Grumman F-14 Tomcat

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Grumman FTomcatDavid Baker


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t ubli h d in L byrowood Press Ltd

m bury Marlboroughhire 2HR

David Baker L99

rights reserved. No part of thilication may be rep rod u ced o rsmitted inany form or by any meanst ronicor mechanical includingtocopying recording or anyrmation storage and retrieval system

hout permission in writing from thelishers.

is h L i b raryloguing-in-Publication Data

his book i d ed i at d to Ra ha \ ho ;lr \ J om al It ~ r thUl unlike herfather has yet to sampl t d light II th \ ~ w r ,

Chronology

Glossary

Introduction

ont nts

6

14

15

atalogue record for th is book isilable from the British Library.

L86 L26 94 6

1 From T FX t o VFX

2 The Feline Swinger

3 Tomcat Rising

4 Tooth an d Cl aw

5 The Prowling Tomcats

L

47

3

118

15 L

set by Phoenix Typesetting I1kleyt Yorkshire

ed an d bound in Great Britain byer Tanner Frome

Appendix:

Index

US avy Tomcat Units 182

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s, o rt h A me ri a n Ro kw II ao k he ed t ea m a nd G ru mm an .

contract definition began and wast ed o n 1 ctober.

25 September

avy completed its S o ur c e e l ec t io nnd set up several inves tigat ingto ev a l ua t e t h e five VFX contract

als d ue o n l October.

1 Octoberve COP submissions were received

t he c om pe ti ng c on tr ac to rs .an s u b mi tt ed a refined variant of

303E, which at this date had afin but in o ther respects closely

d t h e definitive F 14

13 Decemberion of the five COP proposals wased by the respective Navy boards

decision made to encourage furtherfrom Grumman a n d M c D o nn e ll. This was endorsed by the ChiefofOperations a n d t h e S e cr e ta r y of

etwo days la ter.

17 Decemberep ar tm en t o f Defense formallyed t h e rejection ofVFX proposals

eneral Dynamics, North Americanll a nd t he LT V / Lo ck h eed t eam.

d analysis began on proposals fromell Douglas a nd G r um m an a n d

companies were i nv it ed t o makeired alterations to enhance their

5 Januaryteams from McDonnell Douglas

r um m a n s ub m it t ed t he ir finalls for the VFX contract .

4 Januarypartment of Defense announced

umman was t o b e awarded a definsearch a n d d e v el o p m en t Fixedcentive contract for the VFX, tobein s erv ic e a s the F 14 Tomcat. Acontract is signed on 3 Februaryg six pro to types (later expandede) and 463 product ion ai rcraftan g ed t o i n co r po r at e e i gh t pre

on types). First flight is fixedfor non 3l january 1971.

7 Marchal step t o wa r d t h e f u tu r e way of

t h e Tomcat as a t o ta l w ea p on

I N I R O n U t 110

system was t a ke n w he n t h e lr Llnl gral dLogist ic S up po rt M an ag em en t a m(lLSMT) meeting was held in Bethp g

1969,MarchDesign of the F-14 is frozen and Grummanch an ged t h e single-fin fora twin-finconfiguration, making the l ast major sh i ft in theexternal appearance.

1 9 6 9 , 8 MayThe first engineering drawings of the F-14were re leased to the jig s h ed s an d detaileddesign was well under way.

1969 ,23 MayTh e first Mock-Up Review was held atG r um m a n a n d detailed parts manufacturebegan during june.

1 9 69 , 1 8 A u g u s tTh e F-14 Management ystemsDemonstrat ion began a n d e x te n d ed until25 ep t ember, d u r i ng which ASA verified t he a er od yn am ic a nd a ir cr af tperformance characteristics.

1969, NovemberConstruction began a t G ru mm an o f theF-14Engineering Mock-up ManufacturingAid EMMA), a full-scale, three-dimensional metal model of the definitive designaiding systems f i t -check and proximi tyevaluation as wellas enhancing the subsyst em s l ay ou t d ef in it io n. Th e wingpivot-bearing test article was completed.

1970 ,21 JanuaryTh e software a nd h ar dw a re SystemsIntegration Test Stand (SITS) arrived atPoint Mugu, California, and was followedon 2 February by t he A N /A W G -9co mp u t er d ev e l op men t test equipment forinstallation with the SITS.

1970 ,27 FebruaryGrumman submitted a proposal to the USNavy for the F-14B, designed to fill theadvanced VFX-2 requirement. Th eaircraft differed from the F-14A primarilyin an improved powerplant based on thejTF-22, the Pratt WhitneyF40I-PW-400. Prat t Whitney werea wa r de d a n a d va n ce d t e ch n ol o gy e n gi n e(ATE) d ev e l o pmen t co n t rac t .

1970,FebruaryThe first A WG-9 radar for the F-l4 wasdelivered to the avy; the first integratedradar/missi le test s began in Apri l 1972 .

8

, l 1Jrullllllan olllpi I d ahn ;1\ ion o the

bl n horizonlalslabilizer,a major ~ t u r eo the w ighl- ons ious d ign. Lati Lestswere ompleted on 8 May.

1970, 15 AprilLTV began test N o . 9 of the wing pivo tdevelopment programme. e st s w er es u s p en d ed o n 2 june when two lower lugsexperienced fatigue failure at 1.5times thelife cycle, equivalent to 9,000 a s a g ai n t theexpected 12 OOOhr

1970, 1 8 M a yC on s id er in g t be a pp al li ng m i sm a tc hb et we en t he e ng in e a nd t he i nl et for theTF30 installed in the F-lll , an im[ ortantmilestone was reached a inl t compatibility t rials s t a r te d o n a XTF30- P-4 l2ground-tes t engine for t he F - l4 . T he setests finished with flying colours on 9 july,completely vindicat ing the new boxedinletdesign.

1970, 2 3 J u lyGrumman successfully o mp l et ed t h e finalEMMA configuration and systems/subsystems integration demonstration for theNavy.

1970, 1 SeptemberTh e b o ro n s t ab i li z er f a ti gu e t e st wassuccessfully completed with an equivalentlife of l2,000hr, twice t h e e x p e ted time.

1970, 25 OctoberAt 4:00am a large flatbed t ru ck h au l ed t h efirst prototype F-14 Bu A er N o . 157980),shrouded for secrecy, f rom i ts assemblyp l an t a t Bethpage, NY, a t t he s ta rt o f ajourney that would take it to Plant 7 atGrumman s Calverton facility.

1 9 70 , 1 4 D e c e m be r

E ng in e ru ns were c om pl et ed o n t h e firstF- l4 proto type and taxi trials began atCalverton.

1970, 21 DecemberPiloted by R o be r t S m y th e w it h Wi ll i amMiller in the backseat, the first F-14prototype l i fted off the runway at CalvertonField d u ri n g t h e late afternoon for a f ir stflight that l asted only a few minutes withtwo circuits of the area at 3,000ft.

1 9 7 0 , 3 0 DecemberAsa resul t of massive hydraulic failure, thefirst prototype F-14 crashed at Calvertonduring the aircraft s second flight. Miller

ld Smythe ejected within a second ofIlllpact.

1971 ,29 January n acceptance t es t o n the Versatile\ v i o n i cs Sh o p Test VAST ) s t a t i on waslIccessfully c o m pl e te d . D e s ig n at e d

LJSM-24 7 i t was buil t around a Univac1240 computer for F-14electronics tests.

1971, 1 FebruaryWing pivot test article 9A successfullydemonstrated survivabil i ty at 7 , 00 0 t e sthllurS, equivalent to l5,120 flying hours, ar beyond the specified equivalent 12,000flying hours.

1 9 71 , 1 5 February ,rumman senior executivesbegan a weekIllng briefing of N av al A ir S ys te msC o mm a nd o n s e ri o us f u nd i ng p r ob l em s

with the F-14, c i t i ng ch an g es d eman d ed by he Pentagon w h ic h i n c re a se d t he u ni tprice.

1971 ,5 March[,he Pratt WhitneyTF30-P-4l2 engineLOmpleted qualification tests with performance r a ti ng s i n e x ce s s of specification.On 28 April Pratt Whitney demons tr at ed F 40 1- P- 40 0 i ns ta ll at io n a ndremoval p ro ced u res , t h e en g i ne specifiedfor the F-14B.

1971 ,31 MarchIn a letter to t he N av y s A s si st an tCommander for C o n tr a c ts , G r u m m ans o u g ht ch an ges in the funding for fu tureF-I4 production l ot s t o a bs o rb i nc rea s edCOStS and ease a n i m pe n di n g financialcrisis. The government refused to ta lk .

1971 ,24 MayThe N o . 2 prototype F- l4 BuAer No.157981) made i ts f ir st fl ight fromCalverton Field . It s fligh t test programmewould explore h igh an g l e-o f -at t ack ch aracteristics and handl ing . Later i twould be

used for g u n t ri a ls . Th e aircraft logged454 .4 fly ing hours before i t was a t t r i t ed o n13 May 1974.

1971 ,27 JulyG ru mm an m ad e a commitmen t toCongress to build forty -e igh t F-14s in FY1972 after seeking help wi th i ts financia lproblems by raising the funds i t could notget from t h e g o v ern men t . This was o nl y ashort-term measure and did nothing toalleviate Grumman s long-term problems.

GRUMMAN 1 -14

1971 ,31 AugustThe third F-14 prototype to fly aircraftNo. lX B u A er N o . 1 5 79 91 ) , made itsfirst flight. It was officially t h e N o . 12 aircraft a ss ig ne d t o rep la ce No. l d e st ro y edon 30 December 1 97 0. I t wou ld explorethe full performance envelope and perform high-speed tests. The first supersonicflight was logged on 16 Sep t ember an d itwould exceed Mach 2.25 by t he e nd o f1972. The aircraft co mp l et ed 8 9 4 .7 flyinghours.

1 9 7 1 , 7 OctoberTh e F-14 prototype N o . 4 BuAer No.1 5 79 8 3) m a de i ts fi rst fl igh t a nd on 3 0October commenced an a v io n ic s t e stprogramme when itarrived a t P o in t Mugu,w h ere t h e A W G - 9 a n d t h e Phoenix missilesystem would be tested. After l ,375 flyinghours the aircraftwas mothballed.

1 9 7 1 , 2 6 NovelnberF-14 prototype 0.5 Bu A erN o . 157984)made itsfirst flight from Calverton. On 12December it was flown to Point Muguwhere i t wa s u se d f or s y s t ems t es t s andmission feasibility trials. After 739.3 flyingh o u rs t h e ai rcraftwas p laced instorage.

1971, 2 DecemberNavy Preliminary Evaluation 1 NPE-l)began during whi ch a rev ie w of test dataand flight i n fo rmat i on d emo n s tra t ed thatt h e a i rc r af t was high o n p e rf o rm a n cecompared with the specification. NPE-lwas co mp le t ed o n J6 December.

1 9 71 , 1 0 DecemberF-14 No.6 BuAer o . 157985) made itsfirst flight. This aircraft would conductmissile separation trials during its assignmen t at Point Mugu where itarrived on 15january 1972. The aircraftwas a t t r i ted o n20 june 1973 after l64 flying hours.

1971, 12 DecemberThe wing carry-through box beam success

fully com.pleted fatigue tests equivalent to12,000 flight hours or twice the life of theaircraft.

