Ilir Gëdeshi dhe Russell King PÑRTÑTASHMEN NEW TRENDS IN ...library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/15272.pdf · b t } v a 5 List of figures Figure 1. Potential migration by age

NEW TRENDS IN POTENTIAL MIGRATION FROM ALBANIA

Ilir Gëdeshi and Russell King

Zyra e TiranësRruga “Abdi Toptani”, Torre Drin, kati 3P.O. Box 1418Tirana, Albania

Telefon: 00355 (0) 4 225098600355 (0) 4 2273306

Homepage: http://www.fes.org.al

RINIA SHQIPTARE 2011Mes besimit për të ardhmen dhe dyshimit për të tashmen!

Alba Çela

Tidita Fshazi

Arbjan Mazniku

Geron Kamberi

Jonida Smaja – koordinatore e FES

TENDENCAT E REJA TË MIGRIMIT POTENCIAL NGA SHQIPËRIA

Ilir Gëdeshi dhe Russell King

Zyra e TiranësRruga “Abdi Toptani”, Torre Drin, kati 3P.O. Box 1418Tirana, Albania

Telefon:00355 (0) 4 225098600355 (0) 4 2273306

Homepage:http://www.fes.org.al

RINIA SHQIPTARE 2011Mes besimit për të ardhmen dhe dyshimit për të tashmen!

Alba Çela

Tidita Fshazi

Arbjan Mazniku

Geron Kamberi

Jonida Smaja – koordinatore e FES

New Trends in Potential Migration from Albania

1

NEW TRENDS IN POTENTIAL MIGRATION FROM ALBANIA

Tirana, December 2018

Ilir Gëdeshi and Russell King


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Published by: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung OfficeTirana Rr.AbdiToptani TorreDrin,Katii3-të KutiaPostare1418 Tiranë,ALBANIA

Authors:IlirGëdeshiandRussellKing

The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendationsexpressed in this publishing are of the respective authors and donot necessarily represent those of Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

FriedrichEbertFoundation’spublicationscannotbeusedforcommercialpurposeswithoutapriorwrittenapproval.


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Table of ContentsAbbreviations ..................................................................................9Acknowledgements .......................................................................111.Introduction .............................................................................13 1.1 What is potential migration and how can it be measured? ..15 1.2 Overview of the report ...................................................20

2. TheAlbanianmigrationbackground ......................................213. Migration,developmentandunderdevelopment: theoreticallinkages .................................................................26

4. Methodology ...........................................................................30

5.Resultsofthesurvey:2018comparedto2007 .........................33 5.1.How big is potential migration? .....................................33 5.2.Who are the most likely to potentially migrate? ..............39 - Demographic characteristics .........................................39 - Education ........................................................................42 - Labour-market status ......................................................46 - Income .............................................................................48 - Regional propensities ......................................................50 - Family decision ...............................................................50

5.3.Where to? .........................................................................51 5.4.Reasons for wanting to migrate .......................................60 5.5.Return migrant subsample ...............................................64

6.Conclusionsandrecommendations ...........................................77

Bibliography .................................................................................81


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List of figures

Figure1. Potentialmigrationbyage(in%)Figure2. PotentialmigrationandageFigure3. Potentialmigration for the segment aged 18–40 years

oldin2007and2018Figure4. Correlationbetweenpotentialmigrationandeducation

in2007and2018Figure5. EmploymentstatusandintentiontomigrateFigure6. Correlationbetweenpotentialmigrationandhousehold

income(in%)Figure7. Potential migration and financial situation of the

household(2007)Figure8. PotentialmigrationbyprefectureinAlbaniaFigure9. TopdesireddestinationcountriesFigure10.Topreasonsforselectingthedestinationcountry(in%)Figure11.TopreasonsforselectingthepotentialmigrationcountryFigure12.CausesofpotentialmigrationFigure13.MainfactorforemigratingoutofAlbaniaFigure14.Maindestinationcountriesoflong-termAlbanian

returnees(in%)Figure15.Returnofmigrantsingeneralandforeachcountry,by

yearofreturnFigure16.Durationofstayinyearsofreturneesinthehostcountry

(in%)


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List of tables

Table1. Theleveloftrustofthepopulationandpotentialmigrantsin...(in%)

Table2. Potentialmigrantsbytheperiodtheyintendtomigrate(in%)Table3. Civilstatusofpotentialmigrantsbygender(in%)Table4. Potential migration and highest level of education

completed,2018and2007(in%)Table5. Desirefortrainingandtypeoftrainingin2018and2007

(in%)Table6. Potentialmigrationbyeconomicsectorandprofession(in%)Table7. Decisiontomigrate(in%)Table8. Topdesireddestinationcountries in2018comparedwith

2007(in%)Table9. Income, savings and remittances of Albanian migrant

households(inEuros)Table 10. Potential migrants’ reasons for selecting the destination

country(in%)Table11.MainreasonsforleavingAlbaniaTable12.MainreasonsforreturningtoAlbaniaTable13.GroupsofreturneesbymainreasonsTable14.Desiretomigrateofreturneesandofthosewhohavenot

migratedpreviously(in%)Table15.MainreasonsforleavingAlbaniaTable16.Comparisonofreturneeswiththosewhohavenotmigrated

previously, by status in the labourmarket and desire tomigrate(18–40yearsold)


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Abbreviations

BoA BankofAlbaniaCESS CenterforEconomicandSocialStudiesETF EuropeanTrainingFoundationEVS EuropeanValueStudyEU EuropeanUnionGDP GrossDomesticProductIFAD InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopmentINSTAT AlbanianNationalInstituteofStatisticsIOM InternationalOrganizationforMigrationPSU PrimarySamplingUnitOECD OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationand

DevelopmentUK TheUnitedKingdomUNESCOUnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCultural

OrganizationUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUS UnitedStatesofAmericaWB TheWorldBank


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Acknowledgements

Ourmostsincerethanksgotothemanyindividualswhohelpedustocarryoutthisstudy.Firstandforemost,ourspecialthanksgotothe hundreds of peoplewho afforded their time and commitmentduringthesurveyandinterviewprocesses.WehopethatthisstudywillcontributetosolutionsthatwillhelptoimprovetheirlivesandenhancetheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofAlbania.

WearegratefultotheFriedrich-EbertStiftung(FES)inAlbaniaforitsfinancialsupportandcooperationintherealisationofthisstudy.We would also like to show our gratitude to Mariola Qesaraku,Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Programme Officer, for her extensivesupportandinsightfulcommentsduringvariousphasesofthestudy.Throughoutthestudy,wegainedvaluableinsightsfrommeetings,discussionsandfeedbackfromdifferentexpertsandofficialsfromlocalandcentralgovernmentinstitutions,universitiesandresearchinstitutes, and representatives of international organisations.Special thanks also go to Mr Pandeli Majko, State Minister fortheDiaspora,whoparticipated in the round-table ‘New trends ofpotential migration from Albania’ held on 19 October 2018, inwhichwe shared and discussed thefindings of the study.We aremostgratefultoGencPjetri,projectcoordinatorattheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)inAlbania,whoprovideduswithusefulsuggestionsforthepotentialmigrantsurvey.

OurveryspecialthanksgotoDelinaIbrahimaj,directorgeneralofthe InstituteofStatistics (INSTAT) andher teamof experts,whoparticipatedinthedraftingofthemethodology.


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Inaddition,wearegratefultotheteamwhoworkedtogetherwiththeCenterforEconomicandSocialStudiesfortheirassistanceinthecarryingoutofthisstudy:ArdianaPaca,ArtanGjollesha,BekimReci,DajanaZeqo,DenisaBogdani,EjonaDanaj,ElisabetaShatri,Florida Leci, Helena Shoraj, Ramona Buci and Sidorela Brahaj.Theycollectedthequantitativeandqualitativedatawithoutwhichthisstudywouldnothavebeenpossible.Aspecialcontributionwasmade by Stela Suloti, whoworked tirelesslywith the field-workteam.ThesurveydatabasesandtranscriptsofinterviewsweremadepossiblethroughtheassistanceofNadireXhaxhoandAnitaZeqo.WewouldalsoliketothankMrGentjanSuliandMrsEtlevaPushifor theirassistance inproviding the translationandeditingof thestudyinEnglishandtheirusefulsuggestions.OurgratefulthanksarealsoextendedtoJennyMoneyandSamanthaWannop,fortheirskillful editorial and formatting input and valuable assistance inarrangingtheextensivebibliographyusedinthisstudy.

The Authors


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1. Introduction

From the point of view of migration scholars, Albania is awonderful laboratory for the study ofmigration in its variousforms – international, internal, returnmigration etc.1 It is alsoa country which exemplifies well the ambiguous relationshipbetweenmigrationanddevelopment.Ontheonehand,itisclearthatemigrationhasbeenamajorelementinAlbania’stransitionto amore ‘modern’ economy and society.At themacro scale,remittanceshavecontributedanessentialplankinthestructureofthecountry’sGDPsincetheearly1990s;whilstatthemicrolevel they have given significant support to the survival andprogressofhundredsofthousandsofAlbanianhouseholds.2 On the other hand, the scale of themigration has been such as tounbalancethepopulationofAlbania,leavingthecountrydividedbetweenthechaoticallyurbanisedpoleoftheTiranaregionandthedepopulatingruraluplandsofthenorth,southandinterior.

1. This point is argued by several authors, e.g.Barjaba K., King R. (2005)Introducingandtheorisingmigration,in:King R., Mai N., Schwandner-Sievers S.(eds)The New Albanian Migration.Brighton:SussexAcademicPress,1–28; King R.(2005)Albaniaasalaboratoryforthestudyofmigrationanddevelopment,Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,7(2):133–155;Carletto G., Davis B., Stampini M., Zezza A.(2006)Acountryonthemove:internationalmigrationinpost-communistAlbania,International Migration Review,40(4):767–785.2. See De Soto H., Gordon P., Gëdeshi I., Sinoimeri Z. (2002)Poverty in Albania: A Qualitative Assessment.WashingtonDC:WorldBankTechnicalPaperNo.520;de Zwager N., Gëdeshi I., Germenji E., Nikas C.(2005)Competing for Remittances. Tirana:InternationalOrganizationforMigration;Vullnetari J., King R. (2011)Remittances, Gender and Development: Albania’s Society and Economy in Transition.London:I.B.Tauris.


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The multiple interactions of several population and migrationvariables cause an overall concern for the demographic andeconomic future of Albania. First, the scale of post-1990emigration,proportionate to theAlbanianpopulation,hasbeenthe highest in Europe and one of the highest in the world.According to World Bank figures, within just two decades,henceby2010,thecountryhadproduceda‘stock’of1,438,300emigrants, equivalent to 45.4% of the population residing inAlbania.3Second,theflowofreturningmigrantshasbeenlimited,boostedonlyby theeconomiccrisis inGreeceand (less so) inItaly, the twomaindestinationcountriesofAlbanianmigrants.Third, the scale and demographic selectivity of the outflow(mainlyyoungerpersonshavedeparted)hastakenawaypartofthereproductivelyactiveage-group,whosefertilityistransferredabroad,wheretheirchildrenareborn.Coupledwiththedeclinein the total fertility rate (the average number of children bornto eachAlbanian woman over her reproductive life) to belowthepopulationreplacementlevelof2.1,thisimpliesanabsolutereduction in theAlbanianpopulation, threatening thecountry’slong-termdemographicfuture.

Andfourthly,potentialmigration,thespecificfocusofthisreport,remains high,meaning that a significant share of theAlbanianpopulation living inside the country would like to, or intendsto,emigrate in the future.Hence,whatweobserve inAlbania,asinmanyothercountriesinpost-socialistCentralandEasternEurope, is a toxic demographic cocktail of high emigration,lowreturn,highfuturemigrationpotential,andlowandfallingbirth-rate.Atanaggregatelevel,Albaniashowsfewsigns,afternearly three decades of large-scale emigration, of making themigrationtransitionfromacountryofnetemigrationtooneofnet

3. World Bank(2011)Migration and Remittances Factbook.WashingtonDC:WorldBank,p.54.


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immigration.4Meanwhile,withinAlbania,duetotheinteractingdynamics of international and internal migration, we can alsoobserve a kind of population implosion,with an emptying outoftheperipheralruraluplandareas,whichcoverthemajorityofthispredominantlyhillyandmountainouscountry.

1.1 What is potential migration and how can it be measured?

The notion of potential migration is not well embedded orwidely discussed in the migration literature.5 Nevertheless,it is sporadically referred to in the journal literature and inrecent debates on migration trends and policy.6 According tothe International Organization for Migration (IOM), potentialmigrationis‘theabsolutenumberofadultsplanningorpreparingtomigrate…relativetothesizeofthepopulationintherespectivecountry’.7 Scoping the scattered extant literature on potentialmigration,we find that it can be conceptualised, calculated orpredicted in twomainways:statistically,basedon the‘macro-logics’ of economic and demographic parameters (where the4. HenceAlbaniaisyettofollowtheexampleofseveralotherSouthernEuropeancountries, such as Italy, Greece and Spain, which experienced a ‘migrationturnaround’during the1970sand1980s frommassemigrationbefore tomassimmigrationafter.SeeKing R., Fielding A. J., Black R.(1997)TheinternationalmigrationturnaroundinSouthernEurope,in:King R., Black R.(eds)Southern Europe and the New Immigrations.Brighton:SussexAcademicPress,1–25.5. Moststandardtextbooksonmigrationdonotdiscusspotentialmigration,anditisnotachaptertitle,subheadingorindexentry.6. See, for instance,Elitok S.P. (2010)Estimating the Potential Migration from Turkey to the European Union: A Literature Survey. Hamburg:Hamburg Institute for International Economics Policy Paper, 3–11; Lovo S. (2014)Potentialmigrationandsubjectivewell-beinginEurope,IZA Journal of Migration,3(1):24.7. Lazcko F., Tjaden J., Auer D.(2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeries9,p.1.


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phraseisoftenreversed–‘migrationpotential’);orbysurveyswhich ask respondents about their futuremigration intentions,desires,plansandpreparations.

In the first case, potential migration is often predicted viagravity-type models based on macro-economic variables suchas income/wage differentials and gradients: the greater thedifference or the steeper the gradient across space, the higherthevolumeofmigrationexpected,flowingfromlowwageandhigh unemployment regions or countries to high wage, lowunemployment destinations.8A similar neoclassical frameworkcan be applied to demographic differentiation, looking atpopulation density, population increase and,more specifically,the growth of active-age labour force growth (or decline)rates.A country or regionwith a forecast decline inworking-age population cohorts can be said to have high immigrationpotential,whereasonewithapredictedrapidincreaseinworking-agepeoplecanbesaidtohavehighemigrationpotential.Thesegeographically differentiated surpluses and deficits in labourforcesupplyanddemandcanfurtherbeclassifiedwithrespecttospecificeducation/skilllevelsandprofessionalsectors–rangingfor instance from medical professionals (in short supply inmanywealthycountries)toseasonalagriculturalworkers(oftennot catered for within an advanced country’s domestic laboursupply).

Stillarguingatthelevelofmacro-logics,potentialmigrationcanalsobeseenwithintheframeofmoretime-dependentstructuralvariables, such as economic downturns, political instability orenvironmentalfragility.Hence,aneconomiccrisis,suchasthatwhich affected Greece from 2008 until the early-mid 2010s(andwhichisstilltosomeextentongoing),wouldhaveseveral

8. Boyle P., Halfacree K., Robinson V. (1998) Exploring Contemporary Migration. London:Longman,46–50.


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effectsintermsofpotentialmigrationtrends:anewincreaseinthe emigration ofGreek nationals, a decrease in the inflow ofimmigrants (e.g. fromAlbania), and an increase in the returnmigration of immigrants (e.g. fromGreece toAlbania). Otherflowsmightalsobeforeseen:adecreaseinreturnmigrationofGreeks from abroad, and the relatively under-researched flowof onward migration, whereby (for example) crisis-affectedAlbanian migrants in Greece, instead of returning toAlbania,whichmay not be an attractive proposition for them, onward-migratetoanothercountrywheretheycanfindbettereconomicprospects,suchasGermanyortheUnitedKingdom.9

Movingnowtothesecondwayofgraspingandoperationalisingthe concept of potential migration, by asking people abouttheir intentions via direct surveys (questionnaires, interviewsetc.), here we take inspiration from recent Gallup and IOMresearch,10andframeourownsurveyinthatlight.Especiallyforquestionnaire surveyswithpre-definedand standardquestions,therearetwocriticaldecisionsthatneedtobemadeinregardtoquestionformulation;thesedecisionsareparticularlyimportantif comparative research isplanned,cross-nationallyor throughtime. The first, and most important, is how the key questionis phrased, e.g. with reference to desire, intention, plans orpreparations.Thereareclear,ifnuanced,differencesinmeaningattachedtothefollowingexamplesofhowthequestionisposed:

9. Karamoschou C.(2018)The Albanian Second Migration: Albanians Fleeing the Greek Crisis and Onward Migrating to the UK. Brighton: University ofSussex,SussexCentreforMigrationResearchWorkingPaperNo.93.10. Lazcko F., Tjaden J., Auer D.(2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeriesNo. 9, p. 1.; see alsoEsipova N., Ray J., Srinivasan R. (2011)The World’s Potential Migrants: Who Are They, Where They Want to Go, and Why it Matters. WashingtonDC:Gallup.


