Fishman, Joel

7/29/2019 Fishman, Joel

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Building the Positive Peace:Te Urgent Need to Bring the IsraeliPalestinian Conict Back to Basics*

Kobi Michael and Joel Fishman

It is generally accepted that the peace process, launched in 1993, went o the tracksand ailed to meet the expectations o the interested parties: the state o Israel, thePalestinian Authority, and the international community.

Te international discourse plays down the historical depth o the dispute andeerything which pertains directly to the Jewish religious, national, and cultural heri-tage that dates back more than three millennia in the Land o Israel. Also absent

om the international discourse is an awareness o the rich academic and theoreticaloundation o knowledge with regard to peacemaking. Concepts such as the positiepeace, reconciliation, ripeness, stable peaceorhurting mutual stalemate hae notbeen integrated into the discourse.

Te condition o positie peace can be created when social justice mitigates struc-tural and cultural iolence. Cultural iolence occurs when the political leadership o

a movement or state incorporates continuous incitement to hatred and iolence intoa societys public discourse. In contrast to negatie peace, positie peace is not limitedto the idea o getting rid o something but includes the idea o establishing somethingthat is missing and changing the societal and political structure.

A alid discussion o reiing the peace negotiations should adopt the goal ocreating the positie peace and taking the necessary intermediate steps or its imple-mentation. Otherwise, the presence o structural iolence will occasion more physicaliolence, and cultural iolence will provide both the justication and psychologicalinastructure or its continued application.

Te establishment o a Palestinian state which does not comply with the spirit opositie peace increases the chances o bringing into being one more ailed and warlikestate that would become a destabilizing orce in the region. By inciting irredentistsentiment among its own population and the Arab citizens o Israel, it will endanger


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Jewish Political Studies Review

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both Israel and Jordan. Instead o concentrating on state-building, it will become asubersie political entity that will continue to wage its long-standing political andmilitary war against Israel, the Jewish state, and its citizens.

Te concept o the Positive Peace belongs to the rich theoretical oundation oknowledge on peacemaking. According to the literature o conict resolution, ithas our basic components:

1. Mutual acceptance/recognition and reconciliation: in our context, reciprocity in the sense o accepting the national seldetermination o eachparty to the conict;

2. A sense o security and respect toward each community and nation;3. Reciprocal relations and cooperation between nations, communities, and

institutions;4. Establishing dynamic and nonviolent processes to solve disputes and settle

dierences.1

Although, during the Oslo process, contemporaries did not use the language opeace studies, most o the parties concernedwith one notable exceptionshareda basic vision o the type o peace the process was intended to bring about. Duringthe early 1990s, the idea o the Democratic Peace held sway. Many maintainedthat democracies were peaceully inclined by nature, and thereore two neighboring democracies would not make war against one another. Te Soviet Union hadimploded not long beore. A major wave o transitions to democracy in EasternEurope took place in its stead, and it seemed that the momentum would spread tothe Middle East and oster the building o civil society and the saeguarding o human rights.2 Academics and politicians also remembered the European model that

Jean Monnet (18881979) had pioneered, which involved transorming the mutual hatred o France and Germany into a web o interdependent relationships.3Great optimism prevailed, and many expected that the new Palestinian entity

would become the rst Arab democracy possessing some o the eatures o modern Western society.4

Tere are dierent types o peace, each with its own characteristics. AliciaCabezudo and Magnus Havelsrud explained the distinction: Positive peace iswhen social justice has replaced structural violence. In contrast to negative peace,positive peace is not limited to the idea o getting rid o something, but includesthe idea o establishing something that is missing. While getting rid o structural

violence or social injustice, positive peace implies the presence o social justice.5Johan Galtung, who ounded this school o thought, explained that conict iscomprised o a triangle: direct violence, indirect or structural violence, and cultural violence. Ending direct violence alone is not enough to bring about positive


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peace; it is necessary to bring an end to cultural and structural violence which arean integral part o the problem.6 It is the authors view that positive peace is themost desirable and that the lessons o Galtungs school should be applied to theIsraeliPalestinian conict. I this is to be done, policymakers must revise theirgoals and accordingly decide to adopt a signicantly dierent approach.7

Baruch Spinoza wrote in 1670 that Peace is not an absence o war, it is a virtue, a state o mind, a disposition or benevolence, condence, [and] justice.8More recently, Shlomo Avineri used this benchmark when he described the cold

peace with Egypt and the continuation o its statesponsored incitement againstIsrael. He remarked in 2001 that Peace is not just the absence o war. 9

As early as 1969, Yehoshaat Harkabi, the real pioneer o the study o Arab at

titudes toward Israel, identied another undesirable condition. He noted: Whatthey [the Arab states] want is at most an armistice, or which Israel, pressured bythe big powers, will be made to pay as i or peace.10 Similarly, the approach oghting and negotiating which belongs to the doctrine o Peoples War must beincluded in this group. Further, we should not overlook Chairman Araats ownidea o peace. During a visit to Venezuela in 1980, he proclaimed: Peace or usmeans the destruction o Israel. We are preparing or an allout war, a war which

will last or generations. We shall not rest until the day when we return to ourhome, and until we destroy Israel. Te destruction o Israel is the goal o ourstruggle, and the guidelines o that struggle have remained rm since the establishment o Fatah in 1965.11 None o these examplesthe cold peace, a orcedarmistice, ghting and negotiating, or politicidepossesses the desirable qualitieso positive peace.

It is generally accepted that the peace process, launched in 1993, went o thetracks and ailed to meet the expectations o the interested parties: the state oIsrael, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community. Recently, theObama administration which began its second term has indicated that it plansto revive the peace process with new vigor. According to this wisdom, the success o this endeavor depends on resh concessions rom Israel. Indeed, the newadministration has made it known that it plans to apply heavy pressure on Israel, inecessary, and or its part, the Palestinian Authority also wants the United States

to apply more pressure on Israel.12

Tis approach is unlikely to bring about thedesired result, mainly because the premises on which it is based are not sound.Te real problem is that, long ago, the wouldbe peacemakers, in their haste

and ear o ailure, did not rame the problem correctly. Tey ailed to ask the rightquestion. In order to avoid disagreement, they concentrated on process and post

poned the substantive issues o content. Tey hoped that the dynamic o congenialnegotiations would acilitate a avorable outcome. By taking reuge in process andhoping to keep the negotiations on track,13 they neglected the real goal: buildinga stable and sustainable peace, or positive peace. Te implementation o a lasting


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agreement requires an understanding o the nature o violence and its structuraland cultural components. It ollows that an eective approach necessitates the creation o the right climate by educating each population or the desired transitionto positive peace and reshaping the hierarchy o values to conorm to this goal.