1 9 71 , 2 8 D e c e m b erF-l4 prototype No.3 BuAer No. l57982)and N o . 9 BuAer No 1 5 97 9 88 ) m a d etheir first flights, becoming the seventha nd t he e ig ht h ai rcraft to fly o. 3 wasassigned to test the structural limits of theaircraft and No.9 was sent to Point Mugufor A WG-9 evalu3tion with Hughes

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Aircraft engineers. Itarrived on l1972. o. 3 was placed in s t o r752.4 flying hours and o. 9 wballed after 1,506.3 flying hours.

1971 ,31 DecemberF-14 o. 8 BuAer 0 157987)fi rst fl igh t before jo ining the fprogramme to gather aerodynamicseveral parts of t h e p er forman ce s p eThe aircraftwas a t t r i t ed o n J 9 S1974 after 456 flying hours.

1972, 20 JanuaryGrumman informed the avy thanot honour original F-14 p ro d uc t if ro m L ot 5 b e ca u se of financialo n t h e company. The Navy tookPen t ag o n an d t h e g o v ernmen t bwhich lasted t h ro u g ho u t t h e year

1 9 7 2 , 2 9 FebruaryF-14No. lO BuAerNo.157989)first flight. It went for carrier trialferried to Patuxent on 6 Apri lwhelifted ab o ard t h e USS Fan estell I tfirst catapu l t launch on 15 jperformed the first on-deck landj u ne . Tw o days l a te r t h e a i rc r awrit ten offafter completing onlyhours when it crashed at t he NTest Centre, Patuxent River, Ma

1971, 6 MarchF-14No. 11 BuAer No. 157990)firstflight. On 24 March itarrivedMugu where it began a seriesweapons systems tests. After 1,hours i twas mothballed .

1 9 7 2 , 2 MayF-14 o. 13 BuAer o . 158612the air for the first t ime. Itwas assthe elect romagnet ic and radiatprogramme and spent its e a r lyGrumman s an ech oi c ch amber, athe faciliL) on 2 August.

1972, MayTh e hah of I ra n m ad e it kPresi d en t N i x o n that h e was shohigh-performance ai rcraft toSoviet intrusions of Iranian air srequested details on a p o t ent i a l pofF-14 or F-15 fighters.

1972, 6 JuneF-14 No. 14 BuAer 0.158613)f ir st f li gh t. I t was t o b e u se d by Ga n d t h e Navy for maintenance st

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lossary ntroduction

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air-to-air missileairborne early warningAdvanced Med i um Ran ge A i r- t o-A i r MissileA d v anced Man n ed St ra t eg i cA i rc ra ft

angle of attackbarrier combat air patrolblow-in d o o re j ec t o rBoard of Inspection and Survey

built-in test equipmentBureau of Aeronauticsbeyond-visual-rangecombat air patrolcontract definition phaseColossal Wei g h t Imp rov ement Programd eck l au n ch i n t e rcep tDepartment of Defenseelectronic countermeasuresengineering manufacturing mock-up aid

early warningFleet Air De f ense Figh terforward-looking infra-redfixed price incentiveFiscal Yearground-controlled interceptionGlobal Positioning Systemhigh-speed anti-radiation missile

horizontal display indicatorhead-up displayidentification friend or foeImp ro v ed Man n ed Interceptorinertial meas u remen t u n i tinertial navigation systeminfra-red s earch an d t rackJ o i n t Tac t i ca l In fo rmat io n D i s tr i b ut i o n SystemLow A l t i t ud e N av ig a t io n an d Targ et i n g Infra

redsys temfor Night

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LMMCOMSPMTBF

ACANASC

BC

FONPEPa

PCMRCSRDFRFPRIOSAMSCWSFCSLEPSORSWIPTACTACATARCAPTARPSTCSTFXUHFVDIVFEVHSICVPVSTOL

WRA

L u n ar Mo d ul emissile control officerMach Sw eep Pro grammean - ti me-between-fa ilurenewton; SI u n i t o f fo rce 0.225 pounds force

ational Advisory Committee for Aeronauticsaval Air Systems Command

nuclear biological an d ch emi ca l [weapons]

Naval flight officerNavy Preliminary Evaluationpascal; SI d er i ved u n i t of pressure 1 n ewton/sq mpu lse-code-mod ulationradar cross-sectionRapid Deployment Forcerequest for proposalsrad ar i n t e rcep t officersurface-to-air missilesupercri t ical wingspecific fuel consumptionService Life Extension ProgramSpecific O p erat i o n a l Req u i remen tSuper-Weight-Improvement ProgramTact ica l A i r CommandTACtical A i d t o avigationt a rg et co mb at air patrolTac t ica l A i r Recon n ai ss an ce PodSys temTel ev i s i on CameraSi g h tTactical Fighter Experimentalultra-high frequencyvertical display indicatorvariable-flap ejectorvery-high-speed-integra ted -circuit

variable plugvertical o r s h o r t t ak e-o f fan d l an d in g

weapons replaceable assemblies

U n l ik e m o st a i r cr a f t of t h e p o s t- Wo rl dWar II period, the F-l4 Tomcat wasdeveloped from the failure of an o t h er aircraft. Itwas not d es i g n ed as t h e s u cc e ss o r toanything but arose from t h e n e e d for an airsuperiority fighter a n d e v ol v ed fromengines radar and weapon systemsconceived for earl ier types that h ad n ot

mad et h e grade.In t h e e n d it b ecame an airs u p er i o r it y f i g h t er as w el l. Th e generalo p era t i o n a l requirement s temmed fromt h e n eed to replace t h e FA P h an t o m II andabsorb broader mission roles then not filledby an y o t h er fighter. In that regardit wroteits own specif ication to a mandate stipulated by the US Navy. B u t m o re t h an t h atit arose t h r ou g h t h e genius of people atG ru m ma n a nd t he ir l o ng l i ne of Navyfighters incorporatingcreative engineeringand radical p ro d uc ti on c on c ep tse m br a ci n g n e w m at e ri a ls a n d i n no v at i vemeans of putt ing them together.

The F - 14 w as the last in Grumman sfeline family a nd t he last g rea t p ro d uc t ofthat company s long and prestigious rangeo f a i rc r af t a n d s p ac e cr a ft . Th e lattercanno t be s t res s ed too highly for itcontributed in no small measure to thesuccess of t h e co mpan y an d its unique wayof doing things. Of those products that maybe men t io n ed t h e L u n ar Mo d ul e w h ichput twelve a s tr o na u ts o n t h e m o on d u ri n gsix fl ights between July 1969 andDecember 1972, represented in many wayst h e p e a k of Grumman s engineering excel

lence. Less dramatic i n w or ld n ew s, theF-14 a d op t e d m a ny of t h e man ag emen tdesign an d en g i neer i ng practices forged byGrumman t hr ou gh A SA s leadership inspace projects.

Professionally I first came acrossGrumman in 1 9 62 w h en it recei v ed t h econ trac t for t he L un ar M od ul e. Firstamo n g n i n e co n t en ders for the job of realizing A meri ca s h o pes to reach the moonGrumman was to h a ve t h e job of fulfillingJohn F Kennedy s dream tha t NASA

astronauts w o ul d p e rf o rm t h e u l ti m at ed emo ns t ra r i on o f t ech n i ca l prowess. It did,less t h an s ev en years later, a period duringw h i ch n u mero u s problems and seeminglyi n t rac t ab l e o b s t ac les were overcome. Itwas that spiri t a n d t h e d e t er m i na t i on toget the job done tha t characterizedGrumman in many ways an old-fashioned

company that put people in the forefronto f c or p or a te c on c er n . L at er w he nGrumman gave t h e N av y the most powerful carrier-based air superiority fighter yetbuil t it ap p l i ed tha t character to thedaunting job of building a replacement forthe failed F-l11B. A ll eyes w ere on t heVFX w i n ner t h e mo re so because a majorindustry player - General Dynamics - hadb een unable to match an impossibledemand for a common d es i gn t o s e rv eb oth t he A ir Force s a nd t he avy srequirements.

Throughout the period when Grummanlaboured t o b ui ld the VFX winnerrelations with t h e So v i e t U n i o n acq ui red anew sophist i cat ion: P res ident ixonwanted t nt a nd t he S ov ie ts b eg an t otalk about arms reductions only later usingprotocols to e va de t h e in ten t o f t heSALT- l a nd t he S ALT- 2 agreementsignedin the 1970s. A prod uct of t h e Co l dWar t h e To m ca t g a ve f l at - t op a v ia t or sprotection from an ex p an di n g So v i e t N av ya n d a d v an c i ng technologies that threatened the integrity of car r ie r b a t t le groupsand freepassage of cargo o n t h e world ssea

lanes.T h ro u g h t h e final period of Soviet impe

rial ism the Tomcat policed the seasp ro v i d i ng co v er and protect ion for thecarrier ba t t le group. In the afterma t h o f theSoviet collapse the F-14 cont inues tom a i nt a i n t h e edge over an oppositionwhich now comprises many separate statesno longer under a s ingle government.

All types of aircraft are subject to theDarwinist law: a d ap t o r die. There hasn ev er b een a m or e b l a t an t ap p li ca t io n of

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that law than in the post-Cold Ww h ich man y s ep ara t e s t a t es viee nc e a nd p ow er. I n t h e b i po l arc o m mu n i sm a n d c a pi t a li s m t h e c hwere clear. Now w it h n e it hprepared to wage global nuclearthe survival of a minor c l i en t s td i s para t e co u nt r i es are a b a nd o ne

biggest bullyin the region. FromSo v i e t Union a veritable floodquality arms fuels c o nc e rn a btechnical toys now a t t he did e sp o ts a n d a n ar c hi s ts . Te r ro r i st g rw i t h s p en di n g powers g r ea t er t hco u n tr i es arm sadpeoplewith weextremist ideology.

In this ne w world order incnumbers of states possess opossess, weapons of mass destruo t h erw i se t h rea t en t o destabilizeC ol d W ar world. Th e n e ed tremains f or , i n the words o fTruman the bi g s t ic k a ndnothing to eq u al t h e psychologicaa carrier b a tr l e g r ou p l o om i ngh or iz on . I t h as w or ke d wel lMed i t e r ran ean an d w h en lack oensues the firepower is t h er e t othe aggressor s assets. In p r o tecar r ie r b a t t le group, the F-14 willto play its part in carrying out tof r e ta l ia t io n o r p u ni s h me n t t o w hoev er t h rea t en s peace.

As d efen s e b u d get s fall in redemands f or a peace dividend

the end o f t he old War adefence dollar has h ad t o buy conmo re b an g for t h e b u ck t h an it ethe past. I t is no longer acceptablevidual aircraft types t o p er fo rma nd t he age of the multi-missionis firmly entrenched in procuremcies for the n e x t g e ne r at i on o f c oaircraft. Designed and b ui l t f orpurpose, the F 14 has h ad t o chthe times a nd t he fact that itrelative ease broaden its m i ss


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CHAPTER 0 E

rom X to V X

December 1941 the US N av y hcarriers. At the end of the Pacifi1 94 5 i t h ad 9 9 f l at -t op s equippemore than 5,000 aircraft, includingnear to the theoret i cal Iimit oengine performance. At thewartime fleet carrier design, t h e t h idw y class ships launched in

1946 rep res en t ed t h e best t h e N a vget f or a u e ca u e. Wi t h a displace48,145 tonne and a c o m p le m2,510, each could acco mmo d ate130 aircraft and sail half way rworld w i t h o ut t o u chi n g land. Thecarry the flag in t h e i mmedi a t e pperiod.

