G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU),petitioner,vs.NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED,respondent.x------------------------------------------xG.R. Nos. 158944-45 March 3, 2008NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED,petitioner,vs.UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU),respondent.R E S O L U T I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:On 22 August 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision1in the above-entitled cases, the dispositive part of which reads WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R. No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestl be declared to have committed unfair labor practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl is AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.Subsequent thereto, Nestl Philippines, Incorporated (Nestl) filed a Motion for Clarification2on 20 September 2006; while Union of Filipro Employees Drug, Food and Allied Industries Union Kilusang Mayo Uno (UFE-DFA-KMU), on 21 September 2006, filed aMotion for Partial Reconsideration3of the foregoing Decision.The material facts of the case, as determined by this Court in its Decision, may be summarized as follows:UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestl belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants. On 4 April 2001, as the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU4was to end on 5 June 2001,5the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestl of their intent to "open [our] new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004 x x x as early as June 2001."6In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations.On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only)7, Nestl reiterated its stance that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom."8Dialogue between the company and the union thereafter ensued.On 14 August 2001, however, Nestl requested9the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between it and UFE-DFA-KMU owing to an alleged impasse in said dialogue;i.e., that despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA.Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective, though, and the UFE-DFA-KMU filed aNotice of Strike10on 31 October 2001 with the NCMB, complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., "retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA".11On 07 November 2001, anotherNotice of Strike12was filed by the union, this time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations. The result of a strike vote conducted by the members of UFE-DFA-KMU yielded an overwhelming approval of the decision to hold a strike.13On 26 November 2001, prior to holding the strike, Nestl filed with the DOLE aPetition for Assumption of Jurisdiction,14praying for the Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, to assume jurisdiction over the current labor dispute in order to effectively enjoin any impending strike by the members of the UFE-DFA-KMU at the Nestls Cabuyao Plant in Laguna.On 29 November 2001, Sec. Sto. Tomas issued an Order15assuming jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute. The fallo of said Order states that:CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Nestl Philippines, Inc. (Cabuyao Plant) pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.Accordingly, any strike or lockout is hereby enjoined. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the further deterioration of the current labor relations situation.The parties are further directed to meet and convene for the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) who is hereby designated as the delegate/facilitator of this Office for this purpose. The NCMB shall report to this Office the results of this attempt at conciliation and delimitation of the issues within thirty (30) days from the parties receipt of this Order, in no case later than December 31, 2001. If no settlement of all the issues is reached, this Office shall thereafter define the outstanding issues and order the filing of position papers for a ruling on the merits.UFE-DFA-KMU sought reconsideration16of the above but nonetheless moved for additional time to file its position paper as directed by the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.On 14 January 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas denied said motion for reconsideration.On 15 January 2002, despite the order enjoining the conduct of any strike or lockout and conciliation efforts by the NCMB, the employee members of UFE-DFA-KMU at Nestls Cabuyao Plant went on strike.In view of the above, in anOrderdated on 16 January 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas directed: (1) the members of UFE-DFA-KMUto return-to-workwithin twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of such Order; (2) Nestlto accept backall returning workers under the same terms and conditions existing preceding to the strike; (3) both partiesto cease and desistfrom committing acts inimical to the on-going conciliation proceedings leading to the further deterioration of the situation; and (4) thesubmission of their respective position paperswithin ten (10) days from receipt thereof. But notwithstanding theReturn-to-Work Order, the members of UFE-DFA-KMU continued with their strike, thus, prompting Sec. Sto. Tomas to seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) for the enforcement of said order.On 7 February 2002, Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU filed their respective position papers. Nestl addressed several issues concerning economic provisions of the CBA as well as the non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement Plan in the collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, UFE-DFA-KMU limited itself to the issue of whether or not the retirement plan was a mandatory subject in its CBA negotiations.On 11 February 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas allowed UFE-DFA-KMU the chance to tender its stand on the other issues raised by Nestl but not covered by its initial position paper by way of aSupplemental Position Paper.UFE-DFA-KMU, instead of filing the above-mentioned supplement, filed several pleadings, one of which was aManifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 11, 