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KANT'S THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS

LOUIS DUPR?

HE HAD DONE with other branches of philosophy, In his theory of

history Kant combined various strands of eighteenth-century thought and gave them a new interpretation. A lifelong supporter of the En

lightenment, he nevertheless resisted the uncritical optimism of the

philosophes. The notion of unqualified rational and moral progress, so evident to them, remained highly problematic to him: it had no "in

tuitional content" and seemed to conflict with experience. All too of ten history seems "woven together from folly, childish vanity, even

from childish malice and destructiveness."1 Nonetheless, Kant con

ceded, human behavior shows a certain consistency, as the existence of actuarial tables confirms. Despite prolonged interruptions of irra

tionality, Kant's own time suggested that our species was finally be

coming more reasonable. The fact that some ascending pattern of ra

tionality emerged from individual erratic acts indicated the presence of "a definitive natural plan for creatures who have no plan of their

own."2 The Critique of Judgment, the writing of which coincided with that of several of Kant's essays on history, declared the ideologi cal principle indispensable for any kind of methodological knowledge, though that principle itself remained beyond rational proof. In the natural sciences, the form and structure of organic beings cannot be understood without assuming some teleological orientation of the

parts to the whole. A similar orientation toward a rational end seems to rule the be

havior of intelligent beings. What distinguishes the natural ordering of

As

Correspondence to: Department of Religious Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.

1 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," (1784) in Kant on History, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 12. For the German see vol. 7 of Kants Ge sammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der k?niglich preussischen Akademie der

Wissenschaften (hereafter "AK" given with volume and page number), (Ber lin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-), 18.

2 "Universal History," 12; AK7, 18.

The Review of Metaphysics 51 (June 1998): 813-828. Copyright ? 1998 by The Review of Metaphysics



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Interessante notare coincidenza cornologica KdU e srcitti storia.

814 LOUIS DUPRE

humans from that of other organic creatures, however, is that their end surpasses mere survival or the satisfaction of organic needs and desires. Over a sufficient length of time it appears evident that their

capacities aim at a goal that lies beyond the organic coordination of the species. In one lifetime no individual can hope to accomplish

measurable progress toward the attainment of this goal. A develop ment toward full humanity requires generations. However, is what we call "the end" more than the random effect of random actions? Nature does nothing in vain, Kant responds.3 Why would the human animal be endowed with reason, if not for climbing beyond the optimal main tenance of its physical existence? Readers acquainted with Darwin's

theory of natural selection may not find that answer sufficient. Still Kant carefully avoids presenting the teleology of history as the con

clusion of a scientific proof. It remains a postulate, though one that he considers in principle, if not in its specific application, needed for the understanding of rational beings.

The question remains, however, whether the teleological princi ple, indispensable for the scientific knowledge of nature, may be used to justify the idea that the human race progresses morally and ratio

nally. Is Kant entitled to extend the teleological principle beyond the study of the individual organism? The idea of a teleological progres sion of humanity toward a state of reason is not essential for the

knowledge of human nature in the way final causality is for under

standing an organic nature. In Kant's defense it must be said that he does more than extend the teleological principle as he had formulated it in the Third Critique. He combines that principle with the postu lates of practical reason as they appear in the Groundwork of the

Metaphysics of Morals (1795) and in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). According to those works, reason provides the object of

moral obligation with a content and conveys to it an absolute charac ter. For finite rational individuals even an entire lifetime does not suf fice for achieving the morally good. (In the Second Critique this fact supported the postulate of the immortality of the soul.) It takes many

generations to build up an objective realm of moral goodness. The task may forever remain unfinished, yet the moral imperative does not relent its demand. Human nature, then, must be capable of ap

proaching ever more closely to an ideal that it cannot attain in a lim

3 "Universal History," 13; AK 7,19.



Luca Corti

Non estende semplicemente teleologia a storia

Luca Corti

KANTS THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS 815

ited time span, if the categorical imperative is indeed the imperative of

reason.