Followin o major demobilizationend of the Pacific War t h e U S aits capital ships without a n o b via nd c on iderable opposit ion wa s

and improved landing aids enhancedcarrier operability and efficiency, addingan awesome capability to an already effective force. Of American invention, nuclearpropulsiongave t h ecar r i e r virtually unlimit ed r an ge while a revolutionarybreakthrough in s m al l -s c al e n u cl e a rweapons during the 1950s provided sh ip

board ai rcraft with u n p reced en t ed h i t t in gpower.Together, these r e fi n em e nt a n d c a pa

bilities multiplied greatly the effectivenessof the carrier t as k f or e i n the 1960s. owadded to a constellat ion of Air Forcebasesin friendly countries, US firepower couldbe delivered through massive naval forcestha t could themselves be protected byseaborne air umbrellas. But gett ing to thatp o in t h a d b e en a l on g, hard road. Whent h e J a pa n es e a t ta c k ed Pearl Harbor in

Epitomizingthe largecarrierbattle groupsthatwon thePacific War thislatter dayview ofthe USea reflects a bridgebetween eras.Lad downin 1944 i t w s commissioned in 1947 and wouldthanfour decadesof service. On its deckare A 6 Intruders F/A 18A Hornets and two E C Hawke

Emergence o the CarrierTaskForce

Two decisions made y senior political andmili tary leaders were crucia l t o d ev el o pm e nt o f the F-14 a n d b o th were made inMoscow. Th e f ir s t was t o e xp an d t he

inventory of turboprop Badger and jetp o we r ed B l in u er l o ng - ra n ge bombersoperated by o v i et m a ri t im e a v ia t io nunits. The econd decision came o u t o f theCuban mi sile crisis of 1962 w h en A d mi ra lG o rs hk o v co n v in ced Premi er Khru hchevto e x pa n d S o vi e t n a va l p o we r ma sivelyand put long-range, surface-to-surfacemissile o n s h ip s a n d s u bm a ri n es . Th eresulting threat to lavy car r ie r b a t t l egroups was p r of o un d a n d , from the

merican viewpoint, unacceptable. Itwasto counter those stand-offthreats that the

avy sought , and eventual ly obtained,w ha t m an y h av e regarded as the world sb e st l o ng - ra n ge i n t er c e pt o r a n d fleetdefence figh ter, a heavyweight in everysense but one with a remarkabledogfighting capability. To u n d ers t an d t h etortuous genesis of the F-1 4 i t h e lp s t o setevents within the evolution of t h e car r ie rtask force.

It h ad b ee n the large c a rr i er b a tt l egroups that fought the Paci fic sea war of1942-45 tha t led to the U globalm a r it i m e p o we r p r oj e ct i on o f t h e C ol dWa r; w h at was good for b ea ti n g an aggres

sive e n em y o n t h e h ig h s e a s was g oo d a s adeter ren t agains t hegemony in distantplaces, and i t wa s the i n v est ed v a l u e ofA m er ic a m os t e xp en si ve d ef en ceresource - t h e c a rr i er b a tt l e g rou p - thatre ul ted ina uniqueaeroplane to protect it.B ec a us e t h e global carrier force wasimmenselyflexible it wasa serious militarythreat to adversaries intent on political ort err itori al ambi t ions . Pr i mar i l y Br i t i s hinventions, new t ech n o l og i es i n c l u d i n gthe angled flight deck, the steam catapult

flat-top flyer. In the late 1960s the Tomcathad stimulated the in t roduction of newm a nu fa c tu ri n g t ec h ni q ue s a nd newmaterials and r e su l te d i n a much copieddesign that wou ld s e rv e a s a hallmark forfront -l ine aviation in the last threed e ca d es o f t h e t w e nt i et h c e nt u ry. It islikely that the F-14 wil l surv ive as a fron tline combat aircraft well i n to t h e s e co n ddecade of the next century, giving the typean o p erat i o n al age o f a t least forty year.This is fitting t r i b ut e i n d eed to the bravenew ways of de igning, building and operating an aeroplane for the f le et a ir d fen cerole which characterized the genesis of theTo mc a t. To t ho se w ho h av e held guardagainst g rea t d an g er from the tw seats ofa Tomcat, well d on e; t o t ho se w ho willcon t inue to do so for t he n e xt severalyears, God speed.

GRUMMAN 1 -14

when Northrop bought out t h e N e w Yorkplanemaker on 1 M ay 1 99 4. In somerespects the two companie were similar,both h av in g b een formed within a y ea r ofeach other i n 1 92 8 o r t h ro p ) an d in 1929 G r um m an ) a n d e a ch being hampered bysmall production runs and low capitalization. But t h e t ak eov er was the onlyway forGrumman to survive and itserved governm e n t i n te r es t s to bol tel orthrop scorporate base and insulate i t f ro m thepredatory tactics of t h e aero sp ace giants.Northrop h a d g r ow n from being a r el atively small builder a nd t h e B-2 made it avital element in the US manufacturingbase.

So it is that the Tomcat b ecame t h e lastof the Navy s Grumman felines, a productof a company tha t for s i x ty - f iv e y e ar smaintained its place as a predominantly

he c ar ri er is testimony to anot an t i c ip a t ed w h en t h e aircraft

together. Plying the skies o f t h eury, carrying reconnaissance pods, the Tomcat has displayed adaptn true Darwinian tyle. But the

a i rc r af t a n d type models tha tfor di fferent defence need are

d by co rp ora t e s t ru c tu res that areves subject to merg ers and

s.om e r es pe ct s the Grumman

was well set up t o adapt to theWar drawdown, but in others

oorly equipped. Whi le s l i mmerg ia nt s Boeing or McDonnel l

Grumman was depleted ofit once had and was not i n a g oo dto re ist takeover b id s. In fac t, i td t o j u st s u ch a n a m al g am a ti o n

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but carrya bigstick said PresidentTruman. an injunctionexpressed throughthe Convair 8-36 abomber which competedfor funds which theNavywanted tomaintaina globalcarrier force.

Refusingto allow the ir Force to monopolize nuclearweapons.the Navyintroducedthe Douglas A 3Skywarriorstrategic nuclear bomber in 1956. hereseen on the Coral Sea close by the Sovietspy t rawler

Gidrofon. The version hereis the A3D-2 reconnaissance type.

simply, it interpreted its mandateto embrace all aspects of air arelated t o m a tt e rs of defence. Un ew d efen ce structure ArmyMarine air force s wou ld b e con

l imi ted by a speci fic defin i tion re latheir primary roles. B ut t h e avmore and sawin t h e a t om i c b o mbof its own w th wh ich to seexpanded role. It too sought amission one w hi ch w ou ld r e qu ircarriers of immense size a n d udented capacity.

Th e first atomic bombs wand heavy w e ig h in g a b o ut 4,545.5kg) witha diameter of 5ftand a length of 11ft 3.33m). To

i t w as a threat that would grow in unforeseen ways.

Th e integration of nat ional defenceforces u nd er t he P en ta go n u mb re ll abrought c o mp et i ti o n a nd a t t imes bit ter

controversy about which force should beresponsib le for what . The Air Force hadconsiderable l everage in seiz ing the highg r ou n d a n d applied t he d oc tr in e o f t he indivisibility of the air toall militaryactivities not conducted by land or sea forces,thus seriously q u es t io n in g t h e N av y s airrole. Out of the big strategic air forces of1 9 4 2 -45 camet h e St ra t eg i c ir Commandtasked with d o mi n a ti n g t h e offensive andas the jo in t C hi e fs o f S t aff d e fi n ed it, savaging the aggressor at will . Quite

d a t ed d e te r re n ce . M o s t important of all,t h e A meri cas are isola ted from the rest ofthe wor l d b y v a st o c e an s ice a n d d ee pwaters in which hostile forces can roam atwill. It s not in any n at i o n s i n t e rest to

leave those waters unprotected. Theseseemingly disparate defence functionswere c o m bi n ed i n t o two carrier roles:defensive ant i -submarine and offensivestrike, be that against incoming air threatsor hostile land or naval forces. Immediatelya f te r Wo r ld War air threats were notseen as a major challenge to the USA.Wi th j a pa n a nd m os t of Europe in ru ins,only t h e S o vi e t U n io n posed a seriousthreat and i t h ad few a ircra ft that couldreach t he o rt h A me ri ca n cOll[inent. But

manufacturing facil i t ies of t h e S o vi e tU n io n a n d b a c k to wage atomic war in theh e ar t o f enemy t er r i to ry. K n o wn as theB-36, itwas central to a cOll[roversy foughto v er t h es e fundamell[al questions: was thecarrier effective in the nuclear age andwou ld i t s urv iv e t o c ar ry out its mission?But that begged a n o th e r q u es t io n : j u stwhat was the carrier s role?

The purpose of a modern navy s notmerely to wage war. It s there in peacetimet o p r ot e c t vital national ill[erests, whichi n c l ud e t h e free passage of merchant fleetsbringing commodities raw materials andmanufactured products. It s also there tostrike d e ep i n to t h e h e a r t of aggressors andstates that directly or indirectly threatenthe welfare of o t h ers . N av al ai r power s avital part o f t h at mission. Added to this ,the US avy w as at the disposal of ATOand formed a cent ral p lank for consoli-

warships at anchor but a series of linkedengagements in t h e b at tl e of Midwayneutralized t h e j ap an es eN av y t h ro ug h t h euse of carrier-based strike power.

Midway was the first batt le in w hi ch am a jo r n av a l engagement was foughtw i t h o ut an y twoships engagingeach other n direct fire. It was the first sea batt le inw hi ch t he fate of n a vi e s h i ng e d o n aconflict fought out in the a ir. B ut wa s i trelevant in an age when long-rangebombers could des troy cit ies and largeships? When in 1947 t h e U S N a vy b e ca m eone of three services under theDepar tmen t o f D ef en se t h e A ir F or cestaked high claim for the strategic punch.It a lo ne h ad t he m e an s to deliver thea t om i c w ea p on a n d it a l o n e co u l d bridgecontinental distances wit hi n a few h ou rs .Moreover, i t h a d o n t h e d r a w in g boards ab o mb er cap ab l e of flying to the industrial

n g s u ch an ex p en s i ve capability.i tain remained as a world-classith carriers and no one seriously

ated confl ict wi th her. O n ly t h eion posed an immediate threat toand it h ad n ei t h er an o cean-g o i ng

a warm-water port. To many theri er s ee me d a n a na ch r on is mded by t h e s t ra teg i c firepower ofly f o rm e d U S Air Force whichie ve d m ad e t he slow moving

ship as obsolete as theghts . After all, had not Billyproved tha t point when hiss an k t h e G e rm a n b at tl es h ipd in 1 92 1 during a show of air

with canvas-covered biplanes?o ug h t not: M i tc h el l s t a rg e t h a denceless a n d t h e bombersfaced no

from the sea o r t he ai r; Pearls ho we d t h e v ul ne ra bi li ty of

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would have to mo ve to PennsyGrumman, BillSchwendler and Jakeformed GrummanAircraft Engineeringup shop at Baldwin,Long Island, in D1929. They turned aprofit of just 5,50first year, subsidizing developmentotwo-seater biplane fighter by repairingItwasthe first Navyfighter to achieve(322kphl in level flight and incorporaenclosed cockpit and retractable maigear. By the time it entered service inNavy had lost interest in the two-seaterconcept, whichclearedthe way forthethe improved version, the F3F. Befutilizing the semi-monocoque fuselagFF-1, Grummanproduced theJF floatpleventuallyled to the J2F Duck of whic1,000 werebuilt between 1933 and 19However, it was the Grumman F2F andthat gave the Navy a fighter that woouslyeclipse theArmy s BoeingF4B. Mjust a refined, single-seat version ofthe Grumman biplanes incorporatedretractable landinggearwitha fullystrefuselage and a closely cow led twin-row

Jr radial engine. But production numsmall- only 169 were built- and it felof all the good biplanedesigns ofthe min that it was outclassed by a new genemonoplane technology that Grummwould bring to the carrier deck. BefGrumman s lastbiplane appeared in 19the company wheeled out the unsucXSBF-1 two-seater scout bomber; thagainst the Curtiss XSBC-2 whichservice in 1939 as the Helldiver,the Ulastcombat biplane.

