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THE EXTRAORDINARY 2002 KOLKA
GLACIER-KARMADON ROCK/ICE
AVALANCHE AND SUBSEQUENTGLACIER/DEBRIS FLOW,
CAUCASUS MOUNTAINS, OSSETIA
REPUBLIC, RUSSIA
____________________________________________________
Stephen G. Evans,
University of Waterloo,
Waterloo, CANADA
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CASE HISTORIES AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT FOR
MOBILE,
VERY RAPID LANDSLIDES
1. POST-EVENT RECONSTRUCTION: INTERPRETATION OF
SEQUENCE, CHARACTERISTICS, AND GEOMETRY OF POST-
FAILURE PROCESSES (FIELD WORK, DIGITAL TERRAIN DATA,
REMOTE SENSING, SEISMOGRAMS, HYDRO-METEOROLOGICALDATA)
2. ATTEMPTS TO MODEL DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR BASED ON (1)
3. COMPARISON TO SIMILAR EVENTS (ANOMALIES ?)
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR HAZARD ASSESSMENT
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INITIAL FAILURE
MECHANISM/VOLUME
ENTRAINMENT
VOLUME
CONFINEMENTCAPRICIOUS JUMP
DISTAL FLOW
RUNOUT 2
DEPOSITIONAL
FAN RUNOUT 1
ELEMENTS OF
MOBILE, VERY RAPID
LANDSLIDE
PROCESSES
PREVIOUSEVENT
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Date of event : September 20, 2002
THE CASE OF THE 2002 KOLKA-KARMADON EVENT, CAUCASUS
MOUNTAINS, RUSSIA
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03/Oct/2001 27/Sept/2002
AST
ER
FalseColou
rImagery
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In
ternationalSpa
ceStationPhoto
graph
Octobe
r19/2002
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4380 m
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9/31image by Alexander Polkvoy
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WIDTH ~ 450 m
DEPTH ~ 275 m
SUPERELEVATION ~ 75 m
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SUMMARY GEOMETRY
Top of starting zone ~ 4350 m
Base of source slope ~ 3250 m
Elevation of Karmadon Gorge ~ 1320 m
Height of path to Gorge ~ 3030 m
Length of path to Gorge ~ 19 klm
Travel Angle to Gorge ~ 9 degrees
Average velocity ~ 91 m/s
Source Volume ~ 20 M cu m
Volume of Kolka Glacier ripped off ~ 110 M cu m
Volume of surficial material entrained in Genaldon
Valley ~ 20 M cu m
Total Volume ~ 150 M cu. m
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Earthquake-triggered 1970 Huascaran rock avalanche, Peruvian Andes
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1987 Parraguirre rock avalanche-debris flow, Chilean Andes
1959 Pandemonium Creek rock avalanche, Coast Mountains, B.C.
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N.B. Downstream limits of rock avalanche/debris flow not well
constrained in these cases
Comparative geometry of Kolka and similar historical
events since 1959
EVENT YEAR VOLUME
ESTIMATE
(M cu. m)
HEIGHT
(km)
LENGTH
(km)
H/L FAHRBOSCHUNG
(degrees)
Pandemonium 1959 7 2 8.6 0.23 13
Huascaran 1962 13 3.60 15.52 0.23 13Huascaran 1970 75-100 3.85 15.6 0.25 14
Parraguirre 1987 13 1.5 17 0.09 5
Kolka-Karmadon
2002 150 3.03 19 0.16 9
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CONCLUSIONS and IMPLICATIONS 1
1. Exemplifies catastrophic potential in glacierised
mountains
2. Comparable to 1959 Pandemonium Creek
(Canada), 1962 & 1970 Huascaran (Peru) and
1987 Parraguirre (Chile) events
3. Average velocity highly anomalous
4. Mechanism of Kolka Glacier entrainment still notclear.
5. Evidence of previous events
6. Potential exists in other valleys in the region with
glaciers and steep slopes in upper reaches
7. Difficulty in characterising true landslide geometry
(source vol., entrainment and distal flow limits)
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CONCLUSIONS and IMPLICATIONS 2
1. Initial volume and failure mechanism often quite
difficult to establish in high mountains2. Post-failure behaviour may involve and may be
influenced by entrainment
3. Entrainment may be massive.
4. Difficulty in characterising true landslide geometry
(entrainment and distal flow limits)
5. 3 and 4 pose modelling problems; true prediction (as
opposed to retrodiction) is possibly far off.
6. Hazard assessment for risk evaluation is conditioned
by this uncertainty
7. Previous events should be a very substantial warning
to the landslide specialist
_____________________________________
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1. NATO
2. Ministry of Natural Resources (Russian
Federation)
Oleg Zerkal
3. Igor Galushkin, Alexander Polkovoy, Elena
Pigareva, Andrei Goncharov, Olga Tutubalina
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