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History of Science and Its Rational ReconstructionsAuthor(s): Imre LakatosSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1970 (1970), pp. 91-136Published by: Springer

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IMRE LAKATOS

HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTIONS*

TABLE OFCONTENTS

Introduction

1. RivalMethodologiesfScience;RationalReconstructionss Guides oHistoryA. InductivismB. ConventionalismC. MethodologicalalsificationismD. MethodologyfScientificesearch rogrammesE. Internalnd External istory

2. Critical omparisonfMethodologies: istorys a Testof ts RationalRecon-structionsA. Falsificationisms a Metacriterion:istoryFalsifies' alsificationismand

anyothermethodology)B. The MethodologyfHistoriographicalesearch rogrammes.istory to

varyingegrees CorroboratestsRationalReconstructionsC. AgainstAprioristicndAntitheoreticalpproachesoMethodologyD. Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

"Philosophyof sciencewithouthistory f science s empty;history fsciencewithout hilosophy f science s blind".Taking tscue from hisparaphrase f Kant'sfamous ictum,his aper ntends oexplainhow hehistoriographyfscience hould earnfrom hephilosophyfscience ndvice versa.It will be argued that a) philosophy f scienceprovidesnormativemrethodologiesn termsof whichthe historian econstructs'internalhistory' nd thereby

rovides a rationalexplanationof thegrowth fobjective nowledge;b) twocompetingmethodologiesan beevaluated withthe help of (normativelynterpreted) istory; c) anyrational econstructionf history eeds obe supplementedy an empiri-cal (socio-psychological)external istory'.

The vitaldemarcation etween ormative-internalndempirical-exter-nal is differentor each methodology.Jointly,nternal nd externalhistoriographicalheories etermine o a very argeextent hechoice of* Thenotes re tobe found npp.122-34. t is to be

regrettedhat heyouldnotbeprintedtthefoot feachpage,because hey orm nintegralart fthepaperEd.).

Boston tudiesnthe hilosophyfScience,VIII.All rightseserved.







92 IMRE LAKATOS

problems or thehistorian.But some of external istory'smostcrucialproblems an be formulatednly n terms f one's methodology;husinternal istory,o defined,s primary,nd external istory nly econd-ary. Indeed,in view of theautonomy f internalbutnot ofexternal)history,xternal istorys irrelevantortheunderstandingf science.'

1. RIVAL METHODOLOGIES OF SCIENCE; RATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTIONS AS GUIDES TO HISTORY

There are severalmethodologiesfloat n contemporaryhilosophy fscience;butthey reall very ifferentromwhatused to be understoodby methodology'n the seventeenthr eveneighteenthentury.hen twas hoped thatmethodology ouldprovide cientists ith mechanicalbook of rulesforsolvingproblems.Thishope has nowbeengivenup:modernmethodologiesr logicsofdiscovery' onsistmerelyf a setof(possiblynot eventightly nit, et alone mechanical) ules fortheap-praisal of ready, rticulated heories.2 ften heserules,or systems fappraisal,also serveas 'theories f scientificationality',demarcationcriteria' r definitionsf science'.3 utside he egislativeomainofthese

normativeules heres,ofcourse, n empirical sychologyndsociologyofdiscovery.

I shall now sketchfourdifferentlogics of discovery'. ach will becharacterisedyrulesgoverninghe scientific)cceptance nd rejectionof theories r research rogrammes.4heseruleshavea doublefunction.First,hey unctions a codeof cientificonesty hoseviolations intol-erable;secondly,s hardcores of (normative) istoriographicalesearchprogrammes.t is their econdfunctionnwhich should ike to concen-

trate.A. Inductivism

Oneofthemost nfluential ethodologiesf cience asbeen nductivism.According o inductivismnly thosepropositions an be accepted ntothebodyofsciencewhich ither escribehard factsor are infalliblen-ductivegeneralisations romthem.5When the inductivistccepts ascientificroposition, eaccepts tas provenlyrue;herejectst f t s not.His scientificigour s strict: propositionmustbe either rovenfromfacts,or- deductively r inductivelyderivedfromotherpropositionsalreadyproven.







HISTORY OF SCIENCE 93

Eachmethodologyas ts pecificpistemologicalndlogicalproblems.For example, nductivism as to establishwithcertaintyhe truth f'factual' 'basic') propositions nd thevalidity f inductivenferences.Some philosophers et so preoccupiedwith their pistemologicalndlogicalproblems hat hey ever et othepointofbecomingnterestednactualhistory;factual historyoesnotfit heir tandardsheymay venhave thetemerityo propose thatwe start he wholebusiness fscienceanew. Someothers ake somecrude olution f these ogical and episte-mologicalproblemsforgranted nd devote themselves o a rationalreconstructionfhistory ithout eing wareofthe ogico-epistemologi-

cal weaknessor,even,untenability)ftheirmethodology.6Inductivistriticismsprimarilyceptical: tconsists nshowinghat

proposition s unproven,hat s,pseudoscientific,ather han nshowingthat tis false.7When the nductivististorianwrites heprehistoryfascientificiscipline, e maydraw heavily pon suchcriticisms. nd heoften xplains heearlydarkage- whenpeoplewereengrossed y un-proven deas' - with the help of some 'external', xplanation, ike thesocio-psychologicalheoryof the retarding nfluence f the Catholic

Church.The inductivist istorian ecognizes nly wosorts fgenuinecientific

discoveries: ardfactual ropositionsnd inductive eneralisations.heseand onlytheseconstitute he backboneof his internal istory.Whenwriting istory, e looks outfor hem findinghem s quitea problem.Only whenhe finds hem, an he start heconstructionfhisbeautifulpyramids.Revolutions onsist n unmasking irrational] rrorswhichthen re exiledfrom hehistory f science ntothehistory fpseudo-

science,nto thehistoryf merebeliefs: enuine cientificrogresstartswith he atest cientificevolutionn anygivenfield.Each internalhistoriography as its characteristicictoriouspara-

digms.8 hemainparadigms f nductivististoriographyereKepler'sgeneralisationsromTychoBrahe'scareful bservations;Newton'sdis-covery of his law of gravitation y, in turn, nductivelyeneralisingKepler's phenomena'ofplanetarymotion; and Ampere'sdiscovery fhis awofelectrodynamicsy nductivelyeneralisingisobservations felectric urrents.Modernchemistryoo is takenbysome nductivistsshaving eally tartedwithLavoisier's xperimentsnd his true xplana-tions' ofthem.







94 IMRE LAKATOS

But the nductivististorian annot offer rationalinternal' xplana-tion forwhy ertainfactsrather han otherswere selected n thefirstinstance.For him this is a non-rational,mpirical, xternalproblem.Inductivisms an internal' heoryfrationalityscompatiblewithmanydifferentupplementarympirical r external heories fproblem-choice.It is,for nstance,ompatiblewith hevulgar-Marxistiew hatproblem-choice is determined y social needs;9 indeed, some vulgar-Marxistsidentifymajor phases in history f sciencewiththemajor phases ofeconomicdevelopment.10ut choice offactsneednotbe determinedysocial factors; t maybe determinedy extra-scientificntellectualn-

fluences.And inductivisms equally compatiblewith the 'external'theoryhat hechoice ofproblemss primarilyeterminedy nborn, rby arbitrarilyhosen (or traditional)theoretical or 'metaphysical')frameworks.

There s a radical brandof inductivism hich ondemns ll externalinfluences,hetherntellectual,sychologicalr sociological, s creatingimpermissibleias: radical nductivistsllow onlya [random] electionby the emptymind. Radical inductivisms, in turn, special kindof

radical nternalism.ccording o the atter nce oneestablishes he xist-ence of someexternalnfluencen the cceptance fa scientificheoryorfactualproposition) ne mustwithdraw ne's acceptance:proofof ex-ternal nfluence eans nvalidation11butsince xternalnfluenceslwaysexist,radical internalisms utopian, and, as a theoryof rationality,self-destructive.12

Whentheradical nductivististorian acestheproblem f why omegreat scientists houghthighly f metaphysics nd, indeed, whythey

thoughthat heir iscoveries eregreat or easonswhich,nthe ight finductivism,ookvery dd, he will efer hese roblems f false onscious-ness'to psychopathology,hat s, to external istory.

B. Conventionalism

Conventionalismllowsfor thebuilding f any systemf pigeon holeswhichorganisesfacts nto some coherentwhole. The conventionalistdecidesto keep thecentre f sucha pigeonhole ystemntact s longaspossible: whendifficultiesrise through n invasion of anomalies,heonly changes and complicatesthe peripheral rrangements. ut theconventionalistoes notregard ny pigeonhole ystem s provenlyrue,








but onlyas 'trueby convention' or possibly ven as neither rue norfalse). n revolutionaryrandsofconventionalismne does not have toadhere forever o a givenpigeonhole ystem: ne mayabandon it if tbecomesunbearably lumsyndif a simpler ne is offeredoreplace t.13

This version of conventionalisms epistemologically,nd especiallylogically,much impler han nductivism:t s in no need of valid nduc-tive nferences. enuine rogress f science s cumulative nd takesplaceonthegroundevelof proven'facts14the hanges n the heoreticalevelare merely nstrumental. heoreticalprogress' s only n convenience('simplicity'), nd not n truth-content.15ne may,ofcourse, ntroduce

revolutionaryonventionalismlso at the evel of factual'propositions,in which ase one would accept factual'propositions ydecisionratherthanby experimentalproofs'.Butthen,ftheconventionalists toretainthe dea that hegrowth f factual' ciencehas anythingo do with b-jective, actual ruth, emustdevise omemetaphysical rinciplewhichhe thenhas to superimposen hisrulesforthegameofscience.16fhedoes not,he cannotescape scepticismr,at least, omeradical form finstrumentalism.

