KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN · 2016. 10. 10. · KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN: TROUBLE IN THE ﬁISLAND OF DEMOCRACYﬂ 28 August 2001 ICG Asia Report No 22 Osh/Brussels

KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN:

TROUBLE IN THE �ISLAND OF DEMOCRACY�

28 August 2001

ICG Asia Report No 22Osh/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA..................................................................................................... i

MAP OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC ................................................................................. ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................. iii

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1

II. POTENTIAL SPARKS FOR CONFLICT................................................................4

A. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ...................................................................................4B. PARLIAMENT.......................................................................................................8C. THE JUDICIARY .................................................................................................10D. THE PUBLIC ......................................................................................................14E. POLITICAL PARTIES (THE OPPOSITION) .............................................................18F. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) .............................................21G. THE MEDIA .......................................................................................................22

III. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................26

APPENDICES

A. KYRGYZ PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS (FEBRUARY/MARCH 2000) .....................29B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................30C. GLOSSARY OF TERMS........................................................................................31D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .....................................................34E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS...............................................................35F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .....................................................................................39

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O S H S K A Y A O B L A S T'

KYRGYZSTAN

ICG Asia Report No 22 28 August 2001

KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN:


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For most of the decade since it gainedindependence, Kyrgyzstan has been described asan island of democracy and stability in CentralAsia. In comparison with other countries in theregion, it has indeed carried out deeper economicreforms and allowed more room for civil societyand opposition political activity. Recentdevelopments, however, indicate that thisstability is fragile, and that hard-won democraticgains are being eroded. If the government ofKyrgyzstan resorts to authoritarianism orcrumbles under the weight of the country�smoribund economy, the international communitywill suffer a setback for its hopes of promoting amodel for economic and political reform inCentral Asia.

The greatest threat to political stability remainspublic discontent with the economy. More than60 per cent of the population live below thepoverty line. While the government has pursuedsome of the most ambitious economic reforms inthe region, these efforts have yet to translate intothe significant economic growth that wouldreverse the steady decline in the standard ofliving.

In 2000 and 2001 protests broke out in Bishkek,Narin, Jalal-Abad and elsewhere in reaction torising costs, stagnant wages and unemployment.Although protests have been modest in scopethus far, widespread public demonstrations andunrest could be on the horizon if the economicsituation remains bleak. Food prices will likelyincrease again this fall, exacerbating socialstrains in a country already struggling with sharp

internal political divisions, ethnic tensions, militaryincursions by the guerrilla group the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and disputes withneighbour states over resources, security andborders.

All this comes against a backdrop of efforts by thegovernment to curtail both personal freedoms andpolitical opposition. During the last several years,and particularly during the 2000 presidentialelection, President Askar Akaev has tightened hisgrip on the country. Although he had a reputation forbeing the leading democrat in the region, he beganhis campaign to diminish any opposition early in hisrule. In recent years harassment of oppositionpoliticians and journalists has been on the rise andthe executive branch has increasingly used a largelycompliant judiciary as a key tool to silence politicalopponents and critical media.

In 2000, former Vice-President and former Ministerof National Security, Feliks Kulov � viewed bymany as the strongest potential challenger in thepresidential race � was sentenced to a long prisonterm after being denied the right to stand for thepresidency on a technicality. Similarly, the humanrights activist and leader of the Erkindik Party,Topchubek Turgunaliev, was also jailed although hehas now been released. Charges against both menwere clearly politically motivated, as was thedecision of the Supreme Court of Arbitration toclose down Asaba � one of the country�s mostpopular opposition papers.

As they have come under mounting pressure,opposition parties have recognised that they will

Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the �Island of Democracy�ICG Asia Report N° 22, 28 August 2001 Page iv

need to join forces if they hope to survive. Tenmajor opposition parties formed a broadcoalition, the People�s Patriotic Movement, inApril 2001. The ability of this oppositioncoalition to provide an effective counter-weightto President Akaev and his supporters remainsunproven. However, the opposition haseffectively galvanised public concern about plansby President Akaev to make territorialconcessions to both Uzbekistan and China toresolve border disputes. A memorandum signedby the Uzbek and Kyrgyz prime ministers on theexchange of land was voted down by theparliament in 2001 and the government hasstruggled to minimise the fallout from the leak oftwo secret border agreements signed with Chinain 1996 and 1999. If ratified, these would giveChina more than 100,000 hectares of Kyrgyzland. The parliamentary opposition has eventhreatened to begin impeachment proceedingsagainst President Akaev for the conduct of theborder matters, and while this is likely an emptythreat, it does highlight the many fault lines in thecurrent political environment. There are alsosigns that President Akaev may be facing someopposition from within his own ranks. All ofthese elements combine to suggest that thepotential for a political crisis that could sparkviolent conflict in Kyrgyzstan has risenconsiderably.

Efforts by the government to suppress religiousmovements such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, whichhave established a solid foothold in southernKyrgyzstan, add to the current atmosphere ofinstability, as have security concerns aboutrenewed incursions by the IMU and disputes withneighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan abouthow best to deal with this threat. There remainssubstantial risk that Uzbekistan might intervenemilitarily in southern Kyrgyzstan if it deems thegovernment in Bishkek is not effectively actingto halt the IMU. Even a small-scale interventionon Uzbekistan�s part would raise fears thatTashkent was seeking to annex territory andpossibly provoke clashes between the ethnicUzbek and Kyrgyz communities.

Kyrgyzstan is faced with a choice ofreinvigorating genuine economic and politicalreform or following the path of authoritarianism.Economic reforms have failed to deliverimproved living standards because they havebeen hobbled by corruption and cronyism. A

weak legal system and fickle governmentinterventions in businesses have meant the countryhas not developed an attractive investmentenvironment.

International support � and constructive pressure� will be crucial in helping President Akaevembrace a more responsible political direction.Indeed, if the president continues on his currentcourse, the likelihood of violence that would furthercripple prospects for progress in the region will onlycontinue to rise, and the once heralded �island ofdemocracy� will disappear into a sea of instability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KYRGYZSTAN:

1. Reinvigorate economic reforms by focusing onpoverty alleviation and improving theinvestment environment.

2. Allow free association of political groups andensure that laws requiring their registration arenot used to restrict political organisations.Grant amnesty for those political opponentsjailed in the run-up to the 2000 presidentialelection.

3. Step up legal reforms by allowing trueindependence for the judiciary, approving anti-bribery statutes and introducing regulations onlobbying.

4. Privatise the state print media and turn thenational television into an independentcorporation controlled by a non-political boardand with its own source of funds. Reform libellaws to make it a civil rather than criminalmatter and limit awards so that libel is not beused to bankrupt opposition media.

5. Reduce the number of government employees,be more transparent in recruitment and grantethnic Uzbeks greater representation ingovernment, the judiciary and the police.

6. Lift restrictions on the Hizb ut-Tahrir andpursue a dialogue with its members, Muslimscholars, media and NGOs.

Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the �Island of Democracy�ICG Asia Report N° 22, 28 August 2001 Page v

7. Elect rather than appoint provincialgovernors to reduce corruption and providestronger local representation.

8. End the use of referenda to circumventparliament, and in particular end the�bundling� of issues in referenda tocircumvent the specific will of theelectorate.

TO THE DONOR COMMUNITY:

9. Major donor countries � in particular theUnited States, the members of the EuropeanUnion and Japan � should make it clear thatany rescheduling of Kyrgyzstan�s debt andcontinued aid will be contingent on furthereconomic reforms and an immediateimprovement in the treatment of oppositiongroups, journalists and the othercomponents of a civil society.

10. Donors should work closely with theKyrgyz authorities, local NGOs, the media

and the domestic/international businesscommunity to reduce corruption, and makeclear that future co-operation will hinge onmajor improvements in the rule of law.Encourage parliament to pass laws governinglobbying and outlawing bribery. Step upassistance for legal training.

11. Donors should assist the Kyrgyz authorities toimprove training for journalists and providefinancial support to the independent media toreduce its technical dependence on the state,by funding, for example, an independentpublishing and printing house.

12. These countries should help the Kyrgyzauthorities in their current efforts to restructuregovernment administration through training ofpublic officials and by aiding the introductionof new standards of personnel management.

Osh/Brussels, 28 August 2001

ICG Asia Report No 22 28 August 2001

KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN:


I. INTRODUCTION

During the early years of the decade sinceindependence from the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstanwas warmly viewed by the internationalcommunity as one of the few success stories ofeconomic and political reform in Central Asia.President Askar Akaev expressed his hopes thatruggedly mountainous Kyrgyzstan could becomethe �Switzerland of Central Asia,� and thecountry was widely hailed as an �island ofdemocracy� in a region where autocracy andconflict seemed to be the norm. In contrast to theother Central Asian states, an independent media,multi-party democracy, NGOs and civil societywere largely allowed to develop freely. Effortswere also made to harmonise relations betweenthe country�s various ethnic groups � primarilythe ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek in southernKyrgyzstan. These freedoms did not lead toupheaval and anarchy, as some neighbouringauthoritarian regimes had argued they would injustifying their own stranglehold on power.

Compared to the authoritarian rule in Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan, the ferocious civil conflict thatraged for five years in Tajikistan and theStalinesque personality cult that PresidentNiyazov developed in Turkmenistan �Kyrgyzstan looked promising indeed. Generousamounts of international assistance flowed to thecountry as a result, and Kyrgyzstan became thefirst state in Central Asia to be welcomed into theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) in Decemberof 1998. The U.S. State Department quickly

called the development a sign of Kyrgyzstan�s�leadership on market reform.�1

Events since that time have seriously dimmedKyrgyzstan�s reputation for reform and, moreperilously, pushed the country closer to crisis. Threemajor factors are contributing to growing instability.First, President Akaev and his supporters havesharply curtailed civil liberties and used a variety ofmethods to crack down on critical journalists andopposition politicians. Second, while economicreforms have been ambitious, poverty remainswidespread and the public is increasinglydissatisfied with declining living standards. Third, aseries of interlocking security concerns appeared:incursions by the guerrilla organisation the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan (IMU), ethnic tensions, thegrowing popularity of the underground Islamistgroup Hizb ut-Tahrir [�Party of Liberation�], anddisputes with neighbouring states over borders,resources and the conduct of counter-insurgencycampaigns.

Even in the best of times, and with the best ofmanagement, Kyrgyzstan would still face sternchallenges. With an ethnically diverse population ofless than five million people, this small, poor andlandlocked country enjoys few natural economicassets. Although it possesses some gold deposits,and reasonably fertile land, the largely agrariansociety is far removed from international marketsand has few comparative advantages. Further, theTien Shan mountain range effectively divides thecountry in two for much of the year. Geographically

1 Statement by James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of StateSpokesman, 22 December 1998.

Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the �Island of Democracy�ICG Asia Report N° 22, 28 August 2001 Page 2

placed between far more powerful and sometimesantagonistic states such as Russia, China andUzbekistan, existence has often been precariousfor Kyrgyzstan. Riots between ethnic Kyrgyz andethnic Uzbeks in the southern city of Osh in 1990also contributed to lingering tensions between thenation�s two largest ethnic groups.

In retrospect, Akaev�s authoritarian bent has beenmore a steady evolution than a sudden shift.Early in his tenure, he argued that the Kyrgyzparliament was populated with Soviet-eraholdovers who opposed political and economicreforms � a claim that was generally viewedwith sympathy both in Kyrgyzstan and abroad.To move ahead with his agenda, Akaev sought toreduce the powers of parliament in favour of theexecutive. He justified this by suggesting that aWestern-style parliamentary system was notpractical while the country had a weak economyand an under-developed civil society. Theamended constitution became law on 5 May 1993and has subsequently been revised twice: in 1996and 1998.

Although tensions continued between theparliament and the president, the institutions ofcivil society developed relatively freely until themid-1990s. Since then, Akaev has tightened hisgrip on power and imposed a number ofrestrictions on the independent media and thepolitical opposition. The presidentialadministration has defended its actions byarguing that strong executive powers are neededto deal with pressing security and economicproblems. During the 2000 presidential elections,which Akaev won with more than 74 per cent ofthe vote amid widespread accusations ofirregularities, the president�s supporters arguedthat the opposition�s lack of experience andintegrity would put not only the safety, but eventhe very existence of Kyrgyzstan, at risk.

Since the election, relations between theexecutive branch and the parliament have steadilyeroded, as has the relationship between thepresidential administration and the media. Inresponse to government�s increasingly centralisedhold on power, ten major opposition partiesformed a broad-based coalition, the People�sPatriotic Movement, in April 2001. Independentjournalists and human rights activists throughoutCentral Asia established �the London Forum� inthe spring of 2001 to focus international attention

on the often-bleak state of civil society in the region.

Although the largest non-governmental organisation(NGO) in Kyrgyzstan � the nation-wide �CoalitionNGO� � faced considerable problems with thegovernment last year following its criticalassessment of the parliamentary and presidentialelections, the non-governmental sector continues tobe quite active. In many ways, the broad range ofNGOs that have sprung up since independence haveacted as a substitute for the media and oppositionpolitical parties, which have faced considerablepressure from the government. Fortunately, and inlarge part because of Kyrgyzstan�s dependence oninternational assistance, President Akaev has beensomewhat sensitive to international criticisms of hisactions. If the international community judges thatKyrgyzstan no longer warrants support because ofits recent steps against democratic institutions,Akaev would soon find himself further besieged in acountry whose economic condition would rapidlydeteriorate without aid.

Grim economic realities have led directly tospontaneous political protests2 and are heighteningthe potential for violent unrest in the country. TheWorld Bank estimates that 64 per cent of thepopulation lives below the poverty line, althoughsome local estimates have placed that figure closerto 80 per cent.3 Kyrgyzstan has earned a goodreputation for its willingness to embrace economicreform. Most state enterprises have been privatised,and the country has introduced significant marketreforms.

However, the collapse of the social safety net in thewake of the Soviet period, rampant inflation and therelatively low level of economic development, haveall combined to produce declining living standards.There is a real sense of hard hardship among manypensioners, the unemployed and government

2 See �Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia�s LocalisedPoverty and Social Unrest,� ICG Asia Report, No. 16, 8June 2001. All ICG reports are accessible at:http://www.crisisweb.org.3 World Bank, �Kyrgyz Republic Country Data: KyrgyzRepublic at a Glance� (Washington, DC: September 2000),available at:http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/kgz_aag.pdfand Res Publica (Bishkek), �Korruptsiia goschinovnikov �prichina nishchety naroda [The corruption of governmentbureaucrats is the cause of the people�s poverty],� ResPublica, 22 May 2001, p. 6.


workers who continue to be among the hardesthit. Corruption and cronyism have underminedsome reforms, which have not produced rapidenough economic growth to alleviate the plight ofmost people. Thus far, 1,200 government jobshave been eliminated at the national level, andanother 2,000 cuts are planned. Despite the pain,far deeper cuts will soon be necessary, when oneconsiders that 22 per cent of those employed �some 393,400 people � work for the civilservice.4 Similarly, while the government hastamed inflation from a high of more than 1,000per cent annually in 1993, to 9.5 per cent in 2000,price rises continue to outpace economic growth.