Every state has an interest in the type o neighbors it has. Sir Robert Francis Cooper, a senior British diplomat and adviser, noted that this is a legitimateconcern or the postmodern or established states. He observed: Te premodern

world is a world o ailed states. Here the state no longer ullls Webers criteriono having the monopoly on the legitimate use o orce. Either it lost the legitimacy,or it has lost the monopoly o the use o orce; oen the two go together. In suchareas chaos and war is a way o lie. In so ar as there is a government, it operates in

a way similar to an organized crime syndicate.14 Cooper stated that it is the legitimate interest o the established postmodern states to act in seldeense, becauseinstability in ones neighborhood poses threats that no state can ignore.15

Te idea o positive peace is easy to grasp, simple, and air. A valid discussion oreviving the peacemaking negotiations should ocus primarily on creating positive

peace and taking the intermediate steps toward its implementation. It was understood that to achieve the benets o real peace each side would have to make sacrices, and each undertook to prepare its respective public or this eventuality. It isalso the responsibility o all o the parties, including the international community,to make their air contribution toward this goal. Unless the terms o reerence andraming o the problem are revised in this sense, the IsraeliPalestinian conict willremain intractable. Structural violence will continue to motivate more violence,and cultural violence will provide both the justication and the psychological inrastructure or its application.

HE IMPORANCE OF CULURAL DISCOUR SE

Te eorts o the international community to revive the political process by renewing direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have intentionallyoverlooked the existence and importance o the culturalreligious and historical

dimensions which, over time, have become part o the Palestinian structure ogovernance. Te international discourse plays down the religious, cultural, andhistorical depth o the dispute and everything which pertains directly to the Jewish national and cultural heritage dating back more than three millennia in theLand o Israel. Also absent rom the international discourse in most cases is anawareness o the rich academic and theoretical oundation o knowledge with regard to peacemaking. Concepts such as positive peace, reconciliation, ripeness,stable peace, or hurting mutual stalemate have not been integrated into thediscourse. Tis omission also characterizes the approach to the concept o justice,


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the signicance o protected values,16

and to the consequences and implications ocultural dierences.Even worse, the international discussion is characterized by a clear asymmetry

o perception which dates rom the beginning o the peace process. At that time,the United States assumed the role o a proactive mediator which did not demandcompliance on the part o both sides. As Natan Sharansky describes, the UnitedStates wanted to strengthen Araat and particularly in the case o incitementsystematically looked the other way, an issue which he raised directly in a acetoace conversation with President Clinton.17 For their part, Israeli policymakers didnot insist on Israels legal and historical rights thus placing the country at a disad

vantage and compromising its position.18 On the one hand, there is a suspicious

attitude toward Israels demand or Palestinian recognition o the Jewish state asthe national state o the Jewish people. Tis is taken as a spiteul and ungraciousIsraeli eort to get out o the political process and the direct negotiations with thePalestinians. On the other, there has been a nearly total avoidance o every aspectrelating to the essential historical narrative, value system, ideology, and religion

which orm the oundation o the Palestinian position.Further, the international community, together with intellectuals and opinion

makers in the West and in Israel, have been irrationally predisposed to display acombination o patronizing views and even arrogance toward the Palestinians. Patronization takes the orm o ignoring explicit statements o the Palestinian leaders which would weaken or ruin the Palestinian claim and may be interpreted as areusal to accept the principle o recognition o the Jewish nationstate. One suchexample was Yasir Araats speech o May 10, 1994, in a Johannesburg mosque,

where he called or a jihad to liberate Jerusalem and publicly declared that he hadentered into the Oslo agreements in bad aith.19 Te tendency is to downplay andignore such statements and to produce rationalizations regarding the internalPalestinian discourse or the internal political constraints, by interpreting some othem incorrectly and removing such evidence rom its historical and cultural context. Such attitudes reect the so bigotry o low expectations.20

One must ask what to make o the commentary on Palestinian television aerit had been ordered to convey the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu

Mazen) directive to make a Palestinian contribution to the eorts to extinguishthe major re in the Carmel Forest (December 2010):

Our human history shows that we have not lingered [dithered] in carry-ing out our humanitarian obligation, just as the [Muslim] leader Saladin[who conquered Jerusalem] sent his physician to treat his enemy, Richardthe Lion Hearted, who led the invasion o our land and conquered it.21

How exactly should we interpret this historical analogy and what really was Abbas


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intended message or the Palestinian public? According to our understanding,this statement reects the Palestinian hegemonic narrative which reuses to viewthe state o Israel as a legitimate entity in the region. From the Palestinian point o

view, Israels existence is the same as the Crusader Kingdom which imposed itselon a place where it did not belong and which did not stand the test o time andIslamic heroism. Tis aulty comparison is deeply anchored in the Palestinian narrative, in its religious and ideological tradition o revolutionary politics.22

Te late Robert ucker, the distinguished Sovietologist, described a movementsuch as the PLO as a revolutionary mass movement under singleparty auspicesor simply a movement regime.23 Abu Mazen was one o the authors and spiritualathers o this ideology, which dates back to the ounding in Cairo o the PalestineLiberation Organization in January 1964, three ull years beore the Six Day War,at a time when Israel lived within the 1949 armistice lines. In the days o AhmadShukeiri, the PLO was rereshingly rank in stating its goals. It called or the destruction o Israel and driving the Jews into the sea.

Writing in 1969, Harkabi explained that according to the religious and ideological worldview o this revolutionary mass movement, the Jews are not a nationand thus have no claim to national seldetermination:

Te conception that the Jews do not constitute a national entity is a vitalprinciple or the Arab position. For i the Israelis do constitute a nation,

then they have the right o sel-determination, and the claim that onlythe Palestinian Arabs have the right o sel-determination, and that onlythey must decide the national character o the country, is invalid. More-over, the Arab claim or exclusive national sel-determination appears inall its starkness as chauvinism that demands rights or itsel which aredenied to the other.24

Writing in 1975, Bernard Lewis observed:

Te PLO in its literature never uses the expression Arabs and Jews, or

to do so would be to admit the existence o a Jewish nation and it is car-dinal to the PLO ideology that there is no such thing. Te ormula whichthey use is Muslims, Christians and Jews. Te Jews, in their view, arepurely a religious minority who possess no separate national identity andhave no right to a separate state.25

Tus, the principle o Palestinian nonrecognition has become the anchor o asymmetry, which creates a reality o a temporary and provisional acceptance o a politicalait accompli whose name is the State o Israel, but negates the possibility


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o a positive and stable peace based on mutual recognition o the right o seldetermination and reconciliation.Such views even antedate the ounding o the PLO. Harkabi described the

Arab objection as ollows:

Te Arabs emphasize that they seek a just solution or a just peace,which constitutes the opposite pole to a peace solution ounded on thestatus quo, on the act o Israels existence. Te just solution, accordingto this view, is the annulment o the wrong involved in the very existenceo Israel and the restoration o Israel to its legal owners. Justice is a denialo Israels existence.