(It is important o clarify he relationbetween onventionalismndinstrumentalism.onventionalism estson therecognitionhatfalse as-sumptionsmayhave true onsequences; hereforealse heoriesmayhavegreat predictive ower. Conventionalists ad to face the problem ofcomparing ivalfalse theories.Most of themconflated ruthwith itssigns ndfound hemselvesolding omeversion fthepragmaticheoryoftruth.t wasPopper's heoryftruth-content,erisimilitudend corro-borationwhichfinallyaid down thebasis of a philosophically lawless

versionof conventionalism. n the otherhand some conventionalistsdid not have sufficientogicaleducation o realise hat ome propositionsmaybe truewhilst eingunproven; nd others alse whilsthaving rueconsequences, ndalso somewhich rebothfalse ndapproximatelyrue.Thesepeople opted for instrumentalism':hey ame to regard heoriesas neither ruenorfalsebutmerely s 'instruments'orprediction. on-ventionalism,s heredefined, s a philosophically ound position; in-strumentalismsa degenerate ersion f t,basedon a mere hilosophicalmuddle ausedby ack ofelementaryogical competence.)

Revolutionaryonventionalism as born as the Bergsonians' hiloso-phy of science: freewilland creativity ere the slogans. The code of







96 IMRE LAKATOS

scientific onourofthe conventionalists lessrigorous han thatof theinductivist: t puts no ban on unproven

peculation,nd allows a

pigeonhole ystem o be built aroundany fancy dea. Moreover, on-ventionalism oes not brand discarded ystemss unscientific:hecon-ventionalistees muchmore of the actualhistory f science s rational('internal') han does the nductivist.

For the conventionalist istorian,major discoveries re primarilyinventionsfnew ndsimpler igeonholeystems.herefore econstantlycomparesforsimplicity:hecomplications f pigeonhole ystems ndtheir evolutionaryeplacementysimpler nes constitutehebackbone

of his internal istory.The paradigmatic ase ofa scientificevolutionor heconventionalist

has beentheCopernican evolution.17fforts avebeenmade to showthat Lavoisier's and Einstein's revolutions oo werereplacements fclumsy heories ysimpleones.

Conventionalististoriographyannotoffer rational xplanation fwhycertainfactswereselected n thefirstnstanceor ofwhy certainparticular igeonholeystems ere ried atherhan thers ta stagewhen

theirrelativemeritswere yetunclear. Thus conventionalism,ike in-ductivism,s compatiblewithvarious supplementarympirical-'exter-nalist'programmes.

Finally, heconventionalist istorian,ike his inductivistolleague,frequentlyncountersheproblem f falseconsciousness'.According oconventionalism,or xample, tis a 'matter ffact'thatgreat cientistsarrive t their heories y flightsftheirmaginations.Why hendo theyoften laimthat hey erived heir heories rom acts?Theconventional-

ist's rationalreconstructionftendiffersrom he greatscientists' wnreconstructiontheconventionalististorian elegatesheseproblems ffalseconsciousnesso theexternalist.18

C. Methodologicalalsificationism

Contemporaryalsificationismrose as a logico-epistemologicalriticismofinductivismnd ofDuhemianconventionalism.nductivism as cri-ticised n thegrounds hat tstwo basicassumptions, amely,hat actualpropositions an be 'derived' fromfactsand thatthere can be validinductive (content-increasing)nferences, re themselvesunprovenand evendemonstrablyalse.Duhem was criticisedn thegrounds hat








comparison f ntuitiveimplicityan onlybe a matter or ubjectiveasteand that t s so ambiguous hatnohard-hittingriticisman be based onit. Popper, n hisLogikderForschung,roposeda new falsificationist'methodology.19his methodologys another brand of revolutionaryconventionalism: he main differences that t allows factual, patio-temporally ingular basic statements', atherthan spatio-temporallyuniversalheories,o beaccepted yconvention.n the ode ofhonour fthefalsificationisttheorys scientificnly f it can be made to conflictwith basicstatement;nd a theorymust e eliminatedf tconflicts ithan acceptedbasic statement. opperalso indicated furtherondition

that theorymust atisfyn order o qualify s scientific:t mustpredictfactswhich renovel, hat s, unexpectedn the ight fpreviousknowl-edge.Thus t sagainst opper's ode of cientificonour oproposeunfal-sifiable heories r 'ad hoc' hypotheseswhich mplyno novel mpiricalpredictions) justas it s against he classical]nductivistode ofscienti-fichonour opropose unproven nes.

The great ttraction fPopperianmethodologyies in itsclarity ndforce. opper'sdeductivemodelofscientificriticismontainsmpirically

falsifiablepatio-temporallyniversal ropositions,nitial onditionsndtheir onsequences. heweaponofcriticisms themodus ollens:neitherinductiveogicnor ntuitiveimplicityomplicate hepicture.20

(Falsificationism, houghlogically mpeccable, has epistemologicaldifficultiesf its own. In its 'dogmatic'proto-versiont assumes theprovability f propositions romfacts and thus the disprovability ftheories a false ssumption.21n itsPopperian conventionalist'ersionit needs some (extra-methodological)inductive rinciple' o lend epis-

temologicalweight o its decisions o accept basic' statements,nd ingeneral o connect tsrules of the scientificame withverisimilitude.2)ThePopperianhistorianooks forgreat, bold', falsifiableheoriesnd

forgreat negative rucialexperiments.hese form he skeleton f hisrationalreconstruction.he Popperians' favourite aradigmsof greatfalsifiableheories re Newton's and Maxwell'stheories, heradiationformulas fRayleigh,Jeans nd Wien,and theEinsteinian evolution;theirfavourite aradigmsfor crucialexperiments re the Michelson-Morley xperiment,ddington's clipse xperiment,ndtheexperimentsof Lummer nd Pringsheim.t was Agassi who tried o turn his naivefalsificationismnto systematicistoriographicalesearch rogramme.23







98 IMRE LAKATOS

In particular e predictedor postdicted',fyou wish)thatbehind achgreatexperimentaliscoveryies a theorywhichthediscovery ontra-

dicted;the mportance f a factualdiscoverys to be measuredbytheimportance f thetheory efuted y it. Agassi seemsto acceptat facevalue the value judgments f the scientificommunityoncerningheimportance f factualdiscoveriesike Galvani's,Oersted's,Priestley's,Roentgen's nd Hertz's;buthe deniesthe myth' hattheywerechancediscoveriesas the first ourwere aid to be) orconfirmingnstancesasHertz first hought is discoverywas).24Thus Agassiarrives t a boldprediction:ll these ive xperimentsere uccessful efutations insome

cases even lanned efutations oftheorieswhichheproposes ounearth,and, indeed, nmostcases,claimsto haveunearthed.25

Popperiannternal istory,nturn,s readily upplementedy externaltheories fhistory. hus Popperhimselfxplained hat on thepositiveside] 1) themain externaltimulus f scientificheories omes from n-scientificmetaphysics',nd evenfrommythsthiswas laterbeautifullyillustratedmainly y Koyre); and that onthenegative ide] 2) factsdonotconstitute uchexternal timulus factualdiscoveries elongcom-

pletely o internalhistory, merging s refutations f some scientifictheory, o thatfacts re onlynoticed fthey onflict ith ome previousexpectation.Both thesesare cornerstones f Popper's psychology fdiscovery.26eyerabendeveloped nothernterestingsychologicalhesisofPopper,namely, hatproliferationfrival heoriesmay externallyspeedup internal opperianfalsification.27

But theexternal upplementaryheories f falsificationismeed notbe restrictedo purely ntellectualnfluences.t has to be emphasized(pace Agassi) thatfalsificationisms no less compatiblewith

vulgar-Marxistview of what makesscienceprogress han s inductivism. heonlydifferences thatwhilefor he atterMarxismmight e invoked oexplainthediscoveryffacts,forthe formertmight e invoked o ex-plainthe nvention fscientificheories; hile he hoice of facts that s,forthe falsificationist,he choice of 'potentialfalsifiers')s primarilydeterminednternally ythetheories.