To this postulate of the possibility of moral progress in time we

must add Kant's conclusion concerning the purpose of the universe in

the Third Critique. Without moral progress the universe loses its

meaning altogether. The historical ascent to a moral ideal thereby be comes an integral part of the teleology of nature as a whole. Kant's ar

gument, then, combines a moral postulate with a regulative idea

needed for thinking of the world as a whole. He neither shows nor

proves the actual presence of design or of historical progress.4 He

merely postulates its necessity. The earlier, historical writings do not

elaborate these presuppositions. However, he alludes to the link of

the moral realm with that of physical teleology when he asks, "Is it

reasonable to assume a purposiveness in all parts of nature and to

deny it to the whole?"5 Neither the teleological directedness of human nature toward a moral ideal, as presented in the Third Critique, nor

the postulate in the Second Critique of an extended time for the fulfill ment of the moral imperative adequately justify the idea of moral

progress through history. The extension in time postulated by the

moral imperative concerns only the lifetime of the individual, while

the moral purpose of the universe does not entail the necessity of his

torical progress: the very existence of moral beings, however imper fect, would seem to satisfy this demand.

Does Kant in his writings on history, especially "The Idea of a Uni

versal History" and "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786), add the element that was missing to make the argument in favor of a

development of the moral principle cogent? The answer, to the extent that it is an answer, must be found in the second thesis of the "Idea for a Universal History": "In man those natural capacities which are di

rected to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only in the

race, not in the individual."6 Reason, according to Kant, does not work instinctively but requires trial, practice, and instruction. One

life, or even a short succession of lives does not suffice to bring an in

dividual person to rational maturity. A full development of the moral capacities of the human race takes centuries and even millennia. We

must not forget, however, that morality differs from reason in this

4 Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press,

1953), 311; AST 5,335-6. 5 "Universal History," 20; AK 7,25. 6 "Universal History," 13;^iT7,18.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Qui però vedi quello che dice P. Rossi su comparazione età dell’uomo, età del genere umano. It seems that exactly that kind of metaphor is underlying Kant’s discourse.

816 LOUIS DUPRE

respect, that, regardless of a person's mental limitations, he or she is

capable of a good intention, at any level of rationality, and hence of

fully moral action.

Assuming that Kant has made a case for progress at least with re

spect to the rational development of the human race, a problem ap pears to emerge with respect to Kant's moral reason: Does it not fol low from this notion of progress that earlier generations, indeed, all those that preceded the age of reason, merely exist for the benefit of the later ones who bring that goal to its full realization? Kant recog

nizes the problem himself: "It remains strange that the earlier genera tions appear to carry through their toilsome labor only for the sake of

later, to prepare for them a foundation on which the later generations could erect the higher edifice which was nature's goal, and yet that

only the latest of the generations should have the good fortune to in habit the building on which a long line of their ancestors had (uninten tionally) labored-"7 He justifies this apparent inequity by declaring reason more important than the fate of those who promote it. This conclusion may seem surprising in the light of Kant's categorical im

perative as formulated in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Mor als: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in

your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a

means, but always at the same time as an end."8 In subordinating thousands of generations to the perfection of reason, history certainly appears to follow a different course.

One might answer that Kant's moral theory merely prescribes what humans ought to do with respect to other humans. It articulates a code of conduct for the relations among members of the same ratio nal species. What remains disconcerting, though, is Kant's suggestion that the history of these free beings is determined by a super-human cause that acts for an end that lies beyond them. Of course, with re

spect to Providence the distinction of means and end does not really apply; it is merely an anthropomorphic way of speaking. All epochs are equally near to God, as Leopold von Ranke wrote. Moreover, Kant

usually refers to the impersonal "Nature" rather than to Providence, thereby reducing at least the impression of a superhuman being that

intentionally interferes with human decisions. Nor would a subordi

7 "Universal History," 14; AK 7, 20. 8 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (London:

Hutchinson and Co., 1956; reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 96; AK 4, 429.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Rif. a natura però non rende più facili le cose.

Luca Corti

Interessante. Conflitto.