Religious movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, anunderground political group seeking to replacethe existing countries of Central Asia with anIslamic caliphate, are attracting increasingnumbers of members, particularly in southernKyrgyzstan. The country has also been rockedduring the last several years by incursions by theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).5 Therelative ease with which the IMU enteredKyrgyzstan in 1999 highlighted the deficienciesof the security services, and sharply escalatedtensions with neighbouring Uzbekistan whichfeels that its neighbour does not do enough tostop radical Islamist groups operating from itsterritory. The situation is further complicated bythe persistent tensions between Uzbek andKyrgyz communities in these southern borderregions.

Friction between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan hasalso increased over unresolved border issues andresources such as water. A memorandum whichwould have transferred territory to Uzbekistan,creating a link to one of its enclaves withinKyrgyzstan, as well as a secret deal with Chinaon border demarcation, aroused controversy

4 The figures quoted are 1999 figures provided by theStatistics Department of the Ministry of Labour andSocial Protection. Figures for 2000 and 2001 are not yetavailable. ICG telephone interview, 8 August 2001.Azimbek Isabekov, a government departmental head, on14 June announced that 1,200 jobs had so far beenabolished in national government and that another 2,000will be cut. Local district administrations will be reducedfrom 150 to 80 employees. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5,No. 115, Part I, 15 June 2001.5 See �Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security,�ICG Asia Report, No. 14, 1 March 2001.

when they were leaked in 2001. Manyparliamentarians and citizens accused Akaev ofbetraying Kyrgyzstan�s interests. Some members ofparliament have even suggested impeaching thepresident, although this is unlikely.

Kyrgyzstan � long held forth as a model of hope inCentral Asia � faces a dangerous confluence ofeconomic and political missteps, mounting socialtensions and serious security concerns. Without aconcerted effort by the government to return to anagenda of reform and active internationalengagement, Kyrgyzstan will be another conflictwaiting to happen.


II. MANY POTENTIAL SPARKS FORCONFLICT

The political landscape in Kyrgyzstan has manyof the hallmarks of a healthy civil society. Sinceindependence, the number of non-governmentalorganisations, media outlets and oppositionparties has swelled. Economic reform and large-scale privatisation efforts have introduced manynew faces into the economy. Constitutionalstandards guarantee a free press, many basicreligious freedoms and the separations of powersbetween the executive, judicial and legislativebranches of government. However, the powerwielded by the respective actors withinKyrgyzstan�s political system has becomedangerously skewed as the presidentialadministration has attempted to consolidate andexpand its authority. This has left Kyrgyzstanawkwardly lurching between genuine reform andreversion to the heavy-handed tactics of theSoviet past. To best understand the potential forconflict today, it is first necessary to look at thekey players. This report considers the role ofseven particularly crucial groups: the executivebranch, the judiciary, parliament, the public,opposition parties, NGOs and the media.

A. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Askar Akaev first assumed the presidency whenthe post was established in 1990. After multiplerounds of voting in the republic�s SupremeSoviet, he emerged as a compromise candidate.In August 1991, Kyrgyzstan declared itsindependence, and on 27 October 1991, Akaevwas �re-elected� after standing for the presidencyunopposed. Complaining that real reform wouldcontinue to be blocked by the largely holdoverSoviet-era parliament, Akaev pushed through anew constitution in 1993.

In December of 1995, Akaev was re-elected forfive years after a campaign beset withirregularities, including the disqualification ofthree opposition candidates shortly before thevote on the trumped up grounds that their electionpetitions contained �invalid� signatures. In July1998 the Constitutional Court ruled that Akaevwas eligible to run for the presidency again in2000, despite the two-term limit in the 1993constitution. Like President Karimov in

neighbouring Uzbekistan, Akaev argued that his firsttwo elections in 1990 and 1991 did not countbecause they took place under the old constitution.

The constitution can be changed by parliament or byreferendum. If changes are made by parliament, theConstitutional Court must endorse them, whereas ifthey are made by referendum, no court endorsementis needed. Akaev has used a series of referenda, themost important of which took place in October1994, February 1996 and October 1998, tostrengthen considerably the powers of the executive.Each has passed by an overwhelming margin andhas been accompanied by claims of ballot stuffing.The president now has the power to appointprovincial governors and government ministers, aswell as to appoint the prime minister in consultationwith parliament. He also has the right to fire theprime minister and dissolve parliament by decree.Further, he appoints the state secretary,6 prosecutorsand judges, as well as a third of the members of theCentral Election Commission. The president alsochairs the Security Council, is the head of the ArmedForces, and controls the National Security Servicesand the Ministry of the Interior. The president hasthe right to declare a state of emergency.7

In the run-up to the October 2000 presidentialelections, the government worked systematically toundermine Akaev�s potential rivals. Former vicepresident Feliks Kulov, after his arrest in May 2000,was tried by a military tribunal for abuse of power.Although initially acquitted, the decision wasappealed and Kulov was found guilty in asubsequent retrial. In May 2001, the leader of theKyrgyz People�s Party Daniyar Usenov, was foundguilty of an assault charge that was more than fouryears old and was sentenced to probation �disqualifying him from running for public office.Not surprisingly, President Akaev won re-electionhandily, with more than 74 per cent of the vote.

Many political observers within Kyrgyzstan lamentthe government�s increasingly authoritarian tilt. Aleading politician, who preferred to remain

6 Often the most influential position after the president, thestate secretary�s role is dependant on the president.According to the Constitution �the President appoints theState Secretary of Kyrgyzstan and determines his status andauthorities� (art. 46, paragraph 1, point 6).7 Konstitutsiia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [The Constitution ofthe Kyrgyz Republic] (Bishkek: Raritet Info, 1999), art. 46and 47, pp. 65-68.


anonymous, told ICG that Akaev has garnered�enormous powers� that allow him to dominateall three branches of government: �If Kyrgyzstanwere a democratic country vesting the presidencywith extensive [constitutional] rights, it wouldnot be so bad. However, since the politicalestablishment does not represent political partiesor political organisations, the consolidation ofpower in the president�s hands can do onlyharm.� Not everyone shares this view. IshembaiKadyrbekov, an independent member ofparliament, said: �The president is a sensibleperson and a strong analyst. His policies aregood, but this does not help when the team whichis to implement these policies is bad.�8

Others claim that Akaev has never fully brokenfree from the old Soviet bureaucracy despite hisinitial efforts. Melis Eshimkanov, the formerowner of the banned opposition paper Asaba andleader of the People�s Party, says: �Akaev isnothing but a marionette,� and a �prisoner of theformer party nomenclature.�9 Or as one journalistexpressed privately, �Perhaps somebody �bought�Akaev at some point. Perhaps his wife reallyrules the country. Who knows? We are littlepeople and know very little about what ishappening in the country at the moment.�10

The Best Jobs that Money Can Buy? It is verydifficult to glean information about the powerstruggles and political perspectives within theexecutive branch. However, there are clear trendsin how the presidential administration functionsthat have an important impact on governance andstability. Presidential appointments andgovernment structures still operate in a stricthierarchy, and large numbers of officials, such asprovincial governors, continue to be appointedrather than directly elected. Until recently thiswas also the case for local mayors, or akims, whowill be selected in popular elections as ofNovember 2001, after limited trial elections wereheld in the spring of 2001.

Officials in the executive branch have used theircontrol of such appointments both as a means forpersonal enrichment and as a tool to keeppotential rivals relatively weak. Because

8 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.9 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.10 ICG interview, Karakol, 3 May 2001.

appointments are frequently rotated by the executivebranch, the average tenure for a governor is onlyabout eighteen months, although there are someexceptions to this rule. This is done to assert centralauthority and to prevent local patronage groups frombecoming too powerful.11 Most appointees are askedto serve outside the region where they have theirstrongest political networks. Thus, the currentgovernor of Osh Province is himself from Narin, thegovernor of Jalal-Abad is from Isik-Köl and thegovernor of Isik-Köl is from Osh. The governorsoften recruit key members of their respective staffsfrom their home regions rather than from the regionin which they work, creating a system that providescitizens with leaders who are not well versed in localconcerns. Those who are appointed ministers,governors and akims are sometimes seen as lackingthe necessary knowledge and skills for the posts.12

Money is also said to be a key in determiningpresidential appointments. Some oppositionpoliticians claim that 70-80 per cent of the peopleworking with Akaev have �bought� their positions� a claim that is obviously impossible to verify.The going rate for a governorship is rumoured to beU.S.$250,000, with a mayoral job costing someU.S.$50,000. Jobs in local administration, schoolsand hospitals are also alleged to be sold on a regularbasis.13 Knowing that they are likely to hold thesepositions for only a limited time, appointees have astrong incentive to them to recover their�investment� as quickly as possible by means ofgraft.

Many of those interviewed for this report claimedthat the president�s wife, Mayram Akaeva, plays akey role in making presidential appointments. Theclans to which the president and his wife belong (theSari-Bagish and the Saruu and Kutchu, respectively)are very well represented in government posts. A

11 Patronage groups in Kyrgyzstan are based on kinship,regional groupings, organisations or schools one belongs to,etc. The traditional kinship system retains its salience amongmany Kyrgyz. Major clan-lineages in Kyrgyzstan includethe Saruu and Kutchu (Talas), the Sayaks (Jumgal �Susamir), the Solto (Chüy), the Bugu (Isik-Köl), the Sari-Bagish (Kemin) Kara-Bagish (Narin), and the Ichkilik groupof clans (south-western Kyrgyzstan).12 ICG interview with Professor Turar Koichuev, Centre forEconomic and Social Reform of the Kyrgyz Academy ofSciences, Bishkek, 30 May 2001.13 ICG interview, Zamira Sydykova, Editor-in-chief, ResPublica, Bishkek, 27 April 2001.


quarter of all state employees in Bishkek are saidto be from Talas, the home district of thepresident�s wife, and the head of presidentialadministration, the director of the Kyrgyz Stategold mining company (Kyrgyzaltin) and thedirector of Kyrgyz Telecom are also all from theregion.14

It is a common view among some observers ofKyrgyz politics that Akaev and his wife haveaccumulated considerable wealth from sellinggovernment posts, though solid evidence tosupport this claim is generally absent. On 7 June2000, the newspaper Res Publica asserted that thepresident�s wife had a stake in the Bishkek HyattRegency Hotel, repeating allegations first raisedin the British newspaper The Guardian.15 If true,they may lend some support to claims thatadministrative positions are sold. However, thepresident�s wife has denied them.16 The strongestevidence for such claims is the presumption thatAkaev would not tolerate the rampant corruptionwhich prevails in his country were he not himselfa beneficiary.

A number of well-qualified and populargovernment officials and politicians have foundthemselves selected for ambassadorial posts asthey became better positioned to challengeAkaev. The former head of presidentialadministration, Mendet Sadyrkulov, currentlyserves as the Ambassador to Iran, the formerrector of the Osh State University and MP, BakytBeshimov, is Ambassador to India, and formerVice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs,Roza Otunbaeva, is Ambassador to the UnitedKingdom. Another popular politician, formerPrime Minister Amangeldi Muraliev, was offeredthe Kyrgyz ambassadorship to China, which hedeclined. He is currently the co-ordinator of theBirimdik Party and holds the chairmanship of theKyrgyz Football Federation. While none of theseindividuals were forced to accept these posts, insome cases doing so also meant that thegovernment dropped threats of investigation, andsuch appointments have been effective in co-

14 ICG interview with Gulmira Temirbekova, assistant to�Coalition NGO�, Talas, 24 April 2001.15 Andrew Clark: �Five Star Headache: Hyatt Discoversthe Pitfalls� The Guardian, London, 16 May 2001.16 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 110, Part I, 11 June2001.

opting or otherwise removing potential adversaries.

A number of Kyrgyz diplomats felt compelled toraise their voices concerning developments aroundlast year�s presidential election � a remarkable stepfor a profession that traditionally remains silent ondomestic politics. Several Kyrgyz ambassadors,however, on the eve of last year�s presidentialelections expressed their concern with thedeteriorating state of democracy and warned againstits consequences. As the Kyrgyz Ambassador toAustria, Alikbek Jekshenkulov, pointed out,�Kyrgyzstan has almost no strategic resources. Butwe do have an international image as an �island� ofdemocracy in Central Asia. We mustn�t jeopardisethat.�17 The ability of ambassadors to affectdomestic politics is limited, largely because they arephysically removed from the country and voters �and also from each other. However, given that mostof them are well known at home, some may enter, orre-enter politics in the future and use the diplomaticservice as an effective stepping-stone to a moreprominent political career.

The rotation of appointed positions, the president�sfondness for sweeping changes of cabinet ministersand efforts to marginalize potential opponents mayall be taking a toll on the government. A former top-level official from the presidential administration,Ishembai Kadyrbekov, who is now an independentmember of parliament, argues that Akaev�ssuccessful approach to balancing various regionaland political groups began to erode in 1995: �In theearly 1990s Akaev gathered a team of skilledpeople, who all supported his policies. He alsoenjoyed the support and respect of the governmentand the Parliament as well as the widespread supportof the people. With time, however, he startedpushing these very people away and now only has ahandful of people on whom he can rely forsupport.�18

In such an environment, the president continues toplace a premium on loyalty. The current Minister ofFinance, Temirbek Akhmataliev, is viewed as one ofthe politicians closest to and most loyal to Akaev.Akhmataliev started his career as a collective farmaccountant and later served as governor of Osh.

17 Sultan Jumagulov, �Diplomats challenge Akaev,�Reporting Central Asia (London: Institute for War andPeace Reporting), No. 13, 28 July 2000.18 ICG interview, Bishkek, 28 April 2001.


Askar Aitmatov, Chief of the InternationalDepartment of the Presidential Administration, isalso a confidant of Akaev, and both men are seento be rising stars on the political scene.

Internal Opposition: Given the high turnover inpresidential appointments and the continuingefforts by the president to weaken rivals, theloyalty of Akaev�s inner circle of supporters isoften subject to question. The president certainlyhas critics among both die-hard Communistapparatchiks and more progressive reformers.Absamat Masaliev, the first secretary of the Partyof Communists of Kyrgyzstan, suggests that it isdifficult to judge either the number of dissenterswithin the administration or how they willrespond to continuing tensions within thegovernment.19 Melis Eshimkanov, the leader ofthe People�s Party, suggests that the Ministry ofForeign Affairs continues to serve as the mostactive wellspring of internal opposition to thepresident.20

The presidential administration continues to bedominated by members of the Soviet-eranomenklatura. Key former Communist hard-linemembers of the government are said to haveclose links with both Russia and Uzbekistan, andshare those countries� disapproval of Akaev�sefforts to lean toward the West. PresidentKarimov of Uzbekistan, and some of the otherformer Soviet leaders, quite apparently dislikeAkaev and would prefer to see him replaced witha more compliant successor. Melis Eshimkanovof the People�s Party speculates that there is stillpotential for a Communist backlash inKyrgyzstan21 � some form of �red revenge� �but Absamat Masaliev, the leader of the KyrgyzParty of Communists, thinks that most of themembers of the Communist Party who defectedto the presidential administration are far moredriven by personal ambitions than ideologicalfervour.22

Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, the leader of the KairanEl Party, argues in a similar vein that mostappointees operate largely on the basis of self-

19 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 April 2001.20 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.21 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 April 2001.22 Ibid.

enrichment.23 He claims that many high-rankingofficials have siphoned off millions of dollars ofgovernment funds and that personal power andwealth are the foremost concerns among thosesurrounding the president. If true, there would belimited incentive for those in positions of power toupset the current system. Corruption of this kind isalso alleged to benefit Akaev by allowing him tohold compromising materials on many in hisadministration and so discourage them fromdefecting or challenging his rule from within.