Tus Nasser says, We talk peace, but we do not accept peace that isbased on the usurpation o rights and on thefait accompli. Tat is why

we work or peace based on justice. (speech at Alexandria University,July 28, 1963)26

Te Palestinians may be able recognize Israels existence de acto but they cannotrecognize the legitimacy o its establishment de jure.27 Tis analysis, published decades ago, remains valid. Te problem is that the Palestinians have neither moved

with the times nor have they revised their ideology. Tey have retained their positions intact, and as we shall observe in the ollowing section, at the Sixth Council o Fatah in Bethlehem in 2009, they reafrmed their commitment to Articles9 and 22 o the Palestine National Charter (adopted in 1964 and amended in1968), justiying the armed struggle and condemning Zionism by linking it withascism. Tis position reects the stubborn reusal to recognize the state o Israelas the national state o the Jewish people and, making use o the slogans o SovietCold War propaganda,28 glories the struggle against its very existence. Further,the Palestine National Charter remains in orce and is posted in its ull version onofcial PLO and PA websites,29 despite the act that, in 1998, Araat and the Palestinian leadership announced that a special committee would make the necessaryamendments in the charter to ensure its compliance with the Oslo agreements andtheir recognition o Israel.30

It is against this background that Mahmoud Abbass contemptuous wordsshould be understood: Te Jewish state. What is a Jewish state? We say, Te stateo Israel. You may call yourselves whatever you wish. But I shall not accept it....It is not my job to give a denition to the state and what is in it. Call yourselves[he stammers] the Zionist, Hebrew, National, Socialist Republic, call it whatever

you wish! I do not care!31Over the years the Palestinians have repackaged their militant and revolution

ary reusal into the orm o sophisticated and light diplomatic slogans so as tomask their real intentions and mislead the international community, even i they


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knew it was not sincere. During the early 1970s, the leadership o the PLO hadlost the support o world public opinion because o rabid statements concerningthe slaughter o Jews.32 At the time, the PLO leadership became so concernedthat they had become known as terrorists that they searched or ways to improvetheir image. Consequently, in 1970, they sent a delegation led by Abu Iyad (SalahKhala ) to North Vietnam to seek advice. During their twoweek visit, the NorthVietnamese counseled the PLO to employ strategic deception, concealing theirreal purpose but working or their goals in phases, while giving the appearance omoderation. 33 Te Vietnamese suggested that seemingly accepting the divisiono the land between two independent states, without stressing that this was onlyan interim phase, would neutralize the PLOs opponents in the West.34 Subse

quently, in 1974, they adopted the Strategy o Stages or o Phased Goals.According to this doctrine, the PLO would take hold o any territory relin

quished by Israelas a result o diplomatic pressure, terrorism, or a combinationo bothand use it as a launching pad or the next round o ghting.35 At itsmeeting in Cairo in the rst week o June 1974, the Palestine National Counciladopted these resolutions.Bernard Lewis explained: Tese [resolutions] make itclear that the PLO was not prepared to renounce any o its maximalist positions,that it would regard any such state merely as a rst step toward its ultimate aim oan allPalestine state, and the struggle to attain this end would continue.36

In this perspective, it is necessary to understand the absolute centrality o theourth dimensiontimein Palestinian strategic thinking. Te amount o time

which the Palestinians are prepared to spend in order to achieve their goals is innite. It is within this ramework, even over generations, that one may appreciatethe true intent o Araat and Fatah, particularly the second part o his 1980 declaration cited above: Peace or us means the destruction o Israel. We are preparingor an allout war, a war which will last or generations .

Resorting to the sophisticated use o code words, the Palestinians adopted theslogan o the twostate solution. Tey had previously used it in their own waragainst South Vietnam. It lulled the ear o the international community, whichinterpreted it to mean that the Palestinians really would be willing to end theconict or all time according to a ormula that would produce two genuinely

independent states: a Palestinian state and the state o Israel, the national state othe Jewish people. Writing in 1993, Mordechai Nisan analyzed exactly what thePalestinians mean by this term:

What is particularly intriguing about the comparative Vietnam-Pales-tine analogy revolves around the act that in both cases it was easibleto talk about the two-staged two-state in one-countrydynamic. Vietnam

was a country divided into two states until the revolutionary revisionistone overwhelmed the illegitimate, status quo, Western-reliant one. Te


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PLO vision revolved about the dynamic process whereby, once a PLOArab state would arise in part o divided Palestine, it would over timeoverwhelm the illegitimate, status quo, Western-reliant one. Israels ate

would be as politically terminal as had been that o Vietnam.37

Te Vietnamese model has retained its attraction or the Palestinians. For example, in April 2004, PLO ofcial Farouk Kaddoumi commented on Ariel Sharonsplan to withdraw rom the Gaza Strip: Let the Gaza Strip be South Vietnam. Wewill use all available methods to liberate North Vietnam [sic].38 Indeed, the twostate slogan is still current; Abu Mazen used it recently in his speech to the UNGeneral Assembly on November 29, 2012.39

Te positions described above reect the persistence and continuity o theArab argumentation on this question.40 Tey reveal that the commitments o theOslo agreements did not result in a substantive change in Palestinian ideology andgoals. Tey were neither reected in their educational system41 nor in the publicmedia under their control. One may conclude that the Palestinian view o Israel andtheir idea o justice are knowable and predictable. Tere are ew new beginnings inhuman experience. When it comes to history, continuity is usually the rule.

HE MAJOR IMPEDIMEN O SELING HE ISRAEL-PALESINE CONFLICAND HE PROBLEM OF INDIREC VIOLENCE

All eorts to evade an indepth discussion o the impediments to settling the conict run the danger o bringing both sides back to the cycle o violence. It hasbeen the accepted practice to classiy these barriersto use the term o YaacovBarSimanovinto three categories: strategic, structural, and psychological.42Tis division, however, entails a certain articiality because within every type obarrier, one may discern some characteristics o the other categories. (One couldequally apply Johan Galtungs classications to good advantage, because they include indirect or structural violence and cultural violence, which are intercorrelated.) It would be more correct, however, rst to recognize the main strategic barrier

and, in this perspective, to appreciate its components in their multidimensionalityand reciprocal relationships. Te main barrier to peace is the existential objectionto the state o Israel as a Jewish state, which provides the guiding principle o thePalestinian strategy.