KANT'S THEORY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS 817

nation of earlier generations to the goals of later ones necessarily con

flict with the moral imperative. For the rule forbids treating a person

merely as a means in a way that excludes him or her being an end as

well. Even if the subservience of earlier generations to later ones, be

yond being the inevitable result of a rationality bound by the limits of time, resulted from a divine choice, it need not follow that Providence uses the older as a mere means for advancing the interests of the

younger. The tension, however, between a present viewed as a means and

a future as an end increases in the following thesis (IV) from "The Idea

for a Universal History": "The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all capacities of men is their antagonism in

society, so far as this is, in the end, the cause of all lawful order among men."9 The development of reason requires a social state of living:

"The highest purpose of Nature, which is the development of all ca

pacities which can be achieved by mankind, is attained only in soci

ety."10 Yet human behavior seems to conflict with man's social nature, as is amply evidenced by the fact that humankind lives in permanent strife and competition. For Kant, this antagonism itself forms part of

Nature's design. Only an "unsocial sociability" that stimulates humans

to conquer and compete with one another prevents them from settling down in an Arcadian lethargy. Without vainglory, lust for power, and

greed humans would seldom strive to develop their full potential: "Thus are taken the first steps from barbarism to culture, which con

sists in the social worth of man; thence gradually develop all talents, and taste is refined; through continued enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in time convert the coarse, nat

ural disposition for moral discrimination into definite practical princi ples, and thereby change a society of men driven together by their ac

tual feelings into a moral whole."11 To reach the purpose of a peaceful and harmonious society millions and millions first have to be sacri ficed in wars. Two years later, in his "Conjectural Beginning of Hu man History," Kant repeated that, though war is the greatest evil (in one of his latest essays he calls it "the source of all evil and corruption in morals"12), it is nonetheless indispensable for the development of

9 "Universal History," 15; AK 7, 20. 10 "Universal History," 16; AK 7, 22. 11 "Universal History," 15; AK 7, 21. 12 "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Pro

gressing?" in Kant on History, 140-41; AK 7, 82.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

società è la realizzazione dell’umanità. Paradossalmente solo NELLA società si raggiunge fine natura.

818 LOUIS DUPR?

human culture.13 This is indeed a disturbing view. But this view

should not be taken to imply that Kant advocates the use of immoral means for the purpose of establishing a moral world. He merely claims that evil itself, while remaining evil and intrinsically rejectable,

may still have meaning in the justification of history as it surpasses the lives of individuals and their moral responsibility.

In the "Idea of a Universal History" Kant claims that a peaceful

society does not exclude competition, as long as it does not interfere

with the freedom of others. To keep competition, especially eco

nomic competition, within acceptable boundaries, however, requires a strict authority. Yet in a free society that authority must come from

weithin, not from above: it must be based upon a mutual, free consent.

Moreover, nothing is gained until nations reach also among them

selves a state of harmony that allows even the weakest to live in secu

rity with powerful neighbors.14 For that purpose a league of nations is

needed, the concept of which Kant developed in his later essay on

perpetual peace.

II

Kant assumes that the goal of history consists in the highest pos sible moral perfection of the human race. Under the impact of Herder he came to see moral growth as a steady realization of the ideal of Hu

manit?t. His review of the text in which Herder developed this ideal, namely, Ideas Toward a Philosophy of the History of the Human

Race (1784) had been quite critical. As presented by Herder, "human

ity" is merely "the bud of a future flower," "the intermediate stage be tween two worlds"15 that was to prepare a different, totally spiritual condition of the human race. Kant frowned upon this analogy be

tween the growth of an organic being and the development to what he interpreted to be a higher species: "There is not the least resemblance

between the gradient progression in the same man who is ever as

cending to a more perfect structure in another life and the ladder

which one may conceive among completely different types and indi

viduals in the realm of nature."16

13 "Conjectural Beginning," in Kant on History, 67; AK 7, 121.

14 "Universal History," 22-23; AK 7, 28. 15 "Review of Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Man

kind" in Kant on History, 34-35; AK 7, 51.



Luca Corti

Interesting.


