Emory Marcus Gupta Neg GSU Round7

7/23/2019 Emory Marcus Gupta Neg GSU Round7

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/emory-marcus-gupta-neg-gsu-round7 1/68

1NC



1nc – daUS-Israel commitments high now – presence is key to maintain

cooperation

Kampeas, 9/ (Ron, correspondent and staf writer, September 3, 2015, “What

America will ofer Israel ater the n!clear deal," #he $ewish Standard,http%&&'ewishstandardtimeso)sraelcom&what*america*will*ofer*israel*ater*the*n!clear*deal&+

WASI-.#/- !he moment the Iran n"clear deal #ecomes law, as seems

increasingly likely ien rowin conressional s!pport or the areement, the $oc"s o$ the U%S%-

Israel con&ersation will shi$t to the '"estion o$ what(s ne)t%

*hat more will *ashington do to mitigate the Iranian threat and reass"re

Israel and other regional allies

4or starters, resident 6arac7 +#ama seems ready to oer an array o$ sec"rity

enhancements mong them are accelerating and increasing de$ense

assistance to Israel o&er the ne)t decade8 increasing the U%S% military

presence in the .iddle ast8 steppin !p the enorcement o non*n!clear related Iran sanctions8 enhancin 9S

interdiction aainst disr!ptie Iranian actiit: in the reion8 and increasing cooperation on missile

de$ense%

#here also will be an emphasis on 7eepin an: o the tens o billions o dollars to which Iran will ain !nettered access thro!h thesanctions relie rom reachin Iran;s pro<ies

Adam S=!bin, the 9S #reas!r: !ndersecretar: chared with enorcin sanctions, made taretin e=bollah a oc!s o his meetinswith Israeli o>cials last wee7, $#A has learned

/nce some n!clear*related sanctions on Iran are lited sho!ld Iran meet the re?!irements in the deal on n!clear restrictions Washinton will allocate reater reso!rces to oc!sin on other sanctions !nafected b: the areement, incl!din those related tobac7in terrorism, accordin to a senior 9S o>cial “We hae a lot o that same personnel and reso!rces we can deote to 9S*speci)c sanctions on Iran and not onl: Iran," the o>cial said

Israeli rime @inister 6en'amin -etan:ah!, not wanting to #e seen as endorsing the deal

while there(s still a chance Congress co"ld sc"ttle it, has directed Israeli

o0cials not to engage with U%S% o0cials on what co"ld #e done a$ter the

deal is in place #he Israeli eno: to Washinton, Ron ermer, has said that Israel wo"ld #e ready $or

disc"ssions only a$ter options to kill the agreement, ormall: 7nown as the $oint

Bomprehensie lan o Action, are e)ha"sted%

“*e appreciate the s"pport that we ha&e gotten $rom this administration ,

rom this president, to enhance o"r sec"rity," ermer told 9SA #oda: in a $!l: 2C interiew “nd the

disc"ssion that we(ll ha&e a#o"t the day a$ter, we(ll ha&e to lea&e to the

day a$ter%"

Bonress has !ntil September 1C to decide whether to allow the deal to proceed

#he American Israel !blic Afairs Bommittee, which is leadin the opposition to the deal, ar!ed in a memo distrib!ted @onda: that9S pledes o post*deal sec!rit: enhancements are inade?!ate

!he administration has tried to reass"re those concerned #y the

dangero"s conse'"ences o$ the $oint Bomprehensie lan o Action ( 2C3++ in two ways4 #y

pledging increased s"pport $or Israel and o"r 5"l$ allies and #y &owing

that it will strictly en$orce the deal," said the memo, which is headlined “romises Bannot 4i< a 6ad

eal" “-either approach will repair the deal;s atal Daw% it leitimi=es Iran as a n!clear*threshold state in 15 :ears"



In an interiew with the 4orward p!blished on @onda:, +#ama attached "rgency to con$ronting

6e7#ollah and other Iranian pro)ies %

Spea7in o Israel, he said, “*e can do e&en more to enhance the "nprecedented

military and intelligence cooperation that we ha&e with them, and to see, are

there additional capa#ilities that Israel may #e a#le to "se to pre&ent

6e7#ollah, $or e)ample, $rom getting missiles"

*ithdrawal res"lts in Israel striking Iran – they $eel insec"re83C : #he 6ipartisan olic: Benter is a non*pro)t orani=ation that Edries principled sol!tions thro!h

rioro!s anal:sis, reasoned neotiation, and respect!l dialo!eE Senators aniel Boats And Bharles Robb, Bo*Bhairs @ichael @a7os7:, ro'ect irector September 200F @eetin the challene !s olic: toward iranian n!cleardeelopment http%&&bipartisanpolic:or&wp*content&!ploads&sites&dea!lt&)les&!sG20polic:G20towardG20iranianG20n!clearG20deelopmentpd

Additionall:, the ne<t resident sho!ld maintain a constant dialog"e with Israel 9S

polic:ma7ers m!st reconi=e the rae and e)istential danger that the Islamic

;ep"#lic poses to Israel 6eliein its e<istence threatened, Israel co"ld eel

compelled to la"nch a strike to deny the Islamic Rep!blic n"clear weapons capa#ility We

reconi=e that Israeli politicians do not beliee that a n!clear Iran can be contained +nly

i$ Israeli policymakers #elie&e that U%S% and H!ropean policymakers will ens"re

that the Islamic ;ep"#lic does not gain n"clear weapons will the Israelis

#e "nlikely to strike Iran independently It will be !p to the resident to

cons"lt with Israel and pro&ide s!> cient ass"rance so that the: do not eel compelled to

!nderta7e !nilateral action

)tinction – e&en small Israel-Iran con<ict escalates

&ery, 1 *** Associate roessor, 9niersit: o Bopenhaen (11&&2013, $ohn Scales Aer:, “An Attac7 /n

Iran Bo!ld Hscalate Into .lobal -!clear War," http%&&wwwco!nterc!rrentsor&aer:01113htm +

espite the willinness o IranJs new resident, assan Ro!hani to ma7e all reasonable concessions to 9S demands,

Israeli press!re ro!ps in Washinton contin!e to demand an attack on Iran 6!t s!ch an attac7

might escalate into a glo#al n"clear war, with catastrophic conse?!ences As we approach

the 100th anniersar: *orld *ar I, we sho!ld remember that this colossal disaster escalated

"ncontrolla#ly $rom what was intended to #e a minor con<ict % !here is a

danger that an attack on Iran wo"ld escalate into a large-scale war in the

.iddle ast, entirely desta#ili7ing a region that is alread: deep in problems !he

"nsta#le go&ernment o$ 3akistan might #e o&erthrown, and the

re&ol"tionary 3akistani go&ernment might enter the war on the side o$

Iran, th"s introd"c ing n"clear weapons into the con<ict % ;"ssia and China ,

=rm allies o$ Iran, might also #e drawn into a eneral war in the @iddle Hast Since

m"ch o$ the world>s oil comes $rom the region, s"ch a war wo"ld certainly

ca"se the price o$ oil to reach "nheard-o$ heights, with catastrophiceects on the glo#al economy % In the danero!s sit!ation that co!ld potentiall: res!lt rom an

attac7 on Iran, there is a risk that n"clear weapons wo"ld #e "sed, either

intentionally, or #y accident or miscalc"lation ;ecent research has shown

that #esides making large areas o$ the world "ninha#ita#le thro"gh long-

lasting radioacti&e contamination, a n"clear war wo"ld damage glo#al

agric"lt"re to s"ch a e)tent that a glo#al $amine o$ pre&io"sly "nknown

proportions wo"ld res"lt% #h!s, n"clear war is the "ltimate ecological

http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm



catastrophe% It co"ld destroy h"man ci&ili7ation and m"ch o$ the

#iosphere% !o risk s"ch a war wo"ld #e an "n$orgi&a#le oense against the

li&es and $"t"re o$ all the peoples o$ the world, 9S citi=ens incl!ded



1nc – Sa"di ara#ia!he plan ca"ses Sa"di ra#ian and widespread n"clear

proli$eration%

+sto&ar 1? K ro'ect irector and Research Scientist at the Benter or

Strateic St!dies at B-A, a not*or*pro)t ederall:*!nded researchorani=ation e was preio!sl: an Ad'!nct roessor in .lobal Sec!rit:St!dies at $ohns op7ins 9niersit: and a ellow at the Bombatin

#errorism Benter at West oint (Ashon, eterrence and the 4!t!re o 9S* .BB

eense Booperation% A Strateic ialo!e Hent, $!l: 2015,http%&&calho!nnpsed!&bitstream&handle&10LM5&M5CL&eterrenceG20andG20theG204!t!reG20oG209S*.BBG20eG20BooperationNB*2015*9*010LL*4inalpdse?!enceO1+-AR

!he 5CC(s mistr"st inherentl: makes pro&iding ass"rance more di0c"lt $or

the U nited S tates% It might also complicate or diminish the United States(

eecti&eness in stemming n"clear proli$ eration in the reion sho!ld Arabstates determine that the: re?!ire n!clear capabilities to efectiel: deter anascendant Iran #hese topics were at the heart o the strateic dialo!e eent6elow we disc!ss the ma'or themes rom the da:;s disc!ssion that hae strateicimplications or the 9nited States #hese themes represent the iews o reionalparticipants and o!r perspectie on those iews #a7en toether, the: comprise theta7eawa:s we deem most important or 9S o>cials to consider reardin .!lrelations #he: also sere as o!r concl!din tho!hts on the eent Increasin

mistr!st is !ndamentall: chanin .BB perceptions o the 9nited States U%S%

.iddle ast policy is "npop"lar with 5"l$ ra# states% *ashington(s

re$"sal to topple the sad regime, its alliance with the Shiitedominated Ira?ioernment in the war aainst ISIS, and the ongoing n"clear negotiations with

Iran ha&e partic"larly eroded con=dence in the U%S% role in the region As ares!lt, mistr"st is increasing in .!l Arab capitals reardin 9S policies and theintentions behind them 5"l$ leaders are skeptical a#o"t U%S% commitments

to the region and see man: c!rrent policies as antithetical to their interests

n"clear deal with Iran co"ld worsen U%S%-5CC relations% #here is a deepc:nicism in most .BB states (/man is the lone e<ception+ reardin the wisdomand iabilit: o reachin a deal on Iran;s n!clear proram espite some statementsb: .BB o>cials in s!pport o the deal ollowin the @a: 2015 Bamp aid S!mmit,the preailin iew in the .BB is that a deal will not be efectie at c!rbin Iran;sn!clear ambitions Instead, the: see it as somethin that will !rther ins!late theIranian reime and p!t it on the road to deelopin a n!clear weapons capabilit:

#he: !rther ear that once a deal has been sined, it will open the door or a 9S*Iran rapprochement, which in t!rn will lead to Washinton placin more aor onIranian interests than on those o Arab states 4or this reason, the: see the 9nitedStates; p!rs!it o a deal as both naPe and somethin almost a7in to a betra:al o its.BB allies It is thereore li7el: that reachin a deal will hae a neatie impact on9S*.!l relations 5"l$ ra# states might seek parity@ with Iran a$ter a

deal A consistent theme in the dialo!e was that .!l Arab states aspire to reachparit: with Iran #his theme was most stronl: adocated b: the Sa!di, Hmirati, and



Q!waiti deleates It was heail: implied thro!h o!r disc!ssions that the .BB eelsit cannot c!rrentl: efectiel: compete with Iran in three areas% reional inD!ence(e, hain a stron and efectie pro<: networ7+, ballistic missile capabilities, andthe n!clear arena Iran;s s!periorit: in these areas is a problem or the .!l statesand one the: want to sole thro!h establishin act!al or efectie parit: with

Iranian capabilities !he p"rs"it o$ parity, in their perspectie, is necessary toco"nter Iranian regional in<"ence and neate its abilit: to !se coercie tacticsas leerae in reional aairs #ho!h a potential component o reachin parit:

with Iran, n!clear prolieration amon .BB states miht still be !nli7el: Altho!hthe term parit: s!ests that .BB states want to deelop a n!clear weaponsproram in response to Iran (or somethin appro<imatei not s!periorto whatthe: perceie to be Iran;s n!clear capabilities+, the ma'orit: lac7s the capacit: andwill to do so @ost .BB states are either incapable or !nwillin to p!rs!e a n!clearproram ess predictable are Sa!di Arabia and 9AH #ho!h the 9AH has the si=e,deense interests, and nascent capabilities to ma7e a n!clear enrichment proramiable, it also has a 1*2*3 n!clear areement with the 9nited States that seerel:limits what its n!clear proram can be #o adance its proram alon the lines oIran;s, the 9AH wo!ld hae to wal7 awa: rom the 1*2*3 areement, which co!lddamae its ties to Washinton and !ndermine its rep!tation in the internationalcomm!nit: At present there is no clear sin that it wo!ld be willin to ta7e thoseris7s in response to an Iran deal Sa"di ra#ia remains the wild card @ $or

n"clear proli$eration in the 5"l$ % Sa"di ra#ia is a party to the !reat: on the-on*rolieration o -!clear Weapons (N3!A% It also possesses a BomprehensieSae!ards Areement with the International Atomic Hner: Aenc: (IAHA+oweer, e&en despite those international agreements, the kingdom(s

n"clear intentions remain m"rky #hat is beca!se ;iyadh(s c"rrent

calc"lations on whether to p"rs"e a n"clear enrichment program with

potential military dimensions (or proc!re access to n!clear weapons rom

a7istan+ appear to #e linked to its perception o$ the Iranian threatpartic!larl: i Iran were to rati: a n!clear deal with the 51 I$ Iran(s in<"ence ia clients in S:ria, Ira?, and Temen contin"es to grow in the midterm, and i$

Sa"di ra#ia eels that it both lac7s the capabilities to co!nter that inD!ence andpercei&es the U nited S tates as e?!all: incapa#le or "nwilling to do so, then

it might p"rs"e policies s"ch as a n"clear program as a matter o$

deterrence I Iran cannot be marinali=ed thro!h sanctions or internationalpress!re, then Sa!di Arabia miht be inclined to p!rs!e a polic: o bi*polarit: inreional power politics, with it and Iran as the two centers o rait: Hither wa:, ithe trend o Iran;s rowin inD!ence contin!es, Sa"di ra#ia will ha&e to make

strategic choices on how to co"nter Iranian in<"ence% In the 5CC(s Boint

military operations against the 6o"this in emen, Sa"di(s new monarch,King Salman, has pro&ed to #e more asserti&e o$ Sa"di(s interests than his

predecessor #he belie amon reional participants was that s!ch orward*leaninpolicies wo!ld contin!e and that Sa!di Arabia will bein to ta7e on a more actierole in directl: co!nterin Iranian pro<ies and reional inD!ence Hstablishin an!clear enrichment proram parallel to the Iranian proram is one wa: that reionalparticipants elt Sa!di Arabia miht decide to do that No $oreign power can

replace the U nited S tates as the sec"rity g"arantor o$ the 3ersian 5"l$



and 5CC states know this U%S%- pro&ided ass"rance remains central to 5CC

deterrence eorts and co"ld remain key to pre&enting n"clear

proli$ eration Despite the near #ottomless list o$ complaints le&ied against

U%S% policies #y the regional participants , it was clear that they saw no

alternati&e to the United States remaining the sec"rity g"arantor or the

.!l , nor did they desire an alternati&e 3articipants did not take serio"slycomments s"ggesting Erance, India, or China as a potential $"t"re

replacement $or the United States in the 5"l$ What did become a oc!s,howeer, were the steps that the 9nited States co!ld ta7e to improe relations andass!rance eorts, partic!larl: in response to a deal 5CC states desire closer

relations with the United States , access to more adanced ballistic missiletechnolo:, and the abilit: to deelop indieno!s deense capabilities 4or thereional participants, the $"ndamental di&ide #etween 5"l$ ra# states and

*ashington was a lack o$ tr"st% !hey saw this in (what the: perceied to be+the limits imposed #y *ashington on their de$ense programs S!ch limitss!ch as those stemmin rom the I-4 treat:preented .BB states romdeelopin ade?!ate ballistic missile deense s:stems capable o deterrin Iran;srob!st ballistic missile proram #he: !rther wanted a !ndamental chane indeense relations with the 9nited States, wherein the latter wo!ld help .BB statesdeelop their own deense capabilities and not simpl: proide access to capabilitiesthat re?!ired constant 9S oersiht or permission to !se

)tinction%

delman 11F4ellow at the Benter or Strateic and 6!detar: Assessments4ormer 9ndersecretar: or eenseA-Andrew Qrepineichresident o theBenter or Strateic and 6!detar: AssessmentsA-Han @ontomer:

Research 4ellow at the Benter or Strateic and 6!detar: Assessments (Hric, #hedaners o a n!clear Iran, 4A L081, http%&&wwwcsbaonlineor&wp*content&!ploads&2010&12&2010122C*#he*aners*o*a*-!clear*Iranpd+

#here is, howeer, at least one state that co!ld receie sini)cant o!tside s!pport%Sa!di Arabia And i it did, prolieration co!ld accelerate thro!ho!t the reion Iranand Sa!di Arabia hae lon been eopolitical and ideoloical rials Ri:adh wo!ldace tremendo!s press!re to respond in some orm to a n!clear*armed Iran, not onl:to deter Iranian coercion and s!bersion b!t also to presere its sense that Sa!diArabia is the leadin nation in the @!slim world #he Sa!di oernment is alread:p!rs!in a n!clear power capabilit:, which co!ld be the )rst step alon a slow roadto n!clear weapons deelopment And concerns persist that it miht be able to

accelerate its proress b: e<ploitin its close ties to a7istan !rin the 1LF0s, inresponse to the !se o missiles d!rin the Iran*Ira? War and their rowinprolieration thro!ho!t the reion, Sa!di Arabia ac?!ired seeral do=en css*2intermediate*rane ballistic missiles rom Bhina #he a7istani oernmentreportedl: bro7ered the deal, and it ma: hae also oUered to sell Sa!di Arabian!clear warheads or the css*2s, which are not acc!rate eno!h to delierconentional warheads eUectiel: #here are still r!mors that Ri:adh and Islamabadhae had disc!ssions inolin n!clear weapons, n!clear technolo:, or sec!rit:



!arantees #his “Islamabad option" co!ld deelop in one o seeral diferent wa:sa7istan co!ld sell operational n!clear weapons and delier: s:stems to Sa!diArabia, or it co!ld proide the Sa!dis with the inrastr!ct!re, material, and technicals!pport the: need to prod!ce n!clear weapons themseles within a matter o :ears,as opposed to a decade or loner -ot onl: has a7istan proided s!ch s!pport in

the past, b!t it is c!rrentl: b!ildin two more hea:*water reactors or pl!toni!mprod!ction and a second chemical reprocessin acilit: to e<tract pl!toni!m romspent n!clear !el In other words, it miht acc!m!late more )ssile material than itneeds to maintain een a s!bstantiall: e<panded arsenal o its own Alternatiel:,a7istan miht oUer an e<tended deterrent !arantee to Sa!di Arabia and deplo:n!clear weapons, delier: s:stems, and troops on Sa!di territor:, a practice thatthe 9nited States has emplo:ed or decades with its allies #his arranement co!ldbe partic!larl: appealin to both Sa!di Arabia and a7istan It wo!ld allow theSa!dis to ar!e that the: are not iolatin the npt since the: wo!ld not be ac?!irintheir own n!clear weapons And an e<tended deterrent rom a7istan miht bepreerable to one rom the 9nited States beca!se stationin orein @!slim orceson Sa!di territor: wo!ld not trier the 7ind o pop!lar opposition that wo!ldaccompan: the deplo:ment o 9S troops a7istan, or its part, wo!ld ain )nancialbene)ts and international clo!t b: deplo:in n!clear weapons in Sa!di Arabia, aswell as strateic depth aainst its chie rial, India #he Islamabad option raises ahost o di>c!lt iss!es, perhaps the most worrisome bein how India wo"ld

respond Wo!ld it target 3akistan;s weapons in Sa!di Arabia with its ownconentional or n!clear weapons ow wo!ld this e<panded n!clear competitioninD!ence sta#ility d!rin a crisis in either the @iddle Hast or So!th AsiaReardless o India;s reaction, an: decision b: the Sa!di oernment to see7 o!tn!clear weapons, b: whateer means, wo!ld be highly desta#ili7ing It wo!ldincrease the incenties o other nations in the @iddle Hast to p!rs!e n!clearweapons o their own And it co!ld increase their abilit: to do so b: erodin the

remainin barriers to n!clear prolieration% each additional state that ac?!iresn!clear weapons weakens the nonproli$ eration regime, een i its partic!larmethod o ac?!isition onl: circ!ments, rather than iolates, the npt Were Sa!diArabia to ac?!ire n!clear weapons, the @iddle Hast wo!ld co!nt three n!clear*armed states, and perhaps more beore lon It is !nclear how s!ch an n*pla:ercompetition wo!ld !nold beca!se most anal:ses o n!clear deterrence are basedon the 9S* Soiet rialr: d!rin the Bold War It seems li7el:, howeer, that theinteraction amon three or more n!clear*armed powers wo!ld be more prone to

miscalc!lation and escalation than a bipolar competition !rin the Bold War,

the 9nited States and the Soiet 9nion onl: needed to concern themseles with anattac7 rom the other@!ltipolar s:stems are enerall: considered to be less stable

than bipolar s:stems beca!se coalitions can shit ?!ic7l:, !psettin the balance opower and creatin incenties or an attac7 @ore important, emerin n!clearpowers in the @iddle Hast miht not ta7e the costl: steps necessar: to presere

reional stabilit: and aoid a n!clear e<chane 4or n!clear*armed states, the

#edrock o$ deterrence is the 7nowlede that each side has a sec!re second*stri7e capabilit:, so that no state can la!nch an attac7 with the e<pectation that itcan wipe o!t its opponents; orces and aoid a deastatin retaliation oweer,emerging n"clear powers might not in&est in e<pensie b!t s"r&i&a#le



capa#ilities s!ch as hardened missile silos or s!bmarinebased n!clear orces.ien this li7el: !lnerabilit:, the close pro<imit: o states in the @iddle Hast, andthe er: short Diht times o ballistic missiles in the reion, an: new n!clear powersmiht be compelled to “la!nch on warnin" o an attac7 or een, d!rin a crisis, to!se their n!clear orces preemptiel: #heir oernments miht also deleate

la!nch a!thorit: to lower*leel commanders, heihtenin the possibilit: omiscalc!lation and escalation @oreoer, i earl: warnin s:stems were notinterated into rob!st command*and*control s:stems, the ris7 o an !na!thori=ed oraccidental la!nch wo!ld increase !rther still And witho!t sophisticated earl:warnin s:stems, a n!clear attac7 miht be !nattrib!table or attrib!ted incorrectl:

#hat is, ass!min that the leadership o a tareted state s!ried a )rst stri7e, itmiht not be able to acc!ratel: determine which nation was responsible And this!ncertaint: , when combined with the press!re to respond ?!ic7l:, wo!ld create asini)cant ris7 that it wo!ld retaliate aainst the wron part:, potentiall: trierin

a regional n"clear war% @ost e<istin n!clear powers hae ta7en steps to protect

their n!clear weapons rom !na!thori=ed !se% rom closel: screenin 7e: personnelto deelopin technical saet: meas!res, s!ch as permissie action lin7s, whichre?!ire special codes beore the weapons can be armed Tet there is no !aranteethat emerin n!clear powers wo!ld be willin or able to implement thesemeas!res, creat in a sini)cant ris7 that their oernments miht lose control oerthe weapons or n!clear material and that nonstate actors co!ld ain access tothese items Some states miht see7 to mitiate threats to their n!clear arsenals8or instance, the: miht hide their weapons In that case, howeer, a sinleintellience compromise co!ld leae their weapons !lnerable to attac7 or thet



1nc – daC; will pass – +#ama will get his way

Eor#es 9/1&15 Vhttp%&&wwworbescom&sites&stancollender&2015&0L&10&the*)e*?!estions*that*will*determine*i*theres*a*oernment*sh!tdown&

#he common wisdom in *ashington is that conressional ;ep"#licans "ltimately

will decide b: /ctober 1 to a straihtorward clean@ contin!in resol!tion that 7eeps !ndin or all

militar: and domestic prorams at their c!rrent leels and with no polic: riders that re'"ire or

pre&ent the +#ama administration $rom doing anything !his short*term BR s!pposedl: will

last "ntil aro!nd the end o this Decem#er and Bonress and the White o!se wo!ld negotiate a

b!det deal in the three months #etween now and then

#hat;s certainl: possible 6!t a clean BR won;t do an: o the thins the o!se and Senate ./ sa:s it wantsincl!din (1+ increasin militar: spendin, (2+ red!cin domestic spendin, (3+ de!ndin lanned arenthood and(M+ p!ttin restrictions on implementin the Iran deal

#hat wo!ld be a lot or conressional Rep!blicans to swallow, een i it;s '!st or a limited period o time

It will also #e hard $or the 5+3 to accept #eca"se it wo"ld appear to #e a

total capit"lation to the *hite 6o"se and conressional emocrats and that(s hard to

do when :o!;e promised :o!r constit!ents that :o!;ll ta7e no prisoners

+#ama has started negotiating now – that(s key

N! 9/1G&15 VThe New York Times, “With ossible Sh!tdown -earin, /bamaoo7s to #a7e 6!det 4iht to ./," http%&&wwwn:timescom&2015&0L&1&!s&with*possible*sh!tdown*nearin*obama*loo7s*to*ta7e*b!det*)ht*to*ophtmlNrO0

Congress h"rtled toward a oernment sh"tdown on #!esda:, with ;ep"#licansthreatening to #lock a b!det deal i$ it incl"des =nancing $or 3lanned

3arenthood, as resident +#ama prepared to Boin the =ght #y p"shing

;ep"#licans to scrap a m!ltibillion*dollar ta) ad&antage $or priate e'"ity managers%

In a speech on Wednesda:, @r /bama is e<pected to call on Rep!blicans to end the ta< brea7 and !se the !nds topa: or spendin increases on domestic and national sec!rit: prorams, and he will enlist b!siness leaders to helphim ma7e his case

In a session at the 6!siness Ro!ndtable in Washinton, @r +#ama will seek to shame

;ep"#licans who control Bonress $or $ailing to strike a deal with emocrats to $"nd the

go&ernment(s operations, !sin the so*called carried*interest proision as an e<ample o what he

ar!es are misplaced priorities, accordin to White o!se o>cials

!he ta) #reak is one that the president has repeatedl: proposed eliminatin, and it is a aorite bXte noire o

emocrats condemnin income ine?!alit: Its repeal has little chance o passin a diided Bonress,

#"t it has gained new political potency in recent da:s, with two Rep!blican presidential candidates,

onald $ #r!mp and $eb 6!sh, endorsin it

@r /bama will call the proposal “one area o common ro!nd," a White o!se o>cial said, spea7in on thecondition o anon:mit: to preiew the remar7s, that can pa: or oernment prorams and promote economicrowth



#he carried*interest chane wo!ld treat the pro)ts that !nd manaers earn rom inestin mone: li7e ordinar:income, which is ta<ed at a top rate o 3L percent, rather than as capital ains, which are s!b'ect to a rate o nomore than 23F percent It wo!ld raise abo!t Y1F billion oer a decade, accordin to the #reas!r: epartment