'False awareness'-'false' fromthe point of view of his rationalitytheory creates problem or hefalsificationististorian. or instance,

whydo some scientists elieve hatcrucial xperimentsrepositive ndverifyingather han negative nd falsifying?t was thefalsificationist








Popper who, in order to solve theseproblems, laboratedbetter hananybody lse beforehimthecleavagebetween bjectiveknowledgeinhis thirdworld')anditsdistortedeflectionsn individualminds.28hushe opened up the wayformydemarcation etweennternal nd externalhistory.

D. MethodologyfScientific esearch rogrammes

According o mymethodology he greatest cientificchievementsreresearch rogrammes hich an be evaluatednterms fprogressivenddegenerating roblemshifts;nd scientific evolutions onsistof one

research rogrammeupersedingovertakingn progress) nother.29hismethodology ffers new rationalreconstructionf science. t is bestpresented y contrastingt with falsificationismnd conventionalism,from othofwhich t borrows ssential lements.

From onventionalism,hismethodologyorrows he icence ationallyto accept by conventionnot only spatio-temporallyingular factualstatements' ut also spatio-temporallyniversal heories: ndeed,thisbecomes hemost mportant lue to thecontinuityf scientificrowth.30

The basic unit fappraisalmustbe not an isolated heory r conjunctionof theoriesbut rather 'research rogramme',with a conventionallyaccepted and thusby provisional ecision irrefutable')hard core' andwith 'positive euristic' hich efines roblems,utlines he onstructionof a belt of auxiliaryhypotheses, oresees nomalies and turnsthemvictoriouslynto examples, ll according o a preconceived lan. Thescientistists nomalies, ut s long s hisresearch rogrammeustainstsmomentum, e may freely ut them aside. It is primarily hepositiveheuristic f hisprogramme, ot the

nomalies,which ictate hechoiceofhisproblems.31nly when the driving orce of the positiveheuristicweakens,maymore ttention e given o anomalies.The methodologyfresearch rogrammesan explain nthisway thehigh egree fautonomyof theoreticalcience; the naivefalsificationist'sisconnected hains ofconjecturesnd refutationsannot.WhatforPopper,Watkins ndAgassiisexternal,nfluential etaphysics,ere urns nto he nternalhardcore'ofa programme.32

The methodology f researchprogrammes resents verydifferent

picture f thegame of sciencefrom he picture f themethodologicalfalsificationist.he bestopening ambit s not a falsifiableand therefore







100 IMRE LAKATOS

consistent) ypothesis, ut a research rogramme.Mere falsification'inPopper's sense) mustnot mply ejection.33 ere falsifications'that s,anomalies) re to be recorded ut neednot be actedupon. Popper'sgreatnegative rucial xperimentsisappear; crucial xperiment's an honori-fic itle,whichmay, fcourse, e conferredncertainnomalies, utonlylong after he event, nly when one programme as been defeatedbyanother ne. According o Popper crucial xperimentsdescribed y anacceptedbasic statement hich s inconsistent ith theory accordingto the methodology f scientificesearch rogrammes oaccepted asicstatementloneentitles he scientist o reject theory. uch a clashmay

present problem major or minor), ut n no circumstance 'victory'.Nature may shout no, but human ingenuity contrary o Weyl andPopper34 mayalwaysbe able to shout ouder.With ufficientesource-fulness nd some uck, any theory an be defendedprogressively'orlong time, ven f t is false.The Popperianpattern f conjecturesndrefutations',hat s the pattern f trial-by-hypothesisollowed yerror-shown-by-experiment,s to be abandoned: no experiments crucial t thetime let lone before it s performedexcept, ossibly, sychologically).

It should be pointedout, however, hatthe methodology f scientificresearchprogrammes as more teeththan Duhem's conventionalism:insteadof leaving t to Duhem's unarticulatedommon ense35 o udgewhen a 'framework's to be abandoned, inject ome hard Popperianelementsntothe ppraisalof whether programme rogresses r degen-eratesor of whether ne is overtakingnother. hat s, I give criteria fprogress nd stagnationwithin programme nd also rules for the'elimination' f whole research rogrammes. research rogrammes

said to be progressings long as its theoretical rowth nticipates tsempirical rowth, hat s, as long as it keeps predicting ovel factswithsome success 'progressiveroblemshift');t s stagnatingf ts theoreticalgrowth ags behind ts empirical rowth, hat s, as long as it givesonlypost-hoc xplanations ither f chance discoveries r of facts nticipatedby,anddiscoveredn, a rivalprogramme'degeneratingroblemshift).36

If a researchprogramme rogressivelyxplains more than a rival, t'supersedes' t, nd therival an be eliminatedor, fyouwish, shelved').37

(Within research rogramme theory an only be eliminated y a

better heory,hat s, by one whichhas excess mpirical ontent ver tspredecessors, ome of which s subsequently onfirmed.And for this








replacement f onetheory e a better ne,thefirstheory oesnotevenhave to be 'falsified'n Popper's sense of the term.Thus progress smarkedby instancesverifyingxcesscontent ather hanbyfalsifyinginstances;38mpirical falsification'nd actual 'rejection'become in-dependent.39efore theory as beenmodifiedwe can neverknow nwhatway t hadbeen refuted',ndsomeofthemost nterestingodifica-tions remotivated ythe positiveheuristic' f theresearch rogrammerather hanby anomalies. This differencelone has importantonse-quences nd leadsto a rationalreconstructionf scientifichangeverydifferentrom hatofPopper's.40)

It is very ifficultodecide, speciallyinceone mustnotdemandpro-gress t each single tep,when a research rogramme as degeneratedhopelessly r whenone of two rivalprogrammes as achieved decisiveadvantageoverthe other. n thismethodology,s in Duhem's conven-tionalism, herecan be no instant let alone mechanical rationality.Neither he ogician's roof f nconsistencyor he xperimentalcientist'sverdict fanomaly andefeat researchrogrammen one blow.One canbe 'wise' only fter he event.41

In this ode of scientificonourmodesty lays a greater ole than nother odes. One must ealise hatone's opponent, ven f agging adlybehind,may still tage a comeback.No advantage orone sidecan everbe regarded s absolutely onclusive. here s never nythingnevitableaboutthe riumphfa programme. lso, heres nevernythingnevitableabout itsdefeat.Thus pigheadedness,ikemodesty, as more rational'scope. The scoresof therival sides,however,mustbe recorded42ndpublicly isplayedt all times.

(We shouldhere t leastrefero themainepistemologicalroblem fthemethodologyf scientificesearchprogrammes. s it stands, ikePopper's methodological alsificationism,t represents veryradicalversion fconventionalism.neneeds oposit ome xtra-methodologicalinductive rinciple o relate even ftenuously thescientificambit fpragmatic cceptances nd rejections o verisimilitude.43nlysuchan'inductiverinciple' anturn cience rom mere ame nto nepistemol-ogicallyrationalexercise;from set of lightheartedcepticalgambitspursuedfor ntellectual un nto a - moreserious fallibilistenture fapproximatingheTruth bouttheUniverse.44)

The methodology f scientificesearch rogrammesonstitutes,ike







102 IMRE LAKATOS

any other methodology, historiographicalesearch rogramme. hehistorian hoaccepts hismethodologys a guidewill ook inhistoryorrivalresearchprogrammes,orprogressivend degenerating roblemshifts.Where heDuhemianhistorianeesa revolution erelynsimplicity(likethat ofCopernicus), e will ook for largescaleprogressive ro-gramme vertaking degeneratingne.Where hefalsificationistees acrucialnegative xperiment,e will predict'thattherewas none,thatbehind ny allegedcrucialexperiment,ehind ny allegedsinglebattlebetweentheory nd experiment,here s a hidden war of attritionbetween wo researchprogrammes. he outcomeof the war is only

later linked in the falsificationisteconstruction ith some allegedsinglecrucialexperiment'.

The methodologyf research rogrammes like anyother heory fscientificationalitymust esupplementedy mpirical-externalistory.No rationalityheory ill ver olveproblemsikewhyMendelian eneticsdisappeared n Soviet Russia in the 1950's, or why certain chools ofresearchntogenetic acialdifferencesr nto he conomics fforeignidcame ntodisreputen theAnglo-Saxon ountriesn the1960's.Moreover,

to explain differentpeeds of development f differentesearchpro-grammes emayneedto nvoke xternal istory. ationalreconstructionof science in the ense n which usetheterm) annotbe comprehensivesincehuman eings renot ompletelyational nimals; nd evenwhenheyactrationally heymayhave false heory f their wnrational ctions. 5

But themethodology f research rogrammes rawsa demarcationbetweennternal nd external istorywhich s markedly ifferentromthatdrawnbyother ationalityheories. or instance,whatfor hefalsi-

ficationistooks ike the regrettablyrequent) henomenon f rrationaladherence o a 'refuted' r to an inconsistentheory ndwhichhe there-forerelegates o external istory,maywell be explainedn terms f mymethodology nternallys a rational defence f a promising esearchprogramme. r, the uccessfulredictions f novelfactswhich onstituteseriousevidencefor a research rogramme nd thereforeital parts ofinternal istory,re irrelevantoth for he nductivistnd forthe falsi-ficationist.46or the nductivistnd the falsificationistt does not reallymatter hetherhediscoveryfa fact receded r followed theory: nlytheirogicalrelation s decisive.The irrational' mpactofthe historicalcoincidencehat theory appened o haveanticipatedfactual iscovery,








has no internalignificance.uchanticipationsonstitutenotproofbut[mere]propaganda'.47Or again,takePlanck'sdiscontent ithhis own1900radiation ormula, hichheregardeds 'arbitrary'.or thefalsifica-tionist heformulawas a bold,falsifiableypothesisndPlanck'sdislikeof t a non-rationalmood, explicable nly nterms fpsychology. ow-ever, n myview,Planck'sdiscontentan be explainednternally:t wasarational ondemnationfan 'ad hoc3'theory.48o mention et notherexample: for falsificationismrrefutablemetaphysics's an externalintellectualnfluence,n my approach t is a vitalpart of therationalreconstructionfscience.