The Grumman Story

In its 12 June 1971 edition, that prestigiousbeacon of Americancorporateactivity usiness k declared that the Grumman Corporation has an old-fashioned aura: paternalistic, inbredand cautious. Its workers remain steadfastlynon-union. Each one still receives a turkey atChristmas as a gift from the management . Itstop executives come up through theranks andfew defect. Consistently profitable,Grummanhas never failed t o p ay a dividend in the 4years it has operated in the precariousbusinessof defense contracting.

All this and more is true of one o f t h e m os tremarkable American aircraft manufacturers,which began life as Grumman AircraftEngineering when Leroy Grummanand twofriends setup their own businessin 1929.

Born in 1895 and brought upin Long Island,New York, a mecca for American flyers,LeroyRandle Grumman was an early convert to aviation and graduated as a Navy pilotin September1918. After a brief periodas an engineer andtest pilot at the League Island NavyYard heresigned his commission to join the LoeningAeronautical Engineering Corporation, a

company building beautifully designed andexquisitely crafted seaplanes and amphibiousaircraft forthe Navy and the Army. In the goldrush to build aeroplanesthat followedthe popularization of air traveland the interest of WallStreet in moppingup smallcompanies, Loeningwas gobbled u p b y bankers and merged withKeystone. But Keystoneand its acquisitionswere harnessed to other companies in theexpanding holdingoperation known as NorthAmerican Aviation,Inc.

WhenLoening employees weretoldthat they

Flagshipfor the world s first classof carrierdesignedfor jetaircraft, the USS Forrestal drew heavcancelled super-carrierthe United States. She was laiddown in 1952, commissioned three years laterwould see thirty-eight years of service before retiring in 1993,leavingthree moreof herclass - SaratoRanger andIndependence - all of which had gone by 1998.

With a fully loaded displacement of80,000t on s a nd a n o ve ra ll l en gt h of 1,089ft 330m) it would have had a maximumflight deck width of 190ft 57.58m). Aunique feature of the d es ig n g av e u p thecharacterist ic fixed island from one side ofthe flight deck, which was clean along theentire length and width of the s hi p, for atelescopic bridge on the forward starboarddeck edge. Fourlarge l ifts l inked the flightdeck to t he h an ga r d ec k an d t he aircomplement comprised fifty-four AJSavages for nuclear s t r ike. Th e niteStates would also carry the new N a vy j e tn u c l ear b o mber on which Douglas begand es ig n s tu d ie s i n 1 94 7. This work wouldresul t in the A3 D Skywarrior, for whichDouglas received a con trac t in March1 94 9; i t wa s f ir st f lo wn i n October 1952and deployed in 1956. At 82,0001b J7,27Jkg) gross weigh t i t was the Navy sheaviestaircraft.

The vision of a strategic US aval forcewas, however, short - l ived and jus t daysafter the keel of CVB-58 was laid in early1950 the project was c an c el l ed a nd t h em on e y t hu s s av ed was diverted to the B-36 .Yet th is reversa l was i t se l fa temporaryhalt in the inevitable development of anocean-going, nuclear capability. Asequence of events that began wi th thetesting of t h eSo v i e t U n i o n s a t o m b o mb inAugust 1949 would give the N av y ad d edresponsibility. The most potent threat tothe USh a d come a stepcloser to posinganunacceptable challenge to t h eco u n t ry an dth is would t rigger approval by PresidentTruman for the development o f t h erm o n uc l ea r w e ap o ns - t he m is na me d hydrogen bomb. Within a matter ofm o nt hs t he C o mm u ni st s in nor thernKorea madea badmistake and invaded thes o u th , t r ig ge r in g a U n it ed N a ti on sresponse and b ri ng in g U f or ce back tothe region in large numbers.

Th e Korean Wa r and America s rolethrough the U n i te d N a t io n s b r ou g ht arenewed vigour abou t t he n ee d for a

global capability. The massive confrontation of superpower sta tes in to ta l war wasno longer the only threat . Regional confl ic t was seen to be as great a threat topeace, perhaps more so, a nd t he rapidmovement of response forces a prerequisite for t imely reaction to unprovokedaggression. Congressional opposition to anexpansion in naval capabil i ty evaporated.Research on reducing the size of atomican d t h ermo nu cl ear weapons was accelera te d a nd a ne w concept of carrier batt le

The A3D-2 Skywarriorwas developedinto afully equippedreconnaissanceversion,the RA-3B,with fullypressurized fuselage a nda s many as twelve cameras.This derivative served with the Heavy PhotographicSquadrons VAP-61 a ndVAP-62.

Operatingoff conventionalcarriers in thelate 1950s and the early1960s,the Skywarriorrepresented thelastof an era when specialized aircraft were developed for dedicatedtasks.

nuclear capability, in June 1946,Department of Defense Act was

e avyordered orth Americanthree prototype, h igh-perfor

rr i er-based , nuclear bombers.s the AJ Savage, the aircraft waswered b y t wo 2,400hp Prat t R - 2 80 0 -4 4 W radial enginesto the high mounted wing and

0 lb 2 0 .4 6k ) thrust Allison J33bo j e t in the t ai l f or assistedThe avage had a w in g s pa n of72 m) , a l en g th of 63ft 19 .09m)oss weight o f a l m os t 5J,0001bg), making it one of biggest aerohe n e nv is ag ed for carrier

s. The avy went a step furtherand persuaded President Trumanfunds in F is ca l Yea r 1 94 9 a

nths period beginning 1 Julydget proposal for a super-carrier.a me t i me , t he N av y B ur ea u o fcs co mp le t ed t h e initial studies

a jet-powered nuclear bombernt.

uper-carrier was coded CV A-58,re d t o u n de r t he d es ig na ti onand given t h e n a m e United Scates

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RO M T X TO V X

the sky there would be insufficientaircraftto tackle each t a rg et and many would getthrough. The Air Force c ho se t o resolvethe problem of destroying large formationof approaching b o mb e r s w i th the equiv a le n t o f a s ledgehammer, backing theDouglas MB-I Genie which had a speciall.5 kiloton n u cl earw arh ead an d a range of6 miles 9 .6km). Fired into a formation ofa p pr oa ch in g b om be rs , G e ni e woulddestroy by blast or shock wave. A l ive testwas conducted i n J ul y 1 95 7 when aNorthrop F-89A corpion f ir ed a Genieacross the Yucca Flat, Nevada, t est range1 5, 0 00 ft 4 , 5 45 . 5m ) o v er t h e h e ad s o fwatching U F personnel Th e lethalr a di u s was o v 1 ,0 0 0f t 3 0 3 .03 m) . The

avy s so lu t ion was less dramatic becausethe maritime-based threats itfaced re ofa different kind. Approaching bomberswith cruise or stand-off weapons targetingcarrier batt le groups would not fly in themassed formations feared by t h e A i r Force.To combat t h e s n e a k at t ack or the simult a ne o u a t ta c k from different direction

ROM T X TO V X

many mile apart , aircraft designer madethe fighters faster and more capable. But itwa a o l u t io n b o u n d to run ou to f plausibleapplication a n d t h e technology of the late1950s gave l i t t le succour to concerned

dmiral.These were earlydays for a i r-to -ai r mis

siles. Th e first examples o f t he nowfamous Sidewinder family, desianatedl -7by the avy for i ts version of the missile,b roke newground. Produced by a brilliantteam of engineers a t t h e Naval OrdnanceTe I Center, China Lake, California, theprecursor XAAM-N-7 was the first tot a ck l e t h e problem of pas ive infra-redguidance di rect . Th se w er e a ls o e ar l ydays in the then extraordinarily exoticfield of electronics , wh n h o t v a cu u mtubes and crystals weI familiar components and field-effect transistors and solidstate devices had y et t o b e invented. ThefirstSidewinders were tested in 1953 andwent in to operat ional use during 1956.Two years later t h e Ch i n ese Jationalist F

6 fighters u se d i de wi nd er s t o shoo t

down fourteen MiG-ISs from the PRepublic, the f ir st t im e t he y were ua ng er. H ow ev er , M c Do nn el l a nd t he

avy selected ano ther missileF4H. The yet -to-be-named Phantomw o ul d c a rr y ix AIM- -6A f ro mknown as IM -7 ) parrow III mi n t ro du ced i n t o avy service by thDemon.

A eriousl imi ta t ionwi th the idewas its relatively shor t r an geconstrained targeting arc. Anythingthan a tail-end attack was unlikelytoin a h i t a n d earlyversions had a marange of little mol than 2 miles until the improved AIM-9C avai lthe early 1960s ext nded that to 17 .6km). Yet thi was sti ll far belo

avy srequi rem nts. At3801b l 7 3kRaytheon SparrowIII was twice theof t h e S i de w in d er b u t it had semicontinuous wave, r a da r h o mi n g arange of 25 miles 40km). This wasbut still not close enough to thement for a n e ff ec ti ve , l on g- ra

saw remarkable developments in US naval aviation reflected through evolving technologies, newcarriers and an emphasis on nuclearweapons. One of Grumman s finestmodels,the F9F-6

orporated the excellence ofthe company s first jetfighter - thePanther- with a ne w swepthed into service during1952to give theNavya jetfighter equalto theSoviet MiG-15 inther, nearly2,000 were built.

y, b r i n g in g h i g h landing speedsuc ed l ow -s pe ed c on tr ol . Th eonal design philosophy was hardo accommodate all the factors butdemand for h i g h er p er fo rman ce

te r capability increased.e l a te 1950s w h en t h e F4H wasn to its fl ight t es t programme,

concerns wereexpressed a b ou t t h ed threatand the ability of the newn of avy fighters to meet it.

nce report were fragmentary butrim forecast . H ar d o n t he heels ofa to mi c b om b te I cam e ang family of air-to-surface missiles

o f h i tt i n g s t a ti o na r y or slowtargets from great dis tance.

d in 1956, the A - I K en ne l wasby the Tu-16 BadgerC and coulda n u cl ear w arhead t o a t arge t 9044 km ) f ro m a h i g h -a l t i t ud e d ro p

Th e A -2 Kipper had a sl ightlyrange and was supersonic through

a programmed autopilot with act ive radarfor terminal homing. The A 3 Kangaroostand-off weapon was designed to hit areatargets such as ports and h a rb o urs wit h a800-kiloton warhead. t was carried by aTu-95 Bear a n d h a d a maximum range of400 m il es 6 40 km ) , a s p ee d of Mach 1.8with a u to p il o t c o n tr o l a n d n o guidance.