Tis principle has been integrated into the structure and institutions o thePalestinian Authority, particularly its media and educational system. It has ostered an atmosphere o violence, the teaching o hate, and counterindoctrination

with regard to peace and coexistence with Israel.43 According to the Palestiniannarrative, as voiced by Abu Mazen to the United Nations, an unprecedented


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historical injustice had been inicted on the Palestinian people. I we apply theanalytical methods o classical political thought, we may note that the goal andpurpose o this regime is to undo that injustice by every possible means includingwar. Once we recognize this basic act, we can understand the purpose and signicance o indirect violencestructural, cultural, and religious. It is clear in thiscontext that the mere absence o violence cannot result in true peace, because allthe institutions o Palestinian societysuch as it isare mobilized or resistanceagainst Israel.

Palestinian recognition o the state o Israel, which in their view is not anationalethnic entity, represents the second side o the pragmatic and temporarycharacter o the Palestinian accommodation to the reality o the state o Israel inthe region. Te various Palestinian actions regard the PLO as the leading organization, but in an absurd manner, its positions do not obligate them. It is ttingin this context to cite the public statement o Muhammad Dahlan, one o the

prominent leaders o Fatah, who enthusiastically explained that there is nodierence between Hamas and Fatah and that he never demanded thatHamas recognize Israel. According to Dahlan, Fatah itsel had never actuallyrecognized Israel and never would. Because o the practical need to obtainunding and other benets Fatah and the Palestinian Authority have recognized Israel, but nothing in this recognition obligates the other actions o thisorganization.44

It is not generally known that Israels demand that the Palestinian Authorityrecognize Israel as the Jewish state has resulted in a major ideological challenge.Evidently, this demand has cultural and religious ramications. As mentionedabove, there is a basic rejection o the reality that Judaism, beyond being a religion, is the aith o a people who possess the right to seldetermination. Teextensive discussion o Palestinian ideologues, such as Abu Mazen, Saeb Erekat,Yasser Abed Rabbo, and Nabil Shaath, reveals their views and earsreal andimaginedabout the implications o this idea. Teir internal discourse reectsa good measure o alarm and the projection o their own behavior on the Israelis.Beyond the complete rejection o Jewish nationhood is the ear that recognition

o this reality could result in the disranchisement and possibly the transer othe oneandahalmillion Arabs, the 1948 Arabs, living within the state o Israel. (Following this line o thought, one should ask conversely what would be theate o Israelis who could one day nd themselves living under Palestinian sovereignty.) Here, Palestinian reusal to recognize Jewish nationhood constitutes abarrier to achieving a positive peace. What is shocking is the depth and breadth othis discussion and the complication which the Palestinians have added. Te ollowing is an excerpt rom Abu Mazens address o May 28, 2011, to the OversightCommittee o the Arab League:


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An additional subject which they [the Israelis] have begun to speak aboutover the last year or two is recognition as a Jewish state or o the Jewish-ness o the state o Israel.

Naturally, we rejected this and we will continue to reject statementso this type. We told them that they can go to the United Nations andraise whatever they wish, but we or our part do not see it as our obli-gation or business, or task to determine what is the nature o the state[Israel] and what is its nationality.

But we know very well what is Netanyahus purpose in raising thissubject. It is clear that:

HewishestodestabilizethepresenceoftheArabsinIsrael; HedesirestopreventcompletelytherightofreturnforeveryPal-estinian individual to the state o Israel.

It is or these two reasons that Netanyahu began to speak about a Jewishstate.

Accordingly, these words [i.e., everything he said] to Congress andAIPAC destroyed everything. Tey removed any basis or negotiations.On what basis can we talk?45

Te unwillingness to recognize the state o the Jewish people and a consensusabout the need to continue the struggle orm the real, shared ideological justication or their strategic goal. Tere are no dierences o opinion about the Palestinians right to the violent struggle including terror and its basic justice. At the sametime, the organizations dieralbeit only slightlyabout the right time to renewthe violent struggle.

It is noteworthy that even aer nineteen years o the political process (and ortyve years since the rst publication o the original Palestine National Charter in1964), the Sixth Council o Fatah, which convened in Bethlehem with great anare in August 2009, and the generous acilitation o the state o Israel, did not leadto the abandonment o the ideological and militant steadastness which has characterized Fatah as a revolutionary movement committed to violent struggle. Te

Sixth Council adopted and reafrmed the Palestine National Charter with all oits components. Among these was Article 9, which calls or the continuation o theviolent struggle against the Zionistcolonial entity until its ultimate destruction:

Armed struggle is the only way o liberating Palestine, and is thus stra-tegic, not tactical. Te Palestinian Arab people hereby arm their un-

wavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to presson towards popular revolution or the liberation o and return to theirhomeland. 46


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Te Palestinian ethos o resistance is reinorced by expressions o incitement andhatred toward Israel, and in the call to violence, whose purpose is the liberation oall o Palestine rom the hands o the oreign Zionist occupation. Te ollowing isthe text o Article 22 o the same Palestine National Charter, which (in 2009) theSixth Council o Fatah reafrmed:

Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with worldimperialism, and is opposed to all liberation movements or movementsor progress in the world. Te Zionist movement is essentially anaticalandracialist;itsobjectivesinvolveaggression,expansionandtheestab -lishment o colonial settlements, and its methods are those o Fascists

and Nazis. Israel acts as the cats paw or the Zionist movement, a geo-graphic and manpower base or world imperialism and a springboardor its thrust into the Arab homeland to rustrate the aspirations o the

Arab nation to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threatto peace in the Middle East and the whole world..47

According to Harkabis analysis, this article makes the claim that the hostility oZionism is directed not only against the Arabs but against all that is good in the

world. Tus, warare against Israel is elevated rom an Arab interest to a universal humanistic mission.48

Such ideological positions permeate the Palestinian narrative and ethos and arehammered into the Palestinian public consciousness with all means at the disposalo the PA: mass communications media, be they ofcial, public, and private. Teyare also transmitted to the younger generation by means o the Palestinian educational apparatus. Aer examining a sample o 117 Palestinian textbooks, IMPACSE, a research organization which specializes in the study o textbooks and employsthe UNESCO guidelines and standards, reported its ndings in 2011:

Te general trend o the fndings is a combination o complete disre-gard o Jews rights, and a near complete disregard o Israels existence.

