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Fear not Values

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the populist vote in Europe.
Catherine de E. Vries & Isabell Hoffmann
Fear not Values.
Catherine E. de Vries Professor of European Politics University of Oxford [email protected]
Isabell Hoffmann Head of eupinions Bertelsmann Stiftung [email protected]
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the forefront of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half a billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political challenges? Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only because cur- rent reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the preferences for reform amongst national elites and publics. Although EU support has interested scholars for over three decades now, we virtually know nothing about public support for EU reform. Current research focuses almost ex- clusively on the causes of support for the current project and fails to provide a sufficient basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the feasibility and sustain- ability of EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst national publics. eupinions examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
Executive Summary
he political landscape across Europe is changing rapidly: support for populist parties is on the rise while mainstream parties are losing ground. This report examines whether it is fears or values that drive these changes.
Two perspectives dominate popular and scholarly interpretations of what is the matter in Europe today. One stresses a conflict between progressive and traditional values while another stresses the divide between those that benefit from globalisation versus those left behind. When it comes to values, the argument is that elites have pushed forward liberal rights, like gender equality, gay rights, ethnic diversity, environmental protection, etc. against the will of ordinary people. In that view, current support for populist parties is the result of a revolt against a liberal elite that is out of touch. A second argumentation stresses the economic fallout of globalisation, and suggests that a growing num- ber of people fear to be left on the sidelines.
Our findings show that fear of globalisation is the decisive factor behind demands for changes away from the political mainstream. Values play a minor role. In a nutshell we find that: The lower the level of education, the lower the income, and the older people are the more likely they are to see globalisation as a threat. Moreover, those who feel close to populist parties are mainly motivated by fear of globalisation. This effect is particularly evident when it comes to right wing populist parties, but it is also present for left wing populist parties. For ex- ample: In Germany, 78 per cent of supporters of the right wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) fear globalisation. In France, 76 per cent of Front National (FN) voters fear globalisation. In Austria, 69 per cent of Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) supporters fear globalisation.
Some of the figures that stand out in our report:
• Europeans are almost equally split when it comes to how they view globalisa- tion. A slight majority sees globalisation as an opportunity (55 per cent), while 45 per cent see it a threat. 35 per cent of respondents are economically anxious, while 65 per cent are not.
• We find considerable country differences when it comes to globalisation fears. In Austria and France a majority of respondents view globalisation as a threat (55 per cent, 54 per cent). French and Italian respondents display the highest level of economic anxiety with 51 per cent and 45 per cent respectively. In the UK, the amount of people who feel economically anxious and see globalisation as a threat is particularly low with only 26 per cent and 36 per cent. Even fewer people are economically anxious in Poland, namely 22 per cent, but Poles are on average wearier of globalisation (50 per cent).
• Age, class, and education are relevant variables to understand fears of globalisation and economic anxiety. With 47 per cent and 38 per cent of those identifying themselves as working class saying that they perceive globalisation as a threat versus only 37 per cent and 25 per cent of middle class people. Also, 47 per cent and 37 per cent of people with lower levels of education express worries about globalisation and their economic situation versus 37 per cent and 28 per cent among those with higher education. When it comes to age, the numbers indicate that the younger you are, the less you worry about the effects of globalisation and your economic future (ranging from 39 per cent and 30 per cent of 18–25 year olds to 47 per cent and 41 per cent of 56–65 year olds). Gender or whether one lives in an urban or a rural environment hardly makes any difference on one’s perception of globalisation or one’s personal economic situation.
• For those identifying with right wing challenger parties in Europe globalization fears are very pronounced. 78 per cent of AfD voters, 76 per cent of FN voters, 69 per cent of FPÖ voters, 66 per cent of Lega Nord voters, 57 per cent of PVV voters, 58 per cent of PiS voters, 61 per cent of Fidez and 50 per cent of Jobbik voters and 50 per cent of UKIP voters see globalisation as a threat
• Left wing populist parties, such as Die Linke, Five Star Movement, and Podemos, also attract people who fear globalisation, but interestingly to a lesser degree.
• When we examine more generally what people think politically depending on if they are fearful of globalisation or not, we see that people who fear globalisation are much more suspicious of politics in general and European integration in particular: They are more likely to support leaving the European Union (47 per cent) in a referendum, and hardly like the thought of more European integration (40 per cent). Only 9 per cent trust the politicians in their country, and 38 per cent are satisfied with how de- mocracy is working in their country. Moreover, 57 per cent of people who are fearful of globalisation think that there are too many foreigners in their country, but only 29 per cent oppose gay marriage and 34 per cent think climate change is a hoax.