Of t h e g r ea t es t c o nc e rn wa the A -4Kitchen. With a single r o ck e t m o t orproducing a maximum speed of Mach 4.6,

the -4 had a ran ge of up to 285 mile 456km) , t er m in al h om i ng a n d a 350kiloton warhead for attack against batt legroup and carriers. Carried by a T u -9 5B ea r a nd l at er by the Tu-22K Blindersupersonic bomber, it r e p re s en t ed t h eunique way oviet de ign teams weredecentralizing the threat by creatingan airlaunched c h al le n ge t o d el iv ery s y st em s- which is w h at t h e c ar r ie r was quick lybecoming for convent ional and nuclearweapons. Added to submarine-launched

24

cruise missiles of more questionable performance, the new class of Soviet weaponryposed a s er io u chall nge and i t w as it sappearance at the nd of the 1950s thatforge d a n ew re qu ir m e nt . W h il e t h e F4Hshowed great promise from the day of i ts .first flight in M ay 1 95 8, i t wa l im it ed bythe technology of its time.

Events were overwhelming the ability ofaircraft d es ig ne rs t o k ee p p ac e w it hexpanding challenges a n d t h e e m er g en c e

of new threats. What the avy needed wasa f i gh t er t h at c ou l d e n ga g e t h e cruisemissile carriers before they relea e d t he irweapons, or at least engage the weaponsafter their re lea e . In t h es eco n d h al f of the1950s, however, on ly short-range missileshad b een d ev e lo p ed and were generallyseen as supplement to the traditionalcannon a rm a me nt . T h is r eq ui re d t hedefending fighters to engage their targets atre lat ivelyclose range - just a few m il e atmost - but with threats spread out a cr o s

One of the all-time carrierheavyweights, NorthAmerican Aviation s A-5 Vigilante expressedthe strategicmoodof theNavywhenthis 80 OOOlb 36,360kg)atom bomber joinedthe Fleetin 1961. t emphaticallystampeda messageof intent- thatthe US Navy was going to continue as aworld force.

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RO T X T V X RO T X T V X

hmore than5 000produced for countriesaround theworld it would be hard to classify the F 4 Phantoma failure but it doestypifythe end ofthe linefor metal aeroplanes and iron bombs and even inVietnam

s hard pressedby the MiG 21

an unswept, houlder-mounted wtwin engines attached to the fuselac h in i n ta k es . Th e b ul bo u n osdictated by rhe size o f t he largeDoppler, track-while-scan radar,such developed for a f ighter. TheW h it n ey T F3 0- P- 2 t ur bo fa nspecially elected for the Missileerb

of their fuel efficiency. Wi t h a sMach .8, the Missileer had to lstat ion f or u p to six hours andmultiple t h rea t en v i ro n men t befortaneously launching selectedEagleat individual targets. TheXAAM-I0was by any standards a b ig mis si le ,length of 1 6f t 1 .5 in ( 4. 8 9m), a mdiameter of 1ft 2in (0.35m) and aweight of 1,2851b (584kg). I t c omt w o s t ages including a s ol id probooster and a long-burn solid scarrying the mis i e a distance of 1(202km) at a maximum speed ofTh e Eagle s act ive seeker wasfrom the Bomarc urface-to-air

i t to th e a signed threat. Ear ly in 1960contracts were awarded for rhe missile anditscarrier. Bendix b ea t o f f t h e co mp et i t i o nfrom fifteen o t h er co n t en d ers an d gor rhejob of d ev e lo p i n g t h e missile, known athe X A A M-IO Eagle, and Douglas wasauthorized to develop the aircraft - anu n l ik e l y l o o ki n g missile t r uc k g iv en t h ecompany model number D - 7 66 w h ic hthe avy designared t h e F 6 D- l Mis i1eer.In one s e ns e t h e r e qu i re m en t w as in theright direction. It put a look-down Dopplerradar system out where it mattered in thet h rea t en v i ro n men t closer to the aggressorand because the scan and track systemcouldcover all threats down to the surfaceo f t he sea i t encompassed all knownclasses of air-to-surface weapon. Howeverb ec au se o f t he e a rt h s c u rv at u re a nds u r face-s ki mmi ng t h rea ts t h e d efend i n gcar ri e rco u l d n o t see many of the weaponsthat could be thrown against it.

The F6D-l Missileer had a bulbous fuselage, twocrew members seated side by side,

d ea lw i th u p to eightseparate target at thesame t ime in an i n t egra t ed system whichreflected t he b el ie f o f t he day - tha tmi i es wouldrake o v erman y of the functions previously carried out by the aircrafti t elf . This was not a uniquely Americanv iew. I n Britain the infamous (a omewould say) D efen ce Wh i t e Pap er of 1957decreed tha t there would be n o newmanned fighter and that piloted aircraftwould be replaced by missiles, thus legitimizing the lack of government support fort h e a i rcra f t indus try. In turn this wouldre ult in the English E l ec tr i c L i g h t ni n gb ei ng t h e l as t manned fighter of whollyBritish design.

For the U avy s Fleet Defense Fighterrequirem nt a purpose-built aircraftwouldhave to carry eight miss iles to an alt i tudeof 35,00Oft (10,606m) a n d t a ke up stat ion1 50 mil es ( 2 40 km) f ro m t h e car ri e r thatlaunched it. There t h e FA D F would use itsown rad ar to locate targets but activehoming radar o n e a ch mi silewould guide

Tangling with aircraft such as theextremelycapable MiG 21 shownhere gave Navypilotsa taste ofwhatwas to comeunlessdesignerstook aquantumleap forward in warplane technology In thelate 1960s theSoviets were clearly catching up the West andthreateningto addtechnicalsuperiorityto a numericaladvantage

f ication for a newaircraf t. This was not yetthe i n t eg rared w eapo n -s ys t em approachthat would d o mi na t e p ro curemen t everaldecades hence but i tw as a start along theright road.

I n 1 95 7 the avy requested proposalsf or thi s n ew f leer defence y t e m a n d thist i me instead of responding to themarketing f rom a pecific contractorthe avy d e ci d ed w h a t it w a nt e d a n dh o w t h e ystem had to perform. That wassimply stated: a d efen ceco n cep t t h a t couldseek at t ack and d es t ro y atta kingweapons before t h e d efen d i n g aircraft ort h e c a rr i er b a tt l e g r o up c a me within theirrange. II wa decided that each car ri e rlaunched miss ile platform would have to

envelope to its vital ex p en s i v e carrierassets. U s in g t h e failed marriage of theSparrow and the F5D-l as a precedentfor renewed effor ts at producing a cruisekil ler the avy p ut t og et he r as p ec if i ca t i on b as ed a r ou n d t h e requirement for a Fleet ir D efen s e Fi g ht e r orF DF. This time a n e w w e ap o n systembuilt t o o p era t i o na l n eed s would drive thespecification f or a n e w l a un c h p l at f or m .The avy reasoned that i t w as better top ut t he c on tr ol o f t he i nt er ce pt in themissile rather than in the a i rf r am e a n dbuild i n to t h e missile range and flexibilityto seek and destroy. Then whatever wasneeded in the way of b la c k b ox es a n dl au nch req ui remen t co u ld drive the speci-

erception of multipletargets . I t was notnew quest . Beginning i n 1 955 therrow \ h ad b een d ev e lo p ed by Douglash ju I that problem in mind, adoptingy active r a da r h o mi n g a n d d e igned foreg r a ti o n w i th the p ro p o s ed D o u gl asD-1 Skylancer. This was the first seriousemp t to i n t egra t e w eap o n sy tem andnch p l a t fo rm b ut t he super onicframe evolved from the ubsonic F4D-1yray and was seriously compromised byptabil i ty and a burgeoning array ofck boxes. The avyaxed both aircraft

missile.Yet even as the avy accep t ed t h e logic

parrow \II armamen t for the F 4H i tl b r oo d ed o v er t h e e x pa n d in g threat

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r e ma i ne d t h e s a me a n d, whileBoeing an d G en era l D y n ami cs /G ru mt o b e n ear t h e required design targew er e t il l f ar f ro m p ro d uc i n g accconcepts. A g ai n t h ey w e n t b a ckdrawings boards and ina third setm e nt s s u bm i tt e d d u ri n g J u n e t h econtenders came out strongly, witin the lead but its prime competi tothe gap. The Pentagon sent t honce again to h o ne t h e blueprintsfo u r th s u b mi s s i o n in Septemberwere the clear winners, g e tt i ngfrom t h e A i r Force Co un ci l, t h e ALogistics o m ma n d, t h e BureauWeapons and the C hi ef o f

perations Adm George W. Andea member of t h eJ o i n t Chiefs of SAnderson worked with Gen u rtfor the ir Force, Gen David hoMar in e Co rps an d Gen George Dethe Army, all u n d er t h e ch a i rmanGen Lyman Lemnitzer.

D u ri n g t h e p e ri o d of the T Frefinement, which w e nt o n u n ab athe first n in e m o nt hs of 196Anderson was increasingly alarmway the avy s pr ior it ies in thetion were slipping and that Grumunable to g et e ne ra l Dynamics tocri t ical deSign changes vitalretaining of the avy s part of thcation. To achieve commonal i ty

Long-range cruisemissiles launched byship or aircraftposeda realthreat to the carrierand

its cof attacksquadrons.Almost 50ft 15mllong.this AS 3 Kangaroo entered service i n 1961 andcoulaunched bythe long-rangeTu-95 Bear. With a range of about 4 miles 1640km it carried a nuclewarhead and would usually have been targeted against harbours. portsor coastal cities.

based fighters with sea legs.On 29 eptember 1961 t h e D ep ar tmen t

of Defenseissuedit RFPfor the integratedTFX; the Pentagon tried t o s u bs u me the

avy s F lee t i r D e fens e requirement intoAir Force n o mencl a t u re an d all referenceto t h e FA DF was quietly erased. Ins tead,because it was to be an Air Force project,i t would get a U SAF d es ig n at i o n an d beknown as the F I l l Respondentsincluded Boeing, General Dynamics,Lockheed, McDonnel l Douglas, NorthA m er i ca n a n d Republic. Acknowledgingits lack of naval expert i se, GeneralD y na m i cs t e a m ed w i th Grumman in ajoint proposal submitted, along with otherbids, during December; General Dynamicswould play pri me c o nt r ac t or a ndGrumman w ou ld b ui ld t h a ft section, tailu ni t a nd l an di ng g ea r for t he A ir Forceversion, assemble t h e en t i re avy versiona n d i n te g ra t e e l ec t ro n ic eq u i p men t intothe latter. Boeing was ranked first with theGeneral Dynamic /Grumman bid second,but none of the submissions wa acceptable. Boeingwas weak in having proposeda n u nt r ie d e ng in e, t h e G en er a l E le ct ri cMF295, whileall were low on crew escape,on-stat ion loitertime an d p er formance atboth high and lowaltitudes.