Alongside denial our monitoring also detected a substantial degree o

demonizing Jews and Israel, while preparing or a violent struggle andcompletely ignoring tolerance, reconciliation and peace. While the text-books do not include calls to apply violence against Israel and the Jews,they are alarmingly rie with Jihadi and Martyrdom vocabulary, Israelremains illegitimate, all its territory is seen by PA textbooks as 1948 oc-cupied Palestinian lands.49

Te authors o this report identiy our consistent themes in the school textbookspublished by the Palestinian Authority: 1) rejection o Jews rights and Israels


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existence; 2) demonization o both Jews and Israel; 3) slanting o the ArabIsraeliconict; and 4) instead o advocating tolerance and peace, encouraging o martyrdom and violent struggle.50 Te delegitimization and demonization o the Israeliside and preparation or the coming struggle go hand in hand with the avoidanceo peace with Israel as a goal. In act, past agreements are explicitly interpreted asa orm o Israels weakness which brought onesided gains or the Palestinians. Itis evident that such concessions did not bring about strategic learning (i.e., thechanging o goals) or the Palestinian political and intellectual leadership or anyother positive change. Tis literature provides an egregious example o indirect

violence, as described above, in the orm o cultural violence which provides thejustication and psychological inrastructure or open violence. One must recog

nize the true danger entailed by this incitement and hatetargeting.An additional theme is principally identied with PA Prime Minister Salam

Fayyad, who is regarded as a man o Western culture who brings a new message toa Palestine riddled with corruption. He is thought to represent an alternative tothe prevailing Palestinian political and national culture. Te centrality o Fayyadand his international standing warrant a careul analysis o his plan.

HE FAYYAD PLAN

Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyads plan, Ending the Occupation, Establishingthe State, which was rst published in August 2009, seeks to build the capacity and oundations or a Palestinian state and is characterized by a type o political pragmatism which the international community enthusiastically supports.Indeed, Fayyad has received the support o the Western world and broad international backing or his plan to build the Palestinian state and to secure recognitiono such an entity within the 1967 borders.

Te Fayyad plan is an impressive document which reects the spirit o the eraand displays sophisticated use o the basic concepts o the international discourse,

with an emphasis on the realization o human rights. Tis maniesto embodies theethos o the struggle against Israel. Except or one or two mentions o the idea o

two statesand not two nationstatesand occasional lone reerences to the explicit name o Israel, the state o Israel is absent rom the document and denitelyrom its spirit.51

It should be noted that Fayyads positionwidely considered relatively moderate, at least by the international communitydid not win wide support amongthe Palestinian public. Fayyad lacks political standing and power. He is even considered an internal enemy o the PA leadership and mainly o the Fatah movement. Tey are even working to limit his reedom and remove him rom the centers o inuence. Fayyads policies and positions represent a sense o statesmanlike


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responsibility which his adversaries interpret as the antithesis o and even a realthreat to the revolutionary worldview that they representa worldview whosevalues and practices are in complete contradiction to those associated with a responsible state in the international community. Fayyad has managed to retain his

position or years because his adversaries recognize the importance o his presence.(At the time o this writing, Salam Fayyad has tendered his resignation, whichAbu Mazen has accepted. For the present, it appears that Fayyad will continue toserve as a caretaker.)52 For the international community, his role is an indispensable condition or continuing the nancial aid without which the Palestinian Authority could not go on.

Te essence o Fayyads strategy is to create a ramework or unilateral stepswhose goal is to secure international recognition o a Palestinian state, even i itwould not come into being within a mutually acceptable legal ramework. Tepurpose o this plan is to obviate the political price o a peace agreement whichwould be acceptable to Israel, namely, recognizing the state o Israel as the homeland o the Jewish people and declaring the end o the conict and an end to newdemands. Tus, the Palestinian strategic goal is to gain independence in the senseo ending the occupation (although not necessarily the independent governanceo a state and all that is associated with it) and exercising Palestinian sovereignty in

Judea and Samaria with the support o the international community, which wouldrecognize a Palestinian state within the pre1967 borders.

Clearly there are important ideas in this document which legitimately ormpart o the process o establishing the Palestinian state. Te documents basicproblem, however, is its attempt to give this initiative ideological weight, integrate it with the ethos o the Palestinian struggle, and make it the cornerstone othe unilateral strategy which guides the Palestinian leadership. Tis strategy eectively has become a major barrier to resolving the conict, because its successulrealization would destroy the very idea o two independent states as the guiding

principle o a genuine peace agreement.

HE DUALIY OF HE CURREN PALESINIAN SR AEGY

An examination o Fayyads positions shows a consistent pattern o duality, inot duplicity. Tere is strong emphasis on the importance o establishing a Palestinian state and its institutions together with the continuation o struggle andresistance. Te identity o the Palestinian state and the justice o its establishmentare emphasized along with the negation and delegitimization o Israel. Te document rejects any Jewish attachment to the land and to Jerusalem, which is described as a city o ArabPalestinian heritage to which Christians and Muslims


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have a genuine cultural and religious attachment (and which Israel has orciblyoccupied).Te document makes careul use o ormulations that have double meanings.53

On the one hand, some convey messages which may be viewed as legitimate andare draed in terms o concepts rom the current discourse and related to international law. On the other, there are messages calling or resistance and struggle,

which in turn oster an ethos and consciousness that does not permit the openingo hearts to the culture o peace. Te adjective Israeli has negative connotationsand is linked to all manner o evil and crimes against the Palestinian people. Israelis described as a brutal and cruel entity which harms the Palestinians and negatesreedom o religion and the Islamic and Christian religions specically.

Palestinian adoption o the logic o unilateralism is designed to open aconvenient escape route rom a return to the directnegotiations track by demanding that Israel reeze building and development o the settlements and inEast Jerusalem. Abu Mazen and the Palestinian leadership reuse to resume direct negotiations with Israel because it would change the Palestinian narrative and

jeopardize its ulllment regarding the issues o reugees, Jerusalem, and securityarrangements.

Te strategy o violent struggle has guided Fatah since its establishment andplayed a major role even throughout the Oslo process. Araat gambled on the dualstrategy o negotiations combined with terror.54 With his ailure, and despite six

years o the Second Armed Uprising (Intiada), Abu Mazen has resorted to thedual strategy o negotiation combined with popular resistance, while concurrentlyinsisting that the use o violence does not serve Palestinian interests. While somehave welcomed this change, it is important to point out that Abu Mazen neverrejected the use o violence nor has he dened terror as immoral or illegitimate.He has been careul to state publicly that terror and violence do not serve the Palestinians at present, which means that under a change o circumstances it wouldbe possible to resume the use o armed orce.

