Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Research to Establish the Partnership between Practice and Education/Research in Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
平和構築の能力開発における実務と教育研究の連携を確立するための研究
Hiroshima University Partnership Projectfor Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
(HiPeCⅡ)
広島大学平和構築連携融合事業
HiPeC Discussion Paper Series Vol.12
Explaining Nepali DemocracyGanga Bahadur Thapa
ProfessorTribhuvan University
Email: [email protected]
November 15, 2011
HiPeC Discussion Paper Series Vol.12
Explaining Nepali Democracy
Ganga Bahadur Thapa
Professor of Politics
Tribhuvan University
Email: [email protected]
November 15, 2011
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form or any means without written
permission from author.
- 2 -
HiPeC Discussion Paper
Explaining Nepali Democracy
Ganga Bahadur Thapa
Professor
Tribhuvan University
Abstract: This paper takes a look at Nepal’s long road to democratic politics, and analyzes the
prospects for establishing a stable democratic future as the country lurches towards a more open
dispensation. When we look at Nepal’s political matrix, its course toward structural changes is
evident, especially in terms of the maneuvers to solve the country’s fundamental problems, ushering
in promising windows of opportunity for institutionalizing constitutional reform, creating new state
institutions, and setting up rule of law and democratic pluralism. But it remains a parliamentary
oligarchy with superficial democratic elements, in which a few elites hold sway over political and
economic destiny against the people’s will. Part of the problem is that while on the one hand Nepal
glorifies the work of social movements, it on the other hand fails to exercise critical judgment at the
crucial moments.
Setting the stage
Successful examples of a simple and safe evolution from despotism to democracy are rare. Yet it is
safe to say that the swift demise of a monarchy that relied upon formidable patronage dispensation
in a country ostensibly embedded with paranoid and even repressive nationalism, in conjunction
with the creation of the constitutional assembly (CA) election that brought the Maoists to power, is
enough to qualify the Nepali case as a miracle. Factors like constitutional limitations, a
malfunctioning economy, fragmentation, foreign interference, polarization, lack of a democratic
mindset, absence of sound party system, the rise of race politics and self-fulfilling prophecies,
negative images of political leadership, and widely practiced patronage present major impediments
to compromise and throttle the growth of democracy. When we look at Nepal's political matrix,
however, its course toward structural changes is evident, especially in terms of the maneuvers to
solve the country’s fundamental problems, which ushered in a promising windows of opportunity
for constitutional reform and the creation of new state institutions to set up rule of law and
democratic pluralism. One encouraging element is the transformation of the system towards
consensual politics, especially considering the Maoists' unusual path to democracy via the ballot
box. The strategic shift to electoral politics was a radical change in perspective.
- 3 -
It will take many years to consolidate political change into substantive shifts in social attitudes and
economic gains. These transformations can, in turn, prompt a holistic and coherent political sphere,
as well as generating the political capital to articulate a path for the country, including a political
system that is inclusive, responsive, and commits citizens to act normatively, responsibly and in the
name of public good. Political consolidation can also produce a well governed state and
deliberative politics wherein political discourse is free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
class and gender.1 (Wright 2008).Unfortunately, Nepali politics currently seems increasingly caught
in a dysfunctional political equilibrium, and is characterized by shouting, slogans and large doses of
sheer nonsense.
It goes without saying that man does not live by bread alone. But, without sufficient desire,
commitment and courage to bring about political, economic and social change, it is not clear what
else can lead to seek peace, democracy, freedom and justice. Even if democracy’s conceptual
vagueness is satisfactorily clarified, the core objective of the political system is often misconstrued.
In any democratic society, from Periclean Athens which allowed only male citizens to vote to the
present 21st century when liberty and equality are paramount issues, state policies are determined
not by the people but by their representatives.2 Today, while in a democracy there exist other
vehicles through which citizens pursue their interests—such as nongovernmental organizations,
interest groups, and social movements – the core of democratic representation3 (Mainwaring,
1 Joseph Wright, “Political Participation and Democratic Stability in New Democracies”, British Journal of
Political Science, 38 (2008), 221- 245.
2 Some argue that guaranteeing civil and political rights and participation is the core feature of deliberative
politics, referencing the centrality of conversation and debate in democratic politics. Good governance is the
minimum in this framework. This argument implies that political participation is the critical link between a
nation’s citizenry and the governing process. As such, the concept of government, good governance and
democratic governance do not have the same meaning.2 Just stressing core values does not mean much for
culturally plural societies because in these societies the state is not just supposed to ensure participation but
also has to evolve a system in which people of diverse groups can freely participate. UNDP defines a state
with good governance in terms of eight characteristics: participatory, consensus-oriented, efficient and
effective, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, accountable and having rule of law. UNDP.(1997),
Reconceptualizing Governance, UNDP, New York, p 9 3
Scott Mainwaring’s(2006) famous study ‘The Crisis of Representation in the Andes’ notes that the
legitimacy and stability of a country's democratic representation are continuous variables. A crisis of
democratic representation refers to the end of this continuum where patterns of representation are unstable
and citizens believe that they are not well represented. Such a crisis can be gauged by both attitudinal and
behavioral indicators. The attitudinal indicators involve citizen perceptions: large numbers of citizens are
- 4 -
Bejarno, Longomez 2006) lies in the relationship between citizens, on the one hand, and elected
politicians, parties, and assemblies, on the other.4
Even if Jana Andolan II (People-powered movement, 2006) was the manifestation of classic left-
wing populism that persuaded the government to play a role in social cohesion, it is reasonable to
utilize its success to facilitate a transition to multiparty democracy. The transition was achieved not
through the collapse of monarchy but by agreement among key political actors; democracy is not
‘the only game in town’. The absence of historical antecedents for democratic governance has
given rise to suspicion within Nepal, even as the end of Maoists insurgency has demonstrated that
Marx's deterministic view of history was grossly mistaken. Again, the question is whether the
parties can be inclusive and disciplined while integrating socio-and-ethno-cultural identities and
interests, and also develop a political will that reflects the shift in society’s preferences. After all,
there is a wide gulf between democratic awakening and democratic empowerment. The post-
monarchy rule has amply demonstrated that although the pluralist interests of the people are
articulated freely without fear of repression, the political order that has gained foothold can at best
be called a ‘manipulated’ democracy. In fact, Nepal has seen so many different transitions that
what seems written in stone at one particular time may be completely irrelevant at another.
The two decades that followed the collapse of authoritarian monarchy—an auspicious opening for a
transition toward democracy—have bestowed hitherto unimaginable opportunities to establish a
national political system that draws its authority from the citizenry, and provides for popular
accountability democracy, freedom, stability and modernity so that citizens can live their own lives
and pursue their own interests. There have been opportunities to make the country more vibrant and
dynamic, to impel the government to govern less and serve diverse interests among the population,
to develop accompanying equal rights for all citizens, and to encourage mechanisms of
accountability and participation. However, enough people realize that the perennial problems of
order such as a dominant state and powerless, fragmented society, remains largely in place. There is
but a narrow ray of light shining on the gloom that envelops Nepal today, and in that ray we can see
a growing sense of insecurity and sense of unease about the future.
dissatisfied with the way in which they are represented, or they do not feel represented at all. The behavioral
indicators are actions by citizens rejecting existing mechanisms of democratic representation—for example,
withdrawing from electoral participation, voting for new parties, especially antiestablishment ones, voting for
political outsiders, turning to antisystem popular mobilization efforts, or joining revolutionary struggles. 4 The essays in this book analyze and explain the crisis of democratic representation in five Andean countries:
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In this region, disaffection with democracy, political
parties, and legislatures has spread to an alarming degree.
