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En lille smule om Bruno Latour og Aktør Netværk Teori

En lille smule om Bruno Latour og Aktør Netværk Teori · •Latour [shemmelighed: Latour er optaget af relationer mellem mennesker og ting. Det er iflg ham en fordelagtig analysestrategi

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En lille smule om Bruno Latourog Aktør Netværk Teori

Bruno Latour

Fransk filosof, antropolog og sociolog.

École des Mines de Paris fra 1982 til 2006.

Sciences Po Paris fra 2006 til 2017.

Holberg Prisen 2013

ANT for business

• Hvordan bliver facts til? (visualisering og inskriptioner)• Viden er ikke afhængig af ‘større hjerner’ men af muligheden for at kombinere spor,

hvoraf nogle opsummeres i todimensionale inskriptioner (kort, diagram, formel).• Betydningen af (måle) instrumenter og laboratorier. Talspersoner og dissidenter.

• Hvordan holdes kollektivet sammen? (associationer mellem humane og non-humane aktører) • Aktører er netværk, og netværk er aktører.• Humane og non-humane aktører analyseres symmetrisk.• Punktualisering sker, når kollektivet handler som én aktør. Når dette ‘lækker’ eller

fejler finder man flere tegn på, hvad kollektivet består af.

Maris Pacifici by Abraham Ortelius1589

Visualisering – runder af akkumulation

Visualisering – verden ses indikrete

A “state”, a “corporation”, a “culture”, an “economy” are the result of a punctualization process that obtains a few indicators out of many traces. In order to exist these entities have to be summed up somewhere

In the debates around perception, what is always forgotten is this simple drift from watching confusing three-dimensional objects, to inspecting two-dimensional images which have been made less confusing

The “great man” is a little man looking at a good map

Økonomiske facts

• Salg – kasseapparat – omsætning – kontoplan – kalkulationsprincip –overskud.

• Performativitet• Viden om økonomi -> beslutninger om outsourcing = virksomhedens grænser.

Hvad nu, hvis to kalkulationsprincipper konkurrerer?

• Mekanisk objektivitet • Værdiansættelse. Viden om fremtiden usikker -> skabe talspersoner. Det

overbevisende argument er genkendeligt, så værdifastsættelse af en virksomhed bliver gennemsnitlig.

Associationer: holde kollektivet sammen

• En aktør er et heterogent netværk• En leder = en person + et budget (+ + +) + efterfølgere

• En lærer = en person + en PP præsentation (+ + + +) + et studium

• Et heterogent netværk er en aktør• A380 flyver ikke; Singapore Airlines flyver

• Teknologi er kollektivet gjort durabelt

Jan Mouritsen, [email protected]

Social norm: tag ikke for megen plads i køleskabet.

Kasserne stopper ikkenogen, men de guider os til at lægge bånd påos selv og andre.

Jan Mouritsen, [email protected]

Challenger disaster

On January 28, 1986,

The disintegration of the vehicle began after a joint in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The failure was caused by the failure of O-ring seals used in the joint that were not designed to handle the unusually cold conditions that existed at this launch. The seals' failure caused a breach in the SRB joint, allowing pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft field joint attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter.

The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were eventually recovered from the ocean floor after a lengthy search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the death of the crew is unknown; several crew members are known to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The shuttle had no escape system,[a][1] and the impact of the crew compartment at terminal velocity with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.[2]

The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the shuttle program and the formation of the Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by United States President Ronald Reagan to investigate the accident The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident,[3] with the agency violating its own safety rules. NASA managers had known since 1977 that contractor Morton-Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings, but they had failed to address this problem properly. NASA managers also disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning, and failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors

Konklusioner

• Latour’s ‘hemmelighed’: Latour er optaget af relationer mellem mennesker og ting. Det er iflg ham en fordelagtig analysestrategi at følge så præcist som muligt, hvordan humane og non-humane aktører bøjer verden for hinanden. Netværk er ikke et lille sluttet humant arrangement; det er det muligt uendelige sæt af mediatorer, som bestemmer tings størrelse eller udstrækning.

• MMD er optaget af, hvordan relationer medieres. Mange af disse relationer forekommer alene humane, men tale er skrøbelig; lyd forsvinder. Non-humane aktører skaber kontinuitet både som skemaer (tal, diagrammer, kalkulationer) og som fordeling og layout af kontorer og arbejdssteder. Non-humane aktører medierer ofte samarbejde.