, and more importantly, they can decrease their dependence from the

upstream republics, since they can use the water stored in their reservoirs as a buffer

whenever the water flow arriving from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan diminishes. Hence, both

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan went along with resource capture strategies, which are

unilateral actions that occur “whereby a riparian, in the absence of formal understandings,

moves ahead with projects that affect the flow or quality of the resource” (Waterbury,

1997: 279).

While the Uzbek resource capture strategies will be discussed in further detail in Chapter

6 (where they will be analysed as hegemonic strategies), it is worth focusing on those

carried out by Turkmenistan, as they have generated controversies and debates all over the

region. It must be first noted that Turkmenistan has traditionally had an isolationist

approach towards the management of transboundary waters and regional issues in general.

Its foreign policy is based on the status of permanent positive neutrality, that was

recognized by the UNGA Resolution on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan on 12

December 1995 (United Nations General Assembly, 1995), and that has been used by the

Turkmen government as a tool to strengthen its authority and to establish a “domestic-

oriented” foreign policy (Anceschi, 2009). As outlined in the timeline, Turkmenistan has

87

not taken part in most of the regional meetings on the management of regional water

resources, and only recently, following the establishment of the UN Regional Centre for

Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia69

(UNRCCA) in its capital Ashgabat, the country

has become more involved – although this involvement seems mostly cosmetic – in the

regional water dialogue.

The Turkmen isolationist approach is well embodied by the decision to realise the

Golden Age (Altyn Asyr) Lake, a giant reservoir in the middle of the Karakum desert whose

construction was launched in the year 2000 by the then President of Turkmenistan

Saparmurat Niyazov. This huge artificial lake70

, that is very likely to increase

Turkmenistan’s water intake from the Amu Darya, has been planned without consulting

with the other riparian countries. The Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov,

defined the Turkmen lake as “truly priceless, not only for Turkmenistan but for the entire

Central Asia region”, because the lake will give birth to “New green oasis, towns, villages,

districts”, while allowing the “development of irrigated agriculture, livestock and fisheries”

(Turmenistan.ru, 2009). This notwithstanding, the project has been harshly criticised by

environmental experts, that contend that the runoff will be insufficient to fill the lake, and

that due to the high evaporation rate the result will be a massive dead lake in the middle of

the desert (Stone, 2008). The Uzbek government has also raised concerns, as it is worried

that the Lake will cause a reduction in the Amu Darya flow to Uzbekistan (International

Crisis Group, 2002: 25-26). However, the Turkmen government has continued with the

construction of the Lake, although delays have postponed its launch – initially expected in

2010 – to an undefined date.

Unilateral actions such as the construction of the Golden Century Lake, which is being

imposed by Turkmenistan on its neighbours without their consent, are emblematic of the

individualist approach to regional water issues that has been gradually adopted by the

69

The UNRCCA – a special political mission of the United Nations – was inaugurated in 2008, following a

request presented by the five Central Asian governments to the UN Security Council. Its mission is to prevent

the main threats to Central Asian security, including international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking,

organized crime and environmental degradation/water issues. The Turkmen government insisted on having

the Centre in Ashgabat, that among the Central Asian capitals is the one that hosts the fewer regional and

international organizations. 70

Once completed, the lake is expected to hold more than 130 billion m³ of water, covering an area of 2,000

square kilometers (Turkmenistan.ru, 2009; Menga, 2013).

88

Central Asian republics71

. In the same way, the construction of major dams in the upstream

countries without the consent of the downstream riparians is an extremely controversial

unilateral action that will impact heavily (and at different levels) on all countries in the

region. For this reason, the almost simultaneous revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata

dams in 2007 acted as a game changer in regional politics. For the first time, the poorer and

politically weaker upstream countries have attempted to drastically change the status-quo,

thus marking the beginning of a new phase in regional water relations. The two major dams

quickly gained prominence in regional politics, monopolizing the attention of the Central

Asian governments and strongly influencing (and straining) their relations.

Before moving to the two case studies, however, it is important to outline the evolution

of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,

using the TWINS matrix. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the analysis has been limited to

these two bilateral relations as they are the ones that best mirror the conflict on Rogun and

Kambarata, since Uzbekistan has been the most vocal dam opponent among the three

downstream countries of the Aral Sea basin.

3.6.3. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

The Central Asian people can be differentiated among nomadic/semi-nomadic, the

Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Turkmens, and sedentary, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, that

settled around the main oasis in the vicinity of the Amu Darya river (Adle and Palat, 2005).

Although the Soviets have attempted to stamp out expressions of traditional identity and

carefully fabricate new nationalities, their effort had no particular significance. The Tajiks

and the Uzbeks have strong bonds, and for instance, at the moment of independence they

had difficulties indicating their nationality for their identity cards, since they were often a

mixture of both identities (Phillips and James, 2001: 29). Although they speak different

languages72

, the peoples of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share a common culture and

traditions, and being the two main contemporary sedentary civilizations of Central Asia,

they also developed a fierce rivalry, that was further exacerbated after the collapse of the

71

Further confirming this attitude, in June 2000 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rejected the multilateral

approach to regional water issues proposed by the then head of the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) Benita Ferrero-Waldner (O’Hara, 2004), advocating instead for a bilateral

approach to solve such issues. 72

Uzbek is a Turkic language, while Tajik is a variety of modern Persian.

89

Soviet Union due to the assignment of the predominantly ethnic Tajik cities of Samarkand

and Bukhara to Uzbekistan (see Chapter 4). As Paul Bergne historical analysis exhaustively

illustrated (2007), the birth of Tajikistan73

in the 1920s caused a profound shift in the way

the Tajiks saw themselves, creating a Tajik national identity where there was none. “The

founding of Tajikistan was not the result of Tajik nationalism but the hour of its birth”

(Lutz Rzehak, quoted in Bergne, 2007: 103), and this new national identity almost

immediately clashed with the Uzbek one.

While, on the one hand, the Soviets did not manage to eradicate expressions of

traditional identity in Central Asia, on the other hand, they were more successful in creating

inter-national divisions through borders, distribution of political power and an intertwined

resource distribution system whose rationale was essentially driven by the divide et impera

rule (Capisani, 2000). And thus, due to the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union,

two rival civilizations turned into strenuous competitors for the management and control of

the region’s natural resources. Significantly, the competition between the two countries

seems to go beyond the mere exchange of natural resources, as its roots lie in the assertion

of power and national interests, in a context where former Communist leaders took a

nationalist turn to enhance the perceived legitimacy of their authority (Mellon 2010, 138-

139).

For these reasons, and also given the geographical configuration of the basin, where

Tajikistan is upstream of the water but Uzbekistan is “upstream” of the gas, bilateral

relations between the two new-born republics have been immediately tense. The

circumstances triggered by the water/energy nexus, soon had Tajikistan – unable to pay for

the gas supplied by Uzbekistan – releasing water from the Nurek reservoir (its main source

of electricity) to generate hydroelectricity in winter. Further complicating matters, a harsh

civil war hit Tajikistan from 1992 until 1997, with devastating effects: between 60,000 to

100,000 victims, some 600,000 (a tenth of the population) were internally displaced, 80,000

left the country, for an estimated economic cost of US$ 7 billion (International Crisis

Group, 2001: i).

73

Tajikistan did not exist as an ethnically defined political unit before the Bolshevik revolution. In 1924, the

USSR created the Tajik ASSR, that was part of the larger Uzbek SSR. In 1929, the Tajik ASSR achieved the

status of union republic, becoming the Tajik SSR.

90

The first of many energy crises74

to come hit Tajikistan in winter 1993 (Barber, 1993),

and in 1996, due to dropping temperatures and rising consumptions, the Tajik government

was forced to cut electric power for an average of 12 hours a day (United Press

International, 1996). Nevertheless, perhaps due to Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik

civil war75

(Horsman, 1999), and to the unstable internal situation in Tajikistan, the

relationship between the two countries was not as tense as it turned out to be after 1997.

During the civil war, Tajikistan actively participated to all major regional water

negotiations and agreements (thus showing the high priority given to water issues in

Tajikistan’s political agenda), and Uzbekistan successfully managed to leave Soviet water

allocation unchanged and out of regional discussions. Yet, in what seems a forerunner of

future tensions, in May 1995 Uzbekistan unilaterally (and suddenly) decided to stop buying

electricity from Tajikistan, violating an agreement between the two republics and causing

discontent amid the Tajik side (the head of the Tajik power grid described the Uzbek move

as “impolite, to say the very least”) (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1995a).

74

Further tensions arose when, in September 1992, supporters of the deposed Tajik President Nabiyev (a

political rival of Rahmon), took control of the town of Nurek and attempted to seize the Nurek dam (that was

at the moment controlled by troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS), which if destroyed

could flood the entire region (Agence France Presse, 1992). The attempt failed, as Nabiyev supporters were

eventually overwhelmed (Olcott, 2012), but this aspect seems interesting because it underlines the highly

strategic value of large dams. For instance more recently (February 2012), during the civil war in Syria rebels

captured the al-Furat dam, the nation's largest dam and a symbol of the Assad family's four-decade rule

(Mroue, 2013). 75

Uzbek military forces fought alongside the Tajik and Russian armies against the front formed by the

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

91

Figure 15: Trajectory of Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011)

After the end of the civil war, and with the beginning of what was previously defined the

second phase of water relations in Central Asia (the one marked by a unilateral approach to

shared problems), relations between the two countries came to be tenser. The signing of

AOAs became the norm, and Tajikistan’s plans to revamp the Soviet hydroelectric projects

abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union and put in standby during the civil war –

most notably the Rogun and Sangtuda dams – contributed to increase strains, as Uzbekistan

strongly opposes their construction76

. And indeed, starting in 2007, when a Russian

involvement in Rogun seemed to materialize, skirmishes intensified, and besides the

frequent resource cuts (form both sides), the two countries got engaged in a harsh dispute

aimed at imposing their view on the management of shared water resources as the dominant

one, through the use of ideational and bargaining power (as it will be illustrated in detail in

Chapter 4).

What emerges from the TWINS matrix (see Figure 15), is that while the two countries

continued to cooperate through ad-hoc actions over the course of the years (although such

cooperation never moved to a higher level), the overall relationship gradually deteriorated.

What was an already politicized issue became constantly securitized and presented as an

76

When asked what he thought about the construction of large hydroelectric stations upstream, Karimov

replied “How will we look into the eyes of our children and grandchildren if Uzbekistan is without water?

This is our land, we are not going to leave it” (Eurasianet.org, 2009). His words illustrate well his tendency to

view water – and the revision of water allocation – as a non-negotiable matter.

92

existential threat. Water issues in the two countries are indeed managed by the Ministries of

Foreign affairs rather than by water officials, as they are perceived as a potential threat to

the interests of the nation and not anymore as a recurrent seasonal problem. It is in

particular the revitalization of the Rogun dam that seems to have triggered this mechanism,

as it has moved the relation between the two countries on the brink of a violent interstate

conflict, although, as Dinar (2009) points out, countries tend to find the use of violence to

solve water problems too costly and unattractive. This third and next phase of interstate

relations, the one that basically orbits around the Rogun dam, will be examined in Chapter

4, through the outline of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics.

3.6.4. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

While Tajikistan’s history is interconnected with that of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan shares

historic and cultural roots with Kazakhstan, to the extent that the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz

can be defined “ethnic cousins”77

(Cummings, 2012: 104). The Kyrgyz have a

predominantly nomadic-pastoral culture, although the Soviet regulations forced them to

undergo a sedentarization process and to practice irrigated agriculture in the Ferghana

Valley (Adle and Palat, 2005). Also in this case, following the collapse of the Soviet Union

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan found themselves as being part of an extremely inter-dependent

system, in which Kyrgyzstan was upstream of the water (of the Syr Darya river), and

Uzbekistan was upstream of the fuel and gas. Two important differences, however, seem to

subsist: i) the flow of the Syr Darya is much more regulated than that of the Amu Darya

(thanks to the hydraulic infrastructures built by the Soviets), and Kyrgyzstan has a stronger

position than Tajikistan towards Uzbekistan, as it can use the mode of operation of its water

infrastructure as a bargaining tool (Wegerich et al., 2007); ii) the internal political situation

of the new-born Kyrgyz republic has been considerably more stable than that of Tajikistan

– at least until 2005 when the Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev was ousted by the Tulip

Revolution – and therefore Kyrgyzstan could almost immediately start challenging the

1992 Almaty Agreement and attempt to exploit its hydroelectric potential in winter.

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Under the Soviet Union, initially the Kazakh SSR was called the Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet

Republic (ASSR) (1920-1925), and was renamed Kazak ASSR in 1926, and only in 1936 was elevated to the

status of a Union-level republic, becoming the Kazakh SSR.

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Thus, in the period 1993-1996 Kyrgyzstan released water from its Toktogul reservoir to

generate hydroelectricity, and Uzbekistan threatened to break the AOAs that the two

countries had already started to sign (Weinthal, 2001; Shalpykova, 2002). The year 1996

marked a breakthrough, as Kyrgyzstan started considering water a commodity, demanding

compensation for its unexploited hydroelectric potential and for the maintenance of its

dams. Significantly, in April 1996, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan reached an

Agreement in which Kyrgyzstan agreed to supply water to the downstream countries that,

in return, agreed to help pay for the upkeep of the Kyrgyz water infrastructures and to

purchase the hydroelectricity generated in Kyrgyzstan. This Agreement (that can be viewed

as a forerunner of the abovementioned 1998 Syr Darya Agreement) gave rise to an

animated debate on those who viewed water as a commodity and those who did not.

Kyrgyzstan's minister for water resources Zhenishbek Bekbolotov was quoted as saying

“Water is a commodity […] Any natural resource that is used should be paid for” (Thoenes,

1996), while Uzbekistan's acting minister for water resources, Abdurahim Zhalalov,

rejected this notion, pointing out that the commodity was hydroelectricity, and not water78

.

And indeed, as it was brought up in paragraph 3.6.2, in 1997 (a very tense year for water

relations in Central Asia), Kyrgyzstan initiated the legislative process aimed at declaring

water as a commodity. Among increasing tensions, and as a reaction to Kyrgyzstan’s

flooding of Uzbek farm fields to produce additional hydroelectricity in winter, in the year

2000 Uzbekistan carried out military exercises at the border with Kyrgyzstan, with the

seeming objective of practicing for capturing the Toktogul Reservoir (Hashimova, 2009;

Muzalevsky, 2010).

78

In addition, Koposyn Kudaibergenov, the deputy chairman of the Kazakh Water Committee, made

reference to the Qur'an adding that “In the Koran [sic] it is written that water should not be sold. We should

solve the problems for each other as partners” (Thoenes, 1996).

94

Figure 16: Trajectory of Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011)

The situation remained to a status of nearly-violized all over 2001, as the Uzbek troops

maintained position near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, and they were accused by the chairman

of the Kyrgyz Parliamentary Committee for International Relations, Alisher

Abdimomunov, of unilaterally occupying disputed Kyrgyz territories (Khamidov, 2001).

Tensions continued also in the following years – although without the involvement of the

Uzbek army – with regular flooding of Uzbek farmland due to excessive winter releases

from the Toktogul reservoir (in 2004, the worst flood since 1969 occurred) (RFE/RL,

2004), triggering harsh criticisms from the Uzbek President Karimov. Nevertheless, the two

countries kept signing AOAs and holding regular talks on how to improve the management

and sharing of natural resources.

Also in this case, as it is effectively illustrated by the TWINS matrix (see Figure 16),

conflict coexisted with cooperation, although the former was only limited to short-term

solutions under the form of ad-hoc agreements to solve the most pressing matters. The

relationship between the two countries gradually deteriorated, especially after the Kyrgyz

government disclosed its plan to give a price to water. Perhaps because of the almost total

control that Kyrgyzstan can exert on the flow of the Syr Darya river – from which the

country can wield a larger bargaining power than for instance Tajikistan – the Kyrgyz

administration has attempted to challenge the status-quo and getting compensation for the

water it releases to the downstream countries. And these efforts were to some extent

95

successful, as both the 1998 Syr Darya agreement and the 2000 Chu and Talas agreement

recognize Kyrgyzstan’s right to get some sort of reimbursement for its water. However,

implementation of the 1998 Syr Darya agreement proved difficult due to high water

variability in dry years, and the Chu and Talas agreement takes into consideration only two

minor river basins shared by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Alike the Rogun dam, the revamp of the Kambarata dam in 2007 further strained

relations with Uzbekistan, although in this case the event did not exactly marked the

beginning of a new phase in water relations. This is because Kyrgyzstan already attempted

to challenge the status-quo, and the Kambarata dam would have a different impact than the

Rogun dam on the overall water flow, as it will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 5,

that will examine the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics put in place to favour and

obstruct the construction of the dam.

3.7. Conclusions

This chapter has given an account of water relations in Central Asia for the period 1991-

2011, outlining the interdependency issues at play in the region and the criticalities that

they have generated. While on the one hand it is clear that the Soviet resource distribution

system left a legacy that has still not disappeared, on the other hand, the Central Asian

republics have not shown a genuine will to cooperate and to put an end to the recurring

seasonal disputes concerning the exchange of water and energy.

A weak institutional framework and the inability to negotiate long-term solutions to

regional problems gradually strained interstate relations, and soon after independence the

first conflicts emerged. The key incompatibility between water demands of irrigation and

hydropower is at the origin of a growing frustration among the upstream and the

downstream countries. The latter want to maintain the status-quo unchanged, while the

former have an interest in changing it to be able to exploit their significant hydroelectric

potential.

This fundamental conflict has driven the evolution of interstate relations over the last

twenty years. Following a first buffer period, in which countries attempted to have a

multilateral approach to regional water issues, an individualist attitude prevailed, and with

it the first recriminations from both sides of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers.

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Subsequently, the almost simultaneous revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in

Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan, has marked the beginning of a third (and on-going) phase of

water relations, in which the upstream countries are more peremptorily attempting to

change the status-quo. These two large dams gained a pivotal role in the regional water

debate, strongly influencing interstate relations and giving rise to a harsh confrontation

between Uzbekistan – the leading dam-opponent among the downstream states – and the

two upstream republics. This political arm-wrestling will be analysed in detail in the

following chapters, that will delve on how power has been wielded and on the key

hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies that these three countries have put in place to

favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams.

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Chapter 4. The Rogun Dam

Rogun is our national idea.

Emomali Rahmon, 2010

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the first of the two case studies of this research,

the construction of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. The dam will be used to examine how

state power is wielded in international transboundary water relations, and to identify which

hegemonic and counter-hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour and obstruct

its construction. The focus is placed on the acrimonious regional debate that emerged after

the revitalisation of the project in the year 2000s, after which its realisation became a matter

of foreign policy, and, as it will be shown, also a matter of national pride. The chapter first

gives an overview of the project, its history and its expected impact. Subsequently, it

outlines and categorizes the various counter-hegemonic tactics that were put in place by

Tajikistan to promote the dam. Finally, the chapter concludes assessing the main effects of

Tajik counter-hegemonic tactics.

4.1. Overview of the Rogun dam

Originally conceived as a dual-purpose structure for irrigation water management and

for hydroelectricity, the Rogun dam was designed in the Uzbek SSR by the Soviet

Hydroproject Institute based in Tashkent during the 1960s, the golden years of the Soviet

hydraulic mission. While realising the design, the Institute also carried out a first feasibility

study. The original project – which is still the one proposed by Tajikistan – consists of a

335 meter high structure, a 70 km long reservoir with a volume of 13.3 km3 and six 600

megawatts (MW) turbines, resulting in a total installed capacity of 3,600 MW (Schmidt,

2007). If compared with other dams, Rogun would be the tallest in the world – the fourth

one being Nurek in Tajikistan (300 m.) – and the twentieth for installed capacity

(International Commission on Large Dams).

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Preparatory construction works began in 1976, and intense construction started in 1982,

involving five to ten thousand people (UNEP, 2011: 48). In 1991, due to the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the worsening political situation in Tajikistan that would eventually lead

to a five year civil war (1992-1997), works at the Rogun site were stopped. Furthermore, in

1993 – which was originally the year set for its first unit to start producing electricity

(Yerofeyeva, 2002) – the upper coffer-dam was washed away by a powerful flash-flood.

Combined with inadequate management caused by the civil war, the flood destroyed most

of the accomplished structure (Fradchuk, 2010), frustrating two decades of efforts and an

investment of 802 million dollars, leaving the “Queen of the Tajik mountains without a

crown” (Djuzhev, 2002). Nevertheless, the idea of building Rogun was already too well-

established in the minds of Tajik bureaucrats to be washed away with the flood.

Table 4: Concise timeline of the Rogun project. Source: Annex 3; Schmidt, 2007; Sodiqov, 2009.

1960s The Soviet Hydroproject Institute in Tashkent designs the dam and carries

out a first feasibility study

1976 Beginning of preparatory construction works

1982 Start of intense construction involving five to ten thousand people

1991 Interruption of works, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

worsening political situation in Tajikistan

1993 A flash-flood destroys most of the accomplished structure

2004 The Russian Aluminium Company (RusAl) agrees to invest US$ 560 million

to complete the construction of the first stage of the project

2005 Tajik and Russian workers begin construction at the Rogun site

2006 The German engineering firm Lahmeyer, which was awarded a contract from

RusAl to carry out a first feasibility study of Rogun, recommends 285 meters

as the ideal height of the dam, instead of 335, on which the GoT insisted. The

GoT will not accept the findings of the report

August Tajik President Rahmon cancels the deal with RusAl and resumes his search

99

2007 for investors

2008 The GoT allocates resources from the state budget to restart the construction

of Rogun

January

2009

The GoT adopts a resolution on the Rogun resettlement scheme, which

envisages the moving of about 30,000 people, from the districts of Rogun,

Nurobod, Dangara, Tursunzade, and Darband

January

2010

The GoT launches an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to sell to its citizens

shares of the “Open Joint Stock Company Rogun”

March

2010

The World Bank announces that it will realize an 18 month feasibility study

and environmental assessment of the dam

2011-2012 In view of the results of the World Bank studies, the GoT interrupts the

resettlement scheme and, in 2012, construction works

4.1.1. Independent Tajikistan and the Rogun dam

Indeed, with independence, the newly-born Tajik government and its President Emomali

Rahmon repeatedly attempted to restart the project, encountering however numerous

obstacles, both financial and political. The project is, in fact, extremely expensive. With a

total cost of US$ 2.9 billion, it cannot be financed by Tajik national resources alone.

Although the GoT has calculated that US$ 800 million of work has already been executed,

the project still requires US$ 2.1 billion of funds (EDB, 2008: 20), equivalent to roughly a

third of the country’s 2011 GDP (The World Bank n.d.a). In order to meet this necessity of

external funding, the GoT has carried out an interrupted effort over the last twenty years

aimed at the mobilisation of financial resources (recounted in full in paragraph 4.3.2).

The turning point in the quest for investments is 2004, when Tajikistan signs an

agreement with the Russian Aluminium Company (RusAl), that decided to invest US$ 560

million to complete the construction of the first stage of the project (Interfax, 2004).

Nonetheless, three years later, the Government of Tajikistan (GoT) cancelled the deal, for a

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disagreement on the height of the dam and on its ownership79

(Eurasianet, 2007a).

Disappointed with the Russians, but still determined to pursue its plan, in 2008 the GoT

allocated resources from its national budget, finally restarting construction works (Avesta,

2011a), while at the same time continuing to look for foreign investors (BBC Monitoring

Central Asia Unit, 2009a). Subsequently, following an internal campaign aimed at creating

a “Rogun ideology” (see paragraph 4.3.1) the GoT invited its citizens to buy shares of the

“Open Joint Stock Company Rogun”, through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) launched in

January 2010.

In the meanwhile, downstream countries – and in particular Uzbekistan – started to

actively advocate against Rogun, worried, among the other things, that the dam would

reduce water availability for irrigated agriculture. As a consequence of this political

diatribe, and particularly after Uzbek reiterated requests of having an external examination

of the project, the World Bank (WB) got involved in the dispute. In 2010, after a round of

consultations with riparian countries that went on from October 2008 until April 2009,

Motoo Konishi, the WB regional director for Central Asia, announced that the bank will

carry on an 18 month feasibility study and environmental assessment of the dam (The

World Bank, n.d.b). More precisely, a Techno-Economic Assessment Study (TEAS) and an

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) were contracted respectively to a

consortium led by Coyne & Bellier and to the company Poyry of Switzerland. As of 2013,

the feasibility study is yet to be released80

, and the Tajik government agreed that “no new

construction would commence until the Assessment Studies have been prepared, reviewed

by the Panels of Experts, then shared and discussed with riparian nations” (The World

Bank, n.d. b).

4.2. Expected impact of the Rogun dam

The Rogun dam has drawn the attention of both Tajikistan and its neighbours. But what

are the reasons of this interest? What effects might the dam have at the national and

79

According to a UN official, the Russians apparently wanted to have a 70 % ownership of Rogun, and this

was the main reason behind the cancelation of the agreement, since Tajikistan wanted to retain the ownership

of Rogun (U.S. Embassy Astana, 2009). 80

Originally, the results of the study were to be released in Summer 2012.

101

regional level? This section aims to shed light on these questions, reviewing the potential

impact that Rogun might have on Tajikistan and on the other Central Asian countries.

4.2.1. A step towards energy independence

Paradoxically, even though Rogun used to be a Soviet project, its significance increased

when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. With independence – and with the vanishing of the

centralised Soviet management system responsible for the allocation of resources to the

Soviet republics – energy-poor Tajikistan had to start paying for the imports of gas, oil and

coal necessary to fulfil its energy needs. However, the country’s failure to pay for

outstanding debts combined with a tense relationship with Uzbekistan, its sole supplier of

natural gas, had the latter cutting gas supplies to Tajikistan in several occasions. To recall

only the more recent examples, at the end of 2011 Uzbekistan raised the price of the natural

gas that sells to Tajikistan to US$ 311 per thousand cubic meter, and, a few weeks later, gas

supplies were cut and Tajikistan, which that year should have received 180 million cubic

meters, and instead received only 160 million (Ria Novosti, 2012). Again, on 31 December

2012, Uzbekistan suspended gas deliveries to Tajikistan81

after both sides failed to agree on

a price for gas, following the expiration of their annual resource supply contract.

Unreliable gas supplies, combined with insufficient winter hydropower output, are at the

cause of frequent electricity shortages, as demand exceeds by far supply, as shown in

Figure 17, which refers to 2009, a year marked by a major energy crisis in Tajikistan.

81

Two days later, Uzbekistan announced a ban on road transportation of liquefied natural gas through its

territory, explaining that the measure was aimed at protecting public safety and the environment.

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Figure 17: Tajikistan’s monthly electricity generation vs. demand in 2009. Source: The World Bank

n.d. c.

Around 70 % of the Tajik population experiences extensive electricity shortages in

winter, which, alongside their social costs, cause economic losses estimated at over US$

200 million per year (The World Bank, 2012: i). For instance, TALCO (the Tajik

Aluminium Company located close to the border with Uzbekistan), a key industrial asset of

Tajikistan and the largest aluminium processor in Central Asia, particularly suffers from

this situation, as it is powered with Uzbek gas and with the electricity generated by the

large Nurek hydropower plant (HPP) located on the Vakhsh river, around 70 kilometres

downstream of the Rogun site.

Under such circumstances, the potential impact of a HPP of the size of Rogun is

remarkable. Namely, as Tajikistan’s electricity production from hydroelectric sources

accounts for around 97 % of total82

(The World Bank n.d.b), the country’s total installed

capacity of 4,500 MW (see Figure 18) could almost double with the additional 3,600 MW

that the Rogun dam will generate, allowing Tajikistan not only to become energy secure,

but also to sell electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan through the proposed CASA (Central

Asia South Asia) transmission line, strongly promoted by the United States (see Figure 19).

82

Most of which is generated by the 3000 MW Nurek HPP.

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Figure 18: Hydroelectric system of the Vakhsh river. As of 2013, the Sangtuda 1 and 2 HPPs are

operational, as they were inaugurated respectively in 2009 and 2011. Source: Tajik Hydro-

Meteorological Service.

Even though it is probably too optimistic to predict that “with Rogun, Tajikistan will live

like Kuwait”, as a representative of Barki Tojik – the energy holding company of Tajikistan

– declared in 2009 (Marat, 2010), potentially many of the country’s energy problems could

104

be resolved by the dam. This is even more relevant after the two exceptionally cold winters

that hit Central Asia in 2007-2008 and in 2008-2009, and that engendered a widespread

energy crisis in Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan, which was further aggravated by the Kazak

and Uzbek withdrawal from the Central Asia Power System (CAPS), officially because of

fear on instability in the transmission lines. Although the two countries later re-joined

CAPS, in that occasion Tajikistan remained fully isolated, as it also lost the possibility to

import gas from Turkmenistan passing through Uzbekistan (The World Bank, 2012: 56).

Figure 19: The Central Asian Electric Grid. Source: USAID Regional Energy Security, Efficiency and

Trade Program (RESET). Available from: http://www.ca-

reset.org/images/pdf/CentralAsiaElectricGrid.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2013].

105

Therefore, for a country where the population has electricity only for two-three hours a

day from October to May (Trend News Agency, 2012), and where winter temperatures can

be particularly rigid, the achievement of energy self-sufficiency and of reliable electricity

supplies is a quite enticing prospect. Whereas for the Soviet Union water reservoirs were

primarily conceived to provide a reliable water supply to downstream irrigated agriculture

(Libert et al., 2008: 10), for independent Tajikistan their main use appear to be the

generation of hydro-electricity. It is in this new setting that Rogun became the centrepiece

of Tajikistan’s energy plans, and the government presents the project as a fundamental leap

forward in national development.

4.2.2. A strong political symbol and a unifying element

At the political level, Rogun can have an equally important impact. The collapse of the

Soviet Union implied that Communism was no longer providing a basis for legitimacy to

national governments, and this led former Communist leaders to take a nationalist turn to

enhance the perceived legitimacy of their authority (Mellon, 2010: 138-139). As Matveeva

points out, Central Asian states created a legitimisation framework through the invention of

national symbols, in the form of “landslide electoral victories, Independence Day parades

with displays of military might, historical writings, leaders’ addresses to the nation,

national holidays, flags and anthems, the currency, the capital and major national

monuments” (Matveeva, 2010: 18). This perspective allows to appreciate the symbolism

and prestige that can be attached to the world’s tallest dam, and to understand how a project

like Rogun can become the centre of a certain rhetoric put in place by the government to

legitimate itself, gain consensus and divert attention from more pressing matters. Even

more so, considering that not long ago Tajikistan – the least prepared of the Central Asian

countries to undergo policies of national consolidation (Gleason, 1997: 100) – was ravaged

by a harsh civil war that enfeebled the authority of the national government and accentuated

regional and clan divisions (Akiner, 2001). The unifying effect of an iconic project like

Rogun can contribute to the creation of a national identity, while helping keep in power

President Emomali Rahmon and his close network from the Kulob region.

And if Rogun is seen as a symbol of patriotism and success, it is understandable why the

GoT wants Rogun to be the tallest dam in the world. Having recently inaugurated the

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world’s tallest flagpole and Central Asia’s largest library (Parshin, 2012), the GoT seems to

pay particular attention on world and regional records. While the original Soviet project, on

which Rahmon insists, envisages a final height of 335 meters, a few alternatives for a lower

dam were proposed over the years (Eschanov, 2011: 1582). Notably, the 285 meters

suggested by RusAl following the impact assessment realized by Lahmeyer83

, were one of

the causes behind the cancelation of the deal in 2007 (RFE/RL, 2007). Nevertheless, it is

worth noting that the huge reservoir envisaged by the 335 meters project, would

irreversibly alter the landscape, as it will flood an area that stretches for over 70 km in

length. Although the Tajik government sees this as a necessary cost, the foreseen forced

resettlement of the 30,000 people living in the Rogun, Nurobod and Rasht areas where the

reservoir will materialise (Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 2012: 6), has raised

complaints and discontent within the country.

On a foreign policy level, the political value of Rogun can also be directly connected

with the historical rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which has its more recent

origin in the dispute for the control of the predominantly ethnic Tajik cities of Samarkand

and Bukhara84

. As a matter of fact, the Uzbek opposition to the project is having the

unintentional effect of further convincing the GoT that the dam can be held up as a symbol

of self-determination and success, one that can be used to unite the people of Tajikistan

around a national idea and against a common antagonist. As an example, in 2010, during an

epistolary dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov

sent a letter to his Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in which he stressed how Uzbek

criticisms have no other effect than uniting the “people of Tajikistan in the idea of building

this vitally important hydropower plant” (Ferghana, 2010). The unifying effect of the

83

Lahmeyer proposed three different stages of construction. In Stage I, Rogun would have a height of 225

meters, in Stage II 285 meters, and in Stage III 335 meters. Only at Stage III Rogun would be the tallest dam

in the world. Overall, Lahmeyer advised the GoT to re-start the project from the beginning (Schmidt, 2007). 84

As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 1924, when the Soviet Union started to create the Central Asian SSRs,

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan corresponded respectively to the Uzbek SSR and the Tajik ASSR (the Autonomous

SSRs were administrative units of a lower status then the SSRs), the latter being part of the larger Uzbek SSR.

In 1929, the Tajik ASSR was transformed to a full-fledged SSR, and its territory was administratively

separated from that of the Uzbek SSR. However, the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara remained in the Uzbek

SSR, thus originating the dispute on whether the cities should belong to Uzbekistan or to Tajikistan. On this

regard, in 2009, during a particularly animated press conference, Emomali Rahmon alluded to his difficult

personal relationship with Islam Karimov, recalling a fight he had with the Uzbek President. In that occasion,

before Leonid Kuchma (the former President of Ukraine) managed to physically separate them, Rahmon

shouted to Karimov: “We will take Samarkand and Bukhara!” (Dubnov, 2009).

107

Rogun dam seems particularly relevant, considering that the drawing of the Soviet borders

left 60 % of the Tajik population outside their home country (Bergne, 2007: 100).

4.2.3. Potential threats to the reliability of water supplies and to the environment

In addition to producing large quantities of electricity and providing a mean to promote

patriotism, Rogun might also influence the water flow of the Amu Darya and, if used with

bad intents, threaten the agricultural interests of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For

instance, the Uzbeks are concerned that if the water stored in the Rogun reservoir is

released in large quantities in winter to generate electricity, the summer flow would be

insufficient to sustain agriculture and the needs of the population downstream. Conversely,

the GoT notes that Rogun would not only improve water supply to currently irrigated lands,

but it will also allow to irrigate 480 thousand additional hectares of land, including 140

thousand in Turkmenistan and 240 thousand in Uzbekistan (Yuldoshev, 2008).

For what concerns the water flow, Wegerich et al. (2007: 3822) observe that only one out

of the three construction stages proposed by Lahmeyer in 2006, Stage III, could give

Tajikistan full control of the Vakhsh river, and consequently, of the Amu Darya.

Nevertheless, Stage III, or in other words having a Rogun with a height of 335 meters and a

reservoir volume of 13.3 km3, is the one on which the GoT insists. Therefore, the dam

would certainly increase the dependence of the downstream countries on Tajikistan (Libert

et al., 2008: 15), and, as a result, the current situation, in which most of the water is

allocated to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, could possibly be reversed. Tajikistan could use

water as a strategic tool, for example by pressing downstream riparian states to pay for

water releases, thus establishing a form of hydro-hegemony (Wegerich, 2008: 72).

Moreover, as the dam is being built on what is notoriously a seismic area, Uzbekistan is

worried that the weight of the dam and of its reservoir could provoke an earthquake that

would have terrible consequences, both for Tajikistan and for the downstream countries

(Mission of Uzbekistan to the E.U., 2010). The anti-Rogun discourse is well summarised

by the declarations of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. For instance, when asked why

Uzbekistan is opposing the construction of Rogun, the Uzbek President replied “How can

we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for eight years, while the Rogun water

reservoir is being filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?” (Interfax, 2010).

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4.2.4. The ensuing debate

Rogun would have an impact at different levels, as it is often the case with structures of

this size. At the domestic level, the dam could allow Tajikistan to become energy

independent, serving as a symbol of success that could reinforce – in the ideas of the Tajik

leadership – national identity. Moreover, Afghanistan and Pakistan could take advantage

from the electricity surplus generated by the dam, through the proposed CASA transmission

line. Nevertheless, Rogun could also impact on the water flow of the Amu Darya, and have

negative consequences on irrigated agriculture in downstream countries. Perhaps even more

importantly, Rogun could provide Tajikistan a strategic advantage in regional water issues,

as the country would be able to control the water flow and, for instance, charge downstream

countries for the water that it releases.

The dam could indeed change the status-quo, and allow Tajikistan to become the hydro-

hegemon in the Amu Darya basin. In the current status of things, although it is difficult to

identify a clear hegemon in the basin (Wegerich, 2008: 78), Uzbekistan is nonetheless

exerting a form of hydro-hegemony, as it has managed to keep its advantageous water

allocation unchanged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As it was mentioned in

Chapter 3, the country contributes 6 % to the flow generated in the basin (Micklin, 2000:

7), but thanks to the Soviet Protocol 566 signed in Moscow in 1987 (Protocol 566, 1987), it

withdraws 36 %85

. Such hydro-hegemony is discernible especially in relation with

Tajikistan, a country which depends from Uzbekistan for its natural gas supplies, and which

has a considerably smaller population, inferior military and political might and a less

developed economy.

Thus, while the project is yet to be realised, and the impacts discussed above are only

potential, the Rogun dam has crystallised the upstream-downstream tensions over the

differing preference of water use. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have shown little

disposition to discuss solutions that would be acceptable to both countries, leaving little

room for compromise (Jalilova et al., 2013: 4). If, on the one side, Tajikistan advocates in

favour of the dam, on the other side, Uzbekistan attempts to hamper its construction.

85

While Tajikistan, which contributes 80 % of flow generated, can withdraw only 15.4 %.

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Based on these assumptions, the strategies carried out by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to

attain their goal, can be respectively defined as counter-hegemonic and hegemonic, with the

former aiming at altering a disadvantageous status-quo, and the latter aiming at maintaining

it unchanged. Therefore, as this is the key to answer the research questions that drive this

study, the remaining of this chapter analyses in detail the counter-hegemonic tactics put in

place by the Tajik government.

4.3. Tajik counter-hegemonic tactics

In her study of counter-hegemonic strategies in the Nile river basin, Ana Cascao (2008:

17) observed that the main goals of the hegemonised are to challenge, contest, change and

create alternatives to the status-quo. This applies also to Tajikistan, which is contesting and

trying to change a status-quo in which it cannot exploit its hydroelectric potential. The key

goal of Tajik counter-hegemonic strategies is to get the conditions necessary to build the

Rogun dam, a fundamental step in the achievement of the Tajik hydraulic mission.

The carrier of the Tajik hydraulic mission is the Tajik hydrocracy. The Tajik hydrocracy

is tasked with implementing existing Soviet projects rather than planning or designing new

ones. Therefore, its key members are high-level decision-makers, such as the Tajik

President Rahmon and officials from his close network of power, most notably the Foreign

Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi, the Prime Minister Akil Akilov and the Tajik Permanent

Representative to the UN, Sirodjidin Aslov86

. All of them have managed to keep an

unvaried position towards the Rogun dam over the last decade, one that can be summarized

into the motto “Rogun shall be built at all costs”.

The strategy adopted by the Tajik hydrocracy to further the construction of the Rogun

dam is shaped by three main drivers: getting visibility and international acceptance for the

project, mobilizing international funds and creating a Rogun ideology at the internal level.

Consequently, these three factors led the hydrocracy to adopt two distinct discourses, one

for the domestic and one for the foreign dimension. While the former presents the dam as a

vital achievement for the country, as a symbol of national pride, honour, progress and

prosperity, the latter focuses on presenting Tajikistan to the international community as a

responsible water user that should be allowed – and possibly, financially supported – to

86

In December 2013 Aslov was appointed Foreign Minister, thus replacing Zarifi as head of the Tajik MFA.

110

exercise its right of building a dam, that will be operated for the mutual benefit of all the

countries in the region to produce clean energy. The Tajik discourse seems then to include

the two main justifications held by dam proponents during the twentieth century: the “big-

dams-are-development” argument, is indeed sided by the cause of hydropower as a clean

and renewable energy that contributes to reduce climate change (Khagram, 2004: 209). The

project is framed in such a way that legitimises Tajikistan’s right to build it, portraying it as

a key for the prosperity of the country and as a symbolic, cooperative regional project.

Overall, the Tajik counter-hegemonic strategy is formed by four main tactics, which all

challenge the status-quo ideally leading to the construction of the Rogun dam: i) internal

support; ii) mobilization of financial resources; iii) international support and iv) knowledge

construction (see Figure 20). The tactics represent the ways in which ideational and

bargaining power are wielded.

Figure 20: Building the Rogun dam: the four tactics forming the Tajik counter-hegemonic strategy

Through these tactics, the Tajik government is attempting to impose its discourse and

ideology. Only when Tajikistan will get consent, it will be able to exploit the geographical

advantage that comes from being the furthest upstream country in the Amu Darya basin.

Challenging the status-quo

Internal support

Knowledge construction

International support

Mobilization of financial resources

111

Soft power here can set the conditions to use structural power, or, to interpret it through a

Gramscian lens, consent is a necessary condition to use force. To reconnect with the

analysis of power and hegemony presented in Chapter 2, while hegemony can be

maintained through the use of connective forms of power, in the same way it can also be

challenged, through a continuous and evolving process aimed at changing the status-quo.

The following, analyses these tactics in detail, outlining the main aspects of the Rogun

discourse and the ways in which it has been disseminated, starting with its domestic

dimension and gradually moving to its international one.

4.3.1. Internal support: creation of a Rogun ideology

Targeting both Tajik citizens living in Tajikistan and those working abroad, the GoT has

carried out a significant effort to create a Rogun identity. This process has a performative

relevance to Rogun, since an ideology bound to the dam can facilitate its physical

construction, notably when the citizens are called to financially support the project. The

strategy gained momentum with the energy crisis of 2007-2008, that left many people

without electricity and heating in many areas of the country including the capital Dushanbe

(Eurasianet, 2008a). After this event, the fact that Tajik citizens should fully appreciate the

benefits of Rogun became a priority for Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (Idiev, 2009),

that started to disseminate his message on national TV, radio channels and websites as well

as on ubiquitous banners and poster. As Molle et al. noted (2009), the creation of certain

meta-discourses and meta-justifications – which usually tend to stress matters such as the

achievement of national goals and priorities or the absence of real alternatives – are among

the classical means of furthering large-scale projects at the internal level, and this is the

case also for Rogun.

In line with Susan Strange (1994) idea of the “knowledge structure”, and with the

Foucauldian view of discourse as an essential element in the operation of power, “as it is

the vehicle through which knowledge and subjects are constituted” (Gaventa, 2003: 4), the

GoT is using ideational discursive means to shape the minds of its citizens and persuade

them of the benefits of the dam. The recurring elements of the internal Rogun rhetoric,

include the portrayal of the dam as a source of light, heat and progress, as a vital and

existential issue and as a solution to most of the problems faced by the country.

112

Tajik media, such as the Khovar and Avesta news agencies, and the Tajik state-run TV

and Radio, work together in both ensuring visibility to the project and in channelling

official statements that report the government’s vision on Rogun. For instance, the internet

portal of the Avesta news agency87

features Rogun on top of the list of topics addressed in

the website (placing it before the “Government”, “Security” and “Business” sections),

while the Khovar news agency duly reports Rahmon’s speeches on Rogun and mirrors the

government’s position on the matter. When in 2008 Rahmon called “on all patriots and

honoured sons of the motherland to take an active part in the soonest completion of the

construction of the first unit of the hydroelectric power station”, all the country’s TV and

radio channels quoted him as saying this (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010i). In

2010, strained relations among the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led to a harsh epistolary

dispute concerning the Rogun dam between the Tajik Prime Minister, Akil Akilov, and his

Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The letters were also simultaneously published in

the Tajik and Uzbek state-owned news agencies, thus informing the citizens of both

countries about the quarrel. While Akilov’s letter discarded the Uzbek view as

unreasonable, and stressed how the Rogun dam is based on the “vital necessity of normal

electricity provision for population and national economy” (Akilov, 2010), the Tajik state-

owned press noted that Uzbek criticisms have no other effect than uniting the “people of

Tajikistan in the idea of building this vitally important hydropower plant” (Ferghana,

2010).

A month before, Khovar – along with the Tajik state TV and Radio which broadcasted it

integrally – reported the yearly Presidential address to the people of Tajikistan, which in

this occasion was almost entirely centred on Rogun. In his message to the nation, Rahmon

provides a comprehensive synthesis of the Rogun rhetoric:

Rogun is our national idea. […] I shall reiterate to all citizens of this sovereign state,

regardless of nationality, language and religion, that Rogun is a real battleground for

honour and dignity, is a popular arena of selfless work for a better future and prosperity of

sovereign Tajikistan! […] I appeal to the children of Tajikistan, living and working in other

countries, and always thinking about the welfare of their ancestral land and the prosperity

of their houses: you can actively participate in this nation-wide initiative and contribute to

the construction of Rogun, a source of light and heat in your homes! […] Rogun is a

symbol of the accomplishment and prosperity of the present and future Tajikistan, of an

87

See http://www.avesta.tj/, top-left sidebar, viewed 1 March 2013.