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• Wouldyouliketomigrateinthefuture?• Doyouintendtomigrate?• Haveyoumadeplanstomigrate?

These differences, relatively clear in English, may becomecompromised if the survey questions are translated into otherlanguagesinacomparativestudy.

The second aspect is the time-frame over which the desires,intentionsorplans formigrationare specified–within thenextyearor,say,5or10years.Differenttimehorizonscanbefactoredintothesamequestion.

Taking the example of the IOM/Gallup surveys on potentialmigration, these asked threemain questions, respectively aboutmigration desires, plans and preparations. These are worded asfollows:11

• Ideally, if you had the opportunity,would you like tomovepermanently to another country, or would you to prefer tocontinuelivinginthiscountry?

Forthosewhoexpressedadesiretoemigrate,

• Areyouplanningtomovepermanentlytoanothercountry,ornot?

Again,forthosewhoansweredaffirmativelytotheabovequestion:

• Haveyoumadepreparationsforthismove?

‘Preparation’ implies applying for a visa, savingmoney for the

11. Lazcko F., Tjaden J., Auer D.(2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeriesNo.9,p.7.


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journeyand(whererelevant) learning the languageof the targetcountry.

Whilst potentialmigration surveys can provide some indicationof future actualmigration flows, the linkmay be quite tenuousbecause of the substantive difference between the desire oraspirationtomigrateandtheability todoso.12ResultsfromtheIOM/Gallup surveydata for 160 countries for theperiod2010–2015clearlydemonstratethisstatisticaldisjuncture.Whilstmorethan700millionpeoplearoundtheworldexpressageneraldesiretomigratetoanothercountry,lessthan10%ofthem(66million)areactuallyplanningtomigratewithinthenext12months,andofthese,onlyaboutoneinthree(23million)saythattheyaretakingactivepreparatorystepstorealisetheirplan–thisrepresentsjust0.4%of theworld’sadultpopulation.13Globally, thoseplanningandpreparingtomigratearemorelikelytobemale,young,single,living in urban areas, and in possession of at least secondaryeducation.14

Otherstudiesfrommoregeographicallyspecificpartsoftheworldnuance these global findings presented above. Still using theGallupWorldPolldataset,butjustforEurope,Lovo15demonstratesthat,rather thanpercapitaincomeor(un)employment,potentialmigration is more closely linked to respondents’ subjectivewellbeing. Those with a lower level of subjective wellbeingaremore likely to want tomigrate, and the desired destination

12. See Carling J. (2002) Migration in the age of involuntary immobility:theoretical reflections and Cape Verdean experiences, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,28(1):5–42.13. Lazcko F., Tjaden J., Auer D.(2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeriesNo.9,p.1.14. Ibid.15. Lovo S.(2014)Potentialmigrationandsubjectivewell-beinginEurope,IZA Journal of Migration,3(1):24.


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country ischosenwith reference to itsperceivedqualityof life.In aLatinAmerican study, potentialmigrantswere likely to be‘frustratedachievers’–i.e.surveyrespondentswithhighobjectivesuccess,butwithlowsatisfactionwiththeirlives.16Elitok’sstudyof potential migration from Turkey to Europe likewise arguedfor a shift in emphasis away frompurelyquantitativeeconomicpredictorstomorequalitativeaspectsofmigrationplanning.17

1.2 Overview of the report

Theremainderofthisstudyisorganisedasfollows.Sections2,3and4arefurthercontributionstosettingthebackgroundcontext.RespectivelytheypresentfurtherdetailsonthechangingdynamicsofAlbanianmigration,hypothesesonthelinksbetweenmigrationand development in theAlbanian context, and themethodologyof themain surveywhichconstitutes the empiricalbackboneofthis report – a questionnaire administered face-to-face to 1,421householdsdistributedacross thediverse regionsof the countryduring 2018. Section 5, the longest in the study, presents theresultsofthequestionnairesurvey,whichincludesacomparisonwiththefindingsofasimilarsurveycarriedoutadecadeearlier.Insettingouttheresultsofthestudy,thefollowingkeyquestionsareaddressedinsuccessivesubsections:

• HowbigispotentialmigrationinAlbania,andisitincreasingordecreasingovertime?(subsection5.1)

• Whatarethecharacteristicsofthosewhoarethemostlikelytowantorintendtomigrate?(5.2)

16. Graham C., Markowitz J. (2011)Aspiration and happiness of potentialLatinAmericanmigrants,Journal of Social Research and Policy,2(2):9–25.17. Elitok S.P. (2010) Estimating the Potential Migration from Turkey to the European Union: A Literature Survey. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute forInternationalEconomicsPolicyPaper,3–11.


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• Whichcountriesdotheyplantomigrateto?(5.3)

• Whatarethemainreasonsforwantingtomigrate?(5.4)

In subsection 5.5 we pay specific attention to a subsample ofreturnedmigrantswhoanswered thequestionnaire, asking themwheretheywereabroad,forhowlong,whentheyreturned,whythey returned, and their desire and reasons for re-emigration.Section6presentsthemainconclusionsintermsof‘take-home’findings, and provides a set of recommendations of interest topolicy-makers.

2. The Albanian migration background

Aswaspointedoutintheintroduction,Albaniahasexperiencedan intense periodof emigration since 1990, such that, by 2010,it rankedfirst inEurope andninth in theworld for the scale ofits emigrant stock indexed against the resident population inAlbania.18

Although there is an earlier history of relatively small-scaleemigrationdatingtobeforethecommunistera,themodernstoryofemigrationstartsonlyin1990–91withthefallofthecommunistregimeandtheopeningofthepreviouslyclosedborders.Theexoduswas particularly intense during the first emigration decade, andby2000anestimated800,000Albanianswerelivingandworkingabroad,mostlyinGreeceandItaly.19Muchofthismigrationwas

18. Of the eight countries ranked aboveAlbania (West Bank/Gaza, Samoa,Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, Guyana, Monaco,Antigua-Barbuda, Tonga), all butone(WestBank/Gaza,4million)hadmuchsmallerpopulationsthanAlbania’s3million,andmostalsohadlongerhistoriesofmigration.SeeWorld Bank(2011)Migration and Remittances Factbook.WashingtonDC:WorldBank.19. Barjaba K.(2000)ContemporarypatternsinAlbanianmigration,South-East Europe Review,3(2):57–64.


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spontaneous,irregularandconsistedofyoungmalesseekingworkandescapefromthepost-transitionpoliticalandeconomicchaosthat the country was going through during those years. Towardsthe end of the decade, regularisation schemes, first in Italy, andthen inGreece, enabledmany of themigrants to normalise theirconditionandtobringinfamilymembers.Nevertheless,inGreeceespecially,muchof themigrationremained temporaryorofa to-and-fro nature, whilstmanymigrantswho had initiallymigratedshort-termtoGreecesubsequentlymovedtoItaly,seenasamoredesirabledestinationfromthepointofviewofwork,incomesandsocialintegration.20

Thesecondemigrationdecade,the2000s,sawtheAlbanianoutflowcontinue,butatalessfreneticpace.Thisslackeningofemigrationwasduetothelargescaleofthealready-departedinthe1990s,sothatthereservoirofpotentialmigrantshadforatimebeenpartiallydrained, and also due to the better economic performance of thecountry after the chaotic years of the 1990s. During the seconddecademost of the emigration continued to be directed towardsAlbania’s two close-by EU neighbours, Greece and Italy, wherefamilyandsocialnetworkschannellednewmigrants to theseby-now-established destinations, but the destination geography alsodiversifiedtoincludeotherEuropeancountries,notablytheUnitedKingdom,aswell asNorthAmerica.21By the endof thedecade,estimatesof thenumberofAlbaniansabroadexceeded1million,with theWorldBank, as alreadynoted,offering thefigureof1.4million.22

20. King R., Mai N.(2008)Out of Albania: From Crisis Migration to Social Inclusion in Italy. NewYork:Berghahn.21. King R.(2003)Acrosstheseaandoverthemountains:documentingAlbanianmigration,Scottish Geographical Journal,119(3):283–309.

22. Estimatesof the scaleofAlbanianemigrationnaturallyvaryaccording tothemethodandsourcesused.TheWorldBankfigureof1.44millionfor2010restsonvariouscountries’ estimatesof their ‘stock’ofAlbanianmigrants as


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Thethirdemigrationdecade,whichisnowcomingtoanend,hasbeencharacterisedbyarenewedintensity,newfeatures,andnewdestinations.Theselatestflowspeakedatmid-decadewhenaround66,000AlbanianswererecordedasseekingasyluminvariousEUcountries,primarily inGermany.23Such renewedhighemigrationflows reflect the continuing elevated migration potential of theAlbanianpopulation.AccordingtotheGallupWorldPolldataforthe period 2010–2015,Albania ranks sixth in theworld in termsofthepercentageofadults‘planningtomigrate’.Infact, it is theonlyEuropean country in the top 20,most ofwhich areAfricancountries.24TheAlbanianfigureof9.1%isonlyprecededbyTogo(13.1%),Liberia(12.6%),Comoros(11.2%),Guinea(10.5%)andSierra Leone (10.2%). Those countries which come just behindAlbania,withfiguresrangingbetween8–9%,arealsostateswhosepopulationsareafflictedbywidespreadpovertyand/orcivilstrife(Djibouti,Sudan,DRCongo,Haiti,Libya).

If the key question is broadened to ‘desire tomigrate’, then theGallupWorldPollpotentialmigrationfiguresforAlbaniabecome

wellasonAlbanianofficialsources.Basedontheintercensalresidualmethod,theAlbanian national statistics agency, INSTAT, calculated a net emigrationof600,000fortheperiod1990–2001,and481,000forthedecade2001–2011;therefore a total net emigration of 1.08 million for the two decades. Thedifferencebetweenthetwofigures(1.44millionand1.08million)canprobablybeaccountedforbybirthstoAlbanianemigrantslivingabroad,whichboostthestockfigurebutareexcludedby the intercensal residualmethod.SeeWorld Bank (2011)Migration and Remittances Factbook. Washington DC:WorldBank;INSTAT(2004)Migration in Albania. Population and housing Census 2001. Tirana:InstituteofStatistics;INSTAT(2012)Population and Housing Census 2011. Tirana:InstituteofStatistics.

23. Eurostat Newsrelease (2016)Asylum in the EU member states: recordnumber of over 1.2 million first-time asylum seekers registered in 2015,Eurostat Newsrelease 44,4March.

24. Lazcko F., Tjaden J., Auer D.(2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeriesNo.9.


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evenmoredramatic, andpotentiallydisturbing.On this criterion,potentialmigration fromAlbania is 56%according to the surveydatafor2013–16,equal tothefigureforHaitiandexceededonlybySierraLeone(62%).Moreoverthe20percentagepointincreaseovertheAlbanianfigurefor2010–12isthebiggestofanycountryintheglobaltop-20list.25

TheevidentincreaseinbothrealandpotentialmigrationinAlbania’sthird migration decade – further confirmed by the survey datapresentedlaterinthisreport–raisesimportantquestionsoverthecausesofthismigratoryresurgence.Onceagain,ourmorefocusedanalysisbasedonquestionnaireresponseswillprovidesomemoredetailed answers. For now,we sketch in some general economictrends which, at themacro level, can be argued to underpin theincreasedmigrationtrends.26

First,theglobaleconomiccrisiswhichstartedinlate2008hadbothdirect and indirect effects on theAlbanian economy.AccordingtoWorld Bank data,Albanian GDP growth fell from an annualaverage of 5.7% during 2000–2008 to 2.6% during 2009–2017,whilstunemploymentrosefrom13%in2008to17.5%in2014(and32.5%forthoseaged15–29),tothendropbackdownto13.8%in2017(25.9%foragegroup15–29).27Remittances,amajor factor25. Esipova N., Ray J., Pugliese A. (2017) Number of potential migrantsworldwide tops 700 million, Gallup News, 8 June. Another, more specific,indicatorofpotentialmigrationistherisingnumberofAlbaniancitizensapplyingfortheUSdiversityvisalottery:87,000in2011risingto199,000in2015.Thesetrendsarealsopresentedanddiscussedinourearlierpaper:Gëdeshi I., King R. (2018)Research Study into Brain Gain: Reversing Brain Drain with the Albanian Scientific Diaspora. Tirana:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,11–13.26. See Gëdeshi I., de Zwager N.(2012)EffectsoftheglobalcrisisonmigrationandremittancesinAlbania,in:Sirkeci I., Cohen J.H., Ratha D.(eds)Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond. WashingtonDC:WorldBank,237–254.27. World Bank (2018) Higher but Fragile Growth: Western Balkans RegularEconomic Report No. 14.WashingtonDC:WorldBank.


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inreducingpovertyandinhelpingAlbanianhouseholdstosurvive,fellsharplyfrom957millioneuros(12.3%ofGDP)in2007,to597millioneuros(5.8%ofGDP)in2015.28Thiswasdueinparticulartotheknock-oneffectsoftheseverefinancialcrisisinGreeceand(somewhat less severely) in Italy, the twomainhost countriesofAlbanian migrants, who suffered reduced incomes and risingunemployment as a result. In these countries, the unemploymentrate amongstAlbanian immigrants rose to 24.7% in Greece and12.1%inItaly,therebyslowingdownnewimmigrationflowsandhasteningreturnmigration.29

AjointstudycarriedoutbyINSTATandIOMreportedthat,duringtheperiod2009–2013,133,544Albanianemigrantsaged18+returnedtoAlbania,drivenaboveallbythelossoftheirjobsinGreeceandItaly.30GiventhelackofgoodeconomicprospectsinAlbania,thesame study revealed thatone-thirdof the returneeswanted to re-emigrate. Perhaps the only surprise was that this share was nothigher. In our own survey,we found that returnees had a higherintentiontomigratecomparedtothesimilar-agerespondentswithnomigrationhistory.Returnmigrationisalsoacrucialcomponentoftheso-calledmigration–developmentnexus,reviewedbrieflyinthenextsection.

28. DatafromtheBankofAlbania.29. Arslan C., Dumont J.-C., Kone Z., Moulan Y., Ozden C., Parsons C., Xenogiani, T.(2014)A New Profile of Migrants in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis. Paris: OECD, Social, Employment and MigrationWorkingPaperNo.160.30. INSTAT, IOM (2014) Return Migration and Reintegration in Albania. Tirana:InstituteofStatistics/InternationalOrganizationforMigration.


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3. Migration, development and underdevelopment: theoretical linkages

Given the scale and intensity of emigration from Albania overthelastthreedecades,Albaniaisanappropriateillustrationofthemultiplebutoftenambiguouslinksbetweenmigration,developmentandunderdevelopment–indicativeagainofits‘laboratory’statusforstudentsofbothdevelopmentandmigration.31

Thereisnowawide-rangingliteratureontherelationshipbetweenmigration anddevelopment – onwhat has come to be called the‘migration–development nexus’.32 In most cases this debate isoriented towards understanding how international migration cancontributetothedevelopmentofthehomecountry.Nottobeignoredareotherlinkagesinthesystem,includingmigration’simpactonthereceivingcountryandtheinfluenceofdevelopmentonmigration:for instance, does development lead tomore, or less,migration?Also relevant, especially in the context of the present study, arepossiblefuturemigrationtrends,intheformofpotentialmigration.

Lookingat themigration–developmentsetof interrelationshipsintheround,andgeneralisingrathergrandly, theliteratureidentifiestwocompetingtheoreticalstances,oneoptimistic(akindof‘virtuouscircle’)andtheotherpessimistic(a‘viciouscircle’).Overtime–forinstancesincetheonsetoftheboominlabourmigrationinEuropeintheearlypostwarera–thepreferenceforonetheoreticalposition

31. King R. (2005)Albania as a laboratory for the study of migration anddevelopment,Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,7(2):133–155.32. Van Hear N., Sørensen N.N. eds. (2003) The Migration–Development Nexus. Geneva:InternationalOrganizationforMigration.Foramoretheoreticallyinformed discussion of the migration–development relationship, see de Haas H. (2010)Migration anddevelopment: a theoretical perspective, International Migration Review,44(1):227–264.