A ft er a s e co n d r o u nd of submissionsrequested in pril 1962 and delivered amonth later, the f irs t two ranking designs

The Bogy of ommonality

designed by Hughes for the cancel l edorth merican F-l 8 R ap ie r, a Mach 3

interceptor w i th a d es ig n g ro ss w eigh t of102,0001b (4 6 ,3 6 4 kg ) Bu t n o n e of thisw ou ld w or k i f the airframe requirementsbetween the two s erv ices co u Id not bematched in a flyable aeroplane.

The o ne a re a w he re b ot h ervices didagree, however, was in t h e ap p li ca ti o n ofv a r ia b l e g e om e t r y. E a c h could see thebenfit f or i ts o w n ap p l i ca t i o ns : t he A irForce for diverse miss ion roles ; t h e N av ybecause it significantly cut d eck l an d in gs p eed s , i mp ro v ed the dogfight poten t iaIand y et a ll ow ed h ig h d as h s pe ed s. F ordifferent reasons the two services wantedoptimized performance at both high andlowenergylevels. Variable-geometrywingswouldprovide that i n a w ay other, high-liftdevicescouldnot. Only by redesigning thewingin flight, adapting it for differentflight

regimes an d p er fo rman ce req u i remen t s ,co ul d each service satisfy b o t h en d s of itsspecification. The A ir F o r ce l ik ed to ca ll i tthe mission-adaptive wing and itpromised just that: to ch ang e t h e mi s ionof the aircraft according to set geometries.The ASA w o rk p ro ved that t h e e n gineering problems with swing-wings couldbe olved and i t w as p er f ec t f or the TFXa n d t h e FADF. But s ti l l i t left the generalconfiguration unresolved.

A f te r b o t h t h e A i r Force a n d t h e avytoldthe Secretary of Defense that they couldnot reconcile their very different requiremen ts i n t o a common airframe an d en g in ec o m bi n a ti o n t h e ir j u d ge m e nt was overriden and they were ordered to g et o n withitanyway. In August 1961 M c a ma ra toldt h e N avy that it had to accept a modifiedspecification - and that was that . Theywould get a 3 ft ( 0 .9 I m) d i am e te r r ad arantenna with less performance than stipulated, accept a 55,0001b 25,000kg) all-upweight limit, 10 per c e nt h ig he r t ha n t hemaximum desired, and begiven their sideby-side seating configuration,as requested.The final insult came w he n M c a ma ratold the avy tha t i t w ou ld not be ino v er a ll c h a rg e of its F l ee t A ir D ef en seFighter, because the specification wa topossess commonality with the TFXprogrammeand that would be managed byt h e A i r F or ce . M a ny avy f i g h te rs a resuccessful as land-based combat aircraft,b u t t h er e is not a h ap py h is to ry of land-

ment . The new Defense Secretary envisaged a ing le a i rc r af t that could satisfy notonly T FX an d FA DF req ui remen t s b u t alsoserve as a clo e s u p p o r t a i rc raf t for theA r my a n d t h e M a ri n e Corps . In J u ne t h eArmy a nd t he M ar in e C or ps said theyc ou ld n ot a da pt t he a me aircraftfor theirpurposes and flatly refused to be draggedinto the p ro g ramme. Bi t ter acrimonyflowed b e tw e en t h e s erv i ce ch i e fs andthese bow-tie bastards as t h e n e w army ofcivilian money-savers were d u b bed . Wi t hu n p reced ent ed au t ho r i t ar i ani s m, t h e newguard in the Kennedy White House sweptaside c o n ve n t io n a n d told the servicechiefs what t h e y w o ul d have to do tos q u eeze t he ir r eq ui re m en ts i nt o t he commonali ty funnel.

The problem wereawesome. The avys et a n upper w e i gh t l i m it of 50,0001b 22,727kg) o n t h ei r FA DF a n d allowed it

a maximum lengthof

66ft 20m), et bythe

size of carrierdeck lifts. They wanted a 4ft 1.21m) t racking radar providing the 200m il es ( 32 0 km ) r a ng e sought for earlyintercepts a n d t h a t d i c t at e d a large diameter nose, and for o p t i mum co -op era ti o nb e t we e n p i lo t a n d w e ap o ns o f fi c er t h eywantd side-by-side seating. The ir Forceoptimized a design which c am e o u t a t anaeroplane witha 75, OOlb 34, 9lkg) grossweight, terrainfollowing radarand a highM a ch d as h capability dictat ing a lendernose a n d t a nd e m seating. But i t w as theseparate performance specifications thatcompromised design co n s id era ti o n s , an dall a l on g t h e N a vy insisted that the twoco ul d n o t be reconciled.

Concerned at the cancellat ion of theEag le mis si l , t h e N av y did succes fullycampaign t o f un d low -l ev el w or k o n t heconcept. That activity arose from FighterStudy I set up to examine the case forp ur su in g t he W G- 9 r ad ar p ro je ct fromthe now cancelled Missileer/Eaglep r o gr a m m e. I t s h o we d an indisputableneed for 8 new missile to fill the air defencerequirement ou t to at least 1 0 0 m i le s(I60km) from t h e l au n ch aircraft. The newmissile developed from the Eagle was,appropriately,called the Phoenix, with thew e ap o n d e si g na t io n A A M - -11, laterknown as t h eA IM-5 4 A . The combinationof rad aran d missilewas t h e m o t ambitiousa i r- t o-a i r w eapo n y et a t te m pt e d a nd t heA WG-9 was d er i v ed direct from theadvanced A G - I p u ls e -D o pp l er , lookdown, fire-control system designed for theYF-12 Mach 3 interceptor. The ASG-lhad i t s el f e v o lv e d from t he A S G -I B

h a rd - no s ed d ec i si o n- m ak i ng , M c a m ar aw an ted t o save money wherever he could;in time, an d s o mew h at unju t1y thiswouldlead to his being called M ac k t h e Knife .At the Pen t ag o n h e quickly reviewed alldefence p r og r ammes f o r p o ibl e cut. Theadministrat ion was already pledged, in itelection campaign, t o a ma jo r expan ion ofstrategic and nuclear forces and wanted towhittle away at t h e n o t- s o- v is i bl esecondarydefence projects to help to clawb a ck s o me of tha t outlay. McNamaracoined a n e w p h ra s e that w o u ld rev erb e ra t e t h ro u gh C o ng r es s io n al hallst h ereaf t e rw h en ev er g o v ernmen t agencieswanted funds for a new technologyventure: commonali ty. By merging seemingly d i sp a ra t e r e qu i re m en t s, saidM c a ma ra , g r e at savings can be made byhaving a single programme that served then eeds o f several users.

Taking advantage o f t he open-policylegacy from t h e E i s enh o w er ad mi n i st ration, M c a ma ra w an te d t o merge the AirF or ce T FX and the avy FADFprogramme into a s ing le e ffo r t. H e m etsenior officers from the services andconsulted with D r H arol d Brown, head ofDefense Research and Enginering. On 16February, t o t h e co n s te rn a t io n of the AirForce a nd t he N av y, h e o rd er ed all fourservices t o e x pl o re the possibil i ty of acommon aircraftfor their eparate require-

eprotectionof the carrierbattle group grew along with thecapabilities ofcarrier attackplanesin thes.Sovietaircraft nosing around the sea lanes gave US Navyintelligence important informationaboutxpanding threat and many aircraftwere interrogatedelectronicallywhile being escorted away.

each located outboard of the fuselagel ine. I n thi s w ay t h e b l en d ed i n ne rand fuselage juncture would provide

p tructuralunit w h ere t h e pivot boxbe located. Langley s d i rect o r J o h n

, who would leave at t he e nd o f t h ew h en the lACA met a morpho ed

A, brought this idea t o t he ir. The former test pilot, n o w act i ng

man d i n g g en era l of A F Ta c ti c a lommand, Brig-Gen Frank K Everestt hi s i de a and organized a closed

rence with senior T AC officers andsentatives from industry to sell theof variable-geometry for the F-105cement. I twas just what was needed,aid, t o o pt imize performance for lowslow miss ions as well as fas t f ights atde. n 14 June 1960this wasformal

into SO R- 1 83 and TFX waseived.

e bi rth o f t he A ir F or ce T FXramme waited for t h e i n aug u rat i o n ofK e nn e dy administration in January

a nd t he a tt en ti on s o f t he newlyinted Defense ecretary Robert

amara. I t c al l ed for a Mach 1.2nd-hugging penetrat ion capabili ty aas Mach 2.5 dash at alt i tude, a t ransatc, unrefuell ed ferry range andability from short , unprepared,3,000ft9 m) t ri ps . Coming from the Fordor Company with a reputation for

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F R OM T F X TO VFX FROM TFX TO VFX

Feline Propwash

Grumman will be for ever linked 10 a range of four years before Americawent to warfighters associated with members of the ca t a s u cc es so r to the Wildcat using thefamily, the first of which, the F4F, took to the Wright R-2600 fourteen-cylinder, radiair in 1937 but spent three years in protracted Incorporating improvementsthat accrugestation before it entered service in 1940. exper iencewith the Wildcat design aNamed Wildcat in October 1941, just six tions, the F6F first flew in June 19weeks before America went to war, the US Hellcats were fighting the Japanese byNavy had about 130 operational F4Fs when 1943. Production aircrafthad the 2,000Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December Whitney R-2800 engine. The aircraf1941. Like so many companiesswept into th e b ecam ethe mainstay of Navy and Maruncompromising demands of w ar, G ru mm an u ni ts on fighting flat-tops and all thehad to expand on a massive scale and total aces in the Pacific war flew Hellcatproduction increased from 158 aircraft of a ll production stopped in August 1945 Gtypes in 1940 to 2,247 two years later. Th e h ad built 12,275 Hellcatsandonly 270 haircraft was selected by the British and served lost in combat against 5,156 kills, a lossinitially as the Martlet; F4Fs saw service less than 1:19.from the Arctic Ocean tothe deserts of North Too late to see service against the JaAfrica. the F8F Bearcat was a further impr

y 1942 the Wildcatwas in the vanguard of upon the Hellcat, incorporating similUS Navy operations against the Japanese and features butwith addedspeed and manpropelled the company into the forefront o f b ili ty .Albeit unsolicited, theGrumman pAmerican aeroplane builders. In all, 7,825 got the Navy s attention and the firstWildcats were builtof which 1,123went to the took to the skies in August 1944. HRoyal Navy,but it was in the Pacificthat the F4F orders for almost 6,000F8Fs were cut wmade i ts name. t was while flying Wil dcat s war ended , even as the first Bearcatwith Marine squadron VMF-121 in January sailing to war aboard the carrier th1943 that Capt Joseph J. Foss became the first angley Arguably the best propellerair ace of the Second World Warto equalthe fighter to see service in the US Natwenty-six kills of the highest scoringAmerican Bearcat was too late forWorld War II Wace of the First War, Eddie Rickenbacker. By Korean War began it had been supersethis timethe ratio of kills to losses was almost the newgeneration of Navy jets, also f6:1. At the war's end, Wildcatpilotswere cred- Grumman stable. The Bearcat's lastingited with 1,327kills, a figure g re at ly o ve rt ak en fam ecame on 1 6 August 1969 wheby Grumman s second shipboard monoplane Greenamyer tookhis privately-ownedfighter, the Hellcat. through calibrated traps to secure th

The Grumman F6F Hellcat grewoutof initial speed record for piston-engined aircdesign work, from studies that began almost 483.041 mph 777 7kph .

