Governing child labor in a global supply chain

Insights from a child labor intervention in India’s carpet industry

Akshay Mangla

Presented at Just Supply Chains Conference, Stanford University

May 16, 2008

Background on child labor in Carpet Belt Based in eastern Uttar Pradesh (U.P.)

Pop. 170 million Developmentally “backward” state Socially and politically fragmented

Carpet Belt is largest production region of India 85% of Indian carpets in 2006

Industry is highly export-oriented $620 million export revenue in 2006

Relies heavily on informal production and home-based work in rural areas

Estimates for child labor range from 130,000 – 350,000

Late 1980s witnessed domestic public scrutiny on child labor in the industry Domestic activists focus on state policy for

bonded child labor Joined by international activists in 1990s

targeting all forms of child labor 80% of exports go to Germany and United

States

Challenge of governing labor conditions in carpet supply chain

Foreign Buyer

Exporter

Washer

Raw Material Supplier

Finisher

Dyer

Loom Owner/ Weaver

Weaver Weaver Weaver

Three alternative responses to “child labor” in the Carpet Belt Indian state responds to domestic activism with greater legal enforcement

1986 Child labor Act identifies carpets as “hazardous” sector in accordance with ILO Convention 182 Chief strategy to deter child labor (ages 5-14) through inspections, fines and legal prosecution 1987 National Child Labor Project (NCLP) directs resources towards rescue and rehabilitation Labor Dept. primarily focused on factory and bonded child labor Informality and conflicting legal norms complicates implementation

CLA does not apply to informal or home-based production

Private sector responds to activism and consumer sentiment with social labeling initiatives Chief strategy to monitor suppliers and reward (penalize) good (bad) behavior Various labels emerged with little coordination between them

E.g. STEP Rugmark, Kaleen, Care and Fair Child labor identified according to Indian legal definition but with focus on home-based weaving implementation challenge due to geographic scale, informality, and disaggregated supply chain

UNICEF-IKEA Bal Adhikar Initiative A community-based intervention that addresses “supply side” causes of child labor

Involves local NGOs working at the community-level Identify target communities and “at-risk” families with help from local NGOs and IKEA suppliers Strategy includes social mobilization, alternative schooling, and women’s Self Help Groups (SHGs)

UNICEF abides by U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Initiative recast definition of child labor as “non-schoolgoing children” Challenge of gaining community support and mobilizing residents under conditions of poverty, child

labor norms, and existing caste and gender hierarchies

Local NGOs harness the “moral basis” of social capital to facilitate change Work through existing norms and

hierarchies to gain legitimacy and community participation Morally sensitive language Street plays conveys injustice without

offending Women qua mothers mobilized as social

change agents Network of community members monitor

school enrolment Alternative school run by residents SHG members, teachers and even children

monitor attendance Shared moral understanding provides

framework for negotiating tradeoffs Yet the same strategies that facilitate

change also constrain it Parents cannot be coerced into sending

children to school Drawing on caste identities may hinder

concerted public action on a larger scale Working around state agencies can limit

sustainability

Summing up

Child labor can be addressed in a global supply chain Social and political factors keep children away from school, not just poverty

Governing child labor in a global supply chain requires contextual knowledge: industry, legal conditions, state resources, local institutions, as well as moral norms and hierarchies that govern society

Methods of “top-down” regulation by the state can address some forms of child labor but also may lead to greater informality

Under conditions of informality, geographic dispersion and organizational fragmentation, standard monitoring approaches are constrained

Participatory interventions have more flexibility to work within communities to effect change from the “bottom-up”

Yet community participation carries a price as global child labor norms may clash with local norms and developmental states Some local norms and hierarchies are highly resistant to change

State is still the “legitimate” provider of public goods and services Challenge of working with state agencies despite weak rule of law In large federations like India local interventions can have spillover effects