2002assailing the Order of February 11, 2002 for supposedly being contrary to law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. The union posited that Sec. Sto. Tomas "could only assume jurisdiction over the issues mentioned in the notice of strike subject of the current dispute,"17and that the Amended Notice of Strike it filed did not cite, as one of the grounds, the CBA deadlock.On 8 March 2002, Sec. Sto. Tomas denied the motion for reconsideration of UFE-DFA-KMU.Thereafter, UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Petition forCertiorari18before the Court of Appeals, alleging that Sec. Sto. Tomas committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the Orders of 11 February 2002 and 8 March 2002.In the interim, in an attempt to finally resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then Acting Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with anOrder19dated 02 April 2002, ruling that:a. we hereby recognize that the present Retirement Plan at the Nestl Cabuyao Plant is a unilateral grant that the parties have expressly so recognized subsequent to the Supreme Courts ruling inNestl, Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 90231, February 4, 1991,and is therefore not a mandatory subject for bargaining;b. the Unions charge of unfair labor practice against the Company is hereby dismissed for lack of merit;c. the parties are directed to secure the best applicable terms of the recently concluded CBSs between Nestl Phils. Inc. and it eight (8) other bargaining units, and to adopt these as the terms and conditions of the Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA;d. all union demands that are not covered by the provisions of the CBAs of the other eight (8) bargaining units in the Company are hereby denied;e. all existing provisions of the expired Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA without any counterpart in the CBAs of the other eight bargaining units in the Company are hereby ordered maintained as part of the new Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA;f. the parties shall execute their CBA within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, furnishing this Office a copy of the signed Agreement;g. this CBA shall, in so far as representation is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years; all other provisions shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its effective date which shall be December 5, 2001 (or on the first day six months after the expiration on June 4, 2001 of the superceded CBA).UFE-DFA-KMU moved to reconsider the aforequoted ruling, but such was subsequently denied on 6 May 2002.For the second time, UFE-DFA-KMU went to the Court of Appeals via another Petition forCertiorariseeking to annul the Orders of 02 April 2002 and 06 May 2002 of the Secretary of the DOLE, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.On 27 February 2003, the appellate court promulgated its Decision on the twin petitions forcertiorari,ruling entirely in favor of UFE-DFA-KMU, the dispositive part thereof stating WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, there being grave abuse on the part of the public respondent in issuing all the assailed Orders, both petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated February 11, 2001, and March 8, 2001 (CA-G.R. SP No. 69805), as well as the Orders dated April 2, 2002 and May 6, 2002 (CA-G.R. SP No. 71540) of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the case entitled: "IN RE: LABOR DISPUTE AT NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. (CABUYAO FACTORY)" under OS-AJ-0023-01 (NCMB-RBIV-CAV-PM-08-035-01, NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-10-037-01, NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-11-10-03901) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent is hereby directed to resume the CBA negotiations with the petitioner.20Both parties appealed the aforequoted ruling. Nestl essentially assailed that part of the decision finding the DOLE Secretary to have gravely abused her discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the Retirement Plan was not a valid issue to be tackled during the CBA negotiations; UFE-DFA-KMU, in contrast, questioned the appellate courts decision finding Nestl free and clear of any unfair labor practice.Since the motions for reconsideration of both parties were denied by the Court of Appeals in a joint Resolution dated 27 June 2003, UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl separately filed the instant Petitions for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended.G.R. No. 158930-31 was filed by UFE-DFA-KMU against Nestl seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision insofar as the appellate courts failure to find Nestl guilty of unfair labor practice was concerned; while G.R. No. 158944-45 was instituted by Nestl against UFE-DFA-KMU likewise looking to annul and set aside the part of the Court of Appeals Decision declaring that: 1) the Retirement Plan was a valid collective bargaining issue; and 2) the scope of the power of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl was limited to the resolution of questions and matters pertaining merely to the ground rules of the collective bargaining negotiations to be conducted between the parties.On 29 March 2004, this Court resolved21to consolidate the two petitions inasmuch as they (1) involved the same set of parties; (2) arose from the same set of circumstances,i.e., from several Orders issued by then DOLE Secretary, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, respecting her assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU, Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions;22and (3) similarly assailed the same Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.After giving due course to the instant consolidated petitions, this Court promulgated on 22 August 2006 its Decision, now subject of UFE-DFA-KMUs Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Nestls Motion for Clarification.In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, UFE-DFA-KMU would have this Court address and discuss anew points or arguments that have basically been passed upon in this Courts 22 August 2006 Decision. Firstly, it questions this Courts finding that Nestl was not guilty of unfair labor