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overtheotherhasoscillatedlikeaswingingpendulum.33

Intheoptimisticscenario,migrationhasthepotentialtoachieveaso-called triple-winoutcome–beneficial for thesendingcountry,for the receiving country, and for themigrants themselves.34Thesendingcountryisableto‘export’itssurplusandunemployedlabourforce, receiving in return compensating inflowsof remittances tosupporthouseholdsandcommunities leftbehindand to stimulateinvestmentanddevelopment.Atalaterstage,migrantsmayreturn,bringingwiththemfinancialcapitalintheformofsavings,humancapitalintheformofqualifications,trainingandworkexperience,and ‘social remittances’ in the form ofmore ‘modern’ ideas andattitudestosocialreform.35

Forthedestinationcountry,severaleconomicbenefitscanbeargued.Throughmigrationitreceivesanextrasupplyof‘ready-made’labour(whosecostsofupbringingandeducationithasnotbeenrequiredtobear)tofeedintoitseconomyinvariouslabour-marketsectorswhere,often,locallysourcedlabourisinshortsupply.Thesesectorsinclude labour shortages at the upper end of the skills spectrum(e.g. doctors, engineers, IT specialists) and, on a larger scale, inlower-skilled ‘3D’ jobswhich are typically ‘dirty, dangerous anddemeaning’.Here, typical examples include seasonal agriculturalwork,constructionlabour,domesticcleaning,andpersonal/bodily

33. Theoptimisticscenariowaspredominantinthe1950sand1960s(‘neoclassic’interpretation)andinthe1990sand2000s(‘neoliberal’interpretation),whilstthepessimistic scenariowasmorevocally articulatedduring the1970s and1980s(‘neomarxist’ interpretation),and (according to some) in thecurrentdecadeofthe2010s.Seede Haas H.(2012)Themigrationanddevelopmentpendulum:acriticalreviewofresearchandpolicy,International Migration,50(3):8–25.34. King R., Vullnetari J. (2009)Remittances, return, diaspora: framing thedebateinthecontextofAlbaniaandKosovo,Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,9(4):385–406.35. See King R.(2018)Ismigrationaformofdevelopmentaidgivenbypoortorichcountries?Journal of Intercultural Studies,39(2):114–128.


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careworkinhomesandcareinstitutions.

Thirdly, for the migrants themselves, emigration functions as arouteout of poverty and apathway towards abetter life throughaccess to higher incomes, more employment security, enhancedcareerprospects,andbetterfuturesfortheirfamiliesandchildren.Thesebenefitscaneitherbeenjoyedabroadifthewholefamilyunitmigratesor,ifpartofthefamilyremainsinthehomecountry,thematerial quality of life is improved by the receipt of remittances(whichcanbeinvestedinhousingimprovementsandinthehealthandeducationofchildren)orbyinvestmentprojectsdevelopedbythemigrantuponreturn.

So far, so good; but there is another side to the migration anddevelopment story,which is thenegativeor pessimistic scenario.In this framework, we substitute the word ‘underdevelopment’for ‘development’. Migration is seen initially as a response tothe condition of underdevelopment in the home country (as inthe ‘virtuous circle’ model), but then this outmigration leads tothe further impoverishment, not the development, of the countryof origin.This is due to a series of ‘vicious circle’mechanisms,including excessive population loss, brain drain, depopulation ofperipheral regions (leading to theclosureof shops, schools, ruralhealth centres, transport links etc.), structural and psychologicaldependency on remittances, exploitation of migrant workers inlow-paidandinsecurejobsabroad,thepainfulseparationoffamilymembersandabandonmentoftheelderly.ItisnothardtoseehowmanyofthesenegativesyndromesresonatewiththeexperienceofAlbaniaanditsmigrants.

Thatbeingsaid,itisextraordinarilydifficulttodrawupabalance-sheetoftheprosandconsofmigrationforAlbaniaanditspeople.Onewayof approaching thisquestionwouldbe toposeanother:what wouldAlbania be like if emigration had not taken place?


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This, too, is almost unimaginable except in termsof a landscapeof poverty, hunger, and both rural and urban overcrowding; and,possibly instead, even more massive rural-urban migration thanactuallyoccurredinthedecadesfollowing1990.36So,undoubtedly,migrationhasbeenpartofthesalvationofthecountryinthewakeof thechaosof theeconomicandpolitical transition; as affirmedearlier, it has shored up the country’s balance of payments andenabledalargeshareofAlbanianhouseholdsandfamiliestosurvivethroughdifficulttimes.Albanianmigrantsabroadhavebothsufferedandprospered.Theyhavebeenexploited–overworked,underpaid,cheated–especiallyintheirearlyyearsofworkingabroad,butovertime have surmounted these obstacles and those of awidespreaddiscriminationandstigmatisation,toachievestablesettlementandremarkablyrapidintegration.37

The biggest unknown concerns how migration will impact onAlbania’s (under)development in the future. Recent trendssuggest that the ‘migration transition’ fromnet emigration to netimmigrationisstillsomewayoff.AstheimpactoftheGreekcrisisshowed,Albaniaisstillcastinadependentandvulnerablepositionwith regard to negative economic trends in key host countries.An established channel for emigration has been partially closedoff by Greek economic retrenchment, and a quasi-forced returnmigrationhastakenplaceofthosewhobecameunemployed.Theseinvoluntary returnees are likely to have less development impactthan the return of successful skilledmigrants – but these are the36. One probable impact of zero or low emigrationwould have been greatlyincreasedinternalmigrationtomajorcitiesandthecoast.Buttheserural-urbanmigrationshavealreadytakenplaceonafairlymassivescale,especiallytotheTirana–Durrësconurbation.Foradetailedanalysisofthecomplexrelationshipsbetween internal and internationalmigration seeVullnetari J. (2012)Albania on the Move: Links between Internal and International Migration. Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress.37. King R., Mai N.(2008)Out of Albania: From Crisis Migration to Social Inclusion in Italy. NewYork:Berghahn.


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migrantswho,onthewhole,aretheleastlikelytoreturn,sincetheyareunwilling tosacrifice theirsuccessabroadforuncertaintyandlack of opportunities at home.Moreover, the GallupWorld Pollsurveydataonpotential futuremigration indicate that,at least intermsofaspiration,largesharesoftheAlbanianpopulationseenofutureinstayingintheircountryandwouldliketoleave.

Intherestofthisstudyreport,wepresentourownoriginalsurveydata on potentialmigration, cross-referencing the responseswithseveraleconomic,socialanddemographicvariablestohaveamorepreciseindicationofthecharacterandlikelydestinationsoffuturemigration.

4. Methodology

Theresearchforthisstudyisbasedonprimaryandsecondarydataanalysis.Itconsistsofaliteraturereviewonpotentialmigration,aswellasqualitativeandmainlyquantitativemethodsThelatterconsistofahouseholdsurveyquestionnaireof23questionsadministeredto1,421households,andsemi-structuredinterviewswithpotentialmigrants,officialsandexpertsfromvariousdistrictsofAlbania.Nosinglefamilyorindividualparticipatedinmorethanoneresearchmethod.

A three-stage cluster samplewas deployed. In thefirst stage, thesamplewas broken down byAlbania’s 12 prefectures, using theproportional distribution by population 18 years old and above,basedondatafromthe2011Census.38Thesurveysweredistributedproportionally for each prefecture. In each prefecture, PrimarySamplingUnits(PSUs)werethenselectedand,ineachofthem,inthethirdsamplingstage,14householdsweresubjecttothesurvey.

38. INSTAT(2012)Population and Housing Census 2011.Tirana:InstituteofStatistics.


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IneachPSU,thehouseholdswereselectedrandomly.Therandomselection was conducted by experts of the Institute of Statistics(INSTAT).Theresearchteamwasprovidedwithcardsspecifyingthe households and families to be surveyed. According to themethodology,thesurveyorwouldvisitthedesignatedfamilyuptofourtimes,ondifferentdaysandatdifferenttimesoftheday.

Theresearchteamachieved1,421door-to-doorsurveysacrossalldistrictsofthecountry.ThesurveyonpotentialmigrationwaspartofabroadersurveyconductedwithhouseholdsintheframeworkoftheEuropeanValueStudy(EVS).39Thepotentialmigrationmoduleconsisted of 23 questions on potential migration, including fivequestions which were specific to returned migrants. In addition,from the EVS questionnaire, all the social-demographic data oftherespondentswereabstracted.Thesedataprovidedinformationonage,gender,civilstatus,familycomposition,ethnicity,highesteducational achievement, employment status, qualificationlevel, household income, place of residence (city, village), trust(confidence)ininstitutions,attitudetowardimmigrants,etc.Theteamconductedface-to-faceinterviews,throughaprintedquestionnaire,withonepersonperhousehold,aged18yearsoldorabove.Thoserespondentswhohadpreviousmigratoryexperienceansweredthefivequestionsonthereturn.Inthiscase,areturneewasconsideredapersonwhohadlivedandworkedforatleastoneyearabroadandhadreturnedtoAlbaniaatleastthreemonthsbeforethesurvey.Thepotentialmigrationsurveyrequiredaround12minutestocomplete.

Potentialmigration survey datawere comparedwith data from asimilar survey on potential migration and on returning migrants

39. TheEuropeanValuesStudyisconductedonceintenyearsinallEuropeancountries.TheEVSisalarge-scale,cross-national,longitudinalsurveyresearchprogrammeonbasichumanvalueslikelife,family,work,religion,politicsandsociety.Itprovidesinsightsintotheideas,beliefs,preferences,attitudes,valuesandopinionsofcitizensalloverEurope.


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carried out byCESS at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007,in the framework of a project funded by the European TrainingFoundation (ETF).40Thecomparisonof thedata,overaneleven-yearhorizon,revealednewtrendsregardingpotentialmigrationinAlbania.Also,forthisstudy,weusedothersurveysandinterviewsrealisedbyCESSinthelastdecade.41

Inthesurveyprocess,somepitfallsemerged.Thefirstonepertainedtothefactthatalargenumberofrespondentswereover40yearsold.Thisisexplainedbythefactthat,inmanyfamilies,thepersonswhowereathomeatthemomentofthesurveyandwerewillingtobeinterviewedwereoverthisage.Also,insomevillages,manyyoungpeoplewereabsentduetothehighlevelofinternationalmigration.Asaresult,thetotalnumberofrespondentsaged18–40was575,or40.5%ofthetotalsurvey.Muchofourensuinganalysisisbasedonthisage-group.Anotherproblemthatwasidentifiedwastheslightlyhigher number ofwomen respondents thanmen,which does notrepresent therealgenderratioof theAlbanianpopulation.Lastly,insomelargecitiessuchasTirana,Durrës,VloraandShkodratheincidenceofrefusingtofillthesurvey,mainlyduetoalackoftime,washigher.

40. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.41. Thisstudyalsousessomedatafromtwootherlargesurveysrealisedintheframework of two projects: ‘Global Crisis andMigration: Monitoring a KeyTransmissionChannelfortheAlbanianEconomy’(UNDP,WB,IOM,2010);and‘Strengtheningthelinkbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentthroughdevelopingandtestingreplicablemigration-relatedproductsandservicesformigrantsandtheircommunities’(IFAD,2008–2010).


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5. Results of the survey: 2018 compared to 2007

The following findings are based our analysis of the potentialmigrationsurveyresultsrelatingtotheintentiontomigrate,reasonsfor migration and relevant push factors, directions of potentialflows,returnofmigrantsandthecorrelationbetweenreturnandpotentialmigration.Inaddition,comparisonwiththe2007surveydataenablesustoshowclearlysomenewfeaturesandtrendsofpotentialmigrationinAlbaniaaswellastoformulatesomepolicyrecommendations.

Notethatthephrasingofthekeyquestioninthesurveyswasaboutintention tomigrate (the literal translation of the question fromAlbanian is ‘Doyou think tomigrate…?’). It shouldbepointedoutthatthereisasubtledifferencebetweenintentionanddesiretomigrate.Desiremaynotautomaticallyimplyintention(peoplemaywant tomigratebuthavelittleintentionofdoingsobecauseoftheperceivedandactualbarrierstomigration);andconverselyintention may not necessarily reflect desire (migration may beseenas‘inevitable’orthe‘onlyoption’,yettheremaybenoactualdesiretoleave).

5.1. How big is potential migration?

Figure 1 shows that potentialmigration affects almost all thoseaged18yearsoldandolder.However,fromnowon,thefindingsofourstudyarebasedmainlyonthepopulationaged18–40years,which is selected for two main reasons. First, this is the mostactivesegmentoftheAlbanianpopulationandapparentlyshowsthehighestconcentrationinthetrendofpotentialmigration.Afterthis age, the trend, as noted in Figure 1, declines notably. Thesecondreasonisrelatedtothecomparisonwewanttodrawvis-à-


34

visanothersurveyonpotentialmigrationconductedbyCESSandfundedbytheEuropeanTrainingFoundation(ETF)inlate2006andearly2007,basedonthe18–40agesegment.42Thecomparisonofthedatafromthesetwosurveys,forthesameagegroup,helpstoseemoreclearlythenewtrendsinpotentialmigrationfromAlbaniaoveraneleven-yearhorizon.

Figure 1. Potential migration by age (in %)

Source:CESSPotentialmigrationsurvey,2018.

Accordingtothesurveydata,52%oftheAlbanianpopulationaged18–40yearsoldintendtomigratefromAlbania.Comparedtothe2007survey,whenpotentialmigrationwasat44.2%,thepushtomigrateisnowaround8percentagepointshigher.43Theincreasecanbeexplainedbysocialandeconomicfactors,whichwewillelaborateoninthefollowingparagraphs.42. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.43. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin: ETF;Sabadie J. A., Avato J., Bardak U., Panzica F., Popova N.(2010)Migration and Skills. The Experience of Migrant Workers from Albania, Egypt, Moldova, and Tunisia. WashingtonDC:WorldBank.

19

Figure 1. Potential migration by age (in %)

Source: CESS Potential migration survey, 2018. According to the survey data, 52% of the Albanian population aged 18–40 years old intend to migrate from Albania. Compared to the 2007 survey, when potential migration was at 44.2%, the push to migrate is now around 8 percentage points higher.43 The increase can be explained by social and economic factors, which we will elaborate on in the following paragraphs. The intention to migrate (on such a large scale) is related to the projections people have for their own future, especially for the future of their children. On the one hand, it is a reflection of the real economic, social and political situation in the home country; on the other hand, it reflects the potential opportunities in the host country. This perception of the people about their future is related first of all to economic factors. The global economic crisis that started in the second half of 2008 took its toll on the Albanian economy, as was noted in Section 2. Annual GDP growth halved and unemployment increased sharply.44 Another important economic variable, remittances, also declined sharply. This, in turn, contributed to an increase in the incidence of poverty in Albanian households, a phenomenon that had been almost halved in the period 2000–2008.45 In the meantime, the seasonal and long-term international emigration, primarily to Greece and Italy, that had been a key mechanism for Albanian households to cope with poverty in the first two decades, could no longer play such a 43 European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania. Turin: ETF; Sabadie J. A., Avato J., Bardak U., Panzica F., Popova N. (2010) Migration and Skills. The Experience of Migrant Workers from Albania, Egypt, Moldova, and Tunisia. Washington DC: World Bank. 44 World Bank (2018) Higher But Fragile Growth: Western Balkans Regular Economic Report No.14. Washington DC: World Bank. 45 According to World Bank data from 2002–2008, poverty in Albania was halved to 12.4 per cent but, in 2012, rose again to 14.3 per cent. See: World Bank (2016a) South-East Europe Regular Economic Report, Resilient Growth and Rising Risks, 10.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Potential migration by age (in %)


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Theintention tomigrate(onsucha largescale) is related to theprojections people have for their own future, especially for thefutureoftheirchildren.Ontheonehand,itisareflectionoftherealeconomic,socialandpoliticalsituationinthehomecountry;ontheotherhand,itreflectsthepotentialopportunitiesinthehostcountry.

Thisperceptionofthepeopleabouttheirfutureisrelatedfirstofalltoeconomicfactors.Theglobaleconomiccrisisthatstartedinthesecondhalfof2008tookitstollontheAlbanianeconomy,aswasnotedinSection2.AnnualGDPgrowthhalvedandunemploymentincreased sharply.44 Another important economic variable,remittances, also declined sharply. This, in turn, contributed toan increase in the incidenceofpoverty inAlbanianhouseholds,aphenomenon thathadbeenalmosthalved in theperiod2000–2008.45Inthemeantime,theseasonalandlong-terminternationalemigration, primarily to Greece and Italy, that had been a keymechanismforAlbanianhouseholds tocopewithpoverty in thefirst two decades, could no longer play such a role. Therefore,a new paradoxical situation arose.While, on the one hand, theAlbanianemigrationdriversincreased,ontheother,thetraditionalchannels of emigration decreased. Subsequently, the migrationpotentialoftheAlbanianpopulation,undertheeffectoftheglobaleconomiccrisis,intheabsenceofinternalsolutions,andgiventhepeople’sperceptionoftheirfuture,wasupward.