113

unprecedented development of industry and agriculture, and most importantly, a daily

symbol of warmth and light for every citizen of our country! […] Rogun is a source of

national pride for every citizen of Tajikistan and a symbol of pride for our present and

future life! Rogun is a symbol of the life of our nation, a symbol of life and death of the

Tajik state! (Rahmon, 2010a; translated by the author from the original Russian)

All the key elements of the Rogun discourse are contained in this address: Rogun is

portrayed as a symbol of national pride and honour, of progress and prosperity, and

ultimately, as a matter of life and death for Tajikistan88

. In addition, the “appeal to the

children of Tajikistan living abroad”, seems of particular interest, both because this can be

linked directly to the representation of Rogun as a unifying element, and also because the

amount of remittances sent home by Tajik migrants is estimated to account for half of the

GDP89

(International Labour Organization, 2010).

This aspect acquires more relevance if connected with the sale of Rogun shares to Tajik

citizens. Indeed, Rahmon has extensively used (Dubnov, 2009; Interfax, 2009) certain

aspects of the Rogun discourse – namely the representation of the dam as a vital facility and

as a matter of life and death – to convince his citizens to buy shares of the “Open Joint

Stock Company Rogun” (Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, 2009), that launched an initial

public offering (IPO) on 6 January 2010 (Rasul-zade, 2010), a day which was also declared

the “Day of Solidarity for the Construction of Rogun” (Eurasianet, 2010a), and that was

marked by the birth of a baby named by his family Roghunshoh, King Rogun, in honour of

the power station (Ria Novosti, 2010).

During the IPO, Tajik citizens were forced to sacrifice part of their salaries to purchase

shares of Rogun, while the main streets of Dushanbe had been adorned with banners and

posters advertising the dam, and the Tajik state TV devoted substantial amounts of prime

time broadcast to updates on the progress of the share sale (Leonard 2010). One year later,

some two million shares of Rogun had been sold, earning the GoT US$ 170 million

(Ergasheva 2011), corresponding to less than 10 % of the total amount required to build the

88

Also, and in line with Arundaty Roy’s analysis of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India, this implies that if you

support the dam you are a patriot, but if you don’t, you are an enemy of the nation (Aradhana, 2002). Indeed,

Suhrob Sharipov, the head of the Strategic Research Centre (SRC) of Tajikistan, was quoted as saying that “if

somebody in the country opposes construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, he will automatically

turn into a traitor” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009a). 89

As reported by the International Labour Organization (2010), the total labour migration out of Tajikistan is

estimated to include between 500,000 to 800,000 people, which represent about 10 % of its total population of

6.9 million.

114

dam90

. Although this is a significant amount in absolute terms for the Tajik economy91

, it is

insufficient to make a difference in the overall dam construction process, as it corresponds

to less than 10 % of the total amount required.

But has Rogun really become the people’s dam? In spite of the government’s tight grip

on the media and Tajikistan’s rubber-stamp Parliament designed to maximize Rahmon’s

power (Olcott 2012, 16), Tajik citizens have yet to be persuaded that Rogun is a panacea

(Eschanov 2011, 1579-80). Discontent has risen after the launch of the IPO, as government

employees who refused to buy shares were reportedly being fired, and university students

were forced to show share certificates to their professors before sitting for exams (Bureau

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2011). Mukhiddin Kabiri, the Head of the Islamic

Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and a political rival of Rahmon, accused the government

of diverting the people’s money to unspecified uses not related to the dam (Panvilova

2009). The project has also raised complaints among residents of the Rogun, Nurobod and

Rasht areas, where 30,000 people will be forcibly resettled to make room to the Rogun

reservoir. However, this has not changed Rahmon’s strategy, and the Tajik government has

continued to disseminate its Rogun discourse both at the domestic and at the international

level, where the dam has become one of the cornerstones of Tajikistan’s foreign policy.

4.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources

The IPO represents only a part of the efforts carried out by the GoT to raise funds for the

construction of Rogun. In effect, over the last twenty years the Tajik administration

uninterruptedly looked for the US$ 2.1 billion necessary to build the dam, trying to involve

in the project a great variety of foreign partners. While none of these attempts would

eventually lead to any substantial foreign involvement, it is nevertheless useful to illustrate

them, as pulling together international financial resources is an essential requirement to

fulfil Tajikistan’s hydropower ambitions. To this extent, the case of Tajikistan and Rogun

seems similar to that of Ethiopia and its dam projects in the Ethiopian highlands in which –

as Cascao observes – the mobilisation of international funding constitutes a crucial element

90

Later in 2011, the GoT interrupted the sale of Rogun shares following criticism of the IPO by the

International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund 2010). 91

In 2011, the Tajik budget allocated roughly US$ 1.8 billion in expenditures, of which 210 US$ million to

the energy sector. Available from: http://minfin.tj/downloads/files/MTEFfinalTajikenglish.pdf [Accessed 7

September 2012].

115

in Ethiopia’s counter-hegemonic strategy against Egypt in the Blue Nile Basin (Cascao,

2008: 24).

Worldwide, only a few countries have the necessary funding to realize on their own

structures of the size of Rogun. International players such as China (and to a lesser extent

India), are currently leading the way in the dam building sector, financing several large

projects both within their territory and in other countries and regions (Gleick, 2011: 128-

129), taking the role that in the 1960s belonged to the Soviet Union. Over the last century,

the Soviets contributed to the construction of numerous large dams around the world,

including the Aswan High Dam in Egypt (Mitchell, 2002) the Hoa Binh Dam in Vietnam

(Vietnam Online, n.d.) and the Tabqa dam in Syria (Kolars and Mitchell, 1991). Tajikistan,

notwithstanding the IPO (2010) and the direct allocation of budget money (starting in

2008), is not able to realize the project on its own (and had it been, the whole story would

perhaps have been different). Therefore, the following will outline how Tajikistan has been

targeting large individual donors (particularly Russia) and international financial

institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), to get financial

support for the project.

4.3.2.1. Involving countries…

Already in May 1993, in the middle of the Tajik Civil War, the newly elected President

Emomali Rahmon released an interview to Ostankino Channel 192

in which he declared that

despite financial constraints, “the construction of the Rogun hydro-electric station is

continuing” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993a), adding that Russian President

Eltsin visited the site and that there was a general interest from international investors to

participate in the project. Thence, a few weeks later, Tajik Premier Abdullojonov

announced the drafting of an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan concerning the

construction of Rogun (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993b), that was eventually

signed in April 1994 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994a). A month later, rumours

started to circulate about the establishment of a Tajik-Russian joint-stock company set to

complete the construction of Rogun, but then again no concrete actions followed (BBC

Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994b). Rahmon’s interest on Rogun was reiterated in his 92

Ostankino Channel 1 (currently named Pervyy Kanal, First Channel), was and remains the main Russian

TV channel.

116

election manifesto in November 1994, which stressed the importance of attracting workers

to the construction sites of the Rogun and Sangtuda I93

hydro-power stations (BBC

Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994c). Such goal was also included as a priority area in

the Tajik government's economic reform programme for the period 1995-2000 (BBC

Summary of World Broadcasts, 1995b).

Tajik-Russian talks on Rogun continued also after the end of the civil war. In 1998,

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valery Serov mentioned the preparation of feasibility

studies for the “construction of several hydroelectric plants” in Tajikistan (BBC Monitoring

Central Asia Unit, 1998). One year later, the two countries signed an agreement in which it

was decided that part of Tajikistan's debts to Russia94

was to be paid through shares in a

number of Tajik enterprises and industrial projects, including Rogun (Moscow News,

1999). Again, in 2002, Barki Tojik, signed a contract with the Russian financial group

Baltic Construction Company to build Rogun (Ria Novosti, 2002b). Nevertheless, despite

an undeniable interest showed over the years, Russian involvement on the project did not

materialise into tangible actions, and the construction site remained inactive. This probably

explains why during the following years the GoT tried to involve – with poor results – new

potential investors, including Japan (Ria Novosti, 2002), Pakistan (Interfax, 2002) and the

Czech Republic (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004d). After more than a decade of

negotiations and a handful of unsuccessful agreements, a more effective treaty was signed

in October 2004 by Rahmon and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. One of its effects

was that the Russian aluminium giant RusAl agreed to invest $560 million to resume work

and complete the construction of the first stage of the project (Interfax, 2004). The German

engineering firm Lahmeyer, which was awarded a contract from RusAl to carry out a first

feasibility study of Rogun (Interfax, 2005), recommended that the optimal height of the

dam should be 285 meters, instead of the 335 on which the GoT insisted (Associated Press,

2006), and, as it was noted earlier, such was the disagreement on the height of the dam and

on its ownership that in August 2007 Tajik officials eventually announced the cancelation

of the deal with RusAl (Eurasianet, 2007).

93

Sangtuda I is a 670 MW hydroelectric power plant on the Vakhsh River. The project – realized thanks to a

Russian investment of roughly US$ 720 million – represents the largest foreign direct investment project in

Tajikistan to date (Olcott, 2012: 242 94

US$ 170 million out of an estimated total of US$ 300 million.

117

At this point, it is worth noting that the mobilization of international funding appears to

be subordinated to the resolution of the regional conflict with Uzbekistan. Significantly,

after his visit to Uzbekistan in 2009, the then-President of the Russian Federation Dmitry

Medvedev has clarified that "Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must

be built with consideration of the interests of all neighbouring [sic] states," adding that, "if

there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such

projects" (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009b). Although the MFA of Tajikistan

reacted to this sending a note of protest to the Russian Government (Eurasianet, 2010b) –

and a week later, Emomali Rahmon unusually cancelled a long-planned visit to Moscow

(Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2009) – Russia did not change its position. There seem

to be here a condition comparable to what Barry Buzan called “overlay”, although water

takes the place of security in the original definition. Overlay “occurs when the direct

presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of

security dynamics among the local states” (Buzan et al., 1998: 12). In the case of

Uzbekistan, the country managed to influence Russia to such an extent (using its bargaining

power, as outlined in Chapter 6) that the former eventually decided to withdraw its support

to Tajik hydroelectric plans.

Once more, when the Russian involvement in Rogun faded, the GoT turned its attention

elsewhere, this time towards Ukraine. In March 2008, Ukrainian President Yushchenko

announced its country’s participation in an international consortium to finish the project

(Interfax, 2008). The two sides held talks again a few months later, discussing a deal worth

several hundred million US dollars (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2009) and ending

up signing a memorandum of intent on cooperation in the construction of the dam, which

was not ensued by tangible measures. Surprisingly enough, before the outburst of the

Rogun controversy, even downstream Kazakhstan showed interest in investing in Tajik

hydropower projects. In 2008, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced that "If

a consortium will work on the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then Kazakhstan will

take part, providing materials, helping with shares, and as investor" (RFE/RL, 2008). Two

years later, and again as a result of Uzbek lobbying (IWPR, 2009), Nazarbayev seemed to

have changed his opinion about Tajik plans, and while visiting Uzbekistan he declared that

"there ought to be no hydroelectric power plants in the region without results of the

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expertise obtained and studied" (Dubnov, 2010), referring to Uzbek demands of having an

independent examination of Rogun.

Also Iran, a country that shares with Tajikistan a common language and culture, has

been involved in the Rogun project. In 2009, Ali Asghar Sherdust, the Iranian ambassador

to Tajikistan, uttered his country’s intentions to participate in completing the construction

of Rogun (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009c). Two years later, Iranian support

became “harder”, as outlined by Tajik Defence Minister General Sherali Khairulloyev, that

during increasing tensions with Uzbekistan reminded its neighbours – on what sounded as a

warning – that “Today, if necessary, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Armed Forces can reach

Tajikistan in two hours” (FARS News Agency, 2011). Yet, while Iranian financial support

on Rogun did not materialize, the country has participated in another hydroelectric project,

investing US$ 180 million (82 % of the total cost) in the construction of the less contested

220 MW Sangtuda II hydroelectric plant on the Vakhsh river (Daly, 2011), whose first unit

was inaugurated in September 2011 (ITAR-TASS, 2011).

4.3.2.1. …and financial institutions

Unsurprisingly, the WB – the largest single source of funding for dams around the world

(McCully, 2001: 19) – has also been involved in the Rogun project. As it was mentioned,

the WB is currently preparing a feasibility study and an environmental assessment of the

dam, whose much awaited results – as of 2013 – are yet to be released. Nevertheless, the

Bank’s engagement on this particular issue is due to Uzbek pressures on having an external

evaluation of the project. Despite the fact that in 1994 the financial institution

recommended to drop the project on both financial and ecological grounds (FT Energy

Newsletters, 1995) the GoT attempted to have the WB participate in Rogun in several

occasions, both as a dispute settler and as a provider of international funds. For instance, in

2006 Tajikistan requested the assistance of the WB to resolve the above-mentioned dispute

between RusAl and the GoT (Associated Press, 2006). As it was observed, the dispute with

RusAl would not be solved, and shortly after the cancelation of the contract Tajikistan

sought a loan from the WB, through its energy company Barki Tojik (Global Insight,

2007a).

119

Towards the end of 2007, Rahmon mentioned for the first time the creation of an

international consortium to complete Rogun led by the WB (Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Weekly, 2007). Indeed, a few weeks later, WB Vice-President Shigeo Katsu had a

meeting with the Tajik prime minister Oqil Oqilov, in which he confirmed that the

Bank will take part with a new investment programme aimed at building the dam (BBC

Summary of World Broadcasts, 2007). Then, in May 2008, during one of his regular visits

to the construction site95

, Rahmon announced that the consortium had been established

thanks to the help of the WB and of other unspecified international financial institutions,

adding that this would lead to the completion and operation of two of the six envisioned

turbines within 4 and half years, at the end of 2012 (Parshin, 2008a). For the time being, the

turbines have not been built, and the international consortium seemed to have ceased to

exist, perhaps also because of the WB involvement in the preparation of the two impact

assessments.

As for the ADB, in 2009 the Bank's president Haruhiko Kuroda supported Rogun and

other hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2009), and

subsequently Juan Miranda, ADB director general for Central and Western Asia, expressed

the Bank’s readiness in helping with the assessments. Although Miranda declared that the

Bank “will make it a priority to support projects in this field [hydroelectric] within its

cooperation with Tajikistan” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010h), it appears that

the involvement of the ADB – as it is the case for the other potential donors mentioned so

far – is subordinated to the resolution of the dispute with Uzbekistan, or at least, to the

release of the studies carried out by the WB.

4.3.3. Internationalising Rogun

An important part of Tajik counter-hegemonic strategies consists of getting international

acceptance and support for Rogun. This is because without international acceptance, no

country or financial institution is likely to invest in a project that is considered too

controversial. Therefore, Tajikistan needs to persuade key regional and international

players that the dam is necessary for its development and wellbeing, and moreover, that it

has every right to build it. In other words, Tajikistan needs to impose its discourse as the 95

Rahmon regularly visits the site, both to verify the advancement of the works and to propose Rogun to

potential investors.

120

dominant one. If a discourse is constructed and disseminated successfully, it becomes a

“sanctioned discourse”, that, according to the definition provided by Anthony Turton, “is

the prevailing or dominant discourse that has been legitimised by the discursive élite within

the water sector at any one moment in time. It represents what may be said, who may say it

and how it may be interpreted, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant belief system

or paradigm” (Turton, 2002: 39). Allan (2001: 183-183) usefully draws from Foucault to

explain how a discourse can be understood as a “network of consensus” in politics. In water

politics, the main role of politicians is often to legitimise their inputs in a way that they

become the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the process through which the

sanctioned/dominant discourse is contested, and, at its best result, reversed, can be defined

alternative discourse construction. This is the domain where ideational power is delved and

possibly best observed, as it is through this form of power that discourses, narratives and

ideologies are imposed. It was noted that through ideational power the hegemon convinces

the hegemonised that the current situation is right and proper. Conversely, through

ideational power the hegemonised can reverse the existing perception of the current

situation, and impose a new discourse.

The following analyses how the GoT has delved ideational power, outlining the ways in

which it has fervently sought international support for Rogun, proactively bringing the

matter at the most important international forums worldwide and organising international

conferences and seminars on water management issues.

4.3.3.1. Rogun meets the UN (and a few more)

For what concerns the United Nations, beginning in 1999 during the 54th

United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA), and carrying on uninterruptedly until the 67th

UNGA in 2012,

the GoT gradually introduced in its annual address water issues and, subsequently, the

development of its hydroelectric potential and the construction of Rogun (see Table 5).

Through a well-planned communication strategy aimed at portraying itself as a responsible

water user and as a global leader in encouraging cooperation in the field of water (Rahmon,

2008), the Tajik discourse at the UN is a water-energy crescendo that eventually leads to

Rogun. Considering that the desiccation of the Aral Sea was caused by the series of dams

and river diversion projects (which also included Rogun) realized by the Soviet Union, this

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strategy can be interpreted as an attempt of changing the perception of Central Asia as an

environmentally degraded region, and bestowing to Tajikistan the role of regional leader in

promoting environmental responsibility96

. Hence, in the period 1999-2004, the GoT called

for the attention of the world community on fresh water problems and on greater

cooperation between countries, successfully putting forward two initiatives to declare 2003

the “International Year of Freshwater”, and 2005-2015 the “International Decade for

Action Water for life97

” (Rahmon, 1999 and 2003; Alimov, 2000 and 2001; Nazarov, 2002

and 2004). Then, in 2005, the Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov raised for the first

time at the UN the issue of Tajikistan and of its unexploited hydroelectric potential: “water

resources possessed by Tajikistan provide us with considerable potential advantages in

terms of the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] implementation, since they represent

a huge hydro potential that, unfortunately, is currently used by less than 5 %” (Nazarov,

2005). During the subsequent years, the connection between Rogun and the achievement of

the MDGs, which implies the representation of the dam as a fundamental element to attain

national goals and priorities, became the central message delivered by Tajikistan at the UN

(Aslov, 2007; Rahmon 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Zarifi 2011a; 2012a). Part of the efforts

carried out by the GoT were also aimed at underlining the regional benefits that would stem

from Rogun. For instance, Sirodjidin Aslov, the Tajik Permanent Representative to the UN,

in 2007 stressed how with “the completion of the construction of the Ragun [sic]

hydropower station in Tajikistan alone will make it possible to supply with water extra 3

mln. hectares of land in the neighboring Central Asian states, and ensure water supply in

the years of droughts” (Aslov, 2007).

96

Supporting this interpretation, and shifting the blame to the Soviet Union, the Tajik delegation to the OSCE

declared in 2008 that “any allegation on insalubrities of constructing hydropower plants in Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan is something as systematic mislead of the world community and concealment of ecological crimes

committed in a second half of the 20th century in the Central Asia” (Yuldoshev, 2008). 97

A third initiative of this kind, proclaiming 2013 the “International Year of Water Cooperation (IYWC)”,

was launched by Tajikistan in 2010 (Rahmon, 2010).

122

Table 5: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1999-2012.

“Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Rogun” respectively mean that issues related to the management of

shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the Rogun dam were discussed in

the address. Table constructed by author based on data from the United Nations Bibliographic

Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/).

Content of the Tajik Address Content of the Uzbek address

UNGA session

no. and year

Water Hydroelectric Rogun Water Hydroelectric Rogun

54th, 1999

55th, 2000

56th, 2001

57th, 2002

58th, 2003

59th, 2004

60th, 2005

61st, 2006

62nd, 2007

63rd, 2008

64th, 2009

65th, 2010

66th, 2011

67th, 2012

The address delivered by Hamrokhon Zarifi, the Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the

66th

UNGA in 2011, summarizes well the essence of the Tajik discourse at the international

level, and the evolution of the message delivered by the GoT over the years:

123

Energy resources are of paramount importance for sustainable development. Access to

energy is an imperative for ensuring social and economic development, eradication of

poverty and hunger. […] Complex development of hydropower, combined with other

renewables, will not only allow to increase the capacity of energy systems, but also to

promote their stability and increased efficiency, and to considerably decrease detrimental

emissions into the atmosphere. For over ten years, in the winter season, the Republic of

Tajikistan has experienced a severe shortage of electrical energy supply. Since Tajikistan

lacks other sources of energy it is of vital importance for the country, which possesses huge

hydropower potential, to develop a hydro energy economic sector in a consistent and

complex manner. Tajikistan is prepared to closely cooperate on issues of rational use of

water and energy resources with all the countries of the region, with due consideration to

the common regional interests. (Zarifi, 2011a: 2)

Sustainable development, huge hydropower potential, clean energy, absence of

alternatives, winter energy crises, will to cooperate, distancing from the disastrous Soviet

water administration and, finally, the presentation of Tajikistan as a leader in water

cooperation under the auspices of the UN.

A similar message has been delivered at the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings, in

which the emphasis is placed on matters such as the necessity for Tajikistan to exploit its

hydroelectric potential, the regional benefits originating from Rogun and Tajikistan’s will

to cooperate with its neighbours. Consequently, also in this assembly Hamrokhon Zarifi,

underlined his country’s “necessity of constructing hydropower plants”, as this will be not

only extremely profitable for Tajikistan, but it will also “contribute to sustainable

development of other countries of the region”, considerably increasing their irrigated land98

(Zarifi, 2007). The achievement of energy independence is presented as “a matter of vital

importance […] which will have impact on further social and economic development of the

country (Zarifi, 2011b). Moreover, thanks to Rogun Tajikistan’s energy production will

exceed the “real needs of the region three and more times” – allowing “to satisfy the

growing demands of neighboring [sic] countries” (Zarifi, 2009). In addition, based on the

assumption that the politicisation of hydropower issues is hampering the development of

regional cooperation, the GoT reiterated its effort in promoting regional dialogue,

proposing the creation of an international hydropower consortium to construct Rogun

(Zarifi, 2012b).

98

One year later, the GoT increased the expected hectares of land that Rogun would allow to irrigate to 4.6

million, including 140 thousand additional hectares in Turkmenistan and 240 thousand additional hectares in

Uzbekistan (Yuldoshev, 2008).

124

In line with a Rogun-centred foreign policy, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon raised the

issue of the dam also during his visits to the European Parliament (EP). In 2009, in a speech

to the Foreign Policy Committee of the EP, he defined the completion of Rogun of

“vital importance” for his country (RFE/RL, 2009), while in 2011 he ensured the EP that

Rogun will benefit not only Tajikistan but all the countries in the region, and therefore the

country should be allowed to build the dam (Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 2011). In

another occasion, Zarifi, through his “Message from the roof of the world”, asked the EU to

help Central Asian countries find a solution on regional disputes, nevertheless reminding

that “Tajikistan has abundant unexhausted sources of hydro-energy ranking the 8th

in the

world on total amount and the 2nd

on specific volumes” (Zarifi, 2011c).

Finally, above and beyond the UN, OSCE and the EU, the Rogun campaign at

international organizations is complemented by bringing the issue of Tajikistan and the

development of “its enormous hydropower resources” (Rahmon, 2009a) at key

international conferences, such as the World Water Forum (in 2009 and 2012)99

and the

2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen.

4.3.3.2. Water conferences

Another significant tactic supplementing the Rogun internationalization process, consists

in the organization of international water conferences and seminars. Over the last ten years,

the GoT has organized in its capital Dushanbe several large events in which the Tajik view

on water management issues and on regional cooperation was presented to the participants.

These events – often organised under the auspices or with the financial support of the

United Nations – have been usually conceived within the framework of larger initiatives

successfully presented by the GoT at the UNGA, such as the abovementioned “2003

International Year of Freshwater” and “2005-2015 International Decade for Action Water

for life”.

Not long after the first conferences had been organized, Kai Wegerich noted that

Tajikistan “started to challenge the hegemony of Uzbekistan, which has so far dominated

the international arena with its own sponsored favoured discourses, such as at ICID, the

99

Emblematically, and in line with the process aimed at presenting the country as a responsible water user

and at binding the idea of Tajikistan with that of water, the GoT disseminated at the 2012 World Water Forum

in Marseille brochures and pens uttering the message “Tajikistan is a water country”.

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World Water Week in Stockholm, Green Cross International and the World Water Forum”

(Wegerich, 2008: 83). Indeed, the main goal of these events is to strengthen the image of

the country as a world leader in promoting cooperation in the field of water, to show an

aptitude to cooperate with Uzbekistan100

and the other Central Asian countries, and

eventually to promote the development of Tajik hydroelectric potential101

.

Following the organization of the “International Water Forum” in 2003, the GoT

convened the large and costly “International conference on regional cooperation in

transboundary river basins” in 2005. In 2008, the International Conference on Water

Related Disaster Reduction took place in Dushanbe. In his opening remarks, Tajik

President Rahmon reiterated his desire to expand Tajikistan's hydro-power potential and

urged the creation of an international consortium to develop Lake Sarez (Parshin, 2008b).

These events were followed in 2010 by the “Water for Life” conference and in 2011 by the

conference “Towards the conference on sustainable development (RIO+20): water

cooperation issues”. In addition, and under the umbrella of the UN initiative (which was

proposed by Tajikistan) “2013 International Year of Water Cooperation”, the GoT is

organized a large “High-level International Conference on Water Cooperation” in

Dushanbe in late August 2013, during which Tajikistan will present its analysis and ideas

on water supply and use, as underlined by Rahmat Bobokalonov, Tajikistan’s Minister of

land reclamation and water resources (Bloomberg, 2013).

Overall, the organisation of water conferences serves to portray Tajikistan as a leader in

fostering water cooperation, but also to propagate through authoritative channels Tajik

views on water management and to give a positive image of the Rogun dam. This process,

closely related with the creation and dissemination of a specific knowledge that backs Tajik

assumptions, is delineated in the following section.

100

For example, at the Water for Life conference Tajik Minister of Energy and Industry Sherali Gul, declared

that “Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as to complete the construction of the Roghun

hydroelectric power plant”, also adding that “Tajikistan is not going to block water to Uzbekistan […] We

will never leave our neighbours without water” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010g). 101

Often the conferences end with a guided visit at the Rogun site or at the existing Nurek hydropower

station, as it was the case in 2010 for the Water for Life conference (Interfax, 2010a).

126

4.3.4. Knowledge construction

Knowledge construction can be considered a hegemonic (Warner and Zeitoun, 2006) but

also a counter-hegemonic strategy, since the construction of expertise-based knowledge

serves to contest the scientific assumptions contained in the Uzbek discourse, namely that

the dam will lead to environmental calamities and water shortages. Additionally, most of

the strategies outlined previously could also fit in this category, as in all its endeavours the

Tajik government is attempting to impose its discourse and ideology, propagating a specific

scientific postulation: the seismicity of the area where the project is located is not strong

enough to pose a threat neither to Tajikistan nor to its neighbours. Moreover – and similarly

to what is maintained by most upstream countries when it comes to building a large dam

(Molle et al., 2009) – the Rogun dam will lead to a better regulation of the water flow while

also allowing an increase in the irrigated land in the downstream countries. Science-based

knowledge that presents the Rogun dam as a win-win situation, can provide an authoritative

support that help legitimise the way the issue is framed by the Tajik hydrocracy. This

knowledge has been disseminated by means of newspaper articles, open letters, and the

active engagement of western politicians.

Interestingly, while the Soviet legacy on the environment is strongly condemned by

Tajik Ministers (see note 96), Tajik scientists glorify the Soviet engineering expertise

behind Rogun, that rather than making the project outdated (as the Uzbek government

sustains) (Mirziyoyev, 2007), is presented as the state of the art of dam design and

construction. The benefits of the dam are widely diffused by the Tajik press and by the

websites of the Tajik Embassies, that are also used to counter negative assumptions about

the Rogun dam. For instance, when a Moscow-based scientist with a wide experience in

Tajikistan, Leonid Papyrin, warned about the seismicity of the area and recommended

further engineering investigations (Papyrin, 2011), the Tajik government entrusted the reply

to Professor Dzhonon Ikrami, a Tajik scientist, that objected that:

The current broad scale attack of our neighbors’ environmentalists towards construction of

Rogun HPP reminds me of an incompetent report of a number of major writers led by

Marietta Shaginyan featured in the “Pravda” newspaper in 1962 against the construction of

the Nurek HPP high rock-fill dam. […] After reading a number of statements of our

opponents asserting that for the last 100 years in the Rogun construction area there had been

20 earthquakes with a magnitude of 9 points, we turned to the well-known seismologist,

Academician S. Kh. Negmatullaev and asked to give us the background on seismic

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condition of the Nurek and Rogun HPPs construction area. […] A thorough data review has

showed that the earthquakes with an intensity of more than 6 points on the MSK scale have

never been recorded in the construction area of these high-altitude dams. (Ikrami, 2012)

The article proceeds with a series of counter-arguments to the “myths about Rogun’s

dangers”, in which Ikrami backs up his statements with those of other experts in favour of

Rogun. Similarly, when the Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka published an alarmed article

that defined Rogun a tsunami for Central Asia (Pravda Vostoka, 2011), the criticisms were

dismissed reminding that Rogun was designed by some of the finest Soviet scientists, and

that the project successfully passed the inspections carried out by the WB and the German

company Lahmeyer (Ikrami, 2011). A few months later Pravda Vostoka published another

worried article on Rogun, that was punctually contested in the Tajik government-owned

website Avesta, noting that the seismicity of the area is not strong enough to pose a threat

to the Rogun dam (Avesta, 2011b).

Rahmon and his ministers have also tried to legitimise their views through the

apparently spontaneous endorsement of western politicians and newspapers, and especially

of those that engage with the EU. For instance, Struan Stevenson, a Member of the

European Parliament (MEP) which in 2010 was appointed by the Kazakh Presidency of the

OSCE as Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office responsible for the ecology

and environment of Central Asia, has been actively lobbying for Rogun over the last years,

spreading the Tajik message around the European Institutions and British universities102

.

The declarations and articles released by Stevenson are regularly reposted by the main

Tajik information agencies and disseminated by Tajik Embassies worldwide, as for

example when the MEP called on the West to widely support Emomali Rahmon and his

projects (Stevenson, 2011). In his book “Stalin’s Legacy”, Stevenson describes his first

meeting with Emomali Rahmon:

The president began to thank me for my ‘excellent’ newspaper article about Rogun. He

explained the importance of the project for Tajikistan and said that it was incomprehensible

to him why Uzbekistan’s president was so opposed to it. […] President Rahmon suddenly

lent forward and grabbed me tightly by the wrist. His face was only a few inches from

mine. ‘As you know I am coming to Strasbourg next week for meetings with the President

102

In Fall 2012 and Spring 2013, Stevenson toured several British universities to present his book Stalin’s

Legacy: The Soviet War on Nature.

128

of the European Parliament and for a debate with members of the Foreign Affairs

Committee. I hope that I can meet you there, and I hope that you will repeat your support

for our Rogun hydro project’. (Stevenson, 2012: 169-170)

Rahmon here gets to the point very clearly, asking in a direct way for Stevenson’s

support inside the European Parliament. And indeed, after this meeting Stevenson wrote an

article in which he explained that his goal is “to get necessary information about the Rogun

project, and communicate it to the European Parliament, as not all of them understand the

importance of Rogun to Tajikistan and Central Asia103

” (Avesta, 2011c).

Thus, with the involvement of academics, politicians and the media, the Tajik

government has disseminated its own expertise-based knowledge, emphasising the absence

of seismic risks and therefore countering the scientific assumptions held by the Uzbeks.

This seems to complement and strengthen the Tajik strategy on the Rogun dam, in an

attempt of providing legitimacy and authority to the overarching Tajik discourse.

4.4. Conclusions

As it was anticipated in Chapter 3, the revamp of the Rogun dam has been a source of

regional tensions, leading to the gradual deterioration of bilateral relations between

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The status-quo originally set by the USSR and later maintained

by Uzbekistan, has been challenged by the Tajik hydrocracy through the revitalization of a

Soviet project. This last aspect is relevant, as it underlines how the legacy of the Soviet

Union still plays a central role in regional water management issues.

The Tajik government has used its bargaining and ideational power to frame the Rogun

dam as a cooperative regional project to influence international backers to support – both

diplomatically and financially – its construction. In a process aimed at raising Tajikistan’s

international profile as a water country and at attracting foreign investments, the Tajik

hydrocracy has attempted to impose its discourse as the dominant through different tactics

and strategies, challenging the hegemonic order set by Uzbekistan in which the upstream

country in the Amu Darya basin is not able to exploit its hydroelectric potential.

103

As a reaction to Stevenson’s declarations, the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, an Uzbek political

party and environmental movement, sent a letter of protest to the President of the European Parliament Jerzy

Buzek, in which Stevensons’s declarations were severely criticised (The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan,

2011).

129

While the mobilisation of financial resources has proven difficult for the Tajik

government, the efforts aimed at raising its profile as a regional and global leader in the

promotion of water cooperation have been more successful, and currently Tajikistan

emerges as the key player – at least among the Central Asian countries – when it comes to

launching global water initiatives and organising international water conferences. While the

Tajik government has indeed challenged the status-quo, at present its actions do not seem

effective enough to successfully change it. Tajikistan’s counter-hegemonic actions in the

Amu Darya basin are an on-going process rather than an accomplished one, whose effects

will be assessed only when the destiny of the Rogun dam is set.

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Chapter 5. The Kambarata Dam

God gave us the River Naryn and Kyrgyz people should make full use of it.

Kurmanbek Bakiev, 2009

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the second of the two case studies of this

research, the construction of the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. The dam will be used to

analyse how state power is wielded in international transboundary water relations, and to

identify which counter-hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour its

construction. Similarly to Rogun, also the revitalisation of the Kambarata project in the

2000s triggered an animated regional debate on whether the dam should be built or not,

quickly becoming a matter of foreign policy in regional politics. Also in this case, the

Uzbek leadership appears to be the main antagonist to the project, and the two sides have

been engaged in a diplomatic arm wrestling that has seen the two countries sponsoring and

demeaning the dam.

Following the same structure adopted for the Rogun dam, this chapter first gives an

overview of the project, its history and its expected impact. Subsequently, it outlines and

categorizes the various counter-hegemonic tactics that were put in place by Kyrgyzstan to

favour its construction. Finally, the chapter assesses the main effects of Kyrgyz counter-

hegemonic tactics.

5.1. Overview of the Kambarata Dam

The history of Kambarata is not dissimilar to that of Rogun. Both projects were

conceived during the Soviet hydraulic mission towards the 1970s, partially built in the

1980s, and then finally abandoned in 1991 with the demise of the Soviet Union. Kambarata

was part of the National Plan of the USSR in the Kyrgyz SSR, that from 1960 to 1970 led

to the construction of numerous reservoirs and hydroelectric plants in the country. During

these years the Soviets tamed the Syr Darya and its tributaries all along its course. These

131

facilities were intended to favour irrigated agriculture of rice and cotton in Kazakhstan and

in Uzbekistan, rather than for the generation of hydroelectricity in Kyrgyzstan (Shalpykova,

2002). The upper stream section of this development scheme consisted in the Upper Naryn

Cascade on the Naryn river (a tributary of the Syr Darya), in which the Kambarata complex

– formed by the Kambarata I and the smaller Kambarata II hydroelectric plants – is the

furthest upstream hydraulic structure (see Figure 21).

Figure 21: Overview of existing and projected power stations in the Naryn river. Image taken from a

presentation delivered in Bishkek in September 2010 by Avtandil Kalmambetov, Deputy Minister of

Energy of Kyrgyzstan. Available from: http://www.carecinstitute.org/uploads/events/2010/ESCC-

Sep/Day1-KGZ-Energy-Sector.pdf [Accessed 2 March 2012].

At this point, it is worth noting that the focus of this study is placed on Kambarata I and

not on the smaller (360 MW) Kambarata II HPP. This is due mainly to two reasons. First

and foremost, during these last years the regional debate and controversy have been centred

on Kambarata I, and not on its smaller counterpart, which will have only a minor impact on

the Syr Darya water flow and therefore has not been heavily contested by downstream

countries; the construction of Kambarata II cannot change the existing hegemonic order.

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Second, since Kambarata II became operational in 2010104

(Dzyubenko, 2010), it cannot be

used as a case study and compared with Rogun, as the focus of this research is on counter-

hegemonic and hegemonic measures put in place to favour and obstruct dams which are

still under construction. Henceforth, to avoid misunderstandings, in this research the term

“Kambarata” will refer only to the Kambarata I HPP.

When completed, Kambarata would stand 275 meters high, with a 4.65 km3

reservoir, a

generating capacity of 1,900 MW (four turbines with a capacity of 475 MW each), and a

performance of 5.1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year (Tetra Tech, 2011). The

project was originally designed in the 1980s and construction started in 1986

(Hydroworld.com, 2009). Then, in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the project

was abandoned because of lack of funds. Nevertheless, as it was the case with Rogun,

Kambarata did not die with the Soviet Union, and after a latency period that lasted

approximately a decade, in 2003 the Kyrgyz government started to seriously discuss the

revitalization of the project (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2003).

Table 6: Concise timeline of the Kambarata project. Source: Annex 4; Tetra Tech, 2011.

1970s Planning and design of the Upper Naryn Cascade on the Naryn river

1980s Design of the Kambarata dam

1986 Start of construction works

1991 Interruption of works, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent

lack of funds

2007 Talks about the establishment of a joint-venture with Kazakhstan and Russia

to build Kambarata I and II

January

2009

Russia pledges a US$ 1.7 billion loan to finish construction of Kambarata

104

The dam, which is the first hydroelectric power station launched in Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the

Soviet Union, was inaugurated in August 2010 by Acting Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva. Kambarata II

was built thanks to a US$ 300 million loan from Russia (The Times of Central Asia, 2010)

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April 2009 Interruption of the credit line from Moscow

March

2013

SNC-Lavalin wins a tender to undertake a feasibility study of Kambarata

5.1.1. Independent Kyrgyzstan and Kambarata

The Government of Kyrgyzstan (GoK) has repeatedly attempted to revamp the

construction of Kambarata since independence announcing its revitalization in several

occasions, but, at the time of writing, the project is yet to be restarted. Given its high cost,

which was recently estimated to vary from 2 to almost US$ 5 billion105

(Tetra Tech, 2011:

64), Kyrgyzstan needs to mobilise foreign investments to be able to build the dam.

Although a US$ 1.7 billion deal was struck with Russia in 2009 (Ministry of Economy of

the Kyrgyz Republic, 2011) to proceed with the construction of Kambarata, the agreement

was cancelled a year later (as it was also the case of the RusAl agreement concerning the

Rogun dam). Moreover, the rather turbulent history of the Kyrgyz Republic – arguably the

most unsettled of all the five Central Asian countries – did not facilitate the realisation of

the hydraulic infrastructure.

Following independence in 1991, the newly elected President Askar Akaev made a

genuine effort towards a democratic and pluralist form of governance, distinguishing the

country from its more authoritarian neighbours, leading some commentators to refer to

Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy” (Anderson, 1999). However, a change in Akaev’s

leadership tactics and a turn towards a more authoritarian rule (Spector, 2004) undermined

this democratic experiment. In 2005, protests over flawed parliamentary elections forced

Akaev to flee from his office, leading to a regime change that was chiefly rooted in

domestic politics (Lewis, 2008) and that analysts termed the “Tulip Revolution”’106

, to

match previous events such as the “Rose” and “Orange” revolutions in Georgia and

Ukraine107

. As Scott Radnitz (2006) has noted, technically the term “revolution” is not

105

In 2011 the GDP of Kyrgyzstan was US$ 6.2 billion (The World Bank). 106

For a comprehensive overview of the ‘Tulip Revolution’ and of its wider implications, refer to the edited

volume Domestic and international perspectives on Kyrgyzstan's 'Tulip Revolution' (Cummings, 2009). 107

For more information on the so-called “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet republics, refer to Ó

Beacháin and Polese (2010).

134

accurate to define the 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan, as rather than a major social and political

transformation, what happened resembles to a change in government, “with old patters

reproducing themselves and hindering efforts at real reform on major issues such as

corruption and equitable distribution of resources” (Radnitz, 2006: 133).

In July 2005 the opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiev succeeded Akaev as President of

Kyrgyzstan. After an initial optimism for what appeared as a shift towards democratization,

Bakiev increasingly consolidated his power, dismissing his political opponents and

strengthening his family’s power base in the country (Juraev, 2010). In April 2010, five

years after the ‘Tulip Revolution’, a swift and violent rebellion sparked by anger at high

energy prices and widespread corruption and nepotism, led to the ousting of Bakiev

(International Crisis Group, 2010). At this point, Roza Otunbayeva, a former Member of

Parliament (MP), became the interim president of Kyrgyzstan and remained in office until

December 2011, when Almazbek Atambayev was elected the fourth President of

Kyrgyzstan.

While this stormy past has caused changes in the GoK’s attitude towards Kambarata

over the years, the dam remained an appealing project to each Kyrgyz regime, as its

successful completion would probably boost the popularity of the ruling government

(Kraak, 2012: 193). Yet, whereas the Tajik hydrocracy has managed to keep an unvaried

position towards the Rogun dam over the last decade, in Kyrgyzstan the situation lacked

such continuity, and for instance neither Akaev nor Bakiev was able to form lasting

transmission belt parties (Cummings, 2012; 73). As Holsti noted, every decision-maker is

in part a prisoner of beliefs and expectations that inevitably shape his definitions of reality,

and make him different from anyone else (Holsti, 1967: 39). Accordingly, each Kyrgyz

leader supported the construction of the dam, but with varying levels of enthusiasm. If for

instance Akaev sustained Kambarata, especially during the last years of his presidency, it

was under Bakiev that the dam became a national priority, and some observers saw the dam

as his political pet project (The Times of Central Asia, 2011). Conversely, Bakiev’s

successor, Roza Otunbayeva, has been more cautious on the necessity of building the dam

at all costs.

Different internal situations in Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan resulted in different dam

discourses and rhetoric. While in Tajikistan there is a rubber-stamp Parliament and Rahmon

135

tightly controls the opposition (Olcott, 2012), in Kyrgyzstan the opposition has the

possibility of expressing its dissent inside the Parliament, and the Kyrgyz Republic remains

the most liberal of all the five Central Asians, with the most vibrant contestational politics

(Cummings, 2012: 64). Therefore, unlike the Rogun dam, the ownership of the Kambarata

dam and the way the project money was being administered has been contested by Kyrgyz

members of the Parliament, and predominantly by Roza Otunbayeva when she was a

parliamentarian for the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan during the Bakiev rule.

5.1.2. Between corruption and internal criticism

The hydropower sector is frequently linked with corruption (Wiehen, 1999; McCully,

2001; Pearce, 2007). Transparency International, an NGO which monitors corporate and

political corruption, dedicated its 2008 Global Corruption Report to “Corruption in the

Water Sector”:

The hydropower sector’s massive investment volumes (estimated at US$50–60 billion

annually over the coming decades) and highly complex, customised engineering

projects can be a breeding ground for corruption in the design, tendering and execution

of large-scale dam projects around the world. […] Of the US$11.1 trillion the world is

predicted to spend on energy infrastructure between 2005 and 2030, US$1.9 trillion

may be expected to go toward hydropower. These large numbers create multiple

opportunities for bribery, fraud and other forms of corrupt behaviour. […] Combined

with a lack of transparency, this provides fertile ground for manipulation and abuse.

(Transparency International, 2008: xxv, 86-87)

Corruption and nepotism were also among the main reasons behind the ousting of both

Akaev and Bakiev. Although in the aftermath of the ‘Tulip Revolution’, Bakiev declared

that the new Kyrgyz government would make of the fight of corruption one of its priorities

(Mayak Radio, 2005), Kubanychbek Idinov, a former parliamentarian, later observed that

the scope of corruption became even wider in the period 2005-10. Maxim Bakiev, the son

of Kurmanbek, has been involved in a corruption scandal concerning Kambarata II, and

was accused of diverting into his private bank accounts US$ 200 million from the 300 lent

by Russia (Karabayev, 2010). It is not surprising, then, that the financial management's

transparency of the Kambarata project has often been questioned, particularly for what

concerns the US$ 1.7 billion Russian loan secured in 2009 (see paragraph 5.3.2.2). And

besides corruption, even the necessity of constructing Kambarata (with or without Russian

136

money) has been subject to considerable criticism inside Kyrgyzstan itself. For instance, in

December 2008, Roza Otunbaeva, interrogated the Kyrgyz Parliament on the matter:

Will the Russian $1US.7 billion loan for construction of Kambarata-1 water power

station bring benefit for Kyrgyzstan and does it meet interests of Kyrgyzstan? Frankly

speaking, this is a commercial loan. With this loan the public external debt of

Kyrgyzstan will double. Why do we drive ourselves into the grave? […] We will

benefit nothing. Prior to any agreements we should think about interests of the state.

(AKIpress, 2008c)

Otunbayeva saw the Russian involvement as particularly harmful108

, both economically

and in terms of water ownership. Just before the deal with Russia was signed, she noted

how “A foreign state is taking advantage of a difficult economic situation to become owner

of water. Kyrgyzstan itself has paved the way for Russia to own our water. Will Kyrgyzstan

retain its independence or not?” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009d).