practice, considering that the transaction speaks for itself,i.e, res ipsa loquitor. And made an issue again is the question of whether or not the DOLE Secretary can take cognizance of matters beyond the amended Notice of Strike.As to Nestls prayer for clarification, the corporation seeks elucidation respecting the dispositive part of this Courts Decision directing herein parties to resume negotiations on the retirement compensation package of the concerned employees. It posits that "[i]n directing the parties to negotiate the Retirement Plan, the Honorable Court x x x might have overlooked the fact that here, the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction over the entire 2001-2004 CBA controversy x x x."As to the charge of unfair labor practice:The motion does not put forward new arguments to substantiate the prayer for reconsideration of this Courts Decision except for the sole contention that the transaction speaks for itself,i.e., res ipsa loquitor. Nonetheless, even a perusal of the arguments of UFE-DFA-KMU in its petition and memorandum in consideration of the point heretofore raised will not convince us to change our disposition of the question of unfair labor practice. UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that Nestls "refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice."23It explains that Nestl set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan. In its words, "respondent Nestl Phils., Inc. insisted that the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue before respondent Nestl would agree to discuss other issues in the CBA."24It then concluded that "the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in not ruling that respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice. It also committed a legal error in failing to award damages to the petitioner for the ULP committed by the respondent."25We are unconvinced still.The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by Articles 252 and 253 of the Labor Code, as amended, which state ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms of conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.Obviously, the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is noper setest of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. Theeffectof an employers or a unions individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.26For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x"27in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.Herein, the union merely bases its claim of refusal to bargain on a letter28dated 29 May 2001 written by Nestl where the latter laid down its position that"unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." But as we have stated in this Courts Decision, said letter is not tantamount to refusal to bargain. In thinking to exclude the issue of Retirement Plan from the CBA negotiations, Nestl, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted, considering that eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed to treat the Retirement Plan as a unilaterally granted benefit. This is not a case where the employer exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining, because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of the bargaining representative. Nestls desire to settle the dispute and proceed with the negotiation being evident in its cry for compulsory arbitration is proof enough of its exertion of reasonable effort at good-faith bargaining.In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse does not establish bad faith.[fn24 p.10] It is but natural that at negotiations, management and labor adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the economic issue proposed by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the former but it did not. And the managements firm stand against the issue of the Retirement Plan did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to the point of stalemate.The foregoing things considered, this Court replicates below its clear disposition of the issue:The concept of "unfair labor practice" is defined by the Labor Code as:ART. 247.CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION THEREOF. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.x x x x.The same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by employers, to wit:ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of the recognized collective bargaining agent; [The article referred to is 241, not 242. CAA](f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;(g)To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;(h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations associations or partnerships who have actually participated, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (Emphasis supplied.)Herein, Nestl is accused of violating its duty to bargain collectively when it purportedly imposed a pre-condition to its agreement to discuss and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with UFE-DFA-KMU.A meticulous review of the record and pleadings of the cases at bar shows that, of the two notices of strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU before the NCMB, it was only on the second that the ground of unfair labor practice was alleged. Worse, the 7 November 2001 Notice of Strike merely contained a general allegation that Nestl committed unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith for supposedly "setting pre-condition in the ground rules (Retirement issue)." (Notice of Strike of 7 November 2001; Annex "C" of UFE-DFA-KMU Position Paper; DOLE original records, p. 146.) In contrast, Nestl, in its Position Paper, did not confine itself to the issue of the non-inclusion of the Retirement Plan but extensively discussed its stance on other economic matters pertaining to the CBA. It is UFE-DFA-KMU, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice.A perusal of the allegations and arguments raised by UFE-DFA-KMU in the Memorandum (in G.R. Nos. 158930-31) will readily disclose the need for the presentation of evidence other than its bare contention of unfair labor practice in order to make certain the propriety or impropriety of the ULP charge hurled against Nestl. Under Rule XIII, Sec. 4, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code:x x x. In cases of unfair labor practices,the notice of