EconomicfactorsandthelargeincomegapwithadvancedeconomiesintheEUandNorthAmericaarenottheonlyfactorsthatexplainthe

44. World Bank(2018)Higher But Fragile Growth: Western Balkans Regular Economic Report No.14.WashingtonDC:WorldBank.45. According toWorldBank data from 2002–2008, poverty inAlbaniawashalved to 12.4per cent but, in 2012, rose again to 14.3per cent.See:World Bank (2016a)South-East Europe Regular Economic Report, Resilient Growth and Rising Risks,10.


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desireofthepeopletomigratefromAlbania.TheEVSsurveydatashowthatpeopleingeneral,andpotentialmigrantsinparticular,aredissatisfiedwith theeducationsystem, social security,healthcare,civil service, justice system and political parties (to mention afew).46Table1showsthatmorethanhalfofthegeneralAlbanianpopulationaredissatisfiedand,inthecaseofpotentialmigrants,thelevelofdissatisfactionisseveralpercentagepointshigher.47

Table 1. The level of trust of the population and potential migrants in ... (in %)

Source:EVSSurvey,2018.

We saw from the Introduction that potentialmigration surveys,suchasthosecarriedoutbyGallupandtheIOM,48producefigureswhicharemuchhigherthantheensuingfiguresofrealmigration.Inorderforpotentialmigrationtobecomerealmigration,people46. Respondentswereasked:Pleaselookatthiscardandtellme,foreachitemlisted,howmuchconfidenceyouhaveinthem,isitagreatdeal,quitealot,notverymuchornoneatall?47. Answers‘notverymuch’and‘noneatall’.48. Laczko F., Tjaden J., Auer D. (2017)Measuring Global Migration Potential, 2010–2015.Berlin:GlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre,DataBriefingSeriesNo.9.

Nr Total population (18-40 years) Potential migrants (18–40 years)Agreat

deal

Quitea

lot

Notvery

much

Noneat

all

A

great

deal

Quitea

lot

Notvery

much

Noneat

all

1 Theeducationsystem

13.8 33.7 38.2 14.3 11.8 29.2 42.8 16.2

2 Thesocialsecuritysystem

7.4 34.7 37.5 20.4 4.8 34.0 37.1 24.1

3 Thehealthcaresystem

10.6 32.0 35.7 21.7 9.4 31.1 32.4 27.1

4 Thecivilservice 4.7 32.7 42.4 20.2 4.7 30.1 42.9 22.35 Thejusticesystem 6.5 19.1 35.1 39.3 6.0 16.8 32.6 44.66 Politicalparties 0.7 4.0 23.6 71.7 0.3 4.4 19.9 75.4


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needtohaveproperdocumentation(passports,visas,etc.),enoughmoneytofundtheir tripandexpenditureduring theirsojourn inthehostcountryuntil theyearnincomefromemployment, learnandacquirethelanguageandhaveadequateinformationaboutthehostcountry,haveacircleoffriendsorrelativeswhowillprovideaccommodationandhelptheminfindingajob,orhaveobtainedaworkcontractinadvance,etc.Ifpotentialmigrantsdonothavealloratleastmostoftheabove,itwillbedifficultforthemtomigrateorfortheirmigrationprojecttobeasuccess.

Inordertobeascloseaspossibletothisreality,basedonsomesurveyquestionswebuilttwoindicators.Thefirstindicator,whichwecall‘planningtomigrate’,isrelatedtotheplanningtomigratewithin the currentyearor in thenext threeyears.49Surveydatashow that 17.2% ofAlbanians aged 18–40 years old, or 33.1%ofthosestatingtheirintentiontomigrate,thinktomigratewithinthecurrentyear.Meanwhile,16.7%ofAlbaniansofthesameagegroup or 32.1% of thosewho state that they intend tomigrate,think to migrate within the next three years. The remainingpotential migrants say they intend tomigrate within a ten-yearhorizon(16%)ormorethantenyears(0.7%).Thosewhohavenotdecided yet represent 18.1% of potentialmigrants (Table 2). Inaddition,therearepersonswhostateanintentiontomigrate,butarenotyetclearastothecountrytheywishtomigrateto.Duetothelongtimeperiodinwhichthedesiretomigratemayweakenorchange,dependingonsocialandeconomicconditions,and theirindecisivenessregardingthecountryofdestination,weexcludedthesegroupsfromthecalculationofthisindicator.

49. Therespondentswhohadaffirmedtheirdesiretomigrate,wereasked:Doyouintendtoemigratea)withinthecurrentyear;b)inthenextthreeyears;c)inthenexttenyears;d)morethantenyears;e)don’tknow.


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Table 2. Potential migrants by the period they intend to migrate (in %)

Nr Period Against potential migrants

Against 18–40 year-old

population1 Withinthecurrentyear 33.1 17.22 Inthenextthreeyears 32.1 16.73 Inthenexttenyears 16.0 8.34 Morethantenyears 0.7 0.35 Don’tknow 18.1 9.4

Total 100.0 52.0

Source:CESS,Potentialmigrationsurvey,2018.

Thesecondindicator,whichwecall‘likelytomigrate’,inadditiontoincludingthefirstone,isrelatedtothepossibilitytofundthetrip, the existenceof socialnetworks in thedestinationcountry,theknowledgeofthehost-countrylanguageatacertainlevelandthenecessaryinformationaboutthiscountry.Inthisindicator,wedidnotincludethepossessionoftraveldocuments(passport,visa,etc.)since,asofDecember2008,Albaniansmaytravelvisa-freeintheSchengenarea.50Thecalculationsofthesecondindicatoron‘likelytomigrate’showthatonlyaround7%ofpotentialmigrants,or 3.6% of the population aged 18–40 years old, may actuallymigrate.Thisindicatorisnotablylowerthanthedesiretomigrateandisundoubtedlyclosertothereality.

50. AlbaniansmustholdabiometricpassportinordertotravelwithoutvisastotheEU(Schengenarea).Moreover,thevisa-freeregimeconcernsstaysofupto90dayswithina180-dayperiod,imposinglimitationsandpressureonmigrantswhowouldprefer tostaylongerinthehostcountry.Formoreinformationsee‘AgreementbetweentheEuropeanCommunityandtheRepublicofAlbaniaonthefacilitationoftheissuanceofvisas’athttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22007A1219(05)&qid=1395933714988.


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AccordingtothePopulationCensusof2011,thegroupaged18–40yearsoldrepresentedaround34%ofthepopulation,oraround948,000 persons.51 Duringmore recent years, the population ofAlbaniahasshrunkanditsagestructurehascertainlychanged.52 Yet,assumingthatthepopulationofAlbaniaanditsagestructurehave remainedunchanged,wemay estimate that around34,100personsaged18–40yearsoldmaymigratewithintheyear.

However,thisindicatormustbeinterpretedprudently.Mostofthepotentialmigrantsdonothaveacontract towork in thedesireddestinationcountryandrelymostlyonsocialnetworks tofindajob in the formal or informal sectors.Therefore,most of them,despitetheirdesire,willdependonthelabourdemandinthehostcountry.

5.2. Who are the most likely to potentially migrate?

Inthissection,wewillseesomedemographic,socialandeconomiccharacteristicsofpotentialmigrants,comparingthemtothoseofthegeneralpopulation. Inaddition,wewill shownew trends inpotential migration by comparing results from the 2018 surveywiththosefromthe2007survey.

Demographic characteristics

The survey results show that, ingeneral, the intention tomigrateismorenotableamong theyoungergenerationand that,after the

51. INSTAT(2012)Population and Housing Census 2011.Tirana:InstituteofStatistics.52. Accordingtoprojections,in2018thepopulationsegmentaged18–40yearsoldwillbearound939,000persons.Inthiscase,around33,800personsmaybeexpected,accordingtooursurveypredictions,tomigratewithintheyear.


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40s,thisdesirereducesnotably(seeFigure1).Mostofthosewhothink tomigrate after their 60swish to unitewith their emigrantchildren,mainlyinGreece,ItalyandtheUS.Amorefine-grainedanalysisofthesegmentaged18–40yearsold,themostactiveagegroupand themainobjectof this study, shows that the intentiontomigratepeaksforthe27–30agecohort(Figure2).TheaverageofpotentialmigrationforthissegmentoftheAlbanianpopulationreaches71.2%.

Figure 2. Potential migration and age


Inthemeantime,thecomparisonofbothsurveysrevealsthat,whilein 2007 the migratory potential peaked for the 18–25-year-oldsegment,in2018itpeaksfor27–30-year-olds(Figure3).Aswewillseebelow,thereareanumberofreasonsthatexplainthisshift inthepeakage-groupsinpotentialmigrationinAlbaniaover11years.

23


Source: CESS, Potential migration survey, 2018. In the meantime, the comparison of both surveys reveals that, while in 2007 the migratory potential peaked for the 18–25-year-old segment, in 2018 it peaks for 27–30-year-olds (Figure 3). As we will see below, there are a number of reasons that explain this shift in the peak age-groups in potential migration in Albania over 11 years.

Figure 3. Potential migration for the segment aged 18–40 years old in 2007 and 2018

Source: CESS, Potential migration survey, 2018. Potential migration is higher among men (61.8%) than women (48.3%), which is related to the cultural norms present in Albania and to their civil status. In general, the Albanian migration has been led by men whereas women followed at a later stage, through family reunification or

0102030405060708090

Potential migration and age (18-40 years old)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Potential migration and age (2018, 2007)

2018

2007


41



Potential migration is higher among men (61.8%) than women(48.3%),whichisrelatedtotheculturalnormspresentinAlbaniaand to their civil status. In general, theAlbanianmigration hasbeenledbymenwhereaswomenfollowedatalaterstage,throughfamilyreunificationormarriage.Alittlemorethanhalf(51.7%)ofthosewhointendtomigratearemarriedand47.6%aresingle(Table3).

Table 3. Civil status of potential migrants by gender (in %)

Nr Civil status of potential migrants

Married Never married

Divorced/separated, widowed

1 Men 35.4 64.6 0.02 Women 59.5 39.5 1.03 Allpotentialmigrants 51.7 47.6 0.7


23


Source: CESS, Potential migration survey, 2018. In the meantime, the comparison of both surveys reveals that, while in 2007 the migratory potential peaked for the 18–25-year-old segment, in 2018 it peaks for 27–30-year-olds (Figure 3). As we will see below, there are a number of reasons that explain this shift in the peak age-groups in potential migration in Albania over 11 years.


Source: CESS, Potential migration survey, 2018. Potential migration is higher among men (61.8%) than women (48.3%), which is related to the cultural norms present in Albania and to their civil status. In general, the Albanian migration has been led by men whereas women followed at a later stage, through family reunification or

0102030405060708090

Potential migration and age (18-40 years old)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Potential migration and age (2018, 2007)

2018

2007


42

Thereisaninterestinggenderasymmetryinthesefigures.Thus,thedesiretomigrateishigheramongtheunmarriedmen(64.6%)thanamongthemarriedones(35.4%).Thisisexplainedbythefactthatunmarriedmenaremoreindependentandfreetomigrate,whereasmarried men should take into account their families (wife andchildren) forwhom theyare responsible.Theoppositeholds trueforwomen.Potentialmigrationisloweramongunmarriedwomenandhigheramongmarriedones.Thisisexplainedbythefactthatunmarriedwomenhave limited agency tomigrate independently,sincetheyare‘controlled’bytheirfamilies(high-educatedwomen,students,graduatesetc.areanexception),whereasmarriedwomenmirrortheintentionsoftheirhusbands(tosomeextent),ortheymayfavouremigrationtoamore‘progressive’society.

Education

There isa strongcorrelationbetweeneducationand thedesire tomigrate.Our survey data show that potentialmigration is higheramongpersonswithprofessional,secondaryandtertiaryeducation(Table 4).This fact is explained, on the one hand, by the higheremploymentchancesofeducatedandhighlyskilledpersonsinthemore advancedEU countries (especiallyGermany) and inNorthAmerica. Hence, under conditions of global competition, newlabourmarketsinGermanyseektolurehighlyqualifiedmigrants,who will contribute positively to the long-term competitivenessof the country. On the other hand, this shows that qualified andeducatedpeoplearedissatisfiedwiththeiremploymentchancesandworkconditionsinAlbania.

Thecomparisonwiththe2007surveyshowsareversaloftheabove-describedtrend(Table4).Datafromthe2007surveyshowthatthe


43

lowerthelevelofeducation,thehigherthedesiretomigrate.53Thisisexplainedbythefactthatless-educatedandunskilledpeoplewereeitherunemployedorhaddifficultiesinfindingajobinAlbaniaanddesiredtomigrate(mainlytoItalyandGreece).Whereasthosewhohadaprofessionorwerehighlyeducatedfounditeasiertointegratein thelabourmarket inAlbania.Thereisalsoanotherreasonthatexplainsthistrend.Thesurveywithreturneesin2007showedthat34%ofreturneeswithtertiaryeducationhadworkedinGreeceasunqualified workers, often in the informal sector, which did notencourageothers,inturn,tomigrate.

Table 4. Potential migration and highest level of education completed, 2018 and 2007 (in %)

Nr Highest level of education 2018 20071 Didnotattendschool 0.0 75.02 Lessthanprimary 0.0 46.23 Primary(9yearsschool) 47.3 50.04 Secondarygeneral 57.6 40.95 Secondaryvocational 58.8 44.76 University(Bachelor,Master,PhD) 52.3 40.37 Potentialmigration(population18–40yearsold) 52.0 44.0


Datafromtheabovetablemustbeinterpretedwithcare,becausethe boundaries between groups (secondary general, university)are often non-static and it may happen that some people whorespondedacertaineducational levelattainedat the timeof thesurvey,mayhavesubsequentlymovedontoanotherhigherlevel.In thesurvey, thequestion thatwasasked todividerespondents

53. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.


44

intogroupswasaboutthehighestlevelofeducationattained,asverifiedbyadiplomaorcertificateearned.54Manyindividualswhocurrentlyattenduniversityreported(rightlyso)thattheirhighestattained level was secondary education while, in practice, theyhavemovedontotertiaryeducation.Inthemeantime,surveydatashowthat65.1%ofcurrentuniversitystudentsintendtomigrate.Thisfigureishigherthanthepotentialmigrationaverage,buttheyare included in the group of persons having attained secondaryeducation.

Figure 4. Correlation between potential migration and education in 2007 and 2018


54. Therespondentswereasked:Whatisthehighesteducationallevelthatyouhave attained? The alternatives of choice were: no education at all, primaryeducation (4–5 years of schooling), 8/9 years school, general secondary,vocational secondary (2-year vocational training), vocational secondary (morethan2yearsofvocationaltraining),highernon-universityeducation,universitydiploma,professionalMaster’s,post-universityschool,scientificMaster’s,PhD.

Figu

Source: CE This cormigrate band highadvancedmigrate mcan find u The corrutilised beconomieeducationAccordinstudying in 2013.5

Germanymarket in Potentialsurvey dain an effoattend su

55 Interview56 GëdeshInternation

01020304050607080

ure 4. Corre

ESS, Potential

rrelation betbut also in thh-skilled perd economiesmostly to thunqualified j

relation betwby policymaes in Western, improve ng to an int

and obtainin55 In the mey, CESS notn this countr

l migrants' gata. Almost

fort to preparuch courses

w with Ms Alkhi I., Xhaferanal Organizatio

Did not attend school

P

elation betw

migration surv

tween educahe selection rsons intends in Westere establishedjobs, even in

ween potentakers in the rn Europe mtheir profes

terview withng certificateantime, in mted an interery in the anti

growing inter85% of potere for livingshow greate

keta Kuka, Heaaj E. (2016) Son for Migratio

Less than primary

Potential mi

ween potenti

vey, 2018.

ation and mof the desti

d to migratrn Europe. d (since the n the inform

tial migratiofuture. The

may serve asssional skillsh the Goethion of the Gmany intervest to attendcipation of f

rest in vocatential migrang and workiner interest in

ad of the LanguSocial and Econ.