- 5 -
Nepal is a new democracy with a long history of authoritarianism. With the end of monarchy, the
formidable obstacle and/or the arch-enemy of democracy that amassed unlimited powers in its
name and acted ostensibly for the state’s cause marked a breakthrough in the evolution of political
process. No one has thus far questioned the broad goals of an inclusive democracy that delivers
good governance based on the principles of political pluralism, rule of law, constitutional
supremacy, basic human rights and freedom, an independent justice system, etc. Within the bitter
acrimony and wide divergence of opinion among Nepali politicians, they do not exchange views on
the most important issues facing the country; it remains doubtful that they will find agreement on a
constitution that is accepted by broad cross-sections of Nepali society. Nepal is not yet ready to
break the constitutional ice. Thus, the question is not whether the constitution5 will be drafted by
August 2011, but whether the seventh constitution will cultivate multiculturalism while
simultaneously securing individual rights and liberties, and foster peacekeeping with political
institutions that will be more durable than all previous six constitutions over the last six decades. In
other words, the key evaluative point is not whether the Constitutional Assembly finishes
negotiations before the deadline, but rather whether the content of the new constitution is
effectively addresses Nepal’s most serious social and political issues. As of this writing, no party
on the left or the right has figured out how to accomplish this worthy goal. The outcome of that
particular process is in fact still years down the road. The reason for their differences in opinion is
simple: inter-party politics. The parliamentary parties, who have been seeking an Indian-style
parliamentary democracy since 1991, are pitted against the Maoists and other communist groups,
who accuse the parliamentary parties for their failure to make democracy relevant to the needs of
the people.
The restructuring of the state after the downfall of the monarchy should be understood as an
emergence of a new political reality with the potential for social mobilization for radical changes
enabling previously marginalized and muzzled people to participate directly in governance. Yet a
fundamental tension in contemporary Nepal is that at precisely the time when the country requires
political actors to rise above petty political interests and seek comprehensive domestic revival,
these very actors are mired in political squabbles resulting in the current deeply pessimistic
situation. Political actors often speak of accountability, but that rarely gets translated into genuine
commitment. The basic problem isn’t leadership or infighting. Their basic problem is that they are
too self-centered and incompetent to understand the damage they are propagating. They have no
plausible vision of how to fix the modern liberal nation-state. The challenges they face are
enormous, and the political will to face them does not, and cannot, originate in a vacuum.
5
Earlier it was the Monarchy which would ultimately grant, restore, and reestablish democracy or a
constitution.
- 6 -
Certainly no political system is perfect in achieving total national unity and eliminating all endemic
conflicts. Zakaria6 argues that unfettered political competition
7dooms new democratic regimes
because the new institutions cannot cope with the competing socioeconomic and political demands
of all organized sectors of society. Zakaria cites a handful of examples of how unrestrained political
competition led to the election of future demagogues, with Hitler’s rise from the Weimer
democracy being the most prominent, and more recent examples including Peru’s Fujimori and
Venezuela’s Chavez. The logic of this argument is somewhat relevant in Nepal,8 but we suspect
that if unfettered political competition gives rise to autocratic leaders and illiberal political system,
how a new democracy is fostered by restricting democratic competition and make new democracies
more stable.9 In addition, Linz and Stepan’s approach in their studies of democratic regimes
correctly notes that in the absence of favorable institutional conditions democratic consolidation
evolves not linearly but with bifurcations, obstacles, structural constraints and reversals.10
It is
logical to expect that it is easier to bring down an autocracy than to construct and consolidate a
democratic regime.
When conflict occurs in a truly pluralist society it in general reflects temporary institutional
disequilibrium, but does not threaten integral societal norms. To the extent such a characterization
is true. When we look at the functioning democracies, we realize that democracy cannot stand
alone, either conceptually or practically, in the context of social and cultural conditions hostile to
democratic citizenship. Yet undoubtedly, elections are crucial in the democratization process; they
6 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, (New York: W. W
Norton, 2003).
7 All modernization theorists who first developed a theoretical link between level of development and
democracy as well as empirical studies have since found that the levels of development and democracy are
positively correlated. Mobilization has long been recognized as an important determinant of political
participation, yet the term political competition has been used to capture many concepts, such as from
contested elections, to who can participate in the elections.
8 The example is Nepal under the late GP Koirala rule, the first man of the people to hold unlimited federal
powers in a notoriously divided society. It is ironic that Koirala is termed a “democrat”, whereas it is widely
believed that he was one of the country’s most corrupt politicians, who successfully endeavored to hold onto
power by hook or by crook, through his crude, callous and somewhat megalomaniacal exercise of power. He
is seen as someone who made grandiose promises while in power but seldom delivered, and if anything
subsequently worked to undermine democracy.
9 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
10 Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1979).
- 7 -
are yet more important for the installation, legitimization and empowerment, at least procedurally,
in the transition form authoritarianism to a new democratic regime, what scholars characterize as a
system of ‘dynamic institutional understanding for democratization,’ which enables the citizens to
exercise power through participation and to assess their capacity to govern by themselves.
A key finding of democratization literature is that while even though contested elections do not
necessary mean free and fair elections, political participation is yet the critical link between a
nation’s citizenry and the governing process. Nepal’s political route is not a model of consistency.
It is the result of elite bargaining, and what scholars call a “top-down “transition.11
In the Nepali
case, there is no guarantee that even meaningful change will be positive change. It should be noted
that every society has its bad actors and needs an established (and accountable) authority to deal
with them. As it was, the outcome of each political movement offered different opportunities to
expand democracy, thus making it difficult to ascertain whether positive peace can be realized.
Brief political history
Understanding the democratic transition in Nepal requires an understanding of the country’s past
history as well as present events. An important structural factor in Nepal’s democratic trajectory is
the historical evolution of various forms of indigenous governance at the time when most of South
Asia was under colonial rule.12
To briefly summarize, ever since Nepal became a political entity
through military conquest by the Gorkha ruler in 1768, its history can be divided into five main
parts. First was the military monarchies under the Shah Kings—the royal autocracy (1768-1846) –
when the political system was essentially militarist in character. This was followed by a Rana
oligarchy (1846-1950). The Rana was one of the ruling clans, which usurped powers from the Shah
Kings by the kot parva (Kot Massacre) and the Shah Kings were imprisoned. The Rana oligarchy
established their own hereditary line of prime ministers, combining the roles of head of government
11
We recognize that the effects of three political variables such as democracy and political freedom, election
systems, and electoral competition are more explicitly concerned with the emergence of democratic regimes.