Most historians avehitherto ended o regard hesolutionof someproblems s being hemonopoly f externalists.ne of these s theprob-lem of thehighfrequencyfsimultaneousiscoveries. or thisproblemvulgar-Marxistsave an easy solution: a discoverys made by manypeople at thesametime,once a social need for t arises.49Now whatconstitutes 'discovery', nd especially majordiscovery, ependsonone's methodology.or the nductivist,hemost mportant iscoveriesarefactual, nd, ndeed, uchdiscoveries refrequently adesimultane-

ously.For thefalsificationistmajor iscoveryonsists n thediscoveryfa theory ather han of a fact.Once a theory s discoveredor ratherinvented),tbecomespublicproperty; ndnothingsmoreobviousthanthat everalpeoplewill test tsimultaneouslyndmake, imultaneously,(minor) factualdiscoveries.Also, a published heorys a challenge odevisehigher-level,ndependentlyestable xplanations.For example,givenKepler's llipses ndGalileo'srudimentaryynamics,imultaneous'discovery' fan inversequare aw is not so very urprising: problem-

situation eingpublic, imultaneousolutions an be explained npurelyinternalrounds.50hediscovery f a newproblemhowevermaynot beso readily xplicable. f one thinks fthehistoryfscience s ofone ofrivalresearch rogrammes,henmost imultaneous iscoveries,heoreti-cal orfactual, re explainedby thefact hatresearch rogrammeseingpublicproperty,manypeople workon them n differentorners f theworld, ossibly otknowing feach otherHowever, eally ovel,major,revolutionaryevelopments re rarely nvented imultaneously.omealleged imultaneous iscoveries fnovelprogrammesre seenas havingbeensimultaneous iscoveries nlywithfalsehindsight:nfact hey redifferentiscoveries,merged nly ater nto a single ne.5'







104 IMRE LAKATOS

Afavourite unting round fexternalistsas been herelated roblemofwhy omuch mportances attached o- andenergy pent n - prioritydisputes. his can be explainedonly externallyythe nductivist,aivefalsificationist,rthe onventionalist;ut n the ight fthemethodologyofresearch rogrammesomepriorityisputesrevital nternalroblems,since n this methodologytbecomes ll-importantorrational ppraisalwhich rogramme asfirstn nticipatingnovelfact nd whichittedn theby now oldfact only ater. Some priority isputes an be explainedbyrational nterest nd not simplybyvanity nd greedforfame. t thenbecomes mportanthatTychonian heory, or nstance, ucceeded ll

explaining onlyposthoc- the observed hasesof,and the distance o,Venuswhichwere riginallyreciselynticipated yCopernicans;2or thatCartesiansmanaged oexplain verythinghat heNewtoniansredictedbut onlypost hoc. Newtonianopticaltheory xplainedpost hoc manyphenomenawhichwere nticipatednd first bserved y Huyghensians.53

All theseexamples how how themethodologyf scientificesearchprogrammesurnsmany roblemswhichhad beenexternal roblems orotherhistoriographiesnto nternal nes. But occasionally heborderline

ismoved n the oppositedirection. or instance heremayhavebeen anexperimentwhich was accepted instantly in the absence of a bettertheory as a negative rucial experiment. or the falsificationistuchacceptance s partof nternal istory; orme t s not rational nd has tobe explained nterms f external istory.

Note. Themethodologyf research rogrammesas criticised othby FeyerabendandbyKuhn.AccordingoKuhn: [Lakatos]must pecifyriteria hichan be usedat the ime odistinguishdegenerativerom progressiveesearch rogramme;ndso on. Otherwise,e hastoldus nothingt all'.54 Actually,do specifyuch riteria.

But Kuhn probablymeant hat [my] tandards avepractical orce nly f they recombinedwith time imitwhat ooks ikea degeneratingroblemshiftaybe thebeginningf a much onger eriod f advance)'.55ince specify o such ime imit,Feyerabendoncludes hatmy tandardsre no more han verbal rnaments'.56related ointwas made by Musgravena letter ontainingomemajor onstructivecriticismsf n earlier raft,n which e demandedhat specify,ornstance,t whatpointdogmaticdherenceo a programmeught o be explainedexternally'atherthaninternally'.

Letmetryoexplainwhyuchobjectionsrebeside hepoint.Onemay ationallystick o a degeneratingrogrammentilt sovertakeny rival nd ven fter.Whatonemust ot o is todenytspoorpublic ecord. othFeyerabendnd Kuhn onflate

methodologicalppraisal f programmeith irm euristicdvice boutwhat o do.57It is perfectlyational o playa risky ame:what s irrationals to deceive neselfabouttherisk.








Thisdoesnotmean s muchicencesmightppear or hosewho tick o a degen-eratingrogramme.orthey an do thismostlynlynprivate. ditors fscientific

journals should refuse o publishtheirpaperswhichwill, in general, ontaineitherolemn eassertionsf their ositionrabsorptionf counterevidenceorevenofrivalprogrammes)yad hoc, inguisticdjustments.esearch oundations,oo,should efusemoney.58

Theseobservationslso answerMusgrave's bjection yseparatingational ndirrationalor honest nd dishonest)dherenceo a degeneratingrogramme.heyalsothrowurtheright nthedemarcationetweennternalndexternalistory.heyshow hatnternalistorysself-sufficientor hepresentationf thehistoryfdisem-bodied cience,ncluding egeneratingroblemshifts.xternal istoryxplainswhysomepeoplehavefalse eliefsbout cientificrogress,ndhow heircientificctivitymaybe influencedy uchbeliefs.

E. Internal ndExternalHistory

Fourtheories ftherationalityfscientificrogress or ogicsofscienti-ficdiscovery have been briefly iscussed. t was shown how each ofthem rovides theoreticalrameworkor herational econstructionfthehistory fscience.

Thus the nternal istory finductivistsonsists fallegeddiscoveriesof hard facts and of so-called nductivegeneralisations. he internal

history fconventionalistsonsists ffactualdiscoveriesnd of theerec-tion of pigeonhole ystemsnd theirreplacementy allegedly implerones.59 he nternal istoryffalsificationistsramatises oldconjectures,improvements hich re said to be always ontent-increasingnd,aboveall, triumphantnegativecrucial experiments'.The methodologyfresearch rogrammes,inally,mphasizesong-extendedheoretical ndempiricalrivalry of major researchprogrammes,progressiveanddegeneratingroblemshifts,nd the slowlyemergingvictoryof one

programme vertheother.Each rationalreconstructionroduces omecharacteristicattern frationalgrowth fscientificnowledge. ut all ofthesenormativeecon-structions ayhaveto be supplementedyempiricalxternalheoriesoexplain heresidualnon-rationalactors. he historyfscience s alwaysricherthan its rationalreconstruction. ut rationalreconstructionrinternal istorysprimary,xternal istory nly econdary,incethemostimportantroblems f externalhistory re defined y internal istory.Externalhistory ither rovidesnon-rationalxplanation f thespeed,locality, electiveness tc. of historic vents s interpretedn termsofinternal istory; r, whenhistory iffersrom tsrational econstruction,







106 IMRE LAKATOS

it provides n empiricalxplanation fwhyt differs. ut therational s-pectof scientificrowths fully ccounted orbyone's logicofscientificdiscovery.