Primary

igration and

26

ial migratio

migration is nation countte mostly to

Less-educa1990s) destal sector, us

on and educe desire to m an incentivs and qualife Institute i

German languviews condud vocationalfuture migrat

tional educants want to png abroad (Tn learning th

uage Departmeconomic Profil

Secondary general

d education

on and educ

expressed ntry. In 2018o Germany,

ated and lowtinations of Ging their soc

cation has migrate to Gve for potentfications, anin Tirana, thuage was thrcted with rel training/cotion.56

ation and traiparticipate inTable 5). Pothe language

ent, Goethe Insle of the Retu

Secondary vocational

level, 2007

cation in 200

not only in , we find tha, North Amw-skilled peGreece and cial networks

another aspGermany andtial migrantsnd learn a fhe number ree times higeturned asyluourses to ada

ining is alson a training ctential migra(72.3%), vo

stitute, Tirana. urn Migrants

University

and 2018

07 and 2018

the intentioat more edu

merica and ersons intenItaly, wheres.

pect that mad other advas to advance foreign languof young pegher in 2017um seekers apt to the la

o corroboratecourse in Albants who waocational tra

in Albania. T

2

2

8

on to ucated

other nd to e they

ay be anced their

uage. eople

7 than from

abour

ed by bania ant to aining

Tirana:

2018

2007


45

This correlation between education and migration is expressednotonlyintheintentiontomigratebutalsointheselectionofthedestinationcountry.In2018,wefindthatmoreeducatedandhigh-skilledpersonsintendtomigratemostlytoGermany,NorthAmericaandotheradvancedeconomies inWesternEurope.Less-educatedandlow-skilledpersonsintendtomigratemostlytotheestablished(sincethe1990s)destinationsofGreeceandItaly,wheretheycanfindunqualifiedjobs,evenintheinformalsector,usingtheirsocialnetworks.

The correlation between potential migration and education hasanotheraspectthatmaybeutilisedbypolicymakersinthefuture.Thedesire tomigrate toGermanyandotheradvancedeconomiesinWesternEuropemayserveasanincentiveforpotentialmigrantsto advance their education, improve their professional skillsand qualifications, and learn a foreign language. According toan interview with the Goethe Institute in Tirana, the number ofyoung people studying and obtaining certification of theGermanlanguage was three times higher in 2017 than in 2013.55 In themeantime, in many interviews conducted with returned asylumseekersfromGermany,CESSnotedaninteresttoattendvocationaltraining/coursestoadapttothelabourmarketinthiscountryintheanticipationoffuturemigration.56

Potential migrants’ growing interest in vocational education andtrainingisalsocorroboratedbysurveydata.Almost85%ofpotentialmigrantswant toparticipate ina trainingcourse inAlbania inanefforttoprepareforlivingandworkingabroad(Table5).Potentialmigrants who want to attend such courses show greater interestin learning the language (72.3%), vocational training (39.1%),

55. InterviewwithMsAlketaKuka,HeadoftheLanguageDepartment,GoetheInstitute,Tirana.56. Gëdeshi I., Xhaferaj E.(2016)Social and Economic Profile of the Return Migrants in Albania.Tirana:InternationalOrganizationforMigration.


46

culturalorientation(22.9%)anduniversitystudies(17%).57Interestinpreparingforworkingandlivinginthedestinationcountryhasgrown notably compared to the 2007 survey when only 48.7%of potential migrants stated such a desire.58 This desire shouldbe supported because it increases the human capital for both thecountryandthepotentialmigrant.

Table 5. Desire for training and type of training in 2018 and 2007 (in %)


Labour-market status

Surveydatashowthatstudentsandemployedpersonshaveahigherpropensitytomigratecomparedtotheunemployed,self-employedandhomemakers(Figure5).Thisfactshowsthatemployment,perse, doesnotpreventmigration,nor isunemployment aparticularfactorwhichdisproportionatelyencouragesthoughtsofmigration.Workconditions,lowwages,andlackofprospectsaresomeofthepushfactorsdrivingpeopletomigrate.Surveydatashowthatpeopleworkinginsomesectorsoftheeconomyandcertainprofessions–incallcentres,healthcare,construction,salesetc.–aremoreinclinedtomigrate(Table6).

57. Potentialmigrantswereasked:Whattrainingwouldyouliketoattend?Therespondentcouldchooseoneormoreoptions,suchaslanguagelearning,culturalorientation,vocationaltraining,universitystudies,other(specify).58. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.

Nr Desiretraining

Languagelearning

Culturalorientation

Vocationaltraining

Universitystudies

Other Don’tknow

1 2018Survey

85.0 72.3 22.9 39.1 17.0 – –

2 2007Survey

48.7 85.1 9.3 19.4 7.4 0.9 1.4


47

Figure 5. Employment status and intention to migrate


Table 6. Potential migration by economic sector and profession (in %)

Nr Sectors/profession Move Stay1 Workinginacallcentre 85 152 Nurses 83 173 Construction 56 444 Clothing 53 475 Footwear 38 626 Salesperson 67 337 Shopkeeper 42 588 Teachers 27 73


Note:Thesedatamustbeinterpretedwithcaution,asinsomecasesthesampleofpersonsissmallandtheresultmaynotbeconvincing.

Source: CE

Nr1 Wo2 Nur3 Con4 Clo5 Foo6 Sal7 Sho8 Tea

Source: CENote: Thesmay not be Income Intentionpoor grouthe respoincome.5

59 Respondcounting ahousehold

Housew

Workin

Worki

F

ESS, Potential

Table 6. Secto

orking in a carses nstruction othing otwear esperson opkeeper achers ESS, Potential se data must be convincing.

n to migrate ups within Aondents (ac9 The group

dents were askall wages, salafalls into, after

wife not otherwise

Self

Un

ng less than 30 hou

ng 30 hours a wee

Figure 5. Em

migration surv

Potential mors/professiall centre

migration survbe interpreted w

is noted amoAlbanian soccording to that is at th

ked: Here is a laries, pensionsr taxes and oth

0

employed

employed

nemployed

urs a week

ek or more

Student

Potent

mployment

vey, 2018.

migration byion

vey, 2018. with caution, a

ong all sociaciety. To cotheir answe

he lowest seg

list of incomess and other in

her deductions.

10

tial migratio

28

status and i

y economic sM

as in some cas

al groups; it orroborate arers) in 10 lgment of the

s and we woulncome that co

20 30

on and emp

intention to

sector and pMove

85 83 56 53 38 67 42 27

ses the sample

is no longerrguments forlarge groups

e ladder of in

d like to knowmes in. Just g

0 40

ployment sta

o migrate

profession (i

of persons is

r a characterr this hypoths based on ncome has le

w in what groupgive the letter

50

atus

in %) Stay15 17 44 47 62 33 58 73

small and the

ristic exclusihesis, we div

their houseess than 70 E

p your househr of the group

60 70

result

ive to vided ehold Euros

hold is, p your


48

Income

Intention tomigrate is noted among all social groups; it is nolongeracharacteristicexclusivetopoorgroupswithinAlbaniansociety.Tocorroborateargumentsforthishypothesis,wedividedtherespondents(accordingtotheiranswers)in10largegroupsbasedontheirhouseholdincome.59

Figure 6. Correlation between potential migration and household income (in %)


Thegroupthatisatthelowestsegmentoftheladderofincomehaslessthan70Euroshouseholdincomepermonth;atthetopisthegroupthathas1,416Eurosorhigherhouseholdincomepermonth.60Bothextremegroupshavethelowestlevelofpotentialmigrationfortotallydifferentreasons.Fortheverypoorfamilies,itisverydifficulttoenvisagemigrationbecausetheydonothave

59. Respondentswereasked:Hereisalistofincomesandwewouldliketoknowinwhatgroupyourhouseholdis,countingallwages,salaries,pensionsandotherincomethatcomesin.Justgivetheletterofthegroupyourhouseholdfallsinto,aftertaxesandotherdeductions.60. TocalculatehouseholdincomeinEuros,weused1Euro=130Albanianlek astheconversionexchangerate.

householincome pdifferent they do ncase of thmigrate iwith low

Fig

Source: CE This pattnot dividof the hohigher a‘insuffici

60 To calcu61 Respondneeds? Theat all suffic

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

ld income peper month.60

reasons. Fonot have adehe rich famiis slightly her income (F

gure 6. Corr

ESS, Potential

tern marks aded based onousehold to among housient’, and ‘so

ulate householddents were askeir answers wecient.

Less than 70

Euro/month

70 Euro

er month; atBoth extrem

or the very pequate financilies, they of

higher amongFigure 6).

relation bet

migration surv

a notable chan their month

afford theireholds that ometimes su

d income in Euked: Overall, iere: More than

to 142 o/month

142 to 212Euro/month

Potent

t the top is tme groups hapoor familiecial, human aften do not ng the group

tween poten

vey, 2018.

ange from thhly income br basic needs

described ufficient, som

uros, we used 1is the financiasufficient; Suf

2 h

212 to 283 Euro/month

283 Euro

tial migratio

29

the group thave the lowe

es, it is veryand social reneed to. It is whose inc

ntial migrati

he 2007 survbut on their s.61 Responstheir financ

metimes not’

1 Euro = 130 Al situation of fficient; Somet

to 371 o/month


on and level

hat has 1,416est level of py difficult toesources for s interesting

come is abov

ion and hou

vey. In this self-assessmses showed cial situation’ (Figure 7).

Albanian lek as the household times sufficien

h472 to 708

Euro/month708 t

Euro/

l of househo

6 Euros or hpotential mig envisage mthe migratio

g to note thave the avera

usehold inco

survey, the ment of the f

that potentin as ‘not a

the conversionsufficient to

nt, sometimes n

to 945 /month


old incomes

higher housegration for to

migration becon process. Iat the intentiage against

ome (in %)

households financial situal migration

at all suffic

n exchange ratecover all yournot; Insufficien

More than 1416

Euro/month

ehold otally cause In the on to those

were uation n was ient’,

e. r basic nt; Not


49

adequatefinancial,humanandsocialresourcesforthemigrationprocess.Inthecaseoftherichfamilies,theyoftendonotneedto.Itisinterestingtonotethattheintentiontomigrateisslightlyhigher among the groups whose income is above the averageagainstthosewithlowerincome(Figure6).

Figure 7. Potential migration and financial situation of the household (2007)


Thispatternmarksanotablechangefromthe2007survey.Inthissurvey, the households were not divided based on theirmonthlyincome but on their self-assessment of the financial situation ofthehouseholdtoaffordtheirbasicneeds.61Responsesshowedthatpotentialmigrationwas higher among households that describedtheirfinancialsituationas‘notatallsufficient’,‘insufficient’,and‘sometimessufficient,sometimesnot’(Figure7).

61. Respondentswereasked:Overall,isthefinancialsituationofthehouseholdsufficienttocoverallyourbasicneeds?Theiranswerswere:Morethansufficient;Sufficient;Sometimessufficient,sometimesnot;Insufficient;Notatallsufficient.

F

Source: CE Regional

All theseThe 200northern propensithigher inDibër) an

Someti

DGjiroka

KoKu

ShkoDu

FLeB

TirElba

V

Figure 7. Po

ESS, Potential

l propensitie

e new featur7 survey shpoor (Kuk

ty to migratn the regionsnd border reg

F

More tha

mes sufficient, som

Not at a

Potenti

0

ibraastraorcaukesoderurresFierezha

Beratranaasan

Vlora

otential mig

migration surv

es

res of potenthowed that kës) and soute. This tren of Vlora, Egions (Korça

Figure 8. Pot

0

an sufficient

Sufficient

metimes not

Insufficient

all sufficient

ial migratio

10

Poten

gration and

vey, 2007.

tial migratiounqualified uthern front

nd is no longElbasan, Tiraa, Gjirokastr

tential migr

10

on and finan

20

ntial migrat

30

financial sit

on are also rand less-ed

tier (Korça, ger noted inana, Berat, etra), see Figur

ration by pr

20

ncial situatio

30

tion by prefe

tuation of th

eflected in tducated youn

Gjirokastran the 2018 sutc. and lowere 8.

refecture in

30

on of the ho

40

ecture (in %

he househol

their geograpng people, a) regions survey. Potenr in the poor

Albania.

40 5

ousehold (in

50 6

%)

ld (2007)

phic distribumainly from

showed a hntial migratir regions (K

50 60

n %)

60 70

ution. m the higher ion is

Kukës,

0


50

Regional propensities

All these new features of potential migration are also reflectedin their geographic distribution. The 2007 survey showed thatunqualified and less-educated young people, mainly from thenorthernpoor(Kukës)andsouthernfrontier(Korça,Gjirokastra)regions showedahigherpropensity tomigrate.This trend isnolongernotedinthe2018survey.PotentialmigrationishigherintheregionsofVlora,Elbasan,Tirana,Berat,etc.andlowerinthepoorregions (Kukës,Dibër) andborder regions (Korça,Gjirokastra),seeFigure8.

Figure 8. Potential migration by prefecture in Albania.


Family decision

Thedecisiontomigrateisoftentheresultofalengthydiscussioninthefamilyandseenasalong-termstrategy.Internationalmigrationisviewedasamechanismthatwouldimprovethefinancialsituationof thehousehold.Thisview is statedbyalmost97%ofpotentialmigrants.

F

Source: CE Regional

All theseThe 200northern propensithigher inDibër) an

Someti

DGjiroka

KoKu

ShkoDu

FLeB

TirElba

V

Figure 7. Po

ESS, Potential

l propensitie

e new featur7 survey shpoor (Kuk

ty to migratn the regionsnd border reg

F

More tha

mes sufficient, som

Not at a

Potenti

0

ibraastraorcaukesoderurresFierezha

Beratranaasan

Vlora

otential mig

migration surv

es

res of potenthowed that kës) and soute. This tren of Vlora, Egions (Korça

Figure 8. Pot

0

an sufficient

Sufficient

metimes not

Insufficient

all sufficient

ial migratio

10

Poten

gration and

vey, 2007.

tial migratiounqualified uthern front

nd is no longElbasan, Tiraa, Gjirokastr

tential migr

10

on and finan

20

ntial migrat

30

financial sit

on are also rand less-ed

tier (Korça, ger noted inana, Berat, etra), see Figur

ration by pr

20

ncial situatio

30

tion by prefe

tuation of th

eflected in tducated youn

Gjirokastran the 2018 sutc. and lowere 8.

refecture in

30

on of the ho

40

ecture (in %

he househol

their geograpng people, a) regions survey. Potenr in the poor

Albania.

40 5

ousehold (in

50 6

%)

ld (2007)

phic distribumainly from

showed a hntial migratir regions (K

50 60

n %)

60 70

ution. m the higher ion is

Kukës,

0


51

Generally, men say that the decision to migrate is taken jointlybythemandotherfamilymembers(48.5%)or‘entirelybythem’(48.5%).Amongwomen, the percentage of thosewho say ‘bothmyself and others’ (84.1%), certainly due to cultural norms, isnotably higher. Only a rather small percentage of them, 11.9%,mostlyunmarriedwomenorthoseinurbanareas,saythattheymaydecide for themselves (Table 7). Respondents, however, say thatthose‘others’whohaveanimpactonthisdecisionaremainlythehusband/wife(47.5%)andtheparents(39.5%).

Table 7. Decision to migrate (in %)

Nr Total Men Women1 Entirelybyyou 23.7 48.5 11.92 Entirelybyothers 3.3 2.0 4.03 Byboth 72.7 48.5 84.14 Don’tknow 0.3 1.0 0.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0


5.3. Where to?

The top ten destination countries to where Albanians intend tomigrateareGermany(21.7%),USA(16.4%),Italy(15.7%),Greece(14.4%), United Kingdom (11%), France (3%), Canada (2.7%),Switzerland(2.3%),Sweden(2.3%)andAustria (1.3%).Figure9showsclearlythattheAlbanianpotentialmigrationisconcentratedin EU countries (74.6%) and in North America (19.1%). Othercountries,outsidetheseareas,includeTurkey(1.3%)andAustralia(0.7%).62

62. Inrecentyears,somemarginalisedgroupsoftheAlbanianpopulation,such


52

Figure 9. Top desired destination countries


Compared to the 2007 survey, the potential migration flows havebeenredirected,asexplainedbythedeeperchangesthathavetakenplaceduetotheimpactfromtwocrises:theglobaleconomiccrisisand the refugee crisis. Thus, Germany is now the most preferredcountryofAlbanianpotentialmigrants–around22%ofthemwishtomigratetothiscountry.In2018,ithasthehighestincreaseby17percentagepointsagainst2007,comparedtoothercountries(Table8).TheimageformedbyAlbanianasylumseekersaboutGermanyasacountrywithgoodsocial-securityservices(education,health,socialprotection), great employment opportunities and high incomes has

astheRomaand(so-called)Egyptians,areincreasinglymigratingtoTurkeytoworkmainlyinmanufacturing.FormoreinformationseeGëdeshi I., Mykerezi P., Danaj E. (2017) Mapping of Skills, Employment and Entrepreneurship Opportunities of Roma and Egyptians in the Project Sites of Tirana, Durrës, Berat and Shkodra.Tirana:UNDP.