strike shall as far as practicable, state the acts complained ofand the efforts to resolve the dispute amicably." (Emphasis supplied.)In the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. (Tiu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123276, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 681, 688.)Employers are accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) This mass of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) In this connection, the rule is that good faith is always presumed. As long as the companys exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.)There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of Nestl apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by the CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestl, the award of moral and exemplary damages is unavailing.As to the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary under the amended Notice of Strike:This Court is not convinced by the argument raised by UFE-DFA-KMU that the DOLE Secretary should not have gone beyond the disagreement on the ground rules of the CBA negotiations. The union doggedly asserts that the entire labor dispute between herein parties concerns only the ground rules.Lest it be forgotten, it was UFE-DFA-KMU which first alleged a bargaining deadlock as the basis for the filing of its Notice of Strike; and at the time of the filing of the first Notice of Strike, several conciliation conferences had already been undertaken where both parties had already exchanged with each other their respective CBA proposals. In fact, during the conciliation meetings before the NCMB, but prior to the filing of the notices of strike, the parties had already delved into matters affecting the meat of the collective bargaining agreement.The Secretary of the DOLE simply relied on the Notices of Strike that were filed by UFE-DFA-KMU as stated in her Order of 08 March 2002, to wit:x x x The records disclose that the Union filed two Notices of Strike. The First is dated October 31, 2001 whose grounds are cited verbatim hereunder:"A. Bargaining Deadlock1. Economic issues (specify)1. Retirement2. Panel Composition3. Costs and Attendance4. CBA"The second Notice of Strike is dated November 7, 2001 and the cited ground is like quoted verbatim below:"B. Unfair Labor Practices (specify)Bargaining in bad faith Setting pre-condition in the ground rules (Retirement issue)"Nowhere in the second Notice of Strike is it indicated that this Notice is an amendment to and took the place of the first Notice of Strike. In fact, our Assumption of Jurisdiction Order dated November 29, 2001 specifically cited the two (2) Notices of Strike without any objection on the part of the Union x x x.29Had the parties not been at the stage where the substantive provisions of the proposed CBA had been put in issue, the union would not have based thereon its initial notice to strike. This Court maintains its original position in the Decision that, based on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the Secretary of the DOLE rightly decided on matters of substance. That the union later on changed its mind is of no moment because to give premium to such would make the legally mandated discretionary power of the Dole Secretary subservient to the whims of the parties.As to the point of clarification on the resumption of negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan:As for the supposed confusion or uncertainty of the dispositive part of this Courts Decision, Nestle moves for clarification of the statement "The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussion hereinabove set forth. No costs." The entire fallo of this Courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R. No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestl be declared to have committed unfair labor practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestl is AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.Nestle interprets the foregoing as an order for the parties to resume negotiations bythemselvesrespecting the issue of retirement benefits due the employees of the Cabuyao Plant. Otherwise stated, Nestle posits that the dispositive part of the Decision directs the parties to submit to a voluntary mode of dispute settlement.A read-through of this Courts Decision reveals that the ambiguity is more ostensible than real. This Courts Decision of 22 August 2006 designated marked boundaries as to the implications of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of the DOLE. We said therein that 1) the Retirement Plan is still a valid issue for herein parties collective bargaining negotiations; 2) the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in limiting to the issue of the ground rules the scope of the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute; and 3) Nestl is not guilty of unfair labor practice. Nowhere in our Decision did we require parties to submit to negotiate by themselves the tenor of the retirement benefits of the concerned employees of Nestl, precisely because the Secretary of the DOLE had already assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute subject of herein petitions. Again, we spell out what encompass the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction power. The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. In the case at bar, the issue of retirement benefits was specifically what was presented before the Secretary of the DOLE; hence, We reject Nestls interpretation. Our decision is crystal and cannot be interpreted any other way. The Secretary having already assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute subject of these consolidated petitions, the issue concerning the retirement benefits of the concerned employees must be remanded back to him for proper disposition.All told, in consideration of the points afore-discussed and the fact that no substantial arguments have been raised by either party, this Court remains unconvinced that it should modify or reverse in any way its disposition of herein cases in its earlier Decision. The labor dispute between the Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU has dragged on long enough. As no other issues are availing, let this Resolution write an ending to the protracted labor dispute between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division).WHEREFORE, premises considered, the basic issues of the case having been passed upon and there being no new arguments availing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is herebyDENIED WITH FINALITYfor lack of merit. Let these cases be remanded to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment for proper disposition, consistent with the discussions in this Courts Decision of 22 August 2006 and as hereinabove set forth. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 164060 June 15, 2007FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (FAMIT),petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:This is an appeal to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated August 21, 2003 and the Resolution2dated June 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71479. The appellate court had reversed the Decision of the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrators. It held that the incorporation of the new faculty ranking to the 2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and private respondent has been the intention of the parties to the CBA.The facts in this case are undisputed.In July 2000, private respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT) hired Arthur Andersen to develop a faculty ranking and compensation system. On January 29, 2001, in the 5thCBA negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument to petitioner Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT).3The latter agreed to the adoption and implementation of the instrument, with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank and pay of the faculty members.On April 17, 2001, FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA effective June 1, 2001.4It incorporated the new ranking for the college faculty in Section 8 of Article V which states that, "A new faculty ranking shall be implemented in June 2001. However, there shall be no diminution in the existing rank and the policy same rank, same pay shall apply."5The faculty ranking sheet was annexed to the CBA as Annex "B," while the college faculty rates sheet for permanent faculty and which included the point ranges and corresponding pay rates per faculty level was added as Annex "C."When the CBA took effect, the Vice President for Academic Affairs issued a memorandum to all deans and subject chairs to evaluate and re-rank the faculty under their supervision using the new ranking instrument. Eight factors were to be considered and given their corresponding weights/points according to levels attained per factor. Among these were: (1) educational attainment; (2) professional honors received; (3) relevant training; (4) relevant professional experience; (5) scholarly work and creative efforts; (6) award winning works; (7) officership in relevant technical and professional organizations; and (8) administrative positions held at MIT.6After a month, MIT called FAMITs attention to what it perceived to be flaws or omissions in the CBA signed by the parties. In a letter7dated July 5, 2001 to FAMIT, MIT requested for an amendment of the following CBA annexes Annex "B" (Faculty Ranking Sheet); Annex "C" (College Faculty Rates for Permanent Faculty Only); and Annex "D" (H.S. Faculty Rates for Permanent Faculty Only). MIT claimed that with respect to Annexes "C" and "D," these contained data under the heading "TOTAL POINTS" that were not germane to the two other columns in both annexes. With regard to the Faculty Ranking Point Range sheet of the new faculty ranking instrument, MIT avers that this was inadvertently not attached to the CBA.FAMIT rejected the proposal. It said that these changes would constitute a violation of the ratified 2001 CBA and result in the diminution of rank and benefits of FAMIT college faculty. It argued that the proposed amendment in the ranking system for the college faculty revised the point ranges earlier agreed upon by the parties and expands the 19 faculty ranks to 23.Meanwhile, MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum during the school year 2000-2001 which resulted in changes in the number of hours for certain subjects. Thus, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty:Rate/Load x Total Teaching Load = Salarywheretotal teaching load equals number of classes multiplied by hours of service per week divided by 3 hours(as practiced, one unit subject is equal to 3 hours service).Upon learning of the changes, FAMIT opposed the formula. It averred that unknown to FAMIT, MIT has not been implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA. In particular, FAMIT cites Section 2 of Article VI, which states as follows:ARTICLE VIGeneral Wage Clausex x x xSection 2. The INSTITUTE shall pay the following rate per load for high school faculty according to corresponding faculty rank, to wit: 25% increase in per rate/load for all high school faculty members effective November 2000; 10% increase in per rate/load for all permanent high school faculty members effective June 2001.8(Emphasis supplied.)On July 20, 2001, FAMIT met with MIT to settle this second issue but to no avail. MIT maintained that it was within its right to change the pay formula used.Hence, together with the issue pertaining to the ranking of the college faculty, FAMIT brought the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for mediation. Proceedings culminated in the submission of the case to the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for resolution.The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered the private respondent to:1.Implement the agreed upon point range system with 19 faculty ranks, along with the corresponding pay levels for the college faculty, consistent with the provisions of Article V, Section 8 of the 2001 CB[A] and Annex C of the said CBA, and2. Comply with the provisions of Article VI, Section 2 of the existing CBA, using past practices or formula in computing the pay of high school faculty based on rate per load and to pay the faculty their corresponding rates on this basis,Both actions of which (sic) should be made concurrent with the effectivity of the current CBA.SO ORDERED.9On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and decreed as follows:WHEREFORE,the petition is herebyGRANTED.The assailed decision of the voluntary arbitrators