6!t the larger =ght is likely to #e o&er the !ndin o 3lanned 3arenthood Spea7er

$ohn A 6oehner is aain conronted with a ran7*and*)le !prisin b: lawma7ers who want to end )nancin o thero!p despite pledes b: him and Senator @itch @cBonnell, the ma'orit: leader, to aoid a oernment sh!tdown

In the Senate on #!esda:, the s7irmishin oer the b!det too7 a bac7 seat to contin!ed )htin oer @r /bama;sn!clear deal with Iran Senate Rep!blicans orced another ote on a resol!tion re'ectin the accord, a moe thatemocrats aain bloc7ed as the: acc!sed Rep!blicans o wastin time

4ar rom iin !p, @r @cBonnell anno!nced plans to orce a ote on an amendment that wo!ld bar @r /bamarom litin economic sanctions aainst Iran !nless Iran released American prisoners bein held in Iran andreconi=ed Israel as a state Rep!blican aides said that ote co!ld ta7e place #h!rsda: mornin

@r .cConnell said last wee7 that he s"pported a broad agreement that wo"ld keep

the go&ernment $"nded or seeral months a position that the Senate emocratic leader,

arr: ;eid o -eada, endorsed #!esda:

“#he Rep!blican leader and I disaree on man: thins, b!t I was er: lad, lad to hear the Rep!blican leader sa:last wee7 that he beliees an: oernment !ndin bill m!st be clean," @r Reid said in a speech on the Senate

Door

I agree that any #"dget deal m"st #e clean , that is, no riders," @r ;eid

contin"ed, “nothin with lanned arenthood, nothin with repealin what the Hnironmental rotection

Aenc: has done, no repealin what the odd*4ran7 bill p!t into efect to stop !s rom hain another Wall Streetmeltdown, no riders dealin with immiration"

@r 8oehner has been more hesitant b!t also said that he was working to a&oid a

sh"tdown

As7ed at a news conerence last wee7 i he co!ld !arantee there wo!ld be no sh!tdown oer lanned arenthood,

@r 6oehner replied% “isten, the goal here is not to sh"t down the go&ernment #he oal is

to stop these horri)c practices o orani=ations sellin bab: parts"

@r 6oehner has lon been a )erce opponent o abortion rihts And priatel:, his leadership team has been

warnin o!se Rep!blicans that the: co!ld ris7 ca!sin seere political damae to abortion opponents i the: orcea sh!tdown oer the iss!e

lanned arenthood is not the onl: potential pitall as the cloc7 tic7s toward the end o the )scal :ear on Sept 30Some emocrats are demandin a reersal o spendin c!ts that were areed to in preio!s :ears; battles aposition that will certainl: meet )erce Rep!blican resistance

Until this week , the *hite 6o"se had not mane"&ered aggressi&ely in the

#"dget =ght %

8"t em#edded in @r +#ama(s message on Wednesda: is a de$ense o$ his own

economic record and a re#"ke o$ ;ep"#licans%

Seen :ears ater the )nancial meltdown that he has spent m!ch o his time in o>ce addressin, the president will

sa:, Rep!blicans are enineerin another )scal crisis with potentiall: disastro!s conse?!ences

Some conressional emocrats &oiced pessimism that a sh"tdown co"ld #e

a&oided, ien past )hts, partic!larl: in 2013, when the oernment was sh!t or 1 da:s in a battle oer @r

/bama;s health care law

“4irst Rep!blicans sh!t down o!r oernment beca!se the: despised the Afordable Bare Act," said RepresentatieZaier 6ecerra o Baliornia, a member o the o!se emocratic leadership “#hen the: tried to sh!t down the 9Separtment o omeland Sec!rit: -ow it;s lanned arenthood"



e added% “Her: da:, 3,000 o o!r wies, mothers, da!hters and sisters co!nt on lanned arenthood orliesain cancer screenins Wh: sho!ld women in America lose their essential health care simpl: beca!seSpea7er $ohn 6oehner can;t control his #ea art: Rep!blicans"

3lanned 3arenthood $"nding was the s!b'ect o a lenth: and emotional disc!ssion amon o!se

Rep!blicans last wee7, in which @r 8oehner endorsed p"rs"ing leislation separate $rom

the larer #"dget =ght%

Accordin to one Rep!blican o>cial who was in the room, @r 6oehner e<pressed s!pport or leislation that wo!ldlimit lanned arenthood;s actiities and allow criminal prosec!tions in some cases o late*term abortions e alsobac7ed a separate bill endin oernment )nancin or lanned arenthood

Some ;ep"#licans ha&e e)pressed concern that two o their collea!es most

aggressi&ely p"shing $or a #"dget =ght o&er 3lanned 3arenthood,

Representaties $im $ordan o /hio and @ar7 @eadows o -orth Barolina, were also strong ad&ocates

o$ sh"tting down the go&ernment in 2013 oer the health care law #hat sh!tdown was !ltimatel:

iewed b: most Rep!blicans as a strateic mista7e

3lan slays +#ama(s agenda H t"rns the a

Kriner 1Fassociate pro$essor o$ political science at 8oston

Uni&ersity Vo!las Qriner, #he Bontemporar: residenc: /bama;sA!thori=ation arado<% S:ria and Bonress;s Bontin!ed Releance in @ilitar: Afairs,Presidential Studies Quarterly MM, no 2 ($!ne+ 30L

#h!s, presidents ma: see7 a!thori=ation in the hope o sec!rin immediate bene)ts in terms o increased p!blics!pport S!ch s!pport ma: be partic!larl: li7el: to emere i the a!thori=ation s!cceeds oweer, the mostimportant adantaes o a conressional a!thori=ationeen o a ailed a!thori=ation otema: materiali=e

months aterward as a militar: ent!re !nolds wealth o$ scholarship has emphasi7ed

Congress(s $ail"re in all b!t the rarest o cases to "se the power o$ the p"rse, the

*3;, or any other meas"re at its disposal to legislati&ely compel a

president to a#andon his pre$erred military policy co"rse (4isher 1LL58 R!daleie

20058 Schlesiner 1LC3+ 6owe&er, this does not mean that Congress has remained

silent when con$ronted with military policies with which it disagrees Rather,

on a wide range o$ military actions rom ma'or wars in Qorea, [ietnam, and Ira?, to smaller

interentions in ebanon, Somalia, aiti, and 6osnia, mem#ers o Bonress hae introd"ced

legislation to constrain the commander in chie, in&estigated presidential policies, and

deno"nced the administration;s handlin o orein polic: beore the teleision cameras Recent research

s!ests that thro!h s!ch actions, een tho!h the: do not hae the orce o law, Bonress has e<erted sini)cantinD!ence on the d!ration o ma'or militar: actions in the postKWorld War II era (Qriner 2010+

Congressional criticism in each o these &en"es is politically costly It can

precipitate #oth real and anticipated shi$ts in p"#lic opinion (6a!m and .roelin

20108 6erins7: 200L8 owell and eeho!se 200C+, and it can $orce presidents to e)pend

political capital in $oreign policy that will then #e "na&aila#le $or other

initiati&es (-e!stadt 1LL0+ @oreoer, congressional criticism sends signals o$

merican dis"nity to o"r ad&ersaries , which can also aect the military

costs that m"st #e paid to achie&e the administration(s o#Becti&es (e,

A!erswald 20008 Sch!lt= 2001+ s a res"lt, presidents $acing legislati&e challenges or

een '!st intense p!blic criticism o$ their military policies on Bapitol ill may concl"de that

staying the co"rse militarily is no longer worth the heightened costs and

will thereore adB"st their polic: co!rse accordingly



Sh"tdown p"ts US cy#er sec"rity proBects at riskFdetection,

pre&ention, and $"t"re de&elopment

;ockwell 1?FEC*4 !he 8"siness o$ Eederal !echnology, sta

writer co&ering ac'"isition, proc"rement and homeland

sec"rity V@ar7 Roc7well, S sh!tdown% J#hereJs an opport!nit: costJ,http%&&cwcom&articles&2015&02&2M&a!in*dhs*sh!tdownasp<

4ederal aencies wonJt lose their e<istin epartment o omeland Sec!rit: c:ber protections i a S spendin bill

is not enacted this wee7, b!t #ig cy#er proBects and the sec"rity work$orce co"ld

$ace longer-term, less tangi#le eects

EI donJt thin7 there will be an immediate operational impact on S c:bersec!rit: operations,E said @ar7

*eather$ord, $ormer dep"ty secretary o$ cy#ersec"rity at S and now a principal at

#he Bhertof .ro!p

B:bersec!rit: operations at the -ational rotection and rorams irectorate (-+ and the />ce o

B:bersec!rit: and Bomm!nications (BSSB+ that contain bi ch!n7s o the departmentJs c:bersec!rit: capabilities,he said, most li7el: will contin!e !ninterr!pted beca!se their operations are deemed essential

!he looming sh"tdown wo"ld land at D6S m!ch li7e the 2013 sh!tdown did across the

ederal oernment I Bonress canJt pass a spendin bill that resident 6arac7 /bama sins, S will 7eepe<empt emplo:ees wor7in ** b!t with no pa: H<empt emplo:eesJ 'obs are Enecessar: or saet: o lie andprotection o propert:,E accordin to ederal r!les

-on*e<empt emplo:ees ** which incl!de administratie, manaement and prorammatic personnel ** wo!ld be!rlo!hed !nder a sh!tdown

!he #iggest impact $rom s"ch an e&ent, said Weatherord, wo"ld #e $elt at

de&eloping cy#er protection proBects S o>cials hae alread: said proBects s!ch as its

Hinstein intr!sion*detection*and*preention s:stem and s:stems that share in$o rmation amon local

oernments and critical inrastr!ct!re wo"ld take a hit, as wo"ld contin"o"s

diagnostics and mitigation (B@+ eorts

Senate emocrats are bloc7in consideration o the o!se*passed S spendin bill, which wo!ld prohibitimplementation o /bamaJs plan to allow millions o illeal immirants to remain in the co!ntr: A )scal 2015omnib!s appropriations bill enacted in ecember !nded S thro!h 4eb 2C

In remar7s at a 4eb 20 American 6ar Association eent, And: +7ment , assistant secretary o the

/>ce o B:bersec!rit: and Bomm!nications within -, said that a sh"tdown Jgrinds to a

haltJ CD. and instein is comments echoed his 4eb 12 testimon: beore the o!se omeland

Sec!rit: BommitteeJs B:bersec!rit:, Inrastr!ct!re rotection and Sec!rit: #echnoloies S!bcommittee that ash!tdown co!ld orce a !rlo!h o 1M0 staf members at the -ational B:bersec!rit: and Bomm!nicationsInteration Benter, as well as stall Hinstein and B@ eforts

/=ment said a sh"tdown wo"ld delay #ringing more agencies on#oard SJs

Hinstein 3A, the latest iteration o the a!tomated intr!sion*detection proram Abo!t 20 percent o the oernment

!ses the sotware, accordin to /=ment It is c"rrently deployed at 11 departments and

agencies, co&ering appro<imatel: ? percent o$ all %go& tra0c, and S plans an

aressie e<pansion o the serice in the comin months /=ment said M aencies hae sined areements toparticipate in H3A serices, coerin L0 percent o all ederal ciilian tra>c

#he epartment o [eterans Afairs alread: !ses the Hinstein 3 manaed sec!rit: s:stem as its =rst line o$

cy#er de$ense K an o!ter wall protecting its networks $rom intr"sion #hat serice

wo!ld not be afected b: a lapse in appropriations



E#hat partic!lar serice is considered a critical serice, so it will contin!e to r!n,E [A BI/ Stephen Warren said in a4eb 2M conerence call with reporters E#here will be no derade in capabilit: We hae a er: stron relationshipand partnership with the ol7s oer at omeland Sec!rit: #he:Je prett: m!ch said the:Jre oin to contin!e themission And itJs a mission that weJre er: dependent onE

@ore broadl:, howeer, Ethe impact on Hinstein co"ld #e signi=cant,J said #on: Cole, ice

president and .lobal .oernment chie technolo: o>cer at enterprise cy#ersec!rit: proider 4ire H:e Bole said itwas not clear what miht be deemed e<empt and non*e<empt !nder the pro'ect, ma7in it di>c!lt to predict the!ll impact

@eas!rin the opport!nit: costs

E!here is a longer-term pro#lem with ac'"isition,E said Weatherord Stopping

work on #ig I! proc"rement proBects ripples down the chain, as work stops

and proc!rement personnel who are still on the 'ob are shi$ted to pro'ects that receie !ndin rom

other so!rces E!here>s an opport"nity costE to the stoppae, he said

/=ment spo7e to that cost in his conressional testimon: S is set to award a tas7 order !nder B@ phase 1 inthe comin wee7s EWith B@, weJre on the ere o iss!in a contract,E /=ment said beore the o!ses!bcommittee EIt wo!ld dela: iss!ance o this awardE

@ore recentl:, S o>cials reiterated to 4BW their concern that !t!re B@ contracts co!ld be dela:ed i a

sh!tdown occ!rs

!he net eect o$ a sh"tdown on D6S cy#ersec"rity, howeer, is meas"re in

other terms, Weatherord and Bole areed

E!he impact on cy#er employee moraleJ co"ld #e signi=cant, Weatherord said

EIJe been thro!h a ew o these in the ederal oernment and in the priate sector o" tell highly

talented people with a lot o$ employment options how important they are,

then treat them like they don>t matter% *atch $or t"rno&er ater this is oerE

Bole made a similar point abo!t morale, sa:in Eit s!rel: wonJt help with 'ob satisactionE /n top o that, he said,

hiring replacements co"ld also take more time, since h!man reso!rces emplo:ees will probabl:

be !rlo!hed, res!ltin in a wor7 bac7!p in that department

)tinction

;othkop$ 11 (aid, [isitin Scholar at Barneie, “Where 4!7!shima meets St!<net% #he rowin threat o

c:ber war", 3&1C&11,http%&&roth7oporeinpolic:com&posts&2011&03&1C&whereN!7!shimaNmeetsNst!<netNtheNrowinNthreatNoNc:berN war+

#he $apanese n!clear crisis, tho!h still !noldin, ma:, in a wa:, alread: be :esterda:Js news 4or a pee7 at

tomorrowJs, reiew the testimon: o .eneral Keith le)ander, head o$ U%S% Cy#er

Command% #esti:in beore Bonress this wee7 and see7in s!pport to p!mp !p his aenc: b!det, the

eneral arg"ed that all $"t"re con<icts wo"ld in&ol&e cy#er war$are tacticsand that the U%S% was ill-e'"ipped to de$end itsel$ against them%

Ale<ander said, EWe are )ndin that we do not ha&e the capacity to do e&erything we

need to accomplish% #o p!t it bl!ntl:, we are &ery thin, and a crisis wo"ld '"ickly

stress o"r cy#er $orces #his is not a h:pothetical danerE

#he wa: to loo7 at this stor: is to lin7 in :o!r mind the St!<net reelations abo!t the reportedl: 9S and Israeli*ledc:ber attac7s on the Iranian n!clear enrichment acilit: at -atan= and the calamities at the 4!7!shima poweracilities oer the past wee7 While seeminl: !nconnected, the stories toether spea7 to the beore and ater o



what c:ber conDict ma: loo7 li7e nemies will #e a#le to target one another>s critical

in$rastr"ct"re as was done #y the U%S% and Israeli team (li7el: wor7in with 6ritish

and .erman assistance+ taretin the Iranian proram and b!rrowin into their operatin s:stems , they will

seek to prod"ce mal$"nctions that #ring economies to their knees, p"t

societies in the dark , or "nderc"t national de$enses%

!hose in$rastr"ct"res might well #e n"clear power systems and the res"ltsco"ld #e akin to what we are seeing in 2apan% LAltho!h one power compan: e<ec!tie

:esterda: 'o7ed to me that man: plants in the 9S wo!ld be sae beca!se the technolo: the: !se is so old thatsotware hardl: pla:s an: role in it at all #his hints at a bit o a blessin and a c!rse in the ract!red 9S powers:stem% itJs decentrali=ed which ma7es it hard to taret oerall b!t sec!rit: is let to man: power companies thatlac7 the sophistication or reso!rces to anticipate, prepare or or manae the rowin threats+

Importantl:, not onl: does the apparent s!ccess o$ the St")net worm demonstrate that

s"ch approaches are now in play #"t it may B"st #e the tip o$ the ice#erg % I

remember oer a decade ao spea7in to one o the top 9S c:ber deenders who noted that een d!rin the lateL0s ban7s were losin millions and millions eer: :ear to c:ber thet ** onl: the: didnJt want to report it beca!se

the: elt it wo!ld spoo7 c!stomers (Tes+ Recentl:, we ha&e seen signi=cant market glitches

worldwide that co"ld easily ha&e #een ca"sed #y inter&entions rather than

B"st mal$"nctions A co!ple :ears bac7 I participated in a scenario at aos in which '!st s!ch amanip!lation o mar7et data was sim!lated and the concl!sion was it wo"ldn>t take m"ch to

"ndermine con=dence in the markets and perhaps e&en $orce traders to

mo&e to paper trading or other &en"es "ntil it was restored% It wo"ldn>t

e&en ha&e to #e a real cy#er intr"sion -- B"st the perception that one

might ha&e happened%

*hat makes the n"clear threat so "nsettling to many is that it is in&isi#le %

It shares this with the cy#er threat% 8"t the cy#er attacks ha&e other

dimensions that s!est that .eneral Ale<ander is not '!st tr:in to bee !p his aenc:Js ban7 acco!nts with

his description o how !t!re warare will alwa:s inole a c:ber component Not only are they

in&isi#le #"t it is hard to detect who has la"nched them, so hard, in $act,

that one can imagine $"t"re tense international relationships in whichopposing sides were constantly, '"ietly, engaging in an "ndeclared #"t

damaging Jnon-war,J something cooler than a Cold *ar #eca"se it is

stripped o$ rhetoric and cloaked in denia#ility, #"t which might #e m"ch

more damaging While there is still onoin debate abo!t the e<act de)nition o c:ber warare there is a

rowin consens!s that the threats posed b: both state*sponsored and non*state actors to power rids, telecom

s:stems, water s!pplies, transport s:stems and comp!ter networ7s are reachin critical leels !his is the

deeply "nsettling sit"ation eecti&ely $ramed #y 5eneral le)ander in his

testimony and rather than ha&ing #een o#sc"red #y this week>s news it

sho"ld only ha&e #een ampli=ed #y it%



1NCF.anama C3!he United States sho"ld incenti&i7e Iran and the ra# 5"l$

states to "se the .anama Dialog"e to esta#lish a trilateral

cooperati&e $ramework $or com#atting illegal sm"ggling,

earth'"ake monitoring and disaster relie$, en&ironmentalremediation, nat"ral reso"rce management, colla#oration on

medical and health pro#lems, and maritime sec"rity

cooperation% !he United States sho"ld maintain the presence

o$ the Ei$th Eleet in 8ahrain%

*e create a new incl"si&e 5"l$ sec"rity architect"re and arms

control regime that sta#ili7es the region%

*ehrey H Sokolsky 1? K Senior Associate in the @iddle Hast roram \ Barneie Hndowment or

International eace ] Senior Associate in BarneieJs R!ssia and H!rasia roram V4rederic Wehre: ] RichardSo7ols7: “6ridin the .!l in the .!l% Reional eace Ater the Iran eal," 4orein Afairs, $!l: 1M, 2015, phttp%&&tin:!rlcom&owe2Frm

*hat is missing rom their prescription or rollbac7 is an: notion that constr"cti&e

engagement with Iranand integrating it into a new and more incl"si&e 5"l$

sec"rity architect"reco"ld help to restrain its dangero"s #eha&ior In act, since

the 1LL0s, Iran;s behaior in the .!l has been relatiel: tame when compared to its militanc: in Ira? and the

eant ra# 5"l$ diplomats themsel&es appear to implicitly recogni7e that

their competition with the Islamic ;ep"#lic can #e compartmentali7ed%

“Hnae in the .!l, contain in Ira?, and rollbac7 in the eant," said one Sa!di diplomat in 200C

#he .!l Booperation Bo!ncil (5CC+made !p o 6ahrain, Q!wait, /man, âtar, Sa!di Arabia, and the 9nited

Arab Hmiratesis the region(s only m"ltilateral sec"rity $or"m% 6owe&er, it

e)cl"des Ira? and Iran In act, it is a de $acto collecti&e de$ense alliance aimed

at Iran% It also sh!ts o!t o!tside powers with a stron sta7e the reion;s sec!rit: and its ast ener: reso!r to

deelopces, incl!din Bhina, India, $apan, the H!ropean 9nion, R!ssia, and the 9nited States

@ore importantl:, the e<istin 5CC sec!rit: architect!re pro&ides no m"ltilateral

mechanism to manage crises and pre&ent con<ict , red!ce tensions, re!late competition

amon the .!l co!ntries, improe predictabilit: and stabilit:, or e<pand m!t!al cooperation on the olatile reion;s

man: ills Hen worse, it doesn(t een gi&e the maBor stakeholders in regional

sec"rity a chance $or $rank and open e)change o$ &iews on their threat

perceptions and sec!rit: concerns With the sinin o the n!clear areement with Iran, this sho!ld chane

new, more incl"si&e regional sec"rity $or"m in the 5"l$ can help remedy

e)isting de=ciencies in the 5CC and pro&ide opport"nities to #"ildcon=dence with Iran !he more tangi#le #ene=ts Iran deri&es $rom this new

sec"rity order and the more it has to lose i its behaior p!ts these ains at ris7, the greater the

stake it will ha&e in regional sta#ility, at least in the 5"l$

*ith U%S% enco"ragement , the 5"l$ ra#s and Iran sho"ld )rst work toward a

dialog"e on less controersial and more technical iss!es #hese wo!ld incl!de com#atting dr!

tra>c7in and other orms o illegal sm"ggling , earth'"ake monitoring and disaster

relie$ , en&ironmental remediation, nat"ral reso"rce management,



colla#oration on medical and health pro#lems, and maritime sec"rity

cooperation

#he ecember atherin o the ann!al .anama Dialog"e wo"ld #e a good place to

B"mpstart these disc"ssions In time, i$ dialog"e yields concrete orms o

cooperation and greater tr"st amon the parties, the $or"m co"ld #e made more

$ormal and the aenda co!ld be #roadened to incl"de more signi=cant con=denceand sec"rity #"ilding meas"res , and possibl: een arms red"ction

arrangements

#he .!l co!ntries will need to ta7e ownership o this process, b!t o"tside stakeholders will

certainly ha&e to caBole, coerce, and incenti&i7e cooperation !o pro&ide a

co"nterweight to Iran and to con&ince rel"ctant 5CC co"ntries , most o$ all

Sa"di ra#ia, to participate , the United States will need to #e a mem#er o$

these talks oweer, .!l sec!rit: cannot be “@ade in America" and so *ashington will need to

#e care$"l a#o"t not getting o"t ahead o$ Sa!di Arabia and its 5CC partners

#hat said, the ne<t meetin o the 9SK.BB Strateic Booperation 4or!m, which will li7el: ta7e place in September

on the marins o the ann!al 9- .eneral Assembl: meetins, is a perect opport!nit: or the 9nited States to beindi>c!lt disc!ssions with its .!l partners #his en!e co!ld also be !sed or ?!iet disc!ssions between 9SSecretar: o State $ohn Qerr: and his Sa!di co!nterpart on this initiatie and, dependin on how these tal7s o, or

direct or indirect trilateral diplomacy #etween Iran, Sa"di ra#ia, and the United

States A drat declaration o principles that wo"ld "nderpin a new sec"rity architect"reco!ld be a ocal point o these disc!ssions

9S polic:ma7ers sho!ld be !nder no ill!sions abo!t the di>c!lt: o oercomin decades o inrained mistr!st inthe .!l% Imainin a new sec!rit: order is one thin, implementin it is ?!ite another @!ch will hine on thebalance o power between the hardliners and pramatists within #ehran and, especiall:, the calc!l!s o theS!preme eader It will also depend on the Sa!dis dialin down sectarian itriol in the media and their threat*monerin o Iran, which has so ar prod!ced an !nhealth: leel o S!nni nationalism

6!t a post*deal polic: that oc!ses e<cl!siel: on rollbac7 will prod!ce conrontation rather than diminish or end it %

policy that incl"des a parallel efort to b!ild a more incl"si&e str"ct"re in the 5"l$

while sim!ltaneo!sl: sinalin a hard line on Iranian maleasance in S:ria and the eantstands a

#etter chance o$ achie&ing the sort o$ sta#ility the people o$ this region

deser&e%

*ithdrawal make 5CC-Iran cooperation impossi#le

3ollack 1? K Senior 4ellow \ Benter or @iddle Hast olic: VQenneth @ ollac7, “Reional implications o a

n!clear areement with Iran," Brookings Institution, $!l: L, 2015, p http%&&tin:!rlcom&pFb5:<

9nort!natel:,there is a greater danger still #he Sa"dis and their S"nni ra# allies

may $ear that the U%S% intends to "se a n"clear deal with Iran as a 5et

+"t o$ the .iddle ast Eree @ card !he 5"l$ states are con&inced that is the

+#ama Administration(s intent Across the board in priate, 5"l$ o0cials damn the Administration or

its wea7 response to Iran, bro!ht to a head at the @a: 2015 s!mmit at Bamp aid, where the claim that the

9nited States ofered nothin new as reass!rance that Washinton wo!ld p!sh bac7 on Iran !he danger

here is that, $ar $rom accommodating !ehran as some hae eared, the 5"l$ states

are $ar more likely to get in !ehran(s $ace to try to deter the Iranians !he

5CC air campaign in emen is a per$ect e)ample o$ this% It represents a st!nnin

depart!re rom past .BB practicethe: neer interened directl: with their own armed orces aainst anotherstate, e<cept behind a massie American orce as in the ersian .!l War o 1LL0*L1



!he "ltimate pro#lem is that the 5"l$ states are not strong eno"gh to take

on Iran alone , and i$ they act pro&ocati&ely toward Iran, e&en i$ intended

to deter Iranian aggression, they co"ld easily pro&oke B"st s"ch

aggression and /or o&erstretch their own limited capa#ilities with

potentially dire conse'"ences $or their own political sta#ility% I$ the U%S% is

not there to reass"re the 5"l$ states and deter Iran, things co"ld get &ery"gly

#he American Role

Ineitabl: with an: ?!estion related to the eo*politics o the @iddle Hast, the ?!estion eent!all: t!rns to the9nited States #he precedin anal:sis all points to the centralit: o the American response to a n!clear areementwith Iran as potentiall: determinin whether s!ch a deal is bene)cial or detrimental to reional stabilit:, and th!s to

American interests themseles As alwa:s, the United States is master o$ its own $ate to a

m"ch greater e)tent than any co"ntry on earth, e&en in the t"r#"lent and

"npredicta#le .iddle ast

#wo points seem to stand o!t to me rom the precedin anal:sis and the modern histor: o the reion #he )rst is

that while Iranian strategy is anti*American, anti*stat!s ?!o, anti*Semitic, aressie and e<pansionist, it

is not reckless and typically '"ite wary o$ merican power *hen the U%S%e)erts itsel$, the Iranians typically retreat % !he e)ception that pro&es the

r"le was in Ira' in 20M, when initially the Iranians did not #ack down $rom

their s"pport to &ario"s anti-merican Ira'i militias, only to ha&e those

militias cr"shed and drien rom Ira? partic!larl: d!rin /peration Bhare o the Qnihts and s!bse?!ent