Source: CE Compareby the deconomicAlbanianhas the h(Table 8)social-seand highAlbania. re-emigrawho studcompletin

63 GëdeshInternation64 For prelBrain DraAbroad: ThAlbania an

ONo

NetherIr

AusBel

Tu

ASwitze

SwCaF

G

Ger

ESS, Potential

ed to the 200deeper changc crisis and

n potential mhighest incr). The imagecurity servic

h incomes hAlmost all

ate to Germdy in EU coung their stud

hi I., Xhaferanal Organizatioiminary results

ain with Albanhe Future Scie

nd the Western

0

OtherorwayrlandsrelandstralialgiumurkeySpainustria

erlandwedenanada

FranceUK

GreeceItalyUSA

rmany

Figure

migration surv

07 survey, thges that hav

the refugeemigrants – arrease by 17 e formed by ces (educatihas been trainterviews wany.63 Anothuntries showdies.64

aj E. (2016) Son for Migratios of this surveynian Scientific entific DiasporBalkans’, Tira

5

Top d

e 9. Top desi

vey, 2018.

he potential ve taken plae crisis. Thuround 22% percentage

Albanian asion, health, ansmitted towith Albaniaher survey c

wed that arou

Social and Econ. y, see: Gëdesh

Diaspora.Tirara? Presentationana, 27–28 Oct

desired dest

32

ired destina

migration face due to us, Germanyof them wispoints aga

sylum seekersocial prote

o the rest oan asylum-seconducted inund 23% of t

conomic Profil

hi I., King R. (ana: UNDP; Kn to the Confetober.

10

tination cou

ation countr

flows have bthe impact y is now thsh to migratinst 2007, crs about Gerection), greaf the populeeker returnn 2017–2018them desire

le of the Retu

(2018) ResearcKing R., Gëderence ‘Migrati

15

untries (in %

ries

been redirecfrom two c

he most prefe to this coucompared tormany as a cat employmeation once ees reveal th

8 with 520 Ato migrate t

urn Migrants

ch Study on Brdeshi I. (2017)ion, Diaspora

20

%)

ted, as explacrises: the gferred countuntry. In 20o other counountry with ent opportunthey returne

hat they desiAlbanian stuto Germany

in Albania. T

rain Gain, Rev) Albanian Stuand Developm

2

ained global try of 18, it ntries good nities ed to ire to

udents upon

Tirana:

versing udents

ment in

25


53

beentransmittedtotherestofthepopulationoncetheyreturnedtoAlbania.AlmostallinterviewswithAlbanianasylum-seekerreturneesrevealthattheydesiretore-emigratetoGermany.63Anothersurveyconducted in2017–2018with520Albanianstudentswhostudy inEUcountriesshowedthataround23%ofthemdesiretomigratetoGermanyuponcompletingtheirstudies.64

Table 8. Top desired destination countries in 2018 compared with 2007 (in %)

Nr Countries Survey 2018 Survey 2007 Change1 Germany 21.7 4.5 + 17.22 USA 16.4 14.5 + 1.93 Italy 15.7 31.2 -15.54 Greece 14.4 26.5 -12.15 UK 11.0 14.7 -3.76 France 3.0 2.0 +1.07 Canada 2.7 3.6 -0.98 Sweden 2.3 0.2 +2.19 Switzerland 2.3 0.0 +2.310 Austria 1.3 0.2 +1.111 Spain 1.3 0.0 +1.312 Turkey 1.3 0.0 +1.313 Belgium 1.0 1.8 -0.814 Other 2.7 0.8 +1.9

Total 100.0 100.0Source:CESS,Potentialmigrationsurvey,2018.

63. Gëdeshi I., Xhaferaj E.(2016)Social and Economic Profile of the Return Migrants in Albania.Tirana:InternationalOrganizationforMigration.64. Forpreliminaryresultsofthissurvey,see:Gëdeshi I., King R. (2018)Research Study on Brain Gain, Reversing Brain Drain with Albanian Scientific Diaspora.Tirana:UNDP;King R., Gëdeshi I.(2017)AlbanianStudentsAbroad:TheFutureScientific Diaspora? Presentation to the Conference ‘Migration, Diaspora andDevelopmentinAlbaniaandtheWesternBalkans’,Tirana,27–28October.


54

Table8showsthatItalyandGreece,oncetraditionaldestinationsforAlbanianmigration,arelosingtheirlureforAlbanianmigrants,duetothehighandprolongedunemploymentinthewakeoftheglobaleconomiccrisis.Inearlieryears,thesetwohostcountrieswerealsonotableforthehighlevelsofculturalracismandstigmatisationthatAlbanianmigrantshadtoendure.ThecomparisonofthetwosurveysshowsthatItalyandGreecehavelost15.5and12.1percentagepoints,respectively,inthe11years.

NewtrendsshowthatAlbanianmigrantswillincreasinglyconcentrateinthemoreadvancedeconomiesofWesternEurope.Thus,KarolineNovinscak Kölker points out in a study that, at the end of 2015,there were around 59,000 legal migrants in Germany.65 Certainly,whenthenumberofmigrantsandsocialnetworksthatconnectthemreaches a criticalmass, thismigrationhas thepotential to becomeself-perpetuating.Throughsocialnetworks,itiseasierforpotentialmigrants to obtain information, find accommodation and a job,arrangedocuments,marriages,etc.

There-directionofmigrationflowsmainlytowardGermanyandsomeotherWesternEuropeancountries(UnitedKingdom,France,Sweden,Switzerland,Austria,Spain,Belgium,etc.)willeventuallyleadinthefuturetootherquantitativeandqualitativechangesinrelationtoincome,savings, remittances, investments, and the human and social capitalofAlbanian migrants. The 2007 survey with returnees showed thatthepercentageofthosewhohadbeentrainedinthehostcountrywastwiceashighinGermanyandtheUKthaninGreece.66Twootherlargesurveysconductedintheearlyyearsoftheglobaleconomiccrisis(2008and2009)showthatthelevelofincome,savingsandremittancesfrom

65. Novinscak Kölker K. (2017) PowerPoint presentation of the study: ‘Migration Networks between Germany and the Countries of Origin: Republic of Albania and Republic of Kosovo’.Tirana,9March2017.66. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.


55

AlbanianmigranthouseholdsinNorth-WestEuropewashigherthaninGreeceandItaly (Table9).67Therefore, the impactofnewmigrationflowsonAlbania’seconomy–throughfinancialandsocialremittances,andinvestmentsandhumancapitalinthecaseofreturn–willbegreater.

Table 9. Income, savings and remittances of Albanian migrant households (Euros)

Source: Gëdeshi I. (2010) Global Crisis and Migration: Monitoring a Key Transmission Channel for the Albanian Economy. Tirana: InternationalOrganization forMigrationandUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammewiththesupportoftheWorldBank;de Zwager N., Gressmann W., Gëdeshi I.(2010)Market Analysis: Albania—Maximising the Development-Impact of Migration-Related Financial Flows and Investment to Albania. Vienna, IASCI, http://cessalbania.al/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Albania_Market_Analasys.pdf (lastaccessed29September2018).

67. Gëdeshi I. (2010)Global Crisis and Migration: Monitoring a Key Transmission Channel for the Albanian Economy. Tirana: International Organization forMigration and United Nations Development Programmewith the support of theWorldBank;de Zwager N., Gressmann W., Gëdeshi I.(2010)Market Analysis: Albania—Maximising the Development-Impact of Migration-Related Financial Flows and Investment to Albania.Vienna, IASCI,http://cessalbania.al/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Albania_Market_Analasys.pdf(lastaccessed29September2018).

Nr IFAD/2008 IOM/WB/UNDP 2009Other EU countries

Italy Greece Other EU countries

Italy Greece

1 Individualaveragemonthlyincome

2,279 1,412 1,283 2,226 1,344 1,125

2 Householdmonthlyincome

3,065 2,380 2,120 3,260 2,518 1,897

3 Householdmonthlyexpenditure

2,157 1,439 1,362 1,972 1,610 1,309

4 Householdmonthlysavings

908 941 757 1,287 908 587

5 Remittances(annual) 2,573 1,545 1,650 2,893 984 1,5276 Percentageof

remittance-sendinghouseholds

72.1 76.8 79.1 62.6 57.5 72.9


56

Ontheotherhand,thisprocesswillbeaccompaniedbybraindrainanddiminishinghumanresourcesinAlbania.Thenumberofengineers,ITspecialists,medicaldoctorsandnurseswhomigratetoGermanyhasbeenontherise.68Oneofoursurveyinterviewees,Dorina,whohasaPhDinmedicine,sharedherconcern:

ThebraindrainfromAlbaniawillcontinue.IntheNetherlands, it isdifficulttobeacceptedasadoctor,becauseyouhavetositexamsfromthebeginning.Germany,however,hasrelaxedthedoctor-recognitionprocedures.TheyacceptmedicalstafffromallBalkancountries,thoughtheyfirsthavetoworkinaruralareaandundergotraining.Almost30%ofstudentsthatcompletedstudiesinthesameyearasmehavegonetoGermany.Eachyear,around180doctorsgraduate,andinthelast3–4yearsaround30%haveemigratedtoGermany.Thisis,regrettably,averyhighpercentage,becausetherehasbeenasix-yearinvestmentforthesedoctors,andtheyarethebestones.Isaythebestbecausetheyareabletolearnthelanguage,i.e.German,fasteranddothejobbetter.

Itis,therefore,thedutyofpolicymakerstomaximise,througheffectivepolicies, thepositiveaspectsandminimise thenegativeonesarisingfromthesenewAlbanianmigrationflows.

Potentialmigrantswereaskedaboutthepossibilityofselectinganothercountry,inadditiontothefirstchoice,asadestinationofmigration.69 Interestingly,eveninthiscase,Germanyisthemostdesiredcountryselectedby23.7%ofpotentialmigrants.ManypotentialmigrantswhooptedforGreeceorItalyas theirfirstchoiceofmigration, selectedGermany as their second option. Meanwhile, the ranking of theothercountrieshasnotchanged.

68. Gjypi A.,(2018)Largimi i mjekëve nga Shqipëria.Tirana:FriedrichEbertStiftung;Tollkuci E., Collaku M.(2017)ChallengesofsocialindicatorsaffectingtheskilledmigrationofAlbanianphysicians.PaperpresentedattheConference‘Migration, Diaspora andDevelopment inAlbania and theWestern Balkans’,Tirana,27–28October.69. Potential migrants were asked:Are there any other countries you mightconsidertoemigrateto?Writeitdown.


57

Wealsoaskedpotentialmigrantsaboutsomeofthefactorswhichdetermine their selectionof thedesireddestinationcountry.70Theanswers (Figure 10) show that the selection of these countries ismainlydeterminedbyarangeofsocialandeconomicfactors,suchasemploymentopportunitiesandhighincome(39.6%),possibilityto save money (12.5%), existence of social networks (10.6%),possibility of education (9.6%), family reunification (5.3%) andsocialsecuritysystem(4.2%).

Figure 10. Top reasons for selecting the destination country (in %)


Selectiondeterminantsaredifferentfordifferentcountries(Table10).So,potentialmigrantswhodesiretomigratetoGermanyandtheUSputmorevalueonemploymentandincome,thepossibilitytosave,theeducationoftheirchildren,thesocialsecuritysystemand healthcare services.The table shows that the percentage of

70. Potentialmigrantswereasked:Whywouldyoumigratetothiscountry?Eachpotentialmigrantcouldchooseuptothreeoptionsfromtheavailablealternatives.

Source: CE Selectionwho desipossibilitservices. US for th

Ta

EmploymTo save mThe sociaTo marry/To accomHad friendPeople areOpportunI knew theEasy acceHad no diThe autho

The auth

I ha

To j

Figure

ESS, Potential

n determinanire to migratty to save, tThe table sh

hese reasons

ble 10. PoteOpt

ment/chances fmoney al security sys/Just married

mpany/union wds/relatives the friendly towities for educe language of

ess to healthcaifficulties to eorities of this

I have been therehorities of the coun

Just mIs not

ave the possibility

I have liI kn

People aS

join/accompanied PossibiI have

Job/possib

10. Top rea

migration surv

nts are diffete to Germathe educatiohows that this higher tha

ential migrationsfor income

tem

with the spoushere wards aliens ation f this country are services enter this councountry are n

e for a short visitntry are not strictmarried/to marrydifficult to enter

Otherto receive a visaHealth services

ived there beforenow the languageare more friendlySocial protectionhusband/parents

ility of education friends/relativesTo save monies

bility of incomes

Main rea

asons for sel

vey, 2018.

erent for difany and the Uon of their he percentagan the avera

ants’ reason

se/parents

ntry not strict

0 5

asons for sel

36

lecting the d

fferent counUS put morchildren, the

ge of potentiage.

ns for selectiTotal G39.6 12.5

4.2 0.8 5.3

10.6 3.7 9.6 3.3 2.2 0.9 0.5

10 15

ecting the m

destination

ntries (Tablee value on ee social secal migrants

ing the destiGermany U

45.2 320.0

4.4 0.0 4.4 5.2 0.7 8.9 1.5 2.9 0.7 1.5

5 20

migration co

country (in

e 10). So, poemploymentcurity systemwho select G

ination counUSA Italy39.8 3614.3 11

6.1 20.0 11.0 7

11.2 172.0 3

14.3 103.1 12.0 01.0 00.0 0

25 30

ountry

%)

otential migt and incomem and healthGermany an

ntry(in %)y Greece

6.7 44.4.9 13.3

2.8 3.31.8 0.07.3 14.47.4 11.13.7 2.20.1 1.1

.8 3.30.0 1.10.9 2.20.0 0.0

35 4

grants e, the hcare

nd the

UK41.7

6.91.42.84.2

19.45.6

12.51.41.4

1.4

40

Tosavemoney


58

potential migrants who select Germany and the US for thesereasonsishigherthantheaverage.

Table 10. Potential migrants’ reasons for selecting the destination country (in %)

Options Total Germany USA Italy Greece UKEmployment/chancesforincome 39.6 45.2 39.8 36.7 44.4

41.7

Tosavemoney 12.5 20.0 14.3 11.9 13.3 6.9Thesocialsecuritysystem 4.2 4.4 6.1 2.8 3.3 1.4Tomarry/Justmarried 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 2.8Toaccompany/unionwiththespouse/parents 5.3 4.4 1.0 7.3 14.4

4.2

Hadfriends/relativesthere 10.6 5.2 11.2 17.4 11.1 19.4Peoplearefriendlytowardsaliens 3.7 0.7 2.0 3.7 2.2

5.6

Opportunitiesforeducation 9.6 8.9 14.3 10.1 1.1 12.5Iknewthelanguageofthiscountry 3.3 1.5 3.1 1.8 3.3

1.4

Easyaccesstohealthcareservices 2.2 2.9 2.0 0.0 1.1

1.4

Hadnodifficultiestoenterthiscountry 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 2.2Theauthoritiesofthiscountryarenotstrict 0.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0

1.4

Itwasnotdifficulttoenterillegally 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Ihadlivedtherebefore 2.5 0.7 2.0 2.8 3.3Ihadbeenthereonashortvisit 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.9Icouldobtainavisa 2 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.4Other 1.1 1.5 0.0 0.0Don’tknow 0.6 0.0 0.0Noanswer/Nonapplicable 0.1 0.0 1.0Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0



59

Theexistenceofsocialnetworksplaysanimportantroleinselectingthedesiredcountryofmigration.Havingrelativesandfriends,orapreviousmigrationexperienceinacountryincreasestheattractionofpotentialmigrantstowardit.Thesesocialnetworksreducerisksandlowermigration-relatedmaterialandpsychologicalcosts.ThisexplainswhyItalyandGreece,regardlessofthenotabledropinthepreferenceshowninthe2018surveyvis-à-visthe2007survey,remaintowardsthetopofthelistofpreferreddestinationcountries(third and fourth place, respectively) for Albanian potentialmigrants. Table 10 also shows that the percentage of potentialmigrantswhoselectItalyandGreece(aswellastheUS)duetothepresenceofsocialnetworksishigherthantheaverage.Familyreunificationisanotherimportantfactorforthesetwo‘traditional’immigrationcountrieswithahighconcentrationoftheAlbanianmigration.

Figure 11. Top reason for selecting the potential migration country


It was notI had livedI had beenI could obOther Don't knoNo answeTotal Source: CE The exismigrationincreaseslower miregardlessurvey, rplace, respotential networkstwo ‘trad

Source: CE People cmigrate. factor fo

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t difficult to ed there beforen there on a shbtain a visa

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11. Top reas

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37

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70


60

Peoplecanhavemultiplereasonsforselectingadestinationcountryto which theywant tomigrate. To deepen our analysis, we alsoaskedpotentialmigrantsaboutthemaindeterminingfactorfortheselection of the destination country of migration71. The answersshowthatemploymentandincome(65.2%),possibilityofeducationfortheirchildren(9.8%),familyreunification(9.4%),presenceofsocial networks (4.5%) and previous experience in that country(3.1%)arethemaindrivingfactorsofpotentialmigration(Figure11).Subsequently,ifwegroupthemainfactorsthatinspirepeopletomigrate,wemaydividethemintomaterial,human(education),andsocialcapitalfactors.