On the subject o violence, one may note Nabil Shaaths speech o November22, 2012. Shaath is responsible or the Palestinian Authoritys external relations,and Abu Mazen sent him to Gaza to address a Hamas rally on his behal. Tere,

he openly praised the struggle and resistance in all its orms, including the armedstruggle. One may assume that both Fatah and Abu Mazen supported Shaathschoice o words. Tis was not the rst time Abu Mazen has conveyed such messages via emissaries and in a way that enables him to maintain deniability. Teollowing is an excerpt rom Nabil Shaaths address:

Te battle that you are waging has been going on or a hundred years.Tis people has been fghting or a hundred years to liberate its land, andto liberate Jerusalem. When you shout out that you are marching toward


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Jerusalemwell, this is exactly what your victory is doing. It is deend-ing Jerusalem and Palestine in its entirety, by all means o resistanceby armed resistance, by political resistance, by going to the U.N., bysolidarityby all orms o conrontation with the enemy occupying ourland.55

It is doubtul whether a Palestinian document, ofcial or otherwise, may be oundwhich clearly lays out the guidelines o the Palestinian national strategy and itsprinciple o organization.56 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Palestinian strategyrests on the unproven assumption o the international community that the IsraeliPalestinian conict is the key to security in the region, stability throughout the

Middle East, and even a lull in the conrontation between Islamic undamentalism and the West. Saeb Erekat articulated this way o thinking, which identiesthe IsraeliPalestinian conict as the major issue in the region: Te question oPalestine constitutes a hub or ongoing interplays in our region through hegemony, blackmail or control. Tis will not be realized without the Palestinian question[sic].57

Although Erekat does not express this idea explicitly, it may be ound in Abbasspeech to the UN General Assembly o November 29, 2012. Here, he made thecase or granting the Palestinian Authority the status o a nonmember observerstate at the United Nations. It is symbolically important that he chose November29 as the date or this speech, the anniversary o UN recognition o the Jewishstate in 1948.

Abbas attempted to project the image o a uture head o state, but on closeexamination, his message is bellicose, emotionally charged, and misleading. He

portrayed the Palestinians as the innocent victims o an unprecedented historicalinjustice. He also declared that the international community stands beore thelast chance or the twostate solution, o course without dening precisely whathe meant by the term. He also called or a just peace, again without dening

what he meant. It would be helpul i he would explain precisely what he had inmind.

Abbas presented Israel as a systematic abuser o human rights and o the rights

o minorities which, with a brutal oot, crushes the rights o the Palestinian national minority in the Land o Israel. Basically, he presented the Palestinian peopleas the innocent victim o Israels colonial occupation, which institutionalizes the

plague o racism and entrenches hatred and incitement.58Abbass choice o language and slogans comes directly rom the Soviet lexicon

o the Cold War.59 Among the terms he used were: racist colonial occupation,ethnic cleansing, aggression and occupation. Araat used the same terms in hisUN address o November 1974, and this may have served as Abbas model. Abbasalso stated:


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Yet, we must repeat here once again our warning: the window o op-portunity is narrowing and time is quickly running out. Te rope o pa-tience is shortening and hope is withering. Te innocent lives that havebeen taken by Israeli bombsare a painul reminder to the world thatthis racist, colonial occupation is making the two-state solution and theprospect or realizing peace a very dicult choice, i not impossible.

Te times have changed, and the leadership o the PLO now wear suits, but thismessage is reminiscent o the words o Araat: oday I have come bearing an olivebranch and a reedom ghters gun. Do not let the olive branch all rom my hand.I repeat: do not let the olive branch all rom my hand. 60 Te language may be

dierent, but the message is the same.Te present Palestinian strategy is based on the coordination o several pro

active methods: an international eort to create a hostile climate toward Israelwhile simultaneously launching unilateral initiatives in order to avoid serious negotiations. By delegitimizing Israel and presenting it as a leper and a war criminal

which opposes peace and peremptorily prevents the rise o a Palestinian state, thePalestinian strategy is to promote a process which will eventually result in a Security Council decision that is avorable to their cause. A parallel move is the Palestinians attempt to aggravate the tensions between Israel and the United States soas to spread the idea that Israel is not a strategic asset but a burden. Domestically,the PA leadership has nurtured the Palestinian resistance ethos, devoting systematic eorts to shaping and preserving the consciousness o the struggle. Tey haveostered an atmosphere o violence and the teaching o hate, while promotingcounterindoctrination about peace and coexistence with Israel.

POSIIVE PEACE AS HE OPIMAL SOLUION OF HE CONFLIC:WHY ISR AEL SHOULD NO ACCEP ANYHING LESS

Te state o Israel cannot agree to the establishment o a neighboring Palestinianstate which is not committed to positive peace with its our basic components (as

specied at the beginning o this article). Te establishment o a Palestinian statewhich does not t into the ramework and spirit o positive peace increases thechances o creating a ailed and hostile state which would destabilize the securityo the region and become an irredentist danger both or Israel and Jordan. Insteado concentrating on state building, it would become a strategic enclave acilitating the political and military struggle as was the case o Cambodia during the warin Vietnam.

Only the creation o a state committed to positive peace can prevent theeventuality o a subversive political entity which would act to incite irredentist


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sentiment among the Arab citizens o Israel. Some members o this populationgroup dene themselves as part o the Palestinian people and collaborate withparts o the intellectual, religious, and political elites which systematically work todestabilize the Zionist political model o the state o Israel, endeavoring to bringabout its demise by constantly exploiting and leveraging the eorts at delegitimization o Israel as the Jewish nationstate.

Israel has a vital interest in the type o neighbor it will have. From its perspective, the political process must be conducted parallel to the process o building thePalestinian state and must rest on three principles:

1) wo nationstates: Palestine as the nationstate o the Palestinian people

and Israel as the nationstate o the Jewish people2) Rehabilitation o the Palestinian reugees outside o Israel3) Obligatory security arrangements aimed at assuring Israels security.

From Israels point o view, a viable Palestinian state should be capable o assertingits eective sovereignty by means o a legitimate central government and shouldbe ree o subversion which would threaten its very existence. A viable Palestinianstate must exercise its authority over its citizens in a legal and responsible mannerand: 1) assure the monopoly on the use o orce; 2) provide or the wellbeing andsecurity o the population to which it is responsible by means o state institutions,eective governance, assuring law and order, and capable economic management;and 3) ulll its obligations toward its neighbors in conormance with international law and thus assure regional security.

Te time has come or the international community to accept the obligation osupporting positive peace. Tat means applying the same standards to both sides;repudiating terror, declaring it immoral, and reusing outright to accord legitimacy to terrorist movements; and most importantly, obliging the Palestinians tocultivate the right atmosphere by developing a cultural inrastructure compatible

with peace and educating its people toward this end.Tese requirements are reasonable and modest, but in order to conduct nego

tiations that will result in the conclusion o the conict and a stable peacenot

just an armistice or the absence o warit is necessary to go back to the basics.Te Palestinians must publicly and irrevocably drop the malicious propositionthat peace and justice entail the liquidation o Israel. Without a clearly stated andundamental change o their strategic goal, the peace negotiations cannot result in

peace. Tis is thesine qua non.Mistakes have been made, and the hour is late. All parties concerned includ

ing the international community must adopt the positive peace as the true goal omeaningul negotiations and strive or a disposition or benevolence, condence,[and] justice.