Others suggest that while a strong opponent may notemerge from within the ranks of the administration,the president�s confidants might not be eager to godown with a sinking ship. Omurbek Tekebaev, theleader of the Ata Meken Party, insists that manyworking for the president are not loyal and woulddefect if a real alternative emerged.24 Others, such asAlevtina Pronenko, the deputy leader of the People�sParty, assess the situation as more complex, arguingthat since the opposition would not be likely towelcome the president�s people, those in theexecutive branch have clear incentives to defend thepresident.25

There is some speculation that Akaev, as a result ofwidespread criticism both at home and abroad, maychoose to step down ahead of the elections in 2005.Prior to doing so, he would identify his successorand conclude an agreement with him similar to theone made between Yeltsin and Putin in Russia. In anofficial statement issued in August 2001, Akaevdeclared that he would not seek a new term andwould instead focus the next four years on preparinga suitable successor, as yet unnamed.26 UnlikeYeltsin, however, Akaev is in good health and theweak Kyrgyz opposition is not in a position tochallenge him. What is more, President Akaev hasreversed his position on this subject in the past.Rumours circulated in the parliament during thesummer of 2001, that the president would call areferendum this autumn to extend his presidencyfrom five to seven years � on the grounds that theeconomic situation requires extraordinary measuresand political stability.

23 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.24 ICG interview, Bishkek, 1 June 2001.25 ICG interview, Bishkek, 2 May 2001.26 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 156, Part I, 17 August2001.


There have also been suggestions that a memberof Akaev�s own family may succeed him in thepresidency. Akaev�s wife is said to nurturepolitical ambitions and could be a potentialsuccessor. Others point to the president�sdecision to appoint his son Aidar as an advisor tothe Minister of Finance as a possible sign that heis being groomed for the top position.27 Akaev�seldest daughter, Bermet, who has relativelyliberal views and international work experience,would also be a plausible candidate for a familysuccession. None of these figures appears tohave the authority to make a popular leader, but itis possible that the same confluence of intereststhat has maintained Akaev�s power for the pastten years would ensure the succession of a familymember. Yet a hand-over of power within theAkaev family has not yet been overtly prepared,and such an attempt would likely stir upconsiderable public anger.

B. PARLIAMENT

The legislature of Kyrgyzstan, the JogorkuKengesh, is divided into upper and lower houses.The upper house, or Legislative Assembly(Mïyzam chigaru palatasï), consists of 45 directlyelected regional members representing thecountry�s six provinces and the city of Bishkek.The lower house, or Assembly of People�sRepresentatives (El öküldör palatasï), has 60elected seats based on districts and theirrespective population.28 Party identificationremains remarkably low � roughly 70 per cent ofthe current members of parliament ran asindependent candidates.29

The last parliamentary election was held in tworounds on 20 February and 12 March 2000.Courts banned four of the fifteen participatingpolitical parties from putting forward their slatesbased on technicalities passed into law the yearbefore. Those banned included three of the mostpopular opposition parties: the People�s Party, the

27 The government paper Kyrgyz Tuusu suggested on 5January 2001 that Aidar Akaev may ascend to thepresidency, see RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 24, Part I,5 February 2001.28 The distribution of deputies by chamber was changedfrom 70-35 to 60-45 as a result of amendments to theConstitution approved by referendum in 1998.29 See Appendix A, Parliamentary Election Results.

Dignity party and the Democratic Movement ofKyrgyzstan. The government also made it difficultfor certain individual opposition candidates toregister, as it did again later in the presidentialelection. The OSCE election observers found the�pre-election period was marred by a high degree ofinterference in the process by state officials, a lackof independence of the courts� and the �selective useof legal sanctions against candidates.�30

The relationship between the parliament andpresidential administration is strained. The use ofreferenda by Akaev to rewrite the constitution isseen by most legislators as a concerted effort toreduce their influence. Alevtina Pronenko, thedeputy leader of the People�s Party insists, �Wehave practically no real powers. Until 1995 weapproved all ministerial appointments. Since 1996,however, we only approve the Prime Minister. The1998 referendum also deprived us of the right topass laws regarding the budget. The parliament isnot in a position to do anything. We cannot startimpeachment proceedings against the president ordemand that the government resign. We have beenturned into a working cabinet for the government.�31

Parliamentarians belonging to the organisedopposition are in a decided minority, and a numberof structural factors have kept them from becominga more effective voice. Their ability to mobilise thepublic against the executive branch is limited both asa result of both government restrictions on the rightto assembly and limited access to the media.Furthermore, not even the more popular parties havedeveloped effective grassroots structures � a vitalcomponent in mobilising support for legislativeaction.

Independent legislators are also vulnerable topressure from the executive branch. Both JyparJeksheev, leader of the Democratic Movement Party,and Giaz Takambaev, leader of the RepublicanParty, maintain that the administration has used avariety of tactics to induce deputies to vote in amanner favourable to the president.32 Reliablesources claim that the Prosecutor�s office has

30 OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and HumanRights, �Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 20February & 12 March 2000,� available at:http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/kyrg00-1-final.htm.31 ICG interview, Bishkek, 2 May 2001.32 ICG interviews Bishkek, 31 May 2001 and 2 June 2001.


prepared cases for tax evasion and other mattersagainst several members of parliament who arebusinessmen, and that the presidentialadministration has made clear to the deputies thatthese cases may be activated should deputies failto take into consideration Akaev�s�recommendations�.

The leader of the Moia Strana Party, JoomartOtorbaev, argues that although the LegislativeAssembly�s powers are limited, the chamber isgradually becoming more independent of theexecutive.33 Despite its limited powers theparliament has on occasion still managed tomobilise against the president, and MelisEshimkanov of the People�s Party claims that thesuccess of the parliament is best seen in thefrequent criticisms that the pro-government presshas levelled at the parliament during mid-2001.34

Territorial and border disputes with neighbouringChina have presented the parliament with a rareopportunity to show its independence andstrength. The parliament demonstrated unity inearly May 2001 when voting against thememorandum signed by Kyrgyz Prime MinisterKurmanbek Bakiev and Uzbek Prime MinisterÓtkir Sultanov on 26 February 2001. Thismemorandum, leaked to the press, would havemade territorial concessions to Uzbekistan,granting that country a corridor of land to one ofits enclaves (Sokh) within Kyrgyzstan. Theparliament also voiced its disapproval ofagreements signed with China in 1996 and 1999,which if ratified would have given Beijing morethan 100,000 hectares of remote mountainterritory. The 1999 agreement was onlydiscovered by the parliament when it was leakedto the public. There have been suggestions thatAkaev made the territorial concessions inexchange for Chinese support of his 2000presidential bid and the provision of militaryassistance and new road links.

The Chinese border agreements are currentlybeing debated by the parliament. A parliamentarydelegation travelled to the disputed areas in May2001 for an inspection, and legislators were stilltrying to obtain copies of the two agreements asof August. There is also some confusion as to

33 ICG interview, 30 April 2001.34 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.

whether the initial 1996 agreement with China wasproperly ratified by the previous parliament. Theexecutive claims that the agreement was ratified byparliament in 1998, but it has so far been unable toproduce a formal record of such a vote. Theexecutive branch has largely ignored attempts byparliament to get more information about theagreements. Tensions between the executive andparliament were further increased in early July,when the Foreign Minister, Muratbek Imanaliev, andthe Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of theJogorku Kengesh, Abdygany Erkebaev, attended ameeting on the Chinese border dispute arranged bythe Human Rights Movement of Kyrgyzstan.Members of parliament boycotted the meeting.

Expressing its disapproval of these potential landdeals, parliament was able to portray itself as astrong defender of the national interest, whileworking to dispel some of Akaev�s claims thatlegislators and opposition figures were too weak todeal with regional security issues. Someparliamentarians even suggested that impeachmentprocedures should be initiated against the president,insisting that under article 58 of the Constitutiononly the parliament has the right to conclude borderagreements with neighbouring countries. Similarly,article 7 of the Law on International Agreementsmakes it clear that the relevant committee inparliament must discuss any international agreementprior to its formal conclusion. The administration�shandling of the border agreements appear to be inviolation of these articles.

Despite the calls for impeachment, such a stepseems unlikely. In all probability, not only would animpeachment resolution be difficult to pass, but itwould leave the president well positioned to dissolveparliament in retaliation. It is doubtful that amajority of deputies would vote in favour ofimpeachment � given that most are Akaevsupporters. What is more, since the debate on theChinese border agreements has been postponed untilthe parliament returns to session in September 2001,the president has had plenty of time to �consult�with deputies and to soften the parliament�s position.Should an impeachment vote fail to get thenecessary support, the parliament wouldautomatically be dissolved and new elections called,and there is obviously no guarantee that all deputieswould retain their seats. Thus some deputies wouldprobably resist the temptation to vote against Akaevat least out of desire to retain office, while others


have considerable financial interests in seeing thepresident remain in power.

For impeachment to go ahead, a majority of thedeputies in the Legislative Assembly would needto vote in favour. A special legislativecommission would then look into thecircumstances surrounding the case after whichcharges against the president would be forwardedto the Constitutional Court for its assessment.Only if the Constitutional Court rules that theaccusations are valid can a parliamentary vote goahead, and this subsequent vote would require atwo-thirds majority of the deputies and wouldneed to be passed within two months of theparliamentary committee completing its work.Should the Constitutional Court make a negativeassessment of the charges, the parliament wouldbe dissolved and new elections called. So even ifthe required number of deputies voted in favourof initiating impeachment proceedings, theConstitutional Court would have to establish thatthe president violated the Constitution by signingthe agreement with China. Given that all of theConstitutional Court justices owe their candidacyfor this position to Akaev, they would certainlybe expected to rule in his favour.

Others contend that it would be difficult for theConstitutional Court to ignore a parliamentaryvote and popular pressure would make it difficultto dismiss the issue out of hand. Some observersargue that while most legislators know thatimpeachment procedures would lead nowhere, itis still important for the opposition to show to thepeople that they are against the agreement withChina. As Melis Eshimkanov, leader of thePeople�s Party, notes, �Newspapers writing aboutthe impeachment discussions in parliament helppeople see that �the little dog is barking at theelephant�.�35

The president, on the other hand, maintainssignificant leverage over the parliament. Hecould call a referendum to amend theConstitution in an effort to derail animpeachment and to strengthen his powersfurther. Akaev has been rumoured to be planninga referendum in the fall of 2001 to extend histerm. Two other measures are also frequentlymentioned as likely to be included in such a

35 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.

referendum: a measure to change the legislaturefrom a bicameral to a unicameral body and aproposal to allow 50 per cent of the deputies to beelected from party lists.36 These two issues enjoyconsiderable support even among oppositionmembers. �Bundling� of unrelated issues in previousreferenda has been a tactic to facilitate the passageof less popular measures In this case, Akaev mightbelieve the tactic could smooth the path to anextension of his presidency. There is no guarantee,however, that the additional measures endorsed by areferendum, would actually strengthen the role ofparliament.

It appears that the president will continue to hold theupper hand over the parliament. Because theexecutive branch � largely backed by a compliantjudiciary � enjoys such clear advantages in power,it does not seem likely that a conflict would eruptbecause of a direct showdown. However, publicanger over the handling of territorial negotiationswith Uzbekistan and China has increased tensionsthat may manifest themselves in unpredictable ways.Should the parliament ratify the agreements withChina, there may be a popular backlash in the nextround of parliamentary elections. Should suchelections be subject to the same type of governmentinterference that marred the 2000 parliamentary andpresidential contests, public unrest might be a directresult. Other hot-button issues could also inflame thepublic, such as corruption, the bad economy, orethnic tensions. Demonstrations were held last yearin areas where well-known politicians were blockedfrom the ballot. Ultimately opposition politiciansmay decide that mustering public anger against thepresident on the streets is easier than competing withthe executive branch on unequal playing field ofinstitutionalised politics.

C. THE JUDICIARY

Kyrgyzstan�s judiciary has yet to develop as anindependent and effective branch of government.The failure to develop this �third leg� of thedemocratic system has allowed Akaev and hissupporters to revert consistently to extra-legal meansto target political opponents and the free press.

36 The opposition frequently argues that increasing thenumber of deputies of the Jogorku Kengesh elected fromparty lists would strengthen the political parties inKyrgyzstan and also enhance their political role.


Courts have been used to manipulate electionresults, to constrain the media, and to issuedamaging verdicts against individuals �including members of the opposition. Suchblatant use of the courts as a political tool has theclear potential to destabilise the politicalsituation.

Further, Kyrgyzstan�s failure to embrace the ruleof law has devastating implications for thecountry�s economic prospects. Without afunctioning and effective legal system, investorswill remain wary, corruption will flourish, andthe benefits of the economic reform process willcontinue to be skimmed off by a narrow elite.According to a poll carried out by the WorldBank, 80 per cent of the public do not trust thecourts.37 Trapped within such a system, peoplemay feel that they have little recourse other thanviolence. Opposition deputy IshembaiKadyrbekov summed up the acute frustration ofmany when he complained that the entire legalsystem is under the control of the president: �Theregime is supported by force and not by thepublic. It should be labelled either a dictatorshipor an authoritarian regime.�38

The Problem: Dependent Kyrgyz Courts. Untilconstitutional changes in 1993, judges wereappointed by parliament. While it is common inmany democracies for the executive branch toappoint judges, in Kyrgyzstan there is broadagreement that the judiciary often functions ineffect as a tool of the presidency. ShamaraiMaichiev, President of the National LegalCorporation39 says, �Judges cannot beindependent as they are appointed by thepresident, funded by the budget and givensalaries below the minimum wage.�40 Many

37 Slovo Kyrgyzstana (Bishkek), �Askar Akaev. Bezvysochaishei spravedlivosti net pravosudiia [AskarAkaev: without the highest level of fairness there is nojustice],� Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 24 May 2001, p. 3.38 ICG interview, Bishkek, 28 April 2001.39 The National Legal Corporation is a commercialcompany that was founded in November 1998 by twolawyers. It provides consultations on legal issues,defends people in court and assists organisations wishingto register with the Ministry of Justice, among otherthings. The National Legal Corporation should not beconfused with the Association of Lawyers, which is anorganisation defending the interests of lawyers inKyrgyzstan. ICG telephone interview, 14 August 2001.40 ICG interview, Bishkek, 1 June 2001.

judges remain fearful of losing their jobs, andunemployment rates among lawyers are high.Maichiev also notes that there are about 25,000lawyers, but only about 1,000 practise law and thereare very few vacancies in the court system. JoldoshKyrymbekov, a deputy prosecutor in Isik-KölProvince characterised the judges� predicament: �Ifyou have four children and a poor salary, then whatcan you do�?�41

Judges are appointed for terms of four to sevenyears, and their licences may be revoked after threeyears, making them further vulnerable to pressurefrom the executive branch. Akaev announced on 18May 2001, that judicial salaries will be raised 50 percent as of 1 January 2002 and that judges willreceive public housing and an official car.42

However, these benefits will barely keep pace withinflation, and will not address the core problem ofthe executive branch�s inclination to interfere withthe judiciary.