Ira?i*American campains alon the lower #iris s we see in Ira' today, the Iranians

apparently recogni7e that they misB"dged #oth merica(s will and its

capacity to act then, and are once aain content to battle Washinton or political inD!ence in

6ahdad, b!t "nwilling to challenge U%S% power militarily, e&en #y pro)y%

#he second is the other side o the coin rom the )rst In the a#sence o$ merican engagement,

leadership and military in&ol&ement, the 5CC states (led, as alwa:s, b: the Sa!dis+ #ecome

$rightened and their tendency is to lash o"t and o&ere)tend themsel&es

Aain, the "nprecedented 5CC air campaign in emen is a striking e)ample o$

this% s the 5"l$ ra#s see it, they ha&e ne&er seen the United States so

disengaged $rom the regionFat least not in 35 :earsand so they $eel that they ha&e

had to take e'"ally e)ceptional action to make "p $or it % I contin!e to see the

5CC inter&ention in emen as a wholl: !nnecessar: and !nhelp!l moe, a rash decision

meant to check what the 5CC sees as a looming Iranian @con'"est@ o Temen In

priate, 5CC o0cials make no #ones in saying that they $elt compelled to do

so #eca"se the United States was embracin Iran rather than deterrin or deeatin it While all o that is a set o

oerstatements and e<aerations, it dries home the point that in the a#sence o$ a strong merican

role in p!shin bac7 on Iran, the 5CC(s de$a"lt mode is to attack on their own, and that onl:

ma7es the sit!ation worse, not better

5CC lasho"t goes n"clear and ca"ses e)tinction

8"cci, 1? K h is a irector, o!las and Sarah Allison Benter or 4orein and -ational Sec!rit: olic: at

#he eritae 4o!ndation (Steen , “#he Bonditions are Ripe or a @a'or @iddle Hastern War", Real Blear eense,3&31&15,http%&&wwwrealcleardeensecom&articles&2015&03&31&theNconditionsNareNripeNorNaNma'orNmiddleNeasternNwarN10CF33html+&&S$4



!he Sa"dis, power!l in their own riht, hae allied with Al Sisi in H:pt, Qin Abd!llah in $ordan, and most o

the other .!l Arab States #he: are also allied with the 3akistanis, who ha&e one o the

larest militaries in the world, and n"clear weapons to boot Additionall:, there is a rowin possibilit:

that the #!r7s ma: throw in with the S!nni side

It(s a h"ge amo"nt o$ =re power, ri&alry and armed con<ict concentrated

in a comparati&ely small region% And this tinder#o) co"ld #low "p into amaBor con<agration, with destr"cti&e conse'"ences "nparalleled since

*orld *ar !wo%

6!t, some miht sa:, these opposin blocs hae been in place or decades, why the worry now ^!ite

simpl:, #eca"se merica is no longer playing the role it has played in the

region $or a long, long time %

4or decades, the U%S% ser&ed as sec"rity g"arantor and diplomatic tro!ble*shooter $or o"r

$riends in the region% !he Sa"dis, 2ordanians, gyptians, and other

$riendlies didn(t ha&e to worry that Iran wo"ld gain regional hegemony%

!hey knew a strong, asserti&e merica wo"ld keep Iran(s am#itions in

check @eanwhile, Iran and its pro)ies knew they co"ld go only so $ar #e$ore#eing slowed and stopped #y the '!dicio!s !se o merica power% ! he credi#le threat

o$ merican hard power was eno"gh to keep o"r $riends calm and o"r

enemies '"iet%

!hat has changed% +"r enemies ha&e seen the 9S “lead rom behind" in ib:a, then t!rn its

bac7 on o!r cons!late in 6enha=i #he:;e seen !s draw a “red line" in S:ria, then wal7 awa: when Assad calledo!r bl!f #he:;e seen R!ssia anne< Brimea and bolster the separatists in eastern 97raine while America re!ses to

proide militar: aid to Qie #he:;e seen "s <inch at the tho"ght o$ p"tting merican

#oots on the gro"nd in the =ght against ISIS%

!t it all toether, and it(s a pict"re o$ an merica that is timid, or con$"sed , or

<accid Fa nation that still talks a good hard-power game, #"t lacks the will

to $ollow thro"gh%

@oreoer, the: see an Administration so h!nr: or a “leac:" deal with Iran, that the Iranians considerableneotiatin s7ills are not een bein ta<ed In the .51 tal7s in a!sanne Secretar: o State $ohn Qerr: has madeconcession ater concession with no ?!id pro ?!o rom Iranto the point that 4rance is now emerin as thehardliner on o!r side o the neotiatin table

+"r enemies aren(t the only ones who notice these deelopments +"r $riends do, too

What m!st the Sa!dis and the others thin7 when the: see the administration cast aside reional all: -o 1IsraelBan their “p!sh o!t the door" be ar of i the: et in the wa: o the Administration;s sinle*minded drie toappease the Iranian reime

#hose $riends now ha&e reason to $ear that the n!clear neotiations with Iran will accelerate the

U%S% withdrawal $rom the region oreen worseprod!ce an Iranian*American rapprochement at

their e<pense It is this $ear that has led o"r $riends to #and together to de$endthemsel&es against what the: 7now to be a rowin threat% Iran While the /bama administration ma:

be willin to t!rn a blind e:e to this threat in its p!rs!it o a n!clear deal, Iran;s neihbors do not hae that l!<!r:

Since the 9S has c!t bac7 on dispensin its !s!al antibiotics, o"r Bittery $riends in the .iddle

ast now $eel that they m"st co"nterFstrongly and immediately Fthe local

in$ections promoted and e)ploited #y Iran% And the: are sometimes doin so witho"t

cons"lting the U%S%



!he res"lt is a .iddle ast more e)plosi&e and "npredicta#le than e&er%

!he conditions are now ripe $or a maBor .iddle astern war Fone that co"ld

spill across the glo#e, whereer S!nni and Shia @!slims interact All that remains missin is a spar7

Impossible :o! sa: #hat $!ne da: in Sara'eo, no e<perts predicted the horri:in conse?!ences o .aro rincip;sactions

#oda:, the Sa"dis are massing 1?, troops on the #order with emen%!he 3akistanis and the gyptians ha&e promised gro"nd troops #hese S!nnis

.oernments iew their alliance as one o sel*deense 6!t it(s a h"ge threat to Iran(s desires

$or hegemony, and !ehran may e&en &iew it as a threat to the s"r&i&al o$

the m!llahs; regime

No one wants war, bi or little 8"t among the power #locs o$ the .iddle ast,

*ashington(s mis#egotten policies ha&e $"eled "ncertainty on one side

and percei&ed opport"nity on the other%

In the atermath o the Second World War, mericans ha&e always dreaded a clash o$ the

s"perpowers 6!t the lesson o the 4irst World War is that when large regional powers

especiall: those dri&en #y sectarian and apocalyptic $orcesFare poised to =ght,any miscalc"lation can #e e'"ally cataclysmic%



1nc – cp

!he United States sho"ld in$orm the Kingdom o$ 8ahrain that it

will red"ce its aircra$t carrier presence in the Kingdom o$

8ahrain "nless they implement comprehensi&e h"man rightsre$orms% I$ there is no meaning$"l impro&ement in h"man

rights, the United States sho"ld red"ce its aircra$t carrier

presence in the Kingdom o$ 8ahrain%

!he C3 #oosts US credi#ility on h"man rights

Oagon, 11 K Ad'!nct Senior 4ellow or !man Rihts at the Bo!ncil on 4oreinRelations (@ar7 , /ctober “romotin !man Rihts% Is 9S Bonsistenc: esirableor ossible" http%&&wwwcror&h!man*rihts&promotin*h!man*rihts*!s*

consistenc:*desirable*possible&p222F+A broad*minded iew is that more consistency in promoting h"man rights wo"ld in act

#etter ser&e U%S% credi#ility and national interests residencies past too oten sacri)ced

h!man rihts or other orein polic: ob'ecties 4rom the Spanish*American War thro!h the [ietnam War, 9S polic: was oten atale o assertie interention in other lands or strateic interests in the name o “sain" or “ciili=in" them In the mid*1LC0s, the9nited States established a ormal “h!man rihts" polic: with a dedicated State epartment b!rea! headed b: atricia erien!nder resident $imm: Barter Barter made h!man rihts a central theme, s!estin the 9nited States had an “inordinate ear oBomm!nism," while e<posin ab!ses b: 9S allies (as he still does+ Amon other shits, Barter bac7ed awa: rom a repressie Shaho Iran in lare part d!e to that reimeJs h!man rihts ab!ses H?!all: moralistic in tone, Ronald Reaan bean his presidenc: withthe conerse tilt e appointed $eane Qir7patric7 as ambassador to the 9nited -ations (9-+, drawn to her criti?!e o Barter polic: inIran and elsewhere, titled “ictatorships and o!ble Standards" She ar!ed that traditional a!tocracies were more li7el: to eoleand liberali=e than totalitarian reimes, which see7 reater social control #his led her to re'ect a polic: o pressin more stronl: orreorm in the a!tocracies, which were oten 9S Bold War allies, than in the totalitarian states 6!t Reaan !ltimatel: reconi=edthat 9S interests were bo!nd !p in p!shin Bold War allies to reorm and democrati=e, rom Hl Salador and Bhile to So!th Qorea,the hilippines, and #aiwan #he presidential o!tlier on h!man rihts in the late twentieth cent!r: was .eore W 6!sh In Qie, heca!tioned Hastern H!ropeans aainst “s!icidal nationalism" in see7in independence rom @oscow (d!bbed the “Bhic7en Qie"

speech b: the late William Sa)re+ e dispatched senior aides to reass!re and toast 6ei'inJs leaders shortl: ater the #iananmenS?!are massacre Ater master!ll: leadin a coalition to end Ira?Js occ!pation o Q!wait, he resisted militaril: o!stin Saddam!ssein, een tho!h Saddam had assed his own Q!rdish citi=ens /ne m!st ac7nowlede that the intr!sie 9- sanctions reimep!t in place instead to constrain SaddamJs power in act ca!sed h!manitarian harm to ciilians or twele :ears resident Blinton!sed instit!tions efectiel: to adance h!man rihts rioriti=in the enlarement o the -orth Atlantic #reat: /rani=ation (-A#/+,he accelerated H!ropean 9nion (H9+ steps to ofer Hastern H!ropean co!ntries membership too #hat there were h!man rihtsstandards or 'oinin -A#/ and the H9 created a potent incentie or those co!ntries to improe their records 6!t li7e other 9Spresidents, Blinton pic7ed his )hts e Dipped his position and delin7ed trade and h!man rihts with Bhina in his )rst :ear, andSecretar: o State @adeleine Q Albriht later obsered, “We do not hae a coo7ie*c!tter approach to polic:" when as7ed wh: Bhinaand B!ba were treated diferentl: #he :o!ner resident 6!sh had the most orward*leanin rhetoric on h!man rihts, c!lminatinin his second ina!!ral address, where he proclaimed “the !ltimate oal o endin t:rann: in o!r world" e re'ected “the sotbiotr: o low e<pectations" reardin the people o the @iddle Hast alleedl: not bein s!ited to e<ercise !ll liberties Tet he toowas inconsistent in his actions% he disma:ed h!man rihts actiists b: sa:in the 6ei'in /l:mpics were onl: abo!t sports, he t!rneda blind e:e to a7istani eneralsJ manip!lation o the '!dicial s:stem, he wal7ed bac7 rom press!rin H:ptian leader osni@!bara7, and his policies on detainin s!pposed terrorists !ndermined 9S credibilit: #he ?!estion abo!t the earl: /bamaadministration was whether it wo!ld be more li7e that o .eore W 6!sh (coldl: realist+ or 6ill Blinton (morall: inclined, b!tpic7in his battles+ i7el: all!din oremost to Iran, /bama declared in his $an!ar: 20, 200L, ina!!ral address, E#o those who clin

to power thro!h corr!ption and deceit and the silencin o dissent, 7now that :o! are on the wron side o histor:, b!t that we wille<tend a hand i :o! are willin to !nclench :o!r )stE Accordin to the /bama White o!se, the Arab Sprin eents led him to shitrom this realist polic: o enaement to a more morall: inclined approach li7e resident BlintonJs #his seeminl: serpentine pathon h!man rihts between and within presidencies act!all: reDects m!ch contin!it: and conerence residents Barter and Reaanwere both moralistic in tone and each pressed allies to reorm resident /bama was no more willin or able proactiel: to sh!tterthe .!antanamo 6a: detention acilit: than his predecessor All recent presidents hae been to!h on @:anmarJs leaders andca!tio!s in press!rin BhinaJs What 7ind o consistenc: wo!ld be desirable and achieable 4o!r precepts wo!ld help 4irst, despitehow a h!man rihts emphasis at times clashes with important priorities in bilateral relationships (e, trade, co!nterterrorism, andmilitar: bases+, it is important not to ass!me that h!man rihts alwa:s intrinsicall: contradict 9S interests 4or instance, repressiono e<pression and real*time inormation ma: onl: retard economic rowth and t!rn reimes into press!re coo7ers read: to blowSecond, it is alse to s!est that the reater a co!ntr:Js relatie power, the less the 9S can aford to conront its h!man rihtsailins Addressin liberties in R!ssia and Bhina is all the more important d!e to their eopolitical weiht Indeed, i it is tooinDe<ible in absorbin societal demands, BhinaJs a!tocrac: co!ld ace a r!pt!re threatenin lobal stabilit: #hird, oernments that



re!larl: den: a lare cateor: o their citi=ens e?!al access to '!stice are not onl: iolatin !niersal rihts, b!t also s?!anderinassets 4or e<ample, the 9nited States co!ld adance a ?!iet, s!stained dialo!e with India abo!t the national oernmentJs role intranscendin c!lt!ral practices o discrimination aainst broad social ro!ps that releate al!able h!man capital to s?!alid liesersistent bonded labor o disadantaed castes despite a 1LC ban and remed: law in India is not !nli7e sereation persistin inthe American So!th !ntil 9S national a!thoritiesin another ederal s:stemp!shed states to implement laws @ost o all,co!ntries that den: women and irls propert: and inheritance rihts, ree e<pression, and political participation are orsa7inenormo!s assets or ciic conciliation and economic d:namismwhich is neither in their interests nor those o the 9nited States

4o!rth, the .iddle ast sho"ld not #e seen as an e)ception It is a biotr: o low

e<pectations to thin7 @!slims and Arabs are incapable o e<ercisin !niersal rihts #hat said, there are those who wo!ld !se newl:won tools o reedom to instit!tionali=e repression (as some elected Islamists miht+ Witho!t coertl: handpic7in winners, the9nited States sho!ld ofer a rane o actors who appear a!thenticall: committed to pl!ralism and peace!l contestation help todeelop their capacit: to compete or power and to oern So where does this leae the 9nited States in speci)c cases #a7e IranIts p!rs!it o a n!clear capabilit:8 its reional inD!ence, partic!larl: with respect to Ira? and Ahanistan8 and its role in lobalterrorism are all iss!es o critical importance to the 9nited States, b!t the: do not call or downpla:in h!man rihts recisel:beca!se Iran is s!ch a hea:weiht reional power, h!man rihts are important #he Iranian oernmentJs treatment o women andreliio!s minorities limits them as societal and economic assets #he .reen @oement and the teemin italit: o ciil societ: showthat Iranians lon or !ndamental reedoms Secretar: o State illar: Rodham Blinton is riht to hae 'oined the 9nited Qindom

and Banada in imposin isa restrictions on Iranian o>cials implicated in rihts iolations 8ahrain is a striking

case o$ the appearance o$ inconsistency #y the U nited S tates compared to

the "ltimate U%S% em#race o$ dissent and change in gypt, Oi#ya, Syria,

and !"nisia % 6"man ;ights *atch report doc"mented 8ahrain>s

p"niti&e and &indicti&e campaign o$ &iolent repression" ia arbitrar: arrests, hidden

detention, tort!re, biased militar: co!rt trials, and the sac7in o protest s:mpathi=ers rom 'obs #he 9nited States stood larel:

silent as Sa!di Arabia s!pplied orces to help 6ahrain p!t down dissent !he U nited St ates o"ght to &iewits important na&al #ase in 8ahrain as a reason to disco"rage repression, which

co"ld make that nation less sta#le% 8ahrain limits the $reedom o$ women,

$oreign workers, and political opposition% !he U nited S tates is capa#le o$

de$tly asserting more press"re on this small power to a&oid

co"nterprod"cti&e s"ppression o$ dissent Lhelped #y the Sa"dis no less+, witho!t

losin access to a strateic baseWhile it is neither wise nor easible to hae identical policies or all nations, more

consistency based on these precepts will #etter ser&e U%S% and glo#al interests

!hat(s key to so$t powerF#acks "p rhetoric with action

8etti7a and 3hillips, 1 K h candidate in International Relations and IHASBentre Stone< Scholar at the ondon School o Hconomics and olitical Science, andh st!dent in International Relations at the ondon School o Hconomics andolitical Science and roramme Assistant on the IHAS @iddle Hast InternationalAfairs roramme (.reorio and Bhristopher “/bama;s @iddle Hast olic:% #ime toecide" http%&&wwwlseac!7&IHAS&p!blications&reports&pd&SR003&betti=apd+

4!rthermore, orce!l strateies o democrac: promotion abroad were sheledwhilst respectin h!man rihts at home was emphasised !rin his )rst wee7s/bama s:mbolicall: iss!ed e<ec!tie orders re?!irin the clos!re o the.!antanamo detention camp alon with bannin tort!re and enhancedinterroation techni?!es #hese moes were intimatel: tied with his desire to re*establish America;s international leitimac: and restore its capacit: to lead b:e<ample Rather than b!ll:in @iddle Hastern co!ntries into democratic reorm aswas 6!sh;s want, /bama adopted a more hands of approach 200L saw silencerom the White o!se d!rin Iran;s post*election protests, limited interention in



ebanon;s parliamentar: polls and the adoption o narrower militar: ob'ecties inAhanistan rather than ambitio!s democrati=ation oals

Tet a shi$t in rhetoric can only go so $ar in re#"ilding US credi#ility in thereion !he ."slim world contin"es to scr"tini7e the 3resident(s actions as

m"ch as his speeches 2M*ho!r news channels broadcastin imaes o 9S troops

still )htin in Ahanistan and Ira?, not to mention Israelis in the West 6an7 and.a=a, sere to !ndermine an: messae o reconciliation +#ama(s '"iet

a#andonment o$ democracy ad&ocacy, hihlihted b: recent conressional c!tsin democrac: and oernance aid or @iddle Hastern states, similarl: risks

increasing cynicism towards the administration(s new approach Whilst6!sh;s democrac: promotion at !npoint was detested, the /bama administration;scontin"ed s"pport $or "npop"lar dictators s!ch as H:pt;s osni @!bara7, itsproppin !p o @ahmo!d Abbas; leall:*?!estionable presidential mandatee<tension, and the near*arcical acceptance o amid Qar=ai;s ra!d!lent re*electionin Ahanistan hae dampened an: @!slim optimism /bama ma: hae earned inBairo

@oreoer, recent eents hae shown the railit: o the new administration;srhetorical shit 9nder press!re rom Rep!blican critics ater the attemptedBhristmas a: etroit Diht bombin, /bama owed to, “!se eer: element oo!r national power to disr!pt, to dismantle and to deeat the iolent e<tremists whothreaten !s, whether the: are rom Ahanistan or a7istan, Temen or Somalia8 oran:where" e miht be able to pers!ade liberal s!pporters bac7 home that this isnot a ret!rn to 6!sh;s neo*conseratism, b!t s!ch lang"age will not endear him

to a ."slim world increasingly do"#ting the a"thenticity o$ his rhetoric+#ama is #"rdened #y the weight o$ e)pectation o$ a ."slim world who

hoped he wo"ld not only re&erse the hostility o$ the 8"sh years #"t

somehow s"rpass pre&io"s US leaders in the .iddle ast #he realit: the:ace, that /bama has simpl: ret!rned to the realism o preio!s administrations, isa bitter pill to swallow *hilst a $oreign policy s"ccess in the ."slim world

co"ld still consolidate the raised e)pectations o his Bairo speech, the longer

they m"st wait, the more +#ama is in danger o$ s'"andering this newly

earned so$t power

)tinctionFm"ltiple scenariosF8arlow , irector o the 6erl!nd Benter or Internet St!dies, holds the @ats!shita Bhair o Asian St!dies at

aci)c 9niersit:, h in histor: rom 9B 6er7ele:, 2Q2 ($efre:, @arch, “American ower, .lobalism, and theInternet% Hditorial Hssa:", #he $o!rnal o Hd!cation, Bomm!nit: and [al!es,

http%&&bcispaci)c!ed!&'o!rnal&2002&03&editorialphp_+

@!ch o -:e;s anal:sis is intended to ma7e a relatiel: simple point% #hat the 9nited States isinde)nitel: !nchalleneable in terms o its “hard power"8 b!t “sot power" isrowin steadil: more important in a networ7ed world, and is the more ranible oAmerican so!rces o power #here will be a nat!ral process that somewhat itiates the impact o

American sot power in an: eent as other inormation economies mat!re 4or e<ample, b: 2010, -:e ar!es, therewill be more Bhinese Internet !sers than American onesF While American sites will remain er: attractie, beca!seo the act that Hnlish has become the world;s second lan!ae, Bhina too sits at the center o a lin!istic empirethat not onl: embraces the worldwide iaspora o Bhinese people, b!t has also in the past embraced m!ch o Hast



Asia incl!din Qorea, $apan, [ietnam, and other nations 05 A ichotom: or a #ransition (Ret!rn to Inde<+ -:e;sposition intersects at seeral points with the anal:sis o @an!el Bastells, socioloist and the a!thor o theenc:clopedic m!lti*ol!me wor7, #he Inormation Ae% Hconom:, Societ:, and B!lt!reL -:e;s ar!ment ollows intime !pon that o Bastells in that Bastells wrote in 1LL, -:e ater September 11, 2002 6!t -:e;s position is!ltimatel: ro!nded in an earlier tradition o “realist" de)nitions o power% ower !sed to be in the hands oprinces, oliarchies, and r!lin elites8 it was de)ned as the capacit: to impose one;s will on others @odi:in theirbehaior #his imae o power does not )t with o!r realit: an: loner10` Bastells spends ar more time than does-:e considerin the “Inormation Ae" In doin so, he perhaps has the adantae in conte<t!ali=in Americanpower is ar!ment is also ar more d:namic #o Bastells, the Inormation Ae is an onoin process, which heconsiders rom a n!mber o perspecties -:e beliees that there are two dichotomo!s 7inds o power% “hard" and“sot" 4or Bastells, there are not two 7inds o power, b!t a still incomplete transition rom one 7ind o power toanother 4or Bastells, power is bein permanentl: transormed8 -:e;s hard power is erodin% states, een the mostpower!l one, the 9nited States, now lie in an enironment mar7ed b: a decentrali=ed net o “local terrore?!ilibria" 11 In the past, d!rin the Bold War, seeral ma'or states and their allies established an e?!ilibri!mbased !pon m!t!al ass!red destr!ction8 this preented an: one power rom dominatin the lobal political or

economic s:stem, b!t it also protected each o the ma'or states rom the others 4ollowin the collapse othe Soiet 9nion the 9nited States then en'o:ed a brie period o near absol!tedominance 0 American ower 4ollowin L*11(Ret!rn to Inde<+ 6!t lobal processes had alread:distrib!ted a ariet: o weapons o mass destr!ction amon ma'or and minorpowers, and more importantl:, amon non*state actors as well September 11, 2002, reealed the !lnerabilities o een the reatest o powers to non*state actors #hedeastatin efect o the low*cost and relatiel: simple improised weapons thatwere !sed then s!ddenl: ill!minated a terrible new world #he !se o abacterioloical weapon, Anthra<, then ollowed ?!ic7l: !pon the tra!ma o L*11***so ?!ic7l:

that historians ma: well treat the two eents as one #his attac7 reealed an additional and, to man:,

een more terri:in !lnerabilit: and aain showed the new power o non*state actors Bastells reers

to these sorts o weapons, incl!din chemical and bioloical ones, as well as the eared low*:ield “dirt:" n!clear deices sometimes reerred to as “s!itcase bombs" as “eto technoloies" and

pres!mes that this new decentrali=ed web o reat and small states and non*state actors will re?!ireconstant small interentions b: man: diferent powers to maintain a relatie peace

#his seems to be an apt description o eents since September 11 as a ariet: oalliances, states, and international orani=ations hae 'oined the campain aainst terrorism

#here are, then, man: indications that Bastells is, to a considerable deree at least, correct in his anal:sis o statepower in the Inormation Ae, and -:e wron State power is eolin toward a decentrali=ed abric, li7e all else inthe Inormation Ae 0C #he imitations o the -etwor7ed International S:stem (Ret!rn to Inde<+ #here are alsoman: indications that some in the American polic:*ma7in instit!tions !nderstand the implications o a world li7ethat described b: Bastells Recentl: (@arch, 2002+, the entaon report “#he -!clear ost!re Reiew" disc!ssedconditions !nder which the 9nited States miht !se n!clear weapons #his anal:sis immediatel: attracted a reatdeal o attention beca!se it s!ested the )rst*stri7e emplo:ment o n!clear weapons aainst non*n!clear powersSince the end o World War II s!ch !se has been pres!med to be o!tside the parameters o ciili=ed warare, andpartic!larl: o!tside American n!clear doctrine 6!t times hae chaned As stated b: one reporter, @ichael.ordon, “Another theme in the report is the possible !se o n!clear weapons to destro: enem: stoc7s o bioloicalweapons, chemical arms and other arms o mass destr!ction" 12 #hese are, o co!rse, precisel: the “eto

technoloies" listed b: Bastells13 #he limitation in the c!rrent international s:stem is probabl:

most criticall:, rom an American point o iew, that it tends to restrain !nilateralAmerican action As a res!lt, reat attention necessaril: m!st be paid to alliances

and coalition b!ildin 6!t i an:thin terri)es the international comm!nit: it is thespecter o n!clear war , or the possibilit: o a ret!rn to a Bold War s:stem with itsattendant enormo!s e<penses and the inherent threat o destr!ction 0F #he -!clear

ost!re Reiew (Ret!rn to Inde<+ #he “-!clear ost!re Reiew" represents the 6!sh administration;s attempt tobrea7 the bonds that presentl: restrains American power% )rst*stri7e !se o n!clear weapons efectiel: remoesthe need to cons!lt allies It amo!nts to an attempt to restore the brie period o absol!te domination (and absol!tesec!rit:+ en'o:ed b: the 9S ollowin the all o the Soiet 9nion, beore we had become aware o the terrible neworces that co!ld be emplo:ed b: “ro!e states" and criminal orani=ations s!ch as Al ^!aeda I the 9nited Stateswere to be s!ccess!l in p!ttin the terrorist enie bac7 in the bottle b: threatenin n!clear stri7es on states thatboth harbor terrorists and possess weapons o mass destr!ction, incl!din most especiall: chemical and



bacterioloical ones, then -:e is, perhaps, correct% #here are two sorts o power and the 9nited States can contin!e

to en'o: a near monopol: o classical “hard" power 6!t -:e, li7e Bastells, reconi=es that “!nder theinD!ence o the inormation reol!tion and lobali=ation, world politics is chaninin a wa: that means Americans cannot achiee all o their international oals actinalone"1M #he !proar, both domestic and international oer the implications o the “-!clear olic: Reiew" is

eidence o the essential acc!rac: o Bastell;s anal:sis15 /nce aain, the 9nited States has discoered the limits

o state a!tonom: in a networ7ed



1nc – t.ilitary 3resence is troops only

Elo"rnoy H !angredi 1 – a% Snr d&isor $or Int(l Sec"rty at

CSIS, ;esearch 3ro$ at the Instit"te $or National Strategic

St"dies at the National De$ense U%, H #% Captain, Senior.ilitary Eellow at INSS P NDU – ser&ed the 2oint Sta o$ the