Nonetheless, in his next essay on history, Kant himself came to

interpret Humanit?t as a comprehensive moral ideal. In his "Conjec tural Beginning of Human History" (1786) he traces the emergence of the human race from an animal state to one of genuine humanity. He now dismisses the question whether the human race universally progresses as lying beyond responsible conjecture. Instead, he fo cuses on the one form of progress of which we possess empirical evi

dence, namely, the transition from the state of nature to a civilized

o{ie. A comparison of the present condition of European peoples with that of primitives enables us to make a "responsible conjecture" con

cerning the transformation that released humans from "the womb of nature."17 Fortunate as this awakening of reason was, it also implied a violent expulsion from the state of nature, as the biblical story of the exile from paradise suggests. Nor shall we ever unchallengedly pos sess our civilized state, since nature continues to lure us back to her

protective womb. Still, culture conceived as moral development (not as mere advance of learning) may eventually raise the human race to full Humanit?t. However that process has barely begun. In "Idea for a Universal History" Kant had written: "To a high degree we are, through art and science, cultured. We, are civilized?perhaps too

much for our own good?in all sorts of social graces and decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached morality?for that much is lacking. The ideal of morality belongs to culture; its use for some simulacrum of morality in the love of honor and outward decorum constitutes mere civilization."18

For Herder also, the term Humanit?t had possessed a moral con

notation, though not exclusively a moral meaning. It had implied a de

velopment and integration of all human capacities. Civilization in all

aspects?arts, letters, and social refinement?had formed part of it. For Kant, the term more narrowly referred to the moral aspect of per sonhood, more precisely, to that quality whereby a person is by nature an end and never a mere means. Humanit?t, then, was a moral fact as well as a moral ideal. As a fact, personhood surpasses all other forms of being. It constitutes the ground of all moral obligation. In Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the fact of humanity functions as the ground of the moral imperative: "Act in

16 "Universal History," 37; AK 7, 53. 17

"Conjectural Beginning," in Kant on History, 59; AK 7,114. 18 "Universal History," 21; AK 7, 26.



820 LOUIS DUPRE

such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own per son or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."19 The moral obligation to respect persons as absolute ends applies to all humans, whether primitive or cultured, educated or uneducated, criminal or moral. Their absolute worth de

pends not on cultural or moral achievements, but on the moral and ra

tional capacities of the species. Humanity as such is to be respected in each individual, whatever his or her degree of participation in it.

"This principle of humanity, and in general every rational agent as an

end in itself. . . is not borrowed from experience; firstly, because it is

universal, applying as it does to all rational beings as such and no ex

perience is adequate to determine universality; secondly, because in it

mankind is conceived not as an end of man (subjectively)?that is, as

an object which, as a matter of fact, happens to be made an end?but

as an objective end?one which, be our ends what they may, must as a

law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends."20

In respecting humanity we pursue no ulterior good nor do we obey a

higher command; we merely express the respect due to the intrinsic

worth of humanity.21 The moral worth of the person is fully present from the start and is not subject to any discrimination based on the

stage of cultural development. In another sense, however, humanity for Kant remains a moral

ideal still to be pursued. The fact of being human implies the obliga tion to strive toward the moral and intellectual fullness of humanity.

That fullness appears only at the end of a long and slow process; rea

son and morality are by their very nature capable and needful of de

velopment. Culture mediates humanity as a moral fact with humanity as a moral ideal. But has culture achieved actual progress? In the

"Conjectural Beginning" Kant still considered any answer to that ques

tion "illegitimately conjectural,"22 except for one crucial event. When

the human race, or any part thereof, moved from a natural to a civil

state, it unquestionably progressed to a higher condition. In the essay on Enlightenment Kant claimed that the culture of the Enlightenment had definitively taken the road of irreversible progress. Once reason

19 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 96; AK 4, 429. 20 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 98; A??4, 431. 21 See Allen Wood, "Humanity as End in Itself," in Proceedings of the

Eighth International Kant Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 311.

22 "Conjectural Beginning," 53; AK 7, 109.