How Kyrgyz society regards the rule of law is stillheavily influenced by the Soviet period when manyjudges and lawyers grew accustomed tosubservience to the government. KachikeEsenkanov, a member of the Constitutional Court,maintains that many lawyers remain �dependent� asa result of, �having been educated and havingworked in a Soviet system� where they were highlysusceptible to pressure from state politicalauthorities.43 Marat Sultanov, the chairman of thePervomaisk district court makes a similar point:�We cannot all become independent all of a sudden.We have to educate ourselves.�44

The system remains ripe for abuse. It is widelyacknowledged that judges frequently findthemselves under pressure from high-rankingofficials and bribery is common. No mechanism isin place for dismissing judges who have eitherviolated the code of honour or broken the law. TheCouncil of Lawyers45 rules on such violations and

41 ICG interview, Karakol, 3 May 2001.42Kurbat Otorbaev, �Corrupt Kyrgyz courts,� ReportingCentral Asia (London: IWPR), No. 57, 22 June 2001,available at:http://www.iwpr.net/archive/rca/rca_200106_57_3_eng.txt.43 ICG interview, 30 May 2001.44 ICG Interview. 30 May 2001.45 The Council of Judges consists of 23 judges: two judgesfrom each province in addition to judges from the SupremeCourt, the Supreme Court of Arbitration, the Supreme


has the right to request that the commission thatlicenses judges � the Attestation Commission,whose ten members are appointed by thepresident � reconsider the accreditation of ajudge who has violated standards of professionalconduct. However, the commission has neverrevoked a licence and there is little otherwise inthe current legal system to discourage corruptpractices.

The frequent changes in constitutional and otherlaws since independence has also made itdifficult for lawyers and judges to keep up-to-date and some directly contradictory laws are stillon the books.46 This, however, pales intoinsignificance when compared to the role ofcorruption in the judiciary. As Shamarai Maijiev,President of the National Legal Corporationlaments, �Laws can be bought with money orconnections in our country.�47

The Judiciary and Politics. The role of thejudiciary in the parliamentary elections ofFebruary/March 2000 and the subsequentpresidential contest deserves special attention.The OSCE observed that courts all the way up tothe Supreme Court, took �actions aimed atexcluding particular political forces fromcompeting in the election.�48

Three prominent opposition politicians �Daniyar Usenov of the People�s Party and twoindependents, Ishembai Kadyrbekov and MaratKairov, all ran afoul of the courts on the eve ofthe parliamentary elections. In the cases ofUsenov and Kadyrbekov, charges were broughtagainst them for incidents several years back.Usenov was accused of assault in 1996 �although the person he was alleged to haveassaulted had dropped the charges and made apublic statement to that effect. Nevertheless, the

Military Court and the Constitutional Court. The Councilof Judges is elected every two or three years by theCongress of Judges. ICG telephone interview with MaratSeitbaevich Sultanov, Chairman of the PervomaiskRegional Court, Bishkek, 14 August 2001.46 ICG interview, Zootbek Choroevich Kudaibergenov,Prosecutor, Batken Province, Batken, 20 April 2001.47 ICG interview, Bishkek, 1 June 2001.48 OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and HumanRights, �Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 20February & 12 March 2000.�

charges were reactivated and Usenov was effectivelyprevented from standing for election. Kadyrbekov�scase dated back to 1998 when he was alleged tohave broken the finger of the leader of theDemocratic Party of Women, Tokun Shalieva. Thecourt eventually imposed a restriction order onKadyrbekov, preventing him from leaving Bishkek.Because he was registered as a candidate in NarinProvince, he was effectively stopped fromcampaigning. Despite all this, Kadyrbekov waselected.

The courts attempted to deregister two otherprominent opposition leaders � Omurbek Tekebaevof the Ar-Namis party, and Itshakh Masaliev of theCommunist Party � between the first and thesecond round of voting, but failed. However, boththe leader of the Democratic Movement ofKyrgyzstan, Jypar Jeksheev, and Ar-Namis memberOmurbek Subanaliev were deregistered. Emil Aliev� former Vice President Feliks Kulov�s chiefcampaigner � was detained by the Ministry of theInterior three days before the second vote inconnection with an incident dating back to 1995. Hewas only released a week after the elections and wasthus prevented from carrying out his duties. Kulovhimself won the first round of parliamentaryelections, but lost the second round under dubiouscircumstances. In a gesture rarely seen in CentralAsia, the chairwoman of the election commission inhis district resigned from her post in protest. Sheclaimed in a public statement that she had been putunder intense pressure by the local authorities toensure that Kulov would not make it to parliament.49

For over a month, voters throughout the countrystaged daily protests against the conduct and theoutcomes of the runoff elections. This highlights thegrowing public frustration by the citizens ofKyrgyzstan with the government�s efforts tomanipulate the electoral process.

Since the parliamentary elections, a number ofleading politicians opposed to Akaev�s rule haveeither been put in jail, such as former Vice PresidentKulov and the leader of the Erkindik Party,Topchubek Turgunaliev, or had continuing problemswith the courts, such as Daniyar Usenov of thePeople�s Party. Yuri Maksimov, one of Kulov�sdefenders, claims that he can, �prove that oppositionleaders such as Feliks Kulov and TopchubekTurgunaliev were framed,� adding that �judicial

49 Ibid.


repression of dissidents has reached epidemicproportions in this country.�50

Both Feliks Kulov and Topchubek Turgunaliev,who was released from prison in August 2001,51

may yet return to the political scene, but as longas Akaev is in power, the government will likelyact to make sure they are marginalized. Akaev isrumoured to be contemplating amnesty for bothmen on 31 August (the 10th anniversary ofKyrgyz independence) � to appease theinternational community. However, this wouldcome with a catch: if amnestied, their convictionswould still prevent them from seeking politicaloffice. Both Turgunaliev and Kulov could becatapulted back into politics if public unrestescalates, but at the moment this appearsunlikely.

The Judiciary and the Media: Court casesagainst the media have proliferated during thelast several years, with libel being the mostfrequent charge. Government officials and pro-presidential politicians have brought the majorityof these cases. For example, former Minister ofNational Security Misir Ashyrkulov has suednewspapers such as Komsomolskaia pravda vKyrgyzstane and Delo № for libel. Even judgeshave taken journalists to court. Judge ToktosunKasymbekov from Jalal-Abad took journalistMoldosay Ibraimov to court for an article printedin Akikat that accused the justice of taking a U.S.$15,000 bribe. On 19 June 2000, Ibraimov wassentenced to two years in prison. He was alsogiven a fine of 107,000 söms (U.S.$2,257),whereas Akikat was ordered to pay 100,000 söms(U.S.$2,109) in damages. The provincial court amonth later reduced the fine imposed onIbraimov to 10,000 söms (U.S.$211) and madehis prison sentence conditional. Following anappeal from judge Kasanbekov, however, theSupreme Court referred the case back to theprovincial court, which on 13 March 2001 upheldthe judgement of the Jalal-Abad city court,though the prison sentence was left asconditional. Ultimately, following theintervention of the governor, Judge Kasanbekov

50 Kurban Otorbaev, �Corrupt Kyrgyz courts,� ReportingCentral Asia (London: IWPR), No. 57, 22 June 2001.51 Sultan Jumagulov, �Kyrgyz opposition figure freed.�Reporting Central Asia (London: IWPR) No. 66, 22August 2001

withdrew his charges and requested that the sentenceagainst Ibraimov be annulled.

Until 1996, it was very difficult to take newspapersto court for libel, as plaintiffs had to pay ten per centof desired damages in taxes before a case could beinitiated. This changed after a series of cases wherethe media criticised members of parliament, whenthe legislature decided to remove the taxrequirement. In November 1997, Akaev urged thatlibel be made a civil and not a criminal matter, butthe parliament has not endorsed this provision, anddespite the 1998 referendum that included articleson press freedoms, libel remains part of the criminalcode. Even if libel does become an issue for civilcourts, there are still risks that the government andpowerful figures could abuse it to silence the press.

The large sums of money routinely granted in suchcases have had a chilling effect on the media.Former first secretary of the Soviet-era CommunistParty of Kyrgyzstan, Turdakun Usubaliev (nowwidely viewed as a presidential supporter),demanded more than U.S.$1 million from Asaba inAugust 2000 for the damage the newspaper hadinflicted upon his dignity and honour over the lasteight years. He was eventually awarded $105,000,which led lawyer Yuri Maksimov to complain,�Instead of administering justice, the courts alwaysrule unreservedly in favour of affluent people,whenever their interests are threatened.�52

Newspapers have struggled to pay large fines, and anumber involved in such cases have closed eithertemporarily or permanently. Res Publica, forinstance, was forced to sell its furniture last year inan attempt to cover a U.S.$4,200 award to the thenpresident of Kyrgyz State Television and Radio,Amanbek Karypkulov. In February, the stateprinting house Uchkun was ordered to halt printingof Res Publica until the paper had paid in full. Thenewspaper Delo №, according to its deputy editorSvetlana Krasilnikova, has recently lost five courtcases and is also having problems paying court-imposed awards.53

Zootbek Kudaibergenov, the prosecutor for BatkenProvince, acknowledges that the media law �is a bad

52 Ibid.53 ICG interview, Bishkek, 26 April 2001.


law, but it is still a law and it must befollowed.�54 In private discussions, somejournalists have noted that as long as thenewspapers print accurate information, they arenot in danger of being closed. The chairman ofthe parliamentary committee on questions of thestate and mass media, Kabai Karabekov (himselfa well-known journalist) also argues thatjournalists and politicians alike need to share theblame: journalists suffer from a lack ofprofessionalism while politicians and governmentofficials are too thin-skinned.55

The popular opposition paper Asaba has probablysuffered the most from its run-ins with the courtsystem, although not always due to libel charges.In 2000, Asaba was taken to court by LionTechnics, a private company, for defaulting on a1994 loan. Although the case was controversial,the Arbitration Court ordered Asaba to payslightly more than U.S.$22,000 to the company.As the paper could not afford this settlement,operations were suspended by a district court on6 March 2001, and bankruptcy proceedings wereinitiated a short time later.56

D. THE PUBLIC

It would be a mistake to interpret Akaev�scomfortable election margins as a broad mandateof support from the people. Indeed, many arguethat Akaev is not particularly popular. Speakinganonymously, a local journalist insisted, �Peopledo not like Akaev, but they see no alternative.�57

Valerii Uleev, the director of the human rightsNGO Spravedlivost,� says, �The Kyrgyz peopledo not see any results from Akaev�s policies.They are tired of him, though an alternative willnot emerge for a long time since Kyrgyzstan doesnot have charismatic leaders.�58 TolekanIsmailova, the Chairman of the �Coalition NGO�echoes the same theme: �Our tragedy is that theauthorities do not understand that people want adifferent kind of life.�59

54 ICG interview, Batken, 20 April 2001.55 �The Kyrgyz Presidential Elections October 2000:Final Report� (Dusseldorf: The European Institute forthe Media, 2001).56 RFE/RL Kyrgyz News, 18 April 2001.57 Journalist, 3 May 2001.58 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, 24 May 2001.59 ICG interview, Bishkek, 27 April 2001.

Poverty: Widespread poverty is fuelling much of thediscontent with Akaev�s rule. The World Bankestimates per capita gross national product to be lessthan $300 annually. Over 60 per cent of thepopulation lived below the official poverty line in1998,60 and as noted earlier, some local estimates areeven bleaker. The minimum wage is $2 a day, andstaggering hyperinflation in the early post-independence period wiped out the lifetime savingsof most families. The cost of living increased by 17per cent in 2000 alone, and the social safety net forpensioners, the sick and government employees haslargely collapsed. Even basic necessities such as gasand electricity have become increasingly out ofreach for many families.61

Alevtina Pronenko, the deputy chairman of thePeople�s Party, argues, �Poverty is very dangerousand it is impossible to predict what it may trigger.People are very patient and there are still those whohope for better times. But what happens when thesepeople realise that their hopes are in vain�?62 JyparJeksheev, chairman of the Democratic MovementParty, makes the stakes clear: �A social explosion isentirely feasible. People are disillusioned and theycannot do anything to improve their lot.�63

While the government deserves credit for pushingthrough an ambitious agenda of economic reform,the danger is that it will stop mid-stream, failing totake the urgent steps needed to complete thetransformation to a market economy that is able togenerate lasting growth. Most important, thegovernment needs to address the intertwined issuesof the rule of law and corruption. Without afunctioning and independent judiciary, accompaniedby a genuine effort by the government to crackdown on the corruption that is siphoning off

60 World Bank, �Kyrgyz Republic Country Brief�(Washington, DC: September 2000).61 See O. Duisheev, MP, �Kyrgyzskii narod vprave zhit�dostoino, bezbedno [The Kyrgyz people are entitled to livein dignity and not in poverty,�] Res Publica, 3 April 2001, p.5; Res Publica (Bishkek), �Obnishchanie naseleniia grozit�Kyrgyzstanu sotsial�nym vzryvom [The impoverishment ofthe population threatens Kyrgyzstan with a socialexplosion],� Res Publica, 3 April 2001, and Res Publica(Bishkek), �Korruptsiia goschinovnikov � prichinanishchety naroda [The corruption of the governmentofficials is the cause of the poverty of the people],� ResPublica, 22 May 2001, p. 6.62 ICG interview, Bishkek, 2 May 2001.63 ICG interview, Bishkek, 31 May 2001.


resources, average citizens will continue to bearthe brunt of the country�s economic woes. Acoherent approach to reform is made moredifficult by the continuous process of rotatingofficials in the economic ministries, includingoften officials with marginal economiccredentials. The government will need torecognise that the patience of international donorsis wearing thin for providing assistance to adistant country of limited strategic importancethat fails to address corruption and continues tobecome more authoritarian. Kyrgyzstan is heavilydependent on aid, and the economy could wellgo into a free fall that would take Akaev alongwith it, if foreign aid were substantially curtailed.External debt in 1999 was at U.S.$1.2 billion �just under 100 per cent of GDP � and requiredpayments of U.S.$117.2 million. The countryreceived 54.8 dollars of aid for each personagainst a per capita income of 265 dollars.64

Some positive steps are being taken. Akaevrecently organised a seminar on poverty in Oshafter designating the province as a pilot area forefforts to improve national living standards. Healso has promoted a long-term program aimed atimproving the economic situation. Yet suchmeasures will be no substitute for a multi-partydemocracy, an independent judiciary, a free pressand a serious anti-corruption campaign. For acountry with an urgent need to reschedule itsheavy debt burden, the government�s currenttack could prove disastrous.

The real danger of the simmering publicdiscontent with the economic situation is, asMelis Eshimkanov, the leader of the People�sParty, puts it, �If the Kyrgyz people rise up, theywill listen to no one.�65 Or as Jypar Jeksheev, theleader of the Democratic Movement Party, put it:�When an apple is not quite ripe, it will not fallno matter how hard the tree is shaken. When ripe,however, it doesn�t take much to cause it to fall.Akaev has passed many decisions that were notwell-received and if he continues with this, he

64 World Bank. Kyrgyz Republic Data Profile athttp://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=KGZ&CCODE=KGZ&CNAME=Kyrgyz+Republic&PTYPE=CP. Latest figures are for 1999.65 ICG interview, Bishkek, 29 May 2001.

may well at some point move beyond the point ofpeoples� tolerance.�66

While many observers have seen the greatestlikelihood for crisis in the south of Kyrgyzstan,Jeksheev notes, �A little spark, be it in the south, inBishkek, Talas or Isik-Köl, may result in something.Social conflict could break out in any of the regionsbecause the social situation is the same everywhere.�Tursunbai Bakir uulu, the leader of the ErK Party,warned that people might take to the streets inOctober 2001 as a result of expected increases infood prices.67

The government�s plans to privatise the stateelectricity company (Kyrgyzenergo) � one of themost profitable companies in the country � also hasthe potential to generate considerable public anger ifnot handled well.68 This issue was still beingdebated in parliament as of August 2001.