Secretary o$ the Na&y

V@ichle A 4lo!rno: and Sam $ #anredi, eense Strate: Alternaties% BhoosinWhere to lace Hmphasis and Where to Accept Ris7, rom ^R 2001% Strate:*rien Bhoices or America;s Sec!rit:, Hd% @ichele 4lo!rno: http%&&wwwdticmil&ci*bin&.et#RocAOAAM30L3]ocationO92]docO.et#Rocpd

#erms s!ch as presence and enaement are oten !sed rather loosel: 4ollowin

a s!re: and anal:sis o e<istin so!rces, we deeloped or adopted specific definitions or

the terms !sed to describe these strate: iss!es We de)ne oerseas presence as militar: orces

permanentl: stationed or rotationall: or intermittentl: deplo:ed oerseas or the p!rposes o inD!ence,

enaement, reass!rance, deterrence, and initial crisis response We de)ne peacetime militar:

enaement as encompassin all 9S militar: actiities desined to enhanceconstr!ctie sec!rit: relations and promote broad 9S sec!rit: interests, incl!din actiities s!ch as

combined trainin and ed!cation, militar:*to*militar: interactions, sec!rit: assistance , andario!s other prorams 9S oerseas presence orces are oten also inoled in cond!ctinpeacetime militar: enaement actiities

Signi=cant red"ction o$ troops is a percent red"ction8arasso 1? – Chair o$ the Senate 3olicy Committee

VSenator $ohn 6arasso, Senate Rep!blican olic: Bommittee 15 K 4T 1 eenseA!thori=ation 6ill, *3*15, http%&&wwwrpcsenateo&leislatie*notices&s*13CN:*1*deense*a!thori=ation*bill

Section 1221

H<presses the sense o the Senate that the drawdown o 9S orces in Ahanistansho!ld be based on sec!rit: conditions in Ahanistan and 9S sec!rit: interests in

the reion It oes on to re?!ire the president to certi: that an: ordered sini)cantred!ction in 9S orces in Ahanistan will res!lt in an acceptable leel o ris7 to9S national sec!rit: ob'ecties A sini)cant red!ction is de)ned as the lesser o1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent red!ction o troops then deplo:ed inAhanistan



Qote negati&e – Signi=cant is a key check on the predicta#le

limits o$ the topic – err neg on re'"iring signi=cant changes

and troops only maintains a predicta#le limit on the topic



1nc – na&yIran won(t attack the U%S%

Qenneth @ 3+OOCK , senior ellow in the Benter or @iddle Hast olic: at the6roo7ins Instit!tion, was the director o the center rom 200L to 2012, twice

sered on the staf o the -ational Sec!rit: Bo!ncil, h in political science romthe @assach!setts Instit!te o #echnolo:, 1? V“9S polic: toward the @iddle Hastater the Iranian n!clear areement," A!!st 5, 2015,http%&&wwwbroo7insed!&research&testimon:&2015&0F&05*!s*polic:*iran*n!clear*deal*pollac7_tn3

#wo points stand o!t to me rom the precedin anal:sis and the modern histor: o the reion #he )rst is that

while Iranian strategy is anti-merican, anti-stat"s '"o, anti*Semitic,

aggressi&e, and e)pansionist, Iran is not reckless and is typically '"ite

wary o$ merican power% *hen the United States e)erts itsel$, the Iranians

typically retreat #he e<ception that proes the r!le was in Ira? in 200C, when initiall: the Iranians did not

bac7 down rom their s!pport to ario!s anti*American Ira?i militias, onl: to hae those militias cr!shed and drienrom Ira? d!rin /peration Bhare o the Qnihts and s!bse?!ent Ira?i*American campains alon the lower #iris

s we see in Ira' today, the Iranians apparently recogni7e that they

misB"dged #oth merica(s will and its capacity to act then, and are once

again content to #attle *ashington $or political in<"ence in 8aghdad #"t

"nwilling to challenge U%S% power militarily, e&en #y pro)y

Iran won(t proli$erateFtoo many sec"rity concerns

-!no .+N!I;+ ND Ale<andre D8S, Assistant roessors o olitical

Science at Tale 9niersit:,1

V“#he Strateic oic o -!clear rolieration,"International Security , [ol 3L, -o 2, 4all 201M, p C*51, Accessed /nline thro!hHmor: ibraries

#his article has introd!ced a sec"rity-#ased theory o$ n"clear proli$eration oc!sin on

the strateic interaction between a state, its enemies, and, where present, allies We concl"de that only

two types o$ states ac'"ire the #om#4 power$"l #"t highly threatened

statesR and weaker states whose territory is protected #y an ally they

deem "nlikely to remain present in the lon*term or !nwillin to ens"re its other core sec"rity

goals% !he empirical rarity o$ these strategic sit"ations is responsi#le $or

the relati&ely low n"m#er o$ statesewer than 5 percentthat ha&e ac'"ired the

#om# d"ring the =rst se&en decades o$ the n"clear age #his )ndin ?!estions

re?!ent claims that n!clear weapons are the “weapon o the wea7," the “reat e?!ali=er" in internationalrelations1C5 -o do!bt, n!clear weapons wo!ld enable an otherwise wea7 nation to stand !p to more power!l

adersaries So $ar, howeer, no weak "nprotected nation has e&er managed to

o#tain them

#oda: Iran is at the center o 9S prolieration concerns s a relati&ely weak state in&ol&ed in

an ad&ersarial relationship with the United States, Israel, and S"nni ra#



states, and in the a#sence o$ a power$"l ally, Iran is likely to possess the

willingness to #"ild n"clear weapons A n!clear deterrent wo!ld ma7e the Iranian reime

irt!all: imm!ne to orein threats to its s!rial and miht boost its barainin position on other sec!rit: iss!es

et, at the same time, o!r theor: ma7es clear wh: Iran is "nlikely to ha&e the opport"nity

VHnd ae 50 to n"cleari7e % Eor !ehran to ac'"ire n"clear weapons, its

ad&ersaries m"st estimate the sec"rity #ene=t o$ Iranian proli$eration to

#e lower than the cost o$ a pre&enti&e strike% +therwise, a pre&enti&estrike is a rational option, and either Iran internali7es this threat and

a#andons its n"clear in&estment or its program is likely to #e targeted It

sho!ld thereore come as no s!rprise that #oth U%S% and Israeli leaders ha&e re$"sed to

take the military option o the ta#le d"ring negotiations with Iran o&er its

n"clear program /!r theor: predicts that, either thro"gh a comprehensi&e n"clear

deal or as the res"lt o$ a pre&enti&e strike, Iran will remain a nonn"clear

weapons state

No regional re#alancing or sec"rity dilemmasFthe only

empirical data goes o"r way%Eettweis 11roessor o oli Sci \ #!lane 9niersit: VBhristopher $ 4ettweis, “#he S!perpower as

S!perhero% !bris in 9S 4orein olic:," aper prepared or presentation at the 2011 meetin o the Americanolitical Science Association, September 1*M, Seattle, WA, September 2011, p http%&&ssrncom&abstractO1L0215M

!he )nal and in some wa:s most important pathological #elie$ generated #y h"#ris

places the United States at the center o$ the c!rrent era o relatie peace “All that stands

between ciilit: and enocide, order and ma:hem," e<plain Qaplan and Qristol, “is American power"F !his

#elie$ is a &ariant o$ what is 7nown as the hegemonic sta#ility theory,@ which

proposes that international peace is onl: possible when there is one co!ntr: stron eno!h to ma7e and enorce aset o r!lesL Altho!h it was )rst deeloped to describe economic behaior, the theor: has been applied more

broadl:, to e<plain the c!rrent prolieration o peace At the heiht o a< Romana between ro!hl: 2C 6B and 1F0A, or e<ample, Rome was able to brin an !nprecedented leel o peace and sec!rit: to the @editerranean #hea< 6ritannica o the nineteenth cent!r: bro!ht a leel o stabilit: to the hih seas erhaps the c!rrent era ispeace!l beca!se the 9nited States has established a de acto a< Americana in which no power is stron eno!hto challene its dominance, and beca!se it has established a set o r!les that are enerall: in the interests o allco!ntries to ollow Witho!t a beneolent heemon, some strateists ear, instabilit: ma: brea7 o!t aro!nd thelobeC0 9nchec7ed conDicts co!ld brin h!manitarian disaster and, in toda:;s interconnected world, economict!rmoil that co!ld ripple thro!ho!t lobal )nancial mar7ets #here are ood theoretical and empirical reasons,howeer, to do!bt that 9S heemon: is the primar: ca!se o the c!rrent stabilit:

4irst, the heemonic*stabilit: ar!ment shows the classic s:mptom o h!bris% It o&erestimates the

capa#ility o$ the United States, in this case to maintain lobal sta#ility No state, no

matter how stron, can impose peace on determined #elligerents !he U%S %

military ma: be the most imposin in the histor: o the world, b!t it can only police the system

i$ the other mem#ers generally cooperate Sel*policin m!st occ!r, in other words8 i$other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best sered b: peace, then no amo!nt o

international constab!lar: wor7 b: the 9nited States co!ld 7eep them rom )htin #he )e percent o the world;s

pop!lation that lies in the United States simply cannot $orce peace "pon an "nwilling

ninety-=&e percent % Sta#ility and "nipolarity may #e simply coincidental%

In order or 9S heemon: to be the e<planation or lobal stabilit:, the rest o the world wo!ld hae to e<pectreward or ood behaior and ear p!nishment or bad Since the end o the Bold War, the 9nited States has notbeen especiall: eaer to enorce an: partic!lar r!les Hen rather incontroertible eidence o enocide has notbeen eno!h to inspire action eemonic stabilit: can onl: ta7e credit or inD!encin those decisions that wo!ld



hae ended in war witho!t the presence, whether ph:sical or ps:choloical, o the 9nited States Since most o theworld toda: is ree to )ht witho!t 9S inolement, somethin else m!st be preentin them rom doin soC1Stabilit: e<ists in man: places where no heemon: is present Hthiopia and Hritrea are hardl: the onl: states thatco!ld o to war witho!t the slihtest threat o 9S interention, :et ew choose to do so

Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one o the most basic obserations abo!t misperception in international politics,one that is mani)ed b: h!bris% Rarel: are o!r actions as conse?!ential !pon their behaior as we beliee them tobe #he eo*centric bias s!ests that while it ma: be nat!ral or 9S polic:ma7ers to interpret their role as cr!cial

in the maintenance o world peace, the: are almost certainl: oerestimatin their own importance At the er:least, the 9nited States is probabl: not as central to the m:riad decisions in orein capitals that help maintaininternational stabilit: as it thin7s it is

#hird, i$ U%S% sec"rity g"arantees were the primar: ca"se o$ the restraint shown b:

the other reat and potentiall: reat powers, then those co"ntries wo"ld #e demonstrating

an amo"nt o$ tr"st in the intentions, '!dment and wisdom o another that wo!ld be witho"t

precedent in international history I the states o H!rope and the aci)c Rim detected a ood deal o

daner in the s:stem, rel:in entirel: on the enerosit: and saacit: (or, perhaps the naiet and !llibilit:+ o

Washinton wo!ld be the heiht o strateic irresponsibilit: Indeed it is hard to think o$ a similar choice%

*hen hae any capa#le mem#ers o$ an alliance &irt"ally disarmed and

allowed another mem#er to protect their interests It seems more logical

to s"ggest that the other mem#ers o$ N!+ and 2apan B"st do not sharethe same perception o$ threat that the United States does% I$ there was danger

o"t there, as so man: in the 9S national sec!rit: comm!nit: insist, then the grand strategies o$

the allies wo"ld #e '"ite dierent Hen d!rin the Bold War, 9S allies were not alwa:s

coninced that the: co!ld rel: on 9S sec!rit: commitments H<tended deterrence was neer entirel: comortin8ew H!ropeans co!ld be s!re that 9nited States wo!ld indeed sacri)ce -ew Tor7 or amb!r In the absence o the!ni:in Soiet threat, their tr!st in 9S commitments or their deense wo!ld pres!mabl: be loweri in act thatcommitment was at all necessar: o!tside o the most pessimistic wor7s o )ction

4!rthermore, in order $or hegemonic sta#ility logic to #e an ade'"ate

e)planation $or restrained #eha&ior, allied states m!st not onl: be !ll: coninced o the

intentions and capabilit: o the heemon to protect their interests8 the: m"st also tr"st that the

hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently As disc!ssed aboe,

the allies do not $eel that the United States consistently demonstrates the hihestleel o strategic wisdom In act, they o$ten seem to loo7 with con$"sed e:es !pon o!r

behaior, and are "na#le to e)plain why we so o$ten =nd it necessary to o abroad

in search o$ monsters to destroy % #he: will participate at times in o!r adent!res, b!t minimall:

and rel!ctantl:

4inall:, while #elie&ers in hegemonic sta#ility as the primar: e<planation or the lon peace hae

artic!lated a loic that some )nd compellin, the: are rarely a#le to cite m!ch e&idence to

s"pport their claims In act, the limited empirical data we ha&e s"ggests that

there is little connection #etween the relati&e le&el o$ U%S% acti&ism and

international sta#ility D"ring the 1L9s, the United States c"t #ack on de$ense $airly

s"#stantially, spendin Y100 billion less in real terms in 1LLF that it did in 1LL0, which was a twent:*)e

percent red!ctionC2 #o deense haw7s and other belieers in heemonic stabilit:, this irresponsible “peacediidend" endanered both national and lobal sec!rit: “-o serio!s anal:st o American militar: capabilities do!btsthat the deense b!det has been c!t m!ch too ar to meet America;s responsibilities to itsel and to world peace,"ar!ed Qristol and Qaan"C3 I lobal stabilit: were !nrelated to 9S heemon:, howeer, one wo!ld not haee<pected an increase in conDict and iolence

#he erdict rom the last two decades is airl: plain% !he world grew more peace$"l while the

United States c"t its $orcesCM -o state belieed that its sec!rit: was endanered b: a less*capable 9S

militar:, or at least none too7 an: action that wo!ld s!est s!ch a belie No de$ense

esta#lishments were enhanced to address power ac!!ms8 no sec"rity dilemmas



dro&e insec"rity or arms racesR no regional #alancing occ"rred ater the

stabili=in presence o the 9S militar: was diminished #he rest o the world acted as i the threat o internationalwar was not a pressin concern, despite the red!ction in 9S capabilities #he incidence and manit!de o lobalconDict declined while the 9nited States c!t its militar: spendin !nder resident Blinton, and 7ept declinin as the6!sh Administration ramped that spendin bac7 !p #he two phenomena are !nrelated

#hese )!res will not be eno!h to conince s7eptics @ilitar: spendin )!res b: themseles are ins!>cient todisproe a connection between oerall 9S actions and international stabilit:, and one co!ld also pres!mabl: ar!ethat spendin is not the onl: or een the best indication o heemon:, that it is instead 9S orein political andsec!rit: commitments that maintain stabilit: Since neither was sini)cantl: altered d!rin this period, instabilit:sho!ld not be e<pected Alternatel:, adocates o heemonic stabilit: co!ld beliee that relatie rather thanabsol!te spendin is decisie in brinin peace Altho!h the 9nited States c!t bac7 on its spendin d!rin the1LL0s, its relatie adantae neer waered

oweer, two points desere to be made 4irst, een i it were tr!e that either 9S commitments or relatiespendin acco!nt or lobal paci)c trends, it wo!ld remain the case that stabilit: can be maintained at drasticall:lower leels In other words, een i one can be allowed to ar!e in the alternatie or a moment and s!ppose thatthere is in act a leel o enaement below which the 9nited States cannot drop witho!t increasin internationaldisorder, a rational rand strateist wo!ld still c!t bac7 on enaement and spendin !ntil that leel is determined6asic loic s!ests that the 9nited States o!ht to spend the minim!m amo!nt o its blood and treas!re whilesee7in the ma<im!m ret!rn on its inestment And i, as man: s!spect, this era o lobal peace proes to beinherentl: stable beca!se normatie eol!tion is t:picall: !nidirectional, then no increase in conDict wo!ld eerocc!r, irrespectie o 9S spendinC5 Abandonin the mission to stabili=e the world wo!ld sae !ntold trillions or

an increasinl: debt*ridden nation

Second, it is also worth notin that i opposite trends had !nolded, i other states had reacted to news o c!ts in9S deense spendin with more aressie or insec!re behaior, then s!rel: heemonists wo!ld note that theire<pectations had been '!sti)ed I increases in conDict wo!ld hae been interpreted as eidence or the wisdom ointernationalist strateies, then loical consistenc: demands that the lac7 thereo sho!ld at least pose a problem

As it stands, the only e&idence we hae regarding the relationship #etween U%S%

power and international sta#ility s"ggests that the two are "nrelated

Hidentl: the rest o the world can operate '"ite eecti&ely witho"t the presence o a

glo#al policeman !hose who think otherwise #ase their &iew on $aith alone

It re'"ires a good deal o$ h"#ris $or any actor to consider itsel$

indispensa#le to world peace 4ar rom collapsin into a whirlwind o chaos, the chances are hih

that the world wo!ld loo7 m!ch li7e it does now i the 9nited States were to cease reardin itsel as .od;sladiator on earth #he people o the 9nited States wo!ld be a lot better of as well

Decline $acilitates US m"ltilateralismFpa&es the way $or a so$t

landing that pre&ents their transition impacts%

6e 1roessor o olitical Science at 9tah State 9niersit: VQai e (ostdoctoral ellow in the rinceton*

arard Bhina and the World roram at rinceton 9niersit: (200LK2010+ and a 6radle: ellow o the :nda andarr: 6radle: 4o!ndation (200LK2010+, “#he heemon;s choice between power and sec!rit:% e<plainin 9S polic:toward Asia ater the Bold War," Reiew o International St!dies (2010+, 3, p 1121K11M3

*hen US policymakers percei&e a risin or a sta#le hegemon:, the anarchic nat!re o the

international s:stem is no loner alid in the mind o 9S polic:ma7ers beca!se the preponderant power ma7es the

9S imm!ne rom militar: threats In the sel*perceied, hierarchic international s:stem with the 9S on the top,power-ma)imisation #ecomes the strategic goal o$ the US in part #eca"se

o$ the l"st $or power( dri&en #y h"man nat"re and in part #eca"se o$ the

disappearance o$ the sec"rity constraints imposed b: anarch: #hereore, selectie

enaement and hegemonic dominion #ecome two possi#le strateies or the 9S to ma<imise

its power in the world #he larer the power ap between the 9S and others, the more li7el: selectie enaement

e<pands to heemonic dominion *hen US policymakers percei&e a declining hegemon:

in that the power ap between the heemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers

bein to change their hierarchic &iew o the international s:stem #he rapid decline o relatie power



ca!ses 9S policymakers to worry a#o"t sec"rity imposed b: anarch: een tho!h the 9S ma:

remain the most power!l state in the s:stem d!rin the process o decline +shore #alancing and

m"ltilateralism, thereore, #ecome two possible policy options $or the US to

ma)imise its sec"rity !nder anarch: #he possible b!det constraints d!rin 9S decline ma: lead

to military withdrawals $rom o&erseas #ases In addition, the US #ecomes more

willing to pay the initial

lock-in( price o$ m"ltilateral instit"tions in order toconstrain other states; behaio!r or its own sec!rit:

US $oreign policy towards sia preliminaril: s"pports the power-perception

hegemonic model When resident .eore W 6!sh came to power, the 9S aced d!al de)cits; een

tho!h the 9S won the Bold War and became the heemon b: dea!lt in the earl: 1LL0s #he domestic economicdi>c!lt: imposed a declinin, or at least !ncertain, heemon: to the 6!sh administration Bonse?!entl:, 6!sh hadto withdraw troops rom Asia and cond!cted a rel!ctant ofshore balancin strate: in the earl: 1LL0s Altho!hthe 9S still claimed to 7eep its commitments to Asian allies, the 9S words with the sword became !nreliable at best

!rin resident Blinton;s )rst ten!re, how to reie 9S econom: became the )rst priorit: o the administration #he perception o a declinin heemon did not totall: ade !ntil the middle o the 1LL0s when the 9S econom:

rad!all: came o!t o the recession ."ltilateral instit"tions, especiall: AHB, #ecame

Clinton(s diplomatic weapon to open sia (s market and boost 9S econom: In addition,

the US also endorsed the ;E initiated b: the ASHA- states in order to retain its eroding political and militar: in<"ence ater the strateic retreats in the earl: 1LL0s

6owe&er, the US new economy( based on inormation technolo: and comp!ters re&i&ed

policymakers( con=dence in US hege mony ater the Asian miracle was terminated b: the

1LLC economic crisis !he second part o$ the 1L9s witnessed a rising US

hegemony and the .eore W 6!sh administration reached the ape) o$ US power b: an:

meas!re in the early 1st cent"ry #hereore, since Blinton;s second ten!re in the White o!se, 9S

orein polic: in eneral and towards Asia in partic!lar has become more assertie and power*drien in nat!re6esides recon)rmin its traditional militar: alliances in Asia, the 9S deepened its militar: enaement in the reionthro!h e<tensie sec!rit: cooperation with other Asian states

!he selecti&e engagement policy o$ the 9S in the late 1L9s was s"#stantially

e)panded #y the 8"sh administration to hegemonic dominion ater L&11 #he !nrialled

heemon: relieed 9S o concerns oer sec!rit: threats rom an: other states in the international s:stem !he

l"st $or power( witho!t constraints rom anarch: dro&e US polic:ma7ers to p"rs"e a heemonic

dominion polic: in the world #he pre-emption strategy( and proacti&e missile de$ence

programs reDected the power*ma<imisin nat!re o the heemonic dominion strate: d!rin the .eore W

6!sh administration

What will the 9S do in the !t!re #he power*perception heemonic model s!ests that the 9S cannot escape the

ate o other reat powers in histor: *hen US hegemon: is still risin or at a sta#le stae, no one

can stop US e)pansion $or more power When its econom: can no loner aford its power*

oriented strate:, the US will $ace the same strategic #"rden o$ imperial

o&erstretch( that 5reat 8ritain s"ered in the 1Lth cent!r: oweer, the power*perception

heemonic model also ar!es that 9S orein polic: depends on how 9S polic:ma7ers perceie the rise and all o9S heemon:

I historical learnin can help 9S polic:ma7ers c!ltiate a pr!dent perception reardin 9S heemon:, the early

implementation o$ ofshore balancin and m"ltilateralism may $acilitate the so$t-

landing o$ declining US hege mony @ore importantl:, the real daner is whether the 9S can ma7e

a riht choice between power and sec!rit: when 9S heemon: beins to decline I$ US polic:ma7ers cannot

learn rom histor: b!t insist on seeking more power instead o sec!rit: een tho!h 9S heemon:

is in decline, the likelihood o$ hegemonic war will increase oweer, i 9S polic:ma7ers



choose sec!rit: oer power when 9S heemon: is in decline, ofshore balancin and m!ltilateralism can help the9S ma<imise sec!rit: in the !t!re anarchic, m!ltipolar world 11M1*11M3

e enco!raes power ma<imi=ation

ecline orces them to worr: abo!t sec!rit: eads to m!ltilateralism&/S6

9S willin to pa: loc7*in price to constrain peer competitor

1LL0;s proe

@!ltilateralism creates a sot landin d!rin decline

Unipolarity is destroying #ipartisan compact needed to s"stain

s"pport $or m"ltilateralismFmakes o"r policies erratic and

incoherent%

K"pchan H !r"#owit7 Mroessor o International Afairs \ .eoretown 9niersit: ] roessor

o .oernment \ 9niersit: o #e<as*A!stin VBharles A Q!pchan (Senior 4ellow \ Bo!ncil on 4orein Relations, andenr: A Qissiner Scholar at the ibrar: o Bonress+ ] eter #r!bowit= (Senior 4ellow \ Robert Stra!ss Benteror International Sec!rit: and aw+, “ead Benter% #he emise o iberal Internationalism in the 9nited States,"International Sec!rit:, [ol 32, -o 2 (4all 200C+, pp CKMM

!he conditions that s"stained li#eral internationalism ha&e o late #een

rapidly disappearing, dramaticall: wea7enin its rip on the nation;s politics Since the demise o the

Soiet 9nion, U%S% primacy has red"ced the incenti&es $or ;ep"#licans and

Democrats ali7e to adhere to the li#eral internationalist compact Unipolarity

has heightened the geopolitical appeal o$ "nilateralism, a trend that een the threat

o transnational terrorism has not reersed Unipolarity has also loosened the political

discipline engendered #y the Cold *ar threat , lea&ing U%S% $oreign policy

more &"lnera#le to rowin partisanship at home “Red" and “6l!e" America disaree abo!t the

nat!re o 9S enaement in the world8 rowin disparities in wealth hae reawa7ened class tensions8 andpolitical pragmatism has #een losing gro"nd to ideological e)tremism%

#he polari=ation o the 9nited States has dealt a seere blow to the bipartisan compact between power and

cooperation Instead o$ adhering to the &ital center, the co"ntry(s elected

o0cials, alon with the p!blic, are #acking away $rom the li#eral internationalist

compact, s!pportin either 9S power or international cooperation, b!t rarel: both resident 6!sh and

many Rep!blicans ha&e a#andoned one side o the liberal internationalist compact%

m"ltilateralism has receied little b!t contempt on their watch @eanwhile, the emocrats hae nelected

the other side% man: part: stalwarts are !neas: with the assertie !se o 9S power s the partisan

gyre in *ashington widens, the political center is dying o"t, and s"pport

$or li#eral internationalism is dying with it Accordin to $im each, one o the Rep!blican

moderates to lose his o!se seat in the 200 midterm elections, “V#he 9nited States; middle has irt!all:collapsed And how to reconstr!ct a principled center, a center o rait: in American politics, ma: be the hardestsinle thin at this partic!lar time"5

rominent oices rom across the political spectr!m hae called or the restoration o a rob!st bipartisan center thatcan p!t 9S rand strate: bac7 on trac7 Accordin to emocratic Senator illar: Blinton, “4or more than a hal acent!r:, we 7now that we prospered beca!se o a bipartisan consens!s on deense and orein polic: We m!st domore than ret!rn to that sensible, cooperatie approach" Rep!blican presidential candidate @itt Romne: echoesthis sentiment% “It seems that concern abo!tWashinton;s diisieness and capabilit: to meet toda:;s challenes isthe one thin that !nites !s all We need new thin7in on orein polic: and an oerarchin strate: that can !nitethe 9nited States and its allies"C



#hese e<hortations are in ain !he halcyon era o$ li#eral internationalism is o&erR the

