GATT & WTO - DSB

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    1/39

    GATT-WTO Dispute Settlement

    Mechanism

    Structure of the WTO Agreement

    Annex 1

    1A: GATT1B: GATS

    1C: TRIPs

    Annex 2

    Dispute

    SettlementUnderstanding

    Annex 3

    Trade Policy

    ReviewMechanism

    Annex 4

    Plurilateral

    Agreements

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    2/39

    GATT 1947:

    Nearly 50 years of dispute settlement under theGATT 1947.

    Still no specific procedure or provision for

    settlement of disputes. No provision for establishment of Tribunals for

    settling questions of law or interpretation.

    But even then;

    GATT 1947 resolved many disputes througharound Nineteen Clauses which obligated thecontracting parties to consult in specific instances.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    3/39

    What is a Dispute ?What is a Dispute ?

    Disputes in the WTO are essentially about broken promises. WTO members have agreedthat if they believe fellow-members are violatingtrade rules, they will use the multilateral system

    of settling disputes instead of taking actionunilaterally. That means abiding by the agreedprocedures, and respecting judgments.

    A dispute arises when one country adopts a tradepolicy measure or takes some action that one ormore fellow-WTO members considers to be

    breaking the WTO agreements, or to be a failure

    to live up to obligations.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    4/39

    Objectives

    Article 3.2 of the DSU

    Security and predictability in international trade ;

    Preserving Members rights and obligations ;

    Peaceful settlement of disputes.

    Clarifying the existing provisions.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    5/39

    Outcome ?

    Article 3.7 of the DSU

    Positive solution to a dispute;

    Preferred outcome: Mutually acceptable solution

    Withdrawal of measures inconsistent with the

    covered agreements

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    6/39

    ...and if no mutually agreed solution

    reached ? Panel proceedings

    (Appellate Body review)

    Inconsistent measures...

    1. Withdrawal

    2. Compensation / Suspension of concessions

    Measure

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    7/39

    Article XXII and XXIII deal with provisions

    regarding dispute settlement in GATT.

    Art. XXII made consultations, a basis for

    GATTs dispute settlement procedure.

    Art. XXIII says, the complainant must show that

    either;

    1. Benefits accruing to him under GATT are beingnullified or impaired; or

    2. Attainment of any objectives of GATT is beingimpeded; and that;

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    8/39

    such nullification or impairment is a result of

    either:

    1. breach of obligations by respondent;

    2. application of any conflicting measure byrespondent;

    3. existence of any other situation.

    Over the years, some semblance of formality was

    added to the dispute settlement process in 1979when Tokyo Round adopted an Understanding

    on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement

    and Surveillance.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    9/39

    Complainants

    EC, 81

    Canada, 33India, 18

    Mexico, 21

    Argentina, 15Korea, 14

    Others

    (developed), 34

    US, 93

    Brazil, 24

    Others

    (developing), 90

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    10/39

    Main actors in the WTO

    Dispute Settlement System

    Art.2 DSU establishes Dispute Settlement Body(DSB)

    Administers the WTO Dispute Settlement System

    Establishes panels

    Adopts panel and Appellate Body reports

    Maintains surveillance of implementation

    Non-implementation? Authorizes retaliatory measures

    The panel 3 5 panelists, ad hoc body

    The Appellate Body Standing body of 7 members, 4-yearterm

    Assist panels and theAppellate BodyWTO and AB Secretariat

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    11/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    12/39

    Recourse to WTO dispute settlement:

    Who?Only WTO Members (153 as of November 2009)

    NOT NGOs, individuals (although may lobbygovernments indirect access)

    Appellate Body: No DSU provision requiring legal interest

    Members have a broad discretion whether or not tobring a case

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    13/39

    Recourse to WTO dispute settlement:

    Regarding what?