A number of politicians have accused thegovernment of exaggerating the threat of Islamistextremism to cover up its poor economicmanagement. Joomart Otorbaev, leader of the MoiaStrana Party, comments, �The image of the enemy isbeing used in Kyrgyz politics today. Akaev ischannelling huge sums of money to the army.People are very poor, but the authorities cannot helpthem since the available resources have to be spenton preventing the Islamist fighters from takingcontrol in the South.�69

Scattered public protests over social conditions haveoccurred since the fall of 2000. In November 2000,pensioners in Narin took to the streets to protestdeteriorating living standards. In January 2001, apicket was organised in front of the building of theprovincial administration in Narin to protest delaysin poverty payments (U.S.$3 a month). On 1 May2001, residents of Jalal-Abad demonstrated againstdeteriorating living standards in the country, andseveral of the participants were arrested and releasedlater in the day. A similar protest was also held inBishkek.

66 ICG interview, Bishkek, 31 May 2001.67 ICG interview, Bishkek, 31 May 2001.6868 The Bishkek-based Bureau on Human Rights and theRule of Law has submitted a formal protest to the WorldBank against its requests to the Kyrgyz authorities forextensive privatisation of state assets, includingKyrgyzenergo.69 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 April 2001.


A meeting to protest the closure of the Asabaopposition newspaper was planned for Bishkekon 30 March 2001. At the last moment, it wasrescheduled for 13 April, but some 250 peopleshowed up at the Gorky Square on 30 Marchanyway. A Bishkek municipal law prohibitsdemonstrations in areas other than this locationand city authorities have forbiddendemonstrations on weekends or public holidays,which many opposition figures believe violatesarticle 2 of the Constitution, allowing for thefreedom of expression.

Most of those who showed up for the gatheringwere not political activists but street-traders andpensioners. Their demands were distinctly social,and not political. One protestor reportedlycomplained that none of the country�s naturalresources benefited common citizens, �TheKyrgyz people are worse off than other people inthe CIS. The government is strangling thepeople.�?70 Absamat Masaliev, leader of theParty of Communists, aired similar complaints:�Eighty-five per cent of our country is poor,hundreds of enterprises are not working andeverything has been sold or stolen.� Masalievalso argued, �Asaba wrote about all these issuesand its closure is advantageous to those who donot want the people to know the truth.�71

Although such protests have been small in scale,and usually poorly organised, authorities areclearly concerned. The authorities areincreasingly adopting security precautions tocontain this threat, such as heavy police presenceat demonstrations, yet it is doubtful whether thiscould be effective if the situation deteriorates.Sheer frustration with economic conditions wascited again and again by those interviewed forthis report as the most likely spark for a conflictthat could quickly spread out of control.

Ethnic Relations, Borders and IslamistMovements: Ethnic relations, border tensionsand Islamist movements have further exacerbatedsecurity concerns, particularly in the southernpart of the country. There have not been major

70 Delo № (Bishkek), �Kto ego posadit'? On zhepamiatnik! [Who will put him in Jail? He is a Statue!],�Delo №, 4 April 2001, p. 2.71 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 April 2001.

incidents of violence between ethnic Kyrgyz andethnic Uzbeks since riots in 1990 shook the cities ofOsh and Özgön.72 Concerns about a reoccurrence ofethnic conflict, however, have been a steadyundercurrent of life. For example, in the summer of2001 rumours were circulating that ethnic violencewould soon break out in Özgön or Osh, possibly atthe main bazaars. An incident this springunderscored the brittleness of the situation. On 1May 2001 in Özgön, several teenagers rushed to thebazaar and raised the alarm that bearded Muslimfighters had arrived in the city. Traders fled themarket in panic, leaving their goods behind. Theteenagers turned out to simply be petty criminalswho looted the stalls once the traders left. However,the incident does highlight the potential for smallincidents to quickly turn serious which isparticularly the case when tensions have an ethnicoverlay.

One source of tensions is the fact that Uzbeks havebeen largely shut out of the political process.Because mayors and governors have been appointedrather than elected, Uzbeks often feel they arepoorly represented even in areas where they form alocal majority. Some people claim that the Party ofNational Unity and Concord, whose membership isabout 95 per cent Uzbek, represents the interests ofthe roughly 650,000 Uzbeks living in southernKyrgyzstan, although the party does also have someKyrgyz and Russian members. The party was notregistered in time to take part in the 2000parliamentary elections, though it hopes to fieldcandidates in the next elections, and to get at leastone of its representatives from southern Kyrgyzstaninto the parliament. The party�s presence is not feltvery strongly in the city of Osh where two localfigures dominate politics in the Uzbek community.The first, Mahqamajan Mamasaidov, is president ofthe Uzbek Cultural Centre, and a political ally ofAkaev. The second and more popular figure,parliamentarian Davran Sabirov, is not close toAkaev and has tried to use his seat in the legislatureto voice the concerns of the Uzbek community. Toreduce tensions, it will be crucial to provide Uzbeksgreater opportunities for participation andrepresentation in local government.

Though the proximity of Uzbekistan complicatesrelations between the Uzbek and Kyrgyzcommunities in Kyrgyzstan, irredentism per se is not

72 The familiar Russian name for Özgön is �Uzgen�.


an issue. Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan do not pine tojoin the Uzbek state as they are aware of politicalconditions in Uzbekistan and often quite criticalof Uzbekistan government policies, including thesweeping crackdowns on religious groups,political opposition and journalists. There isgenuine disillusionment within the ethnic Uzbekcommunity regarding the way in whichUzbekistan behaves towards the ethnic Uzbekpopulation in the southern Kyrgyzstan. Onseveral occasions, ethnic Uzbeks have beenkidnapped by security services from Uzbekistanoperating illegally on Kyrgyzstan�s territory.Uzbekistan has also imposed visa requirementson Kyrgyzstan citizens who wish to spend morethan three days in Uzbekistan. Finally, it hasbecome very difficult for Uzbeks fromKyrgyzstan to receive Uzbek citizenship. Allthese factors serve to limit Tashkent�s influenceon the ethnic Uzbek community � at least forthe time being. The harsh treatment handed out tomembers of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan, whichis �advertised� on Uzbek state television, mayalso make people more sympathetic toward thisorganisation and contribute to the destabilisationof Kyrgyzstan in the longer term. In any case,Kyrgyzstan should take the clear message that itwill have fewer problems with its ethnic Uzbekminority if it allows them greater civil liberties,and that efforts to marginalise ethnic Uzbeks willlikely backfire.

The influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir has been growingin southern Kyrgyzstan over the last severalyears. It is a non-militant Islamist group with itsroots in the Arab Middle East that advocates theestablishment of a Islamic caliphate acrossCentral Asia. Despite its utopian character andclosed structure, the group enjoys considerablesupport among Uzbeks in Jalal-Abad and Oshprovinces. The party is also recruiting membersin the Chüy Valley and in Bishkek in northernKyrgyzstan. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not recognisethe legitimacy of the current Kyrgyz regime, andits members see themselves as pitted against astate which is un-Islamic and treats them ascriminal.

Joldors Jorobekov, the Chairman of the StateCommission on Religion, points out that theConstitution bans both political parties foundedon a religious basis and foreign organisationsfrom taking part in the country�s political life.Thus, Hizb ut-Tahrir, as both a religious and an

international party, is considered illegal by theKyrgyz authorities.73 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrirhave been arrested for distributing leaflets, andnearly all of the members apprehended thus far havebeen Uzbeks. This contributes to the sense amongmany Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan that they suffersystematic discrimination. Kyrgyz police officialsalso frequently harass Uzbeks merchants at thebazaars (more so than Kyrgyz traders). Whenarrested, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are faced with alegal apparatus and police force dominated byKyrgyz. Likewise, there are very few Uzbek judges.Detainees are treated harshly, and human rightsactivists in Jalal-Abad � as well as members of theHizb ut-Tahrir themselves � told ICG that Hizb ut-Tahrir members are subjected to various forms oftorture. There is some concern that if thedisrespectful treatment of Hizb ut-Tahrir members isperceived as an attack on the Uzbek communitymore generally, it could escalate ethnic tensions.

On 21 March 2001, some 30 women picketed thelocal police office in Kara-Suu to protest thetreatment of seven Hizb ut-Tahrir members arrestedfor distributing leaflets. A second, larger picketattended by some 80 Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters, tookplace in Kara-Suu on 24 March. Such pickets havethe potential to grow into larger demonstrations.Should violence break out, it is difficult to predicthow members of Hizb ut-Tahrir would themselvesreact. Officially, Hizb ut-Tahrir opposes the use ofviolence, and distance themselves from militantgroups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) though they share their goal of an Islamicstate. As one member of Hizb ut-Tahrir said, �It iseasiest to take power by using arms. The Prophetnever chose the easy path, though. We must achieveour aims by persuasion rather than by force.�74 Thisindividual did however note, �We are with the IMUin spirit.�

Local religious leaders acknowledged that the ranksof the Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kyrgyzstan haveswelled because many young people areunemployed, bored and frustrated. While the Hizbut-Tahrir�s leadership has clearly articulated itsopposition to the use of force, it could be difficult tomaintain this position among frustrated rank-and-filemembers. As one Hizb ut-Tarir member lamented,�[President] Karimov [of Uzbekistan] has arrested

73 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 May 2001.74 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, May 2001.


some 40,000 of our members. It is a pity that weare not allowed to use force to protect them.�75

The border disputes between Uzbekistan andKyrgyzstan also have the potential to sparkbroader popular political turmoil, particularly insouthern Kyrgyzstan. Some members of theKyrgyz community told ICG that they are readyto take up arms to defend Kyrgyz territory,should an agreement be reached with Uzbekistanon creating a corridor from Uzbekistan to theSokh enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Any borderagreement between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstanjudged as unfair by the public also has thepotential to trigger violence between Kyrgyz andUzbeks in Kyrgyzstan.

The destabilising potential of an agreement withChina on disputed territory in the north ofKyrgyzstan is less severe for several reasons.First, the areas in question are remote andsparsely populated. Second, people in Isik-Köland Narin provinces do not seem too concerned.In their view, people only protest if there is apossibility that their own land will be taken away.Third, people in the Narin Province have verylimited access to information through the media,and many are not even aware of the issue. TheKyrgyz authorities are still concerned, though.National television is conducting a campaign infavour of ratifying the 1999 border agreementwith China.76 And while visiting Isik-KölProvince in early June, Kyrgyz governmentofficials warned local inhabitants that they wouldbe punished if they protested the agreement.77

The authorities are trying to persuade the publicthat getting control of the Khan Tengri Peak willbring the country much needed income from thetourist industry.

The authorities also argue that Western politicalscientists have predicted that in 30-40 years� time

75 ICG interview, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jalal-Abad, May 2001. The real number of Hizb ut-Tahrirmembers arrested in Uzbekistan is probably much lower� possibly around 5,000 people � though thegovernment does not allow access to reliable informationon the scale of the arrests or the detentions camps wherethey are imprisoned.76 For an example, see Jetigen (weekly televisionprogram), KTR, 23 June 2001.77 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 105, Part I, 4 June2001.

China will be much stronger politically andeconomically than it is now.78 Failure to settle theborder issue with China today may mean an evenless favourable settlement in the future. China andKyrgyzstan at the June 2001 Shanghai Forumsummit signed a memorandum on the constructionof a rail link between Qashghar in China via theTorugart Pass and Jalal-Abad to Bishkek. Also workhas begun in Osh to improve the road connection toChina. Finally, the authorities argue that upsettingChina over the border issue may result in reducedtrade and thus financial losses for Kyrgyzstan.Opponents argue that the agreements would giveChina control of substantial Kyrgyz water resources,which may cause disputes between the two countriesin the future. While the agreement with China willnot likely provoke an uprising, it feeds on populardistrust of the Chinese and turns this into an issue oftension between the population and the government.

E. POLITICAL PARTIES (THEOPPOSITION)

Opposition parties have yet to transform themselvesinto an effective counterbalance to the executivebranch for several reasons. For many, the �party�label still carries connotations of the Soviet period.Most opposition parties have not built effectivegrassroots structures or established a legislativeagenda that would help the public identify them as agroup working to defend their particular interests.

During the 2000 parliamentary election, 105 seatswere available in the two houses, of which fifteenwere set-aside for proportional distribution topolitical parties. Parties competing in nationalconstituencies had to receive more than five per centof the vote to be eligible to win seats. The Ministryof Justice had registered 32 political parties beforethe parliamentary contest, but of these, only fifteenwere given permission from the Central ElectionCommission to contest the elections. Pro-presidential and pro-governmental parties took nineof the seats, and opposition parties took six.79 Partyrepresentatives also took several seats not earmarkedfor political parties. In total, just over 30 per cent ofthose currently in parliament represent politicalparties.

78 Jetigen, KTR, 23 June 2001.79 See Appendix A for a breakdown of parliamentary seatsby party.


The largest parties � apart from the Party ofCommunists of Kyrgyzstan � are the three pro-presidential and pro-governmental parties Adilet,Birimdik and Moia Strana. The smaller Union ofDemocratic Forces, the Democratic Party ofWomen, the Party of Afghan War Veterans andthe Agrarian Labour Party are also generally pro-administration.

Opposition parties tend to be less organised andhave fewer members. The biggest is the Party ofCommunists of Kyrgyzstan, headed by AbsamatMasaliev. The other most well known parties arethe People�s Party, led by the former editor-in-chief of Asaba, Melis Eshimkanov, whocontested the presidential elections last year andfinished fourth among the six challengers, andAr-Namis, headed by former Vice PresidentFeliks Kulov until his arrest earlier this year.Former vice-speaker of the Legislative Assembly,Omurbek Tekebaev, who finished second in lastyear�s presidential election, heads the Ata-MekenParty, and the ErK party is led by Bakir uulu whowas also a candidate in last year�s elections and iswell known in Kyrgyzstan for negotiating therelease in 1999 of four Japanese hostages held bythe IMU.

Less than twenty deputies in the Parliamentbelong to the opposition and they are not wellpositioned to have a serious impact on politics.None of these parties, except the communists,have branches in more than three or fourprovinces. And where they do have suchbranches they are either not very active (and thusnot very well known to the local population) orhave gone underground. The party of former VicePresident Kulov, Ar-Namis, for example,instructed its members to go underground in theaftermath of the parliamentary elections. Partiesremain regionally focused: strong in the cities oftheir leaders and weak elsewhere. For example,the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan isparticularly strong in the south, because itsleader, Absamat Masaliev, is from BatkenProvince. The Social Democratic Party, on theother hand, is strongest in the north, sinceAlmazbek Atambaev, its former leader andcandidate in last year�s presidential elections,hails from the village of Arashan in theAlamüdün District of the Chüy Province. In some

remote regions, such as Leylek District, there arealmost no party activities.80

Parliamentarian Ishembai Kadyrbekov explains theinherent weakness of opposition political parties inbasic terms: �Policy is made by money,� and mostopposition parties have limited financial resources.81

A leading member of the �Coalition NGO� adds,�People are too frightened of the authorities to jointhe opposition parties,� and stresses that the 1999Law on Political Parties prohibits political partiesfrom conducting business, thus keeping them cashpoor.82 Given the state of the economy, many peopleare hard pressed to afford membership fees.