TheSovietSS-N-2 Styxanti-ship missile, in service during theearly 1980s.was a serious weaponkeenlyrespected if only because it had been soldaroundthe world.Packinga lethalpunch, it has a range50 miles 80km and a high subsonicspeed.

legislators on Capito l Hill decided thatM c a ma ra was perfectly within his rightst o a wa r d t h e c o n t ra c t to the GeneralDynamics/Grumman team and that nomi carriage of justice had taken place,despite protesta tions from Boeing. s forA dm n de rs on , th e lo ng d ra wn out hearings brought nothing but plain truth fromthe including the 1 avy's disquietoverthe entireTFX issue. Before theyearwasOut he received a visit from Korth andGilpatrick to ay that the President was notg o in g to xtend his tenure a C h ie f o fNaval Operations and that he could takeup a position as ambassador to Portugal ifh e w is he d. A s it was, w he n McNamaraa sk ed G eo rg e A n de rs o n to m ee t h im theformer CNO gave theSecretary of Defensesuch a drubbing on integrity and the principles of ethics that he literallyreduced them an to tea rs . A for Mc a ma ra , h e w e nt

too far and t ri ed t o influence RobertK en n ed y w ho s aw to i t that the Presidentknew the full story.

Kennedy wamed to a wa rd Andersont h e D i st i ng u is h ed S e rv i ce Medal butMc a ma r a m a de s u re tha t he himselfw ou ld b e out of the count ry when thatprestigious event took place in the RoseG ar de n a t the White House; so thePre id en t a d va nc ed th e date so that theD efen se e cretary w ou ld h av e to a tt en d .Before leaving for Portugal, Andersonspent an hour with the President, whoassured the former naval chief that he fullyu n de rs to o d w h at h ad b ee n g oing o n a n dthat he wa not prepared to accept in tervention by 'little Czars'. Shortly thereafterKennedy was dead and McNamara wasr ep la c d by Clark Clifford. There was,Anderson thought, jus t ice after a ll inAmerican democracy.

At a projected 5.4 billion, thecommonality programme representedthe largest production contract ever madefor a single aircraft type. Two versions ofth e TFX w ou ld b e p ro d uc ed : th e F-I I IAfor th e A ir Force a nd the F-II IB for thNavy, with only minor differences (visuallyt he s ho rt er nose on the F-III Bwas themostprominem) toshoe-horn the'commonality ' a ircraft in to each serviceniche. As rela ted earlier, the avy wan o ne too h ap py w ith th e lea d role b einga s ig ne d to t he A ir Force, but i t h adextracted a price for t ha t: t he avy w ou ldpay no money for the development of theF-l II B until the first production aircraftwas delivered. Th e A ir Force w ou ld b eprime funding agency and as such would

Moreover, eneral Dynamicswasa Texac o mp a ny, t h e h om e of Vice-PresidentJohnson and Undersecretary Korth . Butthere wa another reason: McNamara hadwanted to keep reins on theAir Forceandw he n h e w as a pp o in ted Cl 0 in ugust1961 d m A n de rs on h ad b ee n told th at ,with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he waexpected to support t he e cr et ar y inkeeping L eM ay i n check. AlthoughAndersonmade itclear that he would haveno part in such a conspiracy, both GeneralDynamics and Boeing were primarily IrForce contractors and McNamara found itcomforting t o k no w that, by selectingGeneral Dynamics, Grumman would bethere to maintain theNavy 's in terests .

Boeingmanaged get high-level attention for the matter a nd S en J oh n LMcClellan form ed an investigatingcommittee, asking McNamara defer the

awarding of the contract until judgementh ad b ee n m a d . Interpreting it as anaffront to his authority, MCI amara wemahead an d aw ar de d t he 439 millioncontract on 24 o v em b er 1 96 2. I th ou ghA d m A n de r so n r a te d G r um m an highlyand had high regard for theirdesign record,hewas furious overthe clandestine way thefinal decision had been made, overwrningthe Joint Evaluation Board and the decisions of theAir Force and the lavychiefs.Mc a ma ra' s s ta ff b ec am e p aran o id a n dsent messages the chiefsof the AirForceand theNavy instructing them on whattosay w he n t he y appeared before theMcClellan committee, which was stillscheduled t o t ak e place during spring1963. Terse response only increased thefear that the civilian leadership could facea revolt.McNamara's staffthen bugged theoffices of the AirForce and Navy chiefs inan attempt to uncover misdeeds whichcould be used against them iftheyarguedfor Boeing.

In the end all itdid was stiffen resolve,but i t w as th e b e gin ning of a decade ofuneasy peace between the military and theD e mo c ra t ic c i vi l ia n l e ad e rs h ip w hi c hreached ir- peak Juring the Vietnam Waras the White House tried micro-manageoperations fr om d e k -t op m ap s a nd t hebean-counters tried to take contro l of thecont ract s . Only with the Reagan/Bushleadership of the 19 Osandthe early 1990swas White Housemeddling eased; but thatis a differentstory.

Back in 1962the hearingsdroned on forseveral weeks,one side fighting it out withthe o ther and all to no avail. Th e

concept but it was to them that the avyhad appeal for rationality in approvingelements in t h e s p ec i fi c at i on a n d theensuing contract. At the fourth presentation B oe in g w as selected by AdmAnderson, for t he av y, a nd G en LeM ay,for the AirForce, as prime contractor.Thisrecommendation was p as ed to avy

ecretary Fred Korth and AirForce ecretary Eugene lucker t a nd t hetwO services then p re pa re d t o workwith the Boeing concep t in wrestlingdown the burgeoning weight, which evena t t h at stage threatened to ground theprogramme.

It was not to be. When the twoSecretaries passed the recommendation toMcNamara and h is a ss i tant, Undersecretary Roswell Gilpatrick, the decisionwas r ev er se d a n d w ord c am e b ac k d ow nthe line tha t t h e G e ne r al D y na m ic s /

Grumman team w ere t o b e awarded acontract for eighteen F-IIIA development aircraft for the ir Force and fiveF-I I I Bs for t he avy. When Boeingheardabout t hi s i t contested the reversalclaiming, correctly, that its competiwrhada more expensive proposal. But Boeing'sb id h ad o nl y 6 .7 per cent commonalitycompared with 3.7 per cen t for theGeneral Dynamics/Grumman proposal,and commonal i ty was t h e g o ld e n key.

nertial guidanceand a single-stage rocketmotor,the AS-4 was developed for useagainstnavaland shore installations.With a range of 300miles 480kml and atop speed ofMach 4.6 it would

een difficultto knockdown.

am ar a, t he A ir F orce an d t he avyhave accepta cerrain amoum of

romise and 'relax' (abandon) certaina originally considered sacra ane[.hatup et th e C 0 was that,not only

the primarystrucWre have bethefor th e two s ervice s, but as far as

ble the assemblies, systems andstems- even componems- had beame. ince adopting standardizationhe British duringWorld War II, thehad prided itselfon developing a etuipment which maximized the effiuse of hardware and minimized cost

p ro cu re me nt . o w i t was having toent 's tandardization ' , turn it aroundall it'commonality'which, to many ofen on Anderson 'sstaff, sounded likeersion '- to theAir Force way.

real problem lay at the in terfaceeen the Office of the Chiefof Naval

ations, staffed by career officers withmpeccable service record and working

-mindedly for the future o f t hece, and the Office of the Secretary ofn e, staffed by civilian bureaucratsg their l ives in the revolving-dooreen think-tanks delving in theory attr y R D e s ta b li s hm e nt s a n d t h er echelons of the Pemagon. I t w asthebureaucrats that Mc a ma ra d rew

gth to s u st a in t h e d o om e d T F X

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RO T X TO V X RO T X TO V X

lopments in the SovietNavy during the 1960s saw a majorcommitmentto producefixed-wingmodelsionally an area ignoredby theSoviets. These Yak ForgerVSTDlaircraftare seen on t h ed eck o f th ek a Kiev class carrier built in the early 1970s.When the US Navy was planninga successorto the F it

ntelligence aboutthe construction of ships such as t h is th a t fo rced th ep ace to f in d a new and morent replacementfor thePhantom.

Two viewsof theSovietcarrierNovorossisk t h ec l as s o f fo ur Kiev carriersbuilt as theof AdmiralGorshkov splanfor a blue-waternoperatingfrom warmwater ports. It was tgence of a powerful Soviet navyfrom what

been a predominantlycoastaldefenceforcethadded complexityto the balanceof forces invthe US carrier battle groups.Note theangleddeckandforward missilehousingsfor cruiseanti-shipweapons.

and a corresponding increase in wing areafrom 525sq ft to550sq ft 4 . 21 to 5 0 . 51 sqm). The Navy version would not carry theTex as In s t ru men t AN/APQ-110 terrainfollowing radar a n d t h e G e ne r al ElectricA /APQ-I13 attack radar w ou ld b ereplaced by t he H u gh es A /AWG-9search radar. Grumman would a d ap t t h eA ir F or ce d es ig n t o c ar ry six A IM - 5 4missiles, two of which would be carried int h e i n t ern a l weapons bay and four on swive l li n g p y lo n s attached to t he o u te r,movable, wingsections.

Weight, of cou rs e, w as to b e the mainproblem for the F-il I or at l ea st i t w ast h e a s pe c t of the aircraft that the avyfastened on t o a s i t f ou gh t d es pe ra t ely toshake loose from t h e T F X a g re e m en tforced upon i t agains t all service advice.When t h e G en era l D y n amics / G rummant ea m g ot the TFX contract it gave the

avy assurance that the f l eet v ers io nwould h a ve a n empty weight of 39,0001band a gross weight of 63,5001b (l7, 727 and2 , 6 4kg ), now8,500lb 3 , 6 4k g) overthe

wouldbe produced regardless of weight butthe fourth prototype would begin a weightreduction programme which would lead toacceptable levels for t h e p r od u ct i onaircraft. At least that was the idea. In 1964,when Grumman had about 6,000e n gi n ee r s w or k in g o n the p ro j ect , o p t imism ranhigh t h a t t h e F-lll Bwould opena n ew o u t er p er i met er fleet-defence capability only dreamed of hitherto - or thatwas w h at t h e p u b l ic re l a t i on s machines aid. I n that o ther world of fantasy andmake-believe, politicians endorsed orderstotall ing 705 aircraf t for the avy versionalone.

Despite the phy ical imilarity betweenthe two versions of the F-lll , the F - l l l Bfor the N av y h ad a horter length,66ft9inv er su s 7 3f t 6 in 2 0 . 2 3m v s. 22.27m), 0that they could be accommodated by thedeck elevators. Performance requirementsstipulated by the N av y in clu ded a lon ge rloiter d u ra ti o n t h an that required by theAir Force, 0 the F- l l lB had its wingspanincreased from63ft to 70ft (19.l to 2l.2m)

to deliver a workable productpatible with the Navy TFX requiret. I t was not for this reasonalone thatentire TFX programme f ai le d a s a

ti-service aircraft, b u t t h e fact t h at t h eF or ce had t o pay for the avy s

ges was en o ug h t o en s u re that the flatflyers d re w t he short s tr aw w he n i t

e to budget allocations within theramme.rom t h e b eg in n i n g i t was recognized

the avy TF X w ou ld t ake lon ge r toelop . I t w as mor e advanced in that itrporated a superiorsuite of electronicsatiSfy the avy s long-shot intercept

ds a n d t h e WG-9 radar ystemhad tontegrated with t h e A IM-5 4 A missile.potential for weight growth was enor

s and Grumman realized that it was anluble is u e u nt i l major developmentproduced a working aeroplane. Only, reasoned the cont ractor and theomer, would theyworry about weight.first three of iv F-I l B developmentaft eventuallyseven would be built)

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RO T X T V X RO T X TO V X

Navy wrote itsfleet defence requirementbetween1960 and 1962 it anticipated as a successortoPhantom an aircraft with greatrange tofly C APo n deepstrike atgreatdistance.Withina yearofdby thePentagon to combineits requirement with theAir Force s ina commonfightertheNavyue a requestfor a replacement to the diminutive A 4 Skyhawk. The A 7 Corsair II seen here

mergefor service atthe endof thedecadegiving added responsibilityto escortfighters.