    Appendix 1 to the DSU

    Disputes under the following agreements must be resolvedpursuant to the DSU:

    WTO Agreement

    Multilateral Trade Agreements (GATT 1994 + 12 other

    agreements on trade in goods)GATS

    TRIPS

    DSU

    (Plurilateral Trade Agreements)

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    14/39

    Kinds of Jurisdiction:

    Compulsory jurisdiction

    Members obliged to bring disputes under the Covered

    Agreements to WTO dispute settlement

    Accession: Consent to accept jurisdiction

    Exclusive jurisdiction

    No other fora

    No unilateral action

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    15/39

    Main Stages:

    Consultat ons60 days

    Panel review6 9 months

    AB review60 90 days

    Adoptionof report by the DSB

    Implementation

    Good offices,conciliation and

    mediationpossible at any

    moment

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    16/39

    ...Consultations

    Article 4 of the DSU

    Diplomatic method of settling the dispute

    Confidential No intervention by the Secretariat

    Without prejudice to the rights of any Member in further legal

    proceedings

    As of April 2010:

    406requests for consultations! !

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    17/39

    Third parties joining consultations

    Article 4.11 of the DSU

    Request filed underArticle XXII of the GATT

    Substantial trade interest

    Notification to the consulting Parties and the DSB

    Within 10 days of the circulation of the original request

    (WT/DSXXX/1)

    Respondent decides:

    Substantial interest? No review, but the Member can

    separately request consultations

    DSB informed about the decision to accept

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    18/39

    GATT(1994), WTO & Dispute Settlement

    Principle: the settlement of disputes shall be rule orientedandnot power oriented.

    Art. 2 of DSU: establishment ofDSB.

    DSU = 27 Articles + 4 Appendices

    DSU is often referred to as the jewel in the crown of WTO.

    DSU confers compulsory jurisdiction to DSB, hencetransforming GATT 1947s soft law status to GATT 1994s

    stringent law mechanism.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    19/39

    Functions of DSB:

    1. Power to establish panels;

    2. Adopt panel reports;

    3. supervisory powers;

    4. Implementation of recommendations and rulings;

    5. Authorizing sanctions on failure in complying

    with dispute settlement decisions.

    The General Council of WTO serves as DSB.

    But, DSB has its own chairman and follows itsown separate procedure.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    20/39

    Good Offices, Conciliation & Mediation

    Art. 5 : Failure of Consultation

    Within 60 days

    WTO members may approach DSUs Good Offices,

    Conciliation or Mediation services

    * Good Offices, Conciliations & Mediation available beforesetting up of Panel, and not afterwards.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    21/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    22/39

    Request for the establishment

    of a panelIn writing

    Addressed to the DSB

    Indicate whether consultations were held

    Identify the specific measures at issue

    Brief summary of the legal basis claims

    Article 6.2 of the DSU and specific disputesettlement provisions

    to Members as document WT/DSXXX/X

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    23/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    24/39

    Functions of Panels

    1. To enquire into the facts of the case;

    2. To assess relevant elements for a decision on themeasures;

    3. To submit a proposal for such a decision;

    The panel reports donot have legal force behind them.

    The panel reports then go to the contracting partieswhere mediating and political aspects are re-consideredand the panel report if gets adopted, achieves legalforce.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    25/39

    Due to the lack of legal sanction behind behind panel reports, the

    dispute settlement mechanism of GATT 1947 is often termed as softlaw.

    An eminent result of which was blocking of unfavorable panelreports by the contracting parties.

    This consequent blocking of panel reports was later overcome byMontreal rules, 1989.

    Montreal Rules were applied on trial basis from May 1, 1989 till

    conclusion of Uruguay Round in 1994.

    Montreal Rules placed time limits on consultations and providedfor automatic establishment of panels.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    26/39

    Panel proceedings

    Appendix 3DSU

    Generalworkingprocedures

    1. First written submissions of the parties

    2. [Third party submissions]

    3. First substantive meeting with the parties and third

    parties - Third party session4. Written rebuttals of the parties

    5. Second substantive meeting with the parties

    6. Descriptive part of the report to the parties

    7. Parties comments on the descriptive part

    8. Interim review

    9. Final report issued to parties

    10. Final report circulated to all Members

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    27/39

    Adoption of Panel Reports

    Procedure of GATT1947

    ( Faulty)

    Procedure of GATT1994

    (Improved)

    GATT1947: Panel Reports to be adopted only by Consensus; possibility of blocking of unfavorable panel reports.