5.4. Reasons for wanting to migrate

Thereexistvariouscauses forpotentialmigration: amongothers,economic, educational, family, and health factors as well asthe perception of the respondents of their prospects in the homecountry.72

Yet,economic factors,which include the improvementof livingstandards, unemployment, low wages and labour conditions,socialsecurityschemesanddebt,remainthemaindriversfortheAlbanianmigration.According to the2018survey, thesefactorsrepresent 57% of the causes of migration or more than half ofallfactors.ThisshowsthatAlbanianmigration,eveninits thirddecade,continuestobedrivenbyeconomicfactors,althoughtoalesserextent(Figure12).

71.Potentialmigrantswereasked:Whatisthemainreason?72. Respondentswereaskedtoprovidethreemainmigrationreasonsandthentodeterminethemostimportantone.


61

Figure 12. Causes of potential migration


Inadditiontoeconomicfactors,asmallergroupofpersons(19.4%),but the secondmost importantone, cite factors relatedmainly tothelackofeconomic,socialandpoliticalperspectivesinAlbania.These include statements bypotentialmigrants such as ‘There isnofutureinAlbania’,‘Idonot likelivinginAlbania’,‘Iwant tomigrateabroad’,andperhaps‘Adventure’,whichwehavegroupedunderthelabel‘Otherreasons’(Table11).

The above affirmationsdonot showa lackof love for thehomecountry;onthecontrary,theAlbaniansloveandfeelproudoftheircountry.EVSsurveydataalsoshowthatalmost95%ofrespondentssaythattheyare‘veryproud’or‘proud’ofbeingAlbanians.73Rather,

73. IntheEVSsurvey,respondentswereasked:HowprouddoyoufeelofbeinganAlbanian?Thepossibleanswerswere:veryproud,proud,notsoproud,notatallproud.

employmreunifica(3.1%) arthe main(educatio

5.4. Reas There exand healtcountry.7

unemploymain driv57% of migrationlesser ext

Source: CE In additiimportan

71 Respond

To escap

ment and incation (9.4%),re the main dn factors thaon), and soci

sons for wan

xist various cth factors as

71 Yet, ecoyment, low vers for the the causes n, even in ittent (Figure

ESS, Potential

ion to econnt one, cite

dents were aske

pe family problems

InsuTo receive th

To accomp

I thinTo financ

I h

come (65.2%, presence ofdriving factoat inspire pial capital fac

nting to mig

causes for pos well as thonomic factwages and Albanian mof migrationts third deca12).

Figur

migration surv

omic factorfactors rel

ed to provide th

s (conflict with parTo

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he necessary medic

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nk there is no futurce the education ofhad no job/could n

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Main r

%), possibilf social networs of potent

people to mctors.

grate

otential migre perceptiontors, whichlabour cond

migration. Acn or more tade, continu

re 12. Cause

vey, 2018.

rs, a smallerlated mainl

hree main mig

0

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d/just marriedcurity systemcal assistance

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ve in Albaniaget educationt satisfactoryre in Albaniaf my childrennot find a jobing standards

reasons of p

38

lity of educworks (4.5%)tial migratio

migrate, we m

ration: amonn of the resph include tditions, sociaccording to than half of

ues to be dri

es of potenti

r group of ly to the la

gration reasons

5

potential mi

cation for th) and previo

on (Figure 11may divide

ng others, ecpondents of the improveal security scthe 2018 suf all factorsiven by econ

ial migratio

persons (19ack of econ

and then to de

10 15

igration (in

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35


62

thedesiretoleaveAlbaniaisrelatedtothepessimismcreatedbythecurrentstateofaffairs(unemployment,lowincome,poorservices,etc.), and internationalmigration is consideredas apossiblewayout.

Education (17.4%) is the third-ranked among the factors. Somepotentialmigrantsunderlinethatthey‘desiretobeeducated’inthehostcountry(5.4%)andto‘financetheeducationoftheirchildren’(12%).This isexplainedby thepush factorof the lowqualityofeducationinAlbania.Ourpriorresearchhasshownthat,asaresultof thepoorqualityofeducationinAlbania, thenumberofyoungpeoplewhogotostudyinEUuniversitiesisthehighestamongtheWesternBalkancountriesalthough,intermsofincomepercapita,Albaniaisthepenultimatecountryandintermsofpopulationitisthethirdamongthesecountries.74

Family-relatedfactors,suchas‘tomarry/justmarried’,‘reunificationwiththespouseorparents’and‘toescapefamilyproblems’,whichwereanotablefeatureoftheseconddecadeofAlbanianmigration,nowrepresentonly4.6%ofresponses.Inaddition,somerespondentsunderlinehealth-relatedfactorsasmigrationdrivers(1.5%).

Ifwecomparethecurrentpushfactorsforpotentialmigrationwiththosefromthe2007survey,wenotethat,whilestilldominant,theimpact of economic factors has diminished. In addition, family-relatedfactorsalsohavealesserimpact.Conversely,thenumberofpeoplewhohighlighteducation,lackoffutureprospectsinAlbania,and,toalesserextent,healthcare,hasincreased(Table11).

74. Gëdeshi I., King R.(2018)Research Study on Brain Gain, Reversing Brain Drain with Albanian Scientific Diaspora.Tirana:UNDP.


63

Table 11. Main reasons for leaving Albania


Nr Reasons for leaving 2018 ETF Survey/2007

Change

I Economic factors 57.0 65.8 -8.81 Toimprovestandardof

living30.9 35.7 -4.8

2 Havenojob/cannotfindajob

18.3 19.7 -1.4

3 Natureofworkunsatisfactory

6.1 9.3 -3.2

4 Inadequatesocialsecuritysystem

1.3 0.0 +1.3

5 Torepaydebts 0.4 0.2 +0.2II Education 17.4 8.1 + 9.31 Toobtaineducation 5.4 5.4 0.02 Tofinancechildren’s

education12.0 2.7 +9.3

III Family reasons 4.6 11.2 - 6.61 Toaccompany/follow

spouse/parent3.5 10.2 -6.7

2 Togetmarried/justmarried 0.8 0.5 0.33 Toescapefromfamily

problems0.3 0.5 -0.2

IV Health 1.5 1.1 + 0.41 Toreceivenecessaryhealth

care1.5 1.1 +0.4

V Other reasons 19.4 13.8 + 5.61 NofuturehereinAlbania 10.8 2.9 +7.92 Wanttogoabroad 2.6 2.7 -0.13 DonotlikelivinginAlbania4 Adventure5 Other


64

Todeepenour analysis, potentialmigrantswere asked to singleoutfromthesetofselectedfactorsthemainpushfactorfortheirintentionofemigratingfromAlbania.75Accordingtotheresponsesfrom potential migrants, the main reason for 36.5% was forimprovinglivingstandards(Figure13).

Figure 13. Main factor for emigrating out of Albania


5.5. Return migrant subsample

TheinternationalmigrationofAlbanians,especiallystartingfromthelate1990s,goeshand-in-handwiththeirreturn.

Surveydatashowthat17.5%oftherespondentsaged18yearsandolder,havemigratedforatleastoneyear,mainlytoGreece(63.3%),Italy(20.6%),Germany(6%),andtoamuchlesserextenttotheUS,Austria,France,Sweden,Turkey,theUK,etc.(Figure14).

75. Respondentswereaskedtochoosethemostimportantoneamongasetofkeyfactors.

Source: CE 5.5. Retu

The interhand withhave migto a much

F

To receiv

To acc

To fi

Belgi

TurSweFraAus

UGerm

ItGre

ESS, Potential

urn migrant

rnational mih their retur

grated for at h lesser exte

Figure 14. M

ve the necessary m

I desire to

I do not like

Work wa

I think there is no

company/reunite w

inance the educatio

I had no job/co

To improv

0

iumUK

rkeyden

ancestria

USAmany

talyeece

Main d

migration surv

subsample

gration of Arn. Survey daleast one ye

ent to the US

Main destina

To repay debts

medical assistance

o emigrate abroad

Adventure

to live in Albania

as not satisfactory

future in Albania

To get education

with spouse/parent

on of my children

ould not find a job

e living standards

Main r

10

destination c

vey, 2018.

Albanians, esata show thaar, mainly to

S, Austria, Fr

ation countr

0 5

reason to mi

20

countries of

41

specially staat 17.5% of to Greece (63rance, Swed

ries of long-t

10 15

igrate from

30

f long-term

arting from tthe responde3.3%), Italy en, Turkey,

term Alban

5 20

Albania (in

40

Albanian re

the late 1990ents aged 18(20.6%), Gethe UK, etc.

nian returne

25 30

n %)

50 6

eturnees (in

0s, goes han8 years and oermany (6%). (Figure 14)

ees (in %)

35 4

60 70

n %)

nd-in-older, ), and ).

40

0


65

Figure 14. Main destination countries of long-term Albanian returnees (in %)

Source:CESS.Potentialmigrationsurvey,2018.

Figure15,whichisbasedontheyearofreturnfortherespondentmigrant,showsthatthereturnhasbeenadynamicprocess,peakingtwice in the last decade: in 2009–2013,when 31.7%of the totalnumberofreturnAlbanianmigrantswhoweresurveyedreturned;and in 2016–2018when 18.7% returned.The return ofAlbanianmigrantsin2009–2013isrelatedtotheglobaleconomiccrisisandtheresultanthighunemploymentlevelsinGreeceandItaly.Attheendof2013,according toEurostatdata,76 theunemploymentratewas 27.8% inGreece and 12.6% in Italy, but this ratewas evenhigheramongthemigrants.AccordingtoajointstudybyINSTATandIOM,duringthisperiod,around134,000migrantsreturnedto

76. EUROSTAT (2015) Euro area unemployment rate at 11.4%,December 2014. 20/2015–30 January 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6581668/3-30012015-AP-EN.pdf/9d4fbadd-d7ae-48f8-b071-672f3c4767dd

Source: CE 5.5. Retu

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66

Albania.77 In themeantime, thereturnbulgeduring2016–2018isrelatedmainlytothereturnofasylumseekersinGermanyandsomeotherEUcountries.AccordingtodatafromtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO),intheperiod2013–2017,around147,000Albanian citizens sought asylum in EU countries (primarily inGermany,France,etc.),andmostofthemreturnedinthefollowingyears.78In2015–2016,accordingtoavailabledata,AlbaniawasthetopcountryintheworldforthenumberofitscitizensreturnedfromEUcountries.79

Figure 15. The return of migrants by year of return and main host country


77. INSTAT, IOM (2014) Return Migration and Reintegration in Albania. Tirana:InstituteofStatistics/InternationalOrganizationforMigration.78. AccordingtoEASOdata,11,075personsfromAlbaniaappliedforasylumin 2013, 16,805 in 2014, and 65,900 in 2015. Since 2016, the trend has beendownward.Thus,31,553personsappliedforasylumin2016and22,075in2017;79. Morrica V., Stavrou S. (2018) PowerPoint presentation at the InceptionWorkshop ‘Supporting theEffectiveReintegrationof (Roma)Returnees in theWesternBalkans’,Vienna,15January.

42

Source: CESS. Potential migration survey, 2018. Figure 15, which is based on the year of return for the respondent migrant, shows that the return has been a dynamic process, peaking twice in the last decade: in 2009–2013, when 31.7% of the total number of return Albanian migrants who were surveyed returned; and in 2016–2018 when 18.7% returned. The return of Albanian migrants in 2009–2013 is related to the global economic crisis and the resultant high unemployment levels in Greece and Italy. At the end of 2013, according to Eurostat data,75 the unemployment rate was 27.8% in Greece and 12.6% in Italy, but this rate was even higher among the migrants. According to a joint study by INSTAT and IOM, during this period, around 134,000 migrants returned to Albania.76 In the meantime, the return bulge during 2016–2018 is related mainly to the return of asylum seekers in Germany and some other EU countries. According to data from the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), in the period 2013–2017, around 147,000 Albanian citizens sought asylum in EU countries (primarily in Germany, France, etc.), and most of them returned in the following years.77 In 2015–2016, according to available data, Albania was the top country in the world for the number of its citizens returned from EU countries.78

Figure 15. The return of migrants by year of return and main host country

Source: CESS, Potential migration survey, 2018.

75 EUROSTAT (2015) Euro area unemployment rate at 11.4%, December 2014. 20/2015–30 January 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6581668/3-30012015-AP-EN.pdf/9d4fbadd-d7ae-48f8-b071-672f3c4767dd 76 INSTAT, IOM (2014) Return Migration and Reintegration in Albania. Tirana: Institute of Statistics/International Organization for Migration. 77 According to EASO data, 11,075 persons from Albania applied for asylum in 2013, 16,805 in 2014, and 65,900 in 2015. Since 2016, the trend has been downward. Thus, 31,553 persons applied for asylum in 2016 and 22,075 in 2017; 78 Morrica V., Stavrou S. (2018) PowerPoint presentation at the Inception Workshop ‘Supporting the Effective Reintegration of (Roma) Returnees in the Western Balkans’, Vienna, 15 January.

0

5

10

15

20

25

The return of migrants by year of return and main host country

Total

Greece

Italy

Germany

Other


67

Thereturnofmigrants isapotentiallyveryimportantprocessfortheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofAlbania.Returneesbringfinancial capital (savings), human capital (skills and know-how,new mentality and ideas, work habits, etc.) and social capital.However,thisdepends,ontheonehand,onthedurationofstayinthehostcountryandthereasonsforreturning.Potentialbenefitsforthehomecountry aremaximisedwhen the returneeshave stayedlongenoughinthedestinationcountrytoachievetheirobjectiveswith regard to saving,educationorprofessionalqualifications,orwhentheyarestillrelativelyyoungandwishtoinvesthumanandfinancialcapitalintheirhomecountry.Ontheotherhand,itdependsonthecreationofpremisesinthehomecountrytoeffectivelyutilisethehuman,financialandsocialcapitalofreturnees.

Ifwe analyse the duration of stay in the destination country,wenote that the average duration of stay for returnees is 6.1 years.Meanwhile, amore detailed segmentation of the data shows that23.7%ofreturneeshasstayed1yearinthedestinationcountryand24.9%from1to3years(Figure16).Mostofthesemigrantsbelongto twogroups, thefirstofasylumseekerswhohavebeenrefusedtheir application and have therefore returned, and the secondgroup,ofmigrantsforciblyreturnedbyhost-countryauthoritiesormigrantswhohavelosttheirjobsduetotheeconomiccrisisintheneighbouringcountries, according to thewell-knownprincipleof‘lasthired,firstfired’.Asaresult,theyhavebeenunabletoachievetheirmigration goals.The rest of themigrants have stayed 3–10years(30.1%)andmorethan10years(21.3%).Thelastgrouphasgenerallyhadsufficienttimetoachievetheirmigrationgoals.


68

Figure 16. Duration of stay in years of returnees in the host country (in %)


In the survey, returnees were asked about the reasons of returntoAlbania, dividing the responses according to the groups ‘veryimportant’, ‘somewhat important’, and ‘not important’. Table 12showstheirresponses.

The retudevelopmknow-hoon the oPotentialenough iprofessiofinancial in the hom If we anastay for r23.7% of(Figure 1been refuforcibly economichired, firthe migragenerally

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43

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69

Table 12. Main reasons for returning to Albania

Nr Reasons Very important

Somewhat important

Not important

1 Studyprogammecompleted

1.2 0.4 98.4

2 IachievedthetargetforthesavingsIneeded

7.3 11.7 8.0

3 IwasofferedabetterjobinAlbania

4.8 2.4 92.7

4 Ihadtoreturntotakecareofthefamily

49.3 8.5 42.1

5 IwantedmychildrentoreceiveaneducationinAlbania

8.5 5.3 86.2

6 HomesickforAlbania

11.7 18.6 69.6

7 Forcedreturn 15.8 0.4 83.88 Lostmyjoborhad

lowincome22.7 4.9 72.4

9 Divorceordiscontinuedcohabitation

1.6 0.8 97.6

10 Pension 1.2 1.2 97.611 Iwantedtoestablish

abusinessinAlbania

8.1 4.5 87.4


On thebasisof their responses,wegrouped the returnees in fourmaingroups,asshowninTable13.


70

Table 13. Groups of returnees by main reasons

Nr Groups of returnees Size of the group (in %)1 Returneesforcedbyhost-country

authorities;11.9

2 Migrantsreturningduetolosingtheirjoborhavinglowincome;

17.0

3 Migrantsreturningtocarefortheirfamilyorfornostalgia/psychologicalreasons;

54.7

4 MigrantswhohaveachievedtheirmigrationgoalsanddesiretoestablishabusinessinAlbania.

16.2


Note:Thistableshouldbeinterpretedcarefullyasitshowstheapproximatesizeofeachgroupbasedontheresponsesfromthereturnees.