Luca Corti

Due sensi di “umanità”. Primo, intrinseco alla singola persona. Secondo, umanità in generale, progredisce (come se fosse essa stessa una persona).


has become enlightened and freedom emancipated a return to a more

primitive stage becomes impossible.23 No political or religious author

ity is capable of halting humanity on its course to ever greater enlight enment. Nor would it have the right do so: "A contract made to shut off all further enlightenment from the human race is absolutely null and void, even if confirmed by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most ceremonious of peace treaties."24 However, does the removal of the obstacles to human enlightenment mean that we have become enlightened? Kant denies that the progress, which the En

lightenment created the possibility for, has actually been achieved. We do not yet live in an enlightened age, he insists, but we do live in an

age of enlightenment.25 Moral progress has not kept pace with the un deniable intellectual advances of the modern age. Yet without moral

improvement we do not come closer to the ideal of Humanit?t. In one of his last writings, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the

Human Race Constantly Progressing?" Kant finally gives a fully affir mative answer to the question whether we have actually progressed, yet still without embracing the universal optimism of the French phi losophes. He continues to claim that their thesis of an unrestricted

progress of history cannot be proven. Even if we have progressed, what assures us that we shall continue to do so in the future? The pes simistic view is, of course, equally vulnerable and morally untenable.

Kant now decisively dismisses the hypothesis that history moves back and forth between good and evil. Though logically irrefutable, that hy pothesis must be rejected on moral grounds. In a constant alternation of good and evil, he argues, life would be no more than "a farcical

comedy," a hopeless effort to roll "the stone of Sisyphus."26 The pessi mistic view rules out what the moral imperative requires, namely, that moral life follow an ascending line in the human community as well as

in the individual. We may be unable to establish the state of actual

progress at any given period of history and we shall never be able to

penetrate the motives of free beings or to predict their future actions. Nevertheless if conditions conducive to moral behavior improve, we are allowed to claim that the moral situation itself is improving. We still may not predict when and how actual moral progress will occur,

23 "What is Enlightenment?" in Kant on History, 3-10; AK 7, 35-42. 24

"Enlightenment," in Kant on History, 7; AK 7, 39. 25 "Enlightenment," 8; AK 7,40. 26 "An Old Question," 140-41; AK 7, 82.



Luca Corti

Stessa cosa in conflitto facoltà, riguardo a “evento”. Ossia la rivoluzione franscese. Kant: nun se torna addietro.E’ impossibile.

822 LOUIS DUPRE

but we are justified in assuming that, over a sufficiently long period of

time, it will occur.

One would expect Kant then to stipulate which conditions would

increase the possibility of moral progress. Instead, he reverses the

terms of the argument and proposes that we seek an empirical event

that indicates the presence of such conditions.27 Kant finds it in the

disinterested sympathy that his contemporaries spontaneously feel

for the side of freedom when it becomes a subject of public dispute. Whatever the success or failure of the French revolution may be (1795 was indeed a time to raise that question), all enlightened persons, he

claims, applaud the French people for liberating themselves from tyr

anny and consolidating their emancipation in a democratic constitu

tion. A surprising argument to use at the time when the French

armies had begun to create havoc all over Western Europe and were

on their way to abolish the sovereignty of several European states!

Nor had Kant's claim of a universal sympathy for the revolutionary cause remained unchallenged. In his Reflections on the Revolution in

France, Edmund Burke forcefully opposed it. Nonetheless Kant con

fidently declared: "Now I claim to be able to predict to the human race

even without prophetic insight?according to the aspects and omens

of our day, the attainment of this goal. That is, I predict its progress

toward the better which, from now on, turns out to be no longer com

pletely retrogressive. For such a phenomenon [as the French revolu

tion] is not to be forgotten."28 And, even more apodictically: "The hu

man race has always been in progress toward the better and will

continue to be so henceforth."29

Kant never abandoned his thesis that the progress of morality, which resides entirely in the intention, cannot be measured. He

readily passed judgment, however, on the objective conditions that fa

vor or obstruct the objective practice of morality, regardless of the

subjective intentions. By that norm the measure of progress in Kant's

moral worldview consists in the social and legal conditions conducive

to the attainment of a superior level of freedom. Thus he applauded the age of Enlightenment, however poor it was in actual achieve

ments, for having accomplished an irreversible breakthrough toward freedom. Once a people has begun to rule itself, it vrill never voluntar

27 "An Old Question," 143; AK 8, 84. 28 Ibid., 147; AST 8, 88. 29 Ibid.




ily return the reins of government to a despotic monarch or to an arro

gant aristocracy.