    GATT1994:DSU changed the procedure; Interim review of pros and cons of dispute; Parties may ask for review of interim report or its

    parts.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    28/39

    Appellate Body

    ..Established in 1995, under Art. 17 of DSU;innovation of WTO dispute settlement system

    A standing body of 7 Members. 4-year term,renewable once.

    Requirements:Authority and expertise in internationaltrade law;Unaffiliated with any government;Impartiality, broad representativeness.

    *Appointed by the DSB on consensus, based on

    nominations by WTO Members

    Requirements:Authority and expertise in internationaltrade law;Unaffiliated with any government;Impartiality, broad representativeness.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    29/39

    What can be appealed?

    Article 17.6 of the DSU

    Appeals limited to issues of law covered in the panel

    report and legal interpretations developed by the panel;

    No factual findings by the Appellate Body;

    Panels factual findings: In principle, outside the scope ofappellate review.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    30/39

    Role of third parties in Appellate hearings

    Only those Members that were third parties on the panel

    stage;

    Cannot appeal;

    Right to file written submissions and to participate in theoral hearing.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    31/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    32/39

    Implementation Mechanism

    Art.21 : Mechanism for surveillance of implementation ofrecommendations and rulings of Panel & Appellate BodyReports.

    * If Recommendations/Rulings of Panelor Appellate Body are notimplemented; the winning party isentitled to :

    seek compensation; and/or request the Authority to suspend

    Concessions previously made to theoffending member.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    33/39

    CASESCASESBANANA DISPUTE:

    The recent Banana dispute has thrown up problems relatingto Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the DSU.

    FACTS: The dispute involves the EU's regulatory regime for

    imported bananas, enacted in 1993. Prior to 1992 each of the 12 EU member states had its own

    banana import regime. Germany operated on a free marketsystem and had no import restrictions. The other 11 membersimposed a 20% tariff, and 6 members (France, Italy, Portugal,Spain, Greece, and the UK) also applied quotas on bananas

    produced in Central and South America. These latter restrictionswere designed to protect the EU market from bananas producedin former EU territories and in ACP countries (developingcountries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific). As part of its1992 integration program the EU established, an EU-wide

    banana trade regime.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    34/39

    Complaints made by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico andthe US. The complainants alleged that the EC's regime for import,sale and distribution of bananas is inconsistent with GATT

    Articles I, II, III, X, XI and XIII as well as provisions of theImport Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, theTRIMs Agreement and the GATS.

    Panel established on 8 May 1996.Panel found that the EC's banana

    import regime, and licensing procedures for import of bananas,were inconsistent with GATT.

    Following an appeal by the EC, the Appellate Body mostly upheldthe Panel's findings. In September 1997, the Appellate Bodyreport and the modified Panel report were adopted by the DSB.Subsequently, the Arbitrator settled the reasonable period forimplementation to be the period from 25 September 1997 to 1January 1999.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    35/39

    The dispute entered another phase when the complainantsquestioned the WTO-consistency of the measures introduced bythe EC. On 15 Dec. 1998, EC requested the establishment of a

    panel to determine that its implementing measures must bepresumed to conform to WTO rules unless challenged.

    About the same time, Ecuador also requested the re-establishmentof the original panel to examine whether the EC measures are

    WTO-consistent.

    DSB agreed on 12 Jan. 1999 to reconvene the original panel toexamine both Ecuador's and the EC's requests. On 14 Jan. 1999,the US, pursuant to Art. 22.2 ofDSU, requested authorization fromthe DSB for suspension of concessions to the EC in an amount ofUS$520 million. At the same time, the original panel determinedthat the EC bananas regime was still not fully WTO-compatible.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    36/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    37/39

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    38/39

    Conclusion

    Thus we can ascertain that the dispute-settlement process ofWTO, which came into existence as a result of the UruguayRound of trade negotiations on 1st Jan. 1995, is by any objectivestandard, a resounding success.

    Over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and at the end of1997, 25 cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 wereunder consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal

    process.

    The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, thequality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement

    panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO arecomplying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by theDSB.

  • 8/8/2019 GATT & WTO - DSB

    39/39

    Thank You..!!

    Presented by- Navneet KaurLLM (ITBL) Bat h: 2009-11

    NALSAR Univ. of Law, Hyderabad.