Whatever roblem he historian f sciencewishes o solve,hehas firstto reconstructhe relevant ectionof thegrowth f objective cientificknowledge, hat s, therelevant ectionof internalhistory'.As it hasbeen shown,what constitutes orhim internal istory, ependson hisphilosophy,whether e is aware of thisfactor not.Most theories fthegrowth fknowledge re theories fthegrowth f disembodied nowl-edge: whethern experiments crucial or not,whether hypothesiss

highly robable n the ightoftheavailableevidence r not,whetherproblemshiftsprogressiver not, snotdependentn the lightestn thescientists'eliefs, ersonalitiesr authority.hesesubjective actors reofno interestor ny nternal istory. orinstance,he internal istorian'recordsheProutian rogramme ithtshard ore that tomicweightsfpure chemicalelements re wholenumbers) nd its positiveheuristic(to overthrow,ndreplace, he ontemporaryalseobservational heoriesapplied nmeasuring tomicweights). hisprogramme as later arried

through.60he internal istorianwillwaste ittle imeon Prout'sbeliefthat fthe experimentalechniques' f his timewere carefully'pplied,and theexperimentalindings roperlynterpreted,heanomalieswouldimmediatelye seen as mere llusions.The internal istorianwill regardthishistorical act s a fact nthe econdworldwhich s only caricatureof tscounterpartn the hirdworld.61Whyuch aricaturesome about snone of hisbusiness;he might in a footnote pass on the xternalistheproblem f why ertain cientists ad falsebeliefs' bout what heywere

doing.62Thus nconstructingnternal istory hehistorianwillbe highlyelec-tive:he willomit verythinghat s irrationaln the ight fhisrationalitytheory. ut thisnormativeelection till oes not add up toa fully ledgedrational econstruction.or nstance, routneverrticulatedhe Proutianprogramme': heProutianprogrammes not Prout'sprogramme.t isnotonly he 'internal') uccessor the 'internal')defeat f a programmewhich an onlybe udged withhindsight:t isfrequentlylso its content.Internalhistorys not ust a selection f methodologicallynterpretedfacts: tmay be, on occasions, heir adically mproved ersion. ne mayillustratehisusing heBohrian rogramme. ohr, n 1913,maynot have








even hought f thepossibility f electron pin.He had more han noughon his handswithout he pin.Nevertheless,hehistorian,escribing ithhindsighthe Bohrianprogramme,hould include electron pin in it,since lectronpinfits aturallyn theoriginal utline f theprogramme.Bohr mighthave referredo it in 1913.WhyBohr did not do so, is aninteresting roblemwhich deserves to be indicated n a footnote.63(Such problemsmightthen be solved either nternally y pointing orationalreasons n thegrowth f objective, mpersonalknowledge;orexternally y pointing o psychological auses in the development fBohr's personalbeliefs.)

One way to indicatediscrepancies etweenhistory nd its rationalreconstructions to relatethe nternal istoryn thetext, nd indicateinthe ootnotes ow actualhistorymisbehaved'n the ight f tsrationalreconstructions

Manyhistorians ill bhor he deaof nyrational econstruction.heywill uote Lord Bolingbroke:Historysphilosophy eaching yexample'.Theywill aythatbefore hilosophisingwe need a lot more xamples'.65But such an inductivistheory f historiographys utopian.66History

withoutome heoreticalbias' is impossible.67ome historiansook for hediscoveryfhardfacts,nductive eneralisations,thers orbold theoriesand crucialnegative xperiments,etothers orgreat implifications,rforprogressivend degenerating roblemshifts;ll of themhave sometheoreticalbias'. This bias, of course,maybe obscuredby an eclecticvariation ftheories r bytheoretical onfusion: ut neitherclecticismnor confusion mounts o an atheoretical utlook. What a historian e-gards as an external roblem s often n excellent uide to his implicit

methodology: omewill ask why a 'hard fact' or a 'bold theory'wasdiscoveredxactlywhen nd wheretactuallywasdiscovered; therswillask why 'degenerating roblemshift'ould have wide popular acclaimover an incrediblyong period or whya 'progressive roblemshift' asleftunreasonably' nacknowledged.68ong textshave been devoted otheproblem f whether,nd ifso, why, he emergence f sciencewas apurely uropean affair; ut such an investigations bound to remainpiece of confused ambling ntilone clearlydefinesscience' accordingto some normative hilosophy f science. One of the most nteresting

problems f external istorys to specify hepsychological, nd indeed,social conditionswhich re necessary but, of course,never ufficient)o







108 IMRE LAKATOS

make scientificrogress ossible; but in the veryformulation f this'external' roblem omemethodologicalheory,omedefinitionfscienceisbound oenter. istoryf ciences a historyfeventswhich re electedand nterpretedn a normative ay.69 hisbeing o,thehithertoeglectedproblem fappraising ival ogicsofscientificiscoverynd, hence, ivalreconstructionsfhistory, cquiresparamountmportance. shallnowturn o thisproblem.

2. CRITICAL COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES: HISTORY

AS A TEST OF ITS RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS

Theoriesofscientificationalityan be classified nder womainheads.(1) Justificationistethodologieset veryhighepistemologicaltan-

dards: for lassicalustificationistspropositions scientific'nly f t sproven, orneojustificationists,f t sprobable inthesenseoftheproba-bility alculus)or corroboratedin thesense of Popper's thirdnote oncorroboration)o a proven egree.0Somephilosophersfscience aveupthe dea ofproving r of provably) robabilifyingcientificheories ut

remained ogmatic mpiricists:whethernductivists,robabilists, on-ventionalistsrfalsificationist,heytill tick otheprovabilityf factual'propositions.ynow,ofcourse, ll thesedifferentorms f ustification-ismhave rumbled nder heweightf pistemologicalnd ogical riticism.

(2) The only lternatives ithwhichwe are left repragmatic-conven-tionalistmethodologies,rownedbysomeglobalprinciple f induction.Conventionalistmethodologies irstay down rulesabout 'acceptance'and rejection' ffactual ndtheoreticalropositions without et ayingdown rules

boutproof nd disproof, ruthnd falsehood.We thengetdifferentystems f rules of thescientific ame. The inductivist amewould consistof collectingacceptable' not proven)data and drawingfrom hemacceptable' notproven) nductive eneralisations. he con-ventionalistamewouldconsist fcollectingacceptable'dataand order-ingthem nto thesimplest ossiblepigeonhole ystemsor devising hesimplest ossiblepigeonhole ystems nd filling hemwithacceptabledata). Popperspecified et nother ame as 'scientific'.71venmethodol-ogies whichhave beenepistemologicallynd logicallydiscredited,may

goonfunctioning,nthese masculated ersions,s guides or herationalreconstructionf history.But thesescientific ames are without ny








genuine pistemologicalelevance nlesswe superimpose n them omesortof metaphysicalor, fyou wish, inductive') rinciplewhichwill aythat hegame, s specified ythemethodology,ivesus thebest hanceofapproachingheTruth. uch a principle hen urns hepureconventionsof thegame into fallible onjectures; ut without uch a principle hescientificame s ust likeanyothergame.72

It s very ifficulto criticiseonventionalist ethodologiesikeDuhem'sand Popper's.There s no obviouswayto criticiseither gameor a meta-physical rinciple f induction.n order o overcome hesedifficultiesamgoing o propose newtheoryfhowtoappraise uchmethodologies

of science the ones,which at least n thefirsttage, efore he ntroduc-tion of an inductive rinciple are conventionalist). shall show thatmethodologiesmay be criticisedwithout ny directreferenceo anyepistemologicalor evenlogical)theory,nd without singdirectly nylogico-epistemologicalriticism. he basic idea of thiscriticisms thatall methodologiesunctions historiographicalor meta-historical)heories(or research rogrammes)nd can be criticised ycriticisingherationalhistoricaleconstructionso whichheyead.

I shall try o develop this historiographical ethodof criticismn adialecticalway. startwith specialcase: I firstrefute' alsificationismby applying' alsificationismona normative istoriographical eta-level)to itself. henI shallapplyfalsificationismlso to inductivismnd con-ventionalism,nd, ndeed, rgue hat ll methodologiesre boundto endup falsified' ith hehelp ofthisPyrrhonian achine e guerre. inally,I shall 'apply' not falsificationismut the methodology f scientificresearch rogrammesagainon a normative-historiographicaleta-level)

to inductivism,onventionalism,alsificationismnd to itself,nd showthat on thismeta-criterionmethodologiesan be constructivelyriti-cised and compared.This normative-historiographicalersion of themethodologyf scientificesearch rogrammesupplies general heoryof howto compare ival ogicsof discoveryn whichin a sensecarefullytobespecified) istory aybe seen s a 'test'of tsrational econstructions.