• When we contrast these numbers against those who think globalisation is an opportunity, we find that 83 per cent would vote for their country to stay in the EU, 60 per cent think more integration is the way forward for the EU, 20 per cent trust their national politicians, and 53 per cent are satisfied with democracy in their country. Moreover, less people, namely 40 per cent, think that there are too many foreigners in their country, 19 per cent oppose gay marriage and 28 per cent believe that climate change is a hoax.
• The differences based on globalisation fears are much larger than those based on progressive and traditional values.
• In a final step, we examined what people fear specifically about globalisation. We asked what respondents think the major political challenges in the years to come will be. When it comes to economic crisis, poverty, terror, war, and crime the dif- ferences between those who fear globalisation versus those who do not are minor. Only when it comes to migration do we find a clear difference between the two groups: 53 per cent of those who fear globalisation think that migration is a major global challenge, 55 per cent are not in contact with foreigners in their daily lives, and 54 per cent display anti-foreigner sentiments. While only 42 per cent of those who see globalisation as an opportunity think migration is a major global challenge, only 43 per cent do not have any contact with foreigners in their daily lives and even fewer, namely 36 per cent, express anti-foreigner sentiments. These patterns for the EU as a whole also hold true for the nine countries we studied in more detail.
Traditional Values and Globalisation Fears: Setting the Scene
he election of the real estate mogul and politically inexperienced Donald Trump as the President of the United States of America and the outcome of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom have sent shock waves across the globe. Politics in many countries today seems to be
undergoing a transformation. Mainstream politicians are challenged by political outsiders who accuse them to be largely out of touch with the needs and wants of ordinary citizens. Surely, accusations of this kind are politically motivated, but the reactions of much of the public to years of economic and political liberalisa- tion seem to be out of step with the actions of their governments. Government parties are increasingly pushed in a corner and need to find ways to respond to growing discontent.
One such response was British Prime Minister Theresa May’s attack against the political establishment for sneering at voters’ concerns about free move- ment of people in the EU and immigration at her first Tory Party congress in Birmingham, “just listen to the way a lot of politicians and commentators talk about the public. They find their patriotism distasteful, their concerns about immigration parochial, their views about crime illiberal, their attachment to their job security inconvenient.”1 The outcome of the Brexit vote, the support for Trump or the strong electoral showing for populist parties on the left and right, such as Front National in France, the Partij van de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain, are interpreted by politicians and pundits alike as a revolt against politics as usual. Yet, what are voters revolting against?
Two answers to this question seem to have emerged in the popular and academic debate: traditional values and globalisation fears (Inglehart and Norris 2016). One stresses the importance of traditional values and argues that liberal elites have stretched their economical, political, and cultural ideas too far. As a response a large segment of the population demands a correction. Traditional- ism, or something political psychologists define as authoritarianism, captures people’s desire for order and stability over flexibility and change. Traditionalists or authoritarians prefer strong leaders that preserve a status quo and impose order on a world they feel is under threat (Feldman 2003, Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Articles like “Donald Trump and the Authoritarian Temptation” in the
1 See: (accessed 6th October 2016).
In Focus
Atlantic in May 2016 highlight that the current political upheaval is largely a conflict over liberal versus authoritarian values.2
A second answer does not so much stress the socio-cultural basis of public opinion, but the economic nature of it. People feel left behind by globalisation and that political elites no longer look out for them. People support politi- cal outsiders who skilfully articulate their fears about globalisation linked to their economic situation and skill competition by immigrants. In his book the Globalisation Paradox, Dani Rodrik (2011) for example argues globalisation pre- sents a trilemma as societies cannot be globally integrated, completely sover- eign and democratic at the same time. Following his reasoning, deeper economic integration accompanied by further political integration in Europe would likely lead to resistance amongst the most vulnerable demanding a fair distribution of wealth and jobs, and for their government to take back control. The Brexit vote in the UK as well as the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States have been attributed to a revolt of those left behind in the popular media.3
Although traditional values and globalisation fears are not mutually exclusive, and may in fact be linked, in this report we aim to shed light on the distribution of these values and fears in the 28 member states of the EU, and examine whether fears or values are the most important for explaining the political shifts we have witnessed recently. Understanding if fears or values guide people’s support for populist parties, the exit of the EU, and their trust in government, is important as it provides us with more detailed insights about what exactly people worry about. Responding to voter’s concerns is important, but politicians are only able to do so when the exact contours of public opinion are well understood. For example, while values are often perceived as more long-standing, fears might be more dynamic in nature and hence both require different policy solutions.
In this report, we present evidence based on a survey conducted in early August asking people about their traditional values and globalisation fears. We present two types of evidence; one type is based on a sample capturing public opinion in the EU as a whole, and the other completes the picture by focusing on nine EU member states representing the North-West, South, and Central-East European regions.
