Jae Gwon Kim

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Reply to Jaegwon Kim on Mental Causation

August 11, 2003

Dear Jaegwon,

I have just read a piece by you in which you criticize some views o mine and

cha!!enge me in interesting ways" #$his is on page %&'(0 in )$he *any +rob!ems o

*enta! ausation"-. I respect your opinions so I am going to respond to your criticisms"

/irst o a!!, in describing my views #p"%. you shit a!most imperceptib!y rom my

termino!ogy where I ta! about dierent )!eve!s- o a )system-, and to your termino!ogy

where you c!aim I am oering )descriptions o the same situation"- I dont reca!! using

)situation,- and it doesnt sound !ie me" I preer )system"- $his shit is important

because the net move you mae is rom )situation- to )phenomenon4- and then it turns

out that you are going to use this to try to sadd!e me with some ind o reductionist

identity c!aim, )pain 5 neuron irings"- 6ut that is a distortion o my views" 7o what is

the right way not on!y to interpret me, but the right way to te!! the truth8 9e!!, here goes"

$he irst step is, as a!ways, to orget a!! about phi!osophy with its incoherenttermino!ogy, its great traditiona! mistaes and obso!ete categories" $he irst step in short

is to describe the acts" :ou mae it impossib!e to do this at the very beginning where

you as, );ow is it possib!e or the mind to eercise its causa! powers in a wor!d that is

undamenta!!y physica!8- #p"30." 6ut this way o posing the <uestion accepts the

obso!ete distinction o menta! and physica! that we need to overcome and accepting that

distinction that maes it impossib!e or you to hear my answer" 7o !ets give a

description that avoids the o!d mistaes" ;ere is such a description"

$he brain, !ie any other organ or piece o machinery, is a system4 and !ie any

system it has dierent !eve!s o description" +ains are at a higher !eve! and neuron irings

at a !ower !eve!" $o get c!ear about dierent !eve!s o description o a system, consider a

much simp!er system" ompare the brain with a hammer used to drive a nai!" $he

hammer a!so has dierent !eve!s o description" $he hardness #so!idity. o the hammer

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head is at a higher !eve!, the mo!ecu!e movements at a !ower !eve!" 9hen systems

unction causa!!y the dierent !eve!s unction causa!!y, but typica!!y they are dierent

!eve!s o the same causa! system and not dierent causes" $hus when the hammer drives

the nai!, the so!idity o the hammer head unctions causa!!y at the higher !eve! when it

hits the nai!, but at the !ower !eve! the mo!ecu!es in the hammer head transer energy to

the mo!ecu!es in the nai!" $his does not imp!y either that there is overdetermination #that

the movement o the nai! has two independent sets o causes or that so!idity is

epiphenomena! #that it is causa!!y irre!evant." /urthermore the hardness o the hammer

head is ep!ained causa!!y by the behavior o the mo!ecu!es" $his is a typica! orm o

)bottom up- causation where a higher !eve! eature o a system is ep!ained by the

behavior o the !ower !eve! e!ements o which the system is composed" =ow with these

points in mind, the eistence o causa!!y rea! !eve!s within a system and the eistence o

bottom up orms o causa! ep!anation, !et us state some uncontroversia! acts about how

pains unction causa!!y"

/irst act> I have a pain, a headache, and this pain is a higher !eve! eature o my

brain" At a !ower !eve! o the same system there are massive neurons irings in my brain,

=+" $he neuron irings cause the pain by bottom up causation o the sort we ound in the

hammer eamp!e" I describe this act by saying that the pain is caused by neurona!

processes and realized in the neurona! system" #I thin your commitment to a ;umean

ana!ysis o causation maes it hard to accept these acts, so its oay with me i you say

that the pain is explained by neurona! processes" It maes no dierence.

7econd act" $he pain, together with desires and be!ies, causes me to have a

desire or aspirin" $his is !et right event causation across time" $he pain at t1 #a!ong with

be!ies and desires. causes the desire at t2" +hi!osophers have inherited a !ot o mistaes

rom ;ume and one o the avorites is to suppose that a!! causation must be !et right

causation across time"

$hird act> *y desire is itse! caused by !ower'!eve! neuron irings in the brain,

=+?" Just as the pain was caused by neurona! processes whi!e rea!ized in the system o

neurons, so with the desire" :ou cou!d not have a conscious desire un!ess it was caused

by neuron irings and the desire can on!y eist i it is rea!ized in the neurona! system"

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/ourth act> At !ower !eve! description o the system =+ causes =+?" @et right

causation across time" $he higher !eve! eatures unction causa!!y because they are

eatures o a system o !ower !eve! e!ements unctioning causa!!y" =otice that we are not

talking about two causes, but one system of causation described at different levels" And

we cou!d eep going on down to the !eve! o <uars and muons"

In neither the hammer case nor the brain does this set o orma! re!ations imp!y

either causa! overdetermination or epiphenomena!ism, because the !ower !eve! causes are

not separate causes but the same causes described at a !ower !eve! o the system" "

=otice that the description that I have given is tota!!y unprob!ematic as !ong as we

stay away rom the traditiona! phi!osophica! categories"

=ow why do we have prob!ems about the )menta!- cases that we do not have in

the hammer case8 9e!! irst in the hammer case, we typica!!y carve o the surace

eatures and redeine the notions in terms o the causes o the surace eatures" $hat is, on

the basis o the causa! reduction we mae an onto!ogica! reduction" 9e go rom )so!idity

is caused by mo!ecu!ar behavior- to )so!idity just is mo!ecu!ar behavior-" 9e are

re!uctant to do this with pains because the who!e point o having the concept is to name

the irst person onto!ogy, the what'it'ee!s'!ie aspect o pains" 7o in the case o pains the

causa! reduction does not !ead to an onto!ogica! reduction"