isREVERSED. Accordingly, petitioners proposal to include the faculty point range sheet in Annex "B" of the 2001 CBA, as well as to replace Annex "C" with the document on the 23-level faculty ranking instrument and replace the column containing the heading "Total Points" which is attached in Annexes "C" and "D" of the 2001 CBA with the correct data is alsoGRANTED.SO ORDERED.10Hence, the instant petition.The petitioner enumerated issues for resolution, to wit:IWHETHER THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY PROPERLY, LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ALTER, CHANGE AND/OR MODIFY UNILATERAL[L]Y PROVISIONS OF THE COLLECTIVE [BARGAINING] AGREEMENT (CBA) IT HAD NEGOTIATED, ENTERED INTO AND SIGNED WITH THE PETITIONER AND SUBSEQUENTLY RATIFIED AND ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES; ANDIIWHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY PROPERLY, LEGALLY AND VALIDLY CHANGE[,] ALTER AND/OR REPLACE UNILATERAL[L]Y A PROVISION OR FORMULA EMBODIED IN A PERFECTED, EXISTING AND ALREADY ENFORCED CBA TO THE PREJUDICE, OR MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE DIMINUTION OF SALARY/BENEFITS AND DOWNGRADING OF RANKS, OF ITS COLLEGE AND HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY.11Simply put, the issues for our determination are: (1) Is MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA? and (2) Is MITs development of a new pay formula for the high school department, without the knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?On the first issue, FAMIT avers that MITs new proposal on faculty ranking and evaluation for the college faculty is an unlawful modification, alteration or amendment of the existing CBA without approval of the contracting parties.On the other hand, MIT argues that the new faculty ranking instrument was made in good faith and in the exercise of its inherent prerogative to freely regulate according to its own discretion and judgment all aspects of employment.Considering the submissions of the parties, in the light of the existing CBA, we find that the new point range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification of Annex "C" of the 2001 CBA. It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties.As observed by Office of the Voluntary Arbitrators, the evaluation system differs from past evaluation practices (e.g.,those that give more weight to tenure and faculty load) such that the system can lead to a demotion in rank for a faculty member. A perfect example of this scenario was cited by FAMIT in its Memorandum:x x x xTake the case of a faculty member with 17 years of teaching experience who has a Phd. Degree. For school year 2000-2001 his corresponding rank is Professor 3 with 4001-4500 points using the previous CBA. If the college faculty member is ranked based on the ratified 2001 CBA, his/her corresponding rank would increase to Professor 5 with 5001-5500 points.But if the proposal of private respondent is used, the professor, would be ranked as Associate Professor 5 with 5001-5749 points, instead of Professor 5 as recognized by the 2001 CBA. True, there may be an increase in points but there is also a resulting diminution in rank from Professor 3 based on the previous CBA to Associate Professor 5. This would translate to a reduction of the salary increase he is entitled to under the 2001 CBA.12According to FAMIT, this patently is a violation of Section 8, Article V of the 2001 CBA.Noteworthy, Article 253 of the Labor Code states:ART. 253.Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.REVISED PAGE

Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement.13The CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions "constitute the law between the parties." Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court and ask redress.14The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.15On the second issue, FAMIT avers that MIT unilaterally modified the CBA formula in determining the salary of a high school faculty. MIT counters that it is entitled to consider the actual number of teaching hours to arrive at a fair and just salary of its high school faculty.Again, we are in agreement with FAMITs submission. We rule that MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms in the CBA. It is clear from the provisions of the 2001 CBA that the salary of a high school faculty member is based on a rate per load and not on a rate per hour basis. Section 2, Article VI of the 2001 CBA provides:x x x xSection 2. The INSTITUTE shall pay the following rate per load for high school faculty according to corresponding faculty rank, to wit: 25% increase in per rate/load for all high school faculty members effective November 2000. 10% increase in per rate/load for all permanent high school faculty members effective June 2001.16(Emphasis supplied.)In our view, there is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. Needless to stress, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.17The appellate court committed a grave error in the interpretation of the CBA provision and the governing law.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated August 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. The decision of the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrators isREINSTATED. MITs unilateral change in the ranking of college faculty from 19 levels to 23 levels, and the computation of high school faculty salary from rate per load to rate per hour basis isDECLARED NULL AND VOIDfor being violative of the parties CBA and the applicable law.Costs against private respondent MIT.