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NOES

* Te authors acknowledge the assistance o Ido Mizrachi o the Department o StrategicAairs o the Prime Ministers Ofce. He kindly made a number o signicant documentsavailable or the preparation o this article.

1. For background literature, see: Johan Galtung, An Editorial, Journal o Peace Research 1,1 (March 1964): 14.Oliver Ramsbotham, om Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conict Resolu-tion, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 331.Louis Kriesberg, Te Development o the Conict Resolution Field, in I. William Zartman, ed.,Peacemaking in International Conict: Methods and echniques, rev. ed. (Washington: U.S. Institute o Peace Press, 2007).

I. William Zartman, Ripeness: Te Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in Paul C. Stern andDaniel Druckman, eds., International Conict Resolution afer the Cold War(Washington:National Academy Press, 2000), 225250.Yaacov BarSimanov, Adaptation and Learning in Conict Management, Reductionand Resolution,International Journal o Peace Studies 18 (2003): 1937.Herbert C. Kelman, SocialPsychological Dimensions o International Conict, in I. W.Zartman ed., Peacemaking in International Conict: Methods and echniques (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute o Peace, 2007), 61107.

2. Samuel Huntington, Te Tird Wae: Democratization in the Late wentieth Century(Norman, OK: University o Oklahoma Press, 1991). Huntington termed the worldwidereinstatement o democracy the Tird Wave.

3. David Makovsky,Making Peace with the PLO: Te Rabin Governments Road to the OsloAccord(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 15.

4. In Iory owers on Sand, Martin Kramer pointed out that the Palestinian exception wasone o the paradigms which then prevailed in American academic circles. Te Palestinianswere believed to have a vibrant civil society, both inside and outside Palestine. Tey hadrepresentative institutions, unions, and associations. Teir leaders were accountable. Allowthem selrule, and the Palestinians would prove that the Arab world could sustain democracy. Martin Kramer,Iory owers on Sand (Washington, DC: Washington Instituteor Near East Policy, 2001), 70, as quoted by Joel Fishman, Te Broken Promise o theDemocratic Peace: Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Jerusalem Viewpoints, No. 477,Jerusalem Center or Public Aairs, May 1, 2002, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp477.htm.

5. Alicia Cabezudo and Magnus Haavesrud, Rethinking Peace Education, in Charles Web

el and Johan Galtung, eds.,Handbook o Peace and Conict Studies (New York: Routledge,2007), 280.6. See the description o the nature and characteristics o cultural and structural violence

and the need to tackle all dimensions o violence in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall,Contemporary Conict Resolution, 10.

7. A denition o rst and secondorder change may be ound in Leadership and Institutional Change, National Academy or Academic Leadership, http://www.thenationalacademy.org/ready/change.html.

8. Teological-Political reatise,1670.9. Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2001.


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10. Yehoshaat Harkabi, Te ArabIsrael Conict (1969), in Yehoshaat Harkabi, ed.,Pales-

tinians and Israel( Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press/Keter, 1974), 19. Te idea o orcingIsrael to accept an armistice in exchange or major withdrawals was the basis o the illatedRogers Plan (June 1970). Harkabi wrote the seminal studyArab Attitudes to Israel(Jerusalem: Keter, 1972).

11. El Mundo (Caracas), February 11, 1980, as cited by Robert Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession(New York: Random House, 2010), 703 and 1080, n. 58.

12. Khaled Abu oameh, Palestinians Plan Violence to Force the US to Extract Concessions rom Israel, posted February 22, 2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3598/palestiniansplanviolence.

13. Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, Te Case or Democracy (New York: Public Aairs,2004), 151.

14. Obserer, April 7, 2002, as quoted by Joel Fishman, Broken Promise. See also RobertCooper, Te Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos Publications,2000), http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thepostmodernstate.

15. Ibid.16. For urther reading on this concept, see Shiri Landman, Barriers to Peace: Protected Val

ues in the IsraeliPalestinian Conict, in Yaacov Bar Simanov, ed., Barriers to Peace inthe Israeli-Palestinian Conict (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute or Israel Studies, 2010),135177.

17. Case or Democracy, 156, 172.18. Evelyn Gordon, Te Deadly Price o Pursuing Peace, Commentary (January 2010),

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/thedeadlypriceopursuingpeace/.19. On 10 May 1994, Yasir Araat gave what he thought was an otherecord talk at a

mosque while visiting Johannesburg, South Arica. But a South Arican journalist, BruceWhiteld o 702 alk Radio, ound a way secretly to record his (Englishlanguage) remarks. Te moment was an optimistic one or the ArabIsraeli peace process, Araat having just six days earlier returned triumphantly to Gaza; it was widely thought that theconict was winding down. In this context, Araats bellicose talk in Johannesburg abouta jihadto liberate Jerusalem, had a major impact on Israelis, beginning a process o disillusionment that has hardly abated in the intervening years. Daniel Pipes, [AlHudaybiyaand] Lessons rom the Prophet Muhammads Diplomacy, Middle East Quarterly, September 1999, http://www.danielpipes.org/316/alhudaybiyaandlessonsromtheprophetmuhammads. Also, Araat told alQuds editor: I will make Oslo Israels curse, February16, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0tmmd4VoVI.

20. Tis is the expression o Michael Gerson, one o President George W. Bushsspeechwriters.

21. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, December 12, 2010, as quoted by Itamar Marcus and Nan JacquesZilberdik, Palestinian reactions are mixed to PA aid in Carmel re: Even i your home isstolen, you dont want it to burn,Palwatch, posted January 5, 2011, http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?=157&doc_id=4109.

22. See Yose Kuperwasser and Asher Fredman, Te Incitement and Culture o Peace Index:Methodology and rends, in Alan Baker, ed., Te Changing Forms o Incitement to errorand Violence: Te Need or a New International Response ( Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center orPublic Aairs and Konrad Adenauer Stiung, 2012), 5560.


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23. Robert C. ucker,Te Soviet Political Mind,

rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1971), 7.24. Yehoshaat Harkabi, Te Palestinian National Covenant (November 1969), in Harkabi,Palestinians and Israel, 64.

25. Bernard Lewis, Te Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach, Commentary 59(January 1975): 39.

26. Harkabi,Arab Attitudes, 8.27. Yehoshaat Harkabi, Arab Positions on Zionism, in Shmuel Almog, ed.,Zionism and the

Arabs ( Jerusalem: Historical Society o Israel and Zalman Shazar Center, 1983), 191.28. Joel Fishman, Te ColdWar Origins o Contemporary AntiSemitic erminolog y,Jeru-

salem Viewpoints, No. 517, May 216, 2004, Jerusalem Center or Public Aairs, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp517.htm.