If the outcomes had been different, democratization would have been seriously set back. 12
Thus, Nepal has neither the colonial experience of institution-building nor the infrastructure for economic
development that accompanied colonization. Instead, political and economic institutions were permitted by
hereditary monarchies so long as they posed no threat to the monopoly of the ruling class over state power
and resources. Despite being a prosperous and thriving route for trade between India and China, Nepali rulers
were able to maintain total isolation from the rest of the world until the 1950s. This isolation played a major
role in shaping the evolution of the Nepali society and polity. An important element of the isolationist policy
was a total ban on education, giving rulers total domination over the Nepalese people.
- 8 -
with that of military commander. The first democratic opening came about in February, 1951 as a
result of a people’s movement and Indian intervention. A limited democratic institutional
framework was introduced under the Interim Government of Nepal Act 1951. This framework
marked a third decisive phase, which increased hopes that a functioning democracy could emerge
for the first time in country’s history.
There is no single route to democratization, yet there are several pre-conditions for democratic
transition between elections.13
These democratic initiatives were strongly resisted by King
Tribhuvan, who never fulfilled his promise to hold CA elections. He rather amended the 1951 Act
to revive and institutionalize an absolute monarchy. One complicating factor was the bourgeois
parties continued dependence on royal power as state institutions had virtually no influence. The
political parties that were weaker opponents of demands for greater political participation. In some
cases, monarchy was encouraged became aggressive and expansive whereas in others the regime
was constrained by geopolitical factors.
In 1959, nine political parties contested the first parliamentary election and the Nepali Congress
(NC) won an overwhelming majority. Although the newly elected government did contain a
relatively high degree of political competition and strove to consolidate parliamentary governance
through democratic means, a major blow came on 15 December 1960, when King Mahendra
scrapped the elected parliament14
with the support of the army and police, and exercised emergency
powers. This system prevailed until 1990. This thirty year period consisted of nonparty politics
under the Panchayat system, or an assertive monarchy where Shah Kings extended their absolute
rule that centralized the powers in the king. All party related activities were banned, and thus
development of any of the theorized intervening variables that might link hope for economic
development to democratization and Western liberalism were doomed. Eventually, as traditional
and authoritarian elites became more dispensable, they also became weaker opponents of demands
for greater political participation. For instance, a 1979 student uprising forced King Birendra to
introduce political reforms by offering, in a national referendum, the choice between a reformed
nonparty Panchayat regime15
or multiparty democracy. The referendum, held on May 2, 1980
13
For example, a vibrant civil society, previous traditions, whether actual or remembered, of representation,
pluralism, tolerance, and individualism, a limited role of religion; and an effective institutional framework for
a multi-party system are important. Where these conditions exist, a transition to democracy can succeed;
where they are missing, the chances for a transition to a consolidated democracy are slim. Nepal,
unfortunately, seems to mirror the latter case. 14
In Nepal, parliament was repeatedly dissolved by the monarchy and frequently clashed with the political
leaders, especially when democratic elections opened up possibilities for radical change. 15
Some political scientists have defined new political regimes as repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional
or competitive.
- 9 -
returned the Panchayat with a slim majority of 55 percent, but the Third Amendment of the
Constitution that followed incorporated some democratic norms—adult franchise and direct
elections for the legislature. However, in the face of strong opposition from conservative forces the
outcome was unexpectedly negative and significant. Even though elections were held, for example
in 1981 and 1986, they were cosmetic political games more than genuine institutions reflecting
pluralism, democracy or electoral competition.
The authoritarian politics of the Panchayat regime crumbled in the face of a 1990 people-powered
movement popularly known as Jana Andolan I led by bourgeois prodemocracy forces along with an
assortment of different communist factions committed to restoring multiparty politics. This period
was the beginning of institutional democratic governance. The transformation from nonparty
politics to a multiparty system was indeed a striking phenomenon that fundamentally changed the
Nepali political system in three important ways: it transferred sovereignty from the king to the
people; instituted a parliamentary form of government; and constitutionally guaranteed the
democratic and human rights of the people. The Constitution framed after 1990 was a compromise
between three political forces: the traditional monarchy, the NC, and the communists, yet it
provided for rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of basic freedoms of speech,
assembly, religion and property. It also recognized diversity among the people. In a country in
which the monarch had wielded absolute power for over two centuries, the 1990 political change
signified the beginning of a new stage in Nepali politics.16
Another important dimension that made the Nepali case so particularly distinctive and complex was
King Gyanendra's October 2002 intervention and the putsche of February, 2005.The country’s
transition to democracy and a functioning market economy reverted to a neo-authoritarian system
and the course of democratization was blocked. Different kinds of authoritarianism and democracy
certainly exist; consider as an extreme case the oxymoronic 'pseudo-democracy' or 'authoritarian
democracy' invented by Chilean dictator Pinochet to characterize his regime. Under the King’s
regime, there was resurgence in the traditional bases of power, in particular the power concentrated
in the King’s hands. This regime had elements of militarism, absolutism, and arbitrariness, with
rubber-stamp institutions. Nepal’s governance at this time could be characterized as a ‘quasi-
terrorist autocracy’ or a ‘personalist-autocracy’, indicating that the situation had fled out of the
16
Recall that Nepal have had six constitutions between 1948 and 2008 and two political interregnums, after
the ‘third wave’ in 1990 and 2006 due to the political gulf between the main elites, various insurgencies,
belligerent character of transitional regimes, and Maoists’ diversionary manipulations (also see Appendix A).
This observation can be seen associated with the evolution of a state in which a few privileged groups that
have a vested interest in preserving the status quo encouraged centralization of resources and policymaking
powers over the past two or more centuries.
- 10 -
hands of the prodemocratic forces.17
The Maoists’ ‘war of liberation’ was a contributing factor to
Nepal’s halting the process of democratization, which not only polarized Nepali society, but it also
gave the King an opportunity to further consolidate his power under the guise of providing
security.18
There is no doubt that the King took advantage of fragmentation among the democratic
forces and the instability and violence the Maoist insurgency caused, but the monarchy was also
looking for an opportunity to establish its political worth not as a constitutional head but as a real
power holder and operator.
