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8/14/2019 HO2e Micro Ch17
1/21
2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e.
Fernando & Yvonn Quijano
Prepared by:
Chapter
17
The Economics
of Information
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2 of 21 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e.
Why Does State Farm
Charge Young Men So
Much More Than Young
Women for Auto Insu rance?
17.1 Define asymmetric information
and distinguish between adverse
selectionand moral hazard.
17.2 Apply the concepts of adverse
selection and moral hazard to
financial markets.
17.3 Apply the concepts of adverse
selection and moral hazard to
labor markets.
17.4 Explain the winners curseand
why it occurs.
Learning Objectives
In the market for insurance,
asymmetric information leads
to two problems: adverse
selection and moral hazard.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 3 of 21
Asymmetric Information
LearningObjective 17.1
Asymmetric information A
situation in which one party to
an economic transaction has less
information than the other party.
Adverse Selection and the Market for Lemons
Adverse selection The situation
in which one party to a transaction
takes advantage of knowing morethan the other party to the
transaction.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 4 of 21
Asymmetric Information
LearningObjective 17.1
Reducing Adverse Selection in the Car Market:
Warranties and Reputations
1 New cars that need several major repairs
during the first year or two after the date of
the original purchase may be returned to
the manufacturer for a full refund.
2 Car manufacturers must indicate whether
a used car they are offering for sale was
repurchased from the original owner as
a lemon.
Some states have passed lemon laws to help
reduce information problems in the car market.
Most lemon laws have two main provisions:
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 5 of 21
Asymmetric Information
LearningObjective 17.1
Asymmetric Information in the Market for Insurance
Asymmetric information problems are particularly
severe in the market for insurance.
Buyers of insurance policies will always know
more about the likelihood of the event beinginsured against happening than will insurance
companies.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 6 of 21
Asymmetric Information
LearningObjective 17.1
Reducing Adverse Selection in the Insurance Market
To reduce the problem of adverse selection, insurance
companies gather as much information as they can on
people applying for policies.
People applying for individual health insurance policiesor life insurance policies usually need to submit their
medical records to the insurance company.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 7 of 21
LearningObjective 17.1
Does Adverse Select ion Explain Why Som e
People Do Not Have Health Insu rance?
Makingthe
Connect ion
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 8 of 21
Asymmetric Information
LearningObjective 17.1
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard The actions
people take after they have
entered into a transaction that
make the other party to
the transaction worse off.
Dont Let This Happen toYOU!Dont Confuse Adverse Selection with Moral Hazard
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 9 of 21
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
in Financial Markets
LearningObjective 17.2
In response to investor complaints after the
stock market crash of 1929, Congress
established the Securities and ExchangeCommission(SEC) to regulate the stock and
bond markets.
The SEC requires that firms register stocks or
bonds they wish to sell with the SEC and
provide potential investors with aprospectusthat contains all relevant financial information
on the firms.
Reducing Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
in Financial Markets
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 10 of 21
LearningObjective 17.2
Using Government Pol icy to Reduce
Moral Hazard in Investm ents
Makingthe
Connect ion
The government has intervened to
increase the confidence of investors
in the securities traded on the New
York Stock Exchange and in other
financial markets.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 11 of 21
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Labor Markets
LearningObjective 17.3
Principalagent problemA problemcaused by agents pursuing their own
interests rather than the interests of
the principals who hired them.
Efficiency wages.
Seniority system.
Profit sharing.
Firms have several ways to make a workersjob seem more valuable:
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 12 of 21
SolvedProblem 17-3
Changing Workers Compensation to
Reduce Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
LearningObjective 17.3
Compensation that depends
on how much workers sell will
reduce adverse selection andmoral hazard.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 13 of 21
The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?
LearningObjective 17.4
Winners curse The idea that the winner in certain
auctions may have overestimated the value of thegood, thus ending up worse off than the losers.
FIGURE 17-1
Oil Company Bids to Drill
Off the Louisiana Coast
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 14 of 21
The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?
LearningObjective 17.4
1 In competitive bidding, the winner tends
to be the player who most overestimates
true tract value.
2 He who bids on a parcel what he thinks it
is worth will, in the long run, be taken tothe cleaners.
i Obj i 1 4
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 15 of 21
LearningObjective 17.4
Is There a Winners Curse
in the Marriage Market?
Makingthe
Connect ion
A life of bliss or the winners curse?
L i Obj ti 17 4
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 16 of 21
The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?
LearningObjective 17.4
Does the winners curse indicate that the
winner of every auction would have been
better off losing?
No, because the winners curse appliesonly to auctions of common-valueassets
such as oil fieldsthat would be given the
same value by all bidders if they had
perfect information.
When Does the Winners Curse Apply?
L i Obj ti 17 4
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 17 of 21
SolvedProblem 17-4
Auctions, Available Information, and the Winners Curse
LearningObjective 17.4
When the bidders lack full
information, the bids are
farther apart, and farther fromthe true value of the item.
L i Obj ti 17 4
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 18 of 21
The Winners Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction?
LearningObjective 17.4
Pacific Telesis Uses the Winners Curse
to Its Own Advantage
Fear of the winners curse affected the bidding in auctions
for wireless service in California.
L i Obj ti 17 4
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 19 of 21
LearningObjective 17.4
Want to Make Some Money?
Try Auct ion ing a Jar of Coins
Makingthe
Connect ion
The highest bidder on this jar of
coins could lose money.
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2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick OBrien, 2e. 20 of 21
An Inside LOOK Should Bad Credit Increase
Your Car Insurance Rate?
Your Money: Bad Credit Can Inflate Car Insurance Premiums
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Chap
ter
17:
The
Ec
onom
icso
fInforma
tion
G O
Adverse selection
Asymmetric information
Moral hazard
Principalagent problem
Winners curse
K e y T e r m s