#ipartisan compact between power and partnership has #een eecti&ely dismantled I$

le$t "nattended, the political $o"ndations o$ U%S% statecra$t will contin!e to

disintegrate, e)posing the co"ntry to the dangers o$ an erratic and

incoherent $oreign policy !o a&oid this $ate, U%S% leaders will ha&e to

$ashion a new #rand o$ internationalismone that will necessaril: entail less power and less

partnership i it is to hae a chance o sec!rin broad domestic s!pport #o )nd a new e?!ilibri!m between thenation;s commitments abroad and its polari=ed politics at home, the 9nited States will need a rand strate: that isas selectie and '!dicio!s as it is p!rpose!l F*10

."ltilat leads to glo#al coop and power sharingFit creates

shared $ramework o$ interaction changes the way states

interpret glo#al politics

3o"liot 11roessor o oli Sci \ @c.ill 9niersit: V[incent o!liot, “@!ltilateralism as an Hnd in Itsel,"

International St!dies erspecties (2011+ 12, 1FK2

6eca!se it rests on open, nondiscriminator: debate, and the ro!tine e<chane o iewpoints, the m"ltilateral

proced"re introd"ces three key ad&antages that are ained, regardless o$ the

speci=c policies adopted, and tend to dif!se across all participants Bontrar: to the standard

iewpoint, accordin to which a rational preerence or !nctional imperatie lead to m!ltilateral cooperation, here it

is the systematic practice o$ m"ltilateralism that creates the dri&e to

cooperate At the theoretical leel, the premise is that it is not onl: what people thin7 that e<plains what the:

do, b!t also what the: do that determines what the: thin7 (o!liot 2010+ &eryday m"ltilateralism is

a sel$-$"l=lling practice or at least three reasons

4irst, the 'oint practice o m!ltilateralism creates m!t!all: reconi=able patterns o action amon lobal actors #hisprocess owes to the act that practices str!ct!re social interaction (Adler and o!liot orthcomin+2 6eca!se the:are meanin!l, orani=ed, and repeated, practices enerall: cone: a deree o m!t!al intelliibilit: that allowspeople to deelop social relations oer time In the )eld o international sec!rit:, or e<ample, the practice odeterrence is premised on a limited n!mber o est!res, sinals, and lin!istic deices that are meant, as Schellin

(1L%113+ p!t it, to ettin the riht sinal across;; #he same oes with the practice o m"ltilateralism,

which rests on a set o$ political and social patterns that esta#lish the #o"ndaries o$

action in a m"t"ally intelligi#le $ashion% !hese str"ct"ring eects, in t!rn,

allow $or the de&elopment o$ common $rameworks $or appraising glo#al

e&ents @!ltilateral dialo seres not onl: to )nd 'oint sol!tions8 it also ma7es it possible or ario!s actors to

=oom in on the de)nition o the iss!e at handa partic!larl: important step on the lobal stae

#he point is certainl: not that the m!ltilateral proced!re leads eer:bod: to aree on eer:thinthat wo!ld be asimpossible as co!nterprod!ctie #heoreticall: spea7in, there is room or s7epticism that m!ltilateralism ma: eerallow comm!nicatie rationalit: at the lobal leel (see Risse 20008 ie= and Steans 2005+ With s!ch a dierse and!neen pla:in )eld, one can do!bt that disc!rsie enaement, in and o itsel, can lead to common lieworlds

Instead, what the practice o m"ltilateralism $osters is the emerence o a shared$ramework o$ interactionor e<ample, a common lin!istic repertoirethat allows glo#al

actors to make sense o$ world politics in m"t"ally recogni7a#le ways /

co!rse, they may not agree on the speci=c actions to be ta7en, #"t at least they

can #"ild on an esta#lished pattern o$ political interaction to deal with the

pro#lem at handsometimes een #e$ore it emerges in ac"te $orm % In toda:;s pl!ralistic

world, that wo!ld alread: be a considerable achieement



In that sense, m"ltilateralism may well #e a constit"ti&e practice o$ what ! (200L+

calls political $riendship among peoples;; #he a<iomatic practice o principled and incl!sie

dialo is ?!ite apparent in the wa: she describes this social str!ct!re% *hile con<icts, especiall: oer the

distrib!tion o oods and b!rdens, will ine&ita#ly arise, "nder conditions o$ political

$riendship among peoples, they will #e negotiated within a lobal bac7ro!nd

conte<t o norms and

instit"tions #ased on m"t"al recognition, e?!it: in the distrib!tion o

b!rdens and bene)ts o$ glo#al cooperation, and power-sharing in the instit!tions o lobal

oernance rather than domination b: an: ro!p;; (200L%5MK55+ In a world where m"ltilateralism

#ecomes an end in itsel$, this ideal pattern emerges o!t o the str!ct!rin efects o

a<iomatic practice% ta7e the case o -A#/, or instance, which has recentl: had to manae, thro!h the m!ltilateral

practice, airl: stron internal dissent (o!liot 200+ While clashing &iews and interests will

ne&er go away in o!r partic!larl: dierse world, as pessimists are ?!ic7 to emphasi=e (or e<ample, ahl

1LLL+, the management o$ discord is certainl: made easier #y shared patterns o dialo

based on m"t"ally recogni7a#le $rameworks

Second, the m"ltilateral proced"re t:picall: ens"res a remarka#le le&el o$

moderation in the glo#al policies adopted In act, a ?!ic7 historical to!r d;hori=on s!ests that

actors engaged in m"ltilateralism tend to a&oid radical sol"tions in their 'oint decision making / co!rse, the &ery process o$ "niting disparate &oices

helps e)plain why m"ltilateralism tends to prod"ce median consens"s #his is not

to sa: that the m!ltilateral practice ineitabl: leads to lowest common denominators #o repeat, beca!se it entailscomple< and oten painsta7in debate beore an: actions are ta7en, the m!ltilateral proced!re orces inoledactors to deise and potentiall: share similar anal:tical lenses that, in hindsiht, ma7e the policies adopted seeminherentl:, and seeminl: nat!rall:,;; moderate #his is beca!se the debate abo!t what a ien polic: meansta7es place beore its implementation, which ma7es or a m!ch smoother ride when decisions hit the ro!nd #his 'oint interpretie wor7, which constit!tes a cr!cial aspect o m!ltilateralism, creates o!tcomes that are enerall:perceied as inherentl: reasonable articipation brins inherent bene)ts to politics, as 6achrach (1LC5+ ar!ed inthe conte<t o democratic theor: .oin ater the conentional liberal iew accordin to which actors enter politicswith an alread: )<ed set o preerences, 6achrach obseres that most o the time people de)ne their interests inthe er: process o participation #he ar!ment is not that interests ormed in the co!rse o social interaction are inan: sense more altr!istic It rather is that the nat!re and process o political practices, in this case m!ltilateralism,matter a reat deal in shapin participants; preerences (Wendt 1LLL+ In this sense, not onl: does the m!ltilateral

practice hae str!ct!rin efects on lobal oernance, b!t it is also constit!tie o what actors sa:, want, and do(Adler and o!liot orthcomin+

#hird and related, m"ltilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it

generates #y &irt"e o$ the de#ate that the process necessarily entails #here

is no need here to e<plain at lenth how deliberatie processes that are incl!sie o all sta7eholders tend toprod!ce o!tcomes that are enerall: considered more sociall: and politicall: acceptable In the lon r!n, the

large ownership also leads to more e0cient implementation, #eca"se actors

$eel in&ested in the enactment o$ sol"tions on the ro!nd &en episodes o$

political $ail"re, s!ch as the lac7 o 9- reaction to the Rwandan enocide, can generate "se$"l

lessons when re-appropriated m"ltilaterallythin7 o the Responsibilit: to rotect, or

instance3 4rom this o!tloo7, there is no contradiction between e>cienc: and the a<iomatic practice o

m!ltilateralism, ?!ite the contrar: !he more m"ltilateralism #ecomes the normal or sel*

eident practice o lobal oernance, the more #ene=ts it yields or the man: sta7eholders o lobal

oernance In act, m!ltilateralism as an end in and o itsel co!ld enerate een more dif!se reciprocit: thanR!ie had oriinall: enisioned -ot onl: do its distrib!tional conse?!ences tend to een o!t,

m"ltilateralism as a glo#al go&ernance ro"tine also creates sel$-rein$orcing

dynamics and new $ocal points $or strategic interaction % !he a)iomatic

practice o$ m"ltilateralism helps de=ne pro#lems in commens"ra#le ways

and cra$t moderate sol"tions with wide*ranin ownershipthree process!al bene)ts that !rther

strenthen the impet!s or m!ltilateral dialo 21*23



!hat cooperation is key to planetary s"r&i&alFweak

reg"lations risk e)tinction%

.asci"lli 11roessor o olitical Science \ St #homas 9niersit: V$oseph @asci!lli, “#he .oernance

Bhallene or .lobal olitical and #echnoscienti)c eaders in an Hra o .lobali=ation and .lobali=in #echnoloies,"6!lletin o Science, #echnolo: ] Societ: 4ebr!ar: 2011 ol 31 no 1 p 3*5

*hat is most to #e $eared is enhanced glo#al disorder res"lting $rom the

combination o weak glo#al reg"lations8 the "n$oreseen destr"cti&e

conse'"ences o$ con&erging technoloies and economic lobali=ation8 militar: competition

amon the reat powers8 and the pre&alent #iases o$ short-term thinking held b: most

leaders and elites 6!t no practical person wo"ld wish that s"ch a disorder

scenario come tr"e, gi&en all the weapons o mass destr!ction (*.D s+ a&aila#le now

or which will s"rely #ecome a&aila#le in the $oreseea#le $"t"re s

con&erging technoloies "nited #y I!, cogniti&e science, nanotechnolo:, and

ro#otics ad&ance synergistically in monitored and "nmonitored la# oratories, wemay #e #lindsided #y these $"t"re de&elopments #ro"ght a#o"t #y

technoscientists with a ariet: o ood or destr!ctie or mercenar: moties !he c"rrent la!dable

b!t problematic openness a#o"t p"#lishing scienti=c res"lts on the Internet

wo"ld contri#"te greatly to s"ch negati&e o"tcomes

#o be s!re, i the lobal disorder*emerenc: scenario occ!rred beca!se o postmodern terrorism or ro!e states!sin bioloical, chemical, or n!clear W@s, or a reional war with n!clear weapons in the @iddle Hast or So!thAsia, there miht well be a positie res!lt or lobal oernance S!ch a lobal emerenc: miht !nite the lobal

reat and ma'or powers in the coniction that a lobal concert was necessar: or their s!rial and planetar:s!rial as well In s!ch a lobal reat power concert, basic r!les o economic, sec!rit:, and leal order wo!ld be

!ncompromisinl: enorced both loball: and in the partic!lar reions where the: held heemonic stat!s #hatconcert scenario, howeer, is Dawed b: the limited leitimac: o its str!ct!re based on the members hain the

reatest hard and sot power on planet Harth

t the #ase o$ o"r concerns, I wo!ld ar!e, are h"man procli&ities $or narrow,

short-term thinking tied to indiid!al sel*interest or corporate and national interests in

decision making 4or glo#ali7ation, tho!h propelled b: technoloies o ario!s 7inds, “remains

an essentially h"man phenomenon % % % and the main dri&ers $or the

esta#lishment and "ses o$ disseminati&e systems are hard: perennials% pro)t,

conenience, reed, relati&e ad&antage, c!riosit:, demonstrations o prowess, ideological

$er&or, malin destr!ctieness" #hese h!man dries and capacities will not disappear #heir “maniestations

now e<tend considerabl: be:ond more amiliarl: empowered oernmental, technoscienti)c and corporate actorsto incl!de een indiid!als% terrorists, comp!ter hac7ers and ro!e mar7et traders" (Whitman, 2005, p 10M+

In this dangero"s world, i$ people are to ha&e their h"man dignity reconi=ed

and en'o: their h!man rihts, aboe all, to lie, sec"rity, a healthy en&ironment, and$reedom, we need new $orms o$ comprehensi&e glo#al reg"lation and

control S!ch eecti&e glo#al leadership and go&ernance with rob!st enorcement

powers alone can ade'"ately respond to destr"cti&e c"rrent glo#al pro#lems,

and pre&ent new ones % oweer, s!ccess!l h!man adaptation and innoation to o!r c!rrent comple<

enironment thro!h the social constr!ction o efectie lobal oernance will be a da!ntin collectie tas7 or

lobal political and technoscienti)c leaders and citi=ens 4or o!r glo#al society is ca"ght in the

whirlpool o$ an accelerating process o$ moderni7ation@ that has $or the



most part #een le$t to its own de&ices" (abermas, 2001, p 112+ *e need to

progress in h!man adaptation to and inno&ation $or o"r comple< and problematical lobal social

and nat!ral planetary en&ironments thro"gh glo#al go&ernance I s!est we need

to #egin #y ending the prealent biases o short-termism in thinking and acting

and the $alse &al"es attached to the narrow sel$-interest o$ indiid!als,

corporations, and

states

I aree with Stephen aw7in that the lon*term !t!re o the h!man race m!st be in space It will be di>c!lteno!h to aoid disaster on planet Harth in the ne<t h!ndred :ears, let alone the ne<t tho!sand, or million #here hae been a n!mber o times in the past when its s!rial has been a ?!estion o to!ch and o #he B!banmissile crisis in 1L2 was one o these #he re?!enc: o s!ch occasions is li7el: to increase in the !t!re We shallneed reat care and '!dment to neotiate them all s!ccess!ll: 6!t I;m an optimist I we can aoid disaster orthe ne<t two cent!ries, o!r species sho!ld be sae, as we spread into space 6!t we are enterin an increasinl:danero!s period o o!r histor: /!r pop!lation and o!r !se o the )nite reso!rces o planet Harth, are rowine<ponentiall:, alon with o!r technical abilit: to chane the enironment or ood or ill 6!t o!r enetic code stillcarries the sel)sh and aressie instincts that were o s!rial adantae in the past /!r onl: chance o lonterm s!rial is not to remain inward loo7in on planet Harth, b!t to spread o!t into space We hae maderemar7able proress in the last h!ndred :ears 6!t i we want to contin!e be:ond the ne<t h!ndred :ears, o!r!t!re is in space" (aw7in, 2010+

-onetheless, to rein&ent h"manity pl"ralistically in o!ter space and be:ond will re'"ire

sec"ring o"r one and only glo#al society and planet arth thro"gheecti&e glo#al go&ernance in the oreseeable !t!re And o"r dilemma is that the

enorcement powers o m"ltilateral instit"tions are not likely to #e strengthened

#eca"se o the competition or reater (relatie, not absol!te+ hard and sot power b: the great and ma'or

powers #he: seek their national or alliance s"periority, or at least, parit:, or the sa7e o their

state;s s!rial and sec!rit: now 9nless the lobal disorder*emerenc: scenario was to occ!r soon.od orbidthe reat powers will most li7el:, rec7lessl: and traicall:, leae lobal s!rial and sec!rit: to their loner termaendas M*5



1nc – re$ormUS presence doesn(t s"pport crackdown and remo&ing the

<eet only increases the risk o$ desperate repression

!rom#ly 11 Vaniel #rombl:, eense Bontractor, #he !nconincin case aainst

the 4ith 4leet, $9-H 11, 2011, #he !nconincin case aainst the 4ith 4leet,https%&&slo!chincol!mbiawordpresscom&2011&0&11&the*!nconincin*case*aainst*the*5th*Deet&

4irst of, the US does not and cannot protect the Sa"di and 8ahraini leadership

$rom their own pop"lations, and certainly not with the Ei$th <eet Since, as

Borbett said, men li&e "pon the land and not the sea, a na&al <eet is not a

partic"larly "se$"l tool o$ s"ppressing ins"rgency or re&ol"tion Since the

Sa"di ra#ian National 5"ard has likely #een preparing $or a

co"nterre&ol"tionary operation in 8ahrain at least since the attempted Iranian co!p, "nless

the 8ahraini protesters were somehow a#le to destroy the King Eahd

Ca"seway and 8ahrain(s ports, the SN5 wo"ld ha&e #een inclined to go

in Ater all, in the Sa!di d:nastic loic, i 6ahrain oes, then there is a potential base o Iranian operation, as well as an e<ample o

a non*monarchical, Shia ma'orit: state !his opens "p a n"m#er o$ potentially e)istential

threats to Sa"di ra#ia K the threat o Iranian e<pansion, the threat o a ollow*on reol!tion in the Qindom, and

the threat o Shias in Sa!di Arabia;s oil*rich northeast showin solidarit: with their 6ahraini co!nterparts and disr!ptin theQindom;s economic lieline

It is not clear why remo&ing the <eet wo"ld make ;iyadh any more eager

to compromise I$ anything, the Sa"dis wo"ld pro#a#ly s"ppress the

"prising more #r"tally, since they wo"ld know they no longer ha&e a

*estern $ail sa$e % It is worth pointin o!t that #e$ore the US inter&ened in the Iran-

Ira' !anker *ar, the 5"l$ monarchies sol&ed their sec"rity programs #y

#ankrolling a mass-m"rdering despot who "sed chemical weapons to keep

Iran in check% #his miht not a=e c:nical realists, b!t this is , generally, how oshore#alancing works

o" don(t sol&e democrati7ation- China will =ll in and

petrodollars negate the eect o$ a withdrawal

!rom#ly 11 Vaniel #rombl:, eense Bontractor, #he !nconincin case aainstthe 4ith 4leet, $9-H 11, 2011, #he !nconincin case aainst the 4ith 4leet,https%&&slo!chincol!mbiawordpresscom&2011&0&11&the*!nconincin*case*aainst*the*5th*Deet&

Bertainl: the US has not had a partic"larly great policy record in the 5"l$%

6owe&er, this simpli=es the narrati&e too m"ch Ater all, the ma'or 9S naalpresence in the .!l d!rin the Iran*Ira? war did not bein !ntil 1LFC #his wasbasicall: three :ears ater the #an7er War bean, and the deplo:ment o 9S shipsreDected the ail!re o an ofshore balancin strate: It was not US na&al

presence that intensi=ed the Iran-Ira' war, it was the 9S polic: o tr:in tomaintain a balance o power in the @iddle Hast b: alternatiel: s!pportin Ira? andIran It spilled oer, and 9S naal presence was a res!lt As or the ersian .!l War,9S presence was the sol!tion, not the ca!se o that war, i I remember m: histor:correctl: Bertainl: US policy towards Ira' since then has #een m"ddled, and



in the case o the 2003 inasion, completely wrongheaded in my opinion, #"t

#laming capa#ilities $or o"tcomes is downright $oolish %

Since oil is $"ngi#le, and the 3ersian 5"l$ is still a maBor energy prod"cing

region, e&en the depart"re o$ the US wo"ld still allow 5"l$ monarchies to

#ankroll all sorts o$ arms p"rchases and $"nding to wreak ha&oc aainst

Iran or other potential threats As in the #an7er War, when Soiet ships bean D:inthe Da, other states – pro#a#ly ones with stronger oil interests than theener: a!tar7ic 9SSR K might decide to step in% China, India, and 2apan need

5"l$ oil $ar more than merica does% &en i$ 2apan sits o"t and accepts the

US(s withdrawal rom a ma'or ener: so!rce, will the risin powers o India and

China ne&er decide to directl: or indirectl: #egin military s"pport to the 5"l$

states !hey are also $ar less likely to s'"irm when dynasties decide to

shoot down their pop"laces K so in the lon r!n the 5"l$ states might pre$er

a patron with less democratic e&angeli7ing than the US%

No economic collapse $rom shocks – most comprehensi&e data%

Khadd"ri, F&23&11 (Walid K ormer @iddle Hast Hconomic S!re: Hditor*in*Bhie, #he impact o risin oil prices on the economies o importin nations, Al Arabi:a-ews, p http%&&enlishalarabi:anet&iews&2011&0F&23&135L0html+

*hat is the impact o$ oil price shocks on the economies o importin nations At )rst

lance, there appears to be lare*scale and e<tremel: aderse reperc!ssions or risin oil prices oweer , a

st"dy p"#lished this month #y researchers in the I.E *orking 3aper ro!p

s"ggests a dierent pict"re altoether (it is worth mentionin that the I@4 has not endorsed its

)ndins+ #he st!d: (#obias - Rasm!ssen ] A!stin Roitman, E/il Shoc7s in a .lobal erspectie% Are #he: Reall:

#hat 6adE, I@4 Wor7in aper, A!!st 2011+ mentions that “Using a comprehensi&e glo#al

dataset V` we =nd that the impact o$ higher oil prices on oil*importin economies is

generally small 4 a ? percent increase in oil prices typically ca"ses 5D3 to

$all #y a#o"t hal$ o$ one percent or less" #he st!d: elaborates on this b: statin that this impactdifers rom one co!ntr: to another, dependin on the si=e o oil*imports, as “oil price shoc7s are not alwa:s costl:

or oil*importin co!ntries% altho"gh higher oil prices increase the import #ill, there

are partly osetting increases in e)ternal receipts Vrepresented in new and additional

e<pendit!res borne b: both oil*e<portin and oil*importin co!ntries" In other words, the more oil prices

increase, bene)tin e<portin co!ntries, the more these new re&en"es are recycled, or

e<ample thro"gh the growth in demand $or new ser&ices, la#or, and

commodity imports #he researchers ar!e that the series o oil price rallies (in 1LF3, 1LL, 2005, and

200L+ hae pla:ed an important role in recessions in the 9nited States oweer, ;asm"ssen and

;oitman state at the same time that signi=cant changes in the U%S% economy in the

preio!s period (the appearance o combined elements, s"ch as impro&ements in monetary

policy, the instit!tion o a la#or market more <e)i#le than beore and a relati&ely

smaller "sage o$ oil in the 9S econom:+ has greatly mitigated the negati&e

eects o$ oil prices on the U%S% economy% 1 percent rise in oil prices #e$ore

19:, or instance, "sed to lower the 9S 5D3 #y a#o"t %M percent oer two to three

:ears, while this =g"re started shrinking to no more than %? percent ater

1LFM, owin to these acc!m!lated economic chanes #his means that while oil price shoc7s contin!e to adersel:

impact the U%S% economy, the latter has managed, as a res!lt o the chanes that transpired ollowin

the )rst shoc7 in the seenties, to o&ercome these shocks , and s!bse?!entl:, the impact o$

oil price shocks has #ecome e)tremely limited compared to preio!s periods



No impact to economic decline – pre$er new data

Dre7ner 1 aniel, IR pro at #!ts, #he S:stem Wor7ed% .lobal Hconomic .oernance d!rin the .reat

Recession, World olitics, [ol!me -!mber 1, $an!ar: 201M, pp 123*1M

#he )nal sini)cant o!tcome addresses a dog that hasn>t #arked% the efect o the .reat Recession on

cross*border conDict and iolence D"ring the initial stages o$ the crisis, m"ltiple

analysts asserted that the =nancial crisis wo"ld lead states to increasetheir "se o$ $orce as a tool or sta:in in powerM2 #he: oiced en!ine concern that the lobal economic

downt!rn wo!ld lead to an increase in conDictwhether thro"gh reater internal repression,

di&ersionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting "p o$ great power con<ict

[iolence in the @iddle Hast, border disp!tes in the So!th Bhina Sea, and een the disr!ptions o the /cc!p:

moement !eled impressions o a s!re in lobal p!blic disorder !he aggregate data s"ggest

otherwise , howe&er #he Instit!te or Hconomics and eace has concl!ded that Ethe a&erage

le&el o$ peace$"lness in 1 is appro)imately the same as it was in

MEM3 Interstate &iolence in partic!lar has declined since the start o$ the

=nancial crisis, as ha&e military e)pendit"res in most sampled co!ntries /ther st"dies

con=rm that the 5reat ;ecession has not triggered any increase in &iolent

con<ict, as otta #hemner and eter Wallensteen concl!de% EV#he pattern is one o relatie stabilit: when weconsider the trend or the past )e :earsEMM !he sec!lar decline in &iolence that started with

the end o$ the Cold *ar has not #een re&ersed Roers 6r!ba7er obseres that Ethe

crisis has not to date generated the s"rge in protectionist nationalism or

ethnic e)cl"sion that might ha&e #een e)pectedEM3

Sa"di-Iran pro)y con<ict coming nowFm"ltiple $actors compel

them to p"ll away $rom U%S% control% 3ro&es the link and impact

are non-"ni'"e%*Sa!di Arabia alread: lashin o!tTemen stri7es proe

*#he: are alread: s!per pissed at the 9S.BB !nit: comin now, the: want

independence rom the 9S

.eneie 8D+, ellow in the Stimson BenterJs @iddle Hast proram as well as a

nonresident ellow at the 6roo7ins Instit!tion, 1? V“WashintonJs imits in the.!l," Democracy , Iss!e 3C (S!mmer 2015+, p C1*CM, Accessed /nline thro!hHmor: ibraries

.a!se predicts that the !t!re will brin harmon: between âtar and the other .BB states @ost co!ntries in theco!ncil had been at odds with âtar oer its s!pport o Islamist ro!ps, partic!larl: the @!slim 6rotherhood oH:pt, which the other states iew as a terrorist orani=ation #he: difered or :ears on other iss!es as well, s!chas the price o oil and relations with their own Islamists Some .!l states belieed their neihbors were not

crac7in down hard eno!h on Islamists across the reion

5a"se writes that 5"l$ states ha&e #ecome more "nited #eca"se o$ their

reliance on the United States as Jtheir "ltimate g"arantor o$ sec"rity%J 6e goes

so $ar as to say that the 5"l$ monarchies are *ashington>s closest ra#

allies d"e to the United States>s military #ases in those co"ntries, s"ch as the

Ei$th Eleet in 8ahrain



6!t 5a"se seems to misread the c"rrent state o$ play on the gro"nd% &en

#e$ore the n"clear deal seemed to #e on track, ra# go&ernments #egan

asserting their independence $rom the United States and e)pressing o"tright

$ear o$ Iranian e)pansionism % *hile negotiations between Iran and the 51 were

"nderway, Iran>s in<"ence*direct or indirect*in the ra# world increased % !his is

one reason Sa"di ra#ia, the United

rab

mirates,

8ahrain, and gypt aremaking strides toward an independent and asserti&e $oreign policy

witho"t *ashington % !he most glaring e& idence o$ this new tilt was the

Sa"di decision in late @arch to la"nch airstrikes against Iranian-#acked $actions

in emen Altho!h it is !nclear to what deree Iran is proidin material s!pport to the o!this who too7

power in the Temeni capital o Sanaa in September o last :ear, there is at least a 6o"thi a0nity with

Iran and 6e7#ollah% 5"l$ ra#s, partic!larl: the Sa!dis, #elie&e Iran crossed a red

line #y s"pporting the 6o"this

New Sa"di King Salman has #een working relentlessly to send the

message to his own people that the 5"l$ co"ntries are "nited /n April 1, the seenth da: o

the airstri7es in Temen, Qin Salman ae a speech in Ri:adh beore a cheerin crowd o Sa!di ministers, ormermilitar: leaders, princes o the 7indom, tribal leaders, and a n!mber o dinitaries and citi=ens While ass!rin the

crowd that the 7indom was sae and stable, he added that the 5"l$ alliance was working

J"nited as one team against the c"rrent t"r#"lences in the region%J S"ch

an alliance was s"ccess$"lly $orged thro"gh recent diplomatic eorts

#etween Salman and leaders o$ neigh#oring 5"l$ kingdoms , incl!din 6ahrain, Ab!