It may be pointed out that the ongoing attempts from April, 2006 to reestablish democracy in Nepal
are considerably different in comparison to earlier periods.19
The present phase of building
democracy is different at least in three ways: In April 2006 it was the democratic forces along with
the Maoist insurgents which forced the monarchy to quit from power and hand over it to the
democratic forces. The impetus for a democratic republic came primarily from an indigenous
groundswell in which the reformers were sufficiently powerful to break down the old order. King
Gyanendra tried to suppress the movement by use of force, but it could not withstand the pressure
of the democratic movement backed by the Maoists.20
Secondly, now is the first time that the
17
Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 18
The monarchy was seeking an opportunity to establish its political worth not as a constitutional head but as
a real power holder and operator. Yet inability of the political parties in managing governmental affairs and
internal political and socio-economic contradictions, particularly state and bureaucratic power, continued to
be virtually monopolized by a small elite. For example, real power resided with party bosses and their
henchmen, who functioned as ‘fascist revolutionaries’, rather creating a free, fair and formidable democratic
society. This process further proved to be detrimental to democratic institutionalization. This situation paved
a way for both the consolidation of monarchy and Maoists. 19
In fact, the depth and breadth of people’s involvement came out vividly during the so-called people’s war
led by the Maoists during 1996-2006 successfully brought on board the hitherto neglected demands of
progress, justice and inclusion in public discourse and state policies. It was in 1950 that democracy first came
to Nepal, and this attempt failed after a few years of political competition. The situation remained uncertain
during the whole of the fifties. For a brief interlude in 1959 parliamentary democracy was installed, but a
1960 royal takeover reversed the process. Than for a long period between 1962-1990 the monarchical
panchayat system was in operation. The 1990 democratic movement was a big success and multiparty
democracy was established in the country. But the democratic elite could not take advantage of the situation
in building a structural and procedural foundation for the institutionalization of democracy in the country. 20
It was towards the end of the year 2005 that an understanding began to develop between Maoists and the
pro-parliamentary parties known as Seven Party Alliances (SPA). Various consultations took place in Nepal
and at New Delhi among the Maoist and SPA leaders. On the basis of these consultations the SPA and
- 11 -
question of fundamentally restructuring Nepali society and polity21
has actually been raised. Third,
and most significant both symbolically and politically, is the CA election of April 10, 2008 which
abolished the 240-year old feudal monarchy and converted Nepal from monarchy to a federal22
secular democratic republic. With regard to the federal structure the CA Committee on State
Restructuring and Distribution of State Powers had proposed 14 provinces to be established, as
shown in the map below:
Proposed Federal Structure
Source: Adopted from Ganga Bahadur Thapa and Jan Sharma. (2011). “Nepal's Democratic Deficit
and Federalism: Is it a cure or part of the problem” in Lex Locails--Journal of Local Self
Government, (Maribor Slovenia: Institute for Local self-Government and Public Procurement) 9(1)
January, pp 39-66
Maoists reached a 12 point understanding on 17 November 2005. The 12 point understanding emphasized
restructuring of the Nepali state. It was a major break-through towards Maoists joining SPA for a peaceful
struggle, achieved despite pressure from some international forces which cautioned the political parties of
Nepal not to enter into any collaboration with the Maoists. 21
It is the first time that the question of restructuring of the state has been raised, initially by the Maoists and
later supported by the SPA. The issue of restructuring of state involves the formation of a liberal–democratic
state, Republication State, Multi-structured State, Secular State or Federal State. 22
It is yet an open question whether federal or unitary systems offer more stability. Although federalism is
not be of the panacea like many have argued, people everywhere tend to believe that their way is better than
that of others. This sort of ethnocentrism arises naturally among all people and in all cultures.
- 12 -
Understanding the Maoist Conflict
There have been conflicting interpretations of the Maoist insurgency. For some, it is simply
terrorism; to the Maoists, it is a peasant uprising against a feudal order. For other members of
Nepali society, it is a case of ‘revolutionary romanticism.’ It is also viewed as either a communist
revolution or as an ethnic alliance against high-caste Hindu-dominated political elites. These
conflicting interpretations are in part due to fundamental differences among socially and politically
conscious groups over the allocation of societal resources, .lack of power and self-esteem, ethnic
discrimination, socio-economic deprivation, disenfranchisement, and a legacy of slavery and social
hierarchy. Practical problems are most likely to emerge when one tries to mix cases of political
violence23
with a democratization rationale. The most troublesome situation arises when there are
meaningful relationships between political violence and the impetus for democratization. In this
case, rival explanations about the origin of political violence will negatively affect the
democratization process. The Maoists insurgency must be seen as multidimensional phenomenon—
economic, political, cultural and psychological—indeed as a total social fact. The Maoist’s 40-point
demands24
submitted to the then Nepali government in 1996 have three key dimensions—people-
23 In democracy people do not have to go to war to change their government, instead they can vote it out of
office at election time. But if a political system is based on forceful repression, they have the right to regain
their freedom by force.
24 For example, it called for an end to the special privileges of the king and the royal family. It also sought an
end to social and political inequalities, ethnic/caste disparities, and discrimination against minorities and
disadvantaged groups. Economically, insurgent demands included a nationalization of private property and a
redistribution of land to the landless through revolutionary land reforms. In foreign relations, the insurgents
wanted to redefine Nepal’s relations with India by abrogating all ‘unequal treaties’ with India and a halt on
the recruitment of Nepali hill people to Indian and British armies. This agenda tapped into deep-rooted
concerns in the society and goes some way towards explaining the rapid spread of Maoist influence across
the country. Unlike secessionist movements elsewhere in South Asia, the Maoist insurgency is an internal
political conflict in which both sides battled to control state power. The existence of the state itself was not
under threat because none of the conflicting parties had the ambition to change the borders or the population
structure. Their demands include: (a) Abrogate all unequal agreement with India including 1950 Peace and
Friendship Treaty; (b) Control and regulate Nepal-India open border; (c) Close Gorkha Recruitment centers
and create dignified employment within the country; (d) Provide employment to all Nepalese, and employ the
foreigners if unavoidable only under work permit system; (e) Stop imperialistic and expansionist culture; (f)
Establish a Constitution through elected representatives; (g) Abolish the privileges of the King and the royal
family; (h) Establish control of the people over army, police and administration; (i) Declare Nepal a secular
state; (j) Allow a share of the paternal property to daughters; (k) Distribute the land to the tillers and excess
- 13 -
centered governance, a self-reliant economy, and nationhood – which not coincidentally constitute
the central axes of political debate today.25
Restructuring of the state and government are new
political realities, as is the presence of social mobilization for radical change which enables
marginalized to participate in governance.
Nepal has also faced internal conflicts over the past several decades, most significantly the full-
blown insurgency that burst into the open with the launch of the janayudhha (people’s war) on
February 13, 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (the Maoists). This marked the
beginning of a protracted conflict considered by the Maoists as a ‘war of liberation’. It was led by
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by his nom de guerre ‘Comrade Prachanda’, who commanded
the most radical offshoot of left-wing Nepali politics.
We make no attempt to introduce all of the potentially relevant variables in Nepal’s most recent
regime change. Politically, the Maoists called for an end to the special privileges of the King and
royal family. They also sought an end to social and political inequalities, ethnic/caste disparities,
and discrimination against minorities and disadvantaged groups. Economic demands included
nationalization of private property and redistribution of land to the landless through revolutionary
reforms. In foreign relations, Maoists wanted to redefine Nepal’s relations with India by abrogating
all ‘unequal treaties’ with India and putting a halt on the recruitment of Nepali hill people to Indian
and British armies.
land to the landless; (l) Confiscate the property of the exploiting capitalistic class for ultimate nationalization
and so on. Some other high profile Maoist demands included the drafting of a new republican constitution
through a constituent assembly and radical redistribution of land and property. At the same time, the issues
fuelling the conflict include the regional imbalance in the distribution of resources in hills, tarai (flat land
bordering India) region, cities, and villages, social and political inequalities, ethnic/caste frustrations,
discrimination against minorities and disadvantaged who get little or no share in the military, police or civil
services and are excluded from the national mainstream.
