Gregzter 1NC vs Cuban Embargo

7/28/2019 Gregzter 1NC vs Cuban Embargo

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1NC: EE =/= Embargo

A. Definition -- Economic engagement must be tangible- excludes lifting the embargo

Haass, 2000Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose.Economic engagementmight offertangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans,

and economic aid."Otherequally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade

embargoes, investment bans, orhigh tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitatedentry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

And Increase means to make greater in number.

Dictionary.com Unabridged[Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase,"http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase]

increase [v. in-krees; n. in-krees] Show IPA verb, -creased, -creasing, nounverb (used with object)1.to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase taxes.

B Violationthe aff just removes the embargoit doesnt net increase economic engagement.

C. Voting Issue -

Limitstheir interp explodes the research burden for the neg

Groundmeans they can spike out of all links based off of increasing engagementkills spending and

politics.

Effects T is an Independent Voterthe aff gets advantages off of removing the embargo, NOT increasing

engagement, proves the resolution insufficient.

1NC

Economic engagement increases US trade deficit- kills the economy

Beachy 5/8 (Ben Beachy is Research Director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, Eyes on Trade is a blog bythe staff of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch (GTW) division, As Korean President Addresses Congress Today,First Year of Korea Free Trade Agreement Data Shows U.S. Exports Down, Trade Deficit with Korea Up,http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/trade_deficit_economic_impact/, May 08, 2013)

After First Year of U.S.-Korea FTA, U.S. Exports to Korea Down 10 Percent, Imports from Korea Up andDeficit With Korea Swells 37 Percent, Contradicting Obama Promises of U.S. Export and Job Growth Just-released government trade data, covering the first year of implementation ofthe U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement(FTA), shows a remarkable decline in U.S. exports to Korea and a rise in imports from Korea,provoking a

dramatic trade deficit increasethat defies the Obama administrations promises that the pact would expand U.S.exports and create U.S. jobs, Public Citizen said today. The coincidence of the dismal trade data coming out justbefore the Korean presidents Wednesday address to a joint session of Congress can only heighten attention to the gapbetween the administrations promises and the outcomes of its trade agreements. The Korea pacts damaging

outcomes being the opposite of the administrations promises will certainly complicate the administrations

current efforts to use the same claims about export expansion to persuade Congress to delegate away its

constitutional trade authority or to build support for the administrations next trade deal, a massive 11-nationTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) based on the same model, said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens GlobalTrade Watch. U.S. export growth to countries with NAFTA-style pacts like the U.S.-Korea FTA has been
http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/trade_deficit_economic_impact/http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/trade_deficit_economic_impact/http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/trade_deficit_economic_impact/


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particularly lackluster; growth of U.S. exports to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. exportgrowth to countries that are FTA partners by 38 percent over the past decade. In contrast to the Obamaadministrations promise that the U.S.-Korea FTA would mean more exports, more jobs, U.S. goods exports toKorea have dropped 10 percent (a $4.2 billion decrease) under the Korea FTAs first year, in comparison to the yearbefore FTA implementation. U.S. imports from Korea have climbed 2 percent (a $1.3 billion increase). The U.S. tradedeficit with Korea has swelled 37 percent (a $5.5 billion increase). The ballooning trade deficit indicates the loss oftens of thousands of U.S. jobs. Most Americans will not be shocked that another trade agreement has increasedour trade deficit, because they know that these NAFTA-style deals are losers, but anger toward the politicians whokeep supporting these deals is soaring,said Wallach. The question is why any member of Congress would buy thesame tired promises that once again have proven false and cede to the administrations demands that Congress give

away its constitutional authority over trade to allow the administration to Fast Track into effect yet another deal, TPP,that will increase our trade deficit and cost U.S. jobs. The decline in U.S. exports under the Korea FTA contributedto an overall disappointing U.S. export performance in 2012, placing the United States far behind Obamas stated goalto double U.S. exports by the end of 2014. At the sluggish 2012 export growth rate of 2 percent, the United States willnot achieve the presidents goal until 2032, 18 years behind schedule. The sorry Korea FTA numbers beg the

question: How can the administration call for a rebirth of American manufacturing and job growth while

pushing the TPP, a sweeping deal that would expand the failed Korea FTA model to low-wage countries likeVietnam, ban Buy American provisions and offshore tens of thousands more U.S. jobs, said Wallach.

Low economic growth causes power imbalances that cause war

Royal 10 (Director of CTR Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction U.S. Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signalingand the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Go ldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political scienceliterature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security anddefence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and nationallevels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski andThompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with

the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As

such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution ofrelative power (see also Gilpin.1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk ofmiscalculation (Feaver, 1995).Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as arising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows thatglobal economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major,medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditionsand security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of tradeexpectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditionsand security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade solong as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will beinclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased tradeexpectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others haveconsidered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess

(2002) find astrong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods ofeconomic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong andmutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover,the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce eachother. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood ofterrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to externaltensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggeststhat, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives tofabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and

Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline anduse offorce are

at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that thetendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact thatdemocratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support.