A. Falsificationisms a Meta-criterion:istoryfalsifies'alsificationism(and anyotherMethodology)

In their urely methodological' ersions cientificppraisals, s has al-readybeen said, are conventionsnd can alwaysbe formulateds a







110 IMRE LAKATOS

definitionf science.73How can one criticise uch a definition?f oneinterpretst nominalistically,74definitions a mereabbreviation,terminologicaluggestion, tautology. ow can one criticise tautology?Popper, or ne,claims hathis definitionf science s fruitful'ecause agreatmanypoints an be clarifiedndexplainedwithtshelp'.He quotesMenger:Definitionsredogmas; only heconclusions rawn romhemcan affordsanynew nsight'.5Buthowcan a definitionaveexplanatorypowerorafford ew nsights? opper's nswer s this: It is onlyfromheconsequences f mydefinitionf empirical cience, nd from hemetho-dologicaldecisionswhichdepend upon thisdefinition,hatthescientist

willbe able to see how far t conforms o his ntuitivedea of thegoal ofhis endeavours'.76

The answer omplieswithPopper's generalposition hatconventionscan be criticisedy discussingheirsuitability'elative o somepurpose:'As tothe uitabilityf nyconventionpinionsmaydiffer;nd a reason-ablediscussion f these uestionss onlypossiblebetween artieshavingsome purpose n common.The choice of thatpurpose .. goes beyondrational rgument'.77ndeed,Popperneveroffered theory frational

criticism f consistent onventions. e does notraise, etalone answer,thequestion: Underwhat onditions ould ou giveup yourdemarcationcriterion'78

But thequestion can be answered. give my answer n two stages:I propose first naive and then more sophisticated nswer. startbyrecallinghow Popper, ccording o his own account78a, rrived t hiscriterion. e thought,ike the bestscientists fhistime, hatNewton'stheory, lthoughrefuted, as a wonderful cientific chievement; hat

Einstein's heorywas still better; nd thatastrology, reudianism ndtwentiethenturyMarxismwerepseudo-scientific.is problemwas tofind definitionfsciencewhichyielded hese basic udgments'oncern-ing particular heories; nd he offered novel solution.Now let us con-siderthe proposal that a rationalityheory or demarcationriterion isto berejected f t s inconsistentith n accepted basic value udgment' fthe cientificlite. ndeed, this neta-methodologicalule meta-falsifica-tionism)would seem to correspond o Popper's methodological ule(falsificationism)hat scientificheory s to be rejected f t is inconsis-tentwith n ('empirical')basic statementnanimously cceptedby thescientificommunity.opper'swholemethodologyests n the contention







HISTORY OF SCIENCE 1ll

that thereexist (relatively) ingular tatements n whose truth-valuescientistsan reachunanimous greement; ithout uchagreementherewould be a new Babel and the soaring difice f sciencewould soon ie nruins'.79 ut even f therewere n agreementbout basic' statements,ftherewere no agreementbout how to appraisescientificchievementrelative o this empirical asis',would not thesoaring difice fscienceequallysoon lie in ruins?No doubt t would. Whiletherehas been ittleagreementoncerning universal riterion f the scientificharacter ftheories,here as beenconsiderablegreementver he asttwo enturiesconcerningingle chievements.While therehas been no general gree-

ment oncerning theoryf scientificationality,here as beenconsider-able agreement oncerning hether particular ingle tep n thegamewas scientificr crankish, r whether particular ambitwas playedcorrectlyr not. A general efinitionf science husmust econstructheacknowledgedlyestgambits s 'scientific':f tfails odo so,ithasto berejected.80

Then let us propose tentativelyhat fa demarcationriterions in-consistent ith he basic' appraisalsof thescientific lite, t shouldbe

rejected.Now ifweapplythis uasi-empiricalmeta-criterionwhich amgoing

to reject ater),Popper'sdemarcation riterion that s, Popper's rulesof thegameof science has to be rejected.81

Popper's basic rule s thatthescientistmust pecifyn advance underwhat xperimentalonditions e willgiveup evenhis mostbasicassump-tions.For instance, ewrites, hen riticisingsychoanalysis:Criteria frefutationave to be laid downbeforehand:tmustbe agreedwhich b-

servable ituations,factually bserved,mean that he theory s refuted.But whatkindof clinicalresponseswouldrefute o the atisfaction f theanalystnotmerely particularnalytic iagnosis ut sychoanalysistself?Andhave suchcriteriaverbeendiscussed r agreedupon byanalysts?'2In the ase ofpsychoanalysis opperwasright: o answerhasbeenforth-coming.Freudianshave been nonplussedby Popper's basic challengeconcerningcientific onesty. ndeed, theyhave refused o specify x-perimental onditionsunder whichtheywould give up theirbasic as-sumptions. or Popper thiswas thehallmark f their ntellectual is-honesty. ut what fweput Popper'squestion o theNewtonian cientist:'What kindofobservationwouldrefute o the satisfaction f the New-







112 IMRE LAKATOS

toniannotmerely particularNewtonian xplanation utNewtoniandynamicsndgravitationalheorytself And havesuch riteria ver eendiscussedor agreedupon by Newtonians?'The Newtonianwill, alas,scarcely e able togivea positive nswer.83 ut then fanalysts re tobecondemneds dishonest yPopper's tandards, ewtoniansmust lso becondemned.Newtonian cience,however,n spiteof this sortof dog-matism', s highly egardedby thegreatest cientists,nd, indeed,byPopperhimself. ewtoniandogmatism'hens a 'falsification'fPopper'sdefinition:tdefies opper'srational econstruction.

Poppermaycertainly ithdraw iscelebrated hallenge nd demand

falsifiabilityandrejectionnfalsificationonlyfor ystemsftheories,includingnitial onditions nd all sortsof auxiliary nd observationaltheories.84his s a considerable ithdrawal,or tallows the maginativescientist o savehispettheory ysuitable ucky lterationsn someodd,obscure orner ntheperipheryf histheoreticalmaze.ButevenPopper'smitigatedulewill howupeven themostbrilliantcientistss irrationaldogmatists. or in largeresearch rogrammeshere re always knownanomalies:normallyheresearcherutsthem sideandfollowsheposi-

tiveheuristicf theprogramme.85ngeneral e rivets isattentionnthepositive euristic ather hanonthedistractingnomalies, ndhopesthatthe recalcitrantnstances'willbeturned nto onfirmingnstances s theprogrammerogresses. n Popper'sterms hegreatestcientistsnthesesituations sedforbiddenambits, d hoc tratagems:nstead fregardingMercury's nomalousperihelions a falsificationftheNewtonianheoryofourplanetary ystemndthus s a reasonfor tsrejection,mostphysi-cists shelved t as a problematicnstanceto be solved at some later

stage orofferedd hocsolutions. hismethodologicalttitude ftreat-ingas (mere) nomalieswhatPopperwouldregard s (dramatic) ounter-examples s commonly cceptedby thebestscientists. ome of the re-search rogrammes owheld n higheststeem ythe cientificommuni-typrogressedn an ocean ofanomalies.86hat ntheirhoiceofproblemsthegreatestcientistsuncritically'gnore nomaliesandthat heysolatethemwiththehelp of ad hoc stratagems)ffers,t least on our meta-criterion, furtheralsification f Popper's methodology.He cannotinterpret s rationalsome most important atterns n the growth f

science.Furthermore, orPopper, working n an inconsistentystemmust








invariably e regardeds irrationala self-contradictoryystemmustberejected... because t] s uninformative... o statements singled ut...since all are derivable'.87 ut some of thegreatest cientific esearchprogrammes rogressed n inconsistentoundations.88ndeed in suchcases the best scientists' ule s frequently:Allez en avantet lafoi vousviendra'.This anti-Popperianmethodologyecured a breathing pacebothfor he nfinitesimalalculus nd fornaive ettheory hen heywerebedevilled y ogical paradoxes.

Indeed, fthegameofsciencehad beenplayedaccording o Popper'srulebook,Bohr's 1913paperwould neverhave beenpublished ecause t

was inconsistentlyrafted n to Maxwell's theory, nd Dirac's deltafunctions ouldhavebeensuppressed ntil chwartz.All these xamplesof research ased on inconsistentoundations onstituteurtherfalsifica-tions' of falsificationistethodology.89

Thus several of the basic' appraisalsof the scientific lite 'falsify'Popper's definition f scienceand scientificthics.The problem thenarises,to whatextent, iventheseconsiderations,an falsificationismfunctions a guidefor hehistorian f science.Thesimple nswers,to a

very mallextent.Popper,theleadingfalsificationist,everwrote nyhistory f science;possibly ecause he was too sensitive o the udgmentofgreat cientistsopervert istoryn a falsificationistein. One shouldremember hatwhile n his autobiographical ecollections e mentionsNewtonian cience s theparadigm fscientificness,hat s,offalsifiabil-ity, n his classical Logik derForschunghefalsifiabilityf Newton'stheorys nowhere iscussed.The Logik derForschung,n the whole, sdryly bstract nd highly historical.90WherePopperdoes venture o

remark asuallyon thefalsifiabilityf majorscientificheories, e eitherplunges nto ome ogicalblunder,9' r distorts istoryo fit isrationalitytheory.f a historian'smethodology rovides poorrational econstruc-tion,hemay ithermisread istoryn such waythat tcoincideswithhisrational econstruction,rhe willfind hat hehistory f science s highlyirrational. opper's respect orgreat ciencemadehim choose the firstoption,whilethe disrespectfuleyerabend hose the second.92ThusPopper, n his historical sides, tends to turnanomalies nto crucialexperiments'nd to exaggerateheirmmediatempact n the history fscience.Throughhisspectacles, reat cientistscceptrefutationseadilyand this s theprimary ourceof theirproblems.For instance, n one







114 IMRE LAKATOS

place he claims that theMichelson-Morleyxperimentecisively ver-threw lassical ther heory; ealsoexaggerateshe oleof his xperimentin the emergence f Einstein's elativityheory.93t takes a naivefalsifi-cationist's implifyingpectacles o see,withPopper,Lavoisier's lassicalexperimentss refutingor as 'tending o refute') hephlogistonheory;or to see theBohr-Kramers-Slaterheory s beingknockedout withsingleblow fromCompton;or to see theparityprinciple rejected'by'counterexample'.94

Furthermore,fPopperwants o reconstructheprovisionalcceptanceoftheoriess rational nhis erms, e sboundto gnore hehistorical act

that most mportantheories re born refutednd thatsome laws arefurtherxplained, ather hanrejected,n spiteof theknowncounter-examples.He tends oturn blind yeon all anomaliesknown efore heone which aterwas enthroneds 'crucial ounter-evidence'.orinstance,he mistakenlyhinks hat neitherGalileo's norKepler'stheorieswererefuted eforeNewton'.95 he context s significant.opperholds thatthemost mportant attern fscientificrogressswhen crucial xperi-ment eaves one theory nrefutedhile t refutes rivalone. But, as a

matter ffact,nmost,fnot nall,caseswhere here re tworival heories,both are knownto be simultaneouslynfected y anomales. In suchsituations opper succumbs o thetemptation o simplifyhe situationinto one to whichhismethodologys applicable.96

Falsificationististoriographys then falsified'. ut ifwe apply thesamemeta-falsificationistethod o inductivistnd conventionalistis-toriographies, e shall falsify' hem oo.