25 One of the radical factions within the multiparty process was the Samyukta Janamorcha (United People’s
Front, UPF) which emerged as the third largest party in the 1991 parliamentary elections, winning 9 seats in
the 205-member House of Representatives. Differences between its leaders, Baburam Bhattarai and Niranjan
Govind Vaidya, led to its split on the eve of the 1994 mid-term elections. The Bhattarai faction boycotted the
election while Vaidya’s failed to win a single seat. Prachanda, who had been leading the Mashal faction (a
radical branch of the communist party and Bhattarai joined together to form the CPN-M in 1995. The
people’s war initially started in February 1996 in the three western hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum, and
Jajarkot. Politically, it sought an end to the feudal rule of monarchy by establishing a secular state, or more
accurately, a communist state, through the Constituent Assembly which would draft a completely new
constitution.
- 14 -
The international community and scholars continue to harbor suspicion that the Maoist may have
hidden agenda of turning Nepal into a radical state or creating a ‘monolithic regime.’ But we do not
think the agenda is (or ever was) hidden. Maoists ultimately had their eyes trained on the creation
of a classless society. But they see is as something in the distant future, to be attained stage by stage.
For now, they want to encourage foreign assisted capitalist development as a precursor to
socialism.26
On the other hand, unlike secessionist movements elsewhere in South Asia, the Maoist
insurgency was essentially an internal political conflict27
, resulting from centuries of political
neglect, a divisive social system, and a long conflict-ridden Nepali history in which both sides were
battling to change or maintain the status quo of power structures within the state. Thus, the
existence of the state itself was not threatened, because none of the conflicting parties had the
ambition to change its borders or population structure.28
The Maoists’ dominance in rural areas was
formidable where the government had either withdrawn or was forced out. The insurgents’ three
strategic paths were intertwined in practice—strategic defence (guerrilla warfare), power balance
(sustained face-to-face confrontation with the state security forces), and final assault (armed
26
The electoral participation of Maoists opens the prospect for democratic development, although the
intricate political realities on the ground complicate everything. The Maoists have entered a new era and no
longer have the power to threaten democratic order. They have incredible confidence in their own abilities
and that their messages can move the masses. Nepali Maoists continue to maintain that significant changes
are underway in the Communist movement. 27
Obviously, the Maoists are reported to have received support from People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh
and Maoist Coordination centre in Bihar of India and they have crucial links with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka. They have also received training from these groups in India as “international
ideological cousins” of the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM). They are also the key constituents
of Coordination Centre of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), an umbrella
organization of South Asian rebels that cooperates with each other for advancing their common goals. The
training and fiscal support received from these groups, however, cannot account for the longevity and
enduring strength of the Maoist movement in Nepal. On the other hand, they also benefited militarily from
the extensively-trained retired British Army Gorkhas who inhabit many of the Maoist-controlled regions
throughout the country. 28
Anand Aditya (2002) advances the argument of six major characteristics of the insurgency: (a)
revolutionary in nature with a definite objective; (b) fairly long history; (c) a specific territorial base; (d)
ability to carve a certain niche in the political space of the land; (e) leaders of the movement have ability to
draw public attention; and (f) movement with support base in the neighborhood and links overseas. During
the decade-long insurgency over 15,000 people, mainly including security personnel and insurgents but also
civilians, have lost their lives.
- 15 -
rebellion aimed at seizing power).Additionally, no matter how devastating the insurgency was, the
events that followed its aftermath undeniably legitimize the Maoists.29
Discussion
Conceptually, democracy is a configuration of governance modeled by the general values, nuances,
and even biases of a culture. Mainwaring30
argues that stable democracy in plural societies requires
political parties to be an agent for democratic transformation. Scholars of public affairs often debate
which level of government can best provide services to the citizens. Lijphart31
argues that federal
arrangements and a consociational system of democracy are most appropriate for societies that are
geographically large, and ethnically or linguistically diverse. This type of political system supplies
regular constitutional opportunities to change governing officials, and a social mechanism which
permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among
contenders for political office.32
Countries are much more likely to achieve a stable democracy if
they can identify and embrace political leaders who won't be tempted to roll back to the old order.
However, when power resides firmly and solely at the helm, and where leadership succession is
highly resistant to reform, even political ideology dances to the leader's tune and the few continue to
maneuver all the resources undermining the sovereignty and welfare of the many. The Nepali case
shows that this would ensure privatization of the state with perpetual risk of reversal to
authoritarianism.33
Returning for a moment to the political model, much ink has been spilled over
whether presidential or parliamentary systems offer political stability. Although scholars may find
cases during the post–cold war period ‘electoral authoritarianism’ became the modal form of
29
Ganga Bahadur Thapa,' The Nepalese Dilemma: Conflict and Crisis in Democracy', Readings on
Governance and Development (Kathmandu: Institute of Governance and Development, 2006), 42-61.
30 Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarno and Eduardo Pizzaro Longomez, The Crisis of Democratic
Representation in the Andes (Stanford University Press, 2006).
31 Arend Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy: Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice
(Rutledge: New York, 2008).
32 Karen Rasler and William R Thompson, “The Democratic Peace and a Sequential Reciprocal, Causal
Arrow Hypothesis” Comparative Political Studies, 37(8), 879-908.
33 Deservedly, a fundamental leitmotiv for constitution-making is in the notion of global values, most
preeminent being liberty and equality to enhance democratic legitimacy; yet politicians do good for the
country only when they are motivated by high moral precepts, have genuine sense of service and are
accountable to the electorate.
- 16 -
nondemocratic government in the developing world,34
the trouble is, Nepali politicians are full of
drifting dreamers, with no clear ambitions or plan for reaching them. It is not clear when the
politicians will stop playing their games and try to tackle the very real problems.
Marx believed that the proletarian class could form a revolutionary force sufficiently capable of
introducing new values and drastic social changes for rationally defined national interests by
utilizing a committed citizenry so no single group would be able to usurp power to distribute wealth
and opportunities in its favor. However, the road to the collapse of Marxist regimes from the 1917
Russian Revolution to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was paved by its unrealistic
ideology and economic nationalism. Some analysts see the absence of a strong central party as
central to the crisis of the political party system in Nepal,35
yet the interminable struggles within the
parties often appear more driven by opportunism than ideological differences, culminating in
schisms, scandal, and declining support. All political forces—radical or moderate, national or
regional, old or new—continued to be overshadowed by the individual personalities of the upper
class coterie dominating party politics. The party rank and file have little say in party affairs which
has aggravated the crisis of democratic participation. Even if we assume that Jana Andolan II in
2006 was the manifestation of classic left-wing populism that persuaded the government to play a
role in organizing some form of social cohesion (i.e. welfare) it is unclear that the left received
greater benefits. From a purely analytical perspective, those on the right side of the ideological
spectrum in Nepal are less fragmented than the left side, perhaps because the right did not have
many realistic alternative choices and thus united. The left often benefitted from the mistakes of the
right as much as their own efforts. On the other hand we find that leftist voters remain loyal to the
parties regardless of the fact that their interests were hurt and their values disregarded.
Much of the literature presumes that states can fail because of external shocks or internal or
external decay. Afghanistan and Angola collapsed when their colonial lords withdrew. Sierra Leone
and Congo were looted into putrescence, inviting rebellion and ultimate collapse. However,
Western Europe and Scandinavia have long been shining examples of social democracy, where
people are provided not only with high standards of living but many egalitarian and equitable
services. Undeniably, the difficulties in creating multicultural developmental democracy, including
an equalitarian democratization of the economy, are numerous and interrelated, particularly so in
34
Jason Brownlee, “Executive Elections in the Arab World: When and How Do They Matter” Comparative
Political Studies 44(2011), 807-828 DOI: 10.1177/0010414011402034.