29. For example, the PLO charter currently is posted on the ollowing websites:

1) PLO Reugee Aairs Department, http://plord.ps/ar/index.php?act=Show&id=500;2) PLO Executive Committee, National Ofce or Deense o the Land and or Resistanceto the Settlements, http://plord.ps/ar/index.php?act=Show&id=500; and 3) website othe Palestinian Mission to Germany, http://www.palaestina.org/leadmin/Daten/Dokumente/Abkommen/PLO/palaestinensische_nationalcharta.pd (accessed March 15,2013).

30. According to Farouk Kaddoumi, the Palestinian leadership went through the motions orevising the charter during President Clintons visit to Gaza but did not actually do so.Kaddoumi said that contrary to what many people believe, the PLO Charter was neverchanged to recognize Israels right to exist. Te Palestinian national charter has not beenamended until now. It was said that some articles are no longer in eect, but they werenot changed. Im one o those who did not agree to any changes. Khaled Abu oameh,

Kaddoumi: PLO Charter was never changed,Jerusalem Post, April 23, 2004.31. Abu Mazen, I Reject Israel as a Jewish State, PMW Videos, posted April 30, 2009, http://

www.youtube.com/watch?eature=endscreen&NR=1&v=2ilLeENaxK4.32. Te Meaning o a Democratic Palestinian State (1970), inPalestinians and Israel, 96.33. Abu Iyad [Salah Khala ] with Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land, trans. Linda Butler

Koseoglu (New York: imes Books, 1978), 69, as quoted by Joel Fishman, en Yearssince Oslo: Te PLOs Peoples War Strategy and Israels Inadequate Response,JerusalemViewpoints, No. 503, September 115, 2003, www.jcpa.org/jl/vp503.htm.

34. Yose Bodansky, Araats Peace Process, ACPR Policy Paper18 (1997): 34.35. Case or Democracy, 147.36. Lewis, Palestinians and the PLO, 45. Te text o these resolutions may be ound in Ap

pendix E, Political Programme or the Present Stage o the Palestine Liberation Organization Drawn up by the Palestinian National Council, Cairo, June 9, 1974, in YehoshaatHarkabi, Te Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning(London: Valentine Mitchell, 1979),147148.

37. Mordechai Nisan, Te PLO and Vietnam: National Liberation Models or PalestinianStruggle, Small Wars and Insurgencies 4, 2 (Autumn 1993): 203, 204.

38. Abu oameh, Kaddoumi.39. Full text o Mahmoud Abbass speech to the UN General Assembly, November 29, 2012,

http://www.timesosrael.com/ulltextomahmoudabbassspeechtotheungeneralassemblynovember292012/.


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40. Harkabi, Arab Positions, 187.41. See Introduction,Israel, the West, Women and the Environment in Palestinian extbooks:An Analysis o Palestinian Authority extbooks, Grades 112, IMPACSE Report, 2011,http://www.impactse.org/docs/reports/PA/PA2011.pd.

42. Yaacov BarSimanov, Introduction: Barriers to Conict Resolution, in Barriers toPeace.

43. For cultural context with documentation, see Te Culture o Peace and Incitement in thePA Index, Prime Ministers Ofce, December 2, 2012, http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Documents/hasataENG0212112.ppt.

44. Muhammad Dahlan, Te Fatah Movement does not recognize Israel, PMWPalestinianWatch, posted March 22, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eylEdsu5mOE.

45. Te ofcial website o Mahmoud Abbas, http://www.presidency.ps/videogallery.

aspx?id=49&page=4&=kh.46. Palestinian National Covenant o 1968, in Harkabi,Palestinian Covenant, 120.47. Harkabi,PalestinianCovenant, 123.48. Ibid., Te Palestinian National Covenant (November 1969), in Harkabi,Palestinians

and Israel, 65.49. For urther analysis o the ethos and core values o the Palestinian curriculum, see: Intro

duction,Israel, the West, Women and the Environment in Palestinian extbooks, IMPACSE Report, 2011, p. 3, http://www.impactse.org/docs/reports/PA/PA2011.pd.

50. Ibid. See also Arnon Groiss, Delegitimization o Israel in Palestinian Authority schoolbooks,Israel Aairs 18, 3 (July 2012): 455484.

51. Palestinian National Authority, Palestine, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State:Program o the Tirteenth Government, posted August 2009, http://www.un.int/wcm/

webdav/site/palestine/shared/documents/Ending%20Occupation%20Establishing%20the%20State%20%28August%202009%29.pd.

52. Khaled Abu oameh, Why Salam Fayyad Stands No Chance against Fatah, GatestoneInstitute, April 11, 2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3670/ayyadvsatah.

53. Palestinian National Authority, Palestine, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State.Also Isabel Kershner, Palestinian Leader Maps Plan or Separate State,New York imes,August 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/world/middleeast/26mideast.html?_r=0,

54. Jonathan D. Halevi, Te Palestinian Authoritys Responsibility or the Outbreak othe Second Intiada: Its Own Damning estimony, Jerusalem Center or Public Aairs,No. 594, posted February 20, 2013, http://jcpa.org/article/thepalestinianauthoritysresponsibilityortheoutbreakothesecondintiadaitsowndamningtestimony.

55. Nabil Shaath at a Hamas victory rally in Gaza, which aired on AlQuds V on November 22, 2012. MEMRI V, clip 3651, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/3651.htm.

56. Te closest thing to such a document is Faysal AlHusseini in his Last Interview: TeOslo Accords Were a rojan Horse; Te Strategic Goal is the Liberation o Palestine romthe [ Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 236, July6, 2001, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP23601.

57. Te Political Situation in Light o Developments with the US Administration and Israeli Government and Hamas: Continued Coup dtat; Recommendations and Options,


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December 2009, http://transparency.aljazeera.com/ar/projects/thepalestinepapers/20121911330468619.html.58. Full text o Mahmoud Abbass speech to the UN General Assembly, November 29, 2012,

http://www.timesosrael.com/ulltextomahmoudabbassspeechtotheungeneralassemblynovember292012.

59. See Fishman, ColdWar Origins.60. Speech by Yasser Araat, United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 13,

1974, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, http://mondediplo.com/ocus/mideast/araat74en..

DR. KOBI MICHAEL is a scholar who focuses on peace and war studies and professor

of conflict resolution and strategy. He is a recipient of the Tshetshik Prize (2005)for the best research on Israel National Security, the Itzhak Sade Prize for militaryliterature for a book to which he contributed three chapters (2006), and the Yariv

Award (2002) for the best research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.DR. JOEL FISHMAN is a historian of contemporary events, fellow of the Jerusalem

Center for Public Affairs, and editor of theJewish Political Studies Review.