Subsequently, the day after Tursun Turdumambetov, the head of the State Committee for

the Management of State Property, submitted a bill to nullify the law on constructing and

running the Kambarata I and II HPPs (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009e),

Otunbayeva took again a stance against her government:

The Kyrgyz authorities must admit that their measures to carry

out Kambarata hydroelectric power station projects are not based on any economic

calculations. […] Television advertisements about the construction have already pulled

the wool over our eyes. It should be pointed out that the incumbent president's election

programme was based exactly on this project. However, we see today that they are

talking nonsense to people. It turns out that Kyrgyzstan is unable to complete this

project on its own, without bringing investment. […] What kind of organization [the

state-run Development Fund charged to manage the Russian money] is it? Why is the

government's guarantee insufficient for this organization to allocate 100m dollars? This

is the people's money. It turns out today that the government is forced to kneel and beg

its own money from this fund. (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009f)

Then, in the wake of the 2010 coup, Otunbayeva emerged as the leader of the Kyrgyz

interim government, and maintained this position until the end of 2011. The transition from

being at the opposition to leading the government, also changed Otunbayeva’s position

108

However, in June 2010, when local Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek youth clashed in the Kyrgyz city of Osh

leaving hundreds dead, the then Kyrgyz interim President Roza Otunbaeva asked for Russian military

intervention to calm down the situation (BBC News, 2010).

137

towards Kambarata, and the new President became less critical of the project. On the

contrary, at the launch of the first unit of Kambarata II in August 2010, Otunbayeva seemed

to have become quite supportive of hydroelectric projects:

In such a difficult time as Kyrgyzstan is going through, the launch of the first

generating unit at Kambarata-2 HPP is a historic event for the country. […] The

construction and launch of this HPP shows the power of our country and we do not

intend to turn away from projects for further building of Kambarata-2 and Kambarata-1

HPPs. […] The building of Kambarata strengthens the country’s energy security, en-

sures the uninterrupted work of the hydropower system, and will completely cover all

the republic’s demand, and make it possible to develop its export potential, carrying out

the export of electrical energy to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the future. […] We will

be able to live well in both winter and summer, and are increasing our export potential.

(The Times of Central Asia, 2010)

Nevertheless, despite this new attitude, in November 2010 Otunbayeva decided that the

construction of Kambarata would begin only after a review of the dam is completed, in line

with Uzbek reiterated requests and following a path similar to that of Rogun. Thus, it can

be argued that by treating Kambarata as an open issue, Roza Otunbayeva successfully

managed to freeze a project that she previously criticised, passing on the responsibility of

its construction to her successors, that, in March 2013 hired the Canadian Company SNC-

Lavalin to undertake a feasibility study of the project (Eurasianet, 2013), that should be

released in Fall 2013 (Sytenkova, 2013).

5.2. Expected impact of Kambarata

If competed, a structure of the size of Kambarata will have an impact at both the national

and regional level. The production of hydroelectricity will benefit the crisis-prone Kyrgyz

energy sector, and the dam could also provide popularity to the government. Yet, the dam

will impact the water flow of the Syr Darya and will have also other environmental

consequences that have originated an animated regional debate. This section outlines the

various ways in which the dam could impact on Kyrgyzstan and on its neighbours.

5.2.1. Boosting Kyrgyzstan’s energy production

In line with the Soviet hydraulic mission, Kambarata was originally projected to

facilitate irrigation in the downstream republics rather than to produce hydroelectricity.

However, this order of priority changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today

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the importance of the dam lies in its hydroelectricity generation capacity. This is because

the vanishing of the centralised Soviet resource management system made the achievement

of energy self-sufficiency one of the key goals of post-soviet Kyrgyzstan (Wegerich, 2009:

29), that given the lack of other natural energy resources decided to expand its hydropower

production.

90 % of the energy produced in Kyrgyzstan is hydroelectric, and yet, the country has

developed only 10 % of its potential. The country has 17 operating hydroelectric plants109

,

that form the Toktogul cascade. All of them (besides Kambarata II) were built during the

Soviet period and are today in need of repair, because of protracted lack of maintenance

during the last decades (Zozulinsky, 2010). The total hydroelectric capacity installed is

2,950 MW, and the largest operating plant is Toktogul, that with its 1,200 MW of installed

capacity is considered the flagship hydropower station of Kyrgyzstan (Elektricheskiye

Stantsii, 2006).

Since 2007-2008, the country’s dependence from hydroelectricity, along with a string of

dry summers and extremely cold winters, has engendered a series of harsh energy crises

that left a substantial part of the population without access to reliable supplies of gas,

electricity and heat. Besides leaving Kyrgyzstan without the ability to produce

hydroelectricity, low water levels at the Toktogul reservoir negatively impacted on irrigated

agriculture in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in summer. During the winter of 2008-2009,

rural areas in northern Kyrgyzstan and even in the capital Bishkek had electricity only for a

few hours a day, and increasing anger and frustration among the population started to

seriously challenge Bakiev’s leadership (Ferghana, 2008), which was being blamed for his

incapacity of managing the crisis (Eurasianet, 2008b).

Another energy crisis hit the country in 2009-2010, and overall, household energy

prices during 2007-2010 rose by 81 %, due to inefficiencies in the energy system

(UNDP Bureau for Europe and CIS, 2011). After three years of recurrent energy crisis and

increases in energy prices, discontent and frustration among the people of Kyrgyzstan led to

the ousting of Kurmanbek Bakiev in 2010. However, instead of addressing this energy

emergency by repairing the losses and inefficiencies in the energy system, the solution

109

In addition, Kyrgyzstan has two thermal power stations, with an additional installed capacity of 659 MW.

Thus, the total installed capacity of the country is around 3,600 MW.

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proposed by successive Kyrgyz regimes has been the construction of new dams (Kraak,

2012; Kalmambetov, 2010), and of one in particular, Kambarata.

Thanks to the 1,900 MW generated by Kambarata, Kyrgyzstan would have a 65 %

increase in its total hydroelectric installed capacity, sufficient to meet the country’s demand

for power in the winter period (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009:

180). Moreover, alike Rogun, thanks to the CASA transmission line (see Figure 19)

Kambarata would allow Kyrgyzstan not only to become energy self-sufficient, but also to

sell electricity to neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and China.

Therefore, although the project is extremely costly (according to some analyst, it can be

even considered as anti-economic; Tetra Tech, 2011: 74), and would make Kyrgyzstan

even more reliant on hydroelectricity, the GoK portrays it as the best solution to solve the

country’s energy crisis. This is because, besides its undeniable contribution to the country’s

energy sector, Kambarata could also help the government gain popularity and legitimacy.

5.2.2. Kambarata is good for Kyrgyzstan!

Symbols play an important role in Central Asian politics. Chapter 4 outlined that

Matveeva’s (2009) analysis effectively underlines how symbols are used by Central Asian

leaders to create a legitimisation framework that can help them maintain power.

Murzakulova and Schoeberlein have also acknowledged the importance of symbols and

ideology in the efforts carried out by Kyrgyz leaders to “invent” legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan,

stressing how the Gramscian concept of persuasion is useful to understand the country’s

nation-building process (Murzakulova and Schoeberlein, 2009). And indeed, the symbolism

that can be attached to a mega-structure like Kambarata is significant. Feaux de la Croix

observes that the construction of the Toktogul dam in the 1960s-70s, epitomised the

classical Soviet slogans on human’s mastery over nature and on forceful domination of

rivers, with Lenin’s insight “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the

whole country” adorning the dam’s turbine hall (Feaux de la Croix, 2011: 495). Similarly,

in her study of moral geographies in Kyrgyzstan, she notes that the Kambarata dam can be

interpreted as “a novel effort of the Kyrgyz government to boost its legitimacy and regional

power” (Feaux de la Croix: 2010: 27).

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To the same extent, Kraak explains how directing attention to a large-scale state-

sponsored project like Kambarata could surely benefit the elites: “a new dam the size of the

Kambarata-I would contribute to both national pride and Kyrgyzstan’s regional power.

[Bakiev] presents the dam as a national project, notwithstanding the financial aid from

Russia and elsewhere that would be required” (Kraak, 2012: 188). Kraak also notes how,

over the period 2005-2010, the increasing tension between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has

been blended into a discourse of nationalism, with Kambarata being used as a tool to

conduct foreign policy and assert (or at least attempt to) regional power. It appears that,

similarly to Rogun, the tension with Uzbekistan – which strongly opposes the construction

of large-scale dams in Central Asia – has had the effect of further reinforcing the

nationalistic sentiment attached to Kambarata, whose construction comes to symbolise the

right of self-determination of the Kyrgyz people, which independently decide what to do

with their own natural resources.

The GoK has attempted to persuade its people (see paragraph 5.3.1) that Kambarata is a

source of progress and success, of heat and light, in a way that resembles the Tajik rhetoric

on Rogun. If the people of Kyrgyzstan accept the government’s representation of

Kambarata as right and proper, then the dam, if completed, can unmistakably play a role in

the legitimation of the Kyrgyz leadership. This is even more relevant considering that so far

the history of the Kyrgyz Republic has been marked by a declining economy, social unrests

and dissatisfaction for the government’s inability to offer basic services such as electricity

or heating.

5.2.3. Environmental problems and the setting of a precedent

Not only Kambarata could generate large amounts of energy – the equivalent of two

nuclear reactors – and help legitimise the Kyrgyz government, but it could also provide

Kyrgyzstan with a tool to further control the flow of the Syr Darya, with potential negative

consequences for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although the Syr Darya is much more

regulated than the Amu Darya, and thanks to Toktogul Kyrgyzstan can already control the

Naryn river, downstream riparians – and particularly Uzbekistan – contest the construction

of Kambarata. The reasons of such opposition are both technical and political.

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From a technical point of view, this is probably because if Kambarata is operated at the

same time as Toktogul, there could be even more spills in the Arnasai depression in

Uzbekistan, where the Chardara reservoir is located (Wegerich and Warner, 2010: 327).

And indeed, since 1992, when Kyrgyzstan began to increase winter water releases from

Toktogul to generate hydroelectricity, billions cubic meters of water have been spilled into

the Depression, damaging land and infrastructure and depriving the Syr Darya Delta and

the northern Aral Sea of much-needed water (PA Consortium Group, 2004). Although an

EBRD study contends that “the release of water from Kambarata-I to generate electricity

during the winter will reduce the need for the Kyrgyz authorities to release water from the

Toktogul reservoir” (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009: 180),

there is still the risk that the reservoirs are operated simultaneously, thus causing more

spills in the Depression, and consequently, the opposition of downstream countries. During

a speech delivered in 2009, Kurmanbek Bakiev effectively summarized Kazakh and Uzbek

concerns: “I want to straightforwardly quote [what] the president of Kazakhstan and the

president of Uzbekistan told me: Kurmanbek Saliyevich, you simply flood us in winter”

(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009g). Besides flooding downstream areas,

Uzbekistan is concerned that Kambarata might cause a lack of water in the Fergana Valley,

the most densely populated territory of Central Asia. In addition, the project is located in an

active seismic zone. Since it was designed in the 1970s, when international design criteria

for dam hydrological and seismic safety were less stringent, Kambarata might increase the

geological hazard of rockfalls and landslides (Asian Development Bank, 2013).

From a political angle, downstream countries’ opposition can be directly linked to the

other major Central Asian hydroelectric project, Rogun. Although Rogun is more contested

than Kambarata, as it would have a stronger impact on the less regulated Amu Darya water

flow (even though also Kambarata could give Kyrgyzstan more control to the water flow of

the Syr Darya), the two projects have similar characteristics. Consequently, allowing the

construction of Kambarata could facilitate the construction of Rogun, and vice versa, as this

would set a precedent that implies the admission from downstream countries that large

dams in Central Asia can be built, even if there is no consent from all the parties concerned

by the project. In other words, by allowing the construction of Kambarata, Uzbekistan

would give up on its own weltanschauung concerning the management of shared waters,

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which is based on the principle of absolute integrity of the river rather than on that of

absolute territorial sovereignty claimed by upstream countries (Dellapenna, 2001).

5.2.4. The ensuing debate

Alike Rogun, Kambarata would have a significance at different levels. Domestically, the

dam would allow Kyrgyzstan to meet its energy winter peak demands, while legitimising

the ruling elite and boosting its popularity. At the foreign level, the dam would provide

Kyrgyzstan with an important tool to conduct foreign policy and use water as a strategic

tool. Perhaps more importantly, the construction of Kambarata would set a precedent,

opening the way to the construction of other large-scale hydroelectric plants upstream, thus

implying a change in the status-quo. Until now, downstream countries have managed to

maintain their advantageous water allocation quotas set in the 1980s by the Soviet Union,

and upstream countries have not been successful in exploiting their hydroelectric potential.

The construction of Kambarata would be a regional historical landmark, which would

change the way water resources in Central Asia have been controlled so far.

For these reasons, the revamp of the project in the 2000s has triggered an animated

regional debate between Kyrgyzstan, which obviously advocates in favour of the dam, and

the downstream countries – whose concerns are voiced predominantly by Uzbekistan –

which, coherently with their attitude towards Rogun, strongly oppose the project. On the

one hand, the Kyrgyz discourse tends to present the dam as an existential matter, claiming

the right of exploiting the waters of the Naryn river for the benefit of the Kyrgyz people,

underlining the absence of alternatives and reassuring the downstream countries that the

dam will be operated paying attention to the interests of all basin riparians. On the other

hand, the Uzbek discourse is analogous to that adopted for Rogun, and the two dams are

often treated as a single entity by the Uzbeks, which insist on having an external

examination of a project considered outdated and dangerous.

Both sides have carried out a considerable effort to convince each other and the broader

international community of the validity of their reasons. To this extent, the strategies

carried out by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan can be correspondingly defined as counter-

hegemonic and hegemonic, with the former contesting a disadvantageous status-quo, and

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the latter aiming at maintaining it unchanged. The following analyses in detail the counter-

hegemonic tactics carried out by Kyrgyzstan.

5.3. Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics

In its attempt to build the Kambarata dam, Kyrgyzstan is challenging, contesting and

proposing an alternative to the existing status-quo. As Dinar noted (2006: 150), the Kyrgyz

Republic has already questioned the status-quo since it got independence, making a number

of unilateral decisions (see also chapter 3) that stem from one strategic advantage: its

upstream location in the Syr Darya river. Kyrgyzstan contests the old Soviet inter-

republican quotas which allocated most of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan (Valentini et al., 2004: 62), and the country also seeks compensation from the

downstream countries for the annual cost of maintaining the Toktogul reservoir and its

related infrastructure. This has led Kyrgyzstan’s policymakers to re-evaluate the value of

water as a resource with a price (Bichsel, 2011: 26). In 1997, Akaev signed an edict

codifying his country’s right to profit from water resources within its territories, threatening

to sell water to China if Uzbekistan refuses to pay (Eurasianet, 2000). Similarly, in 2001,

with the adoption of the “Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Inter-State Use of Water Objects,

Water Resources and Water Economy Constructions”, Kyrgyzstan categorized water as a

commodity, placing it at the same level of oil or gas (Legislative Assembly of the Kyrgyz

Republic, 2001). However, as it was explained in paragraph 3.6.2, the Kyrgyz water law

was never enforced, and the issue of the rights of the upstream and downstream states

remained unresolved (Hodgson, 2010: 3).

Besides the water payment issue, Kyrgyzstan has also not been able to take advantage of

its upstream position and tap its significant hydroelectric potential. The completion of

Kambarata (that along with Rogun, would be the first major dam ever finalized in Central

Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union) would imply the fulfilment, at least in part, of

Kyrgyzstan’s hydropower ambitions, as well as the assertion of the country’s God-given

right to make full use of the waters of the Naryn river. While laws can be unilaterally

adopted (as the “water price” laws), the same cannot be said for dams of the size of

Kambarata, for which a small country like Kyrgyzstan needs to get international support

and funding before being able to proceed with its construction. Therefore, and similarly to

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what was observed with Rogun, the GoK is using its ideational and bargaining power to

persuade its neighbours and other relevant international partners of the necessity and

rightfulness of the Kambarata project. This effort aimed at getting consent is solely based

on the use of soft power which, in this case, can create the preconditions to increase

Kyrgyzstan’s hard (or in this case perhaps more appropriately “structural”) power, once and

if the dam is completed.

Overall, the Kyrgyz strategy to facilitate the construction of Kambarata is based on three

main goals: achieve regional, and to a minor extent, international acceptance for the project,

mobilize foreign funds, and get internal support. As a result, the GoK has adopted two,

often converging, discourses, one for the domestic and one for the foreign level. The

Kyrgyz discourse presents Kambarata as a key achievement, as a symbol of success and

perseverance, as a key structure conceived to bring well-being to both Kyrgyzstan and the

downstream countries. And indeed, underlining the beneficial effects of Kambarata on

regional water management, seems to be as important as stressing the positive impact that

the dam will have on the Kyrgyz energy and water sectors. Also in this case, Kyrgyz

counter-hegemonic strategies are formed by four main tactics, as shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22: Building the Kambarata dam: the four tactics forming the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic

strategy

Challenging the status-quo

Internal support

Knowledge construction

International support

Mobilization of financial resources

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Although the tactics adopted by the GoK for Kambarata seem similar to those adopted

by the GoT for Rogun, and in fact to many extents they are, there are some significant

differences between the two, possibly because of the power shifts in the Kyrgyz republic

that have not allowed the same policy continuity as in Tajikistan. These differences will be

partly outlined in the remaining of this chapter and in Chapter 7. The following analyses

Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics in detail, delineating the main aspects of the Kambarata

discourse and the ways in which it has been propagated.

5.3.1. Promoting Kambarata at the domestic level

As Frey noted, images and perceptions play a significant role in politics, and the

emotional salience of large hydraulic infrastructures can be used by leaders to gain

sacrifices and support that would otherwise be missing (Frey, 1993). This support, for

instance, could take the form of financial contributions from the citizens (as in the case of

the Rogun dam) or in the ability to freely allocate public funds to a project (as in the case of

Turkey’s Ataturk dam). The Kyrgyz leadership has sought the support of its people in the

realisation of Kambarata, framing the dam as a symbol of progress and modernization and

as a solution to most of the problems faced by the country, and, above all, as a key to stop

the energy crises that are at the origin of widespread discontent and public unrest. This

move can be considered a counter-hegemonic strategy, since a popular perception of the

dam as a vital national asset might facilitate its construction, providing the Kyrgyz

leadership with legitimacy and a freehand in the management of the financial resources of

Kambarata.

While the effects of such major ventures are best observed in the long term, the latest

Kyrgyz governments operated more in the short run. The Bakiev Presidency, that was the

most involved with the project and with the management of the large Russian loan, held

power only for a lustrum, while Otunbayeva’s ad interim mandate lasted less than two

years. This sharply contrasts with the Tajik political setting in which Emomali Rahmon has

maintained power for the last two decades, and where the President and his key men are the

ones most likely to benefit from Rogun in terms of popularity and visibility. This

notwithstanding, both under Bakiev and (to a lesser extent) Otunbayeva, the Kyrgyz

government has used ideational discursive means to disseminate the Kambarata discourse

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that, alike the Tajik one, portrays the dam as a vital achievement for the country. This

seems indeed to confirm Feaux de la Croix’s (2010) assumption about a continuity between

the construction of Toktogul – that symbolised the Soviet’s slogans on human’s mastery

over nature – and that of Kambarata, that renews the patriotic feeling historically attached

to large dams. And significantly, this quest for patriotism has been in a way

institutionalised in 2008, when some members of the Kyrgyz Parliament announced that

they were planning to ask the President to formerly label Kambarata an all-nation project,

“so that people would have spirit and pride” in the dam”110

(AKIpress, 2008a).

Kyrgyz state-owned radio, TV and the Kabar news agency have functioned as the

mouthpiece of the government, duly reporting speeches and declarations on the importance

of building Kambarata. The key aspects of this dam rhetoric are well summarized by a

speech delivered by Bakiev at a meeting dedicated to a planned explosion aimed at

blocking the River Naryn. The event was planned in coincidence with the “National holiday

of energy industry workers” on 22 December 2009, and was integrally broadcasted by

state-owned Kyrgyz Television 1:

The explosion aimed at blocking the River Naryn was carried out successfully. I want to

repeat this again that this is a great event in the history of Kyrgyzstan's development

[…] and Kyrgyzstan can be proud of the fact that not only this kind of technology was

used but also that it is a rare technology in the world. Its construction [of the Kambarata

complex] started in 1986. However, even such a power as the USSR was forced to

suspend the construction because of limited funds. But after the Union collapsed, we

became an independent sovereign state. Frankly speaking, this was already a dream, and

many top officials forgot and did not dream that we together with you would not only

construct but complete its construction. Today I think nobody doubts that Kyrgyzstan

will complete [the construction of] the Kambarata 2 and Kambarata 1 and this way we

will go upstream along the River Naryn. (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009g)

Bakiev presents the dam as the most viable and only option to achieve energy security,

underlining the absence of alternatives. He emphasizes the beneficial effects that the dam

will have on Kyrgyzstan and on irrigated agriculture downstream, and at the same time he

remarks the right of the Kyrgyz people to use the water of the Naryn river for their greater

good, thus connecting with the conception of water as a national commodity. Bakiev also

underlines how the project deploys some state-of-the-art technology, and exalts the

110

In that occasion, the MPs also declared that they were going to contribute to the project with a one-off

payment from their salary.

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significance for independent Kyrgyzstan of finishing something that not even the Soviet

Union was able to complete.

Kyrgyzstan’s right to build Kambarata and the representation of the dam as a symbol of

national pride was extensively used by Bakiev also during his re-election campaign in

2009:

With the completion of the construction of Kambarata No.2 and No.1, the volume of

water [in the Toktogul reservoir] will not decrease, but on the contrary it will increase.

[…] To be frank, our neighbours - Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan - should only welcome

our decision because we are increasing the volume of water. This means, we will give

them water when they need it. Kyrgyzstan must not be considered a small nation when

the Kyrgyz nation's national interests are considered. Therefore, the Kambarata No.1

and No.2 projects will have no damage on the neighbouring states. […] Therefore, we

are building Kambarata No.2 and we will also build Kambarata No.1. We need them.

(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009h)

Kyrgyzstan is portrayed as a benevolent country, that thanks to Kambarata will be able

to take care of its national interests while sharing with its neighbours the benefits stemming

from an increased control of the Toktogul reservoir. The representation of Kambarata as a

cooperative regional element that will help solving the country’s energy crisis while

regulating the water flow of the Syr Darya, was also adopted by Roza Otunbayeva during

her ad-interim Presidency, even though when she was a MP she appeared less enthusiastic

towards the realisation of the project and she often criticised the management of the

financial resources generated by the Russian loan (see paragraph 5.1). Thus, it appears that

although Kyrgyz citizens have not been called to financially contribute to the construction

of the dam111

, the GoK has nevertheless created a patriotic dam rhetoric with the intent of

persuading its people about the necessity and importance of building the Kambarata dam.

A similar discourse, although more focused on the regional dimension of the dam, was

also disseminated at the international level, with the goal of mobilising international

financial resources and getting international acceptance for the project. These two

correlated elements of the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic strategy are analysed in the

111

It is worth noting that for what concerns the smaller Kambarata II, in 2008 the residents of the Suzak rayon

collected 1 million Kyrgyz Som (roughly US$ 20,000) to facilitate the construction of the dam (AKIpress

News Agency, 2008b). Also, in January 2008 Bakiev suggested the emission of long-term bonds and the

launch of IPOs for large national projects such as Kambarata I and II, but however these proposals were not

followed by concrete actions (Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, 2008).

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following sections, beginning with the tactics aimed at mobilising financial resources and

continuing with those aimed at raising international awareness on the necessity of building

the Kambarata dam.

5.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources

As outlined in paragraph 5.1, the high cost of Kambarata does not allow the Kyrgyz

government to unilaterally proceed with its construction. Recent cost estimates vary from 2

to almost 5 US$ billion112

, an enormous amount for the Kyrgyz economy, that in 2011

generated a GDP of US$ 6.2 billion and whose expenditures in the national budget

amounted to less than US$ 2 billion. The situation is thus similar to that of the Rogun dam,

since a co-financing scheme is essential to proceed with the construction of the dam. This

aspect is also connected with the necessity of getting international support and consent for

the construction of the dam, since the more a project is controversial, the more this deters

potential investors to participate in its realisation, as for instance it has been the case for

Russian participation in the Rogun dam.

As Erika Marat noted (Marat, 2008b: 12), Kyrgyzstan’s lack of expertise in the hydro-

energy sector and the country’s rampant corruption, have made of Kambarata an

economically unattractive project to foreign investors. Moreover, and this applies to most

large dams worldwide, projects of this scale are often anti-economical and their

construction always takes longer than originally planned (McCully, 2001; Mitchell, 2002).

The investment appears to be a political rather than an economic one, both for the Kyrgyz

government, which would have a payback in terms of legitimization and popularity, and for

the potential financial partner, which could sit on the board of the plant and have political

influence while at the same time projecting a positive international image in the region.

Although the World Bank could have been an ideal, neutral partner and contributor to the

Kambarata complex, the financial institution argues that the economic cost of 0.0717

US$/kwh is too high and is therefore not interested in a participation (Moller, 2009: 25).

For this reason, the Kyrgyz government has focused its attention on individual donors,

targeting, among the others, neighbouring Russia and Kazakhstan.

112

Although the Kyrgyz Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources estimated in 2008 that the

construction of the Kambarata dam will require US$ 1.5 billion (AKIpress News Agency, 2008a).

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5.3.2.1. The international consortium and the involvement of Kazakhstan

In 1992, the newly-born Kyrgyz government held talks with the American company

General Electric concerning the construction of a dam complex in the Naryn River (Europe

Information Service, 1992). Nevertheless, after this first, early attempt of attracting a

foreign investor, the Kyrgyz administration put the project aside for the next ten years, and

seriously decided to revamp it only in 2003. Overall, besides the signing of a few,

ineffective, agreements with China (Central Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly, 2008), the

American aluminium company Alcoa (Central Asia General Newswire, 2007a), and the

South-Korean electric power corporation KEPCO (Central Asia General Newswire,

2007b), it appears that the efforts put through by the Kyrgyz government had two main

objectives: at the multilateral level, to set-up a joint venture to build the Kambarata

complex; at the bilateral level, to secure a more direct, individual involvement of Russia.

While the former did not produce any substantial result, the latter materialized into a

substantial loan.

The initial structure of the consortium proposed by Akaev in 2003 included Kyrgyzstan,

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and even the World Bank (Water Power &

Dam Construction, 2003). Thus, besides Turkmenistan, which traditionally has had a rather

isolationist approach to regional issues, all the Central Asian republics were interested in

building the Kambarata dam, which was at the time perceived as a regionally beneficial

water project. The idea was reiterated one year later by the then Kyrgyz Foreign Minister

Askar Aytmatov, that expressed his country’s willingness to create an

international water and energy consortium within the framework of the Central Asian

Cooperation Organization (CACO), with the involvement of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004b). The consortium

was apparently put aside until 2007, when the Kyrgyz First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar

Usenov, announced that since power engineering is considered Kyrgyzstan's second wealth

after gold, the Kambarata project had been included in the state economic development

programme. The partners of this new, reconsidered joint-venture were reduced to three,

with Kyrgyzstan, that would have owned 34 % of the shares, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33

% each (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2007b). And a month later, as an outcome of

Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan, a joint venture involving state-owned companies from

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Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia was established, with the intent of finishing

construction of the Kambarata complex (Eurasianet, 2007b). However, the projected joint

venture never became operational, as Kazakh investors eventually decided to abandon the

scheme.

Indeed, the Kazakh government’s fluctuating attitude towards the Kambarata dam, has

influenced the country’s willingness to invest in the project. In 2000, Kazakh Prime

Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev expressed serious concern about the dam and proposed

that the project should be “blocked in every way”, since it could lead to water being drawn

away from the Toktogul hydroelectric station thus reducing water supplies in Kazakhstan

(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2000). Subsequently, in the period 2003-2007 Astana

showed interest in investing into the Kambarata dam, as revealed by the abovementioned

creation of a consortium and by the Kazakh announcement to bid in the tender for the

Kambarata stations (Global Insight, 2007b). Then again, when Uzbek lobbying against

large dams intensified in 2008, the Kazakh government became more cautious about the

project and decided to leave the consortium, and eventually Kazakh President Nazarbayev

released a statement in which he was extremely critical about the construction of

hydroelectric power plants in the region (Defense and Security, 2010). Hence, the attitude

of Kazakhstan towards the realisation of the Kambarata dam has followed a parallel path as

that towards the Rogun dam, and the interest displayed formerly gradually vanished as the

projects became more controversial. Thus, only one out of the six partners of the initial

consortium remained actively engaged in the negotiations, Russia.

5.3.2.2. The Russian loan and the Manas affair

It was mentioned that the Soviet Union contributed to the construction of numerous

large HPPs within its Republics and around the world. Similarly, the Russian Federation

has also been very interested in investments in hydropower, and during the last two decades

Russian firms (among the others, RusAl, RusHydro and Zarubezhstroy113

) have participated

to several hydropower projects worldwide. It is not surprising then, that an unfinished

Soviet project like the Kambarata dam has later attracted investments from Russia, in the

113

For instance, Zarubezhstroy, that controls power plants in African countries such as Uganda and Libya, in

2011 has agreed to invest US$ 700 million in the 464 MW Rumakali hydropower project in Tanzania

(Bloomberg, 2011).

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same way as the Rogun dam has done in Tajikistan. This is also due to the fact that, besides

attempting to create an international consortium, the Kyrgyz government has repeatedly

tried to involve Russia as the sole investor of the Kambarata project, with overall mixed

results.

Already in 2004, Askar Akaev reached an agreement in which RusAl confirmed its

intention to invest US$ 1.5 billion in the Kambarata power station (BBC Summary of

World Broadcasts, 2004c). A year later, in the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyz

acting Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva declared that the agreement with RusAl was still

in force, since “projects for the construction of the Kambaratin [sic] hydropower plant are

of great significance for our country” (Interfax, 2005). Nevertheless, the situation remained

fuzzy and the project was at a standstill. The newly elected President Bakiev had meetings

with representatives of the Russian government trying to get them interested in the dam

(Ria Novosti, 2006), and in 2007 Russia partially wrote off Kyrgyzstan's debt, showing

again interest in the project. Then, at the end of 2008, the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor

Chudinov announced that Russia finally agreed to lend US$ 2 billion to the Kyrgyz

government, including US$ 1.7 billion for the construction of Kambarata I and II

(AKIpress, 2008b). And indeed, during a visit to Moscow in February 2009 Bakiev

announced that the loan was secured. Interestingly, this event coincided with Kyrgyzstan’s

announcement that the United States should leave the Manas airbase (Emerson et al., 2009:

58), a strategic military airport near Bishkek that the US Air Force had rented to support the

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and whose military presence in Russia’s backyard had long

vexed the Kremlin.

Using Manas as a bargaining tool, Bakiev struck a quid pro quo deal that was,

predictably, received with dissatisfaction by Uzbek President Karimov, that was possibly

also taken by surprise by this new development. Only a few weeks earlier, in fact, Dmitry

Medvedev had clarified during his visit to Uzbekistan that new HPPs in Central Asia shall

be built only with the consent of all parties involved, thus causing a little diplomatic crisis

with Tajikistan (see Chapter 4). Now, on the contrary, Russia was endorsing and facilitating

the realisation of the Kambarata project, since the offset was worth the cost. Therefore,

during the important IFAS meeting of the five Central Asian Presidents in April 2009,

Karimov criticised Moscow’s influence on regional issues, declaring that “third countries

152

which would very much like to take part in this discussion are also pursuing their own

aims” (Eurasianet, 2009).

However, the Uzbek President could stop worrying shortly afterwards, since Bakiev did

not manage to close the American air base at Manas. On the contrary, in July 2009 the US

signed a new lease for Manas that was much more profitable for the Kyrgyz government.

This new development infuriated the Russian leadership, that suddenly interrupted the

credit line, de facto cancelling the deal. The Kyrgyz government did not return the money

already received, and shortly before the overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in April 2010,

Kyrgyz representatives were still complaining that Russia had failed to deliver the loan

promised for Kambarata (International Crisis Group, 2010). One of the first initiatives of

the new Otunbayeva government was to send the then ad-interim Prime Minister

Atambayev to Moscow, to discuss several issues including the Kambarata credit (Kraak,

2012: 192). But after the disappointment provoked by the Manas lease, the possibility of

having Russia investing in the Kambarata project seems unlikely, unless until trust is

restored.

5.3.3. International support

It appears then, that despite the attempts that the GoK has carried out to attract investors

to the project, regional controversies and geopolitical manoeuvrings have so far made these

efforts ineffective. This has increased the necessity of giving visibility to the project,

getting international support and consent to its construction, and projecting a positive

international image of the Kambarata dam, since this could make the dam less contentious

and facilitate its realisation. In a similar way to the Rogun dam, persuading regional and

international partners of the necessity of building the Kambarata dam for the wellbeing of

all Central Asian countries constitutes a key element of Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic

strategies.

The Kyrgyz government has used ideational means to disseminate and attempt to impose

its discourse as the dominant one. What is being questioned here is the prevailing belief that

no new HPPs can be built in the Aral Sea basin, and implicitly, that water cannot be used as

a commodity. While the latter point had been already challenged by unilaterally adopting

(and later cancelling) a national law that declared water a commodity, the former cannot be

153

contested in a similar manner. Besides the fact that, as reminded by Karimov, the

construction of the Kambarata dam without the agreement of all the parties involved could

lead to serious confrontations and even wars (Reuters, 2012), the GoK does not have the

means to unilaterally proceed with the realisation of the project. This calls for more subtle,

diplomatic tactics that could change the perception of large dams as potentially harmful and

deleterious. The following analyses how the Kyrgyz government has framed the Kambarata

dam at the international level, illustrating the various tactics adopted to portray it as a

positive and cooperative regional project.

5.3.3.1. Proactive diplomacy

The basic tenet of the Kyrgyz discourse on Kambarata is that the dam will enable

Kyrgyzstan to solve its frequent energy crises while better regulating the water flow of the

Syr Darya. Downstream Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be able to increase their irrigated

land, and will no longer suffer from winter flooding thanks to the combined operation of

the Kambarata and Toktogul reservoirs. Such discourse is almost identical to the Tajik one

on Rogun, which also underscores the positive effects that the dam will have on the energy

sector of Tajikistan and on downstream irrigation thanks to the combined operation with

the Nurek reservoir. What differs, though, is the emphasis with which this discourse has

been disseminated by the governments of the two upstream Central Asian republics. If, on

the one hand, the Tajik leadership has made of the Rogun dam one of the key priority areas

of its foreign policy, on the other hand, the Kyrgyz government has been more moderate in

executing its international Kambarata campaign. Arguably, other more pressing matters

such as the 2005 and 2010 changes of government, made it difficult for the Kyrgyz

government to engage in an all-round Kambarata campaign.

Therefore, the process aimed at getting international support for the Kambarata dam is

formed by a series of distinct events, rather than by a long-term awareness-raising strategy.

For instance, if we examine the content of the addresses delivered by Kyrgyzstan and

Uzbekistan at the UNGA (see Table 7), what emerges is that the Kyrgyz government has

never referred neither to the Kambarata dam nor to the development of its hydroelectric

potential, while on the contrary, the Uzbek government – the key antagonist of the project –

has done this several times.

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Table 7: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1999-2012.

“Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Kambarata” respectively mean that issues related to the management

of shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the Kambarata dam were

discussed in the address. Table constructed by author based on data from the United Nations

Bibliographic Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/).

Content of the Kyrgyz Address Content of the Uzbek address

UNGA

session no.

and year

Water Hydroelectric Kambarata Water Hydroelectric Kambarata

54th, 1999

55th, 2000

56th, 2001

57th, 2002

58th, 2003

59th, 2004

60th, 2005

61st, 2006

62nd, 2007

63rd, 2008

64th, 2009

65th, 2010

66th, 2011

67th, 2012

Only in three occasions (Bakiev, 2005; Dosbol, 2008; Chudinov, 2009), the

representatives of the Kyrgyz government have outlined the necessity to manage regional

155

transboundary water resources in a cooperative and a mutually beneficial manner114

. This

has also been the case for the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings, where only once, in

2007, Kyrgyzstan stressed the need to cooperate in the management of natural resources,

which “should not become enemies of the state which possesses them” (Karabaev, 2007).

Yet, regional water issues in Central Asia were extensively debated at the 2009 World

Water Forum in Istanbul. During his address, the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov

offered a comprehensive overview of the Kyrgyz framing of the Kambarata project,

highlighting how the dam could be the best possible solution to solve water and energy

problems in Central Asia:

At present time, the Kyrgyz Republic explored only 10% of existing hydro potential.

For the last years our state has been using 8,0-9,0 km³ of water resources per year for

own needs. The rest of water course – more than 30, 0 km³ of water resources goes to

the territory of neighboring countries. […] Kyrgyzstan believes necessary to consider

water problem in direct connection with energetic, as supply of population with

electricity and heating at the cost of functioning of hydropower plant is vitally

important condition for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as water supply for

agricultural needs of downstream countries. […] By putting these [Kambarata I and II]

water reservoir into operation, needs in electric energy of the republic will be fully

satisfied and it will let work Toktogul hydro juncture in optimal regime, in which

downstream countries are concerned. (Chudinov, 2009)

Chudinov’s declaration essentially retraced the concepts outlined by Kurmanbek Bakiev

at the tense IFAS meeting held in Almaty a few months earlier. Also in that occasion, the

Kyrgyz President remarked how the Kambarata project could satisfy his country’s energy

needs while better regulating the water flow for downstream countries (Bakiev, 2009).

What is striking in this case is that in spite of the fact that the Almaty gathering had been

organised to exclusively discuss issues related to the Aral Sea, Bakiev centred his statement

on the Kambarata dam, an issue that should have remained off-limits. Such unexpected

development distressed Uzbek President Karimov, and led Nursultan Nazarbayev to rebuke

his Kyrgyz counterpart for his undisciplined behaviour115

(BBC Monitoring Central Asia

114

Interestingly, while Tajikistan portrayed itself as a “water country” promoting several UN initiatives such

as the “Year of Fresh Water” or the decade “Water for Life”, Kyrgyzstan has put forward a somewhat similar

effort to create the image of a “mountain country”. For instance, in 2000 the country supported the FAO

initiative “International Year of the Mountains” (Ibraimova, 2000), and in 2007, the then Minister of Foreign

Affairs Ednan Karabaev put forward an initiative to organise in Kyrgyzstan the “Second Mountain Global

Summit” (Karabaev, 2007). 115

A month later, Bakiyev challenged once more the downstream countries declaring that both phases of the

Kambarata project will be built, regardless of those who do not agree with this (Eurasianet.org, 2009a).

156

Unit, 2009i). Bakiev’s move is significant, because it challenges the non-written rule that

has kept topics such as the revision of water allocation and the construction of large HPPs

out of multilateral discussions between the Central Asian Presidents. This is mostly due to

Uzbekistan’s emblematic use of bargaining power, that has allowed Tashkent to keep water

allocation unchanged after the collapse of the Soviet Union by preventively leaving the

issue of their revision out of the regional political agenda.

Underlining the beneficial effects that the project will have in regulating the water flow

of the Syr Darya appears to be a recurring element in the Kyrgyz framing of the Kambarata

dam. This is relevant, because if downstream countries are persuaded of the veracity of this

assertion, they could possibly change their attitude towards the project. One of the keys to

make this discourse convincing and get consent, is to back such assumption with

authoritative scientific opinions. This dimension of Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics, the

construction of knowledge, is analysed in the following paragraph.

5.3.4. Knowledge construction

As outlined in Chapter 4, knowledge construction can be considered both a hegemonic

and a counter-hegemonic strategy. This is because expertise-based knowledge may serve to

establish a dominant belief, but also to challenge it. For what concerns the Kambarata dam,

the Kyrgyz government contests the Uzbek belief that the dam will lead to a decrease in the

volume of water flowing downstream. To this extent, the scientific knowledge held up and

disseminated by the Kyrgyz government is almost identical to that maintained by the Tajik

government and, overall, by most upstream countries when it comes to building a large dam

(Molle et al., 2009): the dam will lead to a better regulation of the water flow while also

allowing an increase in the irrigated land. Such assumption is at the base of each of the

counter-hegemonic tactics carried out by the Kyrgyz government, because it constitutes the

central message embedded in each of them. A convincing and respected expertise-based

knowledge is a primary prerequisite to successfully persuade regional and international

actors of the credibility of Kyrgyz assertions. Besides being a counter-hegemonic strategy

in itself, knowledge construction can be arguably considered a broader underlying

fundamental for the deployment of ideational power.

157

However, Kyrgyzstan’s lack of expertise in the hydro-energy sector116

(Marat, 2008b;

UNDP Bureau for Europe and CIS, 2011) did not facilitate the creation and dissemination

of expertise-based knowledge in support of the Kambarata dam, leading the Kyrgyz

government to back its statements with external expertise. For instance, the 2004 World

Bank report “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: improving regional cooperation in the

Syr Darya Basin”, has been frequently used by representatives of the Kyrgyz government

as a source of authoritative knowledge, although the report only dedicated a few and far

from enthusiastic lines to the Kambarata complex:

Long-term structural options like the construction of new storage hydroelectric projects

Kambarata I (1900 MW) and Kambarata II (360 MW) at an estimated cost of $1.5

billion upstream of the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic could increase winter

power generation without increasing winter discharges. These projects, however, would

also substantially increase summer power output and markets for the surplus power

have to be found. The projects have to be shown to be the least cost solution to the

Kyrgyz power needs and may have to be jointly owned by all relevant riparian countries

as well as by other potential buyers of power to enable water sharing and power

purchase agreements and to raise funds by spreading the external debt burden among

the many owners. (The World Bank, 2004: vi)

Yet, at the abovementioned IFAS meeting Bakiev remarked how the report released by

the “authoritative financial institution” wholeheartedly supported the Kambarata project,

since the dam would allow Kyrgyzstan to increase winter power generation without

increasing winter discharges of water (Bakiev, 2009). In other occasions, the Kyrgyz

leadership and state-owned press have disseminated the opinions of Ibrahim Aliyev, a

former director general of the company “Naryngidrostroy”. A Kyrgyz veteran of the sector,

Aliyev presents the realisation of the project as a pressing need for Kyrgyzstan, that will

allow the production of precious hydroelectricity while better regulating the operation of

the Toktogul reservoir. The opinions of Uzbek scientists are considered unfounded, since

they do not have a sufficient amount of knowledge to discuss the issue (Kabar Analitika,

2011). On a more conciliatory tone, this thesis was sustained by the Kyrgyz Minister of

Energy and Industry Avtandil Kalmambetov (Kabar, 2011; The European Times, 2011),

116

Driven by the necessity of increasing his country’s know-how, in 2007 Bakiev put forward an initiative to

set up in Bishkek an international water management academy (in some documents also referred to as the

“Water University of Central Asia”), with the declared aim of training highly skilled specialists in the field

(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2007a). At the time of writing, however, the Academy is yet to be

established.

158

and by the then Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit,

2010f), that also proposed to Uzbekistan the realisation of a feasibility study of Kambarata

led by a team of experts from Kyrgyzstan.

5.4. Conclusions

Just like regional relations in Central Asia have had three different and evolving phases

in the period 1991-2011, also the recent history of the Kambarata project has been marked

by three succeeding periods, that correspond to the leadership changes in Kyrgyzstan.

Although Akaev supported the project, it was certainly under Bakiev that the Kambarata

dam gained more prominence and its realisation became a national priority. After that, the

ad-interim Presidency of Roza Otunbayeva has been too brief and transitory to really

delineate a strategy towards the project, although also in this period the dam was presented

as a cooperative regional project that could help solving the country’s frequent energy

crises while regulating the water flow of the Syr Darya.

But to what extent were the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics successful? Despite

frequent negotiations with potential investors, regional controversies and geopolitical

manoeuvrings have so far made these efforts ineffective. Moreover, the Kambarata dam did

not gain an international visibility comparable with other similar projects such as the Rogun

dam. Overall, the Kyrgyz strategy lacked the continuity that seems necessary to

successfully contest the status-quo and impose a new dominant discourse. The possibility

of expressing dissent inside the Parliament and abrupt government changes in 2005 and

2010, did not allow the Kyrgyz leadership to engage in an all-round Kambarata campaign.

The same does not apply to the Uzbek government, that placed its anti-dam campaign

among the priority areas of its foreign policy. The following chapter illustrates in detail

how Uzbekistan used its power to maintain the status-quo unchanged and hamper the

constructions of large dams in Central Asia.

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Chapter 6. Uzbek hegemonic tactics

Water resources could become a problem in the future that could escalate

tensions not only in our region, but on every continent. I won't name specific

countries, but all of this could deteriorate to the point where not just serious

confrontation, but even wars could be the result.

Islam Karimov, 2012

Following the analysis of the counter-hegemonic tactics utilised by Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan, this chapter outlines and categorizes the hegemonic tactics put in place by the

Uzbek government to impede the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams. This

concludes the analysis of how state power has been wielded in Central Asia to favour and

obstruct the revitalisation of these two large hydroelectric projects, and outlines the full

picture of the regional debate that they have generated.