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DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, andthus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recenteconomic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises,whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and nationallevels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in theeconomic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Russia DA

Russia expanding influence, specifically to former Soviet spheres, its key to the economyGoodrich 7/5 2011[Lauren, 2011Russia's Evolving Leadership, STRATFOR,http://politicom.moldova.org/news/russias-evolving-leadership-perceptions-of-putin-part-2-222643-eng.html]//Abraha

Putins goal was to fix the country, which meantrestoring state control (politically, socially and economically), strengthening the FSB andmilitary and re-establishing Russias influence and international reputationespecially in the former Soviet sphere ofinfluence. To do so, Putin had to carry Russia through a complex evolution that involved shifting the country from accommodating to aggressive at specificmoments. This led to a shift in global perceptions of Putin, with many beginning to see the former KGB agent as a hard-nosed autocrat set upon rekindlinghostilities and renewing militarization. This perception of Putin is not quite correct. While an autocrat and KGB agent (we use the present tense, as Putin has saidthat no one is a former KGB or FSB agent), he hails from St. Petersburg, Russias most pro-Western city, and during his Soviet-era KGB service he was tasked

with stealing Western technology. Putin fully understands the strength of the West and what Western expertise is needed

to keep Russia relatively modern and strong. At the same time, his time with the KGB convinced him that Russia can

never truly be integrated into the West and that it can be strong only with a consolidated government, economy

and security service and a single, autocratic leader. Putins understanding of Russias two great weaknesses informs this worldview. The first

weakness is that Russia was dealt a poor geographic hand. It is inherently vulnerable because it is surroundedby great powers from which it is not insulated by geographic barriers. The second is that its population is

composed of numerous ethnic groups, not all of which are happy with centralized Kremlin rule. A strong hand

is the only means to consolidate the country internally while repelling outsiders. Another major challenge is that

Russia essentially lacks an economic base aside from energy. Its grossly underdeveloped transportation system

hampers it from moving basic necessities between the countrys widely dispersed economic centers. This has led

Moscow to rely on revenue from one source, energy, while the rest of the countrys economy has lagged decades

behind in technology.

Russian economic deterioration leads terrorism and nuclear conflict resulting in extinction.

Sheldon Filger 2009 Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction May 10, 2009,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html]

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other majorindustrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, bothintimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political

stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union . Already, strikes and protests are occurringamong rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin

and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even

unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where

economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would befor the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic

vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear

arsenal ofsufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and PrimeMinister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and

political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major

economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community havealready concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in

the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear

arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist

organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear

arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

Immigration 1NC
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html


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Momentum for CIR passage now, but some GOP opposition remains

Bolton 5/10The Hill (Alexander, Immigration bill gains momentum,http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/298933-gang-of-eight-claims-it-has-met-gop-demands-to-improve-immigration-bill)

The Senates Gang of Eight fended off a slew of poison-pill amendments aimed at the immigration reform bill,

building momentum for the legislation that has sparked strong opposition from conservatives. Members of the gangtouted the passage of a group of GOP-sponsored amendments they said had strengthened the bill and would helpaddress the concerns of conservatives. The Senate Judiciary Committee voted down GOP-sponsored amendments todelay putting 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to citizenship and to dramatically increase the number of BorderPatrol agents and surveillance vehicles. The bills sponsors also dodged an effort from the left by Sen. Chris Coons (D-

Del.) to halt Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano from deporting illegal immigrants to unsafe areas. Sen.Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), the bills lead sponsor, argued that Coonss proposal was so broad that it could stop almostall deportations to Mexico, where more than 12,000 people died in drug-related violence last year. The members of

the Gang of Eight on the Judiciary panel, Schumer and Sens. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)

and Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), hung together to knock down amendments that could undermine bipartisan support

for the bill. They also picked up support at times from two other Republicans on the panel, Sens. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and John Cornyn (R-Texas). Schumer said he was encouraged by support from Republicans during thehearing and predicted it would grow.On occasional votes, we went beyond just the members of the Gang of Eightwho voted for certain things, Schumer told reporters. In the overall tone, I get the sense that even those on the otherside of the aisle would like to be able to support something, many of them beyond just Jeff Flake and LindseyGraham.

Plan saps Obamas capital

Birns and Mills 13 (Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Frederick B., COHA Senior ResearchFellow, 01/30, Best Time for U.S.Cuba Rapprochement Is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)Despite the basic intransigence of US policy towards Cuba, in recent years, important changes have been introducedby Havana: state control over the economy has been diminished; most travel restrictions affecting both Americans andCubans on the island have been lifted; and the group of 75 Cuban dissidents detained in 2003 have been freed.Washington has all but ignored these positive changes by Havana, but when it comes to interacting with old foes suchas those of Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia, somehow constructive dialogue is the order of the day. One reasonfor this inconsistency is the continued opposition by the anti-Castro lobby to a change of course by Washington.

The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too

little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool forcoercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba does notinclude a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues touse temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debateand total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated,detained or jailed. But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for moredemocracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, couldenter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a moredemocratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case theprecise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami. To furthermoves towards rapprochement with Cuba, the U.S. State Department should remove the country from the list of statesponsors of terrorism. It is an invention to depict Havana as a state sponsor of terrorism, a charge only levied by the

State Department under pressure from Hill hardliners. As researcher Kevin Edmunds, quite properly points out: Thisposition is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of economic and covertdestabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles and OrlandoBosch, both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States (Nov. 15, 2012,Kevin Edmonds blog). It was precisely the propensity of some anti-Castro extremists to plan terrorist attacks againstCuba that urgently motivated the infiltration of such groups by the Cuban five as well as the close monitoring of theseorganizations by the FBI. Another gesture of good will would be for the White House to grant clemency to the Cubanfive: Gerardo Hernandez, Ramn Labaino, Fernando Gonzalez, Antonio Guerrero and Ren Gonzalez. They areCuban nationals who were convicted in a Miami court in 2001 and subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 15years to double life, mostly on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Despite requests for a change of venue out


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of Miami, which at first was granted and later denied, the trial took place in a politically charged Miami atmospherethat arguably tainted the proceedings and compromised justice. Supporters maintain that the Cuban five had infiltratedextremist anti-Castro organizations in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Cuba and did not pose any securitythreat to the United States. It would be an important humanitarian gesture to let them go home. Perhaps such a gesturemight facilitate reciprocity on the part of Cuban authorities when it comes to American engineer Alan Gross who ispresently being detained in a Cuban jail. There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obamaadministration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obamas election to a second termmeans that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towardsthe island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washingtonhas lifted some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send

remittances to relatives on the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative JoseSerrano (D-NY) on January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harshterms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargoduring the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especiallywith ultra-hardliner Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, andher counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a capitulation tothe Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, butmight in fact be advanced by dtente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history mayvery well be that it ought never to have been started.