From 1962to 1969the US Navywould fail inits attemptto geta fleet replacementfor the F 4 Phantombecauseof thepolicy of commonality. What DefenseSecretaryMcNamara did was togivethe Navytimetocome up with a product appropriatefor the nextgeneration instead of the F 111 Weight problems struc-turalfatigue poor engine inlet and exhaust design and excessivedrag penaltiesrevealeda flawed design.

G r um m an h ad t h ei r own, veryideas about a substitLIte.

Bu t t h e industry t o o h ad b eenalternatives, particularly comLeaking s to ri es about its iMcD on n el l mad e it known thworking on a swing-wingversion4 Phantom II and ear ly in 1 96 7 isuch a project. Known as the F -4had a completely redes igned wshoulder-mounted p iv ot b ox e ininner wing section, variable-ou t e r w ing s w i th a s weep of f ro mdegrecs. The wings incorporatedleading-edge flaps and trailing-e

cancelled. In fact, for some time Grummanhad been e d g in g a w ay from t h e j o in tendeavour with General Dynamics andq u ie t ly s t a rt e d t h e process of looking atalternatives. Unhappy with some technicalchoices forced o n t he programme by thep r i me c o n tr a c to r G e n er a l Dynamics,Grumman wereworking up theirown solut io n w hi ch c ou ld b e a pp li ed t o a new,a ll - a vy, a ir cr af t t o r ep la ce the F-IIIB.One area where Grumman differed fromGeneral Dynamics was in the design of thewing box and in the materials selected fori t. Even as th ey accomp ani ed t h e i r seniorpartner in defence of the maligned F- l l1 B

Within day of S en M cC le ll ana n n ou n c in g t h e e n d of his moratoriumDefense Secretary Mc a m a ra t o ok theu n p reced ent ed s t ep of attempting to runt h e F - l 11 p r og r am m e f rom his own officein the Pentagon. On 25 Augu t 1 96 6 heheld the f ir st i n a r egu lar e ri es of weeklymcetings t o s o lv e p ro b le m s with thea ir c ra ft a nd t he p ro gr am m e in general .McN amaras h u n n ed i n v o lv ement with theu n i fo r m ed m i li t ar y a n d the Pentagon sproject officer was not invitedto t h e meetings. But it cu t little ice with en.M cC l el l an a n d t h e avy made it knownthat i t w as out t o g et its F- il l B vers ion

g ra mm e. m or at or iu m o n t he T FX issueimposed by en McClellan when PresidentKennedy was assassinated in Novcmber1963 ended in mid August 1 9 66 w h enM c Cl e ll a n d e m an d ed answers andr ec on ve ne d t he S en at e P er ma ne ntI n ve s ti g at i on s u b co m mi t t ee . T h is t i met h eN av y wouldbe ready. In the first roundof hearings held between 26 February to 20

ovember 196 3, w he n S en M c l el la nex amin ed t h e legality of M c a ma ra s c o ntractor sel c t io n , t h e S u bc o mm i t te e wasbroadly divided in two on favouring theG e ne r a l D y na m i cs / Gr u mm a n t e am o v rBoeing. This t i me t h e S u b co m m it t e ew a nt e d t o k no w why t h e u n i t flyaway costof the F-I ll B h ad j u mp ed f ro m 2 .9 m ill io n in 1 96 3 to 8 million less than threeyear later. ew memb ers s i de d w it hM c l el la n a nd o ld er m em be rs h ad thep o o r t ech ni ca l record t o p o nd e r, factorsw hi c h w ou ld give McClel l an greatcrleverage in the hearings and on the floor oft h e Sen a t e.

an d w i n d -t u n n el t e ts of can d i d at e co nf i gu r a ti o n s w e re t o t al l y inadequate ino bt ai ni ng t he d at a a nd d et ai le d fluiddynamics information essential in arrivinga t t h e rightinlet. This would bea basic andtime-consuming flaw t h r ou g h ou t t h eaircraft s life, but for the avy F-I I IB itwas a disaster. The p ro bl em aro s e fromchannelled ducting bringing upersonic airthrough a quarter-round inlet , thuscreating pressure anomalies at thecompre sor face. Although the problemwould eventually b e r e o lved, i t p l ay ed nopart in t h e F - l 1 1 Bsinceit came long aftert h e d emis e of the avyaircraft. However,lessons that began to be learned from 1965would, p arado x i ca ll y, p ro v i d e the testse s en ti a l i n gett ing i t r ight o n t hc aircraft ssuccessor, which w ou ld u se a derivativeversion of the same enginc.

By mid-1966 the co t overruns, weighti n cr e as e a n d p e rf o rm a nc e d e fi c it a d de dc o nc e rn t o c o nf u si o n in Co ng ress w h erethe l eg is l at o rs p uz zl ed v cr the pro-

ft er bu rn er. I th ou gh the afterturbofan brings advantages in high

au g mcn t a t i on an d low c ru is e F Cc fuel consumption , it challenges

signer with t h e n e e d to compensaterge b oa t ta i l i n t h e n o n -af t e rb urn erand facing high back-end drag andl os s. I n f li gh t t es ts w it h t he first

pe thc enginessuffered compressorlo se t o the ai rcraft s max i mu man c c a n d a bo v e M a ch 2 At thath e en g in e would s tall if the aircraftu t t h rou g h high-g manoeuvre, buth 2.35 i t w ou ld h a pp e n sponta

a n d w i th o ut warning in straightvel flight. Careful study of the flightd t o t h e inevitable conelu ion thatof p ract i ca l t es t in g h ad given then l et design engineers too few datawhich to produce o p t i mi zed

rframe/cngine geometries.er built before, afterburning turbowere notorious in theory forng very carefully designed inlets,

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F R O M TFX TO VFX

CHAPTER 2

The eline winger

Representinga majorcommitmentfrom Soviet aircraftbuildersto produce along- range medium bomber.theTupolevTu-22 thatemergedduringthe 1960s w s essentiallya stand-offmissile platform.This exampleoperated by theEgyptian Air Force is coming underclosescrutiny during an encounterover theMediterranean with an F 4 Phantomfrom the USS Roosevet.

I. Two-man crcw tandem seating. A

mission is charactcrised by a s e r ie , o f

rang ing from navigation to kill acss

The c r ew m e mb e r s m u s t carry o u t t h e , e

a g ai n s t a n c n c m y w h o is cqu ippedwith

t i c a te d EC M , s u r fac c - ro -a i r missi les

fighters. Whilc thc VFXcarries various s

to max imisecrew awareness,mon i to ring these

s c n so r s r c q ui r cs h c a ds - d o wn attcntion.

two-man c r e w d i v i d cs thcsc tasks be

thcm, so ihatonc pair of cycs is always at

up.

2. Two cngines. Opcrating safcty

ciency, w e a po n m o u nt i n g, d u c t simp

cng ine acccssibility and growth po tcn t ia

kcy f a cr o rs i n c 1c c ti ng a two-eng ine de

Pratt WhitncyTF3 -PA I2 cng incswebc uti l ised.

1 Advanced wcapon con tro l sy,tcm.analyses concluded that in the fleet air d

mission at Icast 75 per ccnt morefigh ter,

single-shot systcms are requ ired ro m a t

capab i l i t ie, of fighterswith the A WG-9

whilc-scan /mul t i - ,ho t Phoen ix system.

also concludcd that a g a i ns t a i r- or s

launchcd anti-ship missiles a h igh-po

track-whi lc-scanradarwith long-rangc,

s h o t m i , si l e s was nccessary for adc

dcfcnse.

n av al f or ce p re ss ed home the rethreats f rom long-range bombers carstand-off w e ap o ns , i t was theex p an d i n g t h rea t posed by highly mvrable successors to the MiG-21t he a t te n ti o n o f t he Navy. Mog ro un d at t ack w as to become aningly i mp o r t an t p ar t of t h e N av yt hi s w as incorporated, indirectly,VFX specification. In drawingthe avy had ignificantly a d va n cs t a t e of t he a rt by incorporatingmission roles in o n e co n cep t .

ppointed as V FX project direeptember 196 M i ch a el P e le

defined the es ential features of thfication thus:

The ratio of MiG-21s downcd by FAs F-4s

downed by Mi G- 21s d imin ishcd from Apri l

1966 Augu t 1967 . incc August 1967 the

FA has a I : I k i ll r at i o against the o l d er M i G

2 1s . I n a c o n fr o n ta t io n w i th l a te model

MiG-21 s a n d p a rt ic u la r ly w it h t h e n e we r

U R f i gh te rs the FA ) w o ul d bc inadequate.

While this occurred in the e n e my s G C I e n v i

ronment we have classically carried the fight

the e n e my a n d c a n e x p c c t to fight in more

advanced GCI cnv ironments in the future.

A l th o ug h t h e r o ut i ne a p pe a ra n ce o fSoviet Bear and Bison bomberscloseto US

as a time-cr it ical urgency forced on avyplanners by emergingfighter designs fromthe USSR. What had once seemed appropriate for c ar ri er d ef nce thePh o eni x -armed s u p ers o n ic i n t e rcept o rwas n ow n o l on ge r q u it e as appropriatewhen close-in dogfights were more likelycontests . Added to w hi h the lessons fromVietnam w ere o mi n o u s. A confidentialreport asserted that

ew Threats nd ewResponses

T h e G r u mm a n F-L4 Tomcat has beenhailed by most students of airpoweras theworld s be t long-range fleet -defencefighter. The reasonwhyit is such a remarkable aeroplane is enshrined b o t h in i tsgenesis and in the reason for its miss ion.Without t he t or t uo u p at h t ha t l ed t o i t sdesign, o r t h e d e fi n it i o n of i ts r ol e thatevolved through experiences in p eace an dwar the F-14 would h av e b een still-born. s o m e r e sp e ct s the five w a st e d y e ar sb e t w een McN amara s fateful judgementon a common aircraftfor use on land andat ea and i ts inevitable demise allowed ageneration of n ew t hr ea t t o a pp ea r a ndgive the avy an aircraft that i t would noth av e h ad h ad procurement followed the1963 plan for t he T FX - whatever thataircraft eventuallyt urned out to be.

In some ways the fleet-defence role hadbeensuperseded by the air-superiority role

t h e N av y T FX was dead. Less than twom on th l at er t he avy would go out toindus try for bids to build t h e V FX -l.

By t hi s t i me l ar k M Clifford h ad t ak enover as Secretary of Defense fromMc amara who left in February L968t h re e m o nt h s a f te r P r es i de n t J o hn s ons a ck e d h i m from the Pentagon h e h adpresided over for almost f

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Grumman F-14 Tomcat