$he appearance that there is an especia!!y diicu!t phi!osophica! prob!em seems to

me the resu!t o a series o conusions" I be!ieve there are our sets o conusions"

1" onusion about causation"

Apparent!y you have a prob!em about bottom up causation, but it is abso!ute!y common

in nature" It is an o!d phi!osophica! mistae, and as I said, we can b!ame ;ume or it, to

suppose that a!! causation must be event causation going !et to right through time and

covered by a causa! !aw" I sti!! ind it hard to be!ieve that anybody be!ieves that

mytho!ogy but there it is and I suppose it is sti!! common" 6ut non ;umean, non event

causation is very common in nature" As yourse!, )9hat causes this des to eert

pressure on the !oor8- Answer> gravity" 6ut gravity is not another event" It is a

permanent orce operating in nature" I cou!d mu!tip!y eamp!es indeinite!y but there is

no <uestion that this is such a case" r i you !ie, more typica! cases are bottom up

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causation where you move rom the micro to the macro" As yourse!, )9hy does this

tab!e ehibit the eatures o so!idity8- $hat is, or eamp!e, it supports objects, it is

impenetrab!e by other objects, etc" And the answer o course is that the mo!ecu!e

movements causa!!y ep!ain the surace eature o so!idity" $he cause and eect are

simu!taneous and indeed, they are !ie consciousness in the brain, dierent !eve!s o

description o the same system" $he orm o these re!ationships, to repeat, is very

common in nature"

2" A second conusion is about identity"

$here are actua!!y severa! dierent inds o identity statements" $he phi!osophers

avorite is the one that asserts the identity o a materia! object with itse!" *ar $wain 5

7amue! !emens, or eamp!e" r $he Bvening 7tar5 $he *orning 7tar" Another

avorite is identity o composition" $he water is identica! with ;2 mo!ecu!es, because

water is composed o ;20 mo!ecu!es" Bvent identity is much tricier than either o these,

not on!y because #!ie objects. the same event can have so many dierent descriptions

but, even more important!y, events have !ess c!ear boundaries than materia! objects" $he

event o my wa!ing around in room (0 6irge rom 12 to 1 is identica! with my giving a

!ecture in (0 6irge rom 12 to1, because I wa! around whi!e I !ecture" 7o, is the event o

my ee!ing a pain identica! with the event o neuron irings8 $he <uestion is i!!'deined"

;ere is one interpretation> an we introduce the notion o an event big enough to be

described both as my ee!ing a pain, and such and such neurons iring8 I you phrase the

<uestion that way, the answer is yes, o course" It is no more prob!ematic to describe a

sing!e event as ee!ing a pain and neurons iring than describing a sing!e event as me

wa!ing and me !ecturing" 6ut in this !arge sense the identity pain 5 neuron irings is no

use to the identity theorists, because that identity !eaves us with an irreducibi!e irst

person onto!ogy as part o the event and the who!e idea o the identity theory was to

deend materia!ism and reject any irreducib!e menta! component" $he identity theory

was part o a reductionist program" $hey wanted being a pain just to be neurons iring

and nothing more #nothing )over and above- in the jargon o the time." 6ut event

identity big enough to state the truth wont give you that reduction #compare> the identity

o the event o my wa!ing with the event o my !ecturing does not mae wa!ing into

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!ecturing." $he point o the reduction was to give a materia!ist so!ution to the mind'body

prob!em that wou!d show that there was no irreducib!e irst person onto!ogy" 6ut our

identity, pain 5neuron irings, does not give this resu!t, because the event in <uestion

sti!! has both irst person and third person properties" In the case o consciousness, un!ie

say, so!idity, the causa! reduction does not !ead to an onto!ogica! reduction, and that !eads

to the net point"

3" $hird conusion> Ceduction"

Just as there are many dierent inds o identity statements so there many dierent inds

o reductions" $ypica!!y a causa! reduction !eads to onto!ogica! reduction, because we

redeine the reduced phenomenon into its causa! basis" 6ut you cant do this with

consciousness and the brain because you cant do a reduction o a irst person onto!ogy

into a third person onto!ogy" 6ut so what8 $he pain isnt something Eover and aboveE its

neura! basis, even though it is not onto!ogica!!y reducib!e to its neurona! bases" $here are

no causa! powers o the pain that are not causa! powers o the neura! structure, because

the pain is just a state that the structure is in"

%" /ourth conusion> Dua!ism"

6ecause the irst person onto!ogy is not onto!ogica!!y reduced to a third person onto!ogy

we are tempted to thin that there must be some ind o dua!ist onto!ogy !etover, that

pains, etc" might be rea! though epiphenomena!, that the immateria! pain is in a dierent

onto!ogica! category rom the materia! brain, that it is something )over and above- brain

processes" 6ut o course that is a massive mistae"

$he bottom !ine o this entire discussion is that i we orget a!! about the

traditiona! phi!osophica! categories with their massive conusions, due most!y to

Descartes and ;ume, then the prob!ems have a rather easy so!ution" In short, it seems to

me that your objections to me are based not on any rea! dispute about the acts or even in

understanding the acts, but rather on your acceptance o the traditiona! phi!osophica!

categories"

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