Ill

The Enlightenment was a project, more than an achievement.

The human race remains far from having created the ideal public con

ditions for a moral life. None of Kant's writings expresses more dis

tinctly what he regarded as the political ideal of the nations than his essay, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project (1795), writ ten at the conclusion of the war between the French Republic and the armies of the League of European monarchies. Kant adopted some of

the ideas of Abb? de Saint-Pierre's Projet pour rendre la paix perp? tuelle en Europe (1713). Yet writing at the end of the Enlightenment,

he considered peace not only desirable but historically possible and even probable. He resumed the thesis he had stated in his "Idea for a

Universal History," that the human race combines a propensity to so

cial life with socially disruptive tendencies toward vanity, envy, and

unmitigated competition. Both opposites were needed for the initial

development of culture. But as cultural capacities grow, so does their destructive power. In his "Conjectural Beginning" Kant had claimed that war inevitably enters human history as "an indispensable means

to the still further development of human culture."30 At a time of con

flict a nation rallies all its available powers, becomes inventive in its

attempt to outwit the adversary, and produces at maximum capacity. In a developed civilization, however, this brutal means toward cultural increase turns against itself. The nation's resources, instead of being

used for the benefit of its citizens, are wasted on the preparation and conduct of war. Freedom becomes restricted and moral values jeop ardized. Moreover, this hazardous method for acquiring political su

periority has proven to be a most uncertain way for tipping the bal ance in one's favor.31 With remarkable foresight Kant had therefore concluded that, at an advanced stage, culture required peace for its survival. In "Toward Perpetual Peace,"32 he showed how a permanent renunciation of war is both possible and necessary.

30 "Conjectural Beginning," 67; AK 7,121. 31 "Idea for a Universal History," 23; AK 7, 28.

32 "Perpetual Peace," in Kant on History, 85-135; AK 8, 343-86.



824 LOUIS DUPRE

A first condition for attaining a state of lasting peace consists in

empowering the entire citizenry, rather than a single ruler or an aris tocratic group, with the authority for concluding international con

tracts. Many nations have made the transition from a state of nature to a civil state through a contract whereby individuals either surren

der their freedom (Hobbes) or delegate part of its exercise (Rous seau) to an appointed authority. But nations among themselves re

main in a state of nature. The peril of war will continue to threaten them as long as political authority remains beholden to particular in terests. Only a republican constitution, that is, one in which political

power rests with the people (whatever the form of sovereignty may

be?monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic) presents a realistic possi bility for contracting a lasting peace. When the people themselves control the nation's policy, Kant thinks, no State will choose war. In stead all will eventually agree to form a league of nations with an in ternational peace-keeping force rather than standing national armies.

Kant foresaw, and later experience confirmed, that nations would be reluctant to surrender their right of defense or of defensive

aggression and thereby place their national sovereignty at risk. In the

end, however, even the stronger nations will come to see that a viola tion of the integrity of the weaker ones damages their own interests as

well. The interests of each nation are served better by a federation of States than by the gain to be obtained by unilateral action. Its founda tion in nature gives Kant the confidence that peace will inevitably pre vail in the end.

The movement toward peaceful collaboration, then, receives its

impulse from a natural source. Nature drives peoples irresistibly to ward conditions favorable to moral improvement. The morally supe rior state of affairs thus emerges from natural, even selfish propensi ties, more than from disinterested, moral attitudes:

A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, con versely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution. Instead of genuine morality, the mechanism of na ture brings it to pass through selfish inclinations, which naturally con flict outwardly but which can be used by reason as a means for its own end, the sovereignty of law, and, as concerns the state, for promoting and securing internal and external peace.33

A stable political order requires more than good intentions. It may be the outcome of selfish motives, but it must be so structured that "al

33 "Perpetual Peace," 112-13; AK8, 366-67.