habi, âtar, and Q!wait

5a"se arg"es that the Jcirc"mstances are ripe $or an merican initiati&e in

the region%J 8"t in $act, displays o$ ra# "nity ha&e occ"rred despite the

United States>s in&ol&ement in the region, not #eca"se o$ it % *ashington>s new

o&ert"res toward Iran are #eing percei&ed as a threat to 5"l$ states not

only #eca"se o$ the n"clear agreement #"t also #eca"se o$ the +#ama

Administration>s decision not to hea&ily arm the Syrian re#els or la"nch

airstrikes inside Syria at a decisie time in the war 5"l$ leaders #elie&e the

dministration missed opport"nities to o"st ssad $rom power

.a!se also asserts that Ethe chane in oernment in 6ahdad opens !p the possibilit: o bridin e<istin )ss!res

both within Ira? and between Ira? and the .!l statesE In act, the change in go&ernment in

8aghdad , which replaced one Shia-led go&ernment with another, is

e&idence in ra# eyes that the United States has shi$ted its policy $rom one

that considers the 5"l$ states its primary allies in the region to one that

$a&ors Iran % !here$ore, the United States might #e ser&ing as a "ni$ying $orce

among 5"l$ states, #"t not $or the reasons 5a"se states% !here is a

determination now to #e less reliant "pon *ashington, which no longer

appears to share the 5"l$ states> interest in keeping Iran isolated andweak

!he sectarian stance the Sa"dis ha&e taken in leading the airstrike

campaign in emen against Shia militias has also #eg"n to chip away at

another point o$ con<ict among the 5CC4 the ."slim 8rotherhood #here are

rowin sins that e&en the Sa"dis, who declared the 6rotherhood a terrorist orani=ation in @arch 201M

(een tho!h the: aided the moement at diferent points d!rin the 1LL0s+, are taking a more

pragmatic stance 4or its part, the ."slim 8rotherhood is seeking a political



reha#ilitation among 5"l$ states #he 6rotherhood appears to want to position itsel as a soldier in

the )ht aainst Shia e<pansionism b: ta7in sides in the sectarian wars in the reion, partic!larl: in Temen It is

important to note that the 8rotherhood has #een watching Sa"di ra#ia>s

inter&ention in the region &ery closely and looks $orward to #eing part o$

the new order, now that it has been banned in H:pt

In the wake o$ Iran>s recent e)pansionist gest"res and the $rameworkn"clear agreement, all dierences among the 5"l$ states ha&e #een p"t

aside % ra# interests m"st tr"mp 3ersian hegemony% *ashington is well

aware o$ the &iews among 5"l$ states and their new tendency to take

action witho"t U%S% #acking 4or now at least, the 5CC will contin"e to protect its

interests as it sees =t, and there is little the United States can do on iss"es

where the interests o$ the 5"l$ and *ashington no longer coincide

No impact to middle east war

Eettweis, M K Asst ro oli Sci at #!lane, Asst ro -ational Sec!rit: Afairs K 9S

-aal War Bollee (Bhristopher, “/n the Bonse?!ences o 4ail!re in Ira?," Survival,[ol ML, Iss M, ecember, p F3 K LF+

Witho!t the 9S presence, a second ar!ment oes, nothin wo!ld preent S!nni*Shia iolence rom sweepin into

eer: co!ntr: where the reliio!s diide e<ists A S!nni bloc with centres in Ri:adh and Bairo miht ace a Shia

bloc head?!artered in #ehran, both o which wo!ld ace enormo!s press!re rom their own people to )htpro<: wars across the reion In addition to intra*@!slim ciil war, cross*border warareco!ld not be r!led o!t $ordan miht be the )rst to send troops into Ira? to sec!re its own border8 once the

dam brea7s, Iran, #!r7e:, S:ria and Sa!di Arabia miht ollow s!it #he @iddle Hast has no shortae orialries, an: o which miht descend into direct conDict ater a destabilisin 9S withdrawal In the worst case,

Iran miht emere as the reional heemon, able to b!ll: and blac7mail its neihbo!rs with its new n!clear arsenalSa!di Arabia and H:pt wo!ld soon demand s!itable deterrents o their own, and a n!clear arms racewo!ld enelop the reion /nce aain, howeer, none o$ these o"tcomes is

partic"larly likely

Wider war

-o matter what the o!tcome in Ira?, the region is not likely to de&ol&e into chaos Altho!h

it miht seem co!nter*int!itie, b: most traditional meas!res the @id dle Hast is er: stableBontin!o!s , !ninterr!pted oernance is the norm, not the e<ception8 most @iddle Hastreimes hae been in power or decades Its monarchies, rom @orocco to $ordan to eer: .!l

state, hae enerall: been in power since these co!ntries ained independence In H:pt

osni @!bara7 has r!led or almost three decades, and @!ammar .adha) in ib:a or almost o!r #he reionJs

a!tocrats hae been more li7el: to die ?!iet, nat!ral deaths than meet the hanman or

post*co!p )rin s?!ads SaddamJs rather !npredictable reime, which attac7ed its neihbo!rs twice, wasone o the ew e<ceptions to this pattern o stabilit:, and he met an end !n!s!al or the modern @iddle

Hast Its reimes hae s!ried potentiall: destabilisin shoc7s beore, and the: wo!ld beli7el: to do so aain

#he reion act!all: e<periences er: little cross*border warare, and een less since the end o

the Bold War Saddam aain proided an e<ception, as did the Israelis, with their adent!res in ebanon Israel



o!ht o!r wars with neihbo!rin states in the )rst 25 :ears o its e<istence, b!t none in the 3M:ears since [icio!s ciil wars that once en!led ebanon and Aleria hae one?!iet, and its ethnic conDicts do not ma7e the reion partic!larl: !ni?!e

#he biest ris7 o an American withdrawal is intensi)ed ciil war in Ira? rather than reional conDaration Ira?Js

neigh#o"rs will likely not pro&e eager to =ght each other to determine who ets to

be the ne<t co!ntr: to spend itsel into pen!r: proppin !p an !npop!lar p!ppet reime ne<t door As m!ch asthe Sa!dis and Iranians ma: threaten to interene on behal o their co*reliionists, the:hae shown no eaerness to replace the co!nter*ins!renc: role that American troops pla:

toda: I the 9nited States, with its remar7able militar: and !nlimited reso!rces, co!ld not brin abo!t its desiredsol!tions in Ira?, wh: wo!ld an: other co!ntr: thin7 it co!ld do so1C

Bommon interest, not the presence o the 9S militar:, proides the !ltimate o!ndation orstabilit: All r!lin reimes in the @iddle Hast share a common (and !nderstandable+ ear oinstabilit: It is the interest o eer: actor * the Ira?is, their neihbo!rs and the rest o the world * tosee a stable, !nctionin oernment emere in Ira? I the 9nited States were to withdraw,

increased reional cooperation to address that common interest is $ar more likely than

o"tright war$are



NC



NC 4 3ermFDo C3

% .akes the a not topical –

% resol&ed is to #e determined;andom 6o"se Una#ridged G (http%&&dictionar:reerencecom&search?Oresoled]rO+

re·solved Audio Help /rɪˈzɒlvd/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ri-zolvd]

–adjective ir! in purpose or intent" deter!ined #

8% sho"ld@ implies o#ligation@

*e#ster 09 /nline (@erriam*Webster, “Sho!ld", http%&&wwwmerriam*

webstercom&dictionar:&sho!ld+2!sed in a!<iliar: !nction to e<press obliation , propriet:, or e<pedienc: Jtis commanded I sho!ld do so

Sha7espearethis is as it sho!ld be Saae:o! sho!ld br!sh :o!r teeth ater each meal

C% ;ed"ce is distinct $rom disc"ssing a red"ction -5"y, 91 * Birc!it $!de (#I@ 6/H##.HR, 6HBQT 6/H##.HR, indiid!all: and as -e<t 4riend or their @inor

a!hter, A@A-A 6/H##.HR, laintifs*Appellees, /#IS R 6/WH-, Secretar: o ealth and !man Serices (FL*1F32+8 and B A#RIBQ 6A6B/BQ, irector, @ichian epartment o Social Serices (FL*1F31+, eendants*Appellants -os FL*1F31, FL*1F32 9-I#H S#A#HS B/9R# /4 AHAS 4/R #H SIZ# BIRB9I# L23 42d 11F38 1LL19S App HZIS C1+

#he district co!rt concl!ded that the plain meanin o the stat!tor: lan!ae does not appl: to the termination oemplo:ment one obtains on his own A termination, the co!rt held, is not a re!sal to accept emplo:ment

In this case, the plain meanin o the ario!s words s!ests that Ere!se to acceptE isnot the e?!ialent o EterminateE and Ered!ce E As a matter o loic V1F and common !nderstandin,

one cannot terminate or red!ce somethin that one has not accepted Acceptance is V11FL a pre*condition to termination or red!ction #h!s, a re!sal to accept is a prec!rsorto, not the e?!ialent o, a termination or a red!ction n3

n3 #his distinction is also reDected in the dictionar: de)nitions o the words EAcceptE is

de)ned in anticipator: terms that s!est a precondition (Eto !nderta7e the responsibilit: oE+, whereas EterminateE

and Ered!ceE are de)ned in concl!sor: terms (Eto brin to end, to discontin!eE8 Eto diminish insi=e, amo!nt, e<tent, or n!mberE+ See WebsterJs -ew Bolleiate ictionar: (Lth ed 1LF5+

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should






C% d"cation – literat"re sho"ld #e the standard $or

co"nterplan competition, not some arcane de#ate theory

which isn(t rele&ant to ed"cation% +"r co"nterplan is

speci=cally ad&ocated as an alternati&e to the plan in the

literat"reFthat(s the 1NC Oagon e&idence, here(s another card

Nakhleh, 1? K e<pert on @iddle Hastern societ: and politics and on politicalIslam, member o the Bo!ncil on 4orein Relations and a Research roessor at the9niersit: o -ew @e<ico (Hmile, M&20 “Reimainin the @iddle Hast"http%&&wwwlobelocom&reimainin*the*middle*east&+

Some ha&e arg"ed the U nited S tates sho"ld lea&e the region to =) its own

pro#lems and allow the Dame o hatred and sectarianism to b!rn itsel o!t I thereional states are not interested in establishin and n!rt!rin modern, rational,and incl!sie oernin s:stems, wh: sho!ld the 9nited States sacri)ce blood and

treas!re or s!ch a mon!mental tas7 4or instance, as San ieo State 9niersit:proessor Hli=abeth Bobbs ofman has ar!ed in her plea or the 9nited States tosta: o!t o the reliio!s wars in the @iddle Hast, the /bama administration sho!ld“e<it the nann: b!siness"

#o those orein polic: won7s who hae endorsed resident /bama;s approach tothe @iddle Hast, American polic: has come !nmoored in the last three :ears d!e toa lac7 o strateic oc!s and clarit: .eore Washinton 9niersit: proessor @arc:nch, while s!pportie o the president, notes in 4orein olic: that “thisadministration has not done a ood 'ob at la:in o!t and then e<ec!tin a strateicision or the @iddle Hast"

eelopin a strateic ision is not eas:, and withdrawal is not an option #he@iddle Hast is a comple< sit!ation in which the 9nited States has been inoled ordecades and rom which it cannot possibl: e<tricate itsel so caalierl: #he 9nitedStates has a militar: presence in or a militar: tie with almost eer: co!ntr: in thereater @iddle Hast American economic, ed!cational, diplomatic, and nationalsec!rit: interests are closel: tied to the entire reion, reardless o reliio!ssectarianism or ethnic diersit:

reserin these critical interests and !nderc!ttin the appeal o radicalism andterrorism re?!ire a pro*actie post!re What speci)c steps sho!ld the 9nited Statesta7e to reassert its inD!ence in the reion, protect its interests, and !nderc!t theappeal o radicali=ation and terrorism

#ransitionin to emocrac:

!he domestic maladies that dri&e insta#ility, alienation, radicali=ation, andterrorism incl"de inade?!ate ed!cation, poert:, !nemplo:ment, corr!ption,absence o reedom, and massie &iolations o$ h"man rights, incl!din womenand minorit: rihts A!tocrac: miht seem sec!re in the short*term and mihtappear to be serin the short*term interests o the 9nited States As the ArabSprin !prisins showed !s, howeer, citi=ens oten challene their dictatorships



A!tocrac: can no loner !arantee domestic stabilit: or personal sec!rit: or itsciti=ens Altho!h dictatorial reimes hae s!ried the “Arab Sprin," and altho!h.!l r!lin amilies and Western powers, especiall: the 9nited States, are onceaain proppin !p Arab a!tocrats, the: hae ailed to create stable societies,proide 'obs or their people, or diminish the appeal o radicalism amon their

:o!th #he: contin!e to r!le thro!h ear and repression6!t i histor: is an: !ide, a!tocrac: as a stable orm o oernment is a relic o thepast #r!e, a!tocrac: seems to be comin bac7 in st:le, rom @oscow to Bairo 6!tciti=ens contin!e to protest aainst these s:stems, challenin their stabilit:

!shin H:pt awa: rom A!tocrac:

I American leaders accept the premise that what happens in the @iddle Hast co!ld!ltimatel: threaten American interests and personnel, the 9nited States has theleerae to lean heail: on H:ptian president Abdel 4attah al*Sisi to open !p thepolitical s:stem, release the tho!sands o political prisoners in his 'ails, and permitmainstream @!slim parties, incl!din the @!slim 6rotherhood, to participate in

politics

As an “Allied />cer" at the 9S Arm: War Bollee in Barlisle, enns:lania, .eneralal*Sisi wrote a mini*thesis in 200 in which he ar!ed that the best approach todemocrac: in H:pt was a partnership between the militar: and Islam Accordin tothe thesis, which $!dicial Watch obtained !nder the 4reedom o Inormation Act in2013, Sisi;s ar!ment on the central role o the Baliphate and Islam in H:ptiandemocrac: was considered “e<tremist" and “radical"

ain remoed the pop!larl: elected president in a militar: co!p and hainabandoned his earlier position on the partnership with the @!slim 6rotherhood, Sisihas replaced Islam with his personalit: c!lt as a modern da: “Baliph" o the co!ntr:

6: e<pectin the H:ptian people to declare a ba:;a or alleiance to him, Sisi hasp!t H:pt on a potentiall: destr!ctie co!rse, which will proe detrimental to 9Sinterests and sec!rit: in the reion

Restrainin Sa!di Arabia;s Ambitions

merican credi#ility in the reion wo"ld #e immensel: enhanced i$ the U nited

St ates press"red Sa"di ra#ia to halt its mis!ided and pointless war in Temenespite the dail: air bombardment, al*âeda in Temen has e<panded its control, theo!this remain in power, and Iran;s reional inD!ence has not diminished

D% Cost #ene=t analysisFthe C3 pro&es the opport"nity cost tothe plan

8I;KS 99 K senior lect!rer at @asse: 9niersit: (St!art,http%&&econmasse:acn=&cppe&schools&ets1pd +What is opportunity cost? The opportunity cost of a decision is commonly defined as " the &al"e o$ the

#est $oregone alternati&e". espite the incl!sion o the word Eal!eE in man: de)nitions, we point o!t that opportunity

cost is generally measured in terms of a specific alternative - I could either go to the cinema or have a Big Mac

http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/schools/etfs1.pdf

http://econ.massey.ac.nz/cppe/schools/etfs1.pdf



Bombo The cost is then the satisfaction that is missed if only one of these alternatives is possible. As opportunity

cost refers to the best foregone alternative there is a selection process involved where the person or people decide the

relatie al!es o the alternaties As the iss!e is one o choice oer alternaties, they must be mutually e!clusive. In other ords

only one can be chosen. #hoosing one prevents the choice of the other. This can arise because of limited time

or limited money for e!ample. $ence it is a matter of choice due to scarcity.



Net 8ene=t!he impact is a maBor *.D terrorist attack

8"dowsky 1 (6rent, was an aide to ormer Sen lo:d 6entsen and 6ill Ale<ander, then chie dep!t:

ma'orit: whip o the o!se e holds an @ deree in international )nancial law rom the ondon School oHconomics, “6!dows7:% ISIS poses n!clear L&11 threat" http%&&thehillcom&opinion&brent*b!dows7:&21503*brent*

b!dows7:*isis*poses*L*11*scope*threat_i<==3B/[AMZm[+

Ater the latest rotes?!e atrocit: b: the Islamic State in Ira? and S:ria (ISIS+, the beheadin o an American

'o!rnalist, American and H!ropean polic:ma7ers m!st clearl: !nderstand the near certaint:that !nless it is deeated and destro:ed, ISIS will la"nch a maBor terror attack

on merican or "ropean soil% Anal:sts estimate that ISIS has amassed a cashhoard o between Y million and T #illion It is hihl: probable that ISIS will attemptto !se some o this mone: to obtain n"clear, chemical, #iological or other

weapons o$ mass death on the international blac7 mar7et or rom corr!pt o>cialsin nations s!ch as R!ssia, Bhina, a7istan or -orth Qorea to !se in attac7s aainst-ew Tor7, Washinton, ondon, aris, 6erlin, Rome, 6r!ssels or other nations itconsiders in)del enemies #his daner is mani)ed b: the act that ISIS has

recr"ited nationals o the 9 nited S tates and H!rope, who possess American andH!ropean passports and are physically indisting"isha#le rom localpop!lations in America and H!rope It is e<traordinar: that the mass m!rderinb!tcher: o ISIS is so demented than e&en al aeda is oended It is alarmin that

the BIA, which la!nched intellience operations een aainst the 9nited States Senate, and the -SA, which

la!nched massie and !nprecedented eaesdroppin operations, and intellience serices o leadin H!ropean

nations were #lind to the magnit"de o$ the ISIS threat !ntil the most barbaric terrorists in

modern histor: had ta7en oer almost a third o Ira? and are on the brin7 o creatin a terrorist s!per*state thatdwars al âeda;s eforts prior to L&11 I ehementl: opposed the mis!ided Ira? War rom the moment it wasproposed b: ormer resident .eore W 6!sh and hae neer been a neoconseratie, warmoner or s!per*haw7

6!t aggressi&e action against ISIS is "rgently needed% ISIS has stated itsintention to attac7 the 9nited States and H!rope to adance its eil, messianic and

genocidal ideology and ambitions ISIS has the mone: to p!rchase the most deadl:weapons in the world, and has recr!ited American and H!ropean traitors with aboe*aerae capabilit: to

e<ec!te an attac7 #he odds that ISIS can obtain n"clear, chemical, #iological or

other $orms o$ mass destr"ction weapons are impossible to ascertain b!t in a world oast illeal arms tra>c7in, with so man: corr!pt o>cials in nations possessinarsenals o destr!ction, the danger is real% #he act that W@ scares prior to theIra? War raned rom mista7en to deceit!l does not mean that the W@ danerdoes not e<ist toda:% It does I appla!d the recent actions ta7en b: resident /bama /bama;sairstri7es saed tens o tho!sands o Ta=idis rom enocide, too7 bac7 the @os!l am rom ISIS and

saed co!ntless Ira?is, Q!rds and S:rians rom sla!hter #he airstri7es inDicted material damae to ISIS #hediplomac: o /bama and Secretar: o State $ohn Qerr: contrib!ted mihtil: to the replacement o a disastro!s Ira?ioernment b: a oernment can !nite Ira?i S!nnis, Shiites and Q!rds #he /bama*Qerr: initiaties will lead to thecreation o a stable Ahan oernment and aoid the collapse that was possible ater the recent controersialAhan elections #hese are real s!ccesses In the c!rrent political climate, /bama seems to et credit or nothin,

b!t he deseres reat credit or some important s!ccesses in recent wee7s And :et the daner o ISISp!llin of a n!clear, chemical, bioloical or other mass death L&11*st:le attac7 in ama'or American or H!ropean cit: is real Hen with dirt: or primitie W@ weapons, the

cas"alty totals co"ld #e catastrophic



So$t power sol&es Iranian proli$ – the regime $eeds on anti-

mericanism.ilani 9 amid and Bhristina @ohadam director o Iranian St!dies at Stanord9niersit: where he is also a research ellow at the ooer Instit!tion 200L Benteror Strateic and International St!dies

(Abbas, +#ama>s )istential Challenge to hmadineBad, #he Washinton ^!arterl: g 32%2 pp 3NCF april 0L

@oreoer, an /bama presidenc: is li7el: to drasticall: improe the political position o the 9nited States in the

world An: improement in the lobal stat!re o the 9 nited S tates wo!ld not onl:render the Islamic reime;s anti*Americanism less !se!l , b!t it wo!ld also ma7e itharder or the reime to ore or maintain the 7ind o e<pedient anti*Americanalliances the: hae s!ccess!ll: made oer the last 1 :ears #hro!h these tactical and new

strateic alliances, partic!larl: with Bhina, India, and R!ssia, the reime has bo!ht time todeelop its n!clear proram , and made it more di>c!lt or Western powers to pass 9-

resol!tions aainst Iran In act, an increase in tensions between the 9nited States and Iran,

hand in hand with risin lobal demand or oil and as, aforded the reime oil reen!es be:ond itswildest dreams allowin it to ameliorate some o the more dire conse?!ences oeconomic sanctions

*eak credi#ility e&iscerates US power proBection

Cohen, 11

Brai Bohen, ice president or Research and rorams at BSIS and editor o thisol!me, seres as principal adiser to BSIS president, $!ne 2011, “Bapacit: andResole% 4orein Assessments o 9S ower,"

http%&&csisor&)les&p!blication&11013NBohenNBapacit:ResoleNWebpd

#his st!d: )nds that citi=ens o co!ntries o the @iddle Hast are more apt to e<pect a wea7ened 9nited States oer

the ne<t decade 6!t there is also still a sense that the 9nited States is the onl: actor withthe abilit: to pla: the role o e<ternal !arantor o sec!rit: or the reion It is theIsraelis who ?!estion America;s will most sharpl:, as the: beliee that 9S powerpla:s an e<istential rather than merel: a !tilitarian role in their co!ntr:;s !t!re 9ntil

the c!rrent !prisins, @iddle Hastern iews o 9S power were still larel: tied to Ira? and Iran% how the 9nitedStates str!led to shape Ira?;s !t!re oer the past decade, and whether the 9nited States wo!ld be willin to

deter Iran;s reional ambitions oer the ne<t While Iran will li7el: remain the sinle reatest testo 9S power in the reion, it will be important to see whether the wa: Washinton

manaes the “Arab sprin ," the @iddle Hast peace process, and -A#/;s militar: enaement in ib:a will

eent!all: weih more heail: than memories o Ira? or ears o Iran Iran sees 9SinD!ence in the reion in decline and contin!es to loo7 or opport!nities to e<ploitthis It is too earl: to 7now the e<tent to which the !prisins ma: proideopport!nit: or Iran to e<ert inD!ence as well as the e<tent to which the protests arepotentiall: destabili=in to #ehran;s clerical reime Altho!h Arab oernments; concerns abo!t Iran

remain ?!ite hih, p!blic perceptions o the Iranian threat are low b: comparison #o the e<tent the !prisinsprod!ce more democratic oernments, this deelopment miht eent!all: alter reional threat perceptions inwa:s that co!ld aor the 9nited States or, in some circ!mstances, enender reater s!spicion o American power



Hlites in the @iddle Hast beliee that demonstrations o 9S commitment remainthe critical actor When resident /bama e<plained the @arch bombin o ib:arom the /al />ce b: statin, “So or those who do!bted o!r capacit: to carr: o!tthis operation, I want to be clear% the 9nited States o America has done what wesaid we wo!ld do," he was spea7in directl: to those in the reion who hae

diminished e<pectations o 9S power and are distr!st!l o Washinton;s willinness to !se its power

or ob'ecties the reion prioriti=es @iddle Hasterners beliee that a power!l 9nited States that deemphasi=es the

reion co!ld ca!se proo!nd realinment In contrast, a diminished 9nited States committed to thereion co!ld still shape order or decades to come



NCFSol&ency +&er&iewIncl"si&e .anama Dialog"e ends the Sa"di-Iran cold war% Now

is a key time.arashi 1? * Research director \ -ational Iranian American Bo!ncil VRe=a @arashi (sered in the />ce o

Iranian Afairs at the 9S epartment o State+, “Hndin the Iranian*Sa!di Bold War," #he Bairo Reiew o .lobalAfairs, $!ne 1C, 2015, p http%&&tin:!rlcom&n!to

@oin #owards Bollectie Sec!rit:Sa!di Arabia is correct when it points o!t that reional stabilit:el!sie oer the past o!r :earsre?!ires Ri:adh;s

participation I$ the new cast o Sa!di characters r!nnin the kingdom #elie&es that sta#ility

can #e achie&ed witho"t Iran playing an e'"al role , they are doomed to

repeat the ideological mistakes that plag"ed the region thro"gho"t the 1L:s, when Iran so"ght to e)port its re&ol"tion and Sa"di ra#ia

#ankrolled Saddam "ssein(s eiht*:ear war against Iran% s n"clear

negotiations #etween Iran and the world powers near concl"sion , the timeis ripe $or Sa"di ra#ia to =nd a $ace-sa&ing way to switch gears and

reciprocate Iran(s oers o$ engagement %

Sa"di o0cials told me that a #ig o&ert"re $rom Iran co"ld help B"mpstart a

thaw #etween !ehran and ;iyadh, b!t when I pressed them or speci)cs, the: reerted bac7 to !nrealistic

tal7in points% withdrawin Iranian s!pport or 6ashar Al*Assad in S:ria as a precondition to, rather than an o!tcome o,

neotiations more r!it!l approach wo"ld #e ?!ietl: commencin high-le&el diplomacy

between the two co!ntries in an eort to accommodate legitimate Iranian sec"rity

o#Becti&es in ret"rn $or Iranian policy modi=cations !rading concessions o$

e'"al &al"e can ser&e as a $orce $or regional sta#ility #y #reaking down

the hostility and misperceptions that paral:=e bilateral relations

4or Ri:adh, this wo!ld incl!de reconition that% one, neither Sa!di Arabia nor lobal powers can contain Iraninde)nitel:8 and two, it can better inD!ence Iran b: helpin interate the Islamic Rep!blic into the reion;s political

and economic str!ct!res rather than tr:in to 7eep it o!t dopting a policy o$ integration

wo"ld #etter re<ect the region(s nat"ral #alance, which in t"rn wo"ld

make it more sta#le Sa!di Arabia;s c!rrent winner*ta7e*all approach has let it in a wea7er position,

while its polic: o dtente chaned Iran;s pattern o cond!ct as recentl: as 200M #here;s no reason to beliee thatit will prod!ce diferent res!lts toda:

4or its part, !ehran m"st alle&iate Sa"di concerns b: detailin how its reional ambitions do

not, and will not, o!tstrip its post*sanctions role and reso!rces Iran sho"ld also detail steps tored"ce its "se o$ asymmetric war$are as a political tool in the reion as Sa"di

ra#ia takes steps to reintegrate the Islamic ;ep"#lic #oether, these

meas"res will demonstrate !ehran(s commitment to #eing a regional

power that is a $orce $or sta#ility and collecti&e sec"rity

!his approach was ad&ocated #y Sa"di ra#ia as recentl: as 200M t the

.anama Dialog"e in 8ahrain, Sa"d l-Eaisal anno"nced an "rgent need

$or a collecti&e eort aimed at de&eloping a new and more solid

$ramework $or 5"l$ sec"rity%@ 6e went on to say4 regional sec"rity

$ramework that incl"des all the co"ntries o$ the region is the #est

g"arantee $or peace and sta#ility in the .!l S!ch a ramewor7 sho!ld be based on o!r pillars%

the .BB, Temen, Ira? and Iran" 6e contin"ed, Iran sho"ld play a &ital role in



maintaining the sec"rity o$ the region #o do so o!r Iranian riends need to come to terms with

the re?!irements o deelopin hih leels o political, economic, c!lt!ral and sec!rit: cooperation with theirneihbors based on common interests and the m!t!al rerain rom intererence in the domestic afairs o others"

!he Iran that Sa"d l-Eaisal was descri#ing eleen :ears ao is the Iran o$

today% Second chances don(t come o$ten nding the Iranian-Sa"di cold

war, and #"ilding a collecti&e sec"rity $ramework $or the .iddle astone inwhich sec!rit: is b!ilt and s!stained toether rather at the e<pense o one another is the only option

that has not tr"ly #een tried% It is also the option most likely to s"cceed

;ed"ctions aren(t key – err neg

Saa# and 3a&el, 1? K Resident Senior 4ellow or @iddle Hast Sec!rit:, 6rentScowcrot Benter on International Sec!rit: at the Atlantic Bo!ncil, [ice residentand irector, 6rent Scowcrot Benter on International Sec!rit: at the AtlanticBo!ncil (6ilal T, 6arr:, “Art!l 6alance% 4!t!re 9S eense Strate: and 4orce

ost!re in the .!l", Atlantic Bo!ncil, @arch 2015,http%&&wwwatlanticco!ncilor&imaes&p!blications&AB9SNArt!l6alanceNWH6pd+&&S$4

!he #asic principle o$ any $"t"re US $orce post"re in the 5"l$ , reardless o what

happens on the Iranian n!clear ront, sho"ld #e the contin"ation o$ US military access

to the 5"l$ Indeed, instead o )<atin on orce str!ct!re, *ashington sho"ld $oc"s on

identi$ying meas"res that help maintain and enhance military access , and it

sho!ld not be sh: abo!t e<plainin to its .!l partners wh: the latter is more strateicall: sini)cant and m!t!all:bene)cial than the ormer

S!ccess!l realinment o 9S orce post!re in the .!l, and elsewhere, also m!st emphasi=e militar: capabilit:

Indeed, an: serio!s disc!ssion o this topic sho"ld not #e #ogged down with n"m#ers

*hile capacity is certainly an important $actor in the deterrence and

reass"rance e'"ation, it sho"ld #e neither the g"iding principle nor the

main criterion, especially !nder circ!mstances where the principal adersar:in this case, Iran

Fhas in$erior con&entional military capa#ilities #o p!t it simpl:, when thinking

a#o"t the recon=g"ration o$ US military assets in the 5"l$, the key

'"estion sho"ld not #e “how m!ch more, or how m!ch less," b!t instead “what and where@



Sol&esFEollow +n!his new sec"rity architect"re sol&es 1V o$ case% It

$acilitates US withdrawal

.o"sa&ian 1 K Research Scholar with the roram on Science and .lobal Sec!rit: \ rinceton

9niersit: VSe:ed ossein @o!saian, Iran and United States: n Insider!s "iew on the #ailed Past and $oad toPeace, 201M

eace between Iran and the 9S will the path or constr"ction o$ a regional cooperation

system that will pro&ide sec"rity, sta#ility and peace in the 3ersian 5"l$

#etween Iran and its neigh#ors, most importantly Sa"di ra#ia% S"ch a

de&elopment wo"ld also sec"re the sta#le <ow o$ oil and #ring to an end

the pro)y wars in the reion led b: Iran and Sa!di Arabia that co!ld spiral o!t o control an: moment

!he US wo"ld also be able to grad"ally withdraw $rom the region, sain billions o

dollars 2C3

!his is independently a s'"enecing iss"e%

5olden#erg, 1? K Senior 4ellow and irector o the @iddle Hast Sec!rit:roram at the Benter or a -ew American Sec!rit: (Ilan, “9S Strate: Ater the Iraneal", Benter or a -ew American Sec!rit:, $!ne 2015,http%&&wwwcnasor&sites&dea!lt&)les&p!blications*pd&B-ASNIranNealN01015pd+&&S$4

!he United States sho"ld =nd ways to signal to its regional partners that it

remains committed to their sec"rity% It is still important to maintain a

ro#"st con&entional military presence in the .iddle ast a$ter an

agreement to deter Iran rom aressiel: p!rs!in its destabili=in actiities in the reion, iolatin the

n!clear areement, and threatenin reedom o naiation and the Dow o ener: reso!rces espite the reional

oc!s on the !nconentional Iranian threat, a con&entional presence will also reass"re

partners that the United States remains committed to their sec"rity% 3ro&idingthe ra# states greater con=dence in merican commitments will #e a

"se$"l tool $or diss"ading them $rom lashing o"t more aggressi&ely at Iran

in ways that may e)acer#ate the sectarian di&ide% It co!ld also red!ce the li7elihood that

the Arab states wo!ld p!rs!e their own domestic enrichment capabilit: in response to Iran

In p!rs!in this approach, the 9nited States will hae to maintain a care!l balance A ma'or inD!< o 9S assets tothe reion co!ld be proocatie, !ndermine both Iran;s con)dence in the areement and American intentions, and

red!ce the li7elihood o increased cooperation oer time 6!t any signi=cant withdrawal o$

assets wo"ld shake the con=dence o$ #oth the ra# states and Israel% !he

g"iding principle sho"ld #e to maintain an merican $orce post"re that is

essentially the same or slihtl: enhanced #he 9nited States co!ld consider orward stationin a limited

n!mber o more adanced manned and !nmanned aircrat and missile deense assets in the reion, b!t sho!ld not

o too ar be:ond that I$ the agreement takes hold and o&er time Iran(s #eha&iormoderates, there is the potential $or a peace di&idend@ in the long term%



Sol&esFSta#ility5"l$ m"lilateralism sol&esSager 1 * Bhairs the .!l Research Bentre VAbd!la=i= Saer, “Wh: the H9, or all its problems, is still a model

or the Arab World," %uro&e!s 'orld, !blished on $!ne 1 2010, S!mmer 2010, p http%&&tin:!rlcom&?3<ma7<

It is sometimes eas: or H!ropeans to oret how s!ccess!l the H9 has been Ater all, the H9 has !nited acontinent that was once bitterl: diided, it has improed its own deences and has be!n to spea7 with a common

oice on international iss!es #he er: act that H9 interation has bro!ht prosperit: andstr!ct!ral rowth to its member states e<plains wh: the .!l Bo*operation Bo!ncil(.BB+ K a ro!p made !p o 6ahrain, Q!wait, /man, âtar, Sa!di Arabia and the 9nited Arab Hmirates K oten!ses the H9 as a model

As ar as members o the .BB are concerned, H!rope;s reatest achieement has been thepeace and political stabilit: achieed in the wa7e o World War II Harlier incarnations o the H9 li7e the

H!ropean Boal and Steel Bomm!nit: and the H!ropean Hconomic Bomm!nit: created the sort o stabilit: thatpeople in the .!l crae

In the last M0 :ears, the co!ntries o the .!l K the members o the .BB pl!s Iran, Ira?

and Temen K hae l"rched $rom one sec"rity crisis to another #he Iranian reol!tionae wa: to the Iran*Ira? War, which in t!rn led to the Ira?i inasion o Q!wait Bo!ntries in the .!l acea host o challenes ranin rom terrorism and political instabilit: to Ira?i tensionsand Iran;s n!clear aims And international interest onl: deepens the woes o these co!ntries b: meddlin

in their afairs #he second 9S*led inasion o Ira? too7 the lid of lon*simmerin ethnic and sectarian tensions #errorist attac7s in the co!ntr: are still common, and the withdrawal o 9S sec!rit: orces is li7el: to e<pose a!ltlines that had hitherto been hidden #he internal strie in Ira? has been a blea7 reminder o what man: alread:7new% remoin Saddam !ssein was neer oin to be a recipe or instant peace

Aside rom the Ira? problem, .!l co!ntries worr: that Iran;s n!clear ambitions ma: spar7 an"clear arms race or, worse, a pre-empti&e strike #y the U%S% or Israel% .BB

members 7now that Iran and Ira? need an incl"si&e sec"rity arrangement toallow them wor7 towards reater stabilit: 6!t neither Iran nor Ira? is in the mood or b!ildin

brides, and that ma7es a sec!rit:*based m!lti*lateral areement in the .!l seem li7e a distant dream Iran andIra? sho!ldn;t ta7e all o the blame, members o the .BB hae made onl: hal*hearted attempts at m!lti*lateralism,and in debates between .BB co!ntries m!lti*lateralism is rarel: mentioned

In a sit!ation which oten seems hopeless, the lon*term stabilit: created b: the H9, -A#/, and the

/SBH proides m!ch*needed enco!raement In H!rope, historic enemies hae beenable to p!t their pasts behind them to b!ild peace!l relationships #he co!ntries o

the .!l miht one da: be able to do the same , b!t onl: i the: hae a common

sec"rity $ramework In man: wa:s, the H9 represents the sort o model thatc!rrent .BB members aspire to #he H9;s abilit: to ma7e co!ntries row at nationalleel while enco!rain them to wor7 towards common sec!rit: oals is partic!larl:attractie

/ co!rse, polic:ma7ers in the .!l 7now there is no panacea or the reion;s ills and that H!ropean instit!tions

can;t be directl: replicated in a diferent political settin Sec!rit: aims in the .!l sho!ld beadanced thro!h modest co-operati&e steps in which .BB co!ntries rad!all: ta7e control o

the reion;s sec!rit: iss!es .BB co!ntries sho!ld ta7e heart rom their abilit: to co*operate on economic iss!es,and their combined manaement o the Dow and price o oil /n economic and sec!rit: matters, motiation or co*operation m!st come rom within the .!l reion, and not rom witho!t And all .BB co!ntries m!st be inoled inthis, toether with Ira?, Iran and Temen



3erm*ithdrawal calls into '"estion the signal o$ the co"nterplan –

wrecks credi#ility

Saa# and 3a&el, 1? K Resident Senior 4ellow or @iddle Hast Sec!rit:, 6rent

Scowcrot Benter on International Sec!rit: at the Atlantic Bo!ncil, [ice residentand irector, 6rent Scowcrot Benter on International Sec!rit: at the AtlanticBo!ncil (6ilal T, 6arr:, “Art!l 6alance% 4!t!re 9S eense Strate: and 4orceost!re in the .!l", Atlantic Bo!ncil, @arch 2015,http%&&wwwatlanticco!ncilor&imaes&p!blications&AB9SNArt!l6alanceNWH6pd+&&S$4

!he .iddle ast has #een enormo"sly challenging and costly or the 9nited States

d!rin the past two decades, in terms o$ #lood, treas"re, and international

rep"tation % espite this, *ashington can aord neither to lessen its

in&ol&ement nor address the pro#lems o the reion onl: $rom a$ar%

!he United States sho"ld no longer delay the deelopment and implementation o astrategically dri&en redesign o$ its $orce post"re in the 5"l$ With so man: eolin

lobal demands and comple<, m!ltiaceted, and !npredictable sec!rit: challenes, Washinton cannot aford towaste its eforts on less than*core strateic priorities

#h!s, it is more critical than e&er that US de$ense strategy in the 5"l$ #e

designed aro"nd reass"ring partners, deterring ad&ersaries , contin"ing to

cond"ct co"nterterrorism missions, and ad&ancing needed political de&elopment

to help dr: !p so!rces o e<tremism and promote internal sta#ility% Underwriting a new

$orce post"re in the region to s"pport that strategy efectiel: is B"st as

important% S"ch a post"re co"ld #etter assist US military eorts in

protecting and ad&ancing US interests in an increasingly $ragile and

dangero"s region #y placing a contin"ing premi"m on access while alsob!ildin more rob!st maritime capabilities, enhancin missile deenses, ens!rin diersi)cation and

!npredictabilit:, and increasing #"rden sharing %

@ost importantl:, *ashington(s de$ense strategy and $orce post"re sho"ld make

it clear, to partners and adersaries ali7e, that the U nited S tates is in the 5"l$ to stay ,

and that it seeks to b!ild longer-term and deeper relationships with its closest

partners, some o whom hae shed blood in distant operations alonside their 9S militar: co!nterparts It

sho"ld #e clear that "nder almost any scenario that co!ld !nold, the United States

wo"ld retain a strong interest in the sec"rity o$ its partners in this

strategically &ital region%



NC +&er&iewCooperation will resol&e n"mero"s .ideast sectarian wars%

scalation is ine&ita#le witho"t it

Kinninmont 1? * Senior research ellow and dep!t: head o the @iddle Hast and -orth Arica roramme

\ Bhatham o!se V$ane Qinninmont (4ormer associate director or the @iddle Hast and Arica at the Hconomist.ro!p, @iddle Hast and -orth Arica editor and economist \ Hconomist Intellience 9nit, and manain editor or@iddle Hast and Arica \ 6!siness @onitor International+, “Iran and the .BB% 9nnecessar: Insec!rit:," (hatham

)ouse, $!l: 2015

#here are a ew oices in Sa!di Arabia ar!in or a new approach in relations with Iran, altho!h these c!rrentl:appear to be in the minorit: and are larel: o!tside orein polic: decision*ma7in circles 4or instance, the new

inormation minister, Adel !orai=, also appointed in 2015, wrote his 3hD thesis on the histor: o

the Iranian– Sa"di rapprochement% 6e arg"ed at the time that the

rapprochement o$ 199M showed that the two co!ntries ha&e the potential to

oercome str!ct!ral ca!ses o rialr: and achie&e normali7ation8 that the !s!al e<planations ien or

their rialr: ailed to e<plain wh: relations had one thro!h periods o improement and periods o tension8 and

that there were plenty o$ precedents showing Sa"di ra#ia impro&ing itsrelations with co"ntries with which it had sini)cant ideoloical dierences ,

incl"ding China1L

#here has been hih*leel diplomatic enaement between Iran and some o the .!l states since Ro!hani; selection as president in $!ne 2013 Iran;s new @inister o 4orein Afairs, $aad ari, isited the 9AH, âtar, Q!waitand /man in -oemberKecember o that :ear8 and also in late 2013 the âtari orein minister, Qhalid 6in@ohammad Al*Atti:ah, stated that while âtar and Iran were at odds oer S:ria, âtar did not consider Iran itsenem: and was saddened b: the c!rrent tendenc: ` to create a irt!al enem:;20 K rhetoric that contrasted withm!ch o what was comin o!t o Sa!di Arabia #he Sa!di and Iranian orein ministers met on the sidelines o the9- .eneral Assembl: in September 201M, b!t attempts to bride the ap between the two states were wea7enedb: the militar: escalation b: the o!this in Temen at this time

It is li7el: that Iran and its 5"l$ ra# neigh#o"rs will remain diided in their respectie world

iews, ideoloical stances and isions or the reion 6e:ond their rhetorical positions, the: may none the less#e a#le to =nd some common interests, nota#ly4 a&oiding worsening

con<icts #etween S"nni and Shia across the region – incl"ding possible

sectarian con<icts in&ol&ing minorities within their own territoriesR

pre&enting Syria and Ira' #eing ha&ens $or militant gro"psR and protecting

the territorial integrity o$ the e<istin states, incl!din their own

rapprochement wo"ld need to address m"t"al $ears, een tho!h it ma: be di>c!lt or

either side to see the other; s concerns as realistic or en!ine Eor Sa"di ra#ia, the U and 8ahrain,

the chie$ preocc"pations are that their so&ereignty is #eing "ndermined

thro"gh the sto7in o internal dissent, and the ris7 o bein encircled b: pro*Iranian orces Iran also ears

encirclement, both b: 9S bases and b: 'ihadi ro!ps that it reards as pro<ies o .!l states21 Resolin the crisis in 6ahrain willre?!ire that the oernment in @anama addresses the !ndamental local iss!es oer the distrib!tion o power and wealth, and thissho!ld be neotiated amon 6ahrainis themseles22 6!t s!ch a process wo!ld be helped b: an !nderstandin between Sa!diArabia and Iran that 6ahrain sho!ld not be another arena or pro<: conDict between them, as this miht 'eopardi=e broader .!lsec!rit: to the detriment o both co!ntries In the .!l itsel, the iss!e o the three disp!ted islands claimed b: the 9AH and Iranneeds to be addressed It co!ld potentiall: be reerred to an international trib!nal, as was the case with 6ahrain; s border disp!tewith âtar oer the awar islands (resoled b: a '!dment o the International Bo!rt o $!stice in 2001+

@ore broadl:, the increasin interest o risin Asian powers in sec!rin the ree Dow o oil thro!h the .!l co!ldrepresent an opport!nit: to reconcept!ali=e .!l sec!rit: not as the b!rden or asset o a s!perpower, b!t as alobal p!blic ood; that sho!ld be oerned m!ltilaterall: It is alread: noteworth: that while Iran has o!nd it!se!l to ma7e occasional threats abo!t closin the Strait o orm!=, s!ch an action wo!ld toda: hae more o anaderse impact on its all: Bhina than on the .reat Satan; K ma7in this a proo!ndl: ris7: tactic or Iran to deplo:



#here are ?!estions and !ncertaint: or both Iran and the .BB states abo!t how the shit towards Asia will bemanaed, and both sides co!ld bene)t rom a dialo!e on how the reion miht approach new partners with atleast a somewhat less dis!nited ront In this reard, a m!ltilateral ramewor7 ma: allow the co!ntries to moebe:ond their e<istin positions K that .!l sec!rit: is the either b!siness o the .BB, or o a .BB*pl!s*Iran K to loo7at how Iran and the .BB co!ld co*operate in con'!nction with other international powers to lessen the IranK.BB

as:mmetr:

#asic accommodation on m"t"al sec"rity interests co"ld #e #acked "p#y the promotion o$ trade and economic cooperation #here are alread: to!rism,

pilrimae and Diht connections between the two sides o the .!l Iranian o>cials hae stated that the n!mber o .BB to!rists to the co!ntr: has risen since Ro!hani; s election23 A 9AH*based hotel ro!p, Rotana, anno!nced inecember 2013 that it planned to open hotels in #ehran and @ashhad in 20158 this wo!ld ma7e it the )rstinternational hotel ro!p to open new b!sinesses in Iran since 1LCL State*owned airlines rom the .!l monarchies,s!ch as Hmirates and Htihad, alread: operate re!lar serices to cities in Iran (6ahrain; s .!l Air s!spended Dihtsor political reasons in 2011, b!t has rad!all: res!med serices+ An estimated 500,000 Iranian pilrims isit Sa!diArabia or !mra each :ear, altho!h there are sometimes ar!ments oer ha'' isas or the treatment o Iranianpilrims In April 2015, or e<ample, Iran s!spended !mra Dihts to Sa!di Arabia ater claims that Sa!di police hadse<!all: harassed two Iranian pilrims, b!t it was considered that the action probabl: reDected wider politicaltensions

Boncernin the .!l waterwa:, .BB states and Iran co!ld also see7 to wor7 on deelopin common interests K andtechnical cooperation K in areas s!ch as n!clear saet:, cooperation aainst dr!tra>c7in, and protectin the

waters and marine lie o the .!l aainst poll!tion and enironmental damae @!ltilateral orces co!ld partnerwith both Iran and the .BB on s!ch actiities

In the wider region, Sa"di ra#ia and Iran are #acking dierent sides in

Syria, Oe#anon , emen and in the 3alestinian territories , as well as hain

diferent iews on Ira' !ehran and ;iyadh do not necessaril: hold the sol"tion to all o

these sit!ations, #"t they co"ld help to de-escalate them !aking any opport"nity to

p"ll #ack $rom this Sa"di– Iranian cold war( wo"ld make it easier to

resol&e these other con<icts #o )nd sol!tions, howeer, both co!ntries K and other international and

reional powers K sho!ld emphasi=e the primac: o local, national actors in each case

Ira? represents a partic!lar opport!nit: in this respect /ne o the man: iss!es diidin Ira?; s political actionssince 2003 has been whether the co!ntr: sho!ld be more oriented towards Iran (which has close relations with theprime minister;s awa part: and other Shia Islamists+ or Sa!di Arabia (ien that not onl: S!nni actions, b!t also

the sec!lar Shia leader I:ad Allawi, hae called or Ira? to ie primac: to its .!l Arab neihbo!rs+2M Sa!di Arabiahas larel: seen this as a =eros!m ame% its rel!ctance to deal with the oernment in 6ahdad is emphasi=ed b:the act that it has not had an embass: there since 1LL0, altho!h 9S o>cials hae repeatedl: adised Sa!diArabia that i it does not enae with Ira?, the latter will hae no other option than to remain close to Iran #here isnow a window o opport!nit: to b!ild a more constr!ctie relationship ollowin the 201M depart!re o -o!ri Al@ali7i, whose personal relationship with the late Qin Abd!llah was poor Sa!di Arabia welcomed the arrial o thenew Ira?i premier, aider Al Abadi, while Iran stopped bac7in its ormer all: @ali7i when it saw the e<tent o bothdomestic and international opposition to him in the wa7e o the sei=!re o @os!l b: ISIS

In Abadi, or the )rst time in some :ears, Ira? has a prime minister with whom both Iran and Sa!di Arabia thin7 the:can wor7 Sa!di Arabia notabl: inited Ira? to 'oin a reional alliance aainst ISIS, and in $!ne 2015 appointed anambassador to be based in 6ahdad or the )rst time since Saddam !ssein;s 1LL0 inasion o Q!wait #hewillinness o .BB leaders potentiall: to cooperate with Abadi indicates that chanes in 7e: o>cials K and not '!ststr!ct!ral diferences K can be one o the actors determinin relations at both co!ntr: and personal leel oweer,Sa!di Arabia and other .!l Arab co!ntries are worried b: the rowth o Iranian*bac7ed Shia militias, in the orm o

the ashd al Shaabi, in Ira? Iran, or its part, is li7el: to eel indicated in its s!pport or these militias as the: haehelped recapt!re the cit: o #i7rit rom ISIS, and s!ch actions hae enco!raed some opinion*ormers in the 9nitedStates to see Iran as a potential all: aainst the reater enem: o ISIS 6!t i Iran wants to strenthen the Ira?ioernment, it can onl: do so b: iin primac: to indieno!s orces that incl!de more S!nni Ira?is8 Iranian*bac7edmilitias ma: help Abadi; s oernment militaril:, b!t the: wea7en it politicall: in terms o its abilit: to orm acompact with the man: Ira?is who ear Iranian interention in their co!ntr: So ar, there is no indication that Iran iss!pportin a more incl!sie, cross*sectarian and national approach, and witho!t this the ashd al Shaabi and ISISare li7el: to conront each other in an increasinl: polari=ed and sectarian enironment

Reional conDict resol!tion% A parallel trac7 to the n!clear neotiations



/pinion*ormers in Iran hae apparentl: tended to ass!me that a rapprochement with the 9nited States wo!ldnat!rall: lead to a rapprochement with the .!l co!ntries #his )ts with the Iranian reol!tionar: narratie that the.!l monarchies maintain their power mainl: thro!h Western bac7in, b!t are brittle, aein and lac7in indomestic leitimac: oweer, the Sa!di and 9AH stance on S:ria and Temen ma: sinal to them that Sa!di or 9AHpolic: does not necessaril: ollow a Western lead @an: Iranian anal:sts also interpret recent Sa!di polic: on the oilmar7et (ie decidin not to c!t prod!ction despite a sharp all in lobal oil prices+ as motiated b: a desire to p!tpress!re on #ehran

I .!l Arab co!ntries do not tr!st the 9nited States to represent their interests ade?!atel: in an: p!tatierapprochement with Iran, and i Iran no loner thin7s that the 9nited States will brin the .!l co!ntries on boardwith it, it wo!ld be loical or both Iran and the .BB states to represent their interests themseles thro!h hih*

leel dialo!e on the iss!es at sta7e between them 5"l$ co"ntries ha&e maintained

diplomatic ties with Iran, #"t there has not #een the s"stained dialog"e at

senior le&el as is "s"ally re'"ired to make meaning$"l progress in regional

diplomacy In April 2015 Iran;s $aad ari called or a reional dialo!e !nder 9- a!spices to bein to

address the ca!ses o tension in the wider ersian .!l reion;, startin with Temen25

#he 51 neotiators hae opted to 7eep the n!clear neotiations with Iran separate rom iss!es o reionalpolitics, an approach ao!red b: the 9nited States #his has helped to ins!late the process rom ario!s reionalris7s, and also, cr!ciall:, has helped maintain a !nited ront amon the 518 it is hard to imaine the 9nitedStates, R!ssia and Bhina bein able to ma7e s!ch common ca!se thro!ho!t the process i the iss!e o S:ria wasalso on the table -one the less, the n!clear neotiations are li7el: to alter the reional balance o power A parallel

trac7, oc!sin on the reional iss!es, is needed to !ard aainst the bene)ts o the deal bein o!tweihed b: itscosts #his need not aim to )nd a resol!tion to all the conDicts in which Iran, Sa!di Arabia and some o its .!l alliesare at odds, since, as alread: stated, each o these will need a diferent, locali=ed sol!tion led b: domestic pla:ers

6!t s!ch a trac7 co!ld see7 to achiee a detente #etween Iran and its 5"l$ neigh#o"rs,

and this co"ld help to "nwind these other con<icts

#he process co!ld potentiall: be acilitated b: northern H!ropean (e -ordic+ co!ntries that hae less historicalbaae; in the reion, are seen as ne!tral bro7ers and are not inoled in the n!clear tal7s8 or it co!ld beacilitated in partnership with non*alined risin powers, s!ch as 6ra=il or So!th Arica (6ra=il was in act inoled,with #!r7e:, in an earl: efort to mediate a n!clear deal between Iran and the West in 2010, which was re'ected atthe time b: the 9nited States+ #he 9nited States, the H!ropean 9nion, R!ssia and Bhina co!ld plede to respectthe o!tcomes o this parallel trac7

Witho!t a diplomatic process, there is a high risk that the dierences #etween Iran

and key 5CC states oer the emerin reional order will contin"e to play o"t &iolentlyin ario!s co!ntries in the reion, and co!ld potentiall: spread #eyond these #orders% !his

con<ict will not be limited to state actors% it is "nleashing wider social and sectarian

con<icts ISIS is alread: capitali=in on S!nni ears o Iranian dominance, deplo:in a ir!lentl: anti*Shia

narratie, while a rowin n!mber o diferent Shia militias demoni=e Wahhabis; Iranian o>cials hae acc!sed .!l co!ntries o creatin ISIS, b!t while there is certainl: priate .!l !ndin or the ro!p K and while it is possiblethat some coert oernment s!pport or rebels in S:ria has ended !p in its hands K the ro!p is not !nder .!lcontrol, and indeed has attac7ed both Sa!di Arabia and Q!wait @eanwhile, a rowin n!mber o Ira?i Shia militias

are sprinin !p be:ond Iranian control, and ri&alries #etween Iran and 5CC states may