Thebest ogico-epistemologicalemolition f nductivisms, ofcourse,

Popper's; buteven f weassumed hat nductivism erephilosophically(that s,epistemologicallynd ogically)ound,Duhem'shistoriographicalcriticismalsifiest.Duhemtookthemost elebratedsuccesses'of nduc-tivist istoriography:ewton's aw ofgravitationnd Ampere's lectro-magneticheory. hesewere aid to be two mostvictorious pplicationsof nductivemethod. utDuhem and,following im, opper ndAgassi)showed hattheywerenot. Their nalyses llustrate ow the nductivist,ifhe wantsto show thatthe growth f actual science s rational,mustfalsifyctualhistory ut of all recognition.7Therefore,ftherationality

ofscience s inductive,ctualscience s notrational; f t s rational, t snot nductive.98








Conventionalism which, nlike nductivism,s no easyprey ologicalor epistemologicalriticism99can also be historiographicallyalsified.One can showthat hecluetoscientificevolutionss notthereplacementof cumbersomerameworksy simpler nes.

The Copernican evolutionwas generallyakento be theparadigm fconventionalististoriography,ndit s still o regardednmany uarters.For instancePolanyi tells us that Copernicus's simplerpicture'had'striking eauty' nd [justly] arriedgreatpowersof conviction.'100utmodern tudy f primary ources, articularlyy Kuhn,101as dispelledthis myth nd presented clear-cuthistoriographicalefutationf the

conventionalistccount. t is now agreedthat the Copernican ystemwas at least as complex s thePtolemaic'.102 ut fthis s so, then,ftheacceptance fCopernican heory asrational,twasnotfor ts uperlativeobjective implicity.103

Thus nductivism,alsificationismnd conventionalismanbe falsifiedas rational econstructionsf history ith hehelp ofthe ortof historio-graphical riticism have adduced.104 istoriographicalalsificationfinductivism,s we have seen,was initiated lreadyby Duhem and con-

tinued y Popper nd Agassi. Historiographicalriticismsf naive] alsi-ficationism ave been offered y Polanyi,Kuhn,Feyerabend nd Hol-ton.105 he most mportantistoriographicalriticismfconventionalismis to be found n Kuhn's - alreadyquoted- masterpiece n the Coper-nicanrevolution.106heupshot f these riticismss that ll these ationalreconstructionsf history orcehistory f science nto the Procrusteanbed of theirhypocriticalmorality, hus creating ancyhistories,whichhinge on mythical inductivebases', 'valid inductivegeneralisations',

'crucial xperiments',greatrevolutionaryimplifications'tc. But criticsof-falsificationismnd conventionalism rewverydifferentonclusionsfrom he falsificationf thesemethodologies han Duhem, Popper andAgassi did fromtheir own falsification f inductivism.olanyi and,seemingly, olton) concludedthat whileproper,rational cientific p-praisalcan be made nparticular ases, there an be no general heory fscientific ationality.107ll methodologies, ll rational reconstructionscan behistoriographicallyfalsified': cience s rational, ut ts rationalitycannot be subsumedunder the general aws of any methodology.108Feyerabend, n the otherhand,concluded hatnot only an there e nogeneral heory f scientificationality ut also that here s no such thing







116 IMRE LAKATOS

as scientificationality.109hus Polanyi swungtowards conservativeauthoritarianism,hileFeyerabendwung owards ceptical narchism.Kuhn came up witha highly riginalvision of irrationallyhangingrational uthority.110

Although, s it transpires rom hissection, have high regardforPolanyi's, Feyerabend's nd Kuhn's criticisms f extant 'internalist')theories fmethod, drew conclusion ompletely ifferentrom heirs.I decided to look for an improvedmethodology hich offers betterrational econstructionfscience.

Feyerabend nd Kuhn immediatelyriedto 'falsify'my improved

methodologyn turn.111soon had to discoverhat, t east n thesensedescribedn thepresentection,mymethodologyoo- andanymethodo-logywhatsoever can be 'falsified', or he imple eason hat no set ofhumanudgmentss completelyational nd thusno rational econstruc-tion can evercoincidewith ctualhistory.1"2

This recognitioned me to proposea new constructiveriterion ywhichmethodologies ua rationalreconstructionsf historymightbeappraised.

B. TheMethodologyfHistoriographicalesearch rogrammes.istoryto Varyingegrees CorroboratestsRationalReconstructions

I should ike to presentmyproposal n twostages.First, shallamendslightlyhefalsificationististoriographicaleta-criterionustdiscussed,and thenreplace t altogether ith better ne.

First, he lightmendment.f a universal ule lasheswith particular'normative asic udgment', ne shouldallow thescientificommunity

time o ponder heclash: theymaygiveup their articularudgment ndsubmit o thegeneral ule. Second-order' historiographicalfalsifica-tionsmustnot be rushed ny more hanfirst rder' scientificones.1"3

Secondly, ince we have abandonednaivefalsificationismn method,why houldwestick o it nmeta-method?e can easilyreplace t withmethodologyfscientificesearch rogrammesfsecondorder, r fyouwish, methodologyfhistoriographicalesearch rogrammes.

Whilemaintaininghata theory frationalityas to try o organisebasicvalue udgmentsnuniversal,oherentrameworks,e do nothaveto reject uch a frameworkmmediately erely ecauseofsome anom-alies or other nconsistencies. e should,ofcourse, nsist hat a good








rationalityheorymustanticipate urtherasic value udgments nex-

pected n the lightof its predecessors r that t must even eadto the

revision f previously eld basic value-judgments.114e thenrejectarationalityheory nlyfor a better ne, for one which, n this quasi-empirical' ense,represents progressivehiftn the sequenceofresearchprogrammesf rational econstructions.hus thisnew- more enientmeta-criterionnablesustocompare ival ogicsof discoverynddiscerngrowthn meta-scientific'methodological knowledge.

For instance,Popper's theoryof scientificationality eed not berejectedimply ecause t s falsified'ysome actual basic udgments' f

leading cientists. oreover, n our newcriterion,opper'sdemarcationcriterionlearly epresentsrogress ver ts ustificationistredecessors,and in particular,ver nductivism.or,contraryo thesepredecessors,it rehabilitatedhe scientifictatusof falsified heories ike phlogistontheory, husreversing value udgmentwhich had expelledthe latterfrom hehistory fscienceproper nto thehistoryf rrationaleliefs.115Also, it successfullyehabilitatedheBohr-Kramers-Slaterheory.116nthe light of most ustificationistheoriesof rationalityhe history f

science s, at its best,a history f prescientificreludes o somefuturehistory f science.117opper's methodologynabled the historian ointerpret ore fthe ctualbasic value udgmentsnthehistoryfscienceas rational: in thisnormative-historiographicalense Popper's theoryconstitutedrogress. n the lightof better ational reconstructionsfscience one can always reconstructmore of actual great science asrational.118

I hope thatmymodificationf Popper's ogic ofdiscovery illbe seen,

inturn on the riterionspecified as yet furthertepforward. or itseems o offer coherentccountof more ld, isolatedbasicvalue udg-ments;moreover,t has ledto new and, at leastfor he ustificationistrnaivefalsificationist,urprising asic value udgments. or instance, c-cording o Popper'stheory,t was irrationalo retain nd furtherlabo-rate Newton's gravitational heory fterthe discovery f Mercury'sanomalousperihelion; r again, twas irrational o developBohr'soldquantumtheory ased on inconsistentoundations. rom my point ofviewthesewereperfectlyationaldevelopments:ome rearguardctionsin the defence f defeated rogrammes even after he so-calledcrucialexperiments' areperfectlyational.Thusmymethodologyeadsto the







118 IMRE LAKATOS

reversal f thosehistoriographicaludgmentswhichdeleted heserear-guard actions both from inductivist nd from falsificationistartyhistories.119

Indeed, thismethodologyonfidentlyredicts hatwhere he falsifica-tionisteesthe nstant efeat fa theory hrough simple attlewith omefact, hehistorianwilldetect complicatedwar ofattrition,tartingongbefore, nd ending fter,healleged crucial xperiment';nd where hefalsificationistees consistentnd unrefutedheories,tpredictsheexist-ence ofhordesof known nomalies n research rogrammes rogressingon possibly nconsistent oundations.120herethe conventionalistees

the clue to thevictory f a theory ver tspredecessorn theformer'sintuitiveimplicity,hismethodology redicts hat t will be found hatvictory as due toempirical egenerationn the ld andempirical rogressin the new programme.121 hereKuhn and Feyerabend ee irrationalchange, predict hat the historianwill be able to show thattherehasbeen rationalchange.The methodologyf research rogrammeshuspredicts or, fyou wish, postdicts')novelhistorical acts, nexpectednthe light of extant internal nd external)historiographiesnd these

predictionswill, hope, be corroborated y historical esearch. f theyare, thenthemethodology f scientific esearch rogrammes ill itselfconstitute progressive roblemshift.