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Luca Corti

Ancora una volta è “Nature” che governa la pace. Stavolta è pace tra stati, non tra uomini.


though [the citizens'] private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions."34 Kant, no less than Vico and Herder, knew

what Hegel was to call the cunning of reason in history. He allows

that the teleology of nature described in the "Idea for a Universal His

tory" may be regarded as the design of Providence.35 Yet, unlike his

predecessors, he avoids attributing it to a direct intervention of Provi

dence. A providentia gubernatrix may well direct the "cunning con

trivances of nature,"36 but since such a transcendent cause falls be

yond human cognizance, he considers Nature a more fitting term for a

process that occurs entirely within the natural order.

The argument that nature drives history to its moral end by means of a politics of self-interest raises the question whether politics

is ever more than self-interested and hence whether it can be consid

ered moral in the Kantian sense at all. Does the art of the possible not

inevitably entail the practice of compromise? Should the politician be resigned to the disjunction of effectiveness and morality? Granted that history increases the social conditions favoring moral conduct re

gardless of the moral intentions of those who made them, does that

exempt politicians from obeying the moral imperative, "So act that

your maxim could become a universal law regardless of the endVTi Kant concedes that the pragmatics of policy making often conflicts with the norms set by the moral imperative, but, he insists, even the most pragmatic politician is forced to pay homage to the moral ideals of his age. When violating the rights of opposing political groups or of other nations he still must appeal to some rule of natural or interna tional law.38 Thus the practice of false maxims indirectly upholds the

validity of moral principles. Hypocrisy testifies to the truth. The indirectness by which history must realize a moral world or

der is, of course, not the only problem inherent in the Kantian theory of progress. Far more complex is the question how objective condi tions can effectively favor or obstruct moral progress. Apparently

Kant perceived no conflict between his thesis that improved social conditions promote moral practice, and, on the other side, his general principle of moral autonomy. In an appendix to Eternal Peace he con

34 Ibid., 112; AK 8, 366.

35 "Universal History," 25; AK 8,30. 36 "Perpetual Peace," 107; AK 8, 362.

37 Ibid., 124; A?T 8, 377.

38 Ibid., 123-4; A?"8, 376.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Astuzia della ragione.(Già Kant).Ma come darne una interpretazione benevola? Non metafisicamente carica?

Luca Corti

Realizzazione indiretta dei fini. Questione del “progresso” morale.

826 LOUIS DUPRE

cedes that the external, social order directly neither facilitates nor ob structs the internal moral attitude. In the legal order, however, moral

ity and the social-political reality touch one another. The laws in which the moral attitudes that have shaped the legal order (the pure form of legality) became concretely expressed induce citizens to

adopt attitudes similar to those embodied in the laws. Thus Kant con

siders social institutions morally progressive if they encourage citi zens to convert moral ideals into practice. Legality is the public arena

where private virtue and public practice meet. In this arena justice as

sumes that objective external expression which its very nature de mands. To be sure, morality remains restricted to the intention. The

intention itself, however, to be sincere must, to the extent that it is

possible, be executed in external, social action. Legality makes this

possible. It mediates the moral imperative with the very idea of law.

Crucial in the transfer from private intention to social order is the

"public" nature of the form of law. Kant applies the moral imperative to the social order through the primary requirement that the legal or

der to be moral at all must be public: "All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with public

ity."39 Indeed, legality provides the public arena where private inten

tions, good and bad, are forced to become public in external action.

Any attempt to contain the imperative within the private order of in

ternal intentions inevitably results in public inequity. If it were not for the public domain of legality, each claim made on the basis of one per son's intention would be countered by an opposite claim advanced by another person. The moral obligation, then, is partly but essentially linked to the existence of a legal order. Legality, though not moral in

itself, provides the space for intentions to be converted into a coher ent system of justice.

Does it follow, then, that international law as it exists suffices to

realize moral ideals into a global order of peaceful coexistence? Kant denies this. In its present form international law does not express the

general will of all peoples or even of those who accept it. It has merely frozen existing international relations into law; it has legalized the inequality strong nations have inflicted upon the weak. The exist

ing law of nations?the outcome of war?far from being a step toward

eternal peace, perpetuates the state of nature among nations. It lacks

the principal condition for moving nations from a natural to a civil

39 "Perpetual Peace," 127; AS" 8,381.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Socialità (nel senso di pubblicità) diventa marchio caratteristico dell’intenzione già in Kant. Anche se è più criterio. (autocontraddittorietà).