$"el a sectarian con<agration #eyond the control o$ an: o$ these co"ntries

Deepening tensions #etween Iran and the 5"l$ ra# states can only add to

the risks o$ insta#ility and con<ict in the region K ris7s that need to be accorded hiher

priorit: b: the co!ntries p!shin or a n!clear deal

!hat res"lts in proli$

Sa&ir 1? * resident o the eres Benter or eace VAmbassador 9ri Sair, “Rethin7in the @iddle HastJs

n!clear balance," l *onitor , A! 1, 2015 p http%&&tin:!rlcom&nhtLch

#he )erce debate on the Iran deal oc!ses on the near !t!re, a decade at best In any realistic

analysis o$ .iddle astern reso"rces and am#itions, it is likely that the

leading regional powers Iran , Sa"di ra#ia or een gypt and !"rkey



may, in the lon term, ac'"ire or de&elop n"clear weapons !he No% 1

challenge or the @iddle Hast may then #e to create a regional system where the

"se o$ noncon&entional weapons is phased o"tccording to an Israeli n"clear e)pert with e)tensi&e =rsthand e)perience

on these matters, who spo7e to Al*@onitor on condition o anon:mit:, “It may #e time $or

Israel to think in new terms o$ the e)istence o$ n"clear weapons in thehands o$ ra# and other ."slim co"ntries With time, a s:stem o m!t!al n!clear

deterrence, bac7ed b: the 9nited States, ma: become necessar: #he 9S sho!ld ormall: !arantee Israel;s

strateic ede in the reion In parallel, *ashington sho"ld aspire $or a regional sec"rity

agreement which wo"ld incl"de regional coordination o&er prohi#iting the

"se o$ nonconentional weapons n"clear, chemical and #iological or or that

matter, conentional weapons" #he e<pert added that talks to this eect took place within the

Arms Bontrol and Reional Sec!rit: wor7in ro!p in the mid-1L9s, which was one o )e m!ltilateral

wor7in ro!ps established as part o the @adrid Bonerence process

A ormer senior H:ptian o>cial, inoled in these tal7s rom 1LL2 to 1LL, told Al*@onitor on condition oanon:mit: that the disc!ssions :ielded er: little proress d!e to Israel;s !nwillinness to disc!ss its alleedn!clear potential e said, “H:pt adheres toda: to a ision o a n!clear*ree @iddle Hast, which sho!ld incl!deIsrael and Iran" At the end o April o this :ear, H:pt proposed at the 9- -on*rolieration o -!clear WeaponsBonerence to adance a bindin areement on a n!clear*ree @iddle Hast #he 9nited States aborted this proposal

#he two ormer senior H:ptian o>cials share the belie that the time has come $or

policymakers and strategic policy planners to think a#o"t the e&ol&ing

post-Iran-deal reality

oicall: and most probabl:, the $"t"re in the region will take the shape o$ one o$

two scenarios 4 either a m"t"al n"clear deterrence system or a

n"clear-$ree .iddle ast

#he 9S administration will also hae to oc!s on the iss!e o prolieration o nonconentional weapons once the Irandeal debate is concl!ded /bio!sl:, Washinton;s )rst center o attention will be the implementation o the

areement b: the Iranians Tet e&en i$ Iran complies with the agreement , the deal will

ha&e created a new reality in the .iddle ast, generating greater

am#itions in the 5"l$ co"ntries to ac'"ire noncon&entional weapon

capa#ilities% #h!s, the American thin7in sho!ld combine !t!re sec!rit: and political realities in the reion

A senior State epartment so!rce spea7in on condition o anon:mit: said the administration is well aware o theneed or s!ch polic: plannin Tet accordin to this so!rce, the administration estimates that the reion is not ripe

or a n!clear*ree*=one areement, and it will stand b: Israel on the matter /n the other hand, *ashington

wants to pre&ent the proli$eration o$ n"clear weapons and is already

talking to gypt and the 5"l$ States a#o"t enhanced sec"rity cooperation

and assistance and abo!t c!rbin Iran;s reional ambitions Similar tal7s will be held with Israel ater the

conressional ote

While resident 6arac7 /bama made a historic decision in the riht direction on the Iran deal, the US &ision$or the long-term $"t"re o$ the region in the a$termath o$ the deal may #e

myopic % !here are &ery $ew in the .iddle ast who #elie&e that in the lon r!n (a$ter 1-1? years+ Iran will re$rain $rom de&eloping n"clear weapons % s a

res"lt, regional regimes are rethinking their sec"rity policies also in

regard to the de&elopment o$ n"clear deterrence%



1N;



1nr – case de$enseIran proli$ isn(t a threat – they don(t want the #om# and i$ they

get it they won(t "se it

3inker, 11 VSteen, proessor o ps:cholo: at arard 9niersit:, The Better

ngels o+ our Nature 'hy "iolence )as Declined, IS6-% 0C0022L5, or onlineaccess email ale<anderdpappas\mailcom and I will orward :o! the !ll boo7

I c!rrent p!ndits are to be belieed, then as :o! are readin these words the -eweace will alread: hae been shattered b: a ma'or war, perhaps a n!clear war, withIran At the time o this writin, tensions hae been risin oer the co!ntr:;s n!clearener: proram Iran is c!rrentl: enrichin eno!h !rani!m to ashion a n!clear arsenal, and it has de)ed

international demands that it allow inspections and compl: with other proisions o the -!clear -onprolieration #reat: #he president o Iran, @ahmo!d Ahmadine'ad, has ta!nted Western leaders, s!pported terrorist ro!ps,acc!sed the 9nited States o orchestratin the L&11 attac7s, denied the oloca!st, called or Israel to be “wiped ofthe map," and pra:ed or the reappearance o the #welth Imam, the @!slim saior who wo!ld !sher in an ae opeace and '!stice In some interpretations o Shi;a Islam, this messiah will show !p ater a worldwide er!ption o

war and chaos All this is, to sa: the least, disconcertin, and man: writers hae

concl!ded that Ahmadine'ad is another itler who will soon deelop n!clearweapons and !se them on Israel or !rnish them to e=bollah to do so Hen in less dire

scenarios, he co!ld blac7mail the @iddle Hast into accedin to Iranian heemon: #he prospect mihtleae Israel or the 9nited States no choice b!t to bomb its n!clear acilitiespreemptiel:, een i it inited :ears o war and terrorism in response A 200Leditorial in the 'ashington Times spelled it o!t% “War with Iran is now ineitable

#he onl: ?!estion is% Will it happen sooner or later"2CL #his chillin scenario o an!clear attac7 b: Iranian anatics is certainl: possible 6!t is it inevita,le, or eenhihl: li7el: /ne can be '!st as contempt!o!s o Ahmadine'ad, and '!st as c:nical abo!t his moties, while

imainin less dire alternaties or the world ahead $ohn @!eller, #homas Schellin, and man: other orein afairs

anal:sts hae imained them or !s and hae concl!ded that the Iranian n"clear program is not

the end o$ the world2F0 Iran is a sinator: to the -!clear - on p rolieration # reat:,an d Ahmadine'ad has repeatedl: declared that Iran;s n!clear proram is intendedonl: or ener: and medical research In 2005 S!preme eader Qhameini (who wields

more power than hmadineBad+ iss!ed a atwa declarin that n"clear weapons

are $or#idden "nder Islam2F1 I the oernment went ahead and deeloped theweapons an:wa:, it wo!ld not be the )rst time in histor: that national leaders haelied thro!h their teeth 6!t hain painted themseles into this corner, theprospect o oreitin all credibilit: in the e:es o the world (incl!din ma'or powerson whom the: depend, li7e R!ssia, Bhina, #!r7e:, and 6ra=il+ miht at least ie them pa!se

Ahmadine'ad;s m!sins abo!t the ret!rn o the #welth Imam do not necessaril:mean that he plans to hasten it alon with a n!clear holoca!st #wo o the deadlinesb: which writers c on)dentl: predicted that he wo!ld set of the apocal:pse (200C

and 200L+ hae alread: come and one2F2 And or what it;s worth, here is how he e<plained his

belies in a 200L teleision interiew with -6B correspondent Ann B!rr:% (urry: To!;e said that :o! beliee that hisarrial, the apocal:pse, wo!ld happen in :o!r own lietime What do :o! beliee that :o! sho!ld do to hasten hisarrial hmadine-ad: I hae neer said s!ch a thin I was tal7in abo!t peace What is bein said abo!t anapocal:ptic war andlobal war, thins o that nat!re #his is what the ionists are claimin Imam will comewith loic, with c!lt!re, with science e will come so that there is no more war -o more enmit:, hatred -o moreconDict e will call on eer:one to enter a brotherl: loe / co!rse, he will ret!rn with $es!s Bhrist #he two willcome bac7 toether And wor7in toether, the: wo!ld )ll this world with loe #he stories that hae beendisseminated aro!nd the world abo!t e<tensie war, apocal:ptic wars, so on and so orth, these are alse 2F3 As a $ewish atheist, I can;t sa: I )nd these remar7s completel: reass!rin 6!t with one obio!s chane the: are not



appreciabl: diferent rom those held b: deo!t Bhristians8 indeed, the: are milder, as man: Bhristians do beliee

in an apocal:ptic war and hae antasi=ed abo!t it in bestsellin noels As or the speech containinthe phrase that was translated as “wipin Israel of the map," the New York Times

writer Hthan 6ronner cons!lted ersian translators and anal:sts o Iranianoernment rhetoric on the meanin o the phrase in conte<t, and the: were!nanimo!s that Ahmadine'ad was da:dreamin abo!t reime chane in the lon

r!n, not enocide in the da:s ahead 2FM #he perils o translatin orein bombastbrin to mind Qhr!shche;s boast “We will b!r: :o!," which t!rned o!t to mean“o!tlie" rather than “entomb" #here is a parsimonio!s alternatie e<planation o Iran;sbehaior In 2002 .eore W 6!sh identi)ed Ira?, -orth Qorea, and Iran as the “a<is o eil" andproceeded to inade Ira? and depose its leadership -orth Qorea;s leaders saw the writin on the

wall and promptl: deeloped a n!clear capabilit:, which (as the: no do!bt anticipated+ has p!t an end to an:m!sins abo!t the 9nited States inadin them too Shortl: aterward Iran p!t its n!clear proram into hih ear,aimin to create eno!h ambi!it: as to whether it possesses n!clear weapons, or co!ld assemble them ?!ic7l:, to

s?!elch an: tho!ht o an inasion in the mind o the .reat Satan I Iran does become a con)rmed ors!spected n!clear power , the histor: o the n!clear ae s!ests that the mostli7el: o!tcome wo!ld be nothin As we hae seen, n!clear weapons hae t!rned o!t tobe !seless or an:thin b!t deterrence aainst annihilation , which is wh: the n!clear

powers hae repeatedl: been de)ed b: their nonn!clear adersaries #he mostrecent episode o prolieration bears this o!t In 200M it was commonl: predictedthat i -orth Qorea ac?!ired a n!clear capabilit:, then b: the end o the decade itwo!ld share it with terrorists and set of a n!clear arms race with So!th Qorea,

$apan, and #aiwan 2F5 In act, -orth Qorea did ac?!ire a n!clear capabilit:, the endo the decade has come and one, and nothin has happened It;s also !nli7el: thatan: nation wo!ld !rnish n!clear amm!nition to the loose cannons o a terroristband , thereb: iin !p control oer how the: wo!ld be !sed while bein on thehoo7 or the conse?!ences 2F In the case o Iran, beore it decided to bomb Israel (or license e=bollah to do so in an incriminatin coincidence+, with no conceiable bene)t to itsel,its leaders wo!ld hae to anticipate a n!clear reprisal b: Israeli commanders , who

co!ld match them hothead or hothead, toether with an inasion b: a coalition opowers enraed b: the iolation o the n!clear taboo #ho!h the reime isdetestable and in man: wa:s irrational, one wonders whether its principals are soindiferent to contin!in their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselesin p!rs!it o perect '!stice in a radioactie alestine or the arrial o the #welthImam, with or witho!t $es!s at his side As #homas Schellin as7ed in his 2005 -obel ri=e lect!re,

“What else can Iran accomplish, e<cept possibl: the destr!ction o its own s:stem,with a ew n!clear warheads -!clear weapons sho!ld be too precio!s to ie awa:or to sell, too precio!s to waste 7illin people when the: co!ld, held in resere,ma7e the 9nited States, or R!ssia, or an: other nation, hesitant to consider militar:action"2FC #ho!h it ma: seem danero!s to consider alternaties to the worst*case scenario, the daners o

both wa:s In the all o 2002 .eore W 6!sh warned the nation, “America m!st not inore the threat atherinaainst !s 4acin clear eidence o peril, we cannot wait or the )nal proo the smo7in !nthat co!ld come inthe orm o a m!shroom clo!d" #he “clear eidence" led to a war that has cost more than a h!ndred tho!sand lies

and almost a trillion dollars and has let the world no saer A coc7s!re certaint: that Iran will !sen!clear weapons, in de)ance o si<t:*)e :ears o histor: in which a!thoritatie predictions o ineitable

catastrophes were repeatedl: proen wron, co!ld lead to adent!res with een reater costs



;isk o$ miscalc low – history o$ a&oiding con<ict

$ef 6"#er, Bommander, 9S -a: (Retired+, “Will .enerals Stop Iran War" 2*2*

M (http%&&=enh!berblospotcom&200C&02&will*enerals*stop*iran*warhtml+

As the 9S increases the n!mber o ships deplo:ed to the reion, the reater the

odds become o s!ch an incident occ!rrin We can ta7e some comort in the actthat American and Iranian naal ships hae operated in the icinit: o each other inthe .!l and the -orth Arabian Sea or decades and hae learned to aoidEmista7esE that co!ld lead to !nintentional weapons e<chanes -onetheless, thepresent sit!ation between the two co!ntries is more tense that it has been since the

#an7er War in the F0s

Iran will not #e aggressi&e – they will #ack down $rom direct

con$rontation%Sa&yon, C&M&11 (A:elet K director o the Iranian @edia ro'ect at the @iddle Hast@edia Research Instit!te, Iran;s eeat in 6ahrain, phttp%&&wwwmemrior&report&en&0&0&0&0&0&0&5M2Mhtm+

espite its imae as a loomin s!perpower, which reol!tionar: Iran has so!ht or :ears to c!ltiate, its act!al

policy re&eals a deep recognition o$ its weakness as a representatie o the ShiJites, who

constit!te a 10G minorit: in a S!nni @!slim reion istoricall: persec!ted oer cent!ries, the Shi>ites

de&eloped &ario"s means o$ s"r&i&al, incl"ding ta?i:a K the Shi>ite principle o$

ca"tion, as e<pressed in willinness to hide oneJs ShiJite a>liation in order to s!rie !nder a hostile S!nni r!le

K and passi&ity , re<ected in the "se o$ diplomacy alongside indirect

intimidation, terrorism, etc #he ideoloical chane pioneered b: the o!nder o the Islamic Reol!tion in

Iran, A:atollah R!hollah Qhomeini K who transormed the passie perception characteristic o the o the ShiJa (whichwas based on the leend o the mart:rdom o !ssein at the 6attle o Qarbala+ into an actie perception o

mart:rdom (shahada+V2 K is not bein carried o!t b: Iran !ehran is re$raining $rom sending

Iranian nationals to carry o"t martyrdom operations, despite its :ears*lon lori)cation o this

principle It is also not sending Iranians to 5a7a, either on aid missions or to carr: o!t s!icideattac7s K and this despite the act that reime*sponsored orani=ations are recr!itin ol!nteers or s!ch eforts

@oreoer, it appears that the Shi>ite regime in Iran is "tili7ing the leend o !sseinJs

martyrdom solel: $or propaganda p"rposes, in order to lori: its own miht and intimidate the

S!nni and Western world S"ch intimidation is in keeping with Shi>ite tradition, as a

way to conceal !ehran>s "nwillingness to take o&ert military action aainst

e<ternal challenes Boncl!sion !ehran>s de$eat in the 8ahrain crisis re<ects characteristic

Shi>ite restraint , stemming $rom recognition o$ its own weakness in the ace o

the ast S!nni ma'orit: !he decade d"ring which Iran s"ccess$"lly e)panded its

strenth and power e<ponentiall: ia threats and creatin an imae o s!perpower militar: strenth has

collapsed in the 8ahrain crisisR Iran is now re&ealed as a paper tiger that

will re$rain $rom any &iolent con<ict% *hen it came to the cr"nch , it#ecame clear that the most that Iran co"ld do was threaten to !se terrorism or to

s!bert the ShiJite citi=ens o other co!ntries K in keeping with c"stomary Shi>ite #eha&ior –

and these threats were not e&en implemented It can be ass!med that the S"nni

camp, headed b: Sa!di Arabia, is $"lly aware o$ the political and military

signi=cance o$ Iran>s weakness and its "nwillingness to initiate $ace-to-

$ace con<ict #his will hae rami)cations on both the reional and the lobal leels

http://zenhuber.blogspot.com/2007/02/will-generals-stop-iran-war.html

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_tanker.html

http://zenhuber.blogspot.com/2007/02/will-generals-stop-iran-war.html

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_tanker.html



NC EettweisFmpiricsND, their a"thors ignore the $oreign policy options other

co"ntriesFmakes their theoretical predictions #ankr"pt%

6"rrell Girector o the Bentre or International St!dies \ 9niersit: o /<ord VAndrew !rrell,

“eemon:, liberalism and lobal order% what space or wo!ld*be reat powers" International Afairs F2, 1 (200+1 ‒ 1L

Neo-realist theory has enerated an enormo!s and sophisticated literat!re with man: s!btheories and

competin dianoses It is, howeer, limited in a n"m#er o$ important ways In the )rst place,

most o this literat!re is written rom the perspectie o the 9nited States and is implicitl: or e<plicitl:

preocc"pied with the strategies that the US has adopted, or sho"ld adopt, to

s"stain its ad&antageo"s position in the s:stem Second, the $oreign policy choices

o$ second-tier states are arri&ed at ded"cti&ely, irrespecti&e o$ whether or

not they correspond partic"larly closely either to policy options that ha&e

act"ally #een adopted or to "nderstandings o$ those choices within

second-tier states themsel&es #hird, the options are !nderspeci)ed% What precisel: does

bandwaonin; consist o, and what determines the choice amon the er: diferent orms that alinment; withthe heemon miht ta7e oes bandwaonin describe a pattern o behaio!r or a conscio!s polic: choice Is it!se!l to distin!ish between hard and sot orms o balancin What o other options s!ch as hidin; or hedin;

Einally, neo-realism sees the system only in terms o$ the distri#"tion o$

power S:stemic orces are indeed cr!cial8 b!t, as orein polic: anal:sis o the co!ntries !nder consideration

here clearl: demonstrates, there is m"ch more in the system than is contained in

neo-realist theory, and this matters not B"st $or acc"rate empirical

analysis #"t also $or the de&elopment o$ s"ccess$"l theory

!heir de$ense o$ "nipolarity is plag"ed #y concept"al con$"sionand methodological la7iness%

ang 1h Bandidate in the olitics ] International Relations roram \ 9niersit: o So!thern

Baliornia VZianen Tan, #he 9nipolar Bhallene% ower, B!lt!re and A!thorit: and the Adent o War, @arch 25,2010, p http%&&wwwstoc7holmsire!&!ploads&#heG209nipolarG20Bhallene,G203rdG20ratpd

#!rnin the conentional wisdom on its head, the positiist intellect"al enterprise on "nipolarity

is serio"sly impeded #y not B"st concept"al con$"sion #"t also the lack o$

methodological rigor % Boncept!all:, most researchers, man: realists incl!ded, are slow to reali=e that

the character o !nipolarit: is !ndamentall: diferent phenomenon rom bipolarit: and m!ltipolarit: and that thest!d: o !nipolarit: pres!pposes a new set o anal:tical ass!mptions most o the time, i not alwa:s

.ethodologically and theoretically, the o#session with contemporar: UShegemon: gi&es the impression that "nipolarity is historically

"nprecedented , s"ch that scholars "se the e&idence #ased on which their

hypotheses are de&eloped to test their theoretical propositions, a h"ge

ta#oo in positiist research (Qin, Qeohane, ] [erba, 1LLM+ !he "pshot is o$ten that their

policy proBections leap $ar ahead o$ their theoretical and empirical

analyses% the same eidence can be interpreted in rather dierent wa:s, or that the alsi)cation o their

theor: still awaits what Bhina or the 9nited States will do in the !t!reF p 13

http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf

http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf



nc – heg increases warND, "nipolarity increases minor power risk-taking and warF

m"ltilateralism is s"perior%

.onteiro 11roessor o olitical Science at Tale 9niersit: V-!no @onteiro, “Wh: we (7eep+ )htin,"

4orein olic:, ecember 2L, 2011, http%&&waltoreinpolic:com&posts&2011&12&2L&wh:NweN7eepN)htin

@an: seem to thin7 so Writin in the -ew Tor7 #imes a wee7 ao, $osh!a .oldstein and Steen in7er ar!ed thatEwar reall: is oin o!t o st:leE In what concerns the 9nited States, howeer, nothin co!ld be !rther rom the

tr!th !he last two decades, less than ten percent o$ U%S% history, acco"nt $or

more than ? percent o$ the nation>s total wartime% 8etween the de$eat o$

Napoleon in 1F15 and the So&iet demise, great powers were in&ol&ed in wars

on a&erage one e&ery si) years% Since it became the sole s!perpower, the United States

has #een at war $or more than hal$ the time, or twele o!t o twent: two :ears

#hese wars in K"wait (1LL1+, Koso&o (1LLL+, $ghanistan (2001*present+, and Ira' (2003*11+

all res"lted $rom other states not complying with U%S% demands *hen

threatened with U%S% military action, Slobodan .ilose&ic did not $old, the

!ali#an did not gi&e in, nor did Saddam 6"ssein roll o&er In contrast, the Soiet 9nion

alwa:s too7 9S threats serio!sl: espite its tremendo!s miht, it rerained rom ta7in West 6erlin and withdrewits missiles rom B!ba

Wh: were 9S threats heeded b: the Soiet bear b!t now disrearded b: secondar: powers #wo e<planations arecommonl: ofered #he )rst is that the 9nited States is militaril: oere<tended #he second is that while the Soietswere eil b!t rational, toda:Js enemies are irrational 6oth these iews are wron #he war in Ahanistan does notpreent the 9nited States rom badl: damain an: non*n!clear state that de)es it while s!ferin relatiel: littleitsel And the 9SJs new enemies are no less rational than its old ones I 9S threats were able to deter shoe*slammin Ewe will b!r: :o!E Qhr!shche and his h!ndreds o intercontinental n!clear missiles, wh: is the 9nitedStates !nable to stop -orth Qorea and its hand!l o r!dimentar: warheads ** not to mention Iran, which has none

6eca!se threats are not the problem 6ac7ed b: the mihtiest militar: in histor:, 9S threats are eminentl:credible In act, the absence o another reat power capable o deterrin Washinton ies the 9S a ree handabroad As SaddamJs orein minister #ari? A=i= lamented ater Ira?Js h!miliatin deeat in the .!l War, EWe donJthae a patron an:more I we still had the Soiets as o!r patron,none o this wo!ld hae happenedE

#he problem lies elsewhere !rin the Bold War, m!t!all: ass!red destr!ction 7ept the peace #he prospect o an!nproo7ed 9S attac7, which wo!ld !ltimatel: lead to the 9SJs own destr!ction, was !nthin7able 6!t now that

the Soiet 9nion is one, merica>s enemies $eel &"lnera#le e&en i$ they comply

with *ashington>s demands % !hey know that the United States has the

wherewithal to take them down i$ it so decides, so they are "nlikely to

accept any U%S% demands (to a#andon a n"clear program, or e<ample+ that

wo"ld lea&e them in a position o$ e&en greater weakness !his is what

e)plains U%S% in&ol&ement in so many JhotJ wars since the Bold War ended

As the worldJs sole s!perpower, the United States is oten seen as an aggressi&e #ehemoth%

!o make its threats eecti&e, we are told, it m"st restrain itsel$ thro"gh a less

aressie militar: post!re, a commitment to m"ltilateral action, or een a plede to eschew

reime chane 6!t een i it does all this, as lon as 9S power remains !nmatched, Washinton will contin!e toace di>c!lties hain its wa: witho!t resortin to war #his sho!ld come as no s!rprise It ollows rom the!nparalleled power o the 9nited States





co!ntr: openl: hostile to it and armed with n!clear weapons to perect an intercontinental ballistic missile capableo delierin n!clear weapons to 9S soil We thin7 not" (Barter and err:, 200+ #he Iranian n!clear proram hasconsistentl: been one o the oremost concerns o 9S administrations or the past decade As it proresses, it isli7el: that debate on how to preent Iran rom ac?!irin n!clear weapons will intensi: As we hae seen,containment and sanctions can hae co!nterprod!ctie efects #he lesser the abilit: o the Iranian state to achieeits polic: oals witho!t n!clear weapons, the reater the drie towards prolieration Hnaement, or its part,presents serio!s commitment problems #here is no ood reason or Iranian leaders to beliee the credibilit: o 9Spromises o reater !t!re cooperation, were the: to stop their n!clear proram I their c!rrent relatie power iss!ch as to onl: warrant their c!rrent stat!s in the international s:stem, there is no ood reason the 9nited Stateswo!ld 7eep an: promises o better relations in the !t!re, once the ob'ect o disp!teIran;s n!clear proramis no

loner an iss!e 4inall:, pre&enti&e war, besides presentin pointed moral dilemmas, may $ail to

settle the pro#lem concl"si&ely, merely delaying its deno"ement% And :et, a

preentie stri7e aainst Iran b: the 9nited States or one o its client states (e, Israel+ is in no wa: o!t o the

?!estion 4or as long as the United States remains the preponderant power in the

international s:stem, the costs o$ pre&enti&e military action to co"nter n"clear

proli$ eration will #e lower than the potential shi$t in the #alance o$ power

that wo"ld ens"e $rom n"clear ac'"isition #y a state not aligned with

*ashington% S"ch are the str"ct"ral constraints connecting n"clear

proli$eration with pre&enti&e war 2L*31

Oarge military #"dget leads to warF!hey create targets to B"sti$y the #"dget

Calleo 9irector o the H!ropean St!dies roram \ $ohns op7ins 9niersit: Vaid Balleo, 4ollies o

ower% America;s 9nipolar 4antas:, 200L

#he entaonJs dilemma was hardl: new *itho"t a realistic and clear set o$ priorities,

mammoth #"dgetary o"tlays $or de$ense can easily #ecome a so"rce o$

national weakness rather than strength32 !he #igger the military #"dget in

relation to the econom: and the nationJs ciilian priorities, the more '"estions arise oer whether

s!ch a b!det is economicall: and politicall: s!stainable #o be s!stainable, militar: spendin has to be assessed

and disciplined within some larer economic and eopolitical conte<t nation>s military reso"rcesha&e to #e meas"red against its military commitments and more general

geopolitical pretensions% 3arado)ically, the loss o$ the So&iet enemy

legitimi7ed a &astly increased range o$ merican commitments% Unipolar

merica implies a "#i'"ito"s presence aro"nd the glo#e33 5lo#al

management calls $or the political, economic, and c"lt"ral tools $or

Jco "nter in s"rgency operationsJ within resistant co"ntries% 3retensions

along s"ch lines lead to more and greater long-term commitments %

Con<icts grow more likely and the contingencies to #e planned $or grow

more di&erse C5

Documents

Emory Marcus Gupta Neg GSU Round7