35 Other than sect-based parties, Nepal is home to a rich array of political groups ranging from those devoted
to democratic order to those who follow the role model like Peru’s Senderosa Luminosa. Still others
propound extra-constitutional methods and outright subversion. Clearly from the fall of Berlin wall and
breakup of the Soviet Union, many expected that the days of the left-wing radicalism were over; in Nepal it is
flourishing.
- 17 -
transitional circumstances when social conditions do not clearly determine the nature of a political
system.36
Similarly, conflicts among different ideological interests are far more integral to the
accepted fundamental values of liberal democracy propounded by philosophers, most notably
Rawls who defended the liberal state as a self-conscious political mode to pave the way for
common citizens to empower themselves both institutionally and substantively so as to help sustain
and improve democracy.37
Nepal, being small and beautiful, can also be a role model. But the
major problems that have plagued the country and raised doubts about democracy relate to two
potential superficialities—the lack of competence and creative consensus—and four potential
susceptibilities—party tyranny, propaganda politics, subtle domination by a few elite minorities,
and mass apathy.38
It is important to recall that the absence of historical antecedents for democratic
governance gives rise to suspicion of the troubles that lie ahead, even if the end of the 'people's war'
demonstrates that Marx's deterministic view of history was grossly mistaken. Nobody can say
where all this will end, but the old days of socialist fantasizing are gone for good.
Citizens ordinarily pay only cursory attention to politics and involve themselves minimally;
nevertheless they can make coherent political ideas and even appreciate the core ideas of liberalism
and conservatism in organizing their political responses. But, the process of peace-building requires
addressing the root causes of conflict, and its success relies heavily on the political will of domestic
political actors. These actors must work out some sort of compromise to sustain the democratic
process; nothing is automatic. Any particular crisis also needs to be understood not only in terms of
immediate political economic concerns but also historically and in social context. We must look at
how a crisis reshapes state institutions and forms new ideologies. Through such analysis, we can see
the CA election as a watershed moment in Nepali politics actualizing the devolution of authority,
and efficiently designing institutions to give voice to the voiceless. This situation is precisely what
Dahl describes in terms of the ‘democratic paradox’, in which citizens have low faith in democratic
institutions but high esteem for democratic principles and ideals.39
36
Politics, of course, has been defined in many ways, from Laswell's famous dictum of ‘who gets what, when,
and how’ to the equally cynical notion associated with Machiavelli and later given a stamp of scientific
approval by adherents of Darwin, nothing more – or less – than competitive struggle for power conducted
between those at the top who care little for ideals, and even less for the comfort of their fellow citizens.
37 Johan Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
38 There is no evidence of strategic transferability from one situation to another, especially in terms of
socioeconomic and institutional factors, the most effective mechanism to mobilize support base for a
cohesive, non-polarized party system that moves toward a democracy associated with new meaning of civic
life.
39 Robeet A Dahl, On Political Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
- 18 -
Without doubt the abolition of monarchy — the beneficiary of fissiparous politics upon which the
coercive power of the state survived for centuries without accountability — was a magnificent
achievement.40
However, the Maoist’s actions and how they continue to adjust themselves into
society are matters of enduring concern. Nepal’s political future is largely dependent upon the
emerging class structure and class relations, as well as adequate representational rights for
marginalized communities to keep the country intact and realize economic and political reforms.
While Nepal’s political leaders have the reputation of being merchants of dreams, it is unclear how
they will sell the dream of ‘socioeconomic revolution’. This is not the first time the Nepali people
have been told about this dream. The last time they had heard about it was in the 1990s. Yet the
powerlessness of new rulers is so extreme that Nepal’s political transition reflects a contradiction—
a complicated interplay between continuity and change—in which continuity often imitates change
discrediting the very ideas of innovation and modernization. When we ponder Prezworski’s
observation that ‘democracy is a system in which parties lose elections’, Nepal is faced with the
challenge of redefining the people’s identity with reference to internal and external elements. It is
true that democracy can never be perfect; for it must always continue to evolve. Neither is
democracy universal.41
Unfortunately, the façade of the Nepali polity is focused on rituals of
political pomp rather than solving real-life problems.
The fact that Maoists leadership have transformed the party from a small group of obscure rebels to
major political stakeholders is no small feat. Despite their innate attachment to the rubric of
totalitarianism decelerating the growth of progressive elements necessary for enlightenment and
modernity, their remarkable achievements still need to be duly recognized. It's easy to get
discouraged and be negative about prospects for Nepali democracy, but it's so important to think
positive. However, without the state edifice of rules, rights, respect, and responsible to conduct
informed and uncensored public discussion over ideas to build a healthy, secure and reliable
economic and political environment, the chances of having what is now commonly referred as
‘institutional capacity’ are extremely murky. In the Nepali case, even a extraordinary degree of
political unity among political parties does not guarantee social and political transformation unless
the new constitution reflects a contract between the state and its citizenry. Like all contracts, it must
also contain provisions subject to negotiation and compromise, and be actively constructed and
positively maintained.
40
Maoists may have a hidden agenda of turning Nepal into a radical state. But politically, the Maoists have
entered a new era and no longer have the power to threaten democratic order. In addition, no matter how
devastating the insurgency was, the events that followed has legitimized it.
41 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
- 19 -
Equally significant is the reality that external influences remain politically influential in internally
weak countries. As for the external forces, it should be remembered that while India indeed may
not be a neighbor that sincerely sought the stability and prosperity of Nepal, the image of Indian
leaders is gradually being tarnished. Nepal’s other powerful neighbor China considered the
abrogation of the monarchy as an internal Nepali matter. There are numerous external factors and
actors in Nepal (even beyond the two powerhouses India and China) attempting to influence the
ongoing reconfiguration of the political order in the guise of working toward a new democratic
order. These forces do not attempt to strengthen state structures and institutions, instead they work
for their own benefit often derailing or reversing the process.
Nepal’s state is structured in a way that benefits a small set of elites and creates multiple
opportunities for the appropriation of public resources for private ends. For the most part, even the
country’s intellectual elite behaves like lapdogs. When a small elite dominates economic and
political decisions, the link between democracy and equity can be easily broken. It is not clear
when politicians will stop playing their games and try to tackle the very real economic problems. A
free-market economy42
cannot be the bare bones of socioeconomic progress for traditionally
disadvantaged groups, but there are still many who believe that Nepal needs to open its tent to
‘benevolent dictatorship’ or ‘repressive-responsive regime’ or an ‘authoritarian developmental state’
and reject the legitimacy of democratic systems of governance. The advocates of this view look to
the examples of Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea or elsewhere, which utilized the pretext that
ordinary people cannot be entrusted with power because it would corrupt them, and that economics
is a major stabilizing factor for society.