Luca Corti

Vero che la pubblicità incarna (anzi, è la forma irklich) delll’universalità.


state, namely, a common ground for peace. For a federation of na

tions to become effective all participants must have reached within themselves a consensus on the overriding need for a permanent peace. The law of nations, as Kant knew it, still fell far short of that. It aimed at preventing forms of conflict directly detrimental to any na

tion, large or small, yet did not abolish the existing inequalities. Only a

status juridicus that grants all nations equal rights establishes the

possibility for permanent peace. A federation for the maintenance of peace should legislate in ac

cordance with the moral law. Yet in their relations with others, na

tions have persistently flaunted that law. In time of war, citizens com

mit acts totally opposed to its injunction. The arguments used by the accused in trials for war crimes after World War II have shown how such a moral discrepancy between a national and an international code of behavior continues to exist. Indeed, Kant's own morality of intention bears some responsibility for the schizoid rule to which war

criminals appealed. In the legal order the moral attitude consists in

obeying the political authorities, whatever they may order against the

well-being of other nations, as long as one keeps one's intention

"pure." But the treatise on perpetual peace proves that Kant himself, far from consenting to such a duplicity, vigorously strove to overcome

it. As long as the moral intention has not penetrated public life by cre ating rules of public conduct conformable to the moral law, the age of reason had not yet truly begun.

To be sure, as Kant had stressed in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), neither international peace nor republican gov ernments can realize the moral end of history. Indeed, there is no "moral end" of history, but only a moral aim. History as the external

process of human development never enters the moral sanctuary it self. The struggle to realize the moral ideal begins for each person anew and will not be concluded before the end of time. With respect to that struggle history remains an external process, the moral success of which can never be fully assessed or predicted. However much his

tory may increase conditions favorable to the development of human kind's moral capacities, the actual success of the moral development remains uncertain. Inner attitudes never become fully manifest and

history only deals with public deeds and behavior. Does this funda mental distinction still allow us to speak of moral progress? The paradox of history is that it never intrinsically affects that which none theless defines its meaning and purpose. Nevertheless, the link with



828 LOUIS DUPRE

the moral realm, though external, is real and the urge toward the cre

ation of a public realm of freedom is not only possible but necessary. The internal and the external side of practical reason are obviously re

lated, though not intrinsically united. The conditions favoring the

practice of morality and freedom follow a progressive course, accord

ing to Kant, and do so necessarily. Do they also indirectly affect the

internal morality of intentions? Kant does not say so, and some texts

lead us to doubt it.40 He agrees with the French philosophes that rea

son has reached a point of development that renders the progress of

knowledge and of civilization irreversible, and has created conditions

favorable to moral practice. But advances in civilization do not coin

cide with moral progress. Intentions remain purely internal and nei

ther political emancipation nor scientific progress guarantee moral

improvement.41

Yale University

40 "Universal History," 11; ?ff 8,17; and "Conflict of the Faculties," AK 7, 91-92.

411 am much obliged to Allen Wood for his suggestions for improving this paper.



Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Luca Corti

Le intenzioni restano interne?

Luca Corti

Saggio è un riassunto (a grandi linee) delle vedute di Kant sulla storia. Interessante in contrasto tra prospettiva del singolo (dovere morale, massime) e invece prospettivadella storia, la quale in parte sembra agire “dietro le spalle” del singolo. Questo crea una tensione interna al pensiero di Kant. Colui che da p.v. singolo è “morale”, da p.v. storia può invece essere“meno morale” di qualcun altro, il quale si trova a vivere in un epoca in cui la natura umana (Hegeldirebbe, lo spirito) risulta maggiormente progredito, o moralmente più elevato. Contrasto p.v. personale e invece pv. storia. Analogia ancora con KdU, ((vedi Kant, quando parla di spettatore in Conflitto), però allo stesso tempol’elemento morale complica il quadro. (Vedi parte iniziale saggio).

Documents

Dupré (1998) - Kant's theory of history and progress