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180866 March 2, 2010LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC.,Petitioner,vs.LEPANTO CERAMICS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 451of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. (petitioner), assailing the: (1) Decision2of the Court of Appeals, dated 5 April 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78334 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator3granting the members of the respondent association a Christmas Bonus in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), or the balance of Two Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P2,400.00) for the year 2002, and the (2) Resolution4of the same court dated 13 December 2007 denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The facts are:Petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Incorporated is a duly organized corporation existing and operating by virtue of Philippine Laws. Its business is primarily to manufacture, make, buy and sell, on wholesale basis, among others, tiles, marbles, mosaics and other similar products.5Respondent Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association (respondent Association) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. It is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the establishment of petitioner.6In December 1998, petitioner gave aP3,000.00 bonus to its employees, members of the respondent Association.7Subsequently, in September 1999, petitioner and respondent Association entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides for, among others, the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to the members of the respondent Association.8The Christmas bonus was one of the enumerated "existing benefit, practice of traditional rights" which "shall remain in full force and effect."The text reads:Section 8. All other existing benefits, practice of traditional rights consisting of Christmas Gift package/bonus, reimbursement of transportation expenses in case of breakdown of service vehicle and medical services and safety devices by virtue of company policies by the UNION and employees shall remain in full force and effect.Section 1. EFFECTIVITYThis agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1999 and shall remain in full force and effect without change for a period of four (4) years or up to August 31, 2004 except as to the representation aspect which shall be effective for a period of five (5) years. It shall bind each and every employee in the bargaining unit including the present and future officers of the Union.In the succeeding years, 1999, 2000 and 2001, the bonus was not in cash. Instead, petitioner gave each of the members of respondent Association Tile Redemption Certificates equivalent toP3,000.00.9The bonus for the year 2002 is the root of the present dispute. Petitioner gave a year-end cash benefit of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) and offered a cash advance to interested employees equivalent to one (1) month salary payable in one year.10The respondent Association objected to theP600.00 cash benefit and argued that this was in violation of the CBA it executed with the petitioner.The parties failed to amicably settle the dispute. The respondent Association filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation Mediation Board, Regional Branch No. IV, alleging the violation of the CBA. The case was placed under preventive mediation. The efforts to conciliate failed. The case was then referred to the Voluntary Arbitrator for resolution where the Complaint was docketed as Case No. LAG-PM-12-095-02.In support of its claim, respondent Association insisted that it has been the traditional practice of the company to grant its members Christmas bonuses during the end of the calendar year, each in the amount ofP3,000.00 as an expression of gratitude to the employees for their participation in the companys continued existence in the market. The bonus was either in cash or in the form of company tiles. In 2002, in a speech during the Christmas celebration, one of the companys top executives assured the employees of said bonus. However, the Human Resources Development Manager informed them that the traditional bonus would not be given as the companys earnings were intended for the payment of its bank loans. Respondent Association argued that this was in violation of their CBA.The petitioner averred that the complaint for nonpayment of the 2002 Christmas bonus had no basis as the same was not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It argued that the giving of extra compensation was based on the companys available resources for a given year and the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the company does not make profits. Petitioner adverted to the fact that it was debt-ridden having incurred net losses for the years 2001 and 2002 totaling toP1.5 billion; and since 1999, when the CBA was signed, the companys accumulated losses amounted to overP2.7 billion. Petitioner further argued that the grant of a one (1) month salary cash advance was not meant to take the place of a bonus but was meant to show the companys sincere desire to help its employees despite its precarious financial condition. Petitioner also averred that the CBA provision on a "Christmas gift/bonus" refers to alternative benefits. Finally, petitioner emphasized that even if the CBA contained an unconditional obligation to grant the bonus to the respondent Association, the present difficult economic times had already legally released it therefrom pursuant to Article 1267 of the Civil Code.11The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision dated 2 June 2003, declaring that petitioner is bound to grant each of its workers a Christmas bonus ofP3,000.00 for the reason that the bonus was given prior to the effectivity of the CBA between the parties and that the financial losses of the company is not a sufficient reason to exempt it from granting the same. It stressed that the CBA is a binding contract and constitutes the law between the parties. The Voluntary Arbitrator further expounded that since the employees had already been givenP600.00 cash bonus, the same should be deducted from the claimed amount ofP3,000.00, thus leaving a balance ofP2,400.00. The dispositive portion of the decision states, viz:Wherefore, in view of the foregoing respondent LCI is hereby ordered to pay the members of the complainant union LCEA their respective Christmas bonus in the amount of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos for the year 2002 less theP600.00 already given or a balance ofP2,400.00.12Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied by the Voluntary Arbitrator in an Order dated 27 June 2003, in this wise:The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent in the above-entitled case which was received by the Undersigned on June 26, 2003 is hereby denied pursuant to Section 7 Rule XIX on Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration; Amending The Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code of the Philippines; to wit:Section 7. Finality of Award/Decision The decision, order, resolution or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.13Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appealsviaa Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78334.14As adverted to earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.In affirming respondent Associations right to the Christmas bonus, the Court of Appeals held:In the case at bar, it is indubitable that petitioner offered private respondent a Christmas bonus/gift in 1998 or before the execution of the 1999 CBA which incorporated the said benefit as a traditional right of the employees. Hence, the grant of said bonus to private respondent can be deemed a practice as the same has not been given only in the 1999 CBA. Apparently, this is the reason why petitioner specifically recognized the grant of a Christmas bonus/gift as a practice or tradition as stated in the CBA. x x x.x x x xEvidently, the argument of petitioner that the giving of a Christmas bonus is a management prerogative holds no water. There were no conditions specified in the CBA for the grant of said benefit contrary to the claim of petitioner that the same is justified only when there are profits earned by the company. As can be gleaned from the CBA, the payment of Christmas bonus was not contingent upon the realization of profits. It does not state that if the company derives no profits, there are no bonuses to be given to the employees. In fine, the payment thereof was not related to the profitability of business operations.Moreover, it is undisputed that petitioner, aside from giving the mandated 13th month pay, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus at the end of the year since 1998 or before the effectivity of the CBA in September 1999. Clearly, the grant of Christmas bonus from 1998 up to 2001, which brought about the filing of the complaint for alleged non-payment of the 2002 Christmas bonus does not involve the exercise of management prerogative as the same was given continuously on or about Christmas time pursuant to the CBA. Consequently, the giving of said bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the petitioner as this would amount to a diminution of the employees existing benefits.15Not to be dissuaded, petitioner is now before this Court. The only issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator that the petitioner is obliged to give the members of the respondent Association a Christmas bonus in the amount ofP3,000.00 in 2002.16We uphold the rulings of the voluntary arbitrator and of the Court of Appeals. Findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence. This is the rule particularly where the findings of both the arbitrator and the Court of Appeals coincide.17As a general proposition, an arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application of the CBA. He does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice: his award is legitimate only in so far as it draws its essence from the CBA.18That was done in this case.By definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. It is something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. A bonus is granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employers business and made possible the realization of profits.19A bonus is also granted by an enlightened employer to spur the employee to greater efforts for the success of the business and realization of bigger profits.20Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties.21Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.22A CBA refers to a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer, concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all other contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.23It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.24This principle stands strong and true in the case at bar.1avvphi1A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. Terse and clear, the said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioners financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that theP3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.It is noteworthy that in petitioners 1998 and 1999 Financial Statements, it took note that "the 1997 financial crisis in the Asian region adversely affected the Philippine economy."25From the foregoing, petitioner cannot insist on business losses as a basis for disregarding its undertaking. It is manifestly clear that petitioner was very much aware of the imminence and possibility of business losses owing to the 1997 financial crisis. In 1998, petitioner suffered a net loss ofP14,347,548.00.26Yet it gave aP3,000.00 bonus to the members of the respondent Association. In 1999, when petitioners very own financial statement reflected that "the positive developments in the economy have yet to favorably affect the operations of the company,"27and reported a loss ofP346,025,733.00,28it entered into the CBA with the respondent Association whereby it contracted to grant a Christmas gift package/bonus to the latter. Petitioner supposedly continued to incur losses in the years 200029and 2001. Still and all, this did not deter it from honoring the CBA provision on Christmas bonus as it continued to giveP3,000.00 each to the members of the respondent Association in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.30Hence, absent any proof that petitioners consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA voluntarily and had full knowledge of the contents thereof and was aware of its commitments under the contract.The Court is fully aware that implementation to the letter of the subject CBA provision may further deplete petitioners resources. Petitioners remedy though lies not in the Courts invalidation of the provision but in the parties clarification of the same in subsequent CBA negotiations. Article 253 of the Labor Code is relevant:Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. - When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the sixty (60)-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 April 2006 and the Resolution of the same court dated 13 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78334 areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.