Some argue that democracy can be less popular than dictatorship. As traditional parties have eroded,
allowing a surge of left-wing popular mobilization, extremism of any kind cannot be an option for
Nepal. The emerging academic consensus is that political institutions not only breed a democratic
regime, but also their own political salience. Mere rapid economic growth cannot buy political
stability; political institutions also need to develop and mature equally rapidly. The irony of the
Nepali case is that there is no party with a solid plan to put politics on a proper track, let alone
remedy the country’s ills.43
Our own view is that a reappraisal of democracy as a form of
42
While it may be true that socialism insidiously robs people of the ability to rationalize and make sound
judgment, the correct political term for greed is capitalism. When a political system puts 95 percent of the
wealth in the hands of 5 percent of the population the rest of us have to do whatever we can just to feed our
children it's a larger systemic problem. 43
Democracy is an end in itself. The end is the process, not the policy goals of any particular individual or
party. While it is true that parties long in office use up their intellectual capital and can attract human
resources on what they can offer in terms of positions, pay, pensions and patronage. They also have
- 20 -
governance is necessary in order to have a clear and convincing break from its failed past, in
particular the political mobilization of ethnic identities, and politics of inventing cultural
nationalism in order to gain public trust. Nepal fails to critically appreciate its core problems
mainly because elites employ the politics of exclusion in order to impose their will on the people
through a fascist style of governance, with the singular aim of grabbing legitimate power. These
tactics have pushed the people out of their reach. The Maoists currently capitalize on the
shortcomings of these practices, but they are only one part of the problem. The monarchy in Nepal
never tried to accelerate socioeconomic and political reform that would contribute to the well-being
of the Nepali people; rather it acted as a brake or even a reverse gear.
Concluding comments
Modernization theorists argue that political and economic development will promote integration of
ethnic groups on the basis of national identities that override and displace what Almond and
Powell44
, Deutsch 45
and Huntington46
called "parochial" attachments. Yet, all pragmatic attempts
to resolve Nepal’s current problems would require an organized, inclusive and consciously
purposeful approach, a consistent policy and a unified vision aimed at tackling simmering
economic and political conflicts. Democracy works well on values and develops humane, flexible,
productive, and vigorous society. Sidney Verba and Norman H Nie 47
, for example, declare that
political participation is not only a privilege for everyone, but also a necessity in ensuring the
efficiency and prosperity of democratic system ‘if democracy is interpreted as rule by the people’.
Invariably, democracy collapses because the majority is tempted to hold and enhance their power
and the minority is lured to seize opportunity through distasteful ways. The perennial question is
how to create a political model that will become an integral part of the eventual constitutional order
or changing values. If power is too diffused, if policy is tainted by vested interests, or if there is
insufficient political will, neither democratic development nor other welfare objectives will be
promoted.
exclusive access to the communications tools and resources of a government to transmit their messages and
drown out those of their opponents.
44 Gabriel Almond and G Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics; a Developmental Approach (Boston: Little
Brown and Company, 1966).
45 Karl W Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level, reprinted in 1970 (Utah; Aardavark
Global Publishing Company, 1954).
46 Samuel P Huntington, Political Modernization (The Bibbs Merrill Reprinting Series, 1966).
47 Sidney Verba and Norman H Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, first
published in 1972 (The University of Chicago Press edition, 1987).
- 21 -
We know that Nepal’s dual transformation from war to peace, and from authoritarianism to
democracy faces stiff challenges. Some are a result of the country’s legacy of uneven economic and
political development, and others as the result of systemic problems in the governance process,
especially in creating an environment propitious for democratization. Time will reveal whether
Nepal ever becomes a true democracy in which the wants of the poor and powerless are realized. It
is too early to believe that a federal democratic constitution would bring about wonders. The poor
quality of discourse on complex issues like the ethnicization of conflicts, culture-based identity,
and assimilation of people’s liberation army (PLA)is indeed important, but the immediate problem
is how the political leadership advances liberal governance, and how the citizens (especially the
poor48
) can be incorporated into new policy platforms and social relationships of responsibility,
accountability, and participation.
Western theories and strategies regarding democracy and public management are not easily
implemented in contexts where economic and political environments are characterized by vast
information asymmetries, weak democratic traditions and limited administrative capacities. If
anything, Nepal’s new problems are caused below political expectations. There are other pitfalls
besides setting high expectations. There are frequent discussion of the need for good governance,
which is easier said than done. We have leaders who are sophomoric, irresponsible and downright
silly, chicken hawks, too self-centered and incompetent—all of them, as to come forward with an
agenda reforming the state, the most important issues of the country. For all these reasons and
others, we make claim that the question is not whether the people are ready to have a democratic
republic (they are), but whether the rulers are.
In transitional democracies where democracy is not the only game in town such as Nepal that adopt
a parliamentary form of government with proportional representation, the president is no longer
considered a referee or politically neutral arbiter. The prime minister instead becomes the real and
unique motor of executive power. In a system where the state’s core of power remains answerable
to the elected assembly, the president will not challenge the decisions taken by the executive.
Federalism, even if asymmetric, provides the thrills of ownership, autonomy and cultural pluralism
to not only allow but also propel minority groups to mobilize politically and advance their claims in
public seems a good and obvious option. Czech-style parliamentarized presidentialism', a dual
executive system in which an indirectly elected president plays an important role in the realm of
foreign policy, but the paramount powers of governance are exercised by a prime minister who
must have majority support in the parliament is an attractive second option. However, the sad
48
This is obviously a complex question for which there are no straightforward answers or easy solutions.
Otherwise, over a thousand youths would not have been leaving the motherland daily and every third national
(Nepali) would not fall below the World Bank’s measure of poverty (set rather arbitrarily at a dollar a day).
- 22 -
reality is that unless there is a fundamental shift in current political dynamics, Nepalese can only
watch and wonder what the political future will hold.
Politicians need to redefine their vision for sustainable politics and economy. If they want to be
seen as a credible and legitimate government, the country needs to provide opportunities for all to
optimally fulfil their potential. Striving for people’s voice in government depends on a social
contract—an unwritten agreement among individuals to resolve conflict through negotiation,
compromise, and openness. When problems erupt, what is now at stake is not merely a procedural
matter but an actual affront to democracy. What went wrong in Nepal was the expectation that the
leader would assume responsibility and effectively diagnose the problems facing the country.
While long-term political predictions are hazardous, there are reasons to be optimistic for a
democratic consolidation. The present freedom of expression and organization are absolutely
without precedent, particularly in the countryside. But, to maintain stability and build democratic
legitimacy, Nepal must discard confrontation and achieve consensus on the basic rules of the game.
The good news is that a window of opportunity for vibrant institutions with sustained economic
growth exists. However, due largely to the ruling elite’s de facto monopoly over the entire country
and their crypto-fascist tendency, Nepal has to undergo political liberalization blemished with
incidents of violence and conflicts. Even small groups, whose aim is to widen their power base
against the regime or to control society indirectly, have important roles to play. Nepal’s nagging
problem is that without resolving the sultanist malpractices and effectively having what the
pluralists call “a new set of rules for the political game”, the country cannot achieve effective nation
building. Ethnic and regional diversity is without doubt the most defining characteristic of Nepali
society. Federalism should not threaten the stability of the state. It often happens that once a country
is divided, so are its major resources, a situation that leaves the losers with little choice beyond
further conflict. The great riddle is whether elites have the political will and courage to maintain a
viable country for its peaceful people, a country in control of its own destiny. Once more it becomes
clear that unless structural component of social capital motivates the Nepali masses to participate in
the political process and embrace the norms of democratic behavior (i.e. develop a vibrant
democracy without any constraints other than the law to build a politically, ideologically,
economically, and socially sustainable pluralist state), viable democratic governance cannot be
attained. So far, Nepal has been captive to a generation of politicians concerned merely with
utilitarian government; they have not really committed themselves to adopting democratic
principles and values. We are concerned whether the present government will mark the beginning
of the real democratization, which in the long run will shed most of the imperfections prevailing
today, or find failure as previous regimes have.