Political capital is key.Dallas Morning News, 1-2-2013, p. www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece

The presidents wordsto NBCs David Gregory are only thatwords. What will really matter is whetherhe puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former PresidentGeorge W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive

plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didnt stop the Bush White House from fully engaging

Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret inthe 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let SenateRepublicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didnt want a bill, either. And they may not

want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight.

He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short,the nation doesnt need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republica ns bought

into the presidents plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last years election. If the nation isgoing to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of ananswer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already livinghere to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner

must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the

White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and

fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count. HE SAID IT Ivesaid that fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in thefirst year [of the second term] to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough. Weknow how we can fix it. We can do it in a comprehensive way that the American people support.Thats something we should get done. President Barack Obama, in an interview on Meet the Press Sunday

Immigration k2 skilled workersShortage in cyber fields undermines defense against attacks.Reuters, 6/13/2012. Experts warn of shortage of U.S. cyber pros, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/us-media-tech-summit-symantec-idUSBRE85B1E220120613.

Leading cyber experts warned of a shortage of talented computer security experts in the United

States, making it difficult to protect corporate and government networks at a time when attacks

are on the rise . Symantec Corp Chief Executive Enrique Salem told the Reuters Media and Technology Summit in

New York that his company was working with the U.S. military, other government agencies and universities to help

develop new programs to train security professionals. " We don't have enough security professionals and

that's a big issue. What I would tell you is it's going to be a bigger issue from a national security

perspective than people realize ," he said on Tuesday. Jeff Moss, a prominent hacking expert who sits on the U.S.


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Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, said that it was difficult to persuade talented people with technicalskills to enter the field because it can be a thankless task. "If you really look at security, it's like trying to prove a

negative. If you do security well, nobody comes and says 'good job.' You only get called when things go wrong." The

warnings come at a time when the security industry is under fire for failing to detect

increasingly sophisticated pieces of malicioussoftware designed for financial fraud and

espionage and failing to prevent the theft of valuable data . Moss, who goes by the hacker name "Dark

Tangent," said that he sees no end to the labor shortage. " None of the projections look positive," said Moss,

who serves as chief security officer for ICANN , a group that helps run some of the Internet's infrastructure.

" The numbers I've seen look like shortages in the 20,000s to 40,000s for years to come ." Reuters lastmonth reported that the National Security Agency was setting up a new cyber-ops program at select universities to expand U.S. cyberexpertise needed for secret intelligence operations against computer networks of adversaries. The cyber-ops curriculum is geared to

providing the basic education for jobs in intelligence, military and law enforcement. The comments echo those of other

technology industry executives who complain U.S. universities do not produce enough math

and science graduates .

Nuclear WarJason Fritz, July 2009. Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University. Hacking NuclearCommand and Control,http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf.

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open sourceknowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through

computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists capabilities, strategies, and ta ctics. Ifaccess to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause onenuclear-armed state to attack another,thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclearpower. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclearweapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provideterrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and arelatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies whichcould trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework toguide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computernetworks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair triggerposture of existing nuclear arsenals.All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration andremote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by varioushacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points,embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mailspoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to theinstallation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage

between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to accessthese closed networks directly.Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computernetworks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire tohave multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points forterrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would provean easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers tocompromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclearlaunch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known asPerimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establishcommunications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the eventthat nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for thepossibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations inan attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additionalcomputer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terroristscould remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attackagainst Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US wouldbelieve China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted,transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted,thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions incommunication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformedresponses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated withDistributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficultyin identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock outcommunications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively,amidst the confusion of atraditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be
http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdfhttp://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdfhttp://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdfhttp://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdfhttp://www.reuters.com/sectors/industries/overview?industryCode=174&lc=int_mb_1001


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falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly onPresidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses

and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditionalterrorism and cyberterrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, withoutthe need for compromising command and control centres directly.

1NCXO CP

TEXT: The Executive Office off the President should increase economic engagement with Cuba.

The President has large authority to increase economic engagement with Cubasolves the AFF

Ashby 13 (Dr. Tim, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS,3/29/13, Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United StatesThe Importance of

Trading with State-Owned Enterprises, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/)