This chapter first briefly recapitulates on why Uzbek measures can be considered

hegemonic, and later analyses them in greater detail. Since the Uzbek government tends to

consider the Rogun and Kambarata dams as a nearly unique entity, such approach is also

adopted in this analysis, that will thus merge the hegemonic tactics aimed at hampering the

construction of both dams in a single chapter. Unlike Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the actions

carried out by Uzbekistan are not limited by spatial boundaries, as rather than being about a

dam, they are more related to the notion of power and how to maintain it.

6.1. Perceiving a threat

The Aral Sea basin denotes a competitive hydro-hegemonic setting, marked by a

contested control of water resources and a dominative form of hydro hegemony exerted by

Uzbekistan that, as outlined in the previous chapters, can be considered the hydro-hegemon

in both the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya basins. In a competitive hydro-hegemonic

setting, disputants consider the resources under negotiations as limited, and parties take a

160

position and seek power and control (Jarvis and Wolf, 2010: 129). While this hydro-

hegemony might be not particularly clear in absolute terms (Wegerich, 2008; Bernauer and

Siegfried, 2012), or in comparison with other river basins where the hydro-hegemon

appears stronger (e.g. Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin), it is nevertheless rather

evident in relation to the two upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that also

happen to be the poorer and less developed among the five Central Asian countries. At the

regional level, Uzbekistan has been by far the most vocal opponent of the construction of

large hydroelectric plants upstream, and has so far managed to impede or slow down their

realisation. Uzbekistan has also maintained the consolidated control it has over water

resources, keeping unchanged its advantageous water allocation after the collapse of the

Soviet Union, thus continuing to practice the water-intensive cotton monoculture, whose

income is needed by the Uzbek political elites to support the existing system of social,

political, and economic control (Weinthal, 2006). Additionally, since both Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan depend from Uzbekistan for their imports of natural gas, Tashkent uses the

situation to gain leverage on the countries, imposing high purchase prices and

uncompromising payment deadlines, and frequently cutting gas supplies, causing several

serious energy crises (Fumagalli, 2008).

It was also outlined that, over the last two decades, the incompatibility between water

demands of irrigation and hydropower gave rise to a tense confrontation between the

upstream and downstream republics on the use and control of the region’s water resources

(Bohr, 2004). Central Asian leaders tend to portray water as an almost non-negotiable

matter, using Islam and its precepts on water (see paragraph 3.2.1) to justify and legitimise

their views on how the resource should be used and shared. The Uzbek President Islam

Karimov perceives the development of hydraulic infrastructures upstream as an existential

threat to the well-being of his country, and opposes these projects vehemently. In this

context, Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s flagship water resources development projects, the

Rogun and Kambarata dams, have crystallised the upstream-downstream tensions over the

differing preference of water use. Their construction could entail an irreversible change in

the status-quo that the Uzbek government wants to maintain unchanged.

Although the two projects are not identical, their many points in common and the nature

of the threat perceived, led the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) to treat them as a single

161

entity. The Uzbek counter-arguments concerning their realisation are essentially three.

First, due to the seismicity of the area where they are located, the likely event of a major

earthquake could lead to one of the worst man-made catastrophes in history. Second, during

the time necessary to fill the two water reservoirs there will be a reduction in the amount of

water flowing to Uzbekistan. Third, the impact of these two outdated Soviet projects should

be assessed by a UN-backed impartial study carried out by a team of international experts.

These are the three contentions forming the Uzbek discourse, that is projected both at the

international and domestic level and is disseminated through speeches at international

forums, the active criticism of the dams in various settings and the engagement of regional

heavyweights such as Russia or Kazakhstan. Uzbek hegemonic strategies – which are based

on ideational, bargaining and also hard power – are formed by five main tactics, as shown

in Figure 23.

Although these tactics may appear similar to those used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,

there are two important differences. The first is that the Uzbek government, unlike its

antagonists, has also used its hard power (see paragraph 6.5) to defend its interests. This

can perhaps be explained considering the dominant position (and the stronger military

capabilities) that Uzbekistan has in respect to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that can serve as a

deterrent for unilateral and harmful actions that the upstream countries might want to take.

The second and more important difference lies in the basic goal pursued by Uzbekistan,

that is to maintain hegemony and not to counter it. The dominant position broadens the

scope and range of opportunities available to the hegemon, that can reassert and consolidate

its interests while eroding those of the hegemonised.

162

Figure 23: Wielding power: the five tactics forming the Uzbek hegemonic strategy

These five areas of action represent the domains in which the Uzbek government is

wielding its power. The basic goal that is being pursued is to maintain the status-quo

unchanged. This implies the avoidance of changes in water allocation or in the way water is

used and shared. While the Uzbek government can do little to control events such as

population growth and climate change that might sooner or later impact the Central Asia’s

rivers and consequently change the status-quo (Hodgson, 2010), some other events such as

the construction of large dams can be more easily controlled or contested. The following

analyses the five elements of the Uzbek hegemonic strategy in detail, outlining the main

aspects of the Uzbek anti-dam discourse and the ways in which it has been propagated.

6.2. Seeking international support

International support117

is of paramount importance to effectively impede the realisation

of Rogun and Kambarata, since having powerful friends can be a very efficient source of

117

It is worth mentioning that also at the domestic level the Uzbek government has extensively used its

official newspapers and TV channels to discredit the two dams, and especially Rogun and the Tajik

government, possibly because of the particularly tense relationship between the Tajik and the Uzbek

governments and their two presidents. For instance, the widely diffused newspaper Narodnoe Slovo has

repeatedly reiterated the need for an external expert examination of Rogun (BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Maintaining the status-quo

International support

(Reactive Diplomacy)

Knowledge construction

Recourse to Int. Law

Active Stall / Issue

Linkage

Resource capture

163

power (Warner and Zeitoun, 2006). This aspect seems of particular relevance, because it

allows observing how the Uzbek government is using ideational and discursive means to

persuade the international community of the validity of its ideas concerning the

construction of hydroelectric plants, with the final goal of getting consent and imposing its

views as the hegemonic also at the international level. Before it was challenged by

Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s alternative discourses, the Uzbek sanctioned discourse – as it

is the discourse endorsed by the more powerful side – was also the one heard more often at

the international level. The new setting led the Uzbek government to intensify its efforts

and to act mostly in reaction to Tajik and Kyrgyz plans. Overall, the three countries have

shown little disposition to discuss solutions that would be acceptable to all, and the already

acrimonious debate has been further harshened by the GoU’s unaccommodating attitude

and harsh tones.

6.2.1. Reactive diplomacy

The nearly contemporary revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata projects in the

2000s caused the almost immediate reaction of the Uzbek government, which based its

international support strategy on what was being said and done by the Kyrgyz and the Tajik

government. Table 8 – that compares the content of the addresses delivered by the three

countries at the UNGA in the period 1999-2012 – clearly shows how, starting in 2005, the

Uzbek government introduced water and hydroelectric issues in its speeches. This coincides

with the moment in which Tajikistan started to raise awareness on the necessity to develop

its hydroelectric potential, and more in general, with the disclosure of the upstream

countries’ hydroelectric ambitions.

Unit, 2010d), warning on the potential catastrophic effects of the dam and defining it – along with the

Kambarata dam – a “source of misery and poverty” (Narodnoe Slovo, 2012) . Also, in a report broadcasted by

Uzbek TV, the Tajik government was accused of spreading lies on Rogun to damage the friendship between

the Uzbek and Tajik peoples (Eurasianet.org, 2010b).

164

Table 8: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,

1999-2012. “Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Kambarata” and “Rogun” respectively mean that issues

related to the management of shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the

Kambarata and the Rogun dams were discussed in the address. Table constructed by author based on

data from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/).

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN

UNGA session

no. and year

Water Hydro K*/R** Water Hydro R Water Hydro K

54th, 1999

55th, 2000

56th, 2001

57th, 2002

58th, 2003

59th, 2004

60th, 2005

61st, 2006

62nd, 2007

63rd, 2008

64th, 2009

65th, 2010

66th, 2011

67th, 2012

* Kambarata dam; ** Rogun dam.

However, the Uzbek anti-dam international campaign took off in 2007, mostly as a

result of tensions with Tajikistan. As a forerunner of the upcoming conflict, in February

165

2007, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the Uzbek Prime Minister, wrote an open letter118

to his Tajik

counterpart, Akil Akilov, in which he asked to submit Rogun to “a detailed and

independent examination, since it was designed about 40 years ago on the basis of outdated

designing, engineering and technological decisions”, and accused the GoT of “full

ignorance” for not having thought about the possible consequences of the project

(Mirziyoyev, 2007). Playing the card of international support, Mirziyoyev also informs

Akilov that the Uzbek view on the dam is supported by organizations such as “the United

Nations, European Union, World, Asian and Islamic development banks119

, as well as the

Russian Federation and its public circles, as well as other countries”, warning the GoT that

Uzbekistan will not hesitate to ask support to these organizations in case its request for an

external examination is ignored120

.

A few months later, at the 62nd

UNGA, the Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov

introduced what would be a recurring element in the Uzbek anti-dam rhetoric, the recourse

to international law. Quoting the 1991 UN Convention on Environmental Impact

Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection

and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN

Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Norov

notes that “States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity,

mutual benefit and good faith”, reminding to Tajikistan and to the countries interested in

investing in Rogun, that according to these legal instruments the impact of any

hydroelectric project should be assessed by a team of international experts (Norov, 2007).

Uzbek tones harshened at the 64th

UNGA, when Norov accused the Tajik and the Kyrgyz

governments of carrying on an active manipulation of the public opinion to attract

investments for Rogun and Kambarata, ignoring the shrinking of Central Asian glaciers and

the seismicity of the area. In addition, Norov made reference to the recent [August 2009] 118

The letter was originally published in Russian in the Uzbek national newspaper Pravda Vostoka, and

subsequently translated into English by the Uzbek information agency Jahon and published in all Uzbek

embassies’ websites. 119

Uzbekistan evidenced the World Bank support also before the important IFAS (International Fund for

Saving the Aral Sea) meeting of the Central Asian Presidents in 2009. In that occasion, the Uzbek newspaper

Pravda Vostoka published a letter in which Robert Zoellick, the President of the World Bank, shared Uzbek

“concern regarding the delicate ecological balance of the region, and absolute necessity to ensure that the

hydropower potential will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in states of the lower reaches, as

well as the need to consider design of new buildings in seismic zones” (Akipress News Agency, 2009).

120 The epistolary dispute on Rogun continued also in 2010, with yet another exchange of bitter letters

between Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Akil Akilov.

166

accident at the Russian hydroelectric power station Sayano–Shushenskaya, to express

concern that a similar event could happen at the Rogun and Kambarata sites, thus leaving

the people of Uzbekistan without water (Norov, 2009a). A similar warning was also given

by Uzbek President Islam Karimov during his address at the Plenary Session of the UN

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Summit in 2010121

:

It is necessary to take into consideration that the area around the Aral Sea is supplied

with water at the expense of the watercourses of the two main rivers - Arnudarya and

Syrdarya, and any decrease of the watercourse of these rivers means a radical

disturbance of the existing fragile environmental balance in the entire vast region. And

in these conditions any attempts to implement projects drafted 30-40 years ago, yet in

the Soviet period, to construct in the upper stream of these rivers the large scale

hydropower facilities with gigantic dams, and moreover, if to take into account that the

seismicity of the area of forthcoming construction makes up 8-9 points, - all of these

may inflict an irreparable damage to environment and will be a reason for the most

dangerous man-caused catastrophes which we have been witnessing for over the last

years. (Karimov, 2010)

These three points – the request for an external evaluation of the project, the necessity to

take into account the interests of all countries in the basin according to the 1992 and 1997

UN conventions and the fact that the construction of giant hydro facilities in Central Asia is

counterproductive and dangerous – were also the core of the address delivered by the GoU

at the 66th

(Ganiev, 2011) and 67th

(Kamilov 2012) UNGAs, confirming the high priority

that the country has been giving to impeding the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata

dams. In addition, and mirroring the strategy of the Tajik government, the GoU delivered

these messages also at the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings in 2007 (Nematov, 2007),

2008 (Norov, 2008) and 2009 (Norov, 2009b), and, more vehemently, by Islam Karimov at

the opening of the Asian Development Bank's board of governors meeting in the Uzbek

capital, Tashkent (Agence France Press, 2010). Furthermore, the Uzbek leadership

disseminated its criticisms to large HPPs also through the organization of the international

conference “Transboundary environmental problems in Central Asia: application of

international legal mechanisms to solve them”, that took place in Tashkent in 2010. The

event, that was attended by representatives from several UN agencies, international

121

On this subject, when asked a few weeks later why Uzbekistan is opposing the construction of Rogun,

Karimov replied “How can we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for eight years, while the

Rogun water reservoir is being filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?” (Interfax News Agency,

2010).

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organizations and financial institutions, noted the negative impact that Rogun and

Kambarata will have on the environmental situation of Central Asia and, once again,

underlined the importance of acceding to the UN conventions on transboundary

watercourses (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010b).

6.2.2. Incentives to get allies

Besides working to disseminate its anti-dam rhetoric worldwide, the GoU has been using

its bargaining power, mostly under the form of financial incentives, to get support from

regional heavyweights and dissuade them from supporting Rogun and Kambarata, creating

a condition similar to what Buzan defined overlay. Overlay occurs when the direct presence

of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security

dynamics among the local states” (Buzan et al., 1998: 12). In the case of Uzbekistan, the

country managed to influence Russia and Kazakhstan to such an extent that they eventually

decided to withdraw their support to Tajik hydroelectric plans.

For what concerns the Rogun dam, as it was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4 in 2009 the

GoU successfully managed to bring on its side of the dispute the Russian government, thus

provoking a little diplomatic incident between Tajikistan and Russia. Until then, in fact, the

two countries had been involved in protracted negotiations and signed several agreements

on a possible Russian participation on Rogun. However, as a result of bilateral talks

between Russia and Uzbekistan – that resulted in an agreement in which Uzbekistan

decided to supply its natural gas solely to Russia (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union,

2009) – Moscow changed its position, as it was also reaffirmed by Russian Deputy Prime

Minister Sergey Ivanov during his visit to Tashkent in 2010. Also in that circumstance,

Ivanov noted that “construction of major hydroelectric facilities in Central Asia should be

carried out in full agreement with the neighboring countries” (BBC Monitoring Central

Asia Unit, 2010a), implying that without Uzbek agreement Russia will not support the

construction of Rogun. Thus, by granting Russia exclusivity on its gas, Uzbekistan found

an ally in its anti-Rogun campaign.

Furthermore, the Uzbek government paid particular attention to the creation of a

common downstream threat perception, remarking how the two dams might have

potentially catastrophic consequences not only for Uzbekistan but also for Kazakhstan and

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Turkmenistan. And indeed, the Kazakh government, which was initially interested in

investing in both the Rogun and Kambarata dams, later decided to withdraw its financial

and diplomatic support to both projects, joining Uzbek requests for an external examination

of the two power plants122

. This change of views seems to be related to Nazarbayev's

initiative to convene the yearly OSCE summit in Kazakhstan, taking advantage of the

country’s OSCE chairmanship in 2010. Following a visit to Tashkent in which Nazarbayev

secured Karimov’s support on the matter (Eurasianet.org, 2010b), Nazarbayev fully

endorsed the Uzbek position, declaring that no hydroelectric power plant shall be built in

Central Asia without the realisation of a neutral impact assessment (Defense and Security,

2010).

Akin bilateral diplomatic activities were carried out with the other downstream country

of the Amu Darya basin, Turkmenistan (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009l), and in

2011 the two countries signed a Joint Statement, in which they noted that water and energy

issues in Central Asia should be solved in accordance with international legal instruments

such as the to the 1992 and 1997 UN conventions (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit,

2011).

Beyond the creation of a common front against Rogun, Uzbekistan has also been

promptly criticizing any initiative conflicting with its goal, in an attempt of deterring

potential supporters of the project. For instance, when in 2011 Pakistan announced a plan to

import 1,000 MW of Rogun-generated electricity from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan`s

Ambassador in Islamabad Arif Karimov handed a letter of disapproval to senior officials of

the Pakistan Ministry of Water and Power, noting that all downstream riparians opposed

the project in absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment. Moreover, as an incentive

to refrain Pakistan from supporting Rogun, the Uzbek government offered financial support

for the realization of three hydropower plants on the Swat river in Pakistan, that would

represent an alternative source of electricity with their total generation capacity of 1,315

MW (AKIpress, 2011).

122

It is nevertheless worth mentioning that Kazakhstan is now attempting to play a mediation role to resolve

the conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2013).

169

6.3. Knowledge construction

Mirroring (and responding to) Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the GoU has constructed and

disseminated its own expertise-based knowledge about Rogun and Kambarata. In the case

of Uzbekistan, knowledge construction can be considered a hegemonic strategy and not a

counter-hegemonic one. This is because, in a similar way than a sanctioned discourse, the

science-based knowledge constructed by Uzbekistan is also the one endorsed by the more

powerful side. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the two diverging schools of

thought is so acrimonious, that it would be appropriate to describe this strategy also as

“knowledge destruction” or “discrediting knowledge”, since its main objective seems the

portrayal of the “other” as incompetent and fundamentally biased.

These hostilities have been particularly evident between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. If, in

the case of Tajikistan, Professor Dzhonon Ikrami acted as the scientific voice of the

government, in the case of Uzbekistan an analogous role is covered by the Ecological

Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), an Uzbek political party and environmental movement

which has been very vocal on the Rogun dam, and has often served as the communication

arm of the Uzbek government.

For instance, when the MEP Struan Stevenson took position in favour of Rogun (see

chapter 4), the EMU sent a letter of protest to the President of the European Parliament

Jerzy Buzek, severely criticising Stevensons’s declarations and questioning his

environmental expertise:

Is Mr. Stevenson, the member of the Committee of European Parliament on Environment,

Public Health and Food Safety, not aware about possible negative consequences of

construction of enormous dams? Probably, during his two or three visits to the countries of

Central Asia he has not managed to learn environmental problems of all five countries of

the region properly. Did he take into consideration the opinion of millions inhabitants,

whose conditions of life have worsened, first of all, because of building of the large hydro-

power constructions that have created an intense environmental situation in downstream

areas of the rivers? It is also word [sic] to recall the address of Mr. Stevenson at the

hearings in the European Parliament on “Ecocatastrophe of Aral Sea. Can we rescue the

drying Sea?” held in October 12, 2010 in Brussels, where he has been a moderator

Stevenson has called EU and the world community for assistance in solving of the Aral Sea

catastrophe, naming it a “global problem”. Does Mr. Stevenson not really understand that

building of Rogun HPS will become the serious factor that will aggravate the present

situation in the Aral Sea area? So, where are logic, intelligence and integrity? (The

Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2011)

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The letter also warned of the catastrophic impacts of an earthquake in the Rogun area,

supporting this statement with an example coming from Europe, the Vajont disaster in Italy

(The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2011). Again, a few months after the decision of

the WB to finance a feasibility study and an impact assessment for Rogun, the EMU sent a

worried letter to the WB, in which it requested an inspection of the Rogun site. The letter

outlined the usual points of concerns for Uzbekistan, and accuses the WB of partiality, as it

is “making a one-sided evaluation of the tender procedures for environmental assessment of

construction of hydroelectric power station, and do not take into account the interests of all

parties, including those countries which are located in the downstream of Amudarya [sic]

river” (The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2010: 3)123

.

In addition, Pravda Vostoka, the official newspaper of the Cabinet of Ministers of

Uzbekistan, has also been active in disseminating scientific evidence against Rogun. The

article “Rogun, a tsunami for Central Asia”, published in the aftermaths of the Japan’s

earthquake, caused resentful replies from Tajikistan. The piece accuses the GoT of

brainwashing its population, and reminds that a Tajik scientist, Sabit Negmatullaev,

released an interview to Itar-Tass declaring that an earthquake of similar strength than that

occurred in Japan already happened in Tajikistan, and could happen again during the next

ten years. This, according to Pravda Vostoka, proves wrong Tajik Prime Minister Akil

Akilov and the other Tajik authorities, which have been betrayed by the “euphoria of their

own obsessive fantasies about Rogun” (Pravda Vostoka, 2011).

Kyrgyz scientific assumptions on the Kambarata dam have been criticised and contested

in a similar way. In 2009, the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs published an article

written by Sergei Zhigarev, the Director of the Institute “Gidroproject”, that bitterly

criticized Igor Chudinov’s speech at the fifth World Water Forum, reminding the readers

that “It goes without saying, and it is clear to any sober-minded person that the 30-years-old

projects must be subjected to an independent objective examination (Zhigarev, 2009).

Likewise, Natalia Koroleva’s (an official of Uzbekistan's State Nature Committee) article

on Pravda Vostoka, called for an independent feasibility study for a project that will have

123

In its response, the WB specified that the Uzbek request for inspection is ineligible, as “the issues raised by

the Requesters focus on potential harm that could derive from the construction, operation and/or failure of the

proposed Rogun HPP, but not from the Assessment Studies that the Bank intends to finance” (The Inspection

Panel, 2010: 5).

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significant transboundary effects (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009m), while

Mahira Usmanova, a researcher of the Seismology Institute of the National Academy of

Sciences of Uzbekistan, reminded that hydroelectric facilities such as Kambarata should not

be constructed without consideration of seismic issues and geological risks, as this will put

in danger all Central Asian countries (Akipress, 2009).

6.4. Recourse to international law

A recurring element in the Uzbek strategy against Rogun and Kambarata has been the

recourse to international law. The GoU often buttresses its criticisms to the two dams with a

reference to the key principles of international water law: equitable and reasonable

utilization, prior notification, causing no significant harm and consultation between basin

riparians. This is not surprising, especially considering Uzbekistan’s geographical position.

Downstream states, in fact, often claim a right to the “absolute integrity of the

watercourse”, which basically states that upper riparian states can do nothing that affects

the quantity or quality of water that flows down the watercourse (Dellapenna, 2001: 269).

Nevertheless, Uzbek interest on international water law seems to have been triggered

directly by Rogun and Kambarata, rather than by a genuine commitment to the

aforementioned principles. As a matter of fact, Uzbekistan ratified both conventions – the

1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and

International Lakes and the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of

International Watercourses – in September 2007 (United Nations, 2013a and 2013b), a date

which corresponds in particular with the concretization of Tajik plans on Rogun. As Bo

Libert – a UNECE regional advisor that works on water issues in Central Asia and that has

closely followed the ratification process of the UNECE Convention – observes (Libert et

al., 2008: 15), Uzbek ratification was rapid and, perhaps more importantly, unexpected.

However, international water law has still a moral value rather than a binding one, and the

legal architecture for international watercourses remains weak (Rieu Clarke, 2012).

Instruments such as the 1997 Watercourse Convention have not entered into force, and it is

possible that they never will (Hodgson, 2010: 3).

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6.5. Beyond diplomacy: active stalling

In September 2012, amid rising tensions, Islam Karimov released a widely-cited

declaration in which he warned that “Water resources could become a problem in the future

that could escalate tensions not only in our region, but on every continent […] I won't name

specific countries, but all of this could deteriorate to the point where not just serious

confrontation, but even wars could be the result” (Reuters, 2012). Even if implicitly, this

was the first time that the Uzbek President mentioned the possibility of recurring to the use

of force to solve the hydropower row in Central Asia. And in effect, in spite of a very active

and varied international strategy aimed at discrediting the two dams through the imposition

of a specific discourse, in a few occasions the GoU used its hard power to more directly

state its case.

For what concerns the Rogun dam, one of the tactics adopted has been to actively stall

the provision of construction material to the Rogun site. Since all of Tajikistan’s rail

imports has to pass through Uzbekistan, starting in 2010 Uzbek authorities have delayed

thousands of rail carriages bound to Tajikistan that were crossing its border (Eurasianet,

2010b). Moreover, Tashkent has also significantly raised the customs duty for trucks and

unilaterally closed the border several times in 2010 (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2010; BBC

Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010c). Border problems escalated towards the end of 2011,

when a mysterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbekistan, causing the interruption of

one of the three major rail links to Tajikistan, the one between the Uzbek city of Termez

and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa (Radio Free Europe, 2011). Although the Uzbek

newspaper Pravda Vostoka described the incident as a terrorist act, Tajikistan asked, in

vain, for additional investigation. In addition, instead of fixing the track, Uzbekistan

dismantled it, making the movement of trains to Tajikistan impossible (BBC Summary of

World Broadcasts, 2012). It seems then, that the GoU is using time as a source of power.

However, this is done in a less subtle way than the one outlined for instance by Marwa

Daoudy in the Euphrates and Tigris basin, in which time was used as a form of bargaining

power to influence negotiations (Daoudy, 2009). In this case, Uzbekistan is physically

impeding the delivery of building materials, to actively stall and extend over time the

construction process at the Rogun site.

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6.5.1. Issue linkage

While Warner and Zeitoun (2006: 454) listed issue linkage as a counter-hegemonic

strategy that can increase a country’s bargaining power (as in the case of Syria gaining an

advantage from the Kurdish human rights movement that were contesting the Ilisu dam in

Turkey), it appears that in the case of Uzbekistan a point can be made for issue linkage as

an hegemonic strategy and for the use of hard power as a source of bargaining power.

German scholar Ines Dombrowsky (2010) has analysed how issue linkage – which she

defined as an exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength (Dombowsky, 2010:

133) – can play a role in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts. However, matters

related to the exchange of concessions in the use of natural resources in Central Asia, have

been marked by a rather conflictual approach, and in the specific cases of the Rogun and

Kambarata dams, issue linkage has been used for uncooperative ends. More specifically,

the GoU has used its gas resources to gain leverage on both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 24: Natural gas pipelines in Central Asia. Source: Richard Jones, “The Politics of Central Asian

and Caspian Energy” (presentation at Chatham House, London, February 23–24, 2010).

174

Since Uzbekistan is Tajikistan’s sole supplier of natural gas (see Figure 24), the country

has used this strategical advantage as a form of retaliation against Tajik plans. Although gas

cuts had happened before as a consequence of Dushanbe’s failure to pay for outstanding

debts (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009n), other analogous episodes can be

connected directly to the Rogun dispute. In 2010, in a new chapter of the epistolary dispute

between the Uzbek Prime Minister Mirziyoyev and his Tajik counterpart Akilov, the latter

sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev, which was promptly posted by the Tajik news agency

Khovar. The message emphasized the country’s sovereign right to build the dam to

overcome its energy deficits, which could not be addressed by energy imports because of

the artificial barriers created by Uzbekistan (Akilov, 2010). As a response, the GoU did not

send another letter. Instead, a few hours after the reception of the communication,

Uzbekistan unexpectedly halved gas supplies to Tajikistan, without specifying the reasons

behind such decision (Agence France Press, 2010). Two years later another exchange of

letters took place, touching on issues such as Rogun, the interruption of rail traffic between

the two countries and Uzbekistan's decision to withdraw from the Central Asian power grid

(Avesta, 2012). Also in this occasion, Uzbekistan interrupted all gas supplies to Tajikistan,

explaining that there was a supply contract with China that needed to be fulfilled.

Moreover, the Uzbek side did not concede the use of its territory to allow the transit of

Turkmen gas to Tajikistan (The Times of Central Asia, 2012).

This is noteworthy, because by using hard (structural) power in the form of a gas cut, the

Uzbek government has increased its bargaining power, placing the Tajik government in a

testing situation. Besides the implications that this move might have on gas supplies to the

Tajik population, this considerably impacts on the Tajik industrial sector. The Tajik

Aluminium Company (TALCO) is powered with Uzbek gas, and so is the Tajikcement

plant, the largest cement producer of Tajikistan that is of central importance for cement

provisions to the Rogun site.

Likewise, the Uzbek government has used hard power to gain leverage on Kyrgyzstan

and show its disapproval. Beyond the frequent gas cuts caused by behind-time payments

from Bishkek, in 2009 Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on the Kyrgyz-

Uzbek border by digging ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat regions of Kyrgyzstan

and erecting walls in the Rishtan rayon of Uzbekistan, some analysts interpreted this

175

measure as a sign of dissatisfaction towards Kyrgyz hydropower ambitions (Akhmadov,

2009). Once more, when in 2010 Uzbekistan unilaterally closed the Kara-Suu-

Avtodorozhnyy customs checkpoint, some Kyrgyz human rights activists connected this

move with the construction of the Kambarata dam (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit,

2010e).

6.6. Resource capture

According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, resource capture occurs when “the degradation and

depletion of a renewable resource interacts with population growth to encourage powerful

groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favour. These groups tighten

their grip on the increasingly scarce resource and use this control to boost their wealth and

power” (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 177). This seems to connect with Wittfogel’s seminal study

Oriental Despotism (1957), that first introduced the concepts of hydraulic society and

hydraulic despotism. Wittfogel argued that those who control water in arid or semi-arid

regions also control political power. The so-called “hydraulic regimes” might increase their

grip on power by building and managing hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and

network of canals, which would allow bureaucrats to exert control over people and rivers.

More recently, other scholars (Worster, 1985; Reisner, 1993; Swyngedouw, 1999) have

investigated how ruling political elites can increase their influence and preserve social

control through large hydraulic projects, in the so-called “hydraulic mission” to control

nature and conquer the desert.

Resource capture can be the end in itself, but it can also be the means to an end, with the

end being consolidated control of water resources. The construction of large hydraulic

infrastructures such as Rogun and Kambarata (whose realization if often so symbolic that it

becomes the end in itself), offers a good example of how resource capture is associated to

the water/power nexus. Nevertheless, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not the only basin

riparians occupied in capturing water resources, since also Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

have adopted a similar strategy. The latter, in particular, has built a number of reservoirs

using winter releases of water from the Toktogul Reservoir with the plan of using it for

irrigation in summer, becoming less dependent on Kyrgyzstan’s water (Wegerich, 2008).

Among them, there are the Rezak Reservoir in Namangan Region, and the Karaman

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Reservoir in Jizak Region. While these infrastructures alleviate Uzbekistan’s problems in

low-water years, they are not sufficiently large to achieve Uzbek self-sufficiency in

irrigation water (Abbink et al., 2010). Moreover, as Kemelova and Zhalkubaev noted,

Uzbekistan built these reservoirs without notifying or consulting with Kyrgyzstan, the

country whose interests could be potentially harmed by such initiative, thus violating

international water law (Kemelova and Zhalkubaev, 2003). It appears then that the Uzbek

government – that extensively recurs to international water law when its interests have to be

safeguarded – has a one-way (if not contradictory) understanding of the matter, since it

does not respect the same principles for which it advocates.

6.7. Conclusions

While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan resorted to the sole use of bargaining and ideational

power to accomplish their hydraulic mission, Uzbekistan acted similarly but with the

opposite objective, and in addition did not disdain the use of hard power. Dinar (2009)

noted how the use of violence in hydropolitics is too costly and often counter-productive.

Nevertheless, hard power does not refer to the mere use of violence, but more in general to

the structural capacity of influencing the other’s behaviours in less subtle (and more easily

observable) ways than by using ideational or discursive means. And this appears to be the

tactic sometimes used by the Uzbek government, which instead of recurring to the use of

violence, preferred to take advantage from its upstream position in the gas distribution

system.

Besides causing the gradual deterioration of relations between the upstream block and

Uzbekistan, the ways in which Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have challenged and contested

the status-quo have caused the direct and peremptory reaction of the Uzbek leadership,

which employed a wide array of tactics to discredit both projects. The key to understand the

nature of this conflict seems to be symbolic value that has been attached to the two dams

and to their construction. If, on the one hand, Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov underlined

how Uzbek criticisms to Rogun have no other effect than uniting the people of Tajikistan in

the idea that the dam should be built, on the other hand, impeding the construction of both

dams has become a matter of principles for the Uzbek government. The dams come to

symbolize the right of self-determination of the upstream countries but also the right of

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self-defence of Uzbekistan, at least according to how the three countries have portrayed the

matter. Perceptions and images play a crucial role in international politics, in the same way

that symbolism is of central importance in Central Asian politics, both at the internal and at

the regional level. Avoiding a threat (whether a real or a presumed one) assumes a value

since what is visible is equally important as what is invisible, or what is real has the same

value of what is only presented as real. And thus, impeding the construction of the two

dams becomes as important as their construction, since both actions are not anymore the

means to an end, but the end in itself.

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Chapter 7. Conclusions

The most hateful grief of all human grieves is this, to have knowledge of the

truth but no power over the event.

Herodotus, The History - Book IX, 440 B.C.

This thesis was set out to understand and explore how state power is wielded in

transboundary water relations in Central Asia, and what hegemonic and counter-hegemonic

tactics Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have put in place to favour and obstruct the

construction of two large hydroelectric dams, Rogun and Kambarata. This final chapter

assesses and compares the two case studies and their impact on regional water relations.

Subsequently, the findings of this study are presented, along with its contributions to

knowledge and its limitations. Finally, areas for future research are identified and outlined.

7.1. The two case studies compared

As it was explained in the introduction, the two case studies are in many ways similar.

Yet, as it emerged from the analysis carried out in the previous chapters, there are also

some significant differences that can now be illustrated.

At the technical level, the flow of the Syr Darya river is at present more regulated than

that of the Amu Darya river, and therefore the Kambarata dam would have, in absolute

terms, a less significant impact than the Rogun dam on the water flow. The Kyrgyz

government is already in the position to use water as a bargaining tool (and it already did,

as discussed in Chapter 3), while the Tajik government expressly needs a large dam like

Rogun before being able to do so. This notwithstanding, the impact of the Kambarata dam

should not be underestimated, as its construction would set a precedent on regional water

issues, implying that Uzbekistan and the principle of absolute integrity of the river for

which the country advocates were overpowered by the principle of absolute territorial

sovereignty claimed by upstream countries.

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The two dams have also had a different political significance for the governments of

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, one that appears to be greater for the former than for the latter.

Indeed, the Tajik government has placed the Rogun dam at the centre of a specific

ideological production aimed at portraying the dam as a symbol of patriotism, national

unity and progress, to the point that Tajikistan presents itself to the international community

as a “water country”. While a similar dam-rhetoric was also propagated within Kyrgyzstan,

the intensity with which the Kyrgyz government carried out its Kambarata campaign is

considerably lesser than that observed in Tajikistan. For instance, considering the IPO

launched in Tajikistan in 2010 in which the Tajik citizens were forced by the government to

buy Rogun shares, it seems difficult to imagine a similar development in Kyrgyzstan. This

is both because of the more vibrant contestational politics that characterise the Kyrgyz

setting if compared with the Tajik one, and also because of the political instability that

marked Kyrgyzstan over the last decade. Furthermore, the long-standing rivalry between

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led the Tajik government to interpret and portray the

construction of the Rogun dam against the will of Tashkent as a symbol of internal

cohesion, that serves to assert the country’s sovereignty over its natural resources. While

also the Kyrgyz leadership, and particularly Bakiev, represented the dam as an expression

of the God-given right of the Kyrgyz people to use their water as they wish, the tones (and

the nature of the conflict with Uzbekistan) were never as exasperated as in the case of the

Rogun dam.

Likewise, the Uzbek attitude towards the two dams was similar and different at the same

time. It was similar in the sense that the Uzbek government treated the Rogun and

Kambarata dams as a virtually unique entity, linking them together at regional and

international roundtables, presenting and perceiving them both as a direct threat to its

wellbeing. It was different in the sense that the Rogun dam seems to be the one that worried

the most Karimov and his entourage. Specific and more peremptory actions were taken to

oppose its construction, and the Uzbek government constantly retorted each and every point

made by the Tajik government.

Overall, the three countries have been (and still are) engaged in a tense conflict, in which

each of them used its power to assert its interests and get the desired outcome to maintain

180

or contest hegemony. The following paragraph returns to the research questions and

answers them presenting the findings of this study.

7.2. The research questions unwrapped

This thesis has taken a critical hydropolitical approach (i.e. one that studies water

relations taking into consideration aspects such as overt and covert forms of power,

discursive processes and social constructions) to analyse interstate relations in the Aral Sea

basin in Central Asia, and to examine how state power is wielded in transboundary water

relations. Two sub-questions have helped addressing this main research question. The first

one, investigating how water relations evolved in the period 1991-2011, was addressed in

Chapter 3.

This has outlined how the resource distribution system set by the USSR left a heavy

legacy on the Central Asian republics. The incompatibility between water demands of

irrigation and hydropower is at the origin of a growing frustration among the upstream and

the downstream countries. Over the last two decades, this fundamental conflict has strongly

influenced water relations, that have taken a downward trend marked by three different and

evolving phases. During the first “buffer period” (1991-1996), the new-born (and

disoriented) republics decided to preserve the Soviet water allocation, and unconvincingly

attempted to have a multilateral approach to regional water issues signing several

multilateral agreements on water sharing. A more individualist and cautious attitude

towards the management of shared water resources emerged in the period 1997-2006, that

was marked by the first severe regional energy crisis (1997) and by the adoption of

numerous bilateral and trilateral short-term agreements (AOAs) that were often signed as a

response to an on-going crisis and not to prevent its occurrence. Subsequently, the

revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata dams corresponded to the beginning of the third

phase of water relations (2007-2011), characterised by the open and manifest conflict

between Uzbekistan – the leading dam-opponent among the downstream states – and the

two upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two dam projects led to the gradual

deterioration of bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and

Uzbekistan, as it was illustrated by the TWINS matrix.

181

This served as a link to Chapter 4, 5, and 6, that helped answering the second sub-

question, identifying and categorising which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures

have been put in place to favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata

dams. With the due differences (outlined in paragraph 7.1), the analysis showed that the

Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments adopted similar tactics to contest the Uzbek hegemony

and change a disadvantageous status-quo. They both resorted to i) internal support; ii)

mobilization of financial resources; iii) international support; and iv) knowledge

construction, to impose a particular discourse and ideology and wield their soft (ideational

and bargaining) power. Counter-hegemony appeared as a constant and evolving process –

with varying intensities and dimensions – aimed at changing the status-quo. Since the

concept of “half-hegemony” does not seem to be theoretically plausible, counter-hegemony

can exist and be observed even when it is not (yet) successful, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan.

Conversely, the Uzbek government adopted a series of hegemonic tactics – i)

international support; ii) knowledge construction; iii) recourse to international law; iv)

active stalling/issue linkage; and v) resource capture – to maintain hegemony, rather than

countering it. The dominant position in which the hegemon finds itself broadens the scope

and range of opportunities that it can use to reassert and consolidate its interests while

wearing down those of the hegemonised. Thus, Uzbekistan used its hard and soft power to

respectively coerce and persuade other actors and get the desired outcome. Yet, hard power

never implied the use of violence (although this was sometimes used as a threat), even

when tension was at a peak, but rather the recourse to other “structural” measures such as

the construction of water reservoirs or actively stalling the provision of construction

materials. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan only resorted to the use of soft

power, although in their case this can be interpreted as a prerequisite to use hard power: the

moment in which they will get consent and persuade the other actors of the validity of their

reasons, they will be able to build the Kambarata and Rogun dams and capitalize on their

upstream position. Soft power in this case sets the conditions to use structural power,

confirming the reciprocal relationship between material capabilities and ideas, and

emphasizing the intimate connection between material and soft power at the basis of the

concept of hegemony.

182

And indeed, over the course of this research the concept of hegemony and its two related

facets – that refer to how hegemony can be maintained and contested – emerged as central

to the study of power. Social and discursive constructions and the constant attempt to

impose a certain worldview appeared to be a recurring element in the analysis of water

politics in Central Asia, where water has both symbolic value and material worth.

Moreover, the absence of a binding legal framework and the ambiguity that this might

entail, seems to have further strengthened the confrontational attitude aimed at imposing its

own view of things rather than adapting to that of the others.

Among the three forms of power, the ideational one seems to be the most significant to

both maintain and contest hegemony. Going back to Gramsci’s (1975 and 1975a) idea of an

“intellectual” hegemony, and more in general to the power theory review carried out in

Chapter 2, the ability to impose ideas and influence those of the others is considered an

efficacious instrument to affirm hegemony and create expectations and behaviours.

However, while on the one hand the political setting described by Gramsci presented the

figure of a lay Pope, Benedetto Croce, that acted as a key instrument of hegemony, on the

other hand, Central Asian water politics do not seem to be influenced by a singular actor

but rather by a multiplicity of fragmented realities, or as Chantal Mouffe would have

defined them, nodal points of power (Mouffe, 2008). This is perhaps the reason behind the

strong influence that the Soviet Union and its policies still have on water management

issues in Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s water hegemony is primarily a result of the decisions

taken in the Soviet period, and of the succeeding ability of the Uzbek government to

maintain the status-quo unchanged. This does not diminish, however, the intensity of the

counter-hegemonic struggle that has taken place to disarticulate the current hegemonic

order.

7.3. Main contributions, limitations of the study and areas for future research

This thesis contributes to existing knowledge at several levels. It does so by being the

first study to carry out a comprehensive analysis of power dynamics in transboundary water

relations in Central Asia placing the focus on the issue of large dams. Thus, this research

provides an original contribution to the literature on hydropolitics in Central Asia, offering

fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of power and counter-hegemony in the Aral

183

Sea basin. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach used in this dissertation – that takes

and connects insights from critical IR theory, conventional political geography and Central

Asian studies – has been rarely used to analyse water politics in the Aral Sea basin.

The categorisation and detailed illustration of the counter-hegemonic tactics deployed by

the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments adds a contribution to the critical hydropolitics

literature focusing on power dynamics in Central Asia but also at a more general level.

Similarly, the categorisation of the hegemonic tactics adopted by the Uzbek government

provides an additional contribution to the study of how power is used to maintain

hegemony in an international river basin. Also, as it emerged in the previous paragraph, the

present study confirms previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests

that states tend to avoid the use of violence to solve transboundary water conflicts. Indeed,

while conflict and cooperation coexisted in the Aral Sea basin in the period under analysis

– and cooperation proved to be fundamentally ineffective – the use of violence and the

possibility for a “water-war” to erupt remained a remote option.

Conceptually, this study developed an analytical model that connected the concepts of

power and hegemony and revisited the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony,

proposing a redesign of its structure named the “circle of hydro-hegemony”. Hegemony is

placed at the centre of this analytical structure, while the various forms of power are taken

as an interconnected entity that is connective in the function of hydro-hegemony. Such

analytical contribution can prompt constructive discussion about the relationship and

interconnections between the notions of power and hegemony in hydropolitics.

In addition, the empirical material collected during this research led to the creation of

three timelines (Annex 2, 3, and 4), that represent the largest recollection of events of this

kind available at the time of writing, and the possible uses for these data are vast. The

timeline of water relations in the period 1991-2011 could for instance be used by

researchers comparing water interactions in a number of international river basins, or by

those specifically studying water politics in Central Asia. Likewise, the timelines of the

Rogun and Kambarata dams could offer useful information for those studying the politics

and rhetoric of large dams and, more specifically, to those interested in these two projects.

Concerning the data collection, a number of important limitations need to be considered.

First, although the data collection was carried out as scrupulously and thoroughly as

184

possible (see Annex 1), it may occur that some events are not included in the timelines.

This is because the timelines are based on news reports, official declaration and official

documents. Rumours and unsubstantiated events, and more in general, matters that were

not reported by the “official” information channels, were not included in the timelines.

A second limitation is due to the fact that events happening after the year 2011 were

deliberately left out of the timelines. While this was done to keep the scope of the research

within a controllable time span, this time limit does not allow to study recent and relevant

developments concerning water relations in Central Asia and the construction of the Rogun

and Kambarata dams.

Thirdly, this research did not entail any fieldwork. This is due to two connected reasons.

The first, is that prior to this study the author spent one year (2009) working on high-level

water politics in Central Asia for the UNRCCA based in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. While

none of the confidential information accessed during this experience was disclosed nor used

in any way in this thesis, this privileged position allowed the researcher to gain a first-hand

understanding of water politics in Central Asia and of how much certain issues can be

politicised and kept in the inaccessible cabinet rooms of the government124

. Secondly and

consequently, since this research analysed social constructions and official government

representations of water issues, the prospect of doing fieldwork in Central Asia (and for

instance interviewing government representatives) did not seem to add any value to the data

collection, as the outcome would have most likely been very similar to the official stance

that the Central Asian governments take through official declarations, statements and

national state-owned media channels that tend to function as the mouthpiece of the

government.

Finally, it is suggested that further research be undertaken in the following areas. First,

and this comes from one of the limitations of this study, further research might explore

recent developments concerning the construction of the Rogun and the Kambarata dams,

(such as the release of the long delayed WB assessment report on the Rogun dam).

Second, although this is not yet feasible, when a regime change (or a succession) takes

place in Uzbekistan and in Tajikistan it would be interesting to see what position the new

124

As Allan and Mirumachi have noted (2010: 14), “[p]oliticized and securitized relations over transboundary

water disappear first into ministries of foreign affairs and then into what has become known as the shadow

state”.

185

leaderships will take towards regional water management, also considering how much the

2010 government change has impacted on the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. For instance,

will the new Uzbek President attempt to harshen the tones of the conflict to assert his power

and get legitimation? Or will he/she be more accommodating than his/her predecessor? And

also, will the Rogun dam be the pet project of the next Tajik President or will he/she instead

attempt to gain energy self-sufficiency for his country with other, less symbolic projects?