At this point, political parties largely remain enginesfor individual politicians and not broader socialmovements.83 Political parties also have to strugglewith public distrust, and a number of citizens havecomplained that they see little of politicians betweenelections. Turar Koichuev, the former President ofthe Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, said: �Partieswere formed because of the political ambitions ofcertain people. As soon as they are elected deputies,they take care of their own personal interests.�84

The government has imposed a number of obstaclesto expansion of the influence of parties. In severaldistricts � most notably in Bishkek � it hasimposed restrictions on meetings anddemonstrations. A request by the major oppositionparties for a rally permit in Bishkek on 1 May 2001was denied. The opposition organised a peacefulrally of some 500 people in downtown Bishkekdespite the lack of a permit, largely in an effort toshow it would not be cowed by the authorities. Theopposition also does not have access to statecontrolled media which either largely ignore orvilify the opposition, usually casting it asirresponsible and inexperienced. The state media hasalso played up suggestions that the oppositionparties, if allowed into power, would leave thecountry vulnerable to security threats such asmilitant Islamist extremism. Although some politicalparties have their own newspapers (the Republican

80 ICG interview with Bakir Kurbanbaev, chairman of thelocal council in Leylek District, 19 April 2001.81 ICG interview, Bishkek, 28 April 2001.82 ICG interview, 11 May 2001.83 ICG interview with Valerii Uleev, the director of thehuman rights NGO Spravedlivost�, Jalal-Abad, 24 May2001.84 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 May 2001.


Party has Res Publica for example, and thePeople�s Party controlled Asaba until it wasclosed down earlier this year), the oppositionpress has a limited circulation and has struggledto reach a broader audience.

Strengthening the Opposition: In the aftermathof the parliamentary elections, there wasdiscussion of forming a unified opposition, butthis effort was slow to get off the ground.However, cooperation between the oppositionparties began to gain some steam on the eve ofthe 2000 presidential elections. OmurbekTekebaev of the Ata-Meken party and FeliksKulov of the Ar-Namis party forged an alliance,as did the Social Democratic Party and the Partyof Communists of Kyrgyzstan. The government�smanipulation of the presidential contest onlyfurther reinforced the notion that the oppositionwould need to co-operate to survive.

In April 2001, ten opposition parties forged acoalition called the People�s Patriotic Movement.The effectiveness of this alliance remains to bedemonstrated. Even joint meetings and gatheringshave been difficult to arrange as of August 2001.Some are sceptical that their decision to unite willhave much of a political impact given the powerenjoyed by Akaev�s administration. Still, thealliance represents a very important step in that itsignals an intention on the part of the oppositionto work together, and could make it moredifficult for the presidential administration to actagainst individuals or select parties. Further, ifthe alliance could begin to attract some of themembers of the very large bloc of independentsin parliament, it could potentially become a farmore potent force.

Attempts at uniting political parties have alsobeen made at the local level. In Kara-Köl, forinstance, the major political parties have set up anumbrella organisation called the �Civic Union�representing parties including Asaba, theCommunist Party, the Agrarian Workers� Party,Ata-Meken, Ar-Namis, the Women�s DemocraticParty, the Social Democratic Party and others, inaddition to NGOs such as the Union ofConsumers, the Union of Industrialists, the Unionof Afghan Veterans and the Union of ChernobylVeterans. Altogether fifteen political parties andNGOs are members of the Civic Union that isactive in lobbying local and district authorities.Members of the Union stress that they are trying

to find ways to work with the local governmentinstead of organising street protests, and feel thatthey have made some progress in that regard. TheCivic Union, however, is the exception rather thanthe rule, though it provides a useful model of amovement that is focused on achieving socialchange at a local level rather than simply advancingthe candidacy of a given politician.

Considerable concern has been raised by a decisionof the Ministry of Justice earlier this year, whichforces all political parties set up before the 1999Law on Political Parties to re-register. There is clearfear that the process of re-registration is simply aguise to abolish some of the strongest oppositionparties. Deputy Minister of Justice, ErkinbekMamyrov, claims that such fears are unfounded andthat the re-registration is a formality.85 He indicatedto ICG that nineteen parties would need to re-register with the Ministry of Justice by 1 July 2001.He added that several parties that were not requiredto re-register were opposition parties (for instanceKulov�s Ar-Namis Party, Kairan-El, the RepublicanParty, the Party of National Revival and theRepublican Party). A Ministry Official later toldICG that as of 8 August four political parties hadbeen re-registered and that the deadline had beenextended to 1 October.

It is still too early to say whether opposition partieswill be denied re-registration. While this process islegal, it could turn into a transparent effort to silencegovernment rivals. If the Party of Communists ofKyrgyzstan, the People�s Party or Ata-Meken aredenied re-registration there would likely be somepublic protests but probably not on a large-scale.However, even small protests could snowball intolarger unrest given the complex array of politicaltensions in the country.

Following last year�s parliamentary elections, Akaevhas deservedly been under increasing pressure fromthe international community to improve theobservance of democratic and human rights.Outlawing legitimate opposition parties would onlystrengthen the case that assistance should be

85 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 May 2001. Some members ofthe opposition have indicated to the ICG that the re-registration of political parties, unlike the re-registration ofthe media, is justified in that the 1999 Law on PoliticalParties makes certain demands on political parties regardingtheir statutes that were not contained in previous legislation.


withheld until Akaev demonstrates renewedcommitment to democratic norms. If oppositiongroups are not allowed to function legally, thiswill add strength to illegal undergroundmovements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and to thepotential for spontaneous unrest. It is thereforeclearly in Akaev�s and Kyrgyzstan�s interests tore-register the opposition parties.

F. NON-GOVERNMENTALORGANISATIONS (NGOS)

While political parties and the media havesuffered increasing restrictions, NGOs have beenallowed considerably more leeway to develop. Atotal of about 3,000 NGOs were registered withthe Ministry of Justice by the end of 2000,although the number of active NGOs is probablyconsiderably less. The majority of these NGOswork in the social sphere, addressing problemssuch as poverty, unemployment and women�sissues. Some NGOs, such as the Foundation forTolerance International, work to improverelations between ethnic communities in southernKyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan�s largest NGO, anumbrella organisation called �Coalition NGO,�unites some 100 local organisations and hasoffices in all the provinces. It monitors electionsand lobbies the government on a range of issues.

Some NGO representatives argue that NGOs aremore influential than political parties in thecurrent climate. For example, Alevtina Pronenko,the deputy leader of the People�s Party, callsNGOs, �a real force in our country,� andobserves that the �strength of the NGOs wasclearly demonstrated in parliamentary,presidential and local elections. The fact that theauthorities are also setting up their own NGOsdemonstrates that NGOs are a force to bereckoned with.�86 Parliamentarian IshembaiKadyrbekov suggests that the importance of theNGOs comes both in their ability to producefuture leaders and in their capacity to serve aswatchdogs.87 Others, such as AvazbekTursunbaev, the director of the Public Fund�Turan�, are far more modest in their

86 ICG interview, Bishkek, 2 May 2001.87 ICG interview, Bishkek, 28 April 2001.

assessments, insisting, �NGOs play a limited role inKyrgyzstan at the moment.�88

Because they are organised and receive support atthe local level, NGOs are also in a better position tohave mutual lines of communication withcommunities and provide people with informationnot available through the media. Bolot Maripov, theeditor of Obshchestvennyi reiting, argues, �NGOscurrently fulfil the role of media and also partly ofpolitical parties, given that the authorities have putobstacles in the way of parties.�89 The human rightsNGO Spravedlivost� based in Jalal-Abad, publishesits own newsletter, as does the �Coalition NGO�.The latter has a print run of 70,000 and is distributedthroughout Kyrgyzstan. Roza Jumaeva, co-ordinatorof the Narin chapter of �Coalition NGO�, maintains,�Our bulletins are useful and have an impact, sincemany villages do not have access to otherinformation.�90

Not all NGOs are in a position to manage their ownpublications, making links to the media vital. Kara-Köl-based EMTV has televised debates organised bylocal NGOs, and the director of the channel, RuslanOsmonaliev, told ICG that people are familiar withthe work of the NGOs in the province. The localindependent radio station Liubimaia volna alsoprovides local NGOs with free airtime. In other partsof the country, such as Osh, relations between NGOsand the media are less well developed.

Relations between NGOs and political parties arecomplex. In some instances, NGO representativesare sceptical of political parties. Roza Jumaeva from�Coalition NGO� comments: �The political partiesare not capable of doing anything themselves. Onthe eve of the election campaign they turned to us,requesting that we provide them with electionobservers. NGOs represent a strong power and bothpolitical parties and the authorities are trying to useus. We must not allow them to do so. We mustremain independent.�91 Some NGOs helped politicalparties and presidential candidates to arrange localmeetings during the election campaigns last year.While the political role of many NGOs isconstrained (including by restrictions placed onthem by international donors), the issues they

88 ICG interview, Özgön, 18 May 2001.89 ICG interview, Bishkek, 31 May 2001.90 ICG interview, 5 May 2001.91 ICG interview, Narin, 5 May 2001.


address, such as poverty, will remain central tothe public debate.

NGOs and the Government: Not viewing NGOsas a direct threat, the government has allowedthem relative independence. Indeed, becauseNGOs help to alleviate some of the country�smost pressing social problems, and attractinternational funding, the government has goodreason to view them as a constructive socialforce.

The government has also tried to co-opt NGOs toa certain extent, and several �official� NGOshave been set up during the last year. The mostwell known is the �Association NGO�, headed byTokaim Umetalieva who is closely associatedwith the presidential administration.92 Thegovernment has clearly bridled that more andmore money is being directed through NGOs andnot the government. Abdishukur Isabaliev, thechairman of the Osh provincial parliament,complains that international donors choose towork primarily with NGOs and not directly withthe government.93 However, as long as thegovernment fails to deal adequately withcorruption and grows increasingly undemocratic,this trend will continue.

The authorities have also signalled that they wishto cooperate with existing NGOs. On 19 January2001, the government ordered the stateadministration at all levels and also deputies tomeet with NGOs on a regular basis. This wasdone with the aim of improving relations withNGOs and to increase the potential for jointprojects. As Batal Bozgorpoev, the deputygovernor of Isik-Köl Province noted, �We inviteNGOs to the province administration and weprovide them with information. We do notbother, but rather help each other. Our goals arethe same, although we go about things indifferent ways.�94

92 During the OSCE�s press conference following theKyrgyz presidential elections in October 2000,Umetalieva caused a row by shouting at the head of theOSCE election monitoring mission, Mark Stephens, anddenouncing the claims that the elections were not freeand fair.93 ICG interview, 15 May 2001.94 ICG interview, Karakol, 4 May 2001.

However, the government has also put pressure onNGO activists who have been critical of the currentsystem. �Coalition NGO�, for example, ran afoul ofthe government when it monitored last year�sparliamentary elections with financial support fromthe U.S. National Democratic Institute (NDI) andwas highly critical of the way in which the electionswere conducted. As a result, the Ministry of Justiceand the Central Election Commission denied thegroup permission to monitor the presidentialelections, claiming that it was not properlyregistered with the Ministry of Justice. Governmentpressure on �Coalition NGO� during August 2000forced many people to leave the organisation, andTolekan Ismailova, director of the group, was beatenup outside her house in Bishkek in March 2001, inan incident many viewed as politically motivated.

G. THE MEDIA

A free press is integral to a functioning democracy,but unfortunately journalists have increasingly beenunder fire in Kyrgyzstan. Although more than 600media outlets have registered with the Ministry ofJustice, only about 30 per cent of that number arecurrently operating. The difficult economic climateis partially to blame. Newspapers, for instance, havesmall circulations � usually no more than 5,000.Paper and printing services are expensive and mostpeople cannot afford to buy newspapers. It is notunusual for up to fifteen people to read the samecopy of a newspaper. Because the advertisingmarket is small, advertising provides very limitedrevenues. Most newspapers are consequently forcedto rely on sponsors that often bring a distinctpolitical agenda along with their cash, leading onejournalist to complain anonymously, �Although weare �independent�, we are still dependent. If we werefinancially and technically independent and hadsome international protection, it might be possible totalk about freedom of speech in this country.�95

All the major newspapers are printed in Bishkek andmany of them are having problems with theirdistributor, the state-owned Kyrgyzpochtasi. Thus,even people who can afford to buy newspapers stillhave limited access to the media.96 Only a very

95 ICG interview, Karakol, 3 May 2001.96 Tolekan Ismailova, the leader of the Coalition NGO, evenlaments: �There are no newspapers to speak of. People do


limited number of newspapers are printed locallyand, as a rule, they are official publications oflocal governments. Joldosh Kyrymbekov, thedeputy prosecutor in Isik-Köl Province reinforcesthat point, �Newspapers do not always reach thevillages, and they are expensive to buy.Television is therefore very important for ourdistrict.�97

The same is true for much of the country. KTR� the state-owned television company � isavailable in most parts of the country, as are theRussian channels ORT and RTR. In southernKyrgyzstan, most people are also able to watchUzbek television. A majority of the privatetelevision companies, however, are based inBishkek and broadcast to Bishkek and ChüyProvince only. In any event, few people owntelevisions.

Media and Governance: The governmentcontinues to engage in a systematic campaign toeliminate or co-opt the press. Both Pyramida TVand the popular Russian language newspaperVechernyi Bishkek are now said to be controlledby Akaev�s son-in-law, Adil Togumbaev � thehusband of Akaev�s oldest daughter Bermet.Togumbaev is also rumoured to be trying toacquire a majority share in the state printinghouse, Uchkun. The papers Asaba and Delo №,however, have resisted such pressure. The editorof Asaba was approached by representatives ofthe government and asked to sell his paper. Therequest was backed by a threat that if he did notsell, the courts would shut down the paper. Theoffer was made in conjunction with the SupremeCourt of Arbitration�s ruling that the newspaperhad to pay more than U.S.$22,000 to LionTechnics for defaulting on a loan, a case thatappeared to be built on shaky evidence. Asabahas since filed for bankruptcy. Presidentialconfidantes also unsuccessfully offered to payDelo № to cease publishing during the last monthof the 2000 presidential election campaign. Thepaper declined on the grounds that most of thepresidential candidates had already purchasedadvertising space.

not get any information.� ICG interview, Bishkek, 27April 2001.97 ICG interview, Karakol, 3 May 2001.