- 23 -
Bibliography
Almond, Gabriel and G Bingham Powell. (1966). Comparative Politics; a Developmental
Approach (Boston: Little Brown and Company).
Bartels, Larr M (2008). Unequal Democracy, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
Brownlee, Jason (2011). “Executive Elections in the Arab World: When and How Do They Matter”
Comparative Political Studies 44(7):807-828. DOI: 10.1177/0010414011402034.
Dahl, R. A. (2007) On Political Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Deutsch, Karl W. (1954) Political Community at the International Level, reprinted in 1970 (Utah:
Aardavark Global Publishing Company).
Huntington, Samuel P. (1966) Political Modernization (The Bibbs Merrill Reprinting Series)
Linz, Juan J and Alfred Stepan. (1979) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins University Press).
Lijphart, A. (2008) Thinking About Democracy: Power sharing and majority rule in theory and
practice (Rutledge: New York).
Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarno and Eduardo Pizzaro Longomez. (2006) The Crisis of
Democratic Representation in the Andes (Stanford University Press).
Przeworski, Adam. (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. (2000),
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, (New
York: Cambridge University Press).
Rawls, John. (1996) Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press).
Rasler, Karen and William R Thompson (2004) “The Democratic Peace and a Sequential
Reciprocal, Causal Arrow Hypothesis” Comparative Political Studies 37(8) 879-908.
Thapa, Ganga Bahadur (2006). 'The Nepalese Dilemma: Conflict and Crisis in Democracy',
Readings on Governance and Development (Kathmandu: Institute of Governance and
Development) pp. 42-61.
- 24 -
Verba, Sidney and Norman H Nie. (1987), Participation in America: Political Democracy and
Social Equality, first published in 1972 (The University of Chicago Press edition).
Wright, Joseph. (2008), “Political Participation and Democratic Stability in New Democracies,”
British Journal of Political Science 38(2).221- 245.
Zakaria, Fareed (2003) The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, (New
York: W. W Norton).
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were discussed at the lecture series of the HiPeC (Hiroshima
University Partnership Project for Peace-building and Capacity Development), on July 1, 2011 at
Hiroshima University. I am grateful to seminar participants for their stimulating questions and
comments, helping me to hone my analysis and arguments. Without their enthusiasm and thoughtful
comments on the previous version, this article would never come into being, and I am in their debt.
I am especially grateful to K L Maharjan, Professor, Graduate School for International
Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University and member of HiPeC for the opportunity to
present and in providing impetus for my efforts to clarify and tighten my argument. I have also
benefitted greatly from Osamu Yoshida, Professor and Chair HiPeC, whose detailed comments on
the text with skill and good cheer helped me excise much and fill in some important missing pieces.
Similarly, I have been fortunate to benefit from helpful reactions and feedback from Kristin Vekasi,
University of Wisconsin Madison during the development of this article. Also, it must be mentioned
that this paper is written while at the Department of Comparative Competitive Politics, Institute of
Social Science, The University of Tokyo as Japan Foundation Visiting Scholar. Through these
avenues and others, though is gratefully acknowledged, yet I jealously claim full blame for any
errors, foibles, and follies as revealed in this essay.
- 25 -
広島大学平和構築連携融合事業
◆◆研究報告シリーズ Research Report Series
No.1（2006年 3月刊行）
上杉勇司・篠田英朗・瀬谷ルミ子・山根達郎「アフガニスタンにおける DDR－その全体像の
考察－」
No.2（2006年 3月刊行）
篠田英朗「アフガニスタン平和構築の背景と戦略－DDRに与えられた役割の考察－」
No.3（2006年 3月刊行）
Yuji Uesugi 「The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their contribution to the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in Afghanistan」
No.4（2006年 3月刊行）
山根達郎「アフガニスタンにおける DDRの特色－国連 PKO事例とその比較検討－」
No.5（2006年 3月刊行）
瀬谷ルミ子「平和構築における DDR の成果、限界とその役割－日本の平和構築支援への道－」
No.6（2008年 3月刊行）
山根達郎「リベリア内戦と平和構築の射程－テイラー政権崩壊後の国家再建－」
No.7（2008年 3月刊行）
Masatomo Nao Yamaguchi「Greed, Grievances and Underlying Causes of Conflict:A Case Study
from Sierra Leone」
◆◆ディスカッションペーパーシリーズ Discussion Paper Series
No.1（2006年 3月刊行）
淵ノ上英樹・松岡俊二「平和構築と開発援助政策－開発と紛争の理論と紛争リスク評価－」
No.2（2006年 3月刊行）
淵ノ上英樹・松岡俊二「効果的援助の研究史」
No.3（2008年 3月刊行）
Yoko Ogashiwa (editor)「Indigenous Governance and Peace」
No.4（2008年 3月刊行）
Keshav Lall Maharjan, Niraj Prakash Joshi, and Narendra Mangal Joshi「Initiatives of Civil
Societies on Social Capital Development for Peacebuilding in Hills of Nepal」
- 26 -
No.5（2008年 3月刊行）
徳光裕二郎「紛争後の武器回収を通じた平和構築の意義と課題
～シエラレオネにおける「武器と開発との交換」（Arms for Development）を事例として～」
No.6（2008年 3月刊行）
Masahiko Togawa「Hindu Minority in Bangladesh―Migration, Marginalization, and Minority
Politics in Postcolonial South Asia－」
No.7（2010年 9月刊行）
Tetsuro IJI（Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University）・Yuji UESUGI「Terminating Civil Wars:
The Cases of Tajikistan and Cambodia」
No.8（2011年 3月刊行）
香川めぐみ（広島大学平和構築連携融合事業研究員）「ネパールの和平プロセス―なぜ現地
の人々は「変わらない」と感じるのか―」
No.9（2011年 3月刊行）
Humayun Kabir （Postdoctoral Research Fellow, HiPeC, Hiroshima University）「Reflection on
Muslim Minority’s Demands in “New Nepal”」
No.10（2011年 3月刊行）
別所裕介（広島大学平和構築連携融合事業研究員）「「難民」と「国民」の狭間で--ネパー
ル・ヒマラヤ圏における“非-国民的”なるものの行方」--
No.11（2011年 3月刊行）
TOGAWA, Masahiko（General Secretary, HiPeC, Hiroshima University）「Local Society and
the Fieldworker: A Campaign for Protecting the Mausoleum of Fakir Lalon Shah in Bangladesh in
2000.」
広島大学平和構築連携融合事業（HiPeCⅡ）事務局
事業実施委員会委員長：吉田 修（広島大学大学院国際協力研究科教授）
事務局長：外川 昌彦（広島大学大学院国際協力研究科准教授）
研究支援員：梶原 千恵子、雲津 なつみ、荒木 晴香