Third, considering that both the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments have framed their

dam projects as symbols of patriotism, and also considering that little has been written on

the correlation between the control of water resources and the nation-building process,

further research could explore how ruling political elites use iconic projects such as large

dams to create a sense of national identity, gain legitimacy and boost their popularity. The

necessity of expanding on this area, and to link it with the study transboundary water

relations seems even more relevant, it is argued, considering that after a decline in the

number of dams being erected worldwide from the 1970s onwards, dams are now back on

the global agenda, and hundreds of new, controversial projects have been launched in the

last few years.

Fourth, it would be interesting to compare counter-hegemonic tactics in a number of

international river basins, to explore which forms of power are used by different riparians

and why. This might apply to the issue of large dams but also to any other activity aimed at

countering an existing hegemonic order. For what concerns Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,

both countries adopted, in different ways, the same four counter-hegemonic tactics. Will

these be the same in another international river basin?

Fifth, although this goes beyond the field of hydropolitics and enters that of political

science, a comparative study could investigate the rhetoric of justification used by various

governments when it comes to the construction of architectural “white elephants”.

Countries that have apparently no much in common, might indeed use very similar

discourses aimed at portraying a certain infrastructure as the panacea. For instance, this

could be the case of Italy and Tajikistan for what concerns the Strait of Messina bridge

project and the Rogun dam. The results of such a study could be, depending on the point of

view, surprising or predictable. After all, although more than two millennia have passed

since Plato wrote the Republic, the distinction between reality and appearance in politics

186

and the way realities are constructed by politicians appear to be a topical issue also in the

contemporary world.

187

Annex 1. Methodology

1. Research process

This research started in February 2011 and lasted for three years. Overall, the research

process can be divided into five major steps: i) problem definition; ii) research design; iii)

literature review; iv) data collection; v) analysis and writing. While some of them

overlapped, the different stages of the research generally followed one another, as

illustrated in Figure 25.

Figure 25: Timeframe of the research

Discussions with numerous scholars have helped in gradually narrowing the scope of the

research, eventually leading to the choice of the two case studies. The attendance of two

summers schools125

and numerous conferences and workshops allowed me to present my

research and to receive precious feedback. In addition, the two terms that I have spent at the

Department of Geography of King’s College London (Sept.-Dec. 2012) and at the School

of International Relations of the University of St Andrews (Jan.-Mar. 2013), gave me the

opportunity to receive advices from leading scholars and to access relevant bibliographic

resources.

125

In July 2011 I participated to the 14th

Erasmus IP European Seminar on Geography of Water in Cagliari,

while in July 2012 I attended the EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School on Management of

International Water hosted by Prof. Ariel Dinar in Venice.

Month

ActivityYEAR 3YEAR 1 YEAR 2

Literature review

Data collection

Analysis and writing

Problem definition

Research design

188

2. Creation of three chronologies

A central element in the operationalization of this study was the creation of three

detailed chronologies (one for general interstate relations and one each for Rogun and

Kambarata) of relevant speech acts representative of cooperative and conflictive

interactions. The collection of chronological events emphasizes one of the major strengths

of case studies, namely that case studies allow to trace events over time, to subsequently

analyse them (Yin, 2009: 148). The initial analysis of existing databases on water conflicts

and agreements, such as the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) of the

Oregon State University, the IRCC of the ETH-Zurich and the Water Conflict Chronology

of the Pacific Institute, revealed lack of consistency, both when they were compared to each

other or when crossed with other chronologies and reports of events found in published

academic articles. For this reason, it became necessary to compile a new, detailed

chronology, integrating the above mentioned sources with a systematic screening of

relevant media reports operating in and on the region, both using their websites and the

LexisNexis Research software.

Initially, I made a selection of relevant news sources from the region. The main sources

that I used are: BBC Monitoring International Reports from Central and South Asia Units

(that provides also transcription and translations of national TV and radio programs),

Interfax News Agency, Agence France Press, RFE/RL, Interfax and the state-owned

Central Asian media, that act as the mouthpiece of the government. Subsequently, these

selected sources were the object of a systematic screening based on certain keywords that

was done both taking the five countries (LexisNexis allows to isolate the countries of

interest), both isolating country couples (as Tajikistan-Uzbekistan). In addition, and to get

more results, I limited the timespan of each research to a period of 12 months. This was

done because LexisNexis automatically filter the results when they are more than 1000

(which is often the case for period longer than a year), and thus this was the only way to

avoid a possible loss of information. The process of data collection has taken around 14

months.

The events collected include press reports and interviews, official documents and

declarations, letters and memoirs of key individuals. All these documents have the function

of manifesting actions, such as promising or threatening (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 19).

189

These primary sources are supplemented and contextualised through secondary sources,

such as academic articles and reports from international organizations, and also by

conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives of key international

organizations working in the region and with prominent experts on Central Asian interstate

relations126

.

Subsequently, all the information collected and retained was ordered into three

chronologies (see the annexes for the full chronologies): a general one, and a specific

timeline for Rogun and Kambarata. The general timeline consists of a total of 197 speech

acts, which provide a detailed account of regional inter-state relations in the field of water.

The two specific timelines are similar to the general one, the difference being that they

focus only on Rogun and on Kambarata. Certain events are part of two or oven three

timelines, as they were relevant both the specific and in the general context (i.e., a

conference where the five Presidents openly argued over Rogun and Kambarata and

threatened to take certain actions is something that goes in the three timelines).

As mentioned, thanks to BBC Monitoring and its transcription and translation of

national TV and radio programs, I had access to indigenous language sources overcoming

my unfamiliarity with them. On the other hand, I do understand written Russian language

sources127

, and I have therefore accessed them in their original form.

3. Speech acts

The three chronologies are made of speech acts. Speech act theory was originally

developed by a philosopher of language, Austin (1975), in his seminal book How to do

things with words. The main assumption behind speech act theory is that different uses of

language, by their utterance, perform an action. If I say to a friend that “I will buy a house”,

or “I do” during a marriage ceremony, I am promising that I will do something by just

saying it. This is a performative utterance, one through which I am performing an act.

126

It has to be noted that the objective of these interviews was mostly to further understand and assess the

main challenges and tendencies for regional relations and to enrich the research with further details and

elements. Interviews are normally being realized at the margins of international conferences on water

management (such as the 2012 World Water Forum in Marseille, France) or during dedicated trips to IOs

headquarters. 127

When it comes to regional meetings and conferences, Russian is still the lingua franca in Central Asia.

Furthermore, the Central Asian presidents and ministers generally use Russian to address international forums

such as the UNGA or the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings.

190

Austin identified five categories of performative acts (1975: 151-2): verdictives (giving a

verdict or an appraisal), exercitives (the exercising of powers, rights and influence),

commissives (committing to do something by declaring or announcing it), behabitives

(relating with social behaviours, e.g. apologizing, congratulating or cursing), and expositive

(they put an utterance in a context, as in “I reply”, “I assume” or ”I argue”). Further

elaborating on this, Searle (1975) introduced the following categories of speech acts:

assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarations.

Subsequently, Nicholas Onuf (1998) analysed speech acts from a constructivist point of

view, considering them as acts that perform an action and establish a relationship when

they encounter a response or a reaction from the audience towards which they were

directed. Onuf (1998: 66) reduced the categories of speech acts to the following three: 1)

assertive, through which something is asserted, as in “our country is experiencing a

difficult situation”; 2) directive, through which something is demanded, as in “we need

more water”; and 3) commissive, through which something is promised, as in “I will pay

my debts”.

In this research, speech acts are studied within Onuf’s three categories, assertive,

directive and committive, with the clarification that speech acts can be both verbal and

nonverbal facts, as stated by Duffy and Frederking (2009) in their speech acts analysis of

the end of the Cold War. A nonverbal speech act is a physical, concrete action that conveys

a meaning, such as mobilizing troops at the border, which is an example of a directive

speech act. In water relations, an assertive speech act can be for instance a public speech or

an official statement through which sovereignty on water resources is stated. A directive

speech act can be a cut in water resources to obtain, as in the case of relations between

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, a resumption of gas supplies. Finally, a commissive speech act

can be the signing of a treaty or a joint declaration, through which two countries express a

commitment to engage in future actions.

4. Discourse analysis

The concept of discourse analysis does not refer to a specific method but rather to a

research perspective (Keller, 2012: 3). More than a method, discourse analysis is a

methodology that contains methods of data collection and analysis, combining them with a

191

set of assumptions on how language and social interactions construct realities (Muller,

2011). The focus of discourse analysis is on how specific identities, practices, meanings

and knowledge are created by an actor in describing something in a way or in another

(Rapley, 2008: 132). Being this a study on power and hegemony, it is important to focus on

the capacity of one actor to impose or control a certain discourse, as the management of

social representations can be associated with the control over the minds and perceptions of

other people and thus to hegemony (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). Discourse analysis in this study

is used in the analysis of speech acts, to ascertain whether they are assertive, directive or

committive, connecting them with particular periods of water relations in the Aral Sea

basin, and analysing the audience towards which they were addressed and the meaning that

wanted to be conveyed.

The way discourse analysis is carried out is inspired by techniques developed in

grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodology for developing theory that is grounded

in data gathered and analysed systematically (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 273). In this

methodology originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), theory may be generated

directly from the data or, if other theories on the area of investigation already exist, theory

may be further elaborated and modified using the data gathered. The former approach,

applies to the study of counter-hegemonic strategies, which have not been theorised in

detail and therefore theory will be generated directly from the data. The latter approach, on

the other hand, will be used for hegemonic strategies. In this case, the data gathered will be

confronted with the existing theorisation from Warner and Zeitoun (2006), confirming or

further expanding the categorisation of hegemonic strategies. The data collected in the three

timelines, is coded and categorised (and sub-categorised) looking for relationships, patterns

of action and interaction (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 278) between the various basin

riparians. As Birks and Mills note, grounded theory is usually derived from data sources of

a qualitative and interpretive nature (Birks and Mills, 2011: 6), as it is also the case for this

research.

192

Annex 2. Water relations in Central Asia 1991-2011

Key

KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan

EXT Non-Central Asian actor Y Involved in the event

KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT TYPE OF

EVENT SOURCE

1 Y Y Y Y Y

12/10/1991

Statement of heads of water economy organizations

of Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan adopted

on 10-12 October 1991 meeting in Tashkent in

which the countries recognized water as a limited

resource that should be equally distributed among

the republics.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Statement of heads of water

economy organizations of

Central Asian Republics and

Kazakhstan adopted on 10-12

October 1991 meeting in

Tashkent, 1991. Available

from: http://www.icwc-

aral.uz/statute2.htm [Accessed

10 Feb 2012]

2 Y Y Y Y Y

18/02/1992

Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Joint

Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate

Water Resources (also known as the “Almaty

Agreement).

Agreement

Agreement between the

Republic of Kazakhstan, the

Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic

of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

and the Republic of Uzbekistan

on co-operation in interstate

sources' water resources use

and protection common

management, 1992. Available

from: http://www.icwc-

aral.uz/statute1.htm [Accessed

10 Feb 2012]

3 Y Y Y Y Y

26/03/1993

Agreement between Republic of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan on joint

activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone

around the Sea crisis, improving the environment,

and enduring the social and economic development

of the Aral Sea region (Kzil Orda Agreement).

Agreement

Agreement between Republic

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz

Republic, Republic of

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Republic of Uzbekistan on

joint activities in addressing the

Aral Sea and the zone around

193

the Sea crisis, improving the

environment, and enduring the

social and economic

development of the Aral Sea

region, 1993. Available from:

http://www.icwc-

aral.uz/statute13.htm [Accessed

10 Feb 2012]

4 Y Y Y Y Y

15/01/1994

Adoption of "The Program of Specific Measures to

Improve the Ecological, Social and Economic

Situation in the Aral Sea Basin for 3-5 Years" and of

the "The Basic Provisions of the Concept " (now

known as the Aral Sea Basin Program).

Adoption of

a joint

program

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1994. Central

Asian summit agrees measures

to save Aral Sea. 15 Jan.

5 Y

Y

01/01/1994

Informal barter agreement under which Uzbekistan

agreed to provide Kyrgyzstan with winter heat and

electricity in exchange for water during the summer

growing season.

Annual

operation

agreement

RFE/RL, 1997.

Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: The

Politics Of Water. RFE/RL

[online], 9 Oct. Available from:

http://www.rferl.org/content/art

icle/1086795.html [Accessed 3

Feb. 2012].

6 Y Y Y Y Y

03/03/1995

Establishment of the Aral-Ekobank to raise funds to

deal with the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea.

This was established dutring a meetin in Ashgabat

that established the Resolution of the Heads of States

of the Central Asia on work of the EC of ICAS on

implementation of Action Plan on improvement of

ecological situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the 3-5

years to come with consideration of social and

economic development of the region Parties:

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan.

Establishme

nt of a joint

body

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1995. Central

Asian summit agrees measures

to save Aral Sea. 7 Mar.

7

Y

Y

31/05/1995

Uzbekistan is to stop taking electricity from

Tajikistan in a step which the Tajik energy

authorities see as a violation of an agreement

between the two republics, the Moscow daily

'Pravda'reported on 31st May. The head of the Tajik

power grid was quoted as describing the Uzbek

move as "impolite, to say the very least" . He said

that changes to the annual electricity transfer

contract between the republics require the consent of

both of them, "yet Tashkent did not even inform the

Agreement

violation

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1995. Uzbekistan

reinterprets power supply deal

with Tajikistan ('Pravda',

Moscow, in Russian) 2 Jun.

194

Tajik side of its decision" , 'Pravda' reported.

8 Y Y Y Y Y

20/09/1995

Signing of the Nukus Declaration, that focuses on

sustainable development of the Aral Sea Basin and

on financial obligations of the states to ICAS and

IFAS.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Ryabtsev, 2003. 10 Years of

Regional Collaboration in

Shared Water Resources

Management of Central Asia.

3rd World Water Forum,

Kyoto.

9

Y Y

16/01/1996

Agreement between Turkmenistan and the republic

of Uzbekistan on cooperation on questions of water

management. This agreement stipulates that the Amu

Darya’s water be divided equally between

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan agreed to

pay to Turkmenistan US $11.4m. annually as land

rent for the Buxoro and Qashqadaryo pump stations,

as well as for the water storage area of the

Tuyamuyun reservoir. In addition, Uzbekistan

supplies water from the Qashqadaryo pump station

to a 25,000-ha irrigated area of Turkmenistan free of

charge. This was the first meeting between Karimov

and Niyazov.

Agreement Uzbek television, 1996.

UzTVl, 16 Jan.

10 Y Y

Y

01/04/1996

Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan,

the Government of Kyrgyzstan and the Government

of Uzbekistan on management of water resources in

Central Asia. It stipulated compensation for

Kyrgyzstan for not fully utilizing its hydro-power

potential during winter and allowed increased water

releases during summer.

Agreement

The World Bank, 1997.

Kazakhstan-Syrdarya Control

and Northern Aral Sea Project.

The World Bank Public

Information Center.

11 Y Y

Y

12/04/1996

"Water is a commodity," Kyrgyzstan's minister

for water resources, Zhenishbek Bekbolotov, said.

"Any natural resource that is used should be paid

for." Despite the deal announced this week,

Uzbekistan's acting minister for water resources,

Abdurahim Zhalalov, rejected the notion

that water had become a commodity in Central Asia.

Talks on

water/energy

The Moscow Times, 1996.

Kyrgyzstan Gets to Play

Its Water Card. 12 Apr.

195

"Nobody is trading water," he said. "The commodity

is hydroelectricity." Koposyn Kudaibergenov,

deputy chairman of the Kazakh Water Committee,

added that "In the Koran it is written

that water should not be sold. We should solve the

problems for each other as partners."

12 Y

Y

25/12/1996

Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic

of Kyrgyzstan on the question of use water energy

resources of Naryn Syr Darya's hydropower stations

cascade in 1997.

Annual

operation

agreement

UNECE, 2003. Transboundary

water cooperation in the newly

independent states. Moscow-

Geneva.

13 Y Y Y Y Y

28/02/1997

Almaty Declaration, adopted by the leaders of

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

and Uzbekistan. It declared 1998 as Environmental

Protection Year in the central

Asia region, acknowledged the need to develop a

comprehensive programme of environmental

security including the Aral problem and called on the

UN to pay particular attention to the Aral sea crisis.

Joint

statement/de

claration

United Nations, 1997.

A/52/112, 18 Mar. Available

from:

http://www.un.org/documents/

ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-

112.htm [Accessed 16 Feb.

2012].

14 Y Y

Y

01/06/1997 Kyrgyzstan stated that it was planning to charge

Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan for water.

Declaration/

Speech

RFE/RL Newsline, 1997. Vol.

1, No. 53, 97-06-16.

15 Y Y

Y

01/07/1997

Uzbekistan cut off 70 % of flow downstream,

threatening 100,000 hectares and prompting a riot by

Kazakh farmers. Moreover, it has deployed 130,000

troops on the Kyrgyz border to guard the reservoirs

straddling the two countries.

Resource

cut/Mobilisa

tion of

troops

Eurasianet.org, 2000. Central

Asian states wrangle over

water. Available from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v040500.shtml [Accessed 6

Mar. 2012].

196

16 Y Y Y

Y

19/07/1997

Local Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in the northern Tajik

city of Khujand on 19-20 July to discuss water

distribution. he Kazakhs and Uzbeks requested an

increase in the volume of water flowing from the

Kairakum reservoir in Tajikistan into the Syr River.

Tajik representative Kosim Kosimov said such a

decision can be made only by the Tajik central

government. Kyrgyzstan has already announced it

will begin charging its neighbors for water from the

Naryn River; it has not yet decided on a price,

however.

Talks on

water/energy

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No.

78, 97-07-22.

17

Y

Y

24/07/1997

Residents of Southern Kazakhstan Oblast staged a

demonstration to protest a decision by the Uzbek

government to cut the amount of water flowing from

that country into Kazakhstan. The demonstrators

said the Uzbek decision threatened the corn and

cotton crops on some 100,000 hectares of land in the

oblast.

Resource

cut/Protests

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No.

82, 97-07-28.

18 Y Y Y Y Y

26/09/1997

All five Central Asian republics agreed on the need

for a common strategy in using the region's water for

power generation, irrigation and other purposes.

They decided to create a special consortium for this

purpose. The meeting also agreed to install special

equipment in the main rivers of the region in order to

monitor the flow of water into the Aral Sea. The

Central Asian states merged ICAS and IFAS into a

new IFAS under rotating chairmanship of the

Presidents of Central Asian states.

Agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1997. Central

Asian states seek common

strategy for water resources

(Interfax news agency) 3 Oct.

19 Y

Y

01/10/1997

President Askar Akaev signed an edict codifying

Kyrgyzstan's right to profit from water resources

within its territories. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a

clear intent to follow through on its plans. It has

threatened to sell water to China if Uzbekistan

refuses to pay. It has also demanded compensation

for revenues lost from releasing water downstream

to Uzbek farms instead of using it to generate

hydroelectric power.

Adoption of

legal

instruments

Eurasianet.org, 2000. Central

Asian states wrangle over

water. Available from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v040500.shtml [Accessed 6

Mar. 2012].

20 Y Y

Y Y

16/10/1997 Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Imanaliyev's 2-day official Talks on BBC Summary of World

197

visit to Tajikistan ended by an exchange of

ratification instruments for a treaty on the basic

principles of mutual relations between the countries.

Speaking at press conference Thursday, he said

Kyrgyz leadership was extremely interested that

Tajikistan should become participant in

implementation of projects within framework of

Central Asian Union. Specifically, this concerned the

decision of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan

to establish transnational consortiums in 7 directions,

Imanaliyev explained, noting that Tajikistan was

interested in such spheres as water resources and

power engineering.

water/energy Broadcasts, 1997. President

Rahmonov discusses

cooperation with Kyrgyz

foreign minister (Tajik Radio

first programme, Dushanbe, in

Tajik) 18 Oct.

21 Y Y

27/12/1997

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan friday reached a "coal

for water" agreement, ending their three-year-long

row over the issue, the itar-tass news agency

reported saturday. Under this accord, Kyrgyzstan

will provide irrigation water to Kazakhstan in the

spring of 1998. Kazakhstan will pay back with

600,000 tons of coal and partially pay for the

utilization of irrigation works in Kyrgyzstan.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1997. Kazakhstan

and Kyrgyzstan sign water for

coal deal ( ITAR-TASS news

agency (World Service),

Moscow, in Russian) 30 Dec.

22 Y Y

01/01/1998

Kyrgyzstan has threatened to cut off water and

electricity supplies to Kazakhstan unless previous

deliveries are paid for.

Threatening/

Warning

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1998. Kyrgyzstan

unhappy with

Kazakh water and electricity

debts ( ITAR-TASS news

agency (World Service),

Moscow, in Russian) 2 Jan.

23 Y Y Y Y Y

05/01/1998

The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met

behind closed doors in Ashgabat on 5-6 January. On

the agenda were regional cooperation, gas and oil

pipelines, and the situation of the Aral Sea.

Talks on

water/energy

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No.

189, 98-01-06.

198

24

Y

Y

04/02/1998

Agreement Between the Government of the Republic

of Tajikistan and the Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational

Water and Energy Uses. The documents included an

intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the

use of water and energy resources, agreements on

legal aid, cooperation and mutual assistance between

the two countries' security services and interior

ministries, cooperation to combat crime, transport

and on cooperation in the struggle against drug

trafficking. An intergovernmental agreement on

restructuring Tajikistan's debt to Uzbekistan was

also among the documents signed.

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between the

Government of the Republic of

Tajikistan and the Government

of the Republic of Uzbekistan

on Cooperation in the Area of

Rational Water and

Energy Uses. Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Kayrakum-98.pdf

[Accessed 7 Mar. 2012]

25 Y Y

Y

17/03/1998

Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic and the Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan on Joint and Complex Use Water and

Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade

Reservoirs in 1998.

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between the

Government of the Republic of

Kazakhstan, the Government of

the Kyrgyz Republic and the

Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan on Joint and

Complex Use Water and

Energy Resources of the Naryn

Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs

in 1998. Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Annual-Operation-98.pdf

[Accessed 7 Mar. 2012].

26 Y

Y

01/08/1998 Uzbekistan cut off supplies to Kyrgyzsatn on 1

August because of unpaid bills. Resource cut

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No.

148, 98-08-05.

199

27 Y

Y

04/08/1998

Gas supplies from neighboring Uzbekistan have

been restored. The Kyrgyz government has paid

$900,000 of the debt and sent a letter to the Uzbek

authorities guaranteeing future payments.

Resumption

of resource

supply

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No.

148, 98-08-05

28

Y Y

16/10/1998

Talks between Turkmen and Uzebk presidents

concerning regional security, including the use of the

Amu Darya.

Talks on

water/energy

Associated Press Worldstream,

1998. Turkmen, Uzbek

presidents discuss Afghanistan.

16 Oct.

29

Y Y

03/03/1999

Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov

pointed out that attention during his meetings with

Tajikistan President Rakhmanov and Foreign

Minister Nazarov was devoted mainly to the

development of substanative dialogue on all matters

concerning bilateral relations, including the

problems of the Aral Sea. Upon having pointed out

that Tajikistan, as a country with huge water

resources, plays an important role in the resolution

of the problem. Shikhmuradov said message from

the President of Turkmenistan to Rakhmanov have

been delivered, inviting him to attend the Ashgabat

summit on the Aral Sea. Shikhmuradov declared in

favor of intensifying cooperation between the

countries in power development, specifically under

comprehensive programs of the Organization for

Economic Cooperation.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1998. Tajik

Turkmen leader concur on

regional security issues.

(ITAR-TASS news agency) 3

Mar.

30 Y Y Y Y Y

09/04/1999

Agreement between the government of Republic of

Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic, the Government of Republic of Tajikistan,

the Government of Turkmenistan and the

Agreement

Interstate Commission for

Water Coordination of Central

Asia. Available from:

http://www.icwc-

200

Government of Republic of Uzbekistan about the

status of the international fund for saving the Aral

sea (IFAS) and its organizations.

aral.uz/statute3.htm [Accessed

6 May 2012]

31 Y Y Y Y Y

09/04/1999

Adoption of the April 1999 Ashgabat Declaration,

that calls for joint actions to address shared

environmental problems in the Aral Sea basin.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Interstate Commission for

Water Coordination of Central

Asia.

32

Y

Y

13/04/1999

Agreement Between the Government of the Republic

of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic

of Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational

Water and Energy Uses in 1999

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between the

Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan and the

Government of the Republic of

Tajikistan on Cooperation in

the Area of Rational Water and

Energy Uses in 1999. Available

from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Kayrakum-99.pdf

[Accessed 8 Jun. 2012].

33 Y Y Y

Y

07/05/1999

Protocol on Inserting Amendments and Addenda in

the Agreement Between the Governments of the

Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and

the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and

Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin, of 17

March 1998. Id adds Tajikistan to the 17/03/1998

agreement.

Agreement

Protocol on Inserting

Amendments and Addenda in

the Agreement Between the

Governments of the Republic

of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz

Republic, and the Republic of

Uzbekistan on the Use of

Water and Energy Resources of

the Syr Darya Basin, of 17

March 1998Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/SyrDaryaAmm-Jun-99.pdf

[Accessed 15 May 2012].

34 Y Y

17/05/1999

Water supply to the Jambyl and Chimkent regions of

neighboring Kazakhstan from the Kara-Bura

reservoir in Kyrgyzstan was halted. According to

Silaev, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and

Kazakhstan agreed last year that Kazakhstan would

supply Kyrgyzstan with 560,00 metric tons of coal in

1999 in return for water from the Kara-Bura

reservoir, but Kazakhstan has not sent any coal to

Kyrgyzstan so far this year. Nor has the Kazakh

Resource cut RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No.

101, 99-05-25.

201

leadership informed Kyrgyzstan when those

deliveries will be made. According to Pannier, in this

case Kyrgyzstan for the first time used water as a

political tool. It demanded compensation for

maintaining the reservoirs on the Syr-Darya.

Kazakhstan, for example, was asked for shipments

of coal to keep northern Kyrgyzstan warm and

productive in the winter. When Kazakhstan did not

ship the coal, Kyrgyzstan closed off the reservoirs

that release water to Kazazkhstan. The pressure

worked; the bill was paid. (Pannier 2000)

35 Y Y

18/05/1998

Kazakhstan's Intergaz company on 18 May cut gas

supplies to northern Kyrgyzstan. Toktosun

Abduvaliev said his company owes Intergaz some

$2.2 million for supplies received in 1997-1998.

Resource cut

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No.

97, 99-05-19.

36 Y Y

22/05/1999

Northern regions of Kyrgyzstan began receiving gas

from Kazakhstan on 22 May after the Kyrgyz

government paid the first installment, worth $25,

000, of its $2.2 million back debt to Kazakhstan's

Intergaz company, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau

reported.

Resumption

of resource

supply

RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No.

99, 99-05-24.

37 Y Y

22/05/1999

Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic on Comprehensive Use of Water and

Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade

Reservoirs in 1999.

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between the

Government of the Republic of

Kazakhstan and the

Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic on Comprehensive

Use of Water and Energy

Resources of the Naryn Syr

202

Darya Cascade Reservoirs in

1999. Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Annual-KzKg-99.pdf

[Accessed 8 Jun. 2012].

38 Y Y Y

Y

17/06/1999

Agreement between the Governments of the

Republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the

Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of

Uzbekistan on the Parallel Operation of the Energy

Systems of Central Asia.

Agreement

Interstate Commission for

Water Coordination of Central

Asia.

39 Y

Y

01/01/2000

Uzbekistan carried out military exercises at the

border with Kyrgyzstan, with the seeming objective

of practicing for capturing the Toktogul Reservoir,

located on Kyrgyz territory but used by Uzbekistan

to irrigate fields in Fergana valley. This action was a

response by Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan’s flooding of

farm fields, while opening the dam to produce

additional electricity for its population.

Resource

cut/Mobilisa

tion of

troops

CACI Analyst, 2009. Fire over

water in Central Asia.

Available from:

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=

node/5079 [Accessed 7 Jun.

2012].

40

Y

Y

14/01/2000

Agreement Between the Government of the Republic

of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic

of Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational

Water and Energy Uses in 2000.

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between the

Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan and the

Government of the Republic of

Tajikistan on Cooperation in

the Area of Rational Water and

Energy Uses in 2000. Available

from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Kayrakum-00.pdf

[Accessed 2 May 2012].

203

41 Y

Y

15/01/2000

Uzbekistan reduced gas supplies to neighboring

Kyrgyzstan to a minimum in retaliation for Bishkek's

failure to pay its outstanding $400,000 debt for

earlier supplies, ITAR-TASS and AP reported. Most

private homes in Bishkek and other areas of northern

Kyrgyzstan were without gas or heating as most of

Kyrgyzstan's thermal plants are gas fired.

Resource cut RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No.

11, 00-01-17.

42 Y Y

21/01/2000

Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic on the utilisation of the water facilities of

interstate use on the Chu and Talas Rivers . In this

agreement, Kazakhstan agreed to pay Kyrgyzstan

maintenance costs for the use of their shared water

facilities on the Chu and Talas Rivers.

Agreement CA Water Info portal

43 Y

Y

16/03/2000

Intergovernmental Protocol between the Government

of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the

Republic of Uzbekistan on Use of the Naryn-Syr

Darya Water and Energy Resources in 2000.

Annual

operation

agreement

Intergovernmental Protocol

Between the Government of

the Kyrgyz Republic and the

Government of the Republic of

Uzbekistan on Use of the

Naryn-Syr Darya Water and

Energy Resources in 2000 16

March 2000, Osh, Kyrgyzstan.

Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Annual-UzKg-00.pdf

[Accessed 7 Apr. 2012]

44

Y

Y 31/03/2000

Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov has

rejected British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's

proposal on the republic's participation in an

international conference on saving the Aral

Sea. Niyazov believes the politicization of this issue

may cause serious difficulties in relations between

the five CIS countries regarding the distribution

of water resources, the presidential press service has

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax Russian News, 2000.

Turkmen president against

politicization of Aral Sea issue.

31 Mar.

204

told Interfax.

45

Y Y

31/03/2000

Niyazov and Karimov had a telephone conversation

today. As a most pressing topic of the current time

they recalled the rational distribution and purposeful

use of water resources, an issue which concerns the

daily life of their two peoples and also of the other

peoples of the region. The two sides stated that

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan enjoy complete

consensus on this issue.The leaders of Turkmenistan

and Uzbekistan came to the conclusion that these

water-related issues should be regulated on the basis

of bilateral relations and that any international

assistance should not be accompanied by undesirable

politicization.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2000.

Turkmen, Uzbek heads oppose

"politicization" of regional

water issues. (Turkmen

Television first channel,

Ashkhabad, in Turkmen) 1

Apr.

46 Y Y

23/05/2000

Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic on the use of water and energy resources of

the Naryn – Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs in 2000.

Annual

operation

agreement

Agreement Between The

Government of the Republic of

Kazakhstan And The

Government of the Kyrgyz

Republic On the Use of Water

and Energy Resources of the

Naryn – Syr Darya Cascade of

Reservoirs in 2000. Available

from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Annual-KzKg-00.pdf

[Accessed 4 May 2012].

47 Y Y Y Y Y Y 07/06/2000

OSCE head Ferrero Waldner visited Central Asia

and proposed a multilateral approach to water

management. The presidents of Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan said they prefer to handle the problem on

a bilateral basis and rejected the multilateral

approach proposed by the OSCE. Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, however, favor it.

Talks on

water/energy

Eurasianet.org, 2000. OSCE

seeks agreement on Central

Asian water. Available

from:http://www.eurasianet.org

/departments/environment/artic

les/eav060600.shtml [Accessed

7 Mar. 2012].

205

48 Y Y

Y

01/07/2000

Dispute between KG, KZ and UZ during July 2000.

Southern Kazakhstan faced a serious water shortage

after Bishkek cut supplies because of Kazakhstan’s

failure to meet agreed energy supplies and

Uzbekistan reportedly extracted more water than it

was entitled to. Uzbekistan began appropriating

some of Kazakhstan’s water share from the Fergana

Valley. Kazakhstan lobbied Uzbekistan for more

water in meetings and Kazakh TeleCom stopped

relaying international telephone calls from

Uzbekistan.

Resource

cut/capture

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2000. Kazakh-

Uzbek talks on water issues

stalling, Kazakh cotton crop in

balance. (Khabar TV, Almaty,

in Russian) 15 Jul.

49

Y

20/10/2000

Turkmen President Saparmyrat Niyazov attended a

ceremony to launch a project to build

a huge artificial lake in the Karakum desert in central

Turkmenistan. Speaking at the ceremony, a report on

which was broadcast on Turkmen TV later the same

day, Niyazov said that the lake was designed to

collect saline waters from all over Turkmenistan and

to provide the Turkmen people with water over the

next 50 years. He said the project would not harm

the environment of other Central Asian states since it

was merely restoring the facilities which had existed

before Genghis Khan destroyed the area's water

economy in the 14th century.

Resource

capture

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2000. Turkmen

president launches project to

build artificial lake. (Turkmen

Television first channel,

Ashgabat, in Turkmen) 21 Oct.

50 Y Y

21/11/2000

Kazakh Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev

expressed serious concern about the plans to build

the Kambarata hydroelectric station in Kyrgyzstan

with Kazakh funds and proposed that the project

should be "blocked in every way". He thinks that it

will lead to water being drawn away from the

Toktogul hydroelectric station, which would have an

adverse affect on water supplies in Kazakhstan.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2000. Kazakh

government discusses water

supplies to southern Regions.

(Interfax-Kazakhstan news

agency, Almaty, in Russian) 22

Nov.

51 Y Y

24/11/2000

The Kyrgyz parliament has refused to pass the law

ratifying an agreement with Kazakhstan on use of

the water control facilities on two rivers [the Naryn

and Syrdarya]. Deputies took the view that the

republic's water resources are not simply a national

wealth but a commodity.

Other

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2000. Parliament

rejects water accord with

Kazakhstan. 29 Nov.

52 Y Y

01/12/2000

KG and UZ announced with great fanfare a

rescheduling agreement that was designed to solve

the payment problems of natural gas sold to KG.

Annual

operation

agreement

Eurasianet.org, 2000.

Upstream-Downstream: The

Difficulties of Central Asia’s

Water and Energy Swaps.

206

Available from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/business/articles/eav02

0601.shtml [Accessed 5 Jul .

2012].

53 Y

Y

20/01/2001

UZ cut off natural gas supplies to KG for lack of

timely payment, leaving residents in the Northern

regions of KG without natural gas for part of the

winter.

Resource cut

Wines, 2002. Grand Soviet

Scheme for Sharing Water in

Central Asia Is Foundering.

The New York Times, 9 Dec.

54

Y

Y

03/02/2001

An intergovernmental agreements was signed

between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on cooperation in

the efficient use of water resources in 2001.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2001. Water and

energy deals signed. (Tajik

Radio first programme,

Dushanbe, in Tajik) 16 Feb.

55 Y

Y

05/02/2001

Gas supplies are flowing again from Uzbekistan to

Kyrgyzstan following a more than week-long cutoff

that created heating and electricity shortages in many

Kyrgyz cities. Uzbekistan stopped supplying gas to

exert pressure on Kyrgyzstan to pay off $1.35

million in debts for earlier deliveries.

Resumption

of resource

supply

Eurasianet.org, 2000.

Upstream-Downstream: The

Difficulties of Central Asia’s

Water and Energy Swaps.

Available from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/business/articles/eav02

0601.shtml [Accessed 5 Jul .

2012].

56 Y

Y

26/02/2001

Talks between Kyrgyz officials and Uzbek Prime

Minister Otkir Sultonov have started in Bishkek. The

main subject of the talks between the two

government delegations will be resumption of Uzbek

gas supplies to northern Kyrgyzstan and

accumulation of water in Kyrgyz reservoirs for

Uzbekistan's irrigation needs," it added.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2001. Uzbek-

Kyrgyz gas, water talks begin

in Bishkek. (Kabar news

agency, Bishkek, in Russian)

27 Feb.

207

57 Y

Y

01/03/2001

An Uzbex expert declared that"Because of

Kyrgyzstan's extensive water discharge during the

last five years, the total loss for Uzbekistan reached

almost $1 billion,".

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available

from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v031901.shtml [Accessed 5

Aug . 2012].

58 Y Y

06/03/2001

Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz authorities signed a

protocol under which Kazakhstan agreed to settle a

$21.5 million debt in order to facilitate negotiations

on water supplies. Kazakhstan also promised to

supply Kyrgyzstan with fuel and coal. Astana is

seeking up to 750 million cubic meters of water for

irrigation. A formal agreement could be in place by

the end of March.

Annual

operation

agreement

Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available

from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v031901.shtml [Accessed 6

Aug . 2012].

59 Y Y Y

Y

16/03/2001

Protocol of Experts’ Joint Working Meeting to

Develop a Draft Agreement between the

Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz

Republic, Republic of

Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan on Use of

Naryn-Syr Darya Cascade’s Water and Energy

Resources in 2001.

Annual

operation

agreement

Protocol of Experts’ Joint

Working Meeting to Develop a

Draft Agreement between the

Governments of the Republic

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz

Republic, Republic of

Tajikistan and Republic of

Uzbekistan on Use of Naryn-

Syr Darya Cascade’s Water

and Energy Resources in 2001.

Available from:

http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/

mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme

nts/Annual-Protocol-01.pdf

[Accessed 5 Mar. 2012].

208

60 Y Y

Y

01/06/2001

The Kyrgyzstan legislature passed a law identifying

water as a legal commodity, opening the way for the

imposition of a pricing structure, and within a few

months the government declared that it would soon

develop a fee scale by which it would charge the

downstream recipients for water usage. (ICG notes

that Kyrgyzstan has backed down from its original

position. Whereas initially it demanded that

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan pay for all water they

receive, it now insists that they pay only for the

water passing through Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals

– in other words, share maintenance costs.)

Adoption of

legal

instruments

Eurasianet.org, 2001. Water

continues to be source of

tension in Central Asia.

Available from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v102301.shtml [Accessed 30

Apr . 2012].

61 Y Y

24/07/2001

The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Askar

Akayev and Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed

an agreement on economic cooperation for the

period between 2001 and 2005. The two countries

are to set up a consortium for the joint utilization

of water and energy resources. The prime ministers

have been instructed to draw up a plan for

establishing this consortium, the presidents

announced. The Kyrgyz parliament's decision to

demand a charge for the utilization of

Kyrgyz water resources was unacceptable for

Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev said.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Interfax News Agency, 2001.

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan sign

agreement on economic

cooperation. 24 Jul.

62 Y Y

Y

01/08/2001

Following up on the June law, The Kyrgyz

government announced that it was preparing

regulations to charge neighboring states, including

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for the water they use.

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available

from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v102301.shtml [Accessed 27

Sept. 2012].

209

63 Y

Y

15/10/2001

Kyrgyz First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai

Panayev told that Uzbekistan may stop supplying

gas to Kyrgyzstan in the near future, at a press

conference in Bishkek.

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax News Agency, 2001.

Bishkek fears Tashkent may

stop gas supplies. 15 Oct.

64 Y

Y

16/10/2001

Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov told journalists

in Tashkent on October 16 that Kyrgyzstan's move

to charge for water would add friction to already

tense relations. "The

introduction of the law contradicts the international

norms," Sultanov said.

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available

from:

http://www.eurasianet.org/depa

rtments/environment/articles/ea

v102301.shtml [Accessed 27

Sept. 2012].

65 Y

Y

29/10/2001

Protocol on the joint use of water and energy

resources has been signed, obliging Uzbekistan to

ship 300 million cubic meters of gas, oil, fuel and

lubricants to Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek and Osh heat and

electricity stations. Kyrgyzstan also agreed to accept

532 million-kilowatt hours of electricity in

wintertime from Uzbekistan as disbursement for

Uzbekistan's energy debt. Kyrgyzstan, in its turn,

guarantees the accumulation of water in the

Toktogul water reservoir, Central Asia's largest, so

that irrigation water will last for Uzbekistan through

2002.

Annual

operation

agreement

Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Report, 2001.

Kyrgyzstan to be fully supplied

with gas from Uzbekistan. 29

Oct.

66

Y

Y 29/10/2001

Chairman of the Barki Tochik open joint stock

holding company (Tajikistan) Dzhurabek

Nurmakhmatov and director general of one of the

units of the Russian financial-industrial group Baltic

Construction Company Oleg Toni on Tuesday will

sign a contract in Dushanbe to build the Rogun

hydroelectric station.

Agreement

Ria Novosti, 2002. Russians to

complete construction of

Rogun HPP in Tajikistan. 29

Oct.

67 Y

Y

23/01/2002

Report from Uzbek TV "A number of residential

areas in Namangan Region [eastern Uzbekistan] and

agricultural farms are under threat of being flooded

because 650-700 cu.m. of water are being released

from the Toktogul reservoir at present. For example,

since a great deal of water flows in the River

Arnasay in winter, its water level has risen to 7.5 m

during the past 5-6 years. (...) As a result, about

350,000 ha of land in Navoi and Dzhizak Regions

have been flooded, we have had to move hundreds of

sheep farms, and many roads and power

Floods

BBC Monitoring International

Reports, 2002. Kyrgyz fail to

stick to water-energy deal -

Uzbek TV. 23 Jan.

210

transmission lines have been hit by floods.

68 Y Y Y

Y

01/02/2002

The foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan and the deputy foreign minister of

Uzbekistan, have met in Almaty, Kazakhstan. They

discussed regional security, drug trafficking, the

threat posed by the Chardara reservoir in southern

Kazakhstan and the creation of a regional water-

energy consortium.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Uzbekistan

agrees to act to avert overflow

of Kazakh reservoir. (Khabar

Television, Almaty, in Russian)

20 Feb.

69 Y

Y

15/02/2002

Uzbekistan shows concern about possible

emergencies that may arise due to the increased

release of water from the Toktogul reservoir in

Kyrgyzstan.

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax News Bulletin, 2002.

Uzbekistan faces flood threat.

15 Feb.

70 Y Y Y

Y

05/10/2002

Joint Communiqué of the Heads of State of the

Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the

Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of

Uzbekistan, where it was reiterated the need for

coordinated measures in the water sector based on

generally recognized norms and principles of

international law.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Official Documents System of

the United Nations.

71 Y Y Y Y Y

06/10/2002

Dushanbe Declaration, signed during the summit of

the States members of the Organization of Central

Asian Cooperation. It concentrates on improving

information exchange on water and other natural

resources

Joint

statement/de

claration

Official Documents System of

the United Nations.

72 Y Y Y

Y

01/04/2003

The four central Asian states of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are to

collaborate for the construction of the Kambarata

hydroelectric power plant in Kyrgyzstan. According

to preliminary estimates, the construction of the first

Kambarat hydroelectric power plant is expected to

cost US$1.7B, and the second is estimated at

approximately US$230M. It is expected that Central

Asian states, Russia and the World Bank will

provide funding for the projects.

Talks on

water/energy

Water Power & Dam

Construction, 2003. Central

Asian states to participate in

hydro. 30 Apr.

211

73 Y Y Y Y Y

28/08/2003

Authorization of the "Programme of concrete actions

on improvement of environmental and socio-

economic situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the

period of 2003-2010" (ASBP-2)

Agreement

Interstate Commission for

Water Coordination of Central

Asia.

74

Y

Y 01/09/2003

TJ organizes the UN supported Interantional Water

Forum. Countries adopt the Dushanbe Water Appeal,

that reiterates the importance of freshwater resources

and calls on the United Nations, governments,

organizations and stakeholders to commit

themselves more fully to achieving the Millennium

Development Goals and the targets agreed upon in

the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The

Appeal also invites the United Nations to declare

2005-2015 the International Decade of 'Water for

Life.

Water

conference

UN Documents. Dushanbe

Water Appeal, Included as an

Annex to A/58/362.

75 Y

Y

04/12/2003

A contract for supplying natural gas from

Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan in 2004 still has not been

signed. Two-month Kyrgyz-Uzbek talks have ended

fruitlessly. A decision is expected to be made in

early January 2004 . A contract for 2003 was also

signed with a one-month delay, and only after

Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's personal

intervention. Anyway, the 2003 contract for

supplying natural gas to Kyrgyzstan is valid until the

end of the year. No one can guarantee that natural

gas will be supplied to Kyrgyzstan without

interruption after its expiration. Currently

Kyrgyzstan owes almost 11m dollars to Uzbekistan

for natural gas. Of this amount, Kyrgyz people owe

4m dollars to the Kyrgyzgaz for the supplied natural

gas.

No

agreement

reached

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2003. Kyrgyz-

Uzbek talks on natural gas

supplies reopen. (Public

Educational Radio and TV,

Bishkek, in Russian) 4 Dec.

212

76 Y

Y

12/12/2003

The Kyrgyz prime minister, Nikolay Tanayev, has

told parliament that a deal has been reached with

Uzbekistan on gas supplies and that Kyrgyzstan will

be paying for Uzbek gas in foreign currency - it had

been paying 45 per cent in kind. He also defended

Kyrgyzstan's record in paying for gas (Kyrgyzstan

has a debt of 11m dollars for Uzbek gas).

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2003. Deal reached

on Uzbek gas, Kyrgyz premier

tells parliament. (Kyrgyz Radio

first programme, Bishkek, in

Russian) 13 Dec.