Other tactics are more aggressive. �We are all afraidof being closed down. The tax inspectors can alwaysfind something on us,� said one prominent mediafigure. Editors attributed measures taken againstDelo № to the paper�s aggressive reporting of thegovernment harassment of presidential candidateFeliks Kulov.98 On occasion, the state printing houseUchkun has been ordered to temporarily ceaseprinting of controversial newspapers. This is usuallyjustified by the government because of paper or ink�shortages�. On the eve of last year�s elections, ajournalist working in Res Publica announced thatUchkun had gone so far as to censor a sarcasticpoem about Akaev included in an issue of thenewspaper.99 In April this year Uchkun was orderedby court to cease publication temporarily of an issueof Res Publica, made in collaboration withjournalists from Asaba (entitled Asaba v ResPublica), because the title was not officiallyregistered with the Ministry of Justice. Morerecently, Uchkun was reportedly instructed not toprint materials critical of the president or hisfamily.100 Physical violence against journalists hasalso been used, though only rarely. Thus, the editor-in-chief of Kyrgyz Ruuhu, Beken Nazaraliev, wasseverely beaten by four people at a bus stop inBishkek on 16 April 2001.101

Given the stiff penalties for libel, the media imposea degree of self-censorship. To avoid being taken tocourt for violating the �dignity and honour� ofpublic officials, reporters have become increasinglycautious. While greater professionalism is obviouslyboth needed and welcome, the libel laws have alsoclearly had a chilling effect. Many journalistscontinue to be self-taught, and faculties ofjournalism are not well oriented to the demands andresponsibilities of modern media. Internewsprovides some technical training in Bishkek, but thequality of journalism as a whole remains wanting.This has to do in part with the fact that newspapersand television channels have very limited budgetsand are thus not in a position to send their journalistsoff to do investigative journalism. The difficulteconomic situation also does not allow journalists tospecialise in any particular field. Further, access to

98 The European Institute for the Media, �The KyrgyzPresidential Elections 2000. Final Report� (Dusseldorf:European Institute for the Media, 2001).99 Ibid.100 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 110, Part I, 11 June 2001.101 The Times of Central Asia, 19 April 2001, p. 1.


information is often limited, and the governmentfrequently fails to provide public access torecords as required by law.

Despite all the problems, however, the ability ofthe media to influence political events should notbe underestimated. Most notably, the public andparliamentary uproar sparked by the potentialterritorial swap with Uzbekistan erupted after thememorandum detailing this agreement appearedin the newspaper Obshchestvennyi reiting. It isworth noting that Obshchestvennyi reiting isgenerally considered a semi-independent, semi-pro-government paper,102 and most of thematerials printed in this paper are analytical. Itsmajor audience is officials and intellectuals. Byleaking this controversial document to the paper,a high-placed official was able to torpedo theagreement, and rumours abound as to who hadthe most to gain by such a move.

On 4 April 2001, the newspaper Delo № brokethe subsequent story that President Akaev hadsigned an agreement with China in 1999regarding disputed territory along the Kyrgyz-Chinese border. One of the paper�s journalists,Vadim Nochevkin, acted on information receivedfrom a former official in the border guard inNarin Province, who had heard the story from anacquaintance stationed on the Kyrgyz-Chineseborder and who was concerned and asked thenewspaper to investigate.103

Government officials have frequently complainedthat the media is sensationalist and printsincorrect and unverified information. Shortlyafter the 1999 Kyrgyz-Chinese agreementbecame public, opposition newspapers claimedthat a similar agreement had been reached in1996 and that the previous parliament had notratified it despite assurances to the contrary bythe Minister of Foreign Affairs, MuratbekImanaliev. A pro-presidential deputy of theParliament quickly claimed that the 1996 borderagreement between Kyrgyzstan and China had

102 The chairman of the pro-government Moia Stranaparty told ICG that the newspaper is controlled bymembers of his party. Interview with Joomart Otorbaev,Bishkek, 30 April 2001.103 Delo № (Bishkek), �Kitaitsam otdaly zastavu i �koe-chto v pridachu? [The Chinese were Given theOutpost�and Something in Addition?],� Delo №, 4April 2001, p. 4.

indeed been ratified in 1998 by the previousparliament, and he expressed his dissatisfaction withthose Kyrgyz media outlets suggesting otherwise.104

However, Tursunbai Bakir uulu, the chairman of theErK Party, who was a member of both parliaments,confirmed to ICG that the old parliament had indeedvoted on five protocols signed by the Kyrgyz andChinese authorities but the clause that would haveceded Kyrgyz territory to China was not included.105

It appears the Kyrgyz media got the story right.

Representatives of the independent media are notoptimistic with regard to the future. SvetlanaKrasilnikova, the deputy editor-in-chief of Delo №comments, �In ten years we will have noindependent media in Kyrgyzstan. What theindependent media writes will no longer be an issue,since there will be no independent media left. Theauthorities would like to see the situation becomelike that in Turkmenistan.�106

Recent media developments indicate that they maywell be right. On 5 April 2001 the Ministry ofJustice announced that the country�s media outletswould have to re-register with the Ministry by 1 Julybecause the Ministry wanted to find out how manywere actually in operation. The decision to re-register the Kyrgyz media, like the equally ill-advised effort to re-register the political parties,appears to be raw politics dressed up in legalities.However, the Deputy Minister of Justice, ErkinbekMamyrov, sought to reassure ICG that the measurewas not aimed against the independent media.107 Asof 8 August, the Ministry of Justice had re-registered60 media outlets and was reviewing another 30applications. The deadline for re-registration hasbeen extended until 1 October this year.108 Inanother move, on 20 June 2001 the Ministry ofJustice decided to de-register sixteen media outletsthat had registered with the Ministry since 5 April.Two of these � Ferghana and Pozitsiia � hadalready appeared in print. And two � Agym andJoltiken � were founded by journalists who used towork in the now defunct opposition newspaperAsaba. Here too, the government appears to be

104 Jetigen, KTR, 23 June 2001.105 ICG interview, Bishkek, 31 May 2001.106 ICG interview, Bishkek, 26 April 2001. There is noindependent media in Turkmenistan.107 ICG interview, Bishkek, 30 May 2001.108 ICG telephone interview with Ministry Official, 8 August2001.


headed in the wrong direction with regard to civilliberties.

Ethnic Uzbek Media. Ethnic Uzbek citizens ofKyrgyzstan face even greater obstacles in seekingindependent sources of information in their ownlanguage. The problem is particularly severe insouthern Kyrgyzstan, where ethnic Kyrgyz alsohave difficulty getting appropriate languagebroadcasts since the population is distributedmainly along the borders with Uzbekistan,remote from the regional centres. MP AdakhanMadumarov recently said he believes that thegovernment of Uzbekistan is deliberatelyjamming Kyrgyz broadcasts in south-westernKyrgyzstan to ensure that citizens come underUzbekistan�s influence.109 An independent radiostation (Radio Salam) was recently launched inthe Batken with the assistance of Internews andUNICEF in hopes of improving the situation.

Most ethnic Uzbeks, however, do not share theauthorities� concern about broadcasts fromUzbekistan. They claim that they watch UzbekNational Television primarily for the music andthe Uzbek language, and their attitude to thestate-controlled news from Uzbekistan is oftencritical. In the largest population centres in thesouth Kyrgyzstan, however � Osh and Jalal-Abad � it is estimated that less than half thepopulation is able to watch the nationalbroadcasts from Uzbekistan. There are severalindependent television companies and televisionstudios in Osh. The biggest and most well knownof these is Osh TV, which broadcasts primarily inthe Uzbek language. It is accessible to themajority of the population of cities such as Oshand Jalal-Abad and their environs, while otherUzbek language channels such as Keremet andMezon TV have a much more limited range.110

For several years now, the State CommunicationAgency has pushed to have Osh TV switch itsbroadcast channel. However, the director of thecompany, Khaliljan Khudaiberdiev, has refused

109 Sultan Jumagulov, �Locals suffer enclaves impasse,�Reporting Central Asia (London: IWPR), No. 57, 22June 2001.110 The European Institute for the Media, �The KyrgyzPresidential Elections 2000: Final Report� (Dusseldorf:European Institute for the Media, 2001).

because the channel switch, which would alsoinclude using a different broadcasting frequency,would dramatically reduce the number of viewersand be prohibitively expensive. Most mediaobservers feel the State Communication Agency haspushed its demands simply because Osh TV is anUzbek language station, and because authorities fearthat southern Kyrgyzstan will fall under the sway ofUzbekistan. After Osh TV collected 32,000signatures in support of its case, the Supreme Courtof Arbitration recently ruled that it can remain on itscurrent channel for the time being. While a varietyof factors may stand behind it, the Supreme Court ofArbitration�s decision may be understood as anexpression of gratitude by Akaev for the very strongelectoral support he received from the Uzbekcommunity during last year�s presidential elections.

Recent developments in southern Kyrgyzstan seemto indicate that the government has decided to allowKyrgyzstan�s Uzbek-language media some breathingroom. Still, Kyrgyzstan�s Uzbek-language media arecautious in their treatment of political issues. Fewreferences have been made to the Hizb ut-Tahrir orethnic issues. Similarly, the Uzbek-language mediain the region did speak out against the potentialterritorial concessions to Uzbekistan as part of aborder agreement. Any efforts to suppress Uzbek-language media would only make tensions and thepotential for violence in the region more acute.

Journalists in the south are also trying to buildbridges between the two ethnic communities. Localjournalists in the Osh area have launched severalnew newspapers printed in both languages, such asDDD (Dostuk, Dostlik, Druzhba) and the JashMoon/Demos Times. The editor-in-chief of theprovincial administration newspaper in Jalal-Abadannounced that he had launched a new newspapercalled Ferghana. The paper is to be tri-lingual,publishing in Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Russian. Shortlyafter Ferghana was registered with the Ministry ofJustice earlier this year its licence was revoked, as aresult of the Ministry�s decision to cancel alllicences awarded after the re-registration of existingmedia outlets started on 5 April. Ferghana, likefifteen other media outlets, will therefore have to re-apply for registration once the re-registration hasbeen completed on 1 October 2001 � a lingeringreminder that even the most constructive journalistsare still confronted with a maze of governmentregulations designed to put roadblocks in the way ofa free press.


III. CONCLUSIONS

Beneath a veneer of relative calm, Kyrgyzstan ison a long, slow slide toward instability andshows a growing potential for violent conflict.President Akaev has steadily expanded hispowers, and done his best to ensure that politicalopponents are too weak and harassed to pose aserious challenge to his rule. The government hastinkered with the law and the administration ofjustice to manipulate both the parliamentary andpresidential elections in 2000. Despite theobvious abuses, and a rising chorus ofinternational concern, neither dissenters withinthe presidential administration nor opposingparties are well positioned to put Kyrgyzstan on adifferent course in the near future.

The most serious threat comes from a rising tideof public disillusionment with social conditionsand government policies. The last year hasbrought a number of spontaneous demonstrationsin response to the difficult economic situation.,These have the potential to grow into larger,more organised protests. Alternatively, meetingsheld by the opposition to protest widespreadpoverty could galvanise broader social uprisings.Kyrgyzstan�s bleak standard of living providesthe fuel that could accelerate ethnic, religious orregional violence. The continued curtailment ofcivil liberties by the government � includingcrackdowns on the media, political opponentsand religious groups � only makes thefrustration and anger more profound.

It is not too late for Kyrgyzstan to put its house inorder and return to a more reform-minded path.First and foremost, the Akaev administrationneeds to understand that democracy is not itsenemy. The government�s authoritarian tilt willonly alienate much needed donors ofinternational assistance, further antagonise apublic struggling with basic economic survivaland lend appeal to those advocating moreextreme solutions. The opposition must beallowed to operate freely. Restrictions on publicmeetings and demonstrations should beabolished. In the spirit of national reconciliationand justice, amnesty should be declared forpolitical opponents jailed in the run-up to lastyear�s presidential election, such as Feliks Kulov.Such amnesty should be provided withoutlimiting the recipient�s future ability to hold

public office. For its part, the internationalcommunity should make it clear that efforts to assistKyrgyzstan � including debt rescheduling andcontinued aid flows � will be directly contingent oncontinued economic reforms and immediateimprovements in the treatment of opposition groups,journalists and the other components of afunctioning civil society.

Provincial governors should be elected by the publicrather than appointed by the executive, and theprocess of forcing political parties (and the media) toregister and re-register according to the whims of thegovernment should be immediately discontinued.Efforts are also needed to make the election processas transparent as possible. If ballot papers wereprinted abroad, this would diminish the possibilitiesfor manipulating election results. Some oppositionfigures have suggested raising the number of seats tobe elected from party lists from fifteen to 52, or 50per cent of the total, as a means to strengthen therole of political parties in Kyrgyz politics. However,it is also reasonable to question if parties should begranted such a powerful political gift until theyimprove their own efforts to build grassrootsstructures and coherent policy platforms. Thepractice of �bundling� issues to be decided by thepublic in referendums should also be discontinued.A dialogue between the authorities, the politicalopposition, media outlets and NGOs may also helpreduce political tension and make reform morelikely.

Efforts to restore basic democratic rights must beaccompanied by urgent action on the economicfront. The government needs to continue, notabandon economic reforms, focus its efforts onpoverty alleviation and re-negotiate debt paymentswith international lenders so that more money can bedevoted to urgent needs. Any privatisation of suchvaluable national resources as the state electricitycompany Kyrgyzenergo should be overseen by theWorld Bank and other outsiders to ensure that a fairmarket value is received. Price increases forconsumers should be carefully phased in order toavoid disturbances.

The president should also take effective measures toreduce nepotism and corruption within his ownadministration and appoint people to positionsaccording to merit rather than personal loyalty.Transparent hiring criteria should be introduced, andthe overall size of the government �one-quarter ofthe current workforce � will need to be reduced.


Greater numbers of ethnic Uzbeks will also needto be represented in the judiciary, police andother government functions. Internationalassistance with efforts to restructure governmentadministration would be helpful if thegovernment shows progress in reform. As part ofthis effort, more government officials might beinvited to training courses in publicadministration in donor countries and educatedon sound standards for recruitment, training andmanagement. Donors can also help set up bettertraining facilities for public officials inKyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan also needs to initiate legal reforms aspart of the overall strategy to boost economicgrowth. Corruption and the failure to develop therule of law make foreign investors reluctant toinvest in the Kyrgyz economy as they have nolegal protection. Allowing precious stateresources to be skimmed off for the advantage ofthe few also undermines overall confidence andimpedes investment. This in turn fuels poverty,causing the unrest that the government is so eagerto quell. The judiciary must be allowed todevelop as an independent counterbalance to theexecutive. Anti-bribery statutes need to beenshrined in law and regulations concerninglobbying should also be instituted. The selectiveprosecution of businessmen, journalists andpolitical opponents of the government should behalted.

Greater accountability is necessary in theappointment of judges through a system ofeffective checks and balances. Funding for thejudiciary should be provided directly from theparliament and not from the executive. Judgesshould undergo compulsory training to ensurethey reach minimum standards. The internationalcommunity should work closely with the Kyrgyzauthorities to ensure that the presidentialcommission on legal reform works moreefficiently by improving its links with theparliamentary committee on legal issues.

Kyrgyzstan might consider adopting some of thepolicies of the �Coalition 2000� � an anti-corruption campaign initiated in Bulgaria, thatbrought together the authorities, local NGOs andthe media to create public awareness of the high

costs of corruption.111 A similar initiative supportedby the OSCE in Armenia has also achieved goodresults.