Thus rogressn the heory f scientificationalitys marked y discov-eriesof novelhistoricalacts, by thereconstructionf a growing ulk ofvalue-impregnatedistory s rational.122n otherwords, the theory fscientificationality rogresses f it constitutes 'progressive' istorio-graphical esearch rogramme. need not saythatno such historiogra-

phical research rogrammean or should xplain ll history f science srational:even thegreatest cientistsmake false steps and fail n theirjudgment.Because ofthis rationalreconstructionsemain or ever ub-merged n nocean of anomalies. hese nomalieswill ventuallyave obeexplainedithery omebetter ational econstructionrby ome external'empirical heory.

This approach does not advocate a cavalierattitude o the 'basicnormativeudgments' f the cientist.Anomalies'maybe rightlygnoredbythe nternalistua internalistnd relegated o external istory nly s

long s theinternalisthistoriographicalresearchprogrammesprogressing;or ifa supplementarympirical xternalist istoriographicalrogramme








absorbs hem rogressively.ut f n the ight f a rationalreconstructionthehistoryf cience s seen s increasinglyrrational ithoutprogressiveexternalistxplanation such as an explanation f thedegeneration fscience n terms f politicalor religious error, r of an antiscientificideological limate, r of he ise fa newparasitic lassofpseudoscientistswithvested nterestsn rapid universityxpansion'),thenhistoriogra-phical innovation,proliferationf historiographicalheories,s vital.Just s scientificrogressspossible ven fone never etsridofscientificanomalies, rogressn rationalhistoriographys also possible ven f onenevergetsrid of historiographicalnomalies. The rationalist istorian

neednot be disturbed ythe fact hat ctualhistorys morethan, nd,on occasions, vendifferentrom,nternal istory,nd thathemayhaveto relegatehe xplanation fsuchanomalies o external istory. utthisunfalsifiabilityf nternal istoryoes not rendert mmune o construc-tive,butonly onegative, riticismjustas theunfalsifiabilityfa scien-tific esearch rogrammeoes not rendert mmune o constructive,utonlytonegative, riticism.

Ofcourse,one can criticisenternal istory nlyby making he histo-

rian's usually atent)methodologyxplicit, howinghowitfunctionssa historiographicalesearchrogramme. istoriographicalriticism re-quentlysucceeds in destroyingmuch of fashionable xternalism. n'impressive', sweeping', far-reaching'xternal xplanation s usuallythe hallmark f a weak methodological ubstructure;nd, in turn, hehallmark fa relatively eak internal istoryin terms f which mostactual history s eithernexplicable r anomalous) is that t leaves toomuch to be explained by externalhistory.When a betterrationality

theory s produced, nternalhistorymay expand and reclaimgroundfrom xternal istory. he competition, owever, s not as open in suchcases as whentworivalscientificesearch rogrammes ompete.Exter-nalisthistoriographicalrogrammes hich upplementnternal istoriesbased on naivemethodologieswhether ware or unaware f thefact) relikely ither o degenerateuickly r never vento getoff heground, orthe simplereason that hey etout to offer sychological r sociological'explanations' f methodologicallynduced antasies ather hanof morerationally nterpreted)istorical acts.Once an externalistccount uses,

whether onsciously r not, a naive methodologywhich can so easilycreep nto ts descriptive'anguage), t turns nto a fairy ale which,for







120 IMRE LAKATOS

all itsapparent cholarlyophistication, illcollapseunderhistoriogra-phicalscrutiny.

Agassialreadyndicated ow thepovertyf nductivististory penedthedoor to thewild peculationsfvulgar-Marxists.123is falsificationisthistoriography,nturn, lingshedoor wideopento those rendysociol-ogists fknowledge'whotry oexplain hefurtherpossibly nsuccessful)developmentf a theoryfalsified' ya 'crucial xperiment's themani-festation f the rrational,wicked, eactionaryesistance yestablishedauthorityo enlightenedevolutionarynnovation.124utin the ight fthemethodologyfscientificesearch rogrammesuchrearguardkir-

mishes re perfectlyxplicable nternally: here some externalistseepower struggle,ordidpersonalcontroversy,he rationalisthistorianwillfrequentlyind ationaldiscussion.125

An nterestingxample fhowa poortheoryfrationality aympover-ishhistory s thetreatmentf degeneratingroblemshiftsy historio-graphical ositivists.26 Let us imaginefor nstance hat n spiteoftheobjectively rogressingstronomical esearch rogrammes,heastrono-mers re suddenly ll gripped y a feeling f Kuhnian crisis';and then

they ll are converted, y an irresistible estalt-switch,o astrology.wouldregard hiscatastrophes a horrifyingroblem, o be accountedforby some empirical xternalistxplanation.But nota Kuhnian.Allhe sees is a 'crisis'followed y a massconversion ffectn thescientificcommunity:n ordinary evolution. othing s left s problematicndunexplained.127he Kuhnianpsychological piphenomenaf crisis' nd'conversion' an accompany ither bjectively rogressive r objectivelydegeneratinghanges, ither evolutionsrcounterrevolutions.ut this

factfallsoutsideKuhn's framework.uchhistoriographicalnomaliescannotbeformulated,et lone beprogressivelybsorbed, yhis historio-graphical esearch rogramme,nwhich here s nowayofdistinguishingbetween, ay, 'crisis' nd degeneratingroblemshift'.ut suchanoma-lies might ven be predicted y an externalist istoriographicalheorybasedon themethodologyfscientificesearch rogrammeshatwouldspecifyocial conditions nderwhich egeneratingesearch rogrammesmay achieve ocio-psychologicalictory.

C. AgainstAprioristicndAntitheoreticalpproachesoMethodologyFinally, et us contrast hetheory frationality erediscussedwith he








strictlyprioristicor, moreprecisely,Euclidean') and withthe anti-theoreticalpproaches.128

'Euclidean'methodologiesaydown a priori eneral ules or cientificappraisal.Thisapproach s mostpowerfullyepresentedodaybyPopper.In Popper'sviewtheremustbe theconstitutionaluthorityf an immut-able statute aw (laid downin his demarcationriterion)o distinguishbetween ood and bad science.

Someeminent hilosophers, owever, idicule he dea ofstatuteaw,thepossibility f anyvalid demarcation.According o Oakeshott ndPolanyi heremustbe - and canbe - no statute aw at all: only ase law.

Theymay lso arguethat ven fonemistakenlyllowed for tatuteaw,statuteaw too would needauthoritativenterpreters.thinkhatOake-shott's ndPolanyi'spositionhas a great eal of truthn t.Afterll,onemust dmit pace Popper)thatuntilnow all the laws' proposedbytheaprioristhilosophersfsciencehave turned ut to bewrongnthe ightoftheverdicts f thebest cientists.p to thepresent ay thasbeen hescientifictandards, s applied instinctively' y the scientificlite inparticular ases, which have constituted he main - althoughnot the

exclusive- yardstick f the philosopher'suniversal aws. But if so,methodologicalrogress, t leastas far s themost dvanced ciences reconcerned, till ags behindcommonscientific isdom. s it not thenhubris o try o imposesome a priori hilosophy fscienceon themostadvanced ciences? s itnothubris odemand hat f, ay,Newtonian rEinsteineancience urns ut tohaveviolatedBacon's,Carnap'sorPop-per's priorirulesfthe ame, he usiness f ciencehould e tartednew?

I think t is. And, indeed, the methodology f historiographical

researchprogrammesmplies a pluralistic ystem f authority,artlybecausethewisdomof thescientificury and itscase law has not been,and cannot be, fully rticulated y thephilosopher's tatute aw, andpartly ecause thephilosopher's tatute aw mayoccasionallybe rightwhen hescientists'udgment ails. disagree,herefore,othwith hosephilosophersf sciencewhohavetaken tforgranted hatgeneral cien-tific tandards re immutablend reason anrecognise hem priori,129and with hosewhohavethought hat he ight