77 Y Y

25/12/2003

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to jointly operate

a pipeline that supplies the Central Asian neighbors

with gas, one several deals aimed at expanding

economic ties.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to jointly operate

the Bukhara-Almaty pipeline that supplies the two

countries with Uzbek gas, ending a dispute between

Kazakh and Kyrgyz gas companies over sharing the

gas flowing through it, officials said.

Annual

operation

agreement

Associated Press Worldstream,

2003. Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan sign deals to

improve economic ties. 25 Dec.

78

Y

Y

29/12/2003

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed water and energy

supply deals and discussed other long-standing

problems as they attempt to improve strained

relations. Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesman

Ilkhom Zakirov said the visit by Akil and other

senior ministers visit signaled "the mutual desire to

finally sit down and discuss a wide range of

Cooperation issues."

Annual

operation

agreement

Associated Press Worldstream,

2003. Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan sign

energy, water deals, discuss

long-standing issues. 29 Dec.

79 Y

Y

Y

03/01/2004

Tajik and Kyrgyz natural-gas firms have succeeded

in signing contracts with Uzbekistan's gas supplier

Uztransgaz for deliveries of gas in 2004.

Annual

operation

agreement

RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-06.

213

80 Y Y

Y

04/01/2004

High-level delegations from Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met in Shymkent in

South Kazakhstan Oblast on 4 January to discuss

measures to prevent flooding from a major reservoir

on the Syr Darya River. The discussion ended with

the signing of a protocol under which Kazakhstan

will supply coal and fuel oil to Kyrgyzstan in

January and Kyrgyzstan will reduce its hydroelectric

output and increase power generation in its thermal

plants, while Uzbekistan will raise the flow of water

from the Chardara Reservoir into its nearby Arnasai

Reservoir. The three delegations also agreed to set

up a working group to regulate the flow of the Syr

Darya.

Annual

operation

agreement

RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-06.

81

Y

Y

13/01/2004

Some Kazakh media have complained that

Uzbekistan has not taken the measures promised at

the 4 January meeting to control the flow from the

Chardara Reservoir on the Uzbek-Kazakh border.

Declaration/

Speech RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-14.

82 Y Y

Y

01/02/2004

The Syr Darya River has burst its banks, submerging

fields and settlements near the Uzbek-Kazakh border

in the region's worst floods since 1969. The rising

waters are partly due to unseasonably heavy rain

over the winter, but the major reason lies in the

Central Asian states' longstanding inability to

manage their shared water resources in a coordinated

and rational manner. The root of the problem is

Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir.

Floods

RFE/RL Central Asia Report,

2004. Volume 4, Number 7, 16

Feb.

83 Y Y Y

Y

11/02/2004

TJ agreed to immediately reduce its own discharges

from its Qayroqqum Reservoir to stop the floods.

The Syr Darya actually passes through this body of

water. In the first week of February the Tajiks, far

from helping to defuse the crisis, were contributing

to it by discharging large additional amounts of

water for their own hydroelectric purposes.

Annual

operation

agreement

RFE/RL Central Asia Report,

2004. Volume 4, Number 7, 16

Feb.

214

84

Y

Y

12/02/2004

Kazakh Agriculture Minister and Deputy Prime

Minister Akhmetzhan Yesimov traveled to Tashkent

for bilateral follow-up talks with Uzbek Prime

Minister Shavkat Mirzayoev.

Talks on

water/energy RFE/RL Newsline, 04-02-13.

85 Y Y

Y

14/02/2004

Karimov sent a letter to Nazarbaev blaming the

current excess of water in the basin of the Syr Darya

River on Kyrgyzstan's carelessness in releasing

water from the Toktogul reservoir.

Open Letter RFE/RL Newsline, 04-02-17.

86 Y Y Y

Y

13/05/2004

Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar

Aytmatov in an interview with the Kyrgyz AKIpress

on 13 May 2004 commented on the country's

position regarding some issues relating to Kyrgyz-

Kazakh economic cooperation. "Moreover, currently

an issue of the creation of an international water and

energy consortium is being considered within the

framework of CACO Central Asian Cooperation

Organization. It is expected that an investment

policy will be conducted within the framework of

this consortium, which is aimed at the construction

of new hydroelectric power stations - Kambar-Ata-1

and Kambar-Ata-2 southwestern Kyrgyzstan

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. (Corr)

Kyrgyzstan to develop

cooperation with "fraternal"

Kazakhstan - minister.

(AKIpress, Bishkek, in

Russian) 13 May.

87 Y Y Y

Y

28/05/2004

The presidents of the four Central Asian countries,

Nursultan Nazarbayev Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev

Kyrgyzstan , Emomali Rahmonov Tajikistan and

Islam Karimov Uzbekistan , signed a joint

communique, an agreement between the member

states on mutually broadcasting TV and radio

programmes and a decision on setting up an

international water and energy consortium within the

framework of CACO.

Joint

statement/de

claration

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Central

Asian leaders set up water-

energy consortium. (Interfax-

Kazakhstan news agency,

Almaty, in Russian) 28 May.

88 Y Y

12/07/2004

An agreement to this effect was signed during a

session of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh joint

intergovernmental commission for bilateral

cooperation yesterday 12 July . Kazakhstan intends

to buy over 1bn kWh from the country. This is the

highest figure in recent years. For its part,

Kyrgyzstan is ready to comply with Kazakhstan's

wishes and to increase water discharges from the

Toktogul reservoir. Southern Kazakh regions badly

need irrigation water during the vegetation period.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. (Corrected)

Kazakhstan to increase imports

of Kyrgyz electricity. (Pyramid

TV, Bishkek, in Russian) 13

Jul.

215

89 Y Y

Y

15/07/2004

Delegations from three Central Asian countries -

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - are

considering the issues of water discharge from the

Toktogul hydroelectric power station [in

northeastern Kyrgyzstan] during the vegetation

period.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyz,

Kazakh, Uzbek officials

discuss water issues in

Tashkent. (Kyrgyz Radio first

programme, Bishkek, in

Russian) 16 Jul.

90

Y

Y

16/07/2004

Uzbekistan has pledged to increase

the water released from the Syr Darya river to the

Shardara reservoir in South Kazakhstan Region by

80 cu.m. per second to irrigate the cotton

fields.This agreement was reached during a meeting

between Kazakh Agriculture Minister Serik

Umbetov and Uzbek Deputy Agriculture Minister

Mahmud Jalolov held in the region's Makhtaaral

District on 16 July, the regional agriculture

department has told the Interfax-Kazakhstan news

agency.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Uzbekistan

pledges more water for Kazakh

cotton fields. (Interfax-

Kazakhstan news agency,

Almaty, in Russian) 20 Jul.

91

Y Y

19/11/2004

Uzbek President Islam Karimov and his Turkmen

counterpart Saparmurat Niyazov toasted champagne

and signed agreements that signalled an end to

tensions over an alleged assassination attempt on

Niyazov in 2002 and over the Amu-Darya River that

criss-crosses the countries' border. "We have solved

the water dispute for future generations," Niyazov

said.

Agreement

Agence France Presse, 2004.

Turkmen, Uzbek leaders vow

end to tension

over water, assassination bid.

19 Nov.

92

Y

Y 16/10/2004

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said after a

meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin

in Dushanbe, that in all, the Russian aluminum giant

RUSAL will participate in projects worth more than

$1 billion in Tajikistan. Rusal will, for example,

receive an as yet unspecified stake in the Rogun

hydroelectric project for $560 million of investment

in the Rogun dam's completion.

Talks on

water/energy

Interfax Mining & Metals

Report, 2004. RUSAL to hep

build aluminum smelter in

Tajikistan. 21 Oct.

93 Y Y

08/02/2005

The Kazakh-Kyrgyz intergovernmental commission

has reached an agreement on the use of the

Toktogul water reservoir in Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan

will reduce the amount of water released by the

Toktogul reservoir into the Kazakh Shardara

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Kyrgyzs agree to

cut water discharge to prevent

floods in Kazakhstan. (Kazakh

Television first channel,

216

reservoir from 740 cu.m. per second to 650 cu.m. per

second. In return, Kazakhstan will consider

supplying natural gas to the neighbouring state.

Pressure was put on the Toktogul hydroelectric

power station due to the shortage of electricity in

winter months.

Astana, in Kazakh) 8 Feb.

94

Y

Y

10/02/2005

A Tajik government delegation headed by Prime

Minister Oqil Oqilov arrived in Tashkent today. Two

documents were signed on the results of the talks.

They are intergovernmental agreements on the

mutual settlement of accounts for cargo

transportation and the payment of Tajikistan's state

debt in 2005, and on cooperation in the rational use

of water and energy resources in the period from

February 2005 to April 2006.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan sign energy, debt

accords. (Uzbek Television

first channel, Tashkent, in

Russian) 10 Feb.

95 Y

Y

06/05/2005

Incident between the border communities of Charbak

and Sogment [both Kyrgyz] and Khushyor [Uzbek].

Farmers from Khushyor demand that a schedule for

supplying irrigation water be changed.

Other

BBC Monitoring International

Reports, 2005. NGOs said

playing "key role" in settling

Uzbek-Kyrgyz water row. 6

May.

96 Y

Y

19/05/2005

TJ and KG presidents met and agreed to boost the

development of their relationd at all levels. They

said Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could become the

countries who could export power not only to the

region but to the world as well

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Tajik, Kyrgyz

leaders hail prospects for

energy ties. (Asia-Plus news

agency, Dushanbe, in Russian)

19 May.

217

97 Y Y Y Y Y

31/05/2005

The heads of the Central Asian states have taken a

decision to set up a water and energy consortium

(WES). This will be a significant step towards the

integrated management of water resources in the

region, the Tajik minister of land reclamation

and water resources, Abduqohir Nazirov, told a

conference in Dushanbe today.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Central Asia agrees

consortium for rational use

of water at Tajik forum.

(Avesta website, Dushanbe, in

Russian) 31 May.

98

Y

Y 01/06/2005

A session of the Tajik Assembly of Representatives

has cancelled an old agreement (1994) between the

Russian and Tajik governments to complete the

construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power

station on the River Vakhsh. Another reason for the

cancellation of the agreement was the signing of a

new agreement "On long-term cooperation between

the Tajik government and RusAl.

Cancelation

of an

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Tajik-Russian

power plant deal cancelled.

(Avesta website, Dushanbe, in

Russian) 1 Jun.

99

Y

Y 19/09/2005

Rahmon announced that construction of Rogun will

begin with the involvement of Russian capital in late

September. Rahmon stressed again the strategic

importance of the unique hydroelectric power station

not only for Tajikistan and Russia, but also for the

neighbouring countries, specifically Afghanistan.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Russia to start

construction of Tajik power

plant late September. (ITAR-

TASS news agency, Moscow,

in Russian) 19 Sep.

100 Y

Y

13/02/2006

The current state and prospects for cooperation

between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were discussed

by the head of the Tajik state and the Kyrgyz

diplomat during a meeting which was held after the

presentation of credentials.The construction of the

Batken-Konibodom power transmission line [linking

Tajik north with southwestern Kyrgyzstan] and the

Dushanbe-Saritosh [on the border with Kyrgyzstan]

as an important factor for expanding Tajik-Kyrgyz

relations was also discussed. This was said to be one

of the most important directions of the development

of relations between the two neighbouring countries,

as well as the expansion of mutually beneficial

bilateral cooperation in the hydroelectric power

sector and mining industry and rational use

of water resources.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2006. Tajik president

receives Kyrgyz envoy,

relations discussed. (Tajik

television) 14 Feb.

218

101 Y Y

26/07/2006 Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan Inaugurate the Chu-

Talas Rivers Commission

Establishme

nt of a joint

body

UNECE, 2006. Kyrgyzstan and

Kazakhstan Inaugurate the

Chu-Talas Rivers Commission.

24 Jul.

102 Y Y Y

Y

07/09/2006

Leaders of KZ, KG, TJ and UZ -- who discussed

economic, security and cultural cooperation --

concluded two pacts covering water resources -- one

that seeks to save the shrinking Aral Sea and another

that strives to improve the regional water

management system. Summit participants envisioned

the creation of a consortium to tackle long-running

disputes over the distribution of scarce water

resources.

Talks on

water/energy

Eurasianet.org, 2006. Central

Asian leaders seek to improve

regional cooperation. 8 Sep.

103 Y

Y

01/10/2006

During his visit to Kyrgyzstan in October 2006 the

president of Uzbekistan made yet another statement

about ‘further strengthening collaboration in fighting

international

terrorism, religious extremism, and transnational

organised crime’ (cited in Asrorov 2006). What

Islam Karimov didn’t mention in his communique´

was the fact that at that moment the two countries

were perilously close to an open confrontation over

water in the Toktogul Reservoir, the illegal presence

of Uzbek troops in the Sokh enclave, disputes over

natural gas prices and Uzbek refugees from Andijan.

Other

Gazeta Kz., 2006. Pogovorim

ob uzbeksko-kirgizskikh

otnosheniiakh. 15 Nov.

104 Y

Y

14/12/2006

Kyrgyzstan has agreed to buy gas from Uzbekistan

at 100 dollars per 1,000 cu.m. At Uzbekistan's

request, Kyrgyzstan agreed to discharge additional

1.56bn cu. m. of water [from the Toktogul reservoir]

for Uzbekistan's irrigation needs. The neighbouring

country agreed to buy 1.3bn electricity from

Kyrgyzstan at 0.011 [figure as heard] per kWh

during the vegetation period.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2006. Kyrgyzstan agrees

to buy Uzbek natural gas at

new price. (Kyrgyz Television

1) 15 Dec.

105 Y

Y 15/12/2006

Kyrgyzstan and Russia are launching a major

energy-generating project to build the Kambarata-1

and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric cascades in the

Central Asian state, to be operated by Russian

electricity monopoly Unified Energy System (UES),

and designed to produce electricity for domestic

needs and exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan and

northern China.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Ria Novosti, 2006. Russia,

Kyrgyzstan embark on multi-

billion dollar energy project. 15

Dec.

219

106

Y

Y

01/02/2007

Uzbek Prime Minister Writes to his Tajik Colleague

on Rogun Hydrolelectric Power Station, requiring a

detailed examination of the project , accusing TJ of

"full ignorance on the part of the Government of the

Republic of Tajikistan, which has not viewed

possible after-effects and the proper planning and

technical support, but yet continues to speedily

undertake construction of this facility."

Open Letter

Mirziyoyev, 2007. Uzbek

Prime Minister Writes to his

Tajik Colleague on Rogun

Hydrolelectric Power Station. 3

Feb.

107 Y Y

Y 15/03/2007

The Kyrgyz government intends to set up a joint

venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build

two Kambarata hydroelectric power stations.

Kyrgyzstan will own 34 per cent of the shares in the

joint venture, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33 per cent

each, First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov

said that according to preliminary estimates, about

2bn dollars were needed to build the two

hydroelectric power stations, of which 1.7bn dollars

would be spent on Kambarata 1 and 300m dollars

on Kambarata 2.

Kyrgyzstan has already invested a little more than

150m dollars into building the Kambarata 2

hydroelectric power station. In principle, Kazakhstan

and Russia also must invest 150m dollars each.

"The Kambarata projects have been included in a

state economic development programme. The work

on setting up the joint venture must be completed

this year," Usenov said.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Kazakhstan, Russia

to build hydroelectric power

stations in Kyrgyzstan.

(Kyrgyz AKIpress) 15 Mar.

108

Y

Y

28/04/2007

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and Uzbek

President Islam Karimov have discussed prospects

for bilateral cooperation, as well as hydroelectricity

problems, in a telephone conversation, the Tajik

presidential press service said on Saturday.

Talks on

water/energy

Russia & CIS Presidential

Bulletin, 2007. Tajik Uzbek

leader discuss prospects for

cooperation. 28 Apr.

220

109 Y Y

30/04/2007

As an outcome of Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan,

a joint venture involving state-owned companies

from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia is

established. The new venture is expected to finish

construction on two hydroelectric power stations

located on the Naryn River -- Kambarata 1 and

Kambarata 2 –.

Establishme

nt of a joint-

venture

Eurasianet.org, 2007.

Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic

Muscle During Visit to

Kyrgyzstan. 30 Apr.

110 Y Y

09/07/2007

Kazakhstan annulled Kyrgyzstan's debt for the usage

of railways and spread the national tariffs onto the

country, and contributed US$100 million to a

US$120 million joint investment fund to be created.

Kazakh delegation also announced its intention to

bid in the tender for the Kambarata stations.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

Global Insight, 2007.

Kazakhstan Outmanoeuvres

Russia Over Investment in

Kyrgyzstan. 13 Jul.

111 Y Y Y

Y

29/08/2007

Another round of talks on the use of water and

energy resources of the River Syr Darya by the

Central Asian states has ended unsuccessfully

No

agreement

reached

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Central Asian talks

on joint water use break down

in Uzbekistan. (Tajik news

agency Asia-Plus website) 29

Aug.

112

Y

Y 29/08/2007

Rahmon announced that Tajikistan has cancelled a

deal with the giant Russian aluminium

company, RusAl, to build Rogun, after the two sides

failed to come to agreement over the height and type

of dam to be built.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Backgrounder:

Tajikistan cancels giant

Russian dam project. 11 Sep.

221

113 Y

Y

18/09/2007

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan sign several accords, among

which an agreement between the Ministry of

Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing

Industry of Kyrgyzstan and the Ministry of

Agriculture and Environmental Protection of

Tajikistan "On cooperation in the agricultural

sector".

General

cooperation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan sign several accords.

(Kyrgyz AKIpress website) 18

Sep.

114 Y

Y 18/09/2007

Bakiyev expressed his wish to hold in Bishkek an

international water and energy summit under the

aegis of the European Union, and to set up in

Kyrgyzstan an international water management

academy, which could train highly skilled specialists

in this field.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Kyrgyz paper says

sides agreed on disputed areas

at talks with Tajik leader. 21

Sep.

115

Y Y Y

07/01/2008

As a result of temperature fall in the Central Asian

countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Cut

Electricity Supply to Tajikistan.

Resource cut

Regunm news agency, 2008.

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan Cut

Electricity Supply to

Tajikistan. 7 Jan.

116 Y

10/01/2008

Bakiyev said that "The government should start with

the possible emission of long- term bonds for large

national projects, including Kambarata 1 and 2 and

an international highway."

Declaration/

Speech

Russia & CIS Business &

Financial Daily, 2008. Bakiyev

suggests issuing bonds for

national projects. 10 Jan.

117 Y

23/01/2008

The Kyrgyz government has endorsed the draft

budget and its own programme of action for 2008, in

which a total of 1.2bn soms are planned to be

channelled into the construction of

the Kambarata hydroelectric power station.

Adoption of

legal

instruments

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz

government endorses draft

budget for 2008. 28 Jan.

118

Y

Y

24/01/2008

A report published on an UZB newspaper criticized

Tajik hydroelectric power production projects, and

said they might cause environmental problems in the

region.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Uzbek expert raps

Tajik hydroelectric power

station projects. 25 Jan.

222

119 Y

Y

25/01/2008

Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the

opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction

of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This

winter demonstrated that we should speed up the

construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2

hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or

not," Oqilov said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik

premiers discuss electricity

supply, transport. 25 Jan.

120 Y Y

18/02/2008

Kazakh, Kyrgyz foreign ministers discuss

cooperation. Tazhin also said that efficient use

of water and energy resources was also discussed.

"We reached an agreement to take all the necessary

measures to prevent consequences that could be

caused by unregulated water discharges in the River

Syrdarya," he said.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kazakh, Kyrgyz

foreign ministers discuss

cooperation. 18 Feb.

121 Y

Y

01/03/2008

150 Tajik residents of Isfara crossed the border into

Kyrgyz territory to try to destroy a dam that cut them

off from water sources. The dam was reopened later,

after the Tajik side had to retreat due to armed

threats by Kyrgyz border guards.

Resource

capture/Prot

ests

Eurasianet.org, 2008. Ferghana

Valley: Harsh Winter's Legacy

Stokes Ethnic Tension. 1 Jun.

122

Y Y

13/05/2008

Kazakhs President Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated

that Astana was very interested in investing in Tajik

hydro-power projects. "If a consortium will work on

the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then

Kazakhstan will take part, providing materials,

helping with shares, and as investors," Nazarbayev

said during a May 13 joint news conference.

Declaration/

Speech

Radio Free Europe, 2008.

Central Asia: Kazakh, Tajik

Presidents Show Oil And

Water Do Mix. 14 May.

223

123 Y

Y

16/05/2008

The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have

signed an agreement on setting up an inter-

governmental coordinating council. Tasks and ways

of resolving problems in the water and energy,

transport and communications sectors were defined

as priority

Establishme

nt of a joint

body

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan sign cooperation

accords. 16 May.

124 Y Y Y

Y

10/06/2008

Kyrgyzstan will supply 1bn kWh of electricity and

additionally discharge 1.2bn cubic metres

of water, that is in excess of its own needs, to

neighbouring countries. An agreement to this effect

has been reached at a regional conference of the

heads of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik and

Uzbek water resources, fuel and energy sectors.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyzstan reaches

electricity, water accords with

neighbours. 10 Jun.

125 Y Y

Y

08/07/2008

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan agree on free access to

water of river. We have reached an agreement with

Uzbekistan on free access to water of the River Syr

Darya, Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Umurzak

Shukeyev said in Tashkent today. "We reached

agreements with the Kyrgyz government last week

on purchasing electricity amounting to 500m kW [as

published]. In return for this, Kyrgyzstan is to

discharge approximately 600m cu.m. of water from

the Toktogul [reservoir]," Shukeyev said.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan agree on free

access to water of river. 8 Jul.

126 Y Y

18/07/2008

Kazakhstan threatens to stop buying Kyrgyz

electricity if water not supplied. Kazakhstan should

not beg for the water which it is entitled to. We gave

our partners in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan until

Monday [21 July]. Kazakhstan will stop buying

electricity from Kyrgyzstan if water is not supplied

to the Dostyk channel by that time," the chairman of

the committee for water resources of the Kazakh

Ministry of Agriculture, Anatoliy Ryabtsev, said at a

news conference in Shymkent today.

Threatening/

Warning

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kazakhstan

threatens to stop buying

Kyrgyz electricity if water not

supplied. 18 Jul.

127 Y Y Y

Y

19/07/2008

Astana has warned Tashkent that if Uzbekistan

hinders water supply from Kyrgyzstan into the

Dostyk canal (in South Kazakhstan Region, SKR)

then not only Kazakhstan but also other countries in

the region will suffer from this. "Otherwise, the

purchase of expensive electricity from Kyrgyzstan

will be stopped. Not only Kazakhstan but also fields

Threatening/

Warning

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kazakhs warn

Uzbeks of consequences if

Kyrgyz water not supplied. 19

Jul.

224

in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will suffer from this,"

says the government's telegram, the text of which is

available to the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency.

128 Y Y Y Y Y

11/09/2008

The Syr Darya basin countries have failed to agree

on the most topical issue - rational use of

river water. The heads of water and energy facilities

in the Central Asian states admitted that they

practically reached deadlock in Astana yesterday

evening.

No

agreement

reached

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz paper urges

compromise on

energy, water issues in Central

Asia. 12 Sep.

129 Y

Y 09/10/2008

The Russian and Kyrgyz presidents have ordered to

accelerate the construction of the first and

second Kambarata hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan.

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2008. Russian,

Kyrgyz presidents want faster

building of Kambarata HPP. 9

Oct.

130 Y Y Y Y Y

20/10/2008

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and

Turkmenistan have agreed to coordinate the use of

common water and energy resources of the region

during the 2008-09 winter and crop seasons.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Central Asian

states to coordinate use of

common water, energy

resources. 20 Oct.

131

Y

Y

03/12/2008

Uzbekistan against construction of Tajik power plant

on transborder river. "We think that all decisions on

using a watercourse of transborder rivers, including

on building hydro-technical facilities, should not,

under no circumstances, damage the environment

and infringe the interests of people, who live in the

contiguous countries," the paper quoted the acting

head of the State Committee for Environment

Protection, Boriy Alixonov, as saying at an

international environmental forum held in Asgabat

on 3 December.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Uzbekistan against

construction of Tajik power

plant on transborder river. 16

Dec.

132

Y Y Y

01/01/2009

As of Jan. 1 Uzbekistan halted the transmission of

power supplied by Turkmenistan to Tajikistan,

which heightened the severity of the country’s power

shortage into an even more severe crisis.

Resource cut

Central Asia Online, 2009. In

the resolution of the energy

crisis in Tajikistan, a word for

Uzbekistan. 30 Jan.

225

133 Y

Y

Y Y 23/01/2009

While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that

"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian

region must be built with consideration of the

interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, "if

there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will

refrain from participation in such projects." As a

reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a

note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended

by Russian leader's remarks on

water use in region - paper. 11

Feb.

134

Y

Y

27/01/2009

"We will build the Roghun hydroelectric power

station although somebody will be against it," the

deputy Tajik minister of energy and industry Pulod

Muhiddinov said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan to go

ahead with construction of

power plant - official. 27 Jan.

135 Y

Y 01/02/2009

Russia has gone ahead bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan

with a pledge of a loan of $1.7 billion to invest in the

Kambarata hydro project.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Ministry of Economy of the

Kyrgyz Republic, 2012.

Regulation of specific

industries. 21 Sep.

136

Y

Y 02/02/2009

Rahmon has cancelled his visit to Moscow. "There is

a big suspicion that the refusal is a response to a

speech by Medvedev, who just over a week ago in

Tashkent agreed with Uzbekistani President

Islom Karimov that issues of constructing

hydroelectric power stations should be decided

collectively, taking account of the interests of all

countries in the region," Daniil Kislov, founder and

chief editor of the Fergana.ru news agency, told

Gazeta.ru.

Dipl. rel.

Cooling

BBC Monitoring Former

Soviet Union - Political, 2009.

Tajik leader's Moscow visit

cancellation shows cooling of

relations with Russia. 6 Feb.

137

Y Y Y

10/02/2009

As of 10 February, Tajikistan is again on the brink of

energy collapse as last winter.Tajikistan says the

electricity crisis has been caused by a dry summer,

as well as the unresolved issue of Turkmen

electricity transit via Uzbekistan.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbek leader

against politicizing Central

Asian water. 26 Feb.

138 Y

Y

Y

13/02/2009

At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13

February, Uzbek President Islom Karimov said

Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy

projects if independent experts guarantee that the

projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek

TV reported the same day.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against

Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects

if ecology not harmed - leader.

13 Feb.

226

139

Y

Y

18/02/2009

UZ and TJ s signed an agreement on cooperation in

the fields of water, energy and gas. The sides agreed

a schedule of water discharge from the Qayroqqum

reservoir, in line with which the Tajik side will fill

the reservoir of the Qayroqqum hydroelectric power

station by 30 May.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan agree steps to ease

water dispute. 19 Feb.

140

Y

Y

19/02/2009

As a consequence of the 18 Feb. Agreement, and at

the culmination point of Tajik-Uzbek energy

disputes, the Uzbek side resumed the supply of

electricity to Tajikistan.

Resumption

of resource

supply

CACI Analyst, 2009. Fire over

water in Central Asia.

Available from:

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=

node/5079 [Accessed 7 Jun.

2012].

141

Y Y

25/02/2009

Uzbek President Islom Karimov has said water

problems in the Central Asian region should not be

politicized, and shows good relationship with

Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on

the construction of power plants on transborder

rivers in the region must undergo an international

examination.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbek leader

against politicizing Central

Asian water. 26 Feb.

142 Y

Y

Y

14/04/2009

The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal

statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata

projects “pursue commercial interests and far-

reaching political objectives, but disregard the

possible consequences and ignore the concerns of

the neighbouring states”.

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees

Astana as Possible Ally on

Water. 18 Apr.

143 Y Y Y Y Y

15/04/2009

In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon

dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric

schemes will reduce water flows and harm the

environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s

Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other

countries” of trying to “gain control over our

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures

to Kazakstan on Water Dispute.

30 Apr.

227

strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy

enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan

and Kazakstan, to support its cause.

144 Y Y Y Y Y

28/04/2009

IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian

leaders met to discuss water issues related to the

Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation

of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both

flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and

downstream countries dominated the summit's

agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions

among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President

Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan for their plans to implement more

assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn,

demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate

the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly

Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional

balance without clarifying how this might be

achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an

agreement without any specific detail on

transnational water management.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Agence France Presse, 2009.

Central Asian water talks boil

over into bickering. 28 Apr. ;

AKIpress, 2009. President

Bakiev hints neighboring

countries that Kyrgyzstan

needs compensation

for water accumulation. 28

Apr.

145 Y

Y

Y

30/04/2009

ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses

UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead

world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert

goal of intensifying a dispute over water and

electricity in the region, which has been continuing

for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world

community to investment projects for

the construction of hydroelectric power stations in

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islom Karimov knows

well that every time he plays this card in a specific

manner, the issue of foreign investment in the

hydroelectric power stations in the region will be

postponed for a certain time. This is because

Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor

organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing

this, Karimov is skilfully using this card.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims

Uzbekistan to blame for demise

of Aral Sea. 18 May.

228

146 Y

Y Y

05/05/2009

ALMATY follow-up: President Bakiyev of

Kyrgyzstan stated in May of 2009 that both phases

of the Kambarata power project will be built,

regardless of “who likes it or not,” a clear challenge

to the objections of Tashkent and Ashgabat.

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasianet.org, 2009.

Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Stands

Up to Uzbekistan and

Turkmenistan on Hydropower

Projects. 6 May.

147

Y

Y Y 30/05/2009

Tajik President Rahmon speaks about Rogun with

participants in a session of the regional political

dialogue between the EU troika and the Central

Asian countries at the level of foreign ministers. "We

adhere to the principled line which is based on the

need to maintain balance of both national and

regional interests. In this connection I would like to

stress two important points. First, the hydroenergy

sector is not water consuming and it does not

consume water without return. It just

lets water through turbines of the hydroelectric

power station. Unlike the hydroenergy sector,

irrigated farming takes the river flow without return,

and even if returns, it returns part of water as a

drained water of very bad quality. I have repeatedly

said from various rostrums that none of Tajikistan's

projects in this sector [energy sector] will not be

aimed against our neighbours," Emomali Rahmon

said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. None of Tajik

energy projects aimed against

neighbours - leader. 1 Jun.

148 Y

Y

13/06/2009

Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on

the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Specifically, they dug

ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat borderline

regions of

Kyrgyzstan and erected walls in the Rishtan rayon of

Uzbekistan’s Ferghana region. One explanation for

Uzbekistan’s decision relates to Kyrgyzstan’s

intention to build the Kambarata hydro-electric

station. Bishkek-based political scientist Mars

Saryev views the current Uzbek policy as yet another

sign of disapproval of such plans, and another way

of raising difficulties for the Kyrgyz in realizing

their energy potential.

Issue linkage

CACI Analyst, 2009.

Uzbekistan- Kyrgyzstan

building a wall. 7 Jan.

149

Y

Y

15/06/2009

If the construction of hydroelectric power stations

has turned into a national idea for Tajikistan, then for

Uzbekistan such idea is the issue of water usage

because over 60 per cent of the Uzbek population

live in rural areas, the assistant of the Uzbek

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan should seek

compromise on water row -

Uzbek diplomat. 16 Jun.

229

ambassador to Tajikistan, Yuriy Nagay, told Asia-

Plus. We need to listen to each other attentively and

come toagreement," the assistant of the Uzbek

diplomat convinced.

150

Y

16/07/2009

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow

launched the first stage of the Grand Turkmen Lake,

a huge artificial lake in the desert. Berdimuhamedow

stressed the significance of the Turkmen lake and

added: "As is known, our initiatives to provide water

and environmental security, as well as safe use of

transboundary water resources in Central Asia and to

deal with the aftermath of the Aral tragedy

demonstrate that Turkmenistan is

making huge efforts to contribute to common work

on preserving the nature and improving

environment". The project will be implemented in

three stages.

Resource

capture

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Turkmenistan

contributes to "saving"

transborder water resources -

leader. 16 Jul.

151

Y

Y

19/09/2009

Tajikistan suspends exporting electricity to

Uzbekistan. "Tajikistan would benefit more from

selling energy to the neighbouring country, rather

than releasing water for nothing," Yodgori said. Resource cut

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan suspends

exporting electricity to

Uzbekistan. 19 Sep.

152 Y

Y

23/09/2009

Uzbekistan suspends gas supplies to southern and

northern Kyrgyzstan due $19US million gas debt

owed.

Resource cut AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies

resume in Osh. 14 Oct.

153 Y Y

28/09/2009

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are holding talks on

mutual exchange of electricity. "The

fundamental agreement is that we help Kyrgyzstan

with electricity in winter and in return they

supply water to our south during the irrigation

period," Mynbayev said.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan discuss mutual

energy issues. 28 Sep.

154

Y

Y

30/09/2009

Uzbekistan has completely cut off gas supplies to

Tajikistan over a debt that exceeds 18m dollars, a

report circulated by the open joint-stock company

Tojiktransgaz [Tajikgas transportation] today says.

Resource cut

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan cuts

off gas supplies to Tajikistan

over debt. 30 Sep.

230

155

Y

Y

30/09/2009

Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Tajikistan after

the latter has paid the most part of its $18US million

debt for gas.

Resumption

of resource

supply

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan

resumes gas supplies to

Tajikistan. 30 Sep.

156 Y

Y

14/10/2009 Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Osh (gas was cut

on september 23)

Resumption

of resource

supply

AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies

resume in Osh. 14 Oct.

231

157

Y

Y

21/10/2009

The former head of the Tajik Barq-i Tojik power

supply company, Sharifkhon Samiyev, blames

Uzbekistan for energy problems. "I think that energy

issues between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have long

acquired a political and not economic

nature."[Reporter Ramziddin Najmiddinov:]

Everybody in Tajikistan believes that after

construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power

station and commissioning of the South-North and

Tajikistan-Afghanistan power transmission lines,

many energy problems in the country will be

resolved. [Sharifkhon Samiyev:] I also believe in

this. But one should look at things realistically. The

issue of constructing Roghun is not resolved in one

or two years. At the same time, Tajikistan's demand

in electricity is growing every day."

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajik official

blames Uzbekistan for energy

problems. 7 Nov.

158

Y

Y

24/11/2009

Uzbek Ambassador to Tajikistan Shoqosim

Shoislomov said in Dushanbe that Uzbekistan will

end its participation in the Soviet-era electric power

grid as of December 1. He said Uzbekistan has built

a new power distribution system that can provide all

of its regions with electricity and does not need the

outdated electricity grid. Homidjon Orifov, the head

of Tajikistan's National Committee for Dams, said

Uzbekistan's move is most likely connected to the

Tajik-Uzbek standoff regarding the construction of a

new hydropower station near the Tajik city of

Roghun.

Withdrawal

from a

regional org.

Radio Free Europe, 2009.

Tajikistan Reacts To Uzbek

Decision To Quit Power Grid.

27 Nov.

159

Y

Y

25/11/2009

Husrav Goibov, deputy head of the CIS department

at the Tajik Foreign Ministry, says that "The

unilateral decision made by Uzbekistan to leave the

Central Asian Unified Energy System runs counter

to the principles of neighborliness and is politically

motivated,"

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax News Agency, 2009.

Uzbekistan's withdrawal from

Central Asian power grid. 25

Nov.

232

160

Y

Y

01/12/2009

UZ withdraws from Central Asian power grid.

Uzbek officials say Tashkent's participation in the

regional system endangers the flow of electricity to

its domestic consumers. If UZ does not quickly

reverse its decision, some Tajiks suggest Dushanbe

will retaliate by restricting water supplies that

Tashkent desperately needs to keep the country's

cotton sector afloat during the spring and summer.

Withdrawal

from a

regional org.

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan

withdraws from Central

Asian power grid from 1

December. 1 Dec.

161

Y Y

13/12/2009

Uzbek President meet with Turkmen President. In a

speech Karimov said that "I would like to

specifically note the commonality of interests and

stances regarding the rational and fair use

of water and energy resources in the Central Asian

region".

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbek, Turkmen

leaders upbeat on bilateral ties.

13 Dec.

162 Y Y

Y

23/12/2009

Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has said that

downstream countries such as Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan will benefit from the construction of

the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station. He said

by constructing the power plant Kyrgyzstan would

ensure uninterrupted power supply for local

population and accumulate water for irrigation needs

of downstream countries in the region.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz leader says

neighbours to benefit from new

power plant. 23 Dec.

233

163 Y

Y

28/12/2009

Uzbek President Islom Karimov held a meeting with

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov to discuss

prospects for developing bilateral cooperation.

Following the talks, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar

Usenov said his country would possibly carry out an

international expert examination of the project of

the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. "The

Uzbek side has informed the Kyrgyz one of its

concern over plans to construct the Kambarata-1

power plant in view of possible damage to the

environment and the water and energy balance, as

well as possible technological threats. For this

reason, Uzbekistan has requested to carry out an

international expert examination of the project under

the aegis of the World Bank. The reservoir of the

planned Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power station

will contain 5bn cu.m. of water. This volume is large

enough. Kyrgyzstan will benefit from the conduct of

an expert examination of Kambarata-1. According to

him, a delegation of the World Bank's Board of

Directors visited the place allocated for the

construction several weeks earlier. "I asked them to

help and allocate a grant to carry out a thorough

expert examination of Kabarata-1. All the major

facilities should undergo an international

examination. We see nothing bad in it," the Kyrgyz

prime minister noted.

Talks on

dam

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyzstan may

agree to probe into major water

facilities - premier. 30 Dec.

164

Y

Y

01/01/2010

Since January, Tashkent has delayed thousands of

rail carriages, citing “technical and logistical” issues.

Dushanbe says Tashkent is trying to sabotage

construction of a giant hydroelectric power plant,

Rogun.

Border

tensions

Eurasianet.org, 2010. Boxcar

Diplomacy Puts Tajik

Businesses At Tashkent’s

Mercy. 6 Aug.

165

Y

01/01/2010

In his official address to Tajik citizens, President

Rakhmon announced that 2010 will be the year

“when great resources will be mobilized” to

construct the 3,600 mw Rogun dam. “The

construction of this site, important for our country,

has turned into the arena of labor, bravery and

generosity, trials of heroism, and, more so, our

national idea,” said Rakhmon.

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2010.

Will Tajikistan Successfully

Construct Rogun? Volume: 7

Issue: 17.

234

166

Y

Y

08/01/2010

Uzbektransgaz, the gas transport arm of Uzbekistan's

state-run Uzbekneftegaz, cut gas supplies to

Tajikistan in half, from 480,000 cm/d to 240,000

cm/d, due to Tajikistan's failure to pre-pay for gas

supplies.

Resource cut

Agence France Presse, 2010.

Uzbekistan halves energy to

Tajikistan: company. 8 Jan.

167 Y Y Y Y Y

14/01/2010

Water resource ministers of the 5 Central Asian

countries wrapped up two days of discussions on

water pumping limits and operation of hydroelectric

dams on transborder rivers.

Talks on

water/energy

Central Asia Online, 2010.

Ministers discuss water use and

allocation for 2010. 15 Jan.

168

Y

Y

03/02/2010

In a letter to his Tajik counterpart Akil Akilov,which

appeared in the media before reaching the addressee,

Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev called on

Tajikistan to reconsider the construction of Rogun in

order to prevent environmental dangers, maintain

water balance, and provide continuing access to

water for millions of people. He also stated "it is

necessary to make an independent evaluation of the

project before resuming the construction of the

Rogun hydropower plant. The project was elaborated

about 40 years ago and based on obsolete

technologies".

Open Letter

Global Insight, 2010.

Uzbekistan Calls for

Independent Assessment of

Hydropower Project in

Tajikistan. 4 Feb.

169

Y

Y

07/02/2010

Akilov sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev posted by

the Khovar news agency. He emphasized the

country’s sovereign right to build the dam to rectify

energy deficits, which have plagued the country for

years now but “have been impossible to cover by

energy imports because of ongoing man-made

obstacles.” He also referred to the project’s

compliance with international law and the 2006

assessment by the German Lahmeyer corporation.

The latter allegedly confirmed that the project takes

ecological issues into consideration, something

Uzbekistan seriously questions.

Open Letter

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2010. Tajik premier

again affirms absence of Rogun

HPP threat to Uzbekistan. 8

Feb.

235

170

Y

Y

08/02/2010

The reaction of Uzbek side on Akilov’s letter has

been to cut gas supplies to TJ. "Since Sunday,

Uzbekistan has cut in half -- from 28,000 cubic

metres of natural gas per hour to 15,000 cubic metres

-- gas to Tajikistan," a company spokesman told

AFP.

Resource cut

Agence France Presse, 2010.

Uzbekistan cuts energy to

Tajikistan amid tensions:

company. 8 Feb.

171

Y

Y 10/03/2010

The World Bank announced that they will

underwrite an environmental feasibility study for the

proposed Rogun hydropower project. "If the Rogun

project proves its financial and environmental

sustainability, the World Bank will provide the

financial aid and support to the government of

Tajikistan for the establishment of a consortium that

will build this plant. The Tajik government and the

World Bank will sign an appropriate memorandum

on this issue," Konishi said.

ESIA

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Tajikistan: World Bank Offer

Energizes Rogun Hydropower

Project. 15 Mar.

172 Y Y Y

Y

16/03/2010

Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-

UZ rapprochement is evident from

Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to

convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of

Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation.

According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the

environmental and anthropogenic security of and

regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan

and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be

appraised by international experts. "There ought to

be no hydroelectric power plants in the region

without results of the expertise obtained and

studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that

ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks

with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In

principle they are ready for expert evaluation.

Islam Karimovand I have come to an agreement we

are now announcing - after the expert opinion is

ready we are getting down to construction of new

facilities".

Talks on

water/energy

Vremya Novostei, 2010.

Summits, Maneuvres, Jubilees.

26 Mar.

173

Y

Y

19/02/2010

Uzbek newspaper Narodnoye Slovo reiterates need

for expert examination of Rogun, stating that "the

documentation of the project has become obsolete

and the construction needs international

examination".

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek paper

reiterates need for expert

examination of major Tajik

power plant. 19 Feb.

236

174

Y

Y

23/02/2010

Tajik dam expert says no one has right to stop

construction of RogHun plant. "The implementation

of the project, which was launched back in Soviet

era and which underwent all possible examinations

in the Soviet era, is under way. The examination of

the project was carried out by best specialists of

leading institutes of the [former] Soviet Union,"

Homidjon Arifov said. "Tajikistan does not

need agreement of any country or international

organization for the project of the Roghun

hydroelectric power station. Nobody has the right to

veto this project. The fact that the World Bank is

currently conducting an ecological examination of

the Roghun project is the goodwill of Tajikistan in

case if in future the bank makes a decision to take

part in financing the project," the expert said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert

says no one has right to stop

construction of Roghun plant.

24 Feb.

175 Y

Y

01/03/2010

Uzbekistan has unilaterally closed the Qorasuv-

Avtodorozhnyy checkpoint [on the border with

Kyrgyzstan]. Qorasuv-Avtodorozhnyy is the second

biggest and busiest customs checkpoint between

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after the Dostlik

checkpoint in the east of Uzbekistan. Human rights

activists in Kyrgyzstan connect the closing of the

checkpoint with the construction of

the Kambarata hydroelectric power station, which

the Uzbeks think can lead to a decrease in the

volume of water flowing to Uzbekistan.

Border

closure

BBC Monitoring Former

Soviet Union - Political, 2010.

Uzbekistan reportedly closes

checkpoint on border with

Kyrgyzstan. 4 Mar.

176

Y Y

18/03/2010

Tajik leader assures Turkmen counterpart energy

projects not against neighbours. They signed 7

agreements on cooperation. Speaking about the

consumption of water resources in Turkmenistan, the

Turkmen leader said the construction of lakes and

reservoirs in Turkmenistan would help to protect the

environment and use water rationally.

General

cooperation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik leader assures

Turkmen counterpart energy

projects not against neighbours.

18 Mar.

237

177

Y Y

Y Y 31/03/2010

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who

is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's

unchangeable position towards projects on the

construction of major hydroelectric facilities in

Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric

facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in

full agreement with the neighbouring countries,"

Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about

Russia's position towards the construction of the

Roghun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and

Kambar-Ata [hydroelectric power station] in

Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Russian official in

Uzbekistan says power plants

should be built in agreement.

31 Mar.

178 Y

Y

Y Y 03/05/2010

Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian

Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors

meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for

what he said was a lack of foresight about the

environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we

say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's

why, indeed, we treat this problem

seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of

our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly,

especially the countries on the upstream of the

rivers. They do not think about what kind of

consequences it may lead to," he added.

Declaration/

Speech

Agence France Presse, 2010.

Uzbek leader blasts neighbours

in water row. 3 May.

179 Y Y

18/05/2010

Kyrgyzstan unexpectedly shut off supplies of

irrigation water from the Kirov reservoir to

Kazakhstan's Zhambyl region.

Resource cut

Russia & CIS Food and

Agriculture Weekly, 2010.

Kyrgyzstan shuts off irrigation

water flow to Kazakhstan. 19

May.

180 Y Y

19/05/2010

Kazakhstan will reopen its border with Kyrgyzstan

on May 20, that it had closed after the April 7-8

developments that resulted in the change of power in

Bishkek and the flight that took President

Kurmanbek Bakiyev out of Kyrgyzstan. (note: this is

most likely linked with KG shutting off water

supplies to KZ)

Border

opening

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2010. Nazarbayev

has given instructions to open

Kazakhstan's border with

Kyrgyzstan on May 20. 19

May.