A number of steps should likewise be taken toensure the freedom of the media. Considerationshould be given to the state media and nationaltelevision should be turned into an independentnational broadcasting corporation similar to the BBCin the United Kingdom. This would involve puttingit under the authority of an independent board ratherthan under direct government control and ensuringthat it has funds approved by parliament rather thanthe executive. Better training facilities for journalistsshould be provided. Courts should ensure thatrestrictions are not imposed that would interferewith an independent and accurate media. Thisshould include making libel a civil and not acriminal matter and placing a cap on damages tominimise the risk that libel cases will be used tosilence opposition voices.

At the moment, judges continue to be pressured intomaking too many decisions that clearly violate thestandards of a free press. The suppression of anindependent media and a heavily biased state-controlled media is a dangerous mix. The Kyrgyzpeople are entitled to receive objective informationand the government should end its practice ofdeciding which journalists and organisations are�fit� to operate. Further, the Uzbek-language mediain southern Kyrgyzstan should be allowed to operatefreely and joint Kyrgyz-Uzbek media venuesencouraged. Round-table discussions betweenleading members of the two ethnic communities �as well as a dialogue between the Uzbek communityand the Kyrgyz authorities � would also help todiffuse ethnic tensions.

The government should also establish a dialoguewith Hizb ut-Tahrir and develop a more balancedapproach to Islamic clergy. In the interest ofreducing tensions with the Islamic community insouthern Kyrgyzstan � and to preserve its ownsovereignty � the government of Kyrgyzstanshould work to prevent cross border operations byUzbekistan�s security services.

The work of NGOs should be further encouraged.Local communities could benefit greatly from a

111 Information about Coalition 2000 can be found at itswebsite at: http://www.online.bg/Coalition2000.


social partnership between the authorities andNGOs. NGOs are also an important source ofinformation for people living in more remoteregions. The political importance of NGOs islikely to grow in the future, as the politicalinstitutions tap benefits from the organizationalexperience of NGOs, and leading NGO figuresbecome more politically active.

Some of the measures outlined above are likely tocause considerable discontent and even resistancewithin the government of Kyrgyzstan, but thealternative is far worse. Should President Akaevand his government fail to address these pressingissues, the �island of democracy� may soondescend into chaos. The international communityneeds to employ a very careful balance of�carrots and sticks� to help diverse elements ofKyrgyzstan society to negotiate this dangerousperiod.

Osh/Brussels, 28 August 2001


APPENDIX A

KYRGYZ PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS (FEBRUARY/MARCH 2000)

Category Orientation Party Name Party ListSeats

SMCSeats

TotalSeats

Union of DemocraticForces 4 8 12

Democratic Party ofWomen 2 0 2Pro-Presidential

Party of Afghan WarVeterans 2 0 2

Moia Strana 1 3 4

Parties with PresidentialOrientation

Pro-Government /Centrist Agrarian-Labour Party 0 1 1

Independent Candidates - 73 73

People�s Party 0 2 2Opposition DMK/Ar-Namis 0 0 0

Leftist Opposition Party of Communists ofKyrgyzstan (PKK) 5 1 6

Erkin Kyrgyzstan 0 1 1

Parties with OppositionOrientation

Opposition /Centrist Ata-Meken 1 1 2

Source: OSCE/ODIHR, �Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections, 20 February & 12 March 2000: Final Report,� availableat: http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/kyrg00-1-final.htm.


APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CIS Commonwealth of IndependentStates

CPK Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan.

DDD Osh-based newspaper printed inKyrgyz, Uzbek and Russian. Thethree �D�s represent the first letter(D) for the word friendship inKyrgyz (dostuk), Uzbek (dustik)and Russian (druzhba).

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

KTR Kyrgyz Television and RadioCompany (Kyrgyz Televidenie janaRadio Kampaniiasi).

NAC National Agency forCommunication, later renamed toSAC.

OSCE Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe.

PCK Party of Communists ofKyrgyzstan.

SAC State Agency for Communication,formerly NAC.

UNICEF United Nations Children�s Fund.

WTO World Trade Organization.


APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Adilet [�Justice�] Party � Political party unitinggovernment officials.

Agrarian Labour Party � Pro-presidential party.One seat in parliament.

Akikat � Jalal-Abad provincial administrationnewspaper.

Aliev, Emil � Current leader of the Ar-NamisParty.

Ar-Namis [�Dignity�] Party � Political partyheaded by Feliks Kulov until his jailing.

Asaba � Opposition newspaper owned by MelisEshimkanov, the leader of the People�sParty. Closed down by the KyrgyzArbitration Court earlier this year fordefaulting on a loan.

Ata-Meken [�Homeland�] Party � The KyrgyzSocialist Party, chaired by OmurbekTekebaev. Two seats in parliament.

Bakir uulu, Tursunbai � Chairman of the ErkinKyrgyzstan Party. Finished sixth (of sixcandidates) in last year�s presidentialelections. Primarily known for havingnegotiated the release of four Japanesehostages held by the IMU (IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan) in 1999. For thishe was awarded the title �ambassadorextraordinary & plenipotentiary.�

Beshimov, Bakyt � Rector of Osh University untilthe spring of 1998. Officially removed fromhis post on the grounds that his qualificationswere inadequate. Real reason for his removalsaid to be critical remarks about Akaev.Students organised demonstration in protest.

Birimdik Party (in Russian: Edinstvo [�Unity�]) �Pro-governmental party founded in 1994 ledby Amangeldi Muraliev.

Border Agreements with China � Twoagreements were concluded by the Kyrgyzand Chinese presidents on disputed areasalong their common border. The contents ofthe first agreement, which was concluded in1996, are not known. According to the 1999agreement Kyrgyzstan would cede some90,000 hectares (900 sq. km) in the Üzöngü-Kuush river valley (an area along the borderbetween the Narin and Isik-Köl provinces in

Kyrgyzstan and China) in return for the KhanTengri peak (6,995 meters). Most expertsagree that the total amount of land to beceded by both agreements exceeds 100,000hectares. There is considerable confusionregarding the first agreement. The Kyrgyzparliament is having problems obtaining itstext. Besides, Kyrgyz Minister of ForeignAffairs Imanaliev claims that the firstagreement was ratified by the previousKyrgyz parliament, whereas this is denied bymany deputies. Some deputies have calledfor impeachment procedures to be initiatedagainst Akaev in connection with the 1999agreement.

Coalition NGO � Kyrgyzstan�s biggest NGOuniting some 100 NGOs throughout thecountry. It monitored last year�sparliamentary elections with financialsupport from the U.S. through the NDI. Itwas barred from monitoring the presidentialelections. Current activities include lobbyinglegislation in parliament. Leader: TolekanIsmailova.

Delo № � The first independent newspaper ofKyrgyzstan, founded in March 1991. Printedonce a week in Russian.

Democratic Movement Party � Party founded in1993. Major aim to include the creation of alaw-based democratic state and civil society.Leader: Jypar Jeksheev.

Democratic Party of Women � Pro-presidentialparty founded in 1994. The party�s majoraim is to get women more involved in publiclife and to solve the environmental problemsin the country. Party leader: Tokon Shailieva.Two seats in parliament.

El (Bei-Becharalar) Party [�People�s Party�,�Poor People�s Party�] � Opposition partyfounded in 1995 and headed by MelisEshimkanov, former owner of the Asabanewspaper. Two seats in parliament.

Erkin Kyrgyzstan [�Free Kyrgyzstan�] Party(ErK) � Opposition party founded in 1990and initially headed by Omurbek Tekebaev(the current leader of the Ata-Meken Party).


Since 1995 the party has been headed byTursunbai Bakir uulu. One seat inparliament.

Erkindik [�Freedom�] Party � Politicalopposition party led by TopchubekTurgunaliev.

Eshimkanov, Melis � Former owner of the Asabanewspaper, leader of the People�s Party.Finished fourth (of six candidates) in lastyear�s presidential elections.

Ferghana � Jalal-Abad-based newspaper launchedby the editor-in-chief of the Akikatnewspaper. Caters for the Kyrgyz, Uzbekand Russian communities in the South ofKyrgyzstan. Registered with the Ministry ofJustice in the spring and de-registered in Junetogether with fifteen other media outlets (seemedia section).

Hizb ut-Tahrir � Religious party whose majoraim is to create a caliphate uniting allMuslims throughout Central Asia using non-violent means. Illegal in Kyrgyzstan. Enjoysconsiderable support amongst ethnic Uzbeksin the South of Kyrgyzstan.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) �Militant movement intent on toppling theKarimov regime by force. Based inTajikistan. Organised incursions in theBatken province (Kyrgyzstan) in 1999 and2000 in an attempt to enter Uzbek territory.Thought to plan similar incursion this year.

Jash Moon/Demos Times � Kyrgyz/Uzbeknewspaper, founded in Osh in 2000.

Jeksheev, Jypar � Leader of the DemocraticMovement Party.

Jogorku Kengesh [�Supreme Council�] �Kyrgyz Parliament. Consists of twochambers � the Legislative Assembly (60seats) and the Representative Chamber (45seats). Elections to the Jogorku Kengeshwere held in February/March 2000.

Kadyrbekov, Ishembai � Independent member ofthe Kyrgyz Parliament from Narin province.

Kairan-El Party [�Misfortunate People�s Party�]� Opposition party led by MP DooronbekSadyrbaev.

KTR � Kyrgyz Televidenie jana radio kampaniiasi(Kyrgyz Television and Radio Company)

Kulov, Feliks � Often referred to as �Akaev�s(former) right hand.� Has held a number ofhigh-ranking posts � including VicePresident of Kyrgyzstan, Governor of Chüyprovince and Minister of National Security.Arrested shortly after the parliamentary

elections last year, accused of having abusedhis position while Minister of NationalSecurity. Released by the Military Court ofthe Bishkek Garrison on 7 August 2000.Ruling overturned and sent back to theMilitary Court for review on 11 September2000. Court sentenced Kulov to seven yearsin prison early this year.

Kyrgyz Tuusu � Government newspaper printedtwice a week in Bishkek.

Masaliev, Absamat � Leader of the Party ofCommunists of Kyrgyzstan, Deputy.

Masaliev, Itshakh � Member of the Party ofCommunists of Kyrgyzstan, Deputy.

Moia Strana Party (in Kyrgyz: Menin Ölköm[�My Country�]) � Pro-government partyuniting businessmen and members of theintelligentsia. Party leader: JoomartOtorbaev. Four seats in parliament.

Muraliev, Amangeldi � Governor of Osh from1996 to 1999 and Kyrgyz Prime Ministerfrom April 1999 to December 2000.Currently the co-ordinator of the BirimdikParty and also the chairman of the FootballFederation of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Otunbaeva, Roza � Kyrgyz Ambassador to theUK.

Party of Afghan War Veterans � Centrist pro-presidential party maintaining the interests ofAfghan war veterans, victims of regionalconflicts and the Chernobyl accident. Twoseats in parliament.

People�s Party � see El (Bei-Becharalar) Party.Pronenko, Alevtina � Member of parliament and

deputy-leader of the El (Bei-Becharalar)Party.

Republican Party � Opposition Party founded in1999. Most members are journalists (fromRes Publica), NGOs and businessmen. Mainaim is to establish a parliamentary republic.Party leader: Giyaz Tokombaev.

Res Publica � Major Russian-language oppositionnewspaper founded in 1992. Editor-in-chief:Zamira Sydykova.

Sabirov, Davran � Ethnic Uzbek deputy from Oshprovince.

Sadyrbaev, Dooronbek � Film director andmember of parliament and leader of theKairan-El Party.

Sadyrkulov, Mendet � Former chairman of theAuditing Chamber of the Kyrgyz Parliamentand former head of the presidentialadministration. Member of the Moia Strana


Party. Kyrgyz ambassador to Iran since 22March this year.

Sokh Memorandum � Signed by Kyrgyz PrimeMinister Bakiev and Uzbek Prime MinisterSultanov on 26 February 2001. According tothe Memorandum, Kyrgyzstan wouldprovide Uzbekistan with a corridor to itsenclave in the Batken province (SouthernKyrgyzstan) in return for land on the Uzbekside of the border. Initially the Uzbek sideoffered territory in Rishtan District in returnfor a corridor to Sokh. Later, however, theUzbeks withdrew this offer and signalled thatKyrgyzstan would get Taian � amountainous area with no economic orstrategic value � instead. The governor ofBatken, Aibalaev, said that if Kyrgyzstanprovided Uzbekistan with a corridor thiswould effectively turn parts of the Batkenprovince into a Kyrgyz enclave withinUzbekistan. The Kyrgyz Prime Ministertherefore quickly backtracked on theMemorandum, making it clear that it shouldbe treated as a declaration of intent ratherthan a binding agreement between the twocountries. The Kyrgyz parliament votedagainst the memorandum in early May.

Spravedlivost� � Human rights group in Jalal-Abad headed by Valerii Uleev.

Tekebaev, Omurbek � Chairman of the Ata-Meken (Socialist) Party. Re-elected toparliament last year. Vice-speaker of theLegislative Assembly (lower chamber of theparliament) until May this year. Finishedsecond in last year�s presidential elections.

Turgunaliev, Topchubek � Human rightscampaigner and the leader of the ErkindikParty. Known for his ability to gather andappeal to large crowds. Charged withplotting the assassination of Akaev last yearand sentenced to sixteen years in prison on 1September. Sentence later reduced to tenyears and he was released from prison onAugust 20 , 2001. Charges are thought to bepolitically motivated.

Union of Democratic Forces � Pro-presidentialparty. Twelve seats in parliament.

Usenov, Daniyar � Member of the People�s Partywho got into trouble with the courts duringlast year�s parliamentary elections. Deprivedof seat in parliament, following a complaintby the person who ran against him. Later haddifficulties with the courts regarding hisbusiness � on charges assumed to bepolitically motivated.

Usubaliev, Turdakun � Chairman of the KyrgyzCommunist Party, 1961-1985.


APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG�s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the ground incountries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG�s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisationsand made generally available at the same time viathe organisation�s internet site, www.crisisweb.orgICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generate supportfor its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board �which includes prominent figures from the fieldsof politics, diplomacy, business and the media �is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reportsand recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired byformer Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; formerAustralian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has beenPresident and Chief Executive since January 2000.

ICG�s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates field projects in eighteen crisis-affectedcountries and regions across three continents:Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegroand Serbia in Europe; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda,the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leoneand Zimbabwe in Africa; and Burma/Myanmar,Cambodia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan in Asia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, theSmith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

August 2001


APPENDIX E

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS*

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, AfricaReport N°24, 9 July 2001

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000

Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a NewNegotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix, AfricaReport N°33, 14 August 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa Report N°15,4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l�urgence de juger,Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa ReportN°32, 13 July 2001

* Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

East Timor Briefing, 6 October 1999Indonesia’s Shaky Transition, Indonesia Report N°1, AsiaReport N°5, 10 October 1999Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Indonesia ReportN°2, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19 July2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability,Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001Albania Briefing: Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, 23August 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo � Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999

Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001


No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001

KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999

Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, BalkansReport N°114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000


A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, BalkansReport N°116, 10 August 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and theRegion, Balkans Briefing Paper, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19 June2001Eu Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N° 2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2001


APPENDIX F

ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank


Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

Documents

KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN · 2016. 10. 10. · KYRGYZSTAN AT TEN: TROUBLE IN THE ﬁISLAND OF DEMOCRACYﬂ 28 August 2001 ICG Asia Report No 22 Osh/Brussels