In the following sections we seek to answer four questions:
1. How are globalisation fears and traditional values distributed within the EU?
2. Who are the people who fear globalisation or display traditional values?
3. What do people who are fearful of globalisation or have more traditional values want in terms of politics?
4. Finally, what do those who are wary of globalisation fear exactly?
2 See: 481494/ (accessed 6th October 2016).
3 See: (accessed 6th October 2016).
Measuring Values and Fears
easuring concepts like traditional values and globalisation fears in a survey is far from straightforward, and many different authors have taken different approaches. Our approach here is to rely on a set of questions tapping into the two basic concepts we are interested in;
traditional values and globalisation fears. In this section we aim to be transparent about the choices we made.
Traditionalism, or authoritarianism as it is known with political psychology, is a tricky concept that has inspired a large literature in psychology and political science. Asking people about the degree they adhere to traditional values is a difficult exercise as people may not wish to admit this or are not aware of it. We follow a measurement strategy set out by renowned political psychologists Feldman and Stenmer (1997) who tap into traditional authoritarian values by relying on a battery of child-rearing questions.
Specifically, we rely on:
• Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: independence, or respect for elders?
• Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: obedience, or self-reliance?
• Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: to be considerate, or to be well-behaved?
• Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: curiosity, or good manners?
These questions are less prone to social desirability, and not as conceptually linked to the consequences of values that we are interested in. This measurement has now become common practice. We create an additive measure that runs from a belief that children should always be well-behaved, obedient and respectful of elders to a belief that they should be independent, responsible and curious (see Kohn 1977 for a discussion). We combine the answers to the following four ques- tions to create an additive scale where 1 signifies “most traditional” responses as people always responded that children should be well-behaved, obedient and respectful of elders, and 0 signifies “least traditional” responses as people always responded that children should be independent, responsible and curious.
There is not an established tradition to measure people’s fears of globalisation, so we rely on questions dealing with globalisation and people’s economic anxiety. Specifically, we rely on the following three questions:
• Do you think that globalisation is a threat or an opportunity? Answers are coded as 1 if people think it is a threat and 0 if an opportunity.
• An economic anxiety measure which combines of answers to two questions where 1 is coded negative and 0 is coded positive:
– How has your economic situation changed in the last two years? – In general what is your personal economic outlook on the foreseeable future?
All measures used in the analysis are coded between 0 and 1 to ease interpretation, so the numbers in the graphs can be interpreted as percentages.4
4 Note some questions allowed a ‘don’t know’ option and these respondents are excluded in the values presented.
How are Values and Fears Distributed Within the EU?
ow are globalisation fears and traditional values distributed across the EU? Figure 1 below displays the percentage of people who display tra- ditional values, and express that they see globalisation as a threat and are economically anxious. The figure shows that a substantial part of
citizens in the EU are fearful of globalisation, but that this is still a minority over the overall population. Specifically, we see that 45 per cent of people see globali- sation as a threat, while 55 per cent see it as an opportunity, 35 per cent of people report that they feel economically anxious while 65 per cent report that they are not, and 50 per cent of people display traditional values, while 50 per cent do not.
FIGURE 1 EU28: Globalisation fear, economic anxiety, and traditional values
Globalisation as a Threat / as an Opportunity
Economic Anxiety Economic Confidence
Traditionalism Progressivism
In a next step, we explore globalisa- tion fears and traditional values in nine specific countries for which we have conducted a more in-depth study. Figure 2 shows quite substantial vari- ation across countries. While in Aus- tria and France a majority of citizens see globalisation as a threat, 55 and 54 per cent respectively, this share is lowest in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (with 39, 40, 39 and 36 per cent respectively). The
low share of British respondents who think that globalisation is a threat is espe- cially interesting given that the current Prime Minister has suggested that the Brexit vote was mainly a result of people feeling left behind by globalisation. The level of economic anxiety is in fact relatively low in the UK, only 26 per cent say that they are economically anxious, in comparison to some other EU countries. Economic anxiety is very high in Italy as well as in France with half of the popu- lation (45 and 51 per cent respectively) stating that they are worried about their economic situation.
When we look at the distribution of traditional values across the nine different countries, we find that just like in the case of globalisation fears there is considerable variation in the degree of traditionalism. We find the highest levels in France, Poland, and the United Kingdom, where 55 per cent of the population holds more traditional values, and the lowest levels in Austria, Germany, and Hungary (with 38, 39 and 38 per cent respectively).
Overall, the findings presented thus far suggest that notwithstanding im- portant country variation, on average Europeans are split when it comes to their
views about globalisation, and their level of traditionalism. 45 per cent see globalisation as a threat and 50 per cent display traditional values. Moreover, two-thirds do…