238

181 Y Y

19/05/2010 Kyrgyzstan revived agricultural water supply on

Talas River to the south Kazakhstan.

Resumption

of resource

supply

Trend Daily Economic News,

2010. Kyrgyzstan revive water

supply to Kazakhstan. 20 May.

182 Y Y Y Y Y Y 08/06/2010

At the Water for life conference in dushanbe Tajik

President Emomali Rakhmon’s proposed to declare

2012 the International Year of Water Diplomacy.

The proposal will be presented to the 65th session of

the UN General Assembly in September. He also

declared "Wise water management in the basins of

trans-border rivers should be organized with respect

to just and mutually beneficial use of not only water

but also other natural resources." The conference

was marked by tensions between Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan over the Rogun hydropower project.

Water

conference

Central Asia Online, 2010.

Rogun dam dominates water

conference. 9 Jun.

183

Y Y

08/06/2010

A meeting between Tajik President Emomali

Rahmon and Turkmen deputy chairman of cabinet of

ministers in charge of agrarian sector, Myratgeldi

Akmammedow, discussed issues of multifaceted

cooperation between Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

The meeting also discussed topics of today's

conference as well as rational and economical use of

regional water and energy resources.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik leader,

Turkmen official discuss

cooperation. 8 Jun.

184 Y

30/08/2010

KG launched Kambarata-2 $200 million

hydroelectric power station on Monday, its first

since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Acting

President Roza Otunbayeva pressed a symbolic red

button to start the first unit of the Kambarata-2 hydro

project. The project, funded partly by Russia, will

allow Kyrgyzstan to generate more power but could

divert water from its neighbours.

Dam launch

Reuters, 2010. Kyrgyzstan

launches new hydroelectric

power plant. 30 Aug.

239

185

Y

Y

09/06/2010

Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as

to complete the construction of the Roghun

hydroelectric power plant, [Tajik] Minister of

Energy and Industry Sherali Gul has said at the high-

level international conference on medium term

review of the progress of the implementation of the

International Decade for Action "Water for Life"

2005-2015, which is under way in Dushanbe.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajikistan to meet

Uzbekistan's demands

regarding power plant -

minister. 10 Jun.

186

Y Y

11/10/2010

Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov held a meeting

with the Kazakh ambassador to Tajikistan, Abutalip

Akhmetov to discuss prospects for further

development of multilateral and bilateral mutually

beneficial relations. The meeting also discussed

issues in such fields as energy and use

of water resources, including preparing a

draft agreement "On the construction of the 500-

kWh Khujand-Datka-Almaty electricity transmission

line".

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik premier,

Kazakh envoy

discuss water, energy issues. 12

Oct.

187

Y

Y

12/10/2010

UZ President Karimov said that the Rogun project

undermines Uzbekistan's water supplies. "How can

we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water

for eight years, while the Rogun water reservoir is

being filled up. What will farmers be doing all this

time?" Karimov said, when asked why Uzbekistan is

opposing the construction of the Rogun HPP in

neighboring Tajikistan.

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax Central Asia &

Caucasus Business Weekly,

2010. Rogun project

undermines Uzbekistan's water

supplies - Karimov. 12 Oct.

188

Y

Y

21/10/2010

Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi and

experts have dismissed Uzbek President Islom

Karimov's concerns that the construction of a major

hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan will lead to

a shortage of irrigation and drinking water in

Uzbekistan. "The accusations being levelled at

Tajikistan in connection with the construction of the

Roghun hydroelectric power station, and the

allegations that the water will take eight years to

accumulate - during which Uzbekistan will not

get water - do not have any scientific or economic

basis,".

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik minister,

experts flay Uzbek president's

statement on hydropower

project. 19 Nov.

240

189

Y

Y

01/11/2010

UZ has unilaterally closed a post on its border with

TJ without any explanation, a source in the Tajik

Foreign Ministry has told Interfax today.

Border

tensions

Ecological movement of

Uzbekistan, 2010. International

conference «Transboundary

ecological problems of Middle

Asia: Application of

international legislative

mechanisms for their solution».

17 Nov.

190

Y

Y

16/11/2010

Uzbekistan organised in Tashkent an international

conference under the topic of "Transborder

environmental problems of Central Asia: use of

international legal mechanisms to resolve them",

attended by Over 60 representatives of international

organizations and financial institutions from over 30

countries attended the conference. Particularly, it

was attended by specialists from the UN, OSCE,

World Bank, World Health Organization, and others.

The conference noted Rogun negative impact on

regional environment.

Water

conference

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek conference

notes Tajik plant's negative

impact on regional

environment. 1 Dec.

191 Y Y 25/11/2010

Kyrgyz Interim President Roza Otunbayeva said that

for Kyrgyzstan as well as for Tajikistan it is a

"topical" task to reach an agreement in mutually

beneficial cooperation in efficient use of water and

energy resources in Central Asia and said that

Kyrgyzstan is ready for a "constructive" dialogue to

resolve this issue for the benefit of peoples in the

region.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Kyrgyz president

urges closer cooperation in

resolving water, energy issues.

25 Nov.

192 Y Y 01/12/2010

The Uzbek gas distribution company Uztransgaz

(Uzbek gas transportation) has warned Tajikistan

that it may cut off gas supplies to this country if its

debt is not paid. "Tough measures will be taken,

right up to a complete cut-off of gas supplies to

Tajikistan if the debt is not paid," the letter reads.

Threatening/

Warning

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbekistan warns

Tajikistan of gas cut-off over

arrears. 1 Dec.

193 Y Y 02/12/2010

State-run Uzbek TV carried a report December 2 that

accused Tajik government officials of spreading lies

to damage “the friendship between the Uzbek and

Tajik peoples.” The Tajik people are suffering from

the “arbitrariness” of their leaders, the report

asserted, though “their gradually escalating tricks

cannot damage stability in the Republic of

Uzbekistan, or our good relations with the friendly

[Tajik] people.” Regarding the delays at the border,

Dipl. rel.

Cooling

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan:

Competition over Water

Resources Intensifying. 8 Dec.

241

the report added somewhat ominously, “our state

borders have always been open to people with good

intentions."

194 Y Y Y 07/12/2010

Kyrgyzstan has signed an agreement on the parallel

operation of [electric] energy systems with

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," the press service of the

Kyrgyz Energy Ministry has said.

Annual

operation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Kyrgyzstan,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan sign

electricity cooperation accord.

7 Dec.

195 Y Y 05/05/2011

Uzbek-Turkmen cooperation accords signed. The

signed documents included an agreement signed

between the governments of the two countries on

cooperation in science and technology aimed at

"expanding cooperation in spheres such as power

engineering, agriculture, water management, health

care, environment protection and other spheres of

mutual interest".

General

cooperation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2011. Uzbek-Turkmen

cooperation accords signed. 5

May.

196 Y Y Y 16/09/2011

KyrgyzGaz Chairman Turgunbek Kulmurzaev told

RFE/RL that the agreement -- under which

Kyrgyzstan will supply water to southern

Kazakhstan in exchange for gas -- was reached on

September 16 in Bishkek between Kyrgyz officials

and visiting Kazakh Prime Minister Karim

Masimov. Bishkek started looking for alternative gas

supplies after Uzbekistan raised the price for natural

gas deliveries to $278 per 1,000 cubic meters.

Annual

operation

agreement

RFE/RL, 2010. Kazakhs To

Sell Gas To Kyrgyz After

Uzbekistan Raises Price. 20

Sep.

197 Y Y 16/11/2011

Misterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbek

territory that caused key rail traffic between Termez

in Uzbekistan and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa to

be shut down. The UZ described the incident as a

terrorist act. Also: Rather than fix the track, the

Uzbeks dismantled it. Tajikistan calls the actions a

blockade.

Flow of

goods

disruption

Radio Free Europe, 2011. Tajik

Railways Wants Probe With

Uzbeks Of Alleged Terrorist

Blast. 21 Nov.

242

Annex 3. Timeline of the Rogun dam

Key

KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan

EXT Non-Central Asian actor Y Involved in the event

KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT TYPE OF

EVENT SOURCE

1 Y 30/05/1993

The newly elected President of Tajikistan Emomali

Rahmon released an interview to Ostankino Channel

1, in which he declared that despite financial

constraints, “the construction of the Rogun hydro-

electric station is continuing”.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1993. Tajikistan;

Interview with President

Rahmonov. 1 Jun.

2 Y Y 18/07/1993

Tajik Premier Abdullojonov says that a draft has

been elaborated of an agreement between Russia and

Tajikistan concerning the completion of the

construction of Rogun hydroelectric power station.

Draft

Agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1993. Tajik

premier: under CIS treaty

everyone should help us defend

our borders. 20 Jul.

3 Y Y 13/04/1994

The Russian-Tajik intergovernmental talks ended on

Wednesday [13th April] with [the] signing [of] two

agreements: on Russia's participation in completing

the construction of the Rogun hydropower station

and on granting an R80bn credit by Russia to

Tajikistan in 1994.

Agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1994. Russia grants

R80bn in credit to Tajikistan.

14 Apr.

4 Y Y 26/05/1994

According to an official of the Russian Ministry

for Cooperation With CIS Member States, a Tajik-

Russian joint-stock company is being set up to

complete the construction of Tajikistan's Rogun

hydroelectric power station.

Establishme

nt of a joint-

stock

company

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1994. Tajik-

Russian joint venture to

complete Tajik power plant. 3

Jun.

5 Y Y 01/07/1994 The World Bank recommends to drop the project on

both financial and ecological grounds.

Declaration/

Speech

FT Energy Newsletters, 1995.

News: Russia to take half share

in Tajik hydro project. 27 Jan.

243

6 Y 19/10/1994

In his election manifesto, Rahmonov mentions how

important it is to attract workers to the construction

of Rogun and Sangtudin hydro-power stations.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1994. Election

manifesto of presidential

candidate Imamali Rahmonov.

2 Nov.

7 Y Y 09/06/1995

Tajikistan and Russia signed an agreement to

strengthen economic ties between the two countries.

The agreements envisage wide-ranging economic

integration in industry, fuel and power, the creation

of a customs union and Russian assistance in

completing the construction of the Rogun and

Sangtuda hydroelectric power stations.

Agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1995. Uzbekistan

reinterprets power supply deal

with Tajikistan. 2 Jun.

8 Y 19/08/1995

In the Tajik government's economic reform

programme for the period 1995-2000, one of the

priority tasks of the fuel and power complex is to

take measures to complete the construction of the

Rogun and Sangtudinskaya hydroelectric power

stations and one cascade of the Pamir hydroelectric

power stations.

Multiannual

planning

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1995. Tajik

economic reform programme

1995-2000. 27 Sep.

9 Y Y 14/01/1998

ITAR-TASS quoted Russian Deputy Prime Minister

Valeriy Serov as saying that the two sides (Russia

and Tajikistan) had decided to instruct their relevant

ministries to start preparing the necessary document

and to conduct feasibility studies for energy projects

as a whole and particularly for Russia's participation

in completing the construction of several

hydroelectric plants in the country.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia,

1998. Russian premier satisfied

with Tajik visit. 14 Jan.

10 Y Y 16/04/1999

On April 16, day two of Tajik President Emomali

Rakhmonov's visit to Moscow, the parties signed an

agreement on the restructuring of Tajikistan's debts

to Russia, estimated at $ 300 million. According to

Vremya's information, Moscow and Dushanbe have

agreed that $ 170 million will be written off in return

for Tajikistan's stock of 67 billion old Russian rubles

Agreement

Moscow News, 1999. RF

troops stay on in Tajikistan. 21

Apr.

244

(which were in circulation until 1993). Dushanbe

will pay Moscow the remaining $ 130 million

through shares in a number of Tajik enterprises and

industrial projects (such as the unfinished Rogun

hydroelectric power station), a list of which has been

presented to the Russian side. Tajikistan's parliament

has already prepared the legislative basis for these

joint-stock deals. Only two facilities that Dushanbe

regards as strategic - the aluminium plant in Tursun-

Zade and the Nurek hydroelectric power station -

will remain entirely Tajik state property.

11 Y Y 20/12/2000

At the initiative of TJ, the UNGA proclaims the year

2003 as the International Year of Freshwater, (note:

under this framework, in 2003 TJ will organise the

UN funded "Dushanbe Freshwater Forum"), to raise

awareness on issues such as water resources quality

and quantity and cooperation in water resources

management.

UN

resolution

UN Documents, 2000.

Resolution adopted by the

General Assembly [on the

report of the Second

Committee (A/55/582/Add.8)]

55/196. International Year of

Freshwater.

12 Y Y 16/01/2002

Japan is likely to participate in the accomplishment

of the construction of the Rogun and Sangudin

hydroelectric power stations in Tajikistan, special

envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister Muneo Suzuki

said after the meeting with Tajik President Emomali

Rakhmonov on Wednesday.

Declaration/

Speech

Ria Novosti, 2002. Japan is

likely to participate in

construction of two power

stations in Tajikistan. 16 Jan.

13 Y Y 03/06/2002

During Musharraf's visit to Dushanbe, Pakistan and

Tajikistan agreed to set up an intergovernmental

commission. Islamabad and Dushanbe also intend to

jointly build the Rogun hydropower plant in

Tajikistan and a highway connecting Pakistan and

Tajikistan through Afghan territory.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Interfax News Agency, 2002.

Pakistani president leaves

Dushanbe for Asian summit in

Kazakhstan. 3 Jun.

14 Y Y 29/10/2002

Chairman of the Barki Tojik open joint stock holding

company (Tajikistan) Dzhurabek Nurmakhmatov

and director general of one of the units of the

Russian financial-industrial group Baltic

Construction Company Oleg Toni on Tuesday will

sign a contract in Dushanbe to build the Rogun

hydroelectric station whose construction was

Agreement

Ria Novosti, 2002. Russians to

complete construction of

Rogun HPP in Tajikistan. 29

Oct.

245

interrupted in 1992 due to the objective reasons.

15 Y Y 31/05/2003

Talks between TJ deputy PM and Asian Bank

officer. They mention Tajik president's initiative to

hold an international water forum in Dushanbe this

year. The sides also discussed the issue of

completion of the construction of hydroelectric

power stations.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2003. Tajikistan:

Asian bank ready to take part

in joint water supply projects.

31 May.

16 Y Y 01/09/2003

TJ organizes the UN supported International Water

Forum. Countries adopt the Dushanbe Water Appeal,

that reiterates the importance of freshwater resources

and calls on the United Nations, governments,

organizations and stakeholders to commit

themselves more fully to achieving the Millennium

Development Goals and the targets agreed upon in

the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The

Appeal also invites the United Nations to declare

2005-2015 the International Decade of 'Water for

Life.

Water

conference

UN Documents, 2003.

Dushanbe Water Appeal

Included as an Annex to

A/58/362.

17 Y Y 08/10/2004

Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov and Czech

President Vaclav Klaus have signed today an

agreement on Czech-Tajik cooperation. The Czech

Republic will take part for example in

the Rogun water power station completion and the

GUP Tadzikcement Dushanbe cement works

reconstruction.

Agreement

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Czech, Tajik

presidents sign co-

operation agreement. 8 Oct.

18 Y Y 16/10/2004

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said after a

meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin

in Dushanbe, that in all, the Russian aluminium giant

RUSAL will participate in projects worth more than

$1 billion in Tajikistan. Rusal will, for example,

receive an as yet unspecified stake in the Rogun

hydroelectric project for $560 million of investment

in the Rogun dam's completion.

Talks on

water/energy

Interfax News Agency, 2004.

RUSAL to help build

aluminum smelter in

Tajikistan. 21 Oct.

19 Y Y 31/03/2005

Pakistan and Tajikistan has signed a Memorandum

of Understanding (MOU) for sale of electric power

to Pakistan and mutually beneficial cooperation in

the field of hydro power development in particular

high voltage transmission lines. The MOU was

MOU

Balochistan Times, 2005. Pak,

Tajikistan ink MOU for sale of

electric power to pak. 31 Mar.

246

signed after two days meeting of the Federal

Minister for Water and Power Liaqat Ali Jatoi with

the President, PM and his counterpart of Tajikistan

at Dushanbe. Jatoi meanwhile visited a number of

hydro-electric projects including Sarband, Sangtuda,

Bighazi, Norun and Rogun.

20 Y Y Y Y Y Y 30/05/2005

TJ organised a 3-day "International conference on

regional cooperation in transboundary river basins"

in Dushanbe on 30 May as part of the Water for Life

Decade [2005-15].

Water

conference

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Tajik president

urges action to tackle Central

Asia water problems. 31 May.

21 Y Y 01/06/2005

A session of the Tajik Assembly of Representatives

has cancelled an old agreement (1994) between the

Russian and Tajik governments to complete the

construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power

station on the River Vakhsh. Another reason for the

cancellation of the agreement was the signing of a

new agreement "On long-term cooperation between

the Tajik government and RusAl.

Cancelation

of an

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Tajik-Russian

power plant deal cancelled. 1

Jun.

22 Y Y 19/09/2005

Rahmon announced that construction of Rogun will

begin with the involvement of Russian capital in late

September. Rahmon stressed again the strategic

importance of the unique hydroelectric power station

not only for Tajikistan and Russia, but also for the

neighbouring countries, specifically Afghanistan.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2005. Russia to start

construction of Tajik power

plant late September. 19 Sep.

23 Y Y 27/09/2005 Tajik and Russian workers begin construction works

at the Rogun site.

Starting of

works

World Markets Analysis, 2005.

Construction Kicks Off on

3,600-MW Rogun HPP in

Tajikistan. 28 Sep.

24 Y 31/10/2006

Tajikistan could complete the Rogun hydro plant on

its own, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said

at a conference on the regional electricity market.

“Efforts to complete the dam using budgeted money

will start in 2007”, Rakhmonov said. Rakhmonov

said the Rogun plant was currently valued at $804

million. “It will cost $2 billion to finish the plant,”

he said, without specifying whether Russian

aluminium producer RUSAL would be involved.

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Weekly, 2006.

Tajikistan could

build Rogun hydro on its own –

Rakhmonov. 31 Oct.

247

25 Y Y 30/01/2007

Russia will finish building the Rogun hydroelectric

dam in Tajikistan and considers that only Russia and

Tajikistan are capable of handling this huge project,

Ramazan Abdulatipov, Russia's ambassador to

Tajikistan, told a January 30 press conference in

Dushanbe."The Rogun project is crucial to our

partnership, but it has regrettably become a hostage

to technical and technological disputes between

specialists and experts," Abdulatipov said. "We need

to come to terms and start implementing the project.

This is what the Russian president and government

want and a new inter- governmental agreement on

the Rogun plant's construction is being drafted,"

Abdulatipov said, adding that the agreement should

be signed as early as the first half of 2007.

Declaration/

Speech

Russia & CIS Metals and

Mining Weekly, 2007. Russian

ambassador says Russia to

complete hydro plant in

Tajikistan. 2 Feb.

26 Y Y 01/02/2007

Uzbek Prime Minister Writes to his Tajik Colleague

on Rogun Hydroelectric Power Station, requiring a

detailed examination of the project , accusing TJ of

"full ignorance on the part of the Government of the

Republic of Tajikistan, which has not viewed

possible after-effects and the proper planning and

technical support, but yet continues to speedily

undertake construction of this facility."

Open Letter

Mirziyoyev, 2007. Uzbek

Prime Minister Writes to his

Tajik Colleague on Rogun

Hydrolelectric Power Station. 3

Feb.

27 Y Y Y 06/02/2007

Ramazan Abdulatipov, Russia's ambassador to

Tajikistan, told at a press conference in Dushanbe

that "Russia will finish building the Rogun

hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan and considers that

only Russia and Tajikistan are capable of handling

this huge project".

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Weekly, 2007. Russia

to complete Rogun hydro plant

in Tajikistan – ambassador. 6

Feb.

28 Y Y 28/04/2007

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and Uzbek

President Islam Karimov have discussed prospects

for bilateral cooperation, as well as hydroelectricity

problems, in a telephone conversation, the Tajik

presidential press service said on Saturday.

Talks on

water/energy

Russia & CIS Presidential

Bulletin, 2007. Tajik, Uzbek

leaders discuss prospects

for cooperation. 28 Apr.

29 Y 29/08/2007

Tajik newspaper complains that current water

management does not suit Tajikistan’s needs. The

articles adds that the country has to build new

hydroelectric power stations to improve the situation

in terms of energy supplies in the country.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Tajik paper calls

for new mechanism in

energy, water use in Central

Asia. 29 Aug.

248

30 Y Y 29/08/2007

Rahmon announced that Tajikistan has cancelled a

deal with the giant Russian aluminium

company, RusAl, to build Rogun, after the two sides

failed to come to agreement over the height and type

of dam to be built.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Backgrounder:

Tajikistan cancels giant

Russian dam project. 11 Sep.

31 Y Y 04/10/2007

Russian companies are prepared to take part in

completing the construction of

the Rogun hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan,

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin

said after a meeting with President of Tajikistan

Emomali Rakhmon.He said the Rogun plant was "a

big and ambitious project, in which Tajikistan and

Russia are interested." Russia has already invested in

its completion, Naryshkin said.

Declaration/

Speech

Russian Financial Control

Monitor, 2007. Russian

Companies Ready to Join

Construction of Rogun Power

Plant. 4 Oct.

32 Y 01/01/2008

Tajikistan allocates fund form the state budget for

constructing Rogun. In 2008, 180 million Somoni,

and in 2009 - 532 million Somoni in 2010 Rogun

spent 650 million Somoni budget. According to the

Government's Medium Term Program, in 2013, the

Rogun will allocate at least 1.1 billion Somoni, and

in 2014 - 1.8 million Somoni.

Multiannual

planning

Avesta, 2011. Tajikistan is

planning to allocate one billion

for the completion of the

Rogun. 26 Aug.

33 Y Y 24/01/2008

A report published on the Uzbek newspaper Pravda

Vostoka criticized Tajik hydroelectric power

production projects, reminding that the international

legal basis for the use of transboundary rivers and

water streams should be observed in drawing up and

implementing such projects, and also saying that

they might cause environmental problems in the

region.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Uzbek expert raps

Tajik hydroelectric power

station projects. 25 Jan.

249

34 Y Y 25/01/2008

Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the

opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction

of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This

winter demonstrated that we should speed up the

construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2

hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or

not," Oqilov said.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik

premiers discuss electricity

supply, transport. 25 Jan.

35 Y Y 07/03/2008

Ukraine and Tajikistan have signed an action plan

for 2008-2009. Ukraine is ready to take part in an

international consortium to complete

the Rogun Hydroelectric Station, Yushchenko said.

“The Ukrainian side today officially announces its

participation in the consortium to finish

the Rogun Hydroelectric Station,” he said.

The two turbines operating at the Rogun station were

manufactured in Ukraine. "It is reasonable to

suppose that the remaining six turbines will be

Ukrainian," he said.

Signing of

an Action

Plan

Russia & CIS Oil and Gas

Weekly, 2008. Ukraine,

Tajikistan sign two-year action

plan. 12 Mar.

36 Y 29/04/2008

Residents of Tajikistan have been asked by the

President Rahmon and by Mayor Makhmadsaid

Ubaidullayev of the capital, Dushanbe to give up a

month's salary to help build the Rogun dam. Tajik

authorities' request comes after an unusually cold

winter caused widespread electricity shortages and

claimed hundreds of victims nationwide.

Ubaidullayev has calculated that if all the city's

residents give up half their salaries in May and June,

more than $10 million could be raised for the Rogun

dam.

Public

Appeal

The Associated Press, 2008.

Residents of Central Asia's

poorest nation asked to donate

to major hydroelectric project.

29 Apr.

37 Y Y 13/05/2008

Kazakhs President Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated

that Astana was very interested in investing in Tajik

hydro-power projects. "If a consortium will work on

the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then

Kazakhstan will take part, providing materials,

helping with shares, and as investors," Nazarbayev

said during a May 13 joint news conference.

Declaration/

Speech

RFE, 2008. Central Asia:

Kazakh, Tajik Presidents Show

Oil And Water Do Mix. 14

May.

38 Y 30/05/2008

On May 30, Rahmon toured the Rogun construction

site, where he announced the establishment of an

"international consortium" that would complete the

dam and get at least two of its six envisioned units

operating within 4 ½ years. The consortium -- which

Ramon said was set up with the help of the World

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. It is realistic to

launch power plant's first unit

in four years - Tajik leader. 31

May; Eurasianet.org, 2008.

Tajikistan: Government

250

Bank, and other unspecified international financial

institutions -- would ensure "the right to freely

participate in financing for all local and foreign

investors." Calling the Rogun project "epoch-

making," Rahmon spoke confidently on May 30 that

when the dam is completed, it "will not only cover

the electricity needs of [our] country, but also that of

neighboring states." Also: Rahmon once again called

"on all patriots and honoured sons of the motherland

to take an active part in the soonest completion of

the construction of the first unit of the hydroelectric

power station, and, as far as possible, to make their

contribution to ensuring the country's energy

independence". The country's all state radio and TV

channels are today quoting him as saying this.

Harbors Hydro-Power Dreams.

3 Jun.

39 Y Y 06/06/2008

Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov sent a letter to his

Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, saying that

Tajikistan was creating a consortium on the

completion of the $3 billion hydropower station,

with the assistance of the World Bank, and that the

Central Asian state requested that Russia resume its

participation in the project. A source in the Russian

Foreign Ministry said that Russian electricity export-

import operator Inter RAO UES could take over

the Rogun contract, replacing Russia's aluminium

giant RusAl.

Open Letter

Ria Novosti, 2008. Tajikistan

asks Russia to resume

participation in hydro project. 6

Jun.

251

40 Y Y 27/06/2008

Tajikistan organized the International Conference on

Water Related Nature Disasters Reduction. It was

supported by the UN, the World Water Council

(WWC) and other international institutes. During the

conference, Tajik President Rahmon reiterated his

desire to expand Tajikistan's hydro-power capacity

and urged the creation of an international consortium

to develop Lake Sarez.

Water

conference

CAWaterinfo, 2008.

International Conference on

Water Related Disaster

Reduction

Dushanbe, Republic of

Tajikistan, 27-28 Jun.

41 Y Y 03/12/2008

Uzbekistan against construction of Tajik power plant

on transboundary river. "We think that all decisions

on using a watercourse of transboundary rivers,

including on building hydro-technical facilities,

should not, under no circumstances, damage the

environment and infringe the interests of people,

who live in the contiguous countries," the paper

quoted the acting head of the State Committee for

Environment Protection, Boriy Alixonov, as saying

at an international environmental forum held in

Ashgabat on 3 December.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Uzbekistan against

construction of Tajik power

plant on transborder river. 16

Dec.

42 Y Y 06/12/2008

Ukraine and Tajikistan signed a series of documents

here Thursday on enhancing bilateral cooperation in

areas such as economy, trade, education, culture,

agriculture and tourism. "We have agreed that our

two countries would give priority to

boosting cooperation in hydropower," Yushchenko

said. Yushchenko noted that 87 % of the

hydroelectric power equipment used in Tajikistan

was supplied by Ukraine, and the equipment should

be modernized.

Agreement

TendersInfo, 2008. Ukraine :

Ukraine, Tajikistan sign

documents on bilateral co-op. 6

Dec.

252

43 Y Y Y Y 23/01/2009

While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that

"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian

region must be built with consideration of the

interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, “if

there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will

refrain from participation in such projects.” As a

reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a

note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended

by Russian leader's remarks on

water use in region – paper. 11

Feb.

44 Y Y 27/01/2009

“We will build the Roghun hydroelectric power

station although somebody will be against it,” the

deputy Tajik minister of energy and industry Pulod

Muhiddinov said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan to go

ahead with construction of

power plant – official. 27 Jan.

45 Y Y 30/01/2009

The government of Tajikistan has sent a protest note

to the Russian government over a perceived breach

of bilateral trust and agreements. The note refers to

the words of Russian president Dmitry

Medvedev during a state visit to Uzbekistan on 23

January.

Diplomatic

note

Global Insight, 2009. Tajikistan

Protests Against Russia's

Energy Deals with Uzbekistan.

30 Jan.

46 Y Y 31/01/2009

Bilateral co-operation talks have raised the

possibility of Ukraine participating in the completion

of the Rogun project in Tajikistan. Following talks,

the leaders of both countries said a priority for them

was to boost co-operation in hydro power, and noted

that Ukraine had previously supplied much of the

equipment to the sector in Tajikistan. They added

that further co-operation in the construction of

the Rogun project was of interest to Ukraine, and

that a deal worth several hundred million US dollars

was being considered.

Talks on

Rogun

Water Power & Dam

Construction, 2009. Ukraine

interested in

completing Rogun scheme. 31

Jan.

47 Y Y 02/02/2009

Rahmon has cancelled his visit to Moscow. "There is

a big suspicion that the refusal is a response to a

speech by Medvedev, who just over a week ago in

Tashkent agreed with Uzbekistani President

Islam Karimov that issues of constructing

hydroelectric power stations should be decided

collectively, taking account of the interests of all

countries in the region," Daniil Kislov, founder and

chief editor of the Fergana.ru news agency, told

Gazeta.ru.

Dipl. rel.

Cooling

BBC Monitoring Former

Soviet Union, 2009. Tajik

leader's Moscow visit

cancellation shows cooling of

relations with Russia. 6 Feb.

253

48 Y Y 05/02/2009

Iran intends to participate in completing the

construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power

station, the Iranian ambassador to Tajikistan, Ali

Asghar Sherdust, told journalists last night. The

diplomat said that an agreement on this was signed

during the Tajik president's meeting with Iranian

Minister of Commerce Masud Mir-Kazemi

yesterday.

Agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Iran to take part in

construction of Tajik power

plant. 6 Feb.

49 Y Y 11/02/2009

In a speech to the Foreign Policy Committee of the

European Parliament, Tajik President Rahmon --

who is visiting Brussels for the first time and will

meet with NATO and energy officials February 11 --

said the completion of the Rogun hydroelectric

power station is of "vital importance" for his

country.

Declaration/

Speech

RFE, 2009. EU, Tajikistan

Move Toward Closer

Cooperation. 11 Feb.

50 Y Y Y 13/02/2009

At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13

February, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said

Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy

projects if independent experts guarantee that the

projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek

TV reported the same day.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against

Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects

if ecology not harmed – leader.

13 Feb.

51 Y Y 25/02/2009

Uzbek President Islam Karimov has said water

problems in the Central Asian region should not be

politicized, and shows good relationship with

Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on

the construction of power plants on transboundary

rivers in the region must undergo an international

examination.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan "on

brink of energy collapse" –

agency. 10 Feb.

254

52 Y Y Y 14/04/2009

The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal

statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata

projects “pursue commercial interests and far-

reaching political objectives, but disregard the

possible consequences and ignore the concerns of

the neighbouring states”.

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees

Astana as Possible Ally on

Water. 18 Apr.

53 Y Y Y Y Y 15/04/2009

In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon

dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric

schemes will reduce water flows and harm the

environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s

Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other

countries” of trying to “gain control over our

strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy

enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan

and Kazakhstan, to support its cause.

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures

to Kazakstan on Water Dispute.

30 Apr.

54 Y Y 16/04/2009

At the 5th World Water Forum, Tajik President

called upon the international community to assist

Central Asian countries in resolving their water

problems. One of the ways the president sees to

preserve the region's water is to increase the

reservoir capacity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both

countries of the upper reaches, which would

contribute to more efficient utilisation of this natural

resource across the region and an increase in the

production of hydroelectric power.

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia Online, 2009.

Water in Central Asia is a

regional security problem. 24

Mar.

55 Y Y 23/04/2009

UZ evidences WB support before IFAS meeting -

The Gov. Newspaper of UZ "Pravda Vostoka"

published a letter of WB President Robert Zoellick .

The WB would like to clarify that it undertook

responsibility to carry out preliminary study, paying

a close attention to assessment of potential regional

impacts. These studies will determine the technical,

economic and financial viability of the proposed

project, as well as its potential environmental and

social impacts in light of the international

Newspaper

article

AKIpress, 2009. World Bank

to establish international

commission of independents

experts to scrutinize

construction of hydroelectric

power stations - response to

President Karimov's letter. 28

Apr.

255

agreements on the use of transboundary water

resources. In this regard, I have taken into account

and share Your concern regarding the delicate

ecological balance of the region, and absolute

necessity to ensure that the hydropower potential

will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in

states of the lower reaches, as well as the need to

consider design of new buildings in seismic zones.

56 Y Y Y Y Y 28/04/2009

IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian

leaders met to discuss water issues related to the

Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation

of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both

flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and

downstream countries dominated the summit's

agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions

among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President

Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan for their plans to implement more

assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn,

demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate

the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly

Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional

balance without clarifying how this might be

achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an

agreement without any specific detail on

transnational water management.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Agence France Presse, 2009.

Central Asian water talks boil

over into bickering. 28 Apr. ;

AKIpress, 2009. President

Bakiev hints neighboring

countries that Kyrgyzstan

needs compensation

for water accumulation. 28

Apr.

57 Y Y Y 30/04/2009

ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses

UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead

world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert

goal of intensifying a dispute over water and

electricity in the region, which has been continuing

for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world

community to investment projects for

the construction of hydroelectric power stations in

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islam Karimov knows

well that every time he plays this card in a specific

manner, the issue of foreign investment in the

hydroelectric power stations in the region will be

postponed for a certain time. This is because

Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor

organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims

Uzbekistan to blame for demise

of Aral Sea. 18 May.

256

this, Karimov is skilfully using this card.

58 Y Y Y 30/05/2009

Tajik President Rahmon speaks about Rogun with

participants in a session of the regional political

dialogue between the EU troika and the Central

Asian countries at the level of foreign ministers. "We

adhere to the principled line which is based on the

need to maintain balance of both national and

regional interests. In this connection I would like to

stress two important points. First, the hydro energy

sector is not water consuming and it does not

consume water without return. It just

lets water through turbines of the hydroelectric

power station. Unlike the hydro energy sector,

irrigated farming takes the river flow without return,

and even if returns, it returns part of water as a

drained water of very bad quality. I have repeatedly

said from various rostrums that none of Tajikistan's

projects in this sector [energy sector] will not be

aimed against our neighbours," Emomali Rahmon

said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. None of Tajik

energy projects aimed against

neighbours - leader. 1 Jun.

59 Y Y 15/06/2009

If the construction of hydroelectric power stations

has turned into a national idea for Tajikistan, then for

Uzbekistan such idea is the issue of water usage

because over 60 % of the Uzbek population live in

rural areas, the assistant of the Uzbek ambassador to

Tajikistan, Yuriy Nagay, told Asia-Plus. We need to

listen to each other attentively and come to

agreement," the assistant of the Uzbek diplomat

convinced.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan should seek

compromise on water row -

Uzbek diplomat. 16 Jun.

60 Y Y 07/09/2009

Tajikistan is offering to the countries of Central Asia

to take part in the construction of new hydroelectric

power plants in the republic for their needs. This

proposal was made by Tajik President Emomali

Rahmon at the World Climate Conference-3 in

Geneva.

Declaration/

Speech

Russia & CIS Presidential

Bulletin, 2009. Tajikistan

offers its hydropower resources

to central Asia. 7 Sep.

257

61 Y Y 20/10/2009

UKR company Electrotyazhmash signed a

memorandum of intent and an agreement with Barki

Tojik on cooperation in the construction and upgrade

of hydro power plants, in particular concerning

the Rogun hydro power plant.

Agreement

Interfax News Agency, 2009.

Electrotyazhmash starts talks

on creation of jv in Tajikistan.

8 Dec.

62 Y Y 21/10/2009

The former head of Barqi Tojik, Sharifkhon

Samiyev, blames Uzbekistan for energy problems. “I

think that energy issues between Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan have long acquired a political and not

economic nature.”[Reporter Ramziddin

Najmiddinov:] Everybody in Tajikistan believes that

after construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power

station and commissioning of the South-North and

Tajikistan-Afghanistan power transmission lines,

many energy problems in the country will be

resolved. [Sharifkhon Samiyev:] I also believe in

this. But one should look at things realistically. The

issue of constructing Rogun is not resolved in one or

two years. At the same time, Tajikistan's demand in

electricity is growing every day."

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajik official

blames Uzbekistan for energy

problems. 7 Nov.

63 Y Y 24/11/2009

Uzbek Ambassador to Tajikistan Shoqosim

Shoislomov said in Dushanbe that Uzbekistan will

end its participation in the Soviet-era electric power

grid as of December 1. He said Uzbekistan has built

a new power distribution system that can provide all

of its regions with electricity and does not need the

outdated electricity grid. Homidjon Orifov, the head

of Tajikistan's National Committee for Dams, said

Uzbekistan's move is most likely connected to the

Tajik-Uzbek standoff regarding the construction of a

new hydropower station near the Tajik city of

Rogun.

Withdrawal

from a

regional org.

RFE, 2009. Tajikistan Reacts

To Uzbek Decision To

Quit Power Grid. 27 Nov.

64 Y Y 25/11/2009

Husrav Goibov, deputy head of the CIS department

at the Tajik Foreign Ministry, says that "The

unilateral decision made by Uzbekistan to leave the

Central Asian Unified Energy System runs counter

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax News Agency, 2009.

Uzbekistan's withdrawal from

central Asian power grid. 25

Nov.

258

to the principles of neighbourliness and is politically

motivated"

65 Y Y 01/12/2009

UZ withdraws from Central Asian power grid.

Uzbek officials say Tashkent's participation in the

regional system endangers the flow of electricity to

its domestic consumers. If UZ does not quickly

reverse its decision, some Tajiks suggest Dushanbe

will retaliate by restricting water supplies that

Tashkent desperately needs to keep the country's

cotton sector afloat during the spring and summer.

Withdrawal

from a

regional org.

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan

withdraws from Central

Asian power grid from 1

December. 1 Dec; RFE, 2009.

Uzbekistan Withdrawing From

Regional Power Grid. 1 Dec.

66 Y 01/12/2009

President Rakhmon urges Tajik families to buy

Rogun HPP shares. "Some $600 million is currently

needed to launch the first phase of the Roguna HPP,

and for this purpose each family in the country,

except for the poor ones, should spend at least 3,000

somoni (4.353 somoni/$1)

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2009.

President Rakhmon urges Tajik

families to buy Roguna HPP

shares. 2 Dec.

67 Y Y 01/01/2010

Since January, Tashkent has delayed thousands of

rail carriages, citing “technical and logistical” issues.

Dushanbe says Tashkent is trying to sabotage

construction of a giant hydroelectric power plant,

Rogun.

Border

tensions

Eurasianet.org, 2010. Boxcar

Diplomacy Puts Tajik

Businesses At Tashkent’s

Mercy. 6 Aug.

68 Y 05/01/2010

In his official address to Tajik citizens, President

Rahmon announced that 2010 will be the year “when

great resources will be mobilized” to construct the

3,600 mw Rogun dam. “The construction of this site,

important for our country, has turned into the arena

of labour, bravery and generosity, trials of heroism,

and, more so, our national idea,” said Rahmon.

Declaration/

Speech

Rahmon, E., 2010. Message

from the president of the

republic of Tajikistan to the

people of Tajikistan. 5 Jan.

259

69 Y Y 03/02/2010

In a letter to his Tajik counterpart Akil Akilov,

which appeared in the media before reaching the

addressee, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev

called on Tajikistan to reconsider the construction of

Rogun in order to prevent environmental dangers,

maintain water balance, and provide continuing

access to water for millions of people. He also stated

“it is necessary to make an independent evaluation of

the project before resuming the construction of the

Rogun hydropower plant. The project was elaborated

about 40 years ago and based on obsolete

technologies”.

Open Letter

Global Insight, 2010.

Uzbekistan Calls for

Independent Assessment of

Hydropower Project in

Tajikistan. 4 Feb.

70 Y Y 07/02/2010

Akilov sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev posted by

the Khovar news agency. He emphasized the

country’s sovereign right to build the dam to rectify

energy deficits, which have plagued the country for

years now but “have been impossible to cover by

energy imports because of ongoing man-made

obstacles.” He also referred to the project’s

compliance with international law and the 2006

assessment by the German Lahmeyer corporation.

The latter allegedly confirmed that the project takes

ecological issues into consideration, something

Uzbekistan seriously questions.

Open Letter

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2010. Tajik premier

again affirms absence of Rogun

HPP threat to Uzbekistan. 8

Feb.

71 Y Y 08/02/2010

The reaction of Uzbek side on Akilov’s letter has

been to cut gas supplies to TJ. "Since Sunday,

Uzbekistan has cut in half -- from 28,000 cubic

metres of natural gas per hour to 15,000 cubic metres

-- gas to Tajikistan," a company spokesman told

AFP.

Resource cut

Agence France Presse, 2010.

Uzbekistan cuts energy to

Tajikistan amid tensions:

company. 8 Feb.

72 Y Y 10/03/2010

The World Bank announced that they will

underwrite an environmental feasibility study for the

proposed Rogun hydropower project. "If the Rogun

project proves its financial and environmental

sustainability, the World Bank will provide the

financial aid and support to the government of

Tajikistan for the establishment of a consortium that

ESIA

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Tajikistan: World Bank Offer

Energizes Rogun Hydropower

Project. 15 Mar.

260

will build this plant. The Tajik government and the

World Bank will sign an appropriate memorandum

on this issue," Konishi said.

73 Y Y 15/03/2010

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) strongly

supports Rogun. President Emomali Rahmon met

with Juan Miranda, ADB director general for Central

and Western Asia. ADB expressed its readiness to

help with assessments. Juan Miranda said "the Asian

Develop Bank welcomes Tajikistan's energy policy

and that the Rogun power plant construction plays a

key role in it; and in the future the bank will make it

a priority to support projects in this field within its

cooperation with Tajikistan"

Talks on

Rogun

Global Insight, 2002.

Uzbekistan Calls for

Independent Assessment of

Hydropower Project in

Tajikistan. 4 Feb.

74 Y Y Y Y 16/03/2010

Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-

UZ rapprochement is evident from

Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to

convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of

Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation.

According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the

environmental and anthropogenic security of and

regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan

and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be

appraised by international experts. "There ought to

be no hydroelectric power plants in the region

without results of the expertise obtained and

studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that

ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks

with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In

principle they are ready for expert evaluation.

Islam Karimov and I have come to an agreement we

are now announcing - after the expert opinion is

ready we are getting down to construction of new

facilities".

Talks on

water/energy

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Tajikistan: World Bank Offer

Energizes Rogun Hydropower

Project. 15 Mar.

75 Y Y 19/02/2010

Uzbek newspaper Narodnoye Slovo reiterates need

for expert examination of Rogun, stating that "the

documentation of the project has become obsolete

and the construction needs international

examination".

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek paper

reiterates need for expert

examination of major Tajik

power plant. 19 Feb.

76 Y Y 23/02/2010 Tajik dam expert says no one has right to stop

construction of Rogun plant. “The implementation of

Declaration/

Speech

CIS DEFENSE and

SECURITY, 2010. Summits,

261

the project, which was launched back in Soviet era

and which underwent all possible examinations in

the Soviet era, is under way. The examination of the

project was carried out by best specialists of leading

institutes of the [former] Soviet Union,” Homidjon

Arifov said. "Tajikistan does not need agreement of

any country or international organization for the

project of the Rogun hydroelectric power station.

Nobody has the right to veto this project. The fact

that the World Bank is currently conducting an

ecological examination of the Rogun project is the

goodwill of Tajikistan in case if in future the bank

makes a decision to take part in financing the

project," the expert said.

maneuvers, jubilees. 29 Mar.

77 Y Y 18/03/2010

Tajik leader assures Turkmen counterpart energy

projects not against neighbours. They signed 7

agreements on cooperation. Speaking about the

consumption of water resources in Turkmenistan, the

Turkmen leader said the construction of lakes and

reservoirs in Turkmenistan would help to protect the

environment and use water rationally.

General

cooperation

agreement

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik leader assures

Turkmen counterpart energy

projects not against neighbours.

18 Mar.

78 Y Y Y Y 31/03/2010

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who

is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's

unchangeable position towards projects on the

construction of major hydroelectric facilities in

Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric

facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in

full agreement with the neighbouring countries,"

Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about

Russia's position towards the construction of the

Roghun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and

Kambar-Ata [hydroelectric power station] in

Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert

says no one has right to stop

construction of Roghun plant.

24 Feb.

262

79 Y Y Y Y 03/05/2010

Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian

Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors

meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for

what he said was a lack of foresight about the

environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we

say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's

why, indeed, we treat this problem

seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of

our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly,

especially the countries on the upstream of the

rivers. They do not think about what kind of

consequences it may lead to," he added.

Declaration/

Speech

Agence France Presse –

English, 2010. Uzbek leader

blasts neighbours in water row.

3 May.

80 Y Y 09/06/2010

Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as

to complete the construction of the Roghun

hydroelectric power plant, [Tajik] Minister of

Energy and Industry Sherali Gul has said at the high-

level international conference on medium term

review of the progress of the implementation of the

International Decade for Action "Water for Life"

2005-2015, which is under way in Dushanbe.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajikistan to meet

Uzbekistan's demands

regarding power plant –

minister. 10 Jun.