Thefirstgroupconsistsofmigrantswhowereforcedtoreturnbyhost-countryauthorities.Thisgroupconsistsofreturnedasylumseekers,mainly fromGermany, and irregularmigrantswho had no properdocumentsormigrantswhoseresidencepermithadexpired(generallyinGreece).Theforcedreturnofirregularmigrants,especiallyfromGreece,wasacharacteristicfeatureof thefirstdecadeofAlbanianmigration. According to Reyneri, around 1.4 million Albanianmigrantswere deportedduring the period1990–1998.80Accordingtooursurveydata,around15%ofreturneesfallinthisgroup.Thesemigrants,asaresultoftheearlyreturn,wereunabletoachievetheirmigrationgoals,andmostofthemwishtomigrateagain.

80. Reyneri E. (2001)Migrants’ Involvement in Irregular Employment in the Mediterranean Countries of the European Union.Geneva:InternationalLabourOrganization. This figure must be interpreted carefully, as many AlbaniansreturnedtoGreeceevenonthesameday,andthereforethesamepersonmayhavebeendeportedseveraltimes.


71

The second group comprisesmigrants who return due to havinglosttheirjobortoreducedincomefromemploymentinprecariousjobsinthehostcountry.Theglobaleconomiccrisisandthemassiveunemploymentthataccompaniedithadnegativeeffectsonalargeshareoflbanianmigrants,especiallyinGreeceandItaly.81Around17%ofreturneesfallinthisgroup.

Thethirdgroupconsistsofmigrantswhoreturnto‘takecareofthefamily’ or for nostalgia/psychological reasons.This also includesthosewhosaytheyreturnedbecausetheywere‘homesickforthehomecountry’or for ‘divorce/discontinuedcohabitation reasons’,wentintoretirementorwanttheirchildrentoreceiveaneducationinAlbania.Thisrathermixedsetofreturneereasonsisthelargestgroupandaccountsfor54.7%ofreturnees.

Thefourthgroupincludesmigrantswhosaythattheyhaveachievedtheirmigrationgoals(savings,studies),wanttoestablishabusinessinAlbaniaorhavebeenofferedabetter jobin thehomecountry.Whilethisgroupofreturneesaccountsforarelativelysmallshare,around16%,ithasasignificantimpactontheeconomicdevelopmentofthehomecountry,giventheirfinancial,humanandsocialcapital.Nonetheless,thedegreeoftheirpotentialmigration(re-migration)isveryhigh.

The question, in this case, is the relation between returnees andpotentialmigration.Accordingtothesurveydata,70.7%ofreturneesaged18–40yearsoldwishtomigratefromAlbania,mostofthemwithinthenextyear(54.7%)whileothers(18.7%)withinthenext3years.Thepercentageisnotablyhigherthanforthosewhohavenotmigratedpreviously(47.8%).Meanwhile,thecomparisonwith

81. Gëdeshi I., de Zwager N. (2012)EffectsoftheglobalcrisisonmigrationandremittancesinAlbania,in:Sirkeci I., Cohen J.H., Ratha D. (eds)Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond.WashingtonDC:TheWorldBank,237–254.


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the2007surveywithreturnees82showsthattheactualtrendofthisgroupin2018isnotablyhigher(Table14).

Table 14. Desire to migrate of returnees and of those who have not migrated previously (in %)

Nr 2018 ETF 20071 Havenotbeeninmigrationforaperiod

ofatleast1year47.8 na

2 Havebeeninmigrationforaperiodofatleast1year

70.7 44.0

Source:CESS,Potentialmigrationsurvey,2018

This phenomenon is explained by many factors. First, returneeshave amigration experience and self-confidence for undertakingsuchaninitiativeagain.Mostofthem,asshownbyTable13,havenotachievedtheirmigrationgoalsandintendtorealisethembyre-emigrating.Inaddition,theyhavesocialnetworksinthehostcountrythatmay help themwith information, temporary accommodationandfinding a job.The survey shows that 54%of returnees fromItalyandaround40%ofreturneesfromGreece intendtomigratetothepreviousmigrationcountry.TherestofthereturneespreferotherdestinationcountriessuchasGermany,theUS,theUK,etc.Potentialmigrantswhohavenotmigratedbeforewish tomigratemostlytoGermany,NorthAmericaandotheradvancedeconomiesoftheEU.

If these trendscontinue–i.e. the returnofmigrants fromGreece,their re-emigration toothercountriesandnewmigrantflows thattargetGermany–Greecewillloseitsrelativesignificance(alsofrom

82. European Training Foundation (2007) The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Albania.Turin:ETF.


73

a quantitative perspective) for Albanian migration. Meanwhile,other data show thatAlbanianmigrants fromGreece re-emigrate(actually, onward-migrate) to Germany, the UK, NorthAmericaandotherEUcountrieswithoutreturningandstayingtemporarilyinAlbania.

Based on such information, further questions arise. Besides thepreviousmigratory experience and social networks that returneeshaveinthehostcountry,whataretheotherdomesticpushfactors?Whydo returneeswish to amuchhigher extent (+26percentagepoints) to emigrate compared to those who have no migrationexperience?Toanswerthesequestions,wefocusedouranalysisontwoaspects.First,weanalysedthemigrationmotivesofthisgroupand compared themwith those who have no previousmigrationexperience.Thecomparisonofmotivesforbothgroupsshowsthatreturnees emphasise a littlemore factors related to the economy(unemploymentandunsatisfactorywork),education(financingtheeducationoftheirchildren),andhealthcare.Someofthemsaythatthey‘donotliketoliveinAlbania’(Table15).


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Table 15. Main reasons for leaving Albania

Nr Reasons for leaving Returnees 2018 Have not been in migration 2018

I Economic factors 60.0 55.91 Toimprovestandardofliving 30.7 30.92 Havenojob/cannotfindajob 20.5 17.63 Natureofworkunsatisfactory 7.3 5.74 Inadequatesocialsecurity

system1.5 1.2

5 Torepaydebts 0.0 0.5II Education 14.7 18.51 Toobtainaneducation 1.5 6.82 Tofinancechildren’s

education13.2 11.7

III Family reasons 3.4 4.91 Toaccompany/followspouse/

parent2.4 3.9

2 Togetmarried/justmarried 1.0 0.73 Toescapefromfamily

problems0.0 0.3

IV Health 2.4 1.21 Toreceivenecessaryhealth

care2.4 1.2

V Other reasons 19.6 19.61 Nofuturehere 8.8 11.52 Wanttogoabroad 2.9 2.53 DonotlikelivinginAlbania 5.9 3.94 Adventure 1.5 1.75 Other 0.5


Second,weassessedwhether thesedifferences inmotiveshaveareal basis or arise from the perception of the returnees about the


75

realityinAlbania.Wethereforeanalysedthestatusofreturneesinthelabourmarketandtheirdesiretomigrate(Table16).Thisstatusreveals that, while unemployment is high (28.2%), some of thereturneesworkfull-time(27.6%)andpart-time(6.6%)orareself-employed(13.3%,butalmosttwiceasmanythanthosewhohavenotmigratedpreviously).Yet,theveryhighdesiretomigrateamongtheemployedandself-employedreturneesshowsthatthelevelofincomeandworkconditionsarenotsatifyingenoughforstayinginAlbania.

Table 16. Comparison of returnees with those that have not migrated previously, by status in the labour market and desire

to migrate (18–40 years old)

Nr Returnees Never migrated% Desireto

migrate% Desireto

migrate1 Unemployed 28.2 64.5 27.4 49.22 Employed30hours

ormore 27.678.6 19.9 56.9

3 Self-employed 13.3 84.6 6.8 21.94 Homemakers 17.1 55.0 25.9 38.85 Employedlessthan

30hours 6.6100 1.9 33.3

6 Disabled 1.7 0.0 0.6 0.07 Student 5.5 100.0 17.3 62.98 Total 100.0 100.0


The prevalence of economic factors and dissatisfaction with thepoorqualityofservices(healthcare,education)inAlbaniaarenotuncommonandarealsounderlinedbyotherstudies.Thus,ajoint


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INSTATandIOMstudyshowedthat,atthetimeofthesurvey,in2014,almost46%of returneeswereunemployed.Thestudyalsoshowed that only 7% of returnees had invested their financialcapital,mainlyintheservicessectorandagriculture.Morethanhalfofreturneesemphasisedthelackofacceptable-qualityservicesandaninadequatehealthcaresystem.Italsoindicatedthat,asaresultofunemployment,insufficientincomeandlackofproperservices,almost one-third of the returnees wished to migrate again fromAlbania.83

Thehighlevelsofunemploymentandthelackofinvestmentsbythemigrants,intheabsenceofappropriatesocio-economicconditions,resultedintheircapitalnotbeingusedforthedevelopmentoftheirhomecountry.Wehavepointedoutinanotherstudy84 thatfailureto effectivelyuse the capital of the returnees for local social andeconomic development has negative consequences, includingdiscouraging future return migration, increasing the desire tomigrate,andhencedelayingtheonsetofthemigratorytransitionofAlbania.

83. INSTAT, IOM (2014) Return Migration and Reintegration in Albania. Tirana:InstituteofStatistics/InternationalOrganizationforMigration.84. Gëdeshi I., King R.(2018)Research Study on Brain Gain, Reversing Brain Drain with Albanian Scientific Diaspora.Tirana:UNDP.


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6. Conclusions and recommendations

Sincethestartofthepost-socialisttransition,Albaniahasseenunfoldoneofthelargestmodern-daymigratoryprocessesintheworldintermsof thescale(asapercentageof thecurrentpopulation)andintensityof internationalmigration.Albanianmigrationcontinuesandislikelytodosointhefuture.Thisconclusionissupportedbythelimitedstatisticsonongoingflows,andbyourpotentialmigrationsurveys,whichshowmigrationintentionsincreasingfrom44%ofthesurveyedpopulationin2007to52%in2018.Therefore,attheendofitsthirddecadeofinternationalmigration,Albaniaisfarfromthe endof its long, ongoingphaseof large-scale emigration, andequallyfarfromasituationofmigratorybalancewhichmightmarkthestartofatransitiontoacountrywithsignificantimmigration.85

Althoughitdoesnotfullymatchourfigures,GallupInternational,whichhasmeasuredpotentialmigrationin160countriesoftheworldsince2005,ranksAlbaniaamongthetopcountriesintheworldalongwithsomeAfricancountries.Moreover,whencomparingtheperiod2013–2016 with that of 2010–2012, the potential for emigrationfromAlbaniavis-à-visothercountriesshowedthegreatestincrease(20 percentage points): potential migration from 2013–2016 is

85. Typically, the ‘migration transition’ from a situation of net emigration tonetimmigrationinvolvestheshiftinginterplayofseveralinflowsandoutflows.Atanearlystageoftransition,emigrationtailsoff,tobeoutweighedbyreturnmigration.Subsequently,immigrationbringsnewinflowsfromothercountries.ThishasbeentherecenthistoricalexperienceofcountriessuchasItaly,SpainandGreece, although in the latter twoof these especially, the economic crisisunleashedanewphaseofmigrationdynamics:renewedemigrationofSpanishandGreeknationals, reduced returnmigrationofGreekandSpanishnationalslivingabroad,reducedinflowsofnewimmigrants,andfinallyreturnmigrationofimmigrantslivinginthesecountries(suchasAlbaniansreturningfromGreeceoronwardmigratingelsewhere).


78

estimatedat56%,comparedwith36%from2010–2012.86

Thecomparisonofthe2018and2007surveysoutlinedinthispaperhasshownthatsignificantqualitativeandquantitativechangeshavetaken place as regards the nature ofAlbanian migration, whichshould be taken into account by policymakers.Economic factorsdriving potentialmigration and, to a lesser extent, family-relatedfactors prevail, but their contribution has diminished since the2007 survey.New factorshavebecomemore significant, such as‘educationof children’ and ‘lackof prospects inAlbania’.WhileneighbouringGreeceandItalyremainthetopdestinationcountriesforAlbanianmigration,theirrelativeshareinthefutureislikelytobedownward.GermanyandtheUSarecurrentlythemostforeseendestinationcountriesforfutureAlbanianmigration.

These changes in the push factors and in the geography ofthe international migration are also reflected in the social anddemographicstructureandqualityofitsflows.Thedesiretomigrateis higher among the following categories: young people in theirlate 20s, the better educated andmost qualified, thosewhowereemployedandpersonsearningmedium-highincomes.Meanwhile,about a decade earlier, the desire to migrate was higher amongyoungpeople in their early 20s, less educated and less qualified,unemployed and persons earning a low income. Subsequently,Albaniawillbehitevenharderbybrainandskilldrain,whichwilldefinitelyhavenegativeconsequences.

Also,returnees–whosecurveofreturnpeakedin2010–2013(Greekcrisis) and 2016–2017 (refused asylumseekers fromGermany) –haveahigherdesiretomigratethanthosewhohavenotmigrated

86. Esipova N., Ray J., Pugliese A. (2017) Number of potential migrantsworldwide tops 700million, 8 June,Gallup News, 8 June, http://news.gallup.com/poll/211883/number-potential-migrants-worldwide-tops-700-million.aspx(lastaccessed11December2018).


79

previously.Ontheonehand,thisshowsthattheirre-integrationhasnotbeenasuccess.Ontheother,itshowsthatthehomecountryhasnotbeenable toutiliseproperly theirfinancial,humanandsocialcapitaltothebenefitofeconomicdevelopment.

Itisclearthatthedesire/intentofhalfofthepopulationaged18–40yearsoldtomigratefromAlbaniaisanunwantedsyndromeasmuchasitisarealitythatshouldbeaccepted.Ifmigrationistocontinue,effortsshouldbemadetomanageitinsuchawaythatthenegativeeffectsofmigration(disorderlydeparture,braindrain,exploitation)areminimised,andthepositiveimpacts(productiveuseoffinancialremittances,modernisingimpactofsocialremittances,linkstothehomeland,returnmigration,braingainetc.)aremaximised.

Giventherisingeducationalprofileofpotentialmigrants,avenuescanbeexplored for inter-countryagreementsonmanagedskilledmigration,alwaysbearinginmindthedangersofbrainandskillsdrain. This policy suggestion is made in the brief that skilledmigrants (through higher savings and remittances, investmentsandhigherhumanandsocialcapital)contributemore,uponreturn,for themselves, the home country and the host country (a triple-winsituation).Therefore,thepreliminaryeducationandtrainingofpotentialmigrants(takingintoaccountthelabourmarketdemandinEUcountries)maybeanoption,whichmaybeachievedinclosecooperationwiththehostcountry.ThisstudyhasdemonstratedthatAlbanianpotentialmigrantsaremoreaware thanadecadeearlierof the need for professional training, language acquisition andlearningabout thecultureof thehostcountry, inorder tobeabletoadaptmoreeasilytothelabourmarketdemand.Inthiscase,thehostcountrymayinvestinAlbania–intheframeworkofbilateralagreements–invocationaltrainingandeducation,providedthatthetrainedhumanresourcesarelargerthanthosewhodesiretoleave.Recognitionofeducationandtrainingbyhostcountriesisanothermeasure that would facilitate employment and ensure a higher


80

incomeforAlbanianmigrants.

Formalchannelsandemploymentagenciesmayplayasignificantroleinthisaspect.Theymayfacilitateandminimisethetransitionperiod until a job is found in the formal sector in line with theeducationandqualificationlevelofthemigrant.87Inthiscase,wewouldnothaveabrain waste,butawin-win-winsituation.

Theseformalchannelsmayalsobeusedforthereturnofmigrantsand their employment inAlbania, taking into consideration theirqualificationsandexperienceearnedinthehostcountry.Inadditiontoemployment,somereturneeswant to invest theircapital in theeconomy and need support and a favourable business climate.Business consulting agencies may play an important role inchannellingtheircapitalinthelocaleconomy.

EffortsshouldalsobemadetoimproveandbroadenthestructureofemploymentandbusinessopportunitiesinAlbaniasothatfewerpeoplearepessimisticabouttheirfutureinAlbaniaandhenceseemigration as the ‘only way out’. On the other hand, this wouldcontributetotheeffectiveutilisationofremittancesandthefinancial,humanandsocialcapitalofthemigrantsforthedevelopmentofthedomesticeconomy.

87. The2007surveyshowedthattheAlbanianmigrantsspentonaverage2–3yearsuntiltheyfoundajobthatwouldfittheireducationandqualifications.Thistransitoryperiodischaracterisedbyhighmobilityandperiodsofunemployment.TheminimisationofthisperiodwouldundoubtedlyboosttheearningsandhenceincreaseremittancesfromAlbanianmigrants.


81

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Documents

Ilir Gëdeshi dhe Russell King PÑRTÑTASHMEN NEW TRENDS IN ...library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/15272.pdf · b t } v a 5 List of figures Figure 1. Potential migration by age