HO2e Micro Ch17

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    2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e.

    Fernando & Yvonn Quijano

    Prepared by:

    Chapter

    17

    The Economics

    of Information

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    Why Does State Farm

    Charge Young Men So

    Much More Than Young

    Women for Auto Insu rance?

    17.1 Define asymmetric information

    and distinguish between adverse

    selectionand moral hazard.

    17.2 Apply the concepts of adverse

    selection and moral hazard to

    financial markets.

    17.3 Apply the concepts of adverse

    selection and moral hazard to

    labor markets.

    17.4 Explain the winners curseand

    why it occurs.

    Learning Objectives

    In the market for insurance,

    asymmetric information leads

    to two problems: adverse

    selection and moral hazard.

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    Asymmetric Information

    LearningObjective 17.1

    Asymmetric information A

    situation in which one party to

    an economic transaction has less

    information than the other party.

    Adverse Selection and the Market for Lemons

    Adverse selection The situation

    in which one party to a transaction

    takes advantage of knowing morethan the other party to the

    transaction.

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    Asymmetric Information

    LearningObjective 17.1

    Reducing Adverse Selection in the Car Market:

    Warranties and Reputations

    1 New cars that need several major repairs

    during the first year or two after the date of

    the original purchase may be returned to

    the manufacturer for a full refund.

    2 Car manufacturers must indicate whether

    a used car they are offering for sale was

    repurchased from the original owner as

    a lemon.

    Some states have passed lemon laws to help

    reduce information problems in the car market.

    Most lemon laws have two main provisions:

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    Asymmetric Information

    LearningObjective 17.1

    Asymmetric Information in the Market for Insurance

    Asymmetric information problems are particularly

    severe in the market for insurance.

    Buyers of insurance policies will always know

    more about the likelihood of the event beinginsured against happening than will insurance

    companies.

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    Asymmetric Information

    LearningObjective 17.1

    Reducing Adverse Selection in the Insurance Market

    To reduce the problem of adverse selection, insurance

    companies gather as much information as they can on

    people applying for policies.

    People applying for individual health insurance policiesor life insurance policies usually need to submit their

    medical records to the insurance company.

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    LearningObjective 17.1

    Does Adverse Select ion Explain Why Som e

    People Do Not Have Health Insu rance?

    Makingthe

    Connect ion

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    Asymmetric Information

    LearningObjective 17.1

    Moral Hazard

    Moral hazard The actions

    people take after they have

    entered into a transaction that

    make the other party to

    the transaction worse off.

    Dont Let This Happen toYOU!Dont Confuse Adverse Selection with Moral Hazard

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    Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

    in Financial Markets

    LearningObjective 17.2

    In response to investor complaints after the

    stock market crash of 1929, Congress

    established the Securities and ExchangeCommission(SEC) to regulate the stock and

    bond markets.

    The SEC requires that firms register stocks or

    bonds they wish to sell with the SEC and

    provide potential investors with aprospectusthat contains all relevant financial information

    on the firms.

    Reducing Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

    in Financial Markets

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    LearningObjective 17.2

    Using Government Pol icy to Reduce

    Moral Hazard in Investm ents

    Makingthe

    Connect ion

    The government has intervened to

    increase the confidence of investors

    in the securities traded on the New

    York Stock Exchange and in other

    financial markets.

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    Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Labor Markets

    LearningObjective 17.3

    Principalagent problemA problemcaused by agents pursuing their own

    interests rather than the interests of

    the principals who hired them.

    Efficiency wages.

    Seniority system.

    Profit sharing.

    Firms have several ways to make a workersjob seem more valuable:

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    SolvedProblem 17-3

    Changing Workers Compensation to

    Reduce Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

    LearningObjective 17.3

    Compensation that depends

    on how much workers sell will

    reduce adverse selection andmoral hazard.

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    The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?

    LearningObjective 17.4

    Winners curse The idea that the winner in certain

    auctions may have overestimated the value of thegood, thus ending up worse off than the losers.

    FIGURE 17-1

    Oil Company Bids to Drill

    Off the Louisiana Coast

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    The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?

    LearningObjective 17.4

    1 In competitive bidding, the winner tends

    to be the player who most overestimates

    true tract value.

    2 He who bids on a parcel what he thinks it

    is worth will, in the long run, be taken tothe cleaners.

    i Obj i 1 4

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    LearningObjective 17.4

    Is There a Winners Curse

    in the Marriage Market?

    Makingthe

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    A life of bliss or the winners curse?

    L i Obj ti 17 4

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    The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?

    LearningObjective 17.4

    Does the winners curse indicate that the

    winner of every auction would have been

    better off losing?

    No, because the winners curse appliesonly to auctions of common-valueassets

    such as oil fieldsthat would be given the

    same value by all bidders if they had

    perfect information.

    When Does the Winners Curse Apply?

    L i Obj ti 17 4

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    SolvedProblem 17-4

    Auctions, Available Information, and the Winners Curse

    LearningObjective 17.4

    When the bidders lack full

    information, the bids are

    farther apart, and farther fromthe true value of the item.

    L i Obj ti 17 4

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    The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?

    LearningObjective 17.4

    Pacific Telesis Uses the Winners Curse

    to Its Own Advantage

    Fear of the winners curse affected the bidding in auctions

    for wireless service in California.

    L i Obj ti 17 4

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    LearningObjective 17.4

    Want to Make Some Money?

    Try Auct ion ing a Jar of Coins

    Makingthe

    Connect ion

    The highest bidder on this jar of

    coins could lose money.

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    An Inside LOOK Should Bad Credit Increase

    Your Car Insurance Rate?

    Your Money: Bad Credit Can Inflate Car Insurance Premiums

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    G O

    Adverse selection

    Asymmetric information

    Moral hazard

    Principalagent problem

    Winners curse

    K e y T e r m s