81 Y Y Y 07/10/2010

The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan sent an

appeal to the World Bank demanding to inspect the

project of the Rogun hydro power plant. The appeal

read, "The Rogun Project was developed 40 years

ago and does not meet modern realities. […] In our

opinion, the World Bank is making a one-sided

evaluation of the tender procedures for

environmental assessment of construction of

hydroelectric power station, and do not take into

account the interests of all parties, including those

countries which are located in the downstream of

Amudarya river".

Open Letter

UzDaily, 2011. Ecological

Movement of Uzbekistan sends

letter to Europarliament. 21

Jun.

82 Y Y 12/10/2010

When asked why Uzbekistan is opposing the

construction of Rogun, he stated “How can we let

the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for

eight years, while the Rogun water reservoir is being

filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?”

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax Central Asia &

Caucasus Business Weekly,

2010. Rogun project

undermines Uzbekistan's water

supplies – Karimov. 12 Oct.

263

83 Y Y 18/10/2010

The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan publishes a

report on negative effects of "Transboundary impact

of the polluting substances emitted by the State

Unitary Enterprise «Tajik aluminium

company"(TALCO)"(the former Tajik aluminium

factory) on population and environment of various

areas of the Surkhan-Darya Region"

Report

Publishing

The Ecological Movement of

Uzbekistan, 2010. Letter to the

Executive Secretary, The

Inspection Panel

P.O. Box 27566 Washington,

D.C. 20038. 7 Oct.

84 Y Y 21/10/2010

Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi and

experts have dismissed Uzbek President Islam

Karimov's concerns that the construction of a major

hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan will lead to

a shortage of irrigation and drinking water in

Uzbekistan. "The accusations being levelled at

Tajikistan in connection with the construction of the

Rogun hydroelectric power station, and the

allegations that the water will take eight years to

accumulate - during which Uzbekistan will not

get water - do not have any scientific or economic

basis,".

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik minister,

experts flay Uzbek president's

statement on hydropower

project. 19 Nov.

85 Y Y Y 22/11/2010

Viktor Chub, head of the meteorology centre of

Uzbekistan (Uzgidromet), believes that the

construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power

station (Tajikistan) and its launch in the planned

operation mode will significantly influence the flow

of Amu Darya. A similar situation will be observed

with regard to the water flow in Syr Darya [river]

after the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station

and the Toktogul reservoir (Kyrgyzstan) switch to

power generation mode.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek expert

against new hydro-energy

projects in region. 23 Nov.

86 Y Y 01/11/2010

UZ has unilaterally closed a post on its border with

TJ without any explanation, a source in the Tajik

Foreign Ministry has told Interfax today.

Border

tensions

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbekistan closes

post on border with Tajikistan

– agency. 1 Nov.

264

87 Y Y 16/11/2010

Uzbekistan organised in Tashkent an international

conference under the topic of “Transborder

environmental problems of Central Asia: use of

international legal mechanisms to resolve them”,

attended by Over 60 representatives of international

organizations and financial institutions from over 30

countries attended the conference. Particularly, it

was attended by specialists from the UN, OSCE,

World Bank, World Health Organization, and others.

The conference noted Rogun negative impact on

regional environment.

Water

conference

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek conference

notes Tajik plant's negative

impact on regional

environment. 1 Dec.

88 Y Y Y 22/11/2010

The World Bank replied to the request made by the

Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan stating that

"Management considers that this Request for

Inspection should be ineligible for the following

reasons: i) the issues raised by the Requesters focus

on potential harm that could derive from the

construction, operation and/or failure of the

proposed Rogun HPP, but not from the Assessment

Studies that the Bank intends to finance; and ii)

Management has no record of the Requesters’

attempt to raise their issues with it prior to the

submission of the Request for Inspection".

Open Letter

The Inspection Panel, 2010.

Report and Recommendation

On Request for Inspection

TAJIKISTAN: Energy Loss

Reduction Project (Rogun

HPP) (Credits

Nos. 40930-TJ and H1780-TJ).

89 Y Y 02/12/2010

State-run Uzbek TV carried a report December 2 that

accused Tajik government officials of spreading lies

to damage “the friendship between the Uzbek and

Tajik peoples.” The Tajik people are suffering from

the “arbitrariness” of their leaders, the report

asserted, though “their gradually escalating tricks

cannot damage stability in the Republic of

Uzbekistan, or our good relations with the friendly

[Tajik] people.” Regarding the delays at the border,

the report added somewhat ominously, “our state

borders have always been open to people with good

intentions."

TV Report

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan:

Competition over Water

Resources Intensifying. 8 Dec.

90 Y Y Y 18/01/2011

An Uzbek diplomat previously briefed EUobserver

that Tashkent wants EU help to stop neighbouring

Tajikistan from completing the Rogun Dam on the

Vakhsh River. He said the dam has the potential to

cause a large-scale humanitarian disaster if it ever

burst, flooding vast swathes of land in Uzbekistan

and pushing refugees to the EU.

Declaration/

Speech

EUobserver.com, 2011. Uzbek

massacre hangs over Barroso-

Karimov meeting. 18 Jan.

265

91 Y Y 19/01/2011

Tajikistan to help Pakistan counter its energy crisis

with cooperation on hydroelectric sector. TJ

Ambassador also said “I merely want to note, that

some neighboring countries of Tajikistan continue to

obstruct, even up to imposing a blockade of all roads

and the delivery of goods, including railway transit",

he said.

Talks on

water/energy

Right Vision News, 2011.

Pakistan: Tajikistan to help

Pakistan counter its energy

crisis: Ambassador. 19 Jan.

92 Y Y 08/03/2011

Rahmon and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari

signed a number of agreements as officials held

wide-ranging talks on co-operation in agriculture,

health and sports and physical training in Islamabad

March 7-8, officials and business leaders said. They

also signed a joint statement before Rahmon

travelled to Karachi for more meetings.

Pakistan expressed its readiness to help finance

construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun hydroelectric

power plant.

Talks on

water/energy

-

Agreements

Central Asia Online, 2011.

Pakistan, Tajikistan pledge to

combat terror. 9 Mar.

93 Y Y Y Y Y 15/03/2011

Uzbekistan opposes Pakistan's plan to import

electricity from Tajikistan. Arif Karimov met senior

officials of the ministry of water and power last

week and handed over his government`s `letter of

disapproval` for the proposed project. He is reported

to have said that all the low riparian states - not only

Uzbekistan but Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan too -

were opposed to the project because a mandatory

Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessment

(TEIA) report for the development of Rogun

Hydropower project had not been shared by

Tajikistan for clearance

Talks on

water/energy

AKIpress, 2011. Uzbekistan

opposes Pakistan's plan to

import electricity from

Tajikistan. 15 Mar.

94 Y Y 08/06/2011

Rahmon asked EU to reconcile Central Asian

countries. The European Union could help the

Central Asian countries in searching for a

compromise over the region's water and energy

issues, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon told the

European Parliament on Tuesday in France where he

is on a formal visit. "None of our hydropower

structures will ever work in someone's detriment,

and if you look at the problem from a selfless and

fair point of view, it will become obvious: it will

only benefit all the countries and the region as a

Declaration/

Speech

Russia & CIS Military

Newswire, 2011. Tajikistan

asks EU to reconcile C. Asian

countries. 8 Jun.

266

whole,",

95 Y Y Y 21/06/2011

The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan sent a

letter to the President of the European Parliament

Jerzy Buzek. "We have been induced to address you

with this letter because of the ambiguous statements

of the Member of the European Parliament Mr.

Stevenson regarding the construction of the Rogun

hydroelectric power station (HPS) in Tajikistan," the

letter said. "On behalf of European Parliament he

repeatedly acted through Tajik's Mass Media in

favour of implementation of this rather disputable

hydropower project in the riverhead of Amu-

Darya," it added.

Open Letter

UzDaily, 2011. Ecological

Movement of Uzbekistan sends

letter to Europarliament. 21

Jun.

96 Y Y 10/09/2011

Tajik Defense Minister General Sherali Khairulloyev

said that "Today, if necessary, the Islamic Republic

of Iran's Armed Forces can reach Tajikistan in two

hours, and if a military presence of the Tajik side in

the similar plans and programs of the Islamic

Republic is necessary, the representative units of

Tajikistan's Armed Forces are also ready to travel to

Iran," Khairulloyev said on Saturday.

Declaration/

Speech

FARS News Agency, 2011.

Tajik DM Underscores

Expansion of Military

Cooperation with Iran. 10 Sep.

97 Y Y 16/11/2011

Mysterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbek

territory that caused key rail traffic between Termez

in Uzbekistan and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa to

be shut down. The UZ described the incident as a

terrorist act. Also: Rather than fix the track, the

Uzbeks dismantled it. Tajikistan calls the actions a

blockade.

Flow of

goods

disruption

Radio Free Europe, 2011. Tajik

Railways Wants Probe With

Uzbeks Of Alleged Terrorist

Blast. 21 Nov.

267

Annex 4. Timeline of the Kambarata dam

Key

KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan

EXT Non-Central Asian actor Y Involved in the event

KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT TYPE OF

EVENT SOURCE

1 Y Y 19/10/1992

The Kyrgyz government is in talks with General

Electric to build a hydro dam on the Naryn River,

near the Chinese border. Preliminary agreement had

been reached with GE on a complex of dams at

Kambarata, costing dollars US$ 100 million.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

FT Energy Newsletters, 1992. News: Russian Far East. 19

Oct.

2 Y 04/02/1994

Work at Tash-Kumyr and Kambarata hydroelectric

power stations has come to a standstill "due to a lack

of money" . Workers there were paid only twice in

1993.

Interruption

of works

BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, 1994. Kyrgyzstan's

Tash-Kumyr

and Kambaratin power stations

at a standstill. 4 Feb.

3 Y 01/12/1997

The Kyrgyz Prime Minister, Apas Dzhumagulov,

has signed a resolution authorising tenders for

investing in the construction of hydro power stations.

The aim is to accelerate the construction of the

Kambarata 2 plant in Naryn Region and the

completion of the Tash-Kumyr and the Shamaldy

Say stations in the Dzhalal-Abad Region.

Resolution

FT Energy Newsletters, 1997.

Commission established for

Kyrgyz tenders. 1 Dec.

4 Y 01/04/1999

Deputies in the upper house of Kyrgyzstan's

parliament have adopted a draft programme for

restructuring and privatising the national energy

company Kyrgyzenergo. Two hydroelectric power

stations, Kambarata GES-1 and GES-2, which are

being constructed on the Naryn river, as well as

some small hydroelectric plants will be transferred

for concession.

Resolution

FT Energy Newsletters, 1999.

Kyrgyz parliament votes to

privatise. 1 Apr.

268

5 Y Y 21/11/2000

Kazakh Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev

expressed serious concern about the plans to build

the Kambarata hydroelectric station in Kyrgyzstan

with Kazakh funds and proposed that the project

should be "blocked in every way". He thinks that it

will lead to water being drawn away from the

Toktogul hydroelectric station, which would have an

adverse effect on water supplies in Kazakhstan.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2000. Kazakh

government discusses water

supplies to southern Regions.

22 Nov.

6 Y Y Y Y 01/04/2003

The four central Asian states of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are to

collaborate for the construction of the Kambarata

hydroelectric power plant in Kyrgyzstan. According

to preliminary estimates, the construction of the first

Kambarata hydroelectric power plant is expected to

cost US$1.7B, and the second is estimated at

approximately US$230M. It is expected that Central

Asian states, Russia and the World Bank will

provide funding for the projects.

Talks on

water/energy

Water Power & Dam

Construction, 2003. Central

Asian states to participate in

hydro. 30 Apr.

7 Y Y Y Y 13/05/2004

Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar

Aytmatov in an interview with the Kyrgyz AKIpress

on 13 May 2004 commented on the country's

position regarding some issues relating to Kyrgyz-

Kazakh economic cooperation. "Moreover, currently

an issue of the creation of an international water and

energy consortium is being considered within the

framework of CACO Central Asian Cooperation

Organization. It is expected that an investment

policy will be conducted within the framework of

this consortium, which is aimed at the construction

of new hydroelectric power stations - Kambarata-1

and Kambarata-2 south-western Kyrgyzstan

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyzstan

to develop cooperation with

"fraternal" Kazakhstan –

minister. 13 May.

8 Y Y 19/11/2004

Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev visits Russia. An

agreement was reached in accordance with which

Kyrgyzstan would order equipment for electric

power stations from St Petersburg enterprises worth

1bn US dollars. The Russian side confirmed its

intention to invest 1.5bn US dollars in building

the Kambarata hydroelectric power station. The

Russian budget for 2005 includes R100m for

designing a feasibility study for the project. If the

plan follows its initial programme then the

construction of two hydroelectric power stations will

Agreement

BBC Sumary of World

Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyz

paper says recent breakthrough

made in ties with Russia. 24

Nov.

269

be started in 2005.

9 Y Y 19/04/2005

Kyrgyz acting Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva

declared that all earlier-agreed projects with Russian

Aluminium company remain in force. Projects for

the construction of the Kambarata hydropower plant

and an aluminium works are of great significance for

our country," Otunbayeva said. "These projects

should be realized in the coming years," she said.

Declaration/

Speech

Interfax News Agency, 2005.

Bishkek backs equal conditions

for foreign investors. 19 Apr.

10 Y Y 11/05/2005

Acting president of the Kirghiz

Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, declared in an

interview that he had a meeting with Oleg Deripaska

of RusAl, who has shown interest in

the construction of aluminium works in our country.

He is also interested in the power energy sector, the

construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric power

plant, Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2. This will

require ample investment, more than $2 billion.

Declaration/

Speech

Official Kremlin Int'l News

Broadcast, 2005. Radio

interview with Kyrgyzstan’s

acting president and prime-

minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

11 May.

11 Y Y 08/08/2006

Kyrgyzstan's OAO Power Plants and China's state

grid company signed an agreement on long-term

cooperation which envisions the construction and

modernization of several power plants in Kyrgyzstan

with the help of China, including the Uchkurgan

Hydroelectric Plant and the Sarydzhaz

and Kambarata hydroelectric plants.

Agreement

Central Asia & Caucasus

Business Weekly, 2006.

Kyrgyzstan, China expand

energy cooperation. 8 Aug.

12 Y Y 22/09/2006

Kyrgyz authorities provided 62 business projects for

the review of Kazakhstani investors: including

construction projects of two Kambarata hydro power

plants worth over US$ 2 billion Kyrgyz first prime

minister Daniar Usenov highlighted the project

of Kambarata hydro power plants as a priority

interest for the Kazakhstani side.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

Kazakhstan General Newswire,

2006. Kyrgyz authorities

complain of Kazakh

businessmen's passive attitude;

Astana demands to spare its

investors undue government

pressure. 22 Sep.

270

13 Y Y 15/12/2006

Kyrgyzstan and Russia are launching a major

energy-generating project to build the Kambarata-1

and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric cascades in the

Central Asian state, to be operated by Russian

electricity monopoly Unified Energy System (UES),

and designed to produce electricity for domestic

needs and exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan and

northern China.

Joint

statement/de

claration

RIA Novosti, 2006. Russia,

Kyrgyzstan embark on multi-

billion dollar energy project. 15

Dec.

14 Y Y 26/02/2007

Key Russian and Kyrgyz officials have agreed to

partially write off and restructure Kyrgyzstan's debt

to Russia of US$286 million. Kyrgyzstan also

offered Russia the chance to partake in the

construction of two hydro power stations

in Kambarata.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

Global Insight, 2007. Russia

Promises Restructuring of

Kyrgyzstan's Debt. 26 Feb.

15 Y Y Y 15/03/2007

The Kyrgyz government intends to set up a joint

venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build

two Kambarata hydroelectric power stations.

Kyrgyzstan will own 34 % of the shares in the joint

venture, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33 % each, First

Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov said that

according to preliminary estimates, about 2bn dollars

were needed to build the two hydroelectric power

stations, of which 1.7bn dollars would be spent

on Kambarata 1 and 300m dollars on Kambarata 2.

Kyrgyzstan has already invested a little more than

US$ 150 million into building the Kambarata 2

hydroelectric power station. In principle, Kazakhstan

and Russia also must invest 150m dollars each.

"The Kambarata projects have been included in a

state economic development programme. The work

on setting up the joint venture must be completed

this year," Usenov said.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Kazakhstan, Russia

to build hydroelectric power

stations in Kyrgyzstan. 15 Mar.

16 Y Y 30/04/2007

As an outcome of Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan,

a joint venture involving state-owned companies

from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia is

established. The new venture is expected to finish

construction on two hydroelectric power stations

located on the Naryn River, Kambarata 1 and

Kambarata 2.

Establishme

nt of a joint-

venture

Eurasianet.org, 2007.

Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic

Muscle During Visit to

Kyrgyzstan. 30 Apr.

271

17 Y 15/06/2007

The Kyrgyz Parliament has rejected a bill that lifts a

ban on selling the country's Kambarata-1

and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power plants to

private owners.

Resolution

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2007. Parliament

refuses to allow privatization

of Kambarata power plants. 15

Jun.

18 Y Y 09/07/2007

Kazakhstan annulled Kyrgyzstan's debt for the usage

of railways and spread the national tariffs onto the

country, and contributed US$100 million to a

US$120 million joint investment fund to be created.

Kazakh delegation also announced its intention to

bid in the tender for the Kambarata stations.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

Global Insight, 2007.

Kazakhstan Outmanoeuvres

Russia Over Investment in

Kyrgyzstan. 13 Jul.

19 Y Y 16/07/2007

Representatives of Alcoa have arrived in Kyrgyzstan

to study prospects for building an aluminium

producing plant in the Jalal-Abad region

and Alcoa's participation in the construction of the

Kambarata hydroelectric power plants, the Kyrgyz

Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources

said in a statement.

Talks on

water/energy

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2007. Alcoa,

Kyrgyzstan consider building

new aluminum plant. 16 Jul.

20 Y Y 18/09/2007

Bakiyev expressed his wish to hold in Bishkek an

international water and energy summit under the

aegis of the European Union, and to set up in

Kyrgyzstan an international water management

academy, which could train highly skilled specialists

in this field.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2007. Kyrgyz paper says

sides agreed on disputed areas

at talks with Tajik leader. 21

Sep.

21 Y Y 19/11/2007

South-Korean company KEPCO has expressed

interest in taking part in the construction

of Kambarata Hydropower Plant-1 and -2.

Talks on

commercial

cooperation

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2007. Kyrgyzstan to

raise $1.5 bln in private

investments from South Korea.

19 Nov.

22 Y Y 21/11/2007

Mott MacDonald (UK), SNC-Lavalin International

Inc. (Canada) and EDF (France) in cooperation with

PricewaterhouseCoopers, have filed their bids for

preparation of a feasibility study for investing in the

construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2

hydropower plants.

Bid filing

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2007. Three

companies bid

for Kambaratin hydropower

plants. 21 Nov.

272

23 Y 01/01/2008

The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic issues a

decision to re-launch the construction of Kambarata

2 hydropower station (360 MW).

Adoption of

legal

instruments

Ministry of Economy of

Kyrgyzstan, 2008. Regulation

of specific industries.

24 Y 10/01/2008

Bakiyev said that “The government should start with

the possible emission of long- term bonds for large

national projects, including Kambarata 1 and 2 and

an international highway.”

Declaration/

Speech

Russia & CIS Business &

Financial Daily, 2008. Bakiyev

suggests issuing bonds for

national projects. 10 Jan.

25 Y Y 15/01/2008

EDF and PricewaterhouseCoopers have won the

tender for an investment study of the Kambarata-1

and Kambarata-2 hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan,

said Inter RAO UES - the organizer of the tender.

The winner will sign the contract in early 2008.

Contract

Awarding

AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik

premiers discuss electricity

supply, transport. 25 Jan.

26 Y 23/01/2008

The Kyrgyz government has endorsed the draft

budget and its own programme of action for 2008, in

which a total of 1.2 billion Somoni are planned to be

channelled into the construction of

the Kambarata hydroelectric power station.

Adoption of

legal

instruments

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz

government endorses draft

budget for 2008. 28 Jan.

27 Y Y 25/01/2008

Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the

opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction

of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This

winter demonstrated that we should speed up the

construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2

hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or

not," Oqilov said.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik

premiers discuss electricity

supply, transport. 25 Jan.

273

28 Y Y 01/02/2008

A contract has been awarded to Electricité de France

(EDF) and PricewaterhouseCoopers to study the

Kambarata-1 and 2 hydropower projects in the

Kyrgyz Republic.

Contract

Awarding

Water Power & Dam

Construction, 2008. EDF to

study Kambarata schemes in

Kyrgyz Republic. 29 Feb.

29 Y 07/05/2008

The Parliament plans to appeal to the President

requesting him to announce construction

of Kambarata water power station 2 as all-nation

project. This appeal is initiated so that people would

have spirit and pride as the country is

constructing Kambarata water power station using its

own resources only, Speaker Madumarov said today.

The lawmakers plan to contribute their one-week

pay, while Parliament staff will contribute their one-

day pay making 640 thousand Somoni in total (some

US$ 18 thousand) to support construction of the

water power station and related facilities.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2008. Parliament to

ask President to announce

construction

of Kambarata water power

station 2 as all-nation project. 7

May.

30 Y 08/05/2008

Around $ 1.5 US billion investments are required for

construction of Kambarata I and II until 2020. Such

information came from the report made by the

Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources,

specifically: 1) construction of Kambarata water

power station No. 1 (1,900 MW) will require US$

1.2 billion (construction period: 2010-2020) 2)

construction of Kambarata water power station No. 2

(360 MW) will require US$ 280 million

(construction period: 2007-2012).

Other

AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyzstan

needs $4US billion for

construction of water power

stations until 2020. 8 May.

31 Y Y 05/06/2008

Russian energy firm Inter RAO has signed a contract

with the winning bid team for the two Kambarata

projects proposed to be built in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The contract calls for the detailed feasibility study

for the Kambarata projects by early next year.

French energy utility Electricité de France (EDF)

and international professional services

firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers were named as the

lowest bidders for the study in late December 2007.

Contract

Awarding

Water Power & Dam

Construction, 2008. Russian

energy firm signs contract. 4

Jun.

274

32 Y Y 23/09/2008

Russian equipment supplier Power Machines has

received a contract to supply two turbines to the 360-

MW Kambarata 2 hydroelectric project on

Kyrgyzstan's Naryn River.

Contract

Awarding

Hydroworld, 2008. Russian

supplier to equip Kyrgyzstan’s

360 MW Kambarata 2. 25 Sep.

33 Y Y 01/10/2008

KGZ and RUS signed agreements concerning

participation of Russia in construction of Kambarata-

1 and -2 hydroelectric power plants and

modernization of the republican oil and gas complex

with Gazprom's help.

Agreement

The Russian Oil and Gas

Report, 2008. Gazprom

to take part in privatization of

Kyrgyzstan. 13 Oct.

34 Y Y 09/10/2008

The Russian and Kyrgyz presidents have ordered to

accelerate the construction of the first and

second Kambarata hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan.

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2008. Russian,

Kyrgyz presidents want faster

building of Kambarata HPP. 9

Oct.

275

35 Y 28/11/2008

The residents of Suzak rayon collected 1 million

Somoni (roughly US$ 20 thousand) for construction

of Kambarata-2 water power station. These funds

were collected as a result of one-day pay

contributions of workers from public budget

financed organizations and other sources.

Fund

collection

AKIpress, 2008. Suzak rayon

residents collect 1 million som

for construction of Kambarata-

2 water power station. 28 Nov.

36 Y 17/12/2008

Five years will be required to fill in the basin

of Kambarata-1 water power station, said Prime

Minister Igor Chudinov during a joint meeting of

three parliamentary factions today. Russia will give

$2US billion, including $1US.7 billion for

construction of Kambarata-1,2 water power stations

and $300US million for budget support. “Everything

depends upon us now, how quickly we will hold

talks,” he said.

Other

AKIpress, 2008. Five years

required to fill in basin

of Kambarata-1 water power

station. 17 Dec.

37 Y 25/12/2008

Roza Otunbaeva, parliamentarian from the Social

Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, questions

Kambarata. "Will the Russian US$ 1.7 billion loan

for construction of Kambarata-1 water power station

bring benefit for Kyrgyzstan and does it meet

interests of Kyrgyzstan? Frankly speaking, this is a

commercial loan. With this loan the public external

debt of Kyrgyzstan will double. Why do we drive

ourselves into the grave?" Roza Otunbaeva said

Russia will primarily hire Russian citizens and will

become an owner of Central Asian water. "So, we

will benefit nothing. Prior to any agreements we

should think about interests of the state," she said.

Other

AKIpress, 2008. Lawmaker

questions benefit of Russian

loan for construction

of Kambarata-1 water power

station for Kyrgyzstan. 25 Dec.

276

38 15/01/2009

Roza Otunbayeva thinks that the president will have

to bear responsibility if he takes the 2bn-loan to be

allocated by Russia. "I want to emphasize that this

issue is trampling on Kyrgyzstan's national interests.

A foreign state is taking advantage of a difficult

economic situation to become owner of water.

Kyrgyzstan itself has paved the way for Russia to

own our water," she said.

Other

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz ex-minister

says president to be responsible

for 2bn Russian loan. 15 Jan.

39 Y Y Y Y 23/01/2009

While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that

"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian

region must be built with consideration of the

interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, "if

there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will

refrain from participation in such projects." As a

reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a

note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended

by Russian leader's remarks on

water use in region – paper. 11

Feb.

40 Y Y 01/02/2009

Russia has gone ahead bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan

with a pledge of a loan of $1.7 billion to invest in the

Kambarata hydro project. This decision coincided

with Kyrgyzstan’s announcement that the US should

leave the Manas airbase, which is currently serving

as an important supply base for the war in

Afghanistan. --> Follow up 1: "In July 2009, the

U.S. signed a new lease for Manas. The Kyrgyz did

not return the Russian money. Shortly before the

overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in April 2010, they

were still complaining that Russia had failed to open

the credit line promised for Kambarata-1".--> Follow

up 2: Karimov said at IFAS meeting in April 2009

"Third countries which would very much like to take

part in this discussion are also pursuing their own

aims," Karimov noted in thinly veiled remarks that

observers suggested were aimed at Moscow.

Issue linkage

Ministry of Economy of

Kyrgyzstan, 2008. Regulation

of specific industries; ICG,

2010. Policy Briefing Asia

Briefing N°102

Bishkek/Brussels, 27 Apr.

Eurasianet.org, 2009.

Kazakhstan: Central Asian

Leaders Clash over Water at

Aral Sea Summit. 28 Apr.

277

41 Y 05/02/2009

Construction of Kambarata-1 water power station

will help Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan tackle dry

hydrological cycle problems, Igor Chudinov told

news conference today in Bishkek. "we would like to

stress one more time that this will help tackle dry

hydrological cycle problems. Toktogul hydroelectric

station will remain the main regulator. But we will

have the station higher with reserve of 5 billion of

water that can be used in dry hydrological cycles.

We will be able to produce additional 6 billion kWh

without using water from Toktogul reservoir," Igor

Chudinov said when describing advantages

of Kambarata-1 water power station. The Prime

Minister said it is unclear yet who will control water

streams, but Toktogul water power station will be

the property of Kyrgyzstan and the main regulator of

water issues on Naryn river.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2009. PM

Chudinov: Construction

of Kambarata-1 water power

station to help Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan tackle dry

hydrological cycle problems. 5

Feb.

42 Y Y Y 13/02/2009

At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13

February, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said

Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy

projects if independent experts guarantee that the

projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek

TV reported the same day.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against

Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects

if ecology not harmed – leader.

13 Feb.

43 Y Y 25/02/2009

Uzbek President Islam Karimov has said water

problems in the Central Asian region should not be

politicized, and shows good relationship with

Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on

the construction of power plants on transboundary

rivers in the region must undergo an international

examination.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajikistan "on

brink of energy collapse" –

agency. 10 Feb.

44 Y Y 16/03/2009

At the 5th World Water Forum, Tajik President

called upon the international community to assist

Central Asian countries in resolving their water

problems. One of the ways the president sees to

preserve the region's water is to increase the

reservoir capacity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both

countries of the upper reaches, which would

contribute to more efficient utilisation of this natural

resource across the region and an increase in the

production of hydroelectric power.

Declaration/

Speech

Central Asia Online, 2009.

Water in Central Asia is a

regional security problem. 24

Mar.

278

45 Y Y 16/03/2009

At the 5th World Water Forum, Kyrgyz PM

Chudinov states that KG is ready for a constructive

dialogue to discuss mutually beneficial proposals for

the effective use of water resources. He also stated

that “By putting these (Kambarata 1 and 2) water

reservoir into operation, needs in electric energy of

the republic will be fully satisfied and it will let work

Toktogul hydro juncture in optimal regime, in which

downstream countries are concerned. Project on

construction of Kambarata HPS was regulated with

neighboring republics in 80-ies of last century and

passed ecological expertise.”

Declaration/

Speech

Speech of Prime-Minister of

the Kyrgyz Republic I.

Chudinov at the Fifth World

Water Forum Summit

(Istanbul, 16 March 2009).

46 Y Y 24/03/2009

The Uzbek MFA publishes an article written by

S.Zhigarev, Director of OJSC “Gidroproject”

underlining problems deriving from Kambarata. "It

goes without saying, and it is clear to any sober-

minded person that the 30-years-old projects must be

subjected to an independent objective examination"

Newspaper

article

Zhigarev, S., 2009. Problems

Concerning Construction of the

Kambarata Hydropower

Station-1 in Kyrgyzstan. 23

Mar.

47 Y Y Y 14/04/2009

The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal

statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata

projects “pursue commercial interests and far-

reaching political objectives, but disregard the

possible consequences and ignore the concerns of

the neighbouring states”.

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees

Astana as Possible Ally on

Water. 18 Apr.

48 Y Y Y Y Y 15/04/2009

In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon

dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric

schemes will reduce water flows and harm the

environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s

Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other

countries” of trying to “gain control over our

strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy

Declaration/

Speech

IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures

to Kazakstan on Water Dispute.

30 Apr.

279

enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan

and Kazakhstan, to support its cause.

49 Y Y 23/04/2009

UZ evidences WB support before IFAS meeting -

The Gov. Newspaper of UZ "Pravda Vostoka"

published a letter of WB President Robert Zoellick .

The WB would like to clarify that it undertook

responsibility to carry out preliminary study, paying

a close attention to assessment of potential regional

impacts. These studies will determine the technical,

economic and financial viability of the proposed

project, as well as its potential environmental and

social impacts in light of the international

agreements on the use of transboundary water

resources. In this regard, I have taken into account

and share Your concern regarding the delicate

ecological balance of the region, and absolute

necessity to ensure that the hydropower potential

will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in

states of the lower reaches, as well as the need to

consider design of new buildings in seismic zones.

Newspaper

article

AKIpress, 2009. World Bank

to establish international

commission of independents

experts to scrutinize

construction of hydroelectric

power stations - response to

President Karimov's letter. 28

Apr.

50 Y Y Y Y Y 28/04/2009

IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian

leaders met to discuss water issues related to the

Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation

of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both

flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and

downstream countries dominated the summit's

agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions

among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President

Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan for their plans to implement more

assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn,

demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate

the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly

Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional

balance without clarifying how this might be

achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an

agreement without any specific detail on

transnational water management.

Joint

statement/de

claration

Agence France Presse, 2009.

Central Asian water talks boil

over into bickering. 28 Apr. ;

AKIpress, 2009. President

Bakiev hints neighboring

countries that Kyrgyzstan

needs compensation

for water accumulation. 28

Apr.

280

51 Y Y Y Y Y 28/04/2009

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev [chairman

of the Aral Sea summit] rebuked Kyrgyz president

for bringing the issue of Kambarata at the summit, as

only issues related the Aral Sea were being

considered.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz president

rebuked for unscheduled

remarks at Aral Sea summit. 28

Apr.

52 Y Y Y 30/04/2009

ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses

UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead

world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert

goal of intensifying a dispute over water and

electricity in the region, which has been continuing

for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world

community to investment projects for

the construction of hydroelectric power stations in

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islam Karimov knows

well that every time he plays this card in a specific

manner, the issue of foreign investment in the

hydroelectric power stations in the region will be

postponed for a certain time. This is because

Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor

organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing

this, Karimov is skilfully using this card.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims

Uzbekistan to blame for demise

of Aral Sea. 18 May.

53 Y Y Y 05/05/2009

ALMATY follow-up: President Bakiyev of

Kyrgyzstan stated in May of 2009 that both phases

of the Kambarata power project will be built,

regardless of “who likes it or not,” a clear challenge

to the objections of Tashkent and Ashgabat.

Declaration/

Speech

Eurasianet.org, 2009.

Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Stands

Up to Uzbekistan and

Turkmenistan on Hydropower

Projects. 6 May.

54 Y Y 13/06/2009

Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on

the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Specifically, they dug

ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat borderline

regions of

Kyrgyzstan and erected walls in the Rishtan rayon of

Uzbekistan’s Ferghana region. One explanation for

Uzbekistan’s decision relates to Kyrgyzstan’s

intention to build the Kambarata hydro-electric

station. Bishkek-based political scientist Mars

Saryev views the current Uzbek policy as yet another

sign of disapproval of such plans, and another way

of raising difficulties for the Kyrgyz in realizing

Issue linkage

CACI Analyst, 2009.

Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan:

building a wall. 1 Jul.

281

their energy potential.

55 Y Y 15/09/2009

An article by N. Koroleva(an official of Uzbekistan's

State Nature Committee) in Uzbek newspaper

Pravda Vostoka asks for independent feasibility

studies of projects of new water facilities on Central

Asian transboundary rivers should be examined

independently. "The work of the Toktogul reservoir,

the Kambarata -2 hydroelectric power station and

the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station, which

is being designed now, [all in Kyrgyzstan] has a

significant transboundary effect on the environment

of [central Uzbekistan's] Sirdaryo, Jizzax and

Navoiy regions and will cause irreversible negative

environmental consequences,".

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Uzbek report calls

for independent scrutiny of

Central Asian water projects. 8

Oct.

56 Y Y 23/09/2009

Uzbekistan suspends gas supplies to southern and

northern Kyrgyzstan due $19US million gas debt

owed.

Resource cut AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies

resume in Osh. 14 Oct.

57 Y Y 24/09/2009

Mahira Usmanova, researcher of the Seismology

Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of

Uzbekistan, says that "Hydroelectric facilities should

not be constructed in Central Asia without

consideration of seismic issues and geological risks".

Ms Usmanova reminded that the Toktogul

hydroelectric station lies in the area with radioactive

toxic wastes storage facilities. In case the water has

burst out from the dam, not only Kyrgyzstan, but

also Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be

in danger. The Toktogul hydroelectric station in the

tectonic fault zone.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2009. Kyrgyz

hydroelectric stations in highly

seismic zone pose potential

threat of cascade-wise

destruction - Uzbek

Seismology Institute. 24 Sep.

282

58 Y 06/10/2009

Difficulties in getting the money from Russia for

Kambarata, pushed the government to submit a bill

to parliament that would nullify the law on

constructing and running the Kambarata I

and Kambarata II hydroelectric power stations. In

addition, Otunbayeva criticised the government,

saying that "Television advertisements about the

construction have already pulled the wool over our

eyes. It should be pointed out that the incumbent

president's election programme was based exactly on

this project. However, we see today that they are

talking nonsense to people. It turns out that

Kyrgyzstan is unable to complete this project on its

own, without bringing investment,".

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz

government cannot afford to

fund major hydropower project

– official. 6 Oct; BBC

Monitoring Central Asia Unit,

2009. Key hydropower project

unfeasible without foreign help

- Kyrgyz opposition MP. 7 Oct.

59 09/10/2009

The Kyrgyz parliament has declared the law "On the

construction and use the Kambarata hydroelectric

power stations" no longer valid. The head of the

Kyrgyz State Committee for the Management of

State Property, Tursun Turdumambetov, said that the

law in force prevented the attraction of investment to

complete the construction of the Kambarata-2 power

plant, and that it went against the law "On joint stock

companies".

Resolution

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz parliament

voids law banning power plants

from being sold. 10 Oct.

60 Y Y 14/10/2009 Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Osh (gas was cut

on September 23)

Resumption

of resource

supply

AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies

resume in Osh. 14 Oct.

283

61 Y Y 23/10/2009

Kyrgyzstan will use US$ 100 million of a US$ 300-

million state loan provided by Russia to build

the Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power plant, Kyrgyz

Finance Minister Marat Sultanov said in parliament

on Friday. The fund recently suspended its efforts to

fund the project. It is now waiting for Electric Power

Plants to fulfil earlier agreed conditions, including

the construction of the Kambarata-2 facility, an

additional issue of shares for purchase by the fund

and a business plan that would guarantee the

project's seven-year payback period.

Other

Central Asia General

Newswire, 2009. Kyrgyzstan to

spend part of Russian loan

on Kambarata-2. 23 Oct.

62 Y Y Y 23/12/2009

Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has said that

downstream countries such as Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan will benefit from the construction of

the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station. He said

by constructing the power plant Kyrgyzstan would

ensure uninterrupted power supply for local

population and accumulate water for irrigation needs

of downstream countries in the region.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz leader says

neighbours to benefit from new

power plant. 23 Dec.

63 Y Y 28/12/2009

Uzbek President Islam Karimov held a meeting with

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov to discuss

prospects for developing bilateral cooperation.

Following the talks, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar

Usenov said his country would possibly carry out an

international expert examination of the project of

the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. "The

Uzbek side has informed the Kyrgyz one of its

concern over plans to construct the Kambarata-1

power plant in view of possible damage to the

environment and the water and energy balance, as

well as possible technological threats. For this

reason, Uzbekistan has requested to carry out an

international expert examination of the project under

the aegis of the World Bank. The reservoir of the

planned Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power station

will contain 5bn cubic meter of water. This volume

is large enough. Kyrgyzstan will benefit from the

conduct of an expert examination of Kambarata-1.

According to him, a delegation of the World Bank's

Talks on

dam

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2009. Kyrgyzstan may

agree to probe into major water

facilities – premier. 30 Dec.

284

Board of Directors visited the place allocated for the

construction several weeks earlier. "I asked them to

help and allocate a grant to carry out a thorough

expert examination of Kabarata-1. All the major

facilities should undergo an international

examination. We see nothing bad in it," the Kyrgyz

prime minister noted.

64 Y Y Y 13/02/2010

Kyrgyz President Bakiev says that Central Asian

states should live in peace and harmony. He is sure

that the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric

power station will "only benefit our neighbors". "We

will be able to save water. Once the Kambarata-2

hydroelectric power station starts functioning, water

will be regulated on a daily basis. We will be able to

accumulate such a volume of water in the Toktogul

water reservoir that will make it possible not to flood

our neighbors in winter. We will be able to save

water in winter and provide its necessary volumes in

summer," he said.

Declaration/

Speech

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Central Asian

states should live in peace and

harmony - Kyrgyz leader. 13

Feb.

65 Y Y 27/02/2010

Russia and Kyrgyzstan have agreed to conduct an

international expert examination of the project to

complete the two Kambarata hydropower plants in

Kyrgyzstan, Russian Energy Minister Sergei

Shmatko told reporters Saturday.

Agreement

Prime-Tass English-language

Business Newswire, 2010.

Russia, Kyrgyzstan agree on

intl examination

of Kambarata proj. 27 Feb.

66 Y Y Y Y 16/03/2010

Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-

UZ rapprochement is evident from

Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to

convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of

Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation.

According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the

environmental and anthropogenic security of and

regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan

and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be

appraised by international experts. "There ought to

be no hydroelectric power plants in the region

without results of the expertise obtained and

studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that

ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks

with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In

principle they are ready for expert evaluation.

Islam Karimov and I have come to an agreement we

are now announcing - after the expert opinion is

Talks on

water/energy

Eurasianet.org, 2010.

Tajikistan: World Bank Offer

Energizes Rogun Hydropower

Project. 15 Mar.

285

ready we are getting down to construction of new

facilities".

67 Y Y 30/03/2010

A month has passed since Uzbekistan unilaterally

closed the Kara-Suu-Avtodorozhnyy customs

checkpoint. The true reasons behind this decision

have remained unknown, but some human rights

activists connect the closing of the checkpoint with

the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric

power station, which the Uzbeks think can lead to a

decrease in the volume of water flowing to

Uzbekistan.

Border

closure

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Paper eyes recent

closure of customs checkpoint

on Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. 3

Apr.

68 Y Y Y Y 31/03/2010

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who

is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's

unchangeable position towards projects on the

construction of major hydroelectric facilities in

Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric

facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in

full agreement with the neighbouring countries,"

Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about

Russia's position towards the construction of the

Rogun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and

Kambarata [hydroelectric power station] in

Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Talks on

water/energy

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert

says no one has right to stop

construction of Roghun plant.

24 Feb.

69 Y Y Y Y 03/05/2010

Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian

Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors

meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for

what he said was a lack of foresight about the

environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we

say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's

why, indeed, we treat this problem

seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of

our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly,

especially the countries on the upstream of the

rivers. They do not think about what kind of

consequences it may lead to," he added.

Declaration/

Speech

Agence France Presse –

English, 2010. Uzbek leader

blasts neighbours in water row.

3 May.

286

70 Y Y 19/05/2010

Uzbektransgaz, the state gas company of Uzbekistan,

has cut delivery of gas to Osh in neighboring

Kyrgyzstan by 50 % over back payments due of

some 1.6 million Somoni (about US$ 10,000).

Resource cut

TendersInfo, 2010.

Kyrgyzstan: Uzbekistan Cuts

Gas Delivery to Kyrgyzstan. 22

May.

71 Y 30/08/2010

KG launched Kambarata-2 US$ 200 million

hydroelectric power station on Monday, its first

since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Acting

President Roza Otunbayeva pressed a symbolic red

button to start the first unit of the Kambarata-2 hydro

project. The project, funded partly by Russia, will

allow Kyrgyzstan to generate more power but could

divert water from its neighbours.

Dam launch

Reuters, 2010. Kyrgyzstan

launches new hydroelectric

power plant. 30 Aug.

72 Y Y Y 22/11/2010

Viktor Chub, head of the meteorology centre of

Uzbekistan (Uzgidromet), believes that the

construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power

station (Tajikistan) and its launch in the planned

operation mode will significantly influence the flow

of Amu Darya. A similar situation will be observed

with regard to the water flow in Syr Darya [river]

after the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station

and the Toktogul reservoir (Kyrgyzstan) switch to

power generation mode.

Newspaper

article

BBC Monitoring Central Asia

Unit, 2010. Uzbek expert

against new hydro-energy

projects in region. 23 Nov.

73 Y 29/11/2010

Otunbaeva says Kambarata-1 hydropower project to

be reviewed by international experts, following

Uzbek requests. "I think construction of such big

facilities should be reviewed. We will reach

agreement on this issue with our neighbors,"

President Otunbaeva said. "We will discuss this

problem in the spirit of cooperation. I think we will

built the hydropower plant after review is

completed" the President said.

Declaration/

Speech

AKIpress, 2010. President

Otunbaeva says Kambar-Ata-1

hydropower project to be

reviewed by international

experts. 29 Nov.

74 Y Y 10/02/2011

At a meeting of a Russian-Kyrgyz intergovernmental

commission, representatives of the Russian

government agreed to develop a construction project

for several hydropower plants on the Naryn River in

Kyrgyzstan. The representatives of the Russian

delegation also said that the construction

Talks on

dam

Prime-Tass English-language

Business Newswire, 2011.

Russian government to mull

electric power imports from

Kyrgyzstan. 10 Feb.

287

of Kambarata-1 hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan was

expected to be completed with the participation of

Russian companies.

75 Y 02/05/2011

Kyrgyzstan was forced to halt the first unit of its

Kambarata-2 hydropower plant to repair damages

just three months into operation. The damages

occurred during the early stages of construction.

Experts say the power plant was launched

prematurely and that workers had not resolved

problems resulting from a dam explosion in late

2009 that went wrong, the news agency reported.

Accident

Central Asia Newswire, 2011.

Kyrgyzstan forced to halt unit

in Karambata-2 hydro plant. 2

May.

288

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AKIpress, 2008b. Five years required to fill in basin of Kambarata-1 water power station,

17 Dec.

AKIpress, 2008c. Lawmaker questions benefit of Russian loan for construction of

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Avesta News Agency, 2011c. Stevenson: "Russia has no right to Rogun". 25 Jul.

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2007b. Kazakhstan, Russia to build hydroelectric

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009d. Kyrgyz ex-minister says president to be

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009e. Kyrgyz government cannot afford to fund

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009f. Key hydropower project unfeasible without

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009g. Kyrgyz leader says neighbours to benefit from

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009h. Kyrgyz leader aims to run for another term in

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009l. Uzbek, Turkmen leaders upbeat on bilateral

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010c. Uzbekistan closes post on border with

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010f. Kyrgyz premier denies hydropower project row

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010g. Tajikistan to meet Uzbekistan's demands

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BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010h. Tajik leader, Asian bank official discuss energy

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BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2007. Tajik PM, World Bank official discuss

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