At the request of the U.S. Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted detailed reviews of theframeworks for seven key statutes that govern Cuban sanctions. [11] The resulting reports concluded that (i) thepresident still maintains broad discretion to make additional modifications to Cuban sanctions; and (ii) priormeasures, implemented by the executive branch have had the effect of easing specific restrictions of the Cubasanctions and have been consistentwith statutory mandates as well as within the discretionary authority of thepresident. [12] Some legal scholars assert that absence of such explicit statutory provisions in other areas suggests thatCongress did not intend to prohibit the executive branch from issuing general or specific licenses to authorize certain

transactions with Cuba when such licenses are deemed to be appropriate and consistent with U.S. policies. [13]Although a complex variety of federal statutes have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on importation of Cuban goodsunder 31 C.F.R. 515.204, enabling legislation to codify the restriction, has not been passed. For example, 22 U.S.C. 6040(a) notes that 31 C.F.R. 515.204 prohibits the importation of goods from Cuba, but does not codify orexpressly prohibit such activity, and 22 U.S.C. 7028 acknowledges that Congress did not attempt to alter anyprohibitions on the importation of goods from Cuba under 31 C.F.R. 515.204. [14] The complete dismantling of theCuban economic embargo will undoubtedly require congressional legislation; however, the president has broad

powers to modify policy towards Cuba, particularly in an emergency situation that could affect U.S. national security.[15] For example, imports of Cuban origin goods are prohibited under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations(CACRS) except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings,instructions, licenses or otherwise. [16] Such authority could allow the president to argue for the modification of31 C.F.R. 204s complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods by stating that Cuban exports to the

United States help the Cuban people by creating employment andthereby maintainingthe islands socialstability.Considering the domestic political constituency and the political obduracy of U.S. Congress, a more realisticpresidential rationale for allowing Cuban imports from all types of enterprises could be the protection of U.S. bordersduring an era of grave concerns about homeland security. Some policy analysts suggest that bilateral trade with Cubashould be restricted to businesses and individuals engaged in certifiably independent (i.e. non-state) economic activity.[17] While well-intentioned, such a policy would likely have a negligible impact on Cubas economic developmentand fails to recognize that commercial enterprises that the U.S. government would classify as SOEs are actually co-opsor other types of quasi-independent entities that are in the early stages of privatization. Restrictions such as this also

fail to address larger national and regional security concerns which are the primary responsibility of the

president. Although ultimately the Cuban people must freely choose their own political and economic systems,President Obama should be seen as having legal authority to support the transition taking place on the island byopening U.S. markets to Cuban imports. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people and help to

provide economic and social stability that is in turn vital to U.S. national and regional security. Such trade mustincludeboth the islands small, yet growing, private sector and State-Owned Enterprises. In this regard, it wouldbe both unfair and strategically unwise to treat Cuba differently from its stated models, China and Vietnam.

Relations

Turnplan strengthens the regime, kills the economy, and undermines US influence in the region


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Suchlicki 13 (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What Ifthe U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13,http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the banfor U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concessiontotally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. Ifthe U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications:Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises.The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidels brother. American tourists will have limi ted contactwith Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cubas efficientsecurity apparatus. Most Americans dont speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested invisiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penaltiesinclude jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cubanpopulation would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poorin only small quantities, while state and foreign

enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, andtourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around theisland, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or

businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best nave. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S.travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian,European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian,with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s,an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cubaslimited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the islands economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy

began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted orrescinded by Castro. Lifting thetravel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message to the enemies of theUnited States: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction ofnuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the UnitedStates will forget and forgive, and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S.policytoward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S.intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in

Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of thepeople in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is partof Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cubawill send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restricttravel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability tospeak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the returnof Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cubawould have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas,Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we createsignificant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba woulddevelop. Yet there are significant implications.

Relations with Cuba are dead in the water

Hanson and Lee 13(Stephanie and Brianna, Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. -Cuba Relations, Jan31, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What is the status ofU.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana,

Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba hasbeen two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo andincreased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks,while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased someof these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S.citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congressamended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exportedroughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and EconomicCouncil. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as ofFebruary 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. Despite initial optimism

over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationshipdeveloping between the two countries. Tension between Cuba and the United States flared inDecember 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to thecountry to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewishcommunity. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored

"democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism overObama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationshipdeveloping between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obamaadministration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castroaccused the United States of "giving new breath toopen and undercover subversion against Cuba."

The plan is hopelessly insufficient

Hanson and Lee 13 (Stephanie and Brianna, Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. -Cuba Relations, Jan31, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will resume diplomatic relations? Giventhe range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precederesumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could


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have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or aperiod of dtente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations"in the near term. Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll backsanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process ofnormalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred inMarch 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, dtente,

rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. What is the mainobstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations? A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in theway of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "themost important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at FloridaInternational University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as VenezuelanPresident Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

No impact to Russiaaff ev concludes negStratfor 8 [The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front,http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915_russian_resurgence_and_new_old_front]

The next stagedrug facilitationis somewhat trickier. South America is a wide and varying land with verylittle to offer Russian interests. Most of the states are commodity providers, much like the Soviet Union was and Russia istoday, so they are seen as economic competitors. Politically, they are useful as anti-American bastions, so the Kremlinencourages such behavior whenever possible. But even if every country in South America were run by anti-American governments, itwould not overly concern Washington; these states, alone or en masse, lack the ability to threaten American interests in all ways butone.

Whoops aff ev says Mexico is key to RussiaStratfor 8 [The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915_russian_resurgence_and_new_old_front]S. Stability Finally, there is the issue of direct threats toU.S. stability, and this point rests solely on Mexico. Withmore than 100 million people, a growing economy and Atlantic and Pacific ports, Mexico is the only country in theWestern Hemisphere that could theoretically (which is hardly to say inevitably) threaten U.S. dominance in NorthAmerica. During the Cold War, Russian intelligence gave Mexico more than its share of jolts in efforts to cause chronic problems for theUnited States. In fact, the Mexico City KGB station was, and remains today, the biggest in the world. The Mexico City riots of 1968were in part Soviet-inspired, and while ultimately unsuccessful at overthrowing the Mexican government, they remain a testament to thereach of Soviet intelligence. The security problems that would be created by the presence of a hostile state the size of Mexico on thesouthern U.S. border are as obvious as they would be dangerous. As with involvement in drug activities, which incidentally are likely

to overlap in Mexico, STRATFOR expects Russia to be particularly active in destabilizing Mexico in theyears ahead. But while an anti-American state is still a Russian goal, it is not their only option. The Mexican drug cartels havereached such strength that the Mexican governments control over large portions of the country is an open question. Failure of theMexican state is something that must be considered even before the Russians get involved. And simply doing with the Mexican cartelswhat the Soviets once did with anti-American militant groups the world over could suffice to tip the balance. In many regards, Mexicoas a failed state would be a worse result for Washington than a hostile united Mexico. A hostile Mexico could be intimidated, sanctionedor even invaded, effectively browbeaten into submission. But a failed Mexico would not restrict the drug trade at all. The border would

be chaos, and the implications of that go well beyond drugs. One of the United States largest trading partners could well devolve into aseething anarchy that could not help but leak into the U.S. proper. Whether Mexico becomes staunchly anti-American or devolves intothe violent chaos of a failed state does not matter much to the Russians. Either one would threaten the United States with a staggering

problem that no amount of resources could quickly or easily fix. And the Russians right now are shopping around for staggeringproblems with which to threaten the United States. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, all of these options are no-brainers. Threateningnaval interdiction simply requires a few jets. Encouraging the drug trade can be done with a few weapons shipments. Destabilizing acountry just requires some creativity. However, countering such activities requires a massive outlay of intelligence and military assets often into areas that are politically and militarily hostile, if not outright inaccessible. In many ways, this is containment in reverse.

Aff impact ev says we plan would make matters worseBlank 7 (Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College,Russian Democracy, Revisited Spring, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.php)

Admittedly, this means that America must reorient its policies to stop seeking to extend or imposedemocracy. No matter how deeply held, the ideas of the current Administration enjoy no special

legitimacy abroad, whereas international obligations do. Likewise, we must make clear that whilethe interests of the kleptocracy that passes for government in Russia are advanced bylawlessness and imperial predation, neither the interests of the Russian people nor the securityof Eurasia is advanced by such policies. Quite the contrary; those policies entail long-term stagnation and war, not

progress, peace, or security. Thus a realistic policy towards Russia necessarily means realigning thevalues which we promote. They should be those of international law and of enhanced securityfor both peoples and states, not untrammeled unilateralism or that might makes right. But suchrealism also means fearlessly proclaiming and acting upon the truth that Russian scholars themselves know and admit: Russia todayremains a risk factor in world politics.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_statehttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_statehttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_statehttp://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.phphttp://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.phphttp://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/blank.phphttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_statehttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_state


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No Russian aggressiononly a risk of our offense

Barnett, 8-15chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine

Thomas P.M, The New Rules: Debunking the 'Russia Threat' Hype,2011,http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hype, CMR

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I was completing my doctoral dissertat ion on Warsaw Pact-Third World relations. I immediately understood that my time in Soviet studies was done. Why? Because I knew thatRussia was full of brilliant political scientists who, once free to pursue their craft free of ideological constraints, would do a better job explaining things there than outsiders could. The generation of Russian scholars thatemerged in the post-Soviet era proved me right, and none has consistently impressed more than Dmitr i Trenin, who heads up t he Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Trenin, born a merethree years after Josef Stalin's passing in 1953, has just put out a brilliant book entitled, "Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story." In it, he adeptly explores and, better yet, measures the profound ideological distance between

the Soviet Empire we once knew and the post-imperial Russia we struggle to understand today. In the eyes of some U.S. national security experts, "Resurgent Russia" remains

nearly as dangerous and imperialistic today as it did two decades ago. That misperception is due in large part to our world's growing multipolarity, which allows Moscow to economize itsthreat projection. All the Kremlin needs to do today is slap down tiny Georgia or shut down a gas pipeline to Europe,

and without fail, the trope of the menacing Russian bear gets recycled in media coverage the West over. By contrast, Trenin's calmanalysis provides us the historical perspective we so desperately need, with a hint of it coming in the book's opening dedication, which is to Trenin's eldest son, 30 years old, whom he describes as being "of Russia's firstfree generation." Think about that for a second. Trenin's son was born in 1981, meaning he was just coming of age when the Soviet Union finally gave up its ghost in 1991. The two decades that followed, despite thegenerally noncoercive authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin since 2000, represent the single freest period of political and economic life in Russia's long t ortured history. We may see a Russian bear that hasn't changedall that much. But for Russians themselves, the reality is that the private sphere has vastly overtaken the public sphere since Moscow "simply shook off its empire." As Trenin notes, that is nothing less than amazing.

Trenin readily admits that Russia is not yet a true democracy. Instead, for the first time in modern history, we have a Russia that just wants to be

Russia, and not an imperial project. We in the West have been so busy of late debating whether or not America possesses an "empire" that we have neglected to

appreciate just how peacefully Russia managed to divest itself of its own real-world version. But Trenin's real intent in this book isto explore what Russia, without an empire, has really become. Our preferred narrative is that U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher defeated the Soviet Union and won the Cold

War. But Trenin reminds us that Russia was never defeated in the manner of Germany and Japan in World War II. Nor has it

buried itself in regional integration schemes like post-imperial France or married itself to the U.S . as a junior partner in t he manner of post-imperial Britain. Instead,

Moscow itself initiated the collapse of its empire, beginning with its decision to progressively walk away from its Third World allies starting in the early 1980s and

continuing through its st unning decision roughly a decade later to let Eastern Europe simply shift t oward the Western camp. Combined, that essentially amounted to accepting the

dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. In each instance, Moscow had the force necessary to continue the fight for quite a

while longer; it simply chose, pre-emptively, not to. What Boris Yeltsin suggested next was simply too visionary for the West to accept -- namely, Russia's intention to join NATO and economicallyintegrate itself with Europe. Instead, NATO and the European Union admitted Eastern Europe into the Western alliance, while offering Moscow merely a relationship with t he Western alliance. And lest we forget,Vladimir Putin basically asked to join both organizations again early in the last decade, receiving the same negative reply. After all Russia had unilaterally done to end the Cold War, Europe went out of its way to denyMoscow any sense of belonging. Meanwhile, America moved in militarily from the south as part o f its global war on t error, and China progressively encroached -- in an economic sense -- on Russia's "near abroad" inCentral Asia. To Moscow's credit, Trenin notes, it has not moved toward any remilitarization of its relationship with the outside world. If anything, the military reform movement begun in 2008 signals Moscow's near-

complete abandonment of the field of great-power warfare, save for a nuclear deterrent that it nonetheless continues to reduce in agreement with the United States, the one power it truly fears. In sum, in

looking back on these 20 post-Soviet years, it is stunning how little trouble Moscow has fomented in the world, allwhile engineering arguably the greatest military demobilization in human history, going from more than 200 army divisions to less than 100 brigades. Compared to America's vigorous military build-up and long slate of

overseas military interventions since 1990, Russia's record of militarism appears downright negligible by comparison. Representing just 2 percentof the world's population and 2 percent of the world's GDP, " modern" Russia remains a great power of sorts thanks to its sheer landmass and central location. It is a "swing stat e," Trenin notes, between East and West,as well as between the South and a North that looks increasingly to the Arctic Circle for future energy needs. And yet, as Trenin so trenchantly puts it, in today's Russia, "the elite rule, but they do not lead, and do notcare to." Thus the world faces an only partially modernized Russia, where a premodern tsarist politic al system matches up poorly with a postmodern ideological sensibility in which the private sphere soundly trumps thepublic sphere -- for better and worse. Modernity's missing link here is political pluralism, but for now, those instincts lie fundamentally dormant in Russia, even as the bulk of the populace recognizes the eventual needfor them. Russia basically admits what China must officially still deny: Democracy must eventually come, but there is no shor tage of problems to tackle in t he meantime. From the perspective of this former Soviet

expert, it's hard to see how we could have asked for more in the limited time frame since the end of the Cold War. Russia plans no wars with either Europe or "rising" China, w ith whom it has

generated a true strategic partnership, and Moscow welcomes the r ising influence of Turkey and India to its south. Yes, Russia is effectively shut out of Europe for the first time in three centuries, but it seeksno territorial conquest, only soft domination of the sort America pursues throughout much of the planet. All that, with

the only cost being the admittedly bloody dissolution of the Balkans and some nasty guerrilla warfare in the Caucasus. In other words, America and the world have had it pretty

good since the Cold War's end. Our Russian experts don't make this case well enough . But Russia's Russian experts do.

Chinese influence and US influence isnt mutually exclusiveaff ev says China is investing in Cuba not

they will will stop post plan

Attempts to counter Chinese regional influence ensure wartheyll go down fight

Layne 12(Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M Universitys George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, June, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The NationalInterest, lexis, CMR)

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago.

The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been

the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view

Chinas quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is

fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war. In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be

hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hypehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hypehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hypehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hypehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hypehttp://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hype


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Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of

Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the

two powers. These rising tensions were underscored by a recent Brookings study by Peking Universitys Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, national-security director for Asia during the Clintonadministration, based on their conversations with high-level officials in the American and Chinese governments. Wang found that underneath the visage of mutual cooperation that b oth countries project, the

Chinese believe they are likely to replace the United States as the worlds leading power but Washington is working to prevent such a rise. Similarly, Lieberthal related that many American o fficials believe their

Chinese counterparts see the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of a zero-sum game in the struggle for global hegemony. An instructive historical antecedent is the Anglo-German rivalry of the early twentieth

century. The key lesson of that rivalry is that such great-power competition can end in one of three ways: accommodation of the rising challenger by the dominant power; retreat of the challenger; or war. The

famous 1907 memo exchange between two key British Foreign Office officials Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Thomas Sandersonoutlined these stark choices. Crowe argued that London must uphold the Pax Britannica

status quo at all costs. Either Germany would accept its place in a British-dominated world order, he averred, or Britain would have to contain Germanys rising power, even at the risk of war. Sanderso n replied that

Londons refusal to accommodate the reality of Germanys rising power was both unwise and dangerous. He suggested Germanys leaders must view Britain in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe,

with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached wit hout eliciting a scream. In Beijings eyes today, the United States must

appear as the unapproachable, globally sprawling giant.

1) Chinese Wont Go To War Over Taiwana. Military Strategy

Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher And Adam Segal. May2003. Council On Foreign Relations, Chinese Military PowerHttp://Www.Cfr.Org/Content/Publications/Attachments/China_Tf.Pdf Brown Is Chairman Of The Independent Task Force On Chinese Mil itary Power, Is A Partner AtWarburg Pincus And Counselor At The Center For Strategic And International Studies. He Served As Secretary Of Defense During The Carter Administration And WasThe First Secretary Of Defense To Visit The People's Republic Of China, Prueher Is Vice Chairman Of The Independent Task Force On Chinese Mili tary Power, Is AConsulting Professor And Senior Adviser On The Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Program, And Segal Is Director Of The Independent Task Force On ChineseMilitary Power, Is The Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow In China Studies At The Co uncil On Foreign Relations.

The Taiwan Strait is an area of near-term military concern. Current Chinese policy is to avoid a military confrontation if at allpossible. For the next decade,a focal point of Chinese military development will likely remain achieving theability to influence Taiwanschoices about its political future or, failing that, to prevent Taiwan fromachieving formal independence. Here,China is more likely to use new technologies and asymmetric strategies, not toinvade Taiwan outright but ratherto achieve political goalssuch as forcing the resumption of political dialogue between thetwo sides on the mainlands terms. In a crisis, China may also use its military to counter Taiwans economic prosperity by blockade laying mines in the Taiwan Strait,or other means. Moreover, Beijing could decide to utilize force against Taiwan under certain circumstance even if the balance of forces across the st rait favored theUnited States and Taiwan

b. Resources

Dod, 2007. Annual Report To The Congress Military Power Of The Peoples Republic Of China Http://Www.Defenselink.Mil/Pubs/Pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-Final.Pdf

The Principal Focus Of, And Driver For, Chinas Military Modernization In The Near Term Appears To Remain Preparing For Potential Confl Ict In The Taiwan Strait.However, Offi Cial Documents And The Writings Of Chinese Military Strategists Suggest Beijing Is Increasingly Surveying The Strategic Landscape Beyond Taiwan.Some Chinese Analysts Have Explored The Geopolitical Value Of Taiwan In Extending Chinas Maritime Defensive PerimeterAnd Improving Its Ability To Infl

Uence Regional Sea Lines Of Communication. For Example, The Pla Academy Of Military Science Text, Science Of Military Strategy(2000), States: If Taiwan Should Be Alienated From The Mainland, Not Only [Would] Our Natural Maritime Defense System Lose Its Depth,Opening A Sea Gateway To Outside Forces, But AlsoA Large Area Of Water Territory And Rich Resources Of OceanResources Would Fall Into The Hands Of Others. . . .[Our Line Of Foreign Trade AndTransportation Which Is Vital To Chinas Opening Up And Economic Development Will Be Exposed To The SurveillanceAnd Threats Of Separatists And Enemy Forces, And China Will Forever Be Locked To The West Of The Fi Rst Chain Of IslandsIn The West Pacific.Chinas 2006 Defense White Paper Similarly Raises Concerns About Resources And

TransportationLinks When It States That

Security Issues Related To Energy Resources, Finance,Information, And International Shipping Routes Are Mounting. The Related Desire To Protect Energy Investments InCentral Asia And Could Also Provide An Incentive For Military Investment Or Intervention If Instability Surfaces In The Region. Disagreements That Remain WithJapan Over Maritime Claims And With Several Southeast Asian Claimants To All Or Parts Of The Spratly Islands In The South China Sea Could Lead To RenewedTensions In These Areas. Instability On The Korean Peninsula Likewise Could Produce A Regional Crisis In Which Beijing Would Face A Choice Between ADiplomatic Or A Military Response.

Taiwan scenario is a JOKE gregmissing an internal link that the US will attack after China invades

Taiwan

2. U.S. Wont Escalate

Henry C K Liu. Feb 10, 2004. Asia Times. Http://Www.Atimes.Com/Atimes/China/Fb10ad06.Html

While Taiwan is a vital interest of China and China has explicitly stated it will bear any sacrifice,

including millions of lives and even entire cities to regain it, Taiwan is not a comparable vitalinterest for the United States. That is especially so if normal US-China relations hang in the balance at a time when the US geopolitical need forChinese cooperation in the fight against terrorism is on the rise. Nor is the US prepared to make sacrifices comparable toChina's over the Taiwan issue.Chinese strategy thus may well aim at deterring US intervention on Taiwan by making clear that suchintervention would entail exceedingly high costs in terms of American lives and in terms of diplomatic friction. Indeed, the conflict may not be confinable to only the

Taiwan Strait.China will not initiate any preemptive strike against US forces, as history has shown that a Pearl Harbor-type attack would serve only to consolidate US resolve for total war. But to avoid any miscalculation on the part of the United States, China will have to leave nodoubt about the prospect of high US casualties if the US chooses to i ntervene unprovoked in a limited armed conflict over Taiwan.

Even if hegemony could solve in the past influence is down and it cant solve escalation now


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Walt 12 (Stephen M Walt, Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government, PhD inpolitical science from the University of California at Berkeley, BA in international relations from Stanford University, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in SecurityAffairs, co-chair of the editorial board of International Security, member of the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, Journal of Cold WarStudies, and International Security, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, guest scholar at the Brookings Institute, 1-26-12, Whether or not the US is Declining is the Wrong Question,http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/26/asking_the_wrong_question_about_the_us_and_china) GZ

Instead, the real issue is whether developments at home and overseas are making it harder for theUnited States to exercise the kind of dominant influence that it did for much of the latter half ofthe 20th century. The United States had a larger share of global GDP in the 1940s and 1950s, and it wasn't running enormous budgetdeficits. The United States was seen as a reliable defender of human rights, and its support for decolonization after World War II had won itmany friends in the developing world. It also had good relations with a variety of monarchies and dictatorships, which it justified as part of the

struggle against communism. These features allowed the United States to create and lead combinedeconomic, security and political orders in virtually every corner of the world, except for theportions directly controlled by our communist rivals. And the U.S. and its allies eventually won that struggle too,

driving the USSR into exhaustion and watching the triumph of market economies and more participatory forms of government throughout theformer communist world. The United States remains very powerful -- especially when compared with some putativeopponents like Iran -- but its capacity to lead security and economic orders in every corner of the worldhas been diminished by failures in Iraq (and eventually, Afghanistan), by the burden of debt accumulatedover the past decade, by the economic melt-down in 2007-2008, and by the emergence ofsomewhat stronger and independent actors in Brazil, Turkey, India, and elsewhere. One mightalso point to eroding national infrastructure and an educational system that impresses hardlyanyone. Moreover, five decades of misguided policies have badly tarnished America's image inmany parts of the world, and especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. The erosion ofauthoritarian rule in the Arab world will force new governments to pay more attention to popularsentiment -- which is generally hostile to the broad thrust of U.S. policy in the region -- and the United States will be lessable to rely on close relations with tame monarchs or military dictators henceforth. If it the UnitedStates remains far and away the world's strongest state, its ability to get its way in world affairs is declining.

Heg is unsustainable- four reasonsLayne 10 Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security @ Texas A&M[Christopher, The end of Pax Americana, May 1, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/]

Chinas economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States over the last two decades andcontinues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economicforecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the worlds largest economy, measured by overall GDP,sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the worlds leading manufacturing nationatitle the United States had enjoyed for over a centuryand this year China will displace Japan as the worlds second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasingwealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant powerin EastAsia. Optimistscontend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the Great Repressionnot quite adepression but more than a recessionwell be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-

GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age

of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those daysare gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in thefundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating formore than three decades. In the 1980s,these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writersnotably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, SamuelHuntington, and James Chacewho predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economicfoundations of Americas global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, theSoviet Union collapsed, Japans economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton

administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United Stateswill emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury havepumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plusbudget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When theprojected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (theunfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there isreason to worry aboutthe United States fiscal stability. As the CBO says, Even if the recovery occurs as projected and thestimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly

unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem. The dollars vulnerability is the United States geopolitical Achillesheel. Its role as the international economys reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemonywill be literally unaffordable.As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollars vulnerability presents potentiallysignificant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.

Decline is smooth- no transition warsPreble 6/28 (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professorof history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, The Critique of Pure Kagan, http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061)

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does notneed to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither


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does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power,contrary to Kagans assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable ofhandling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countriesand peoples that share common interests and values . Finally, precisely because the United States is sosecure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongeringand threat inflation.Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nations power relative to others and shown howU.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national securitythe very state ofaffairs that Kagan celebratesthey grow even less supportive.

Hegemony causes nuclear balancing and prolifMonteiro 12Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations theory, security studies,and the philosophical foundations of the study of politics. He earned a Licentiates degree in International Relations from the University of Minho (1997), an M.A. degreein Political Theory and Science from the Catholic University of Portugal (2003), and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Chicago (2004/09).

Dr. Monteiros research focuses on great-power politics, power transitions, nuclear proliferation, preventive war, deterrence, and the role of philosophy-of-science

arguments in the production of scientific knowledge in IR. His commentary on these topics has appeared in the Guardian , Foreign Affairs , The

National Interest , Project Syndicate , and the USA Today and been featured in the media, including radio ( e.g. , BBC) and print ( e.g. ,

the Boston Globe ). Dr. Monteiro is a research fellow at Yales Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and a member of the

Scientific Council of the Portuguese International Relations Institute (IPRI). His research has appeared in International

Security and International Theory . Winter 2011/2012Unrest Assured why unipolarity is not peacefulhttp://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064

In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, beable to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsorsexist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if somedo not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor powers security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such,recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme self-help.There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other

states intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great powersponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all states in alltypes of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth,however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for aslong as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that theunipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers willtherefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by theunipole and bolstertheir chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers willattempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible,and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrentsurvivable nuclear weapons. 73 In sodoing, they seek to become major powers.

Prolif causes extinctionRoberts 99(Brad Roberts, researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Chair of the Research Advisory Council for Chemical and Biological

Arms Control Institute, 1999, Viewpoint: Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons,http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf)

This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are twostandard answers to the question of whats at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weaponsof mass destructionall of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems cankill millionsand much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional waremploying mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in humanexperience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms,even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from theperspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international systemin which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and customary. The stability argument relates to the unintendedconsequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and

the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars. Although it is an old truism that

proliferation is destabilizing, it is not always truenot where the acquisition of strategic leverage is

essential to preservation of a balance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditionsof a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. Instead, the risksassociated with the competitive acquisition of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweighthe perceived benefits to states that have considered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Brazil, for example, like Swedenand Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink evenif living there is within their reach. But the standard answers dont really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stakerequires a broader notion of stabilityand an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accidentof history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are movingirreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has

brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In responseto some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weaponscapability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, andwhich likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltzs


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familiar old heresy that more may be better7indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if itis gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this wouldfuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints thatheretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities.

Cuban Econ

Latin America doomeddemocracy, drugs, crime, economy, iran

Duncan Currie, Deputy Managing Editor, National Review Online, 3/13/09,http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OGY4MzA3NGVlZWI5ZjM2YTY5ZmFkNTZmYzZkOWFmNjI=

So the good news from Latin America is bountiful. But so, alas, is the bad news. The region has beenwalloped by the financial crisis and global recession. Argentina is flirting with another economicimplosion. Mexico is being terrorized by vicious drug gangs. Violent crime is rising in CentralAmerica. A formerMarxist-Leninist guerrilla outfit may be on the verge of winning a presidentialelection in El Salvador. Democracy has suffered major setbacks in Venezuela and has also been curtailed in

Nicaragua. In Bolivia, opposition to Pres. Evo Morales, a Chvez-style leftist, has spurred bloody unrest. Testifyingbefore a Senate committee in late January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned that Iran is conducting subversiveactivity in Latin America.

Violent crime ensures Latin American instability

Duncan Currie, Deputy Managing Editor, National Review Online, 3/13/09,http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OGY4MzA3NGVlZWI5ZjM2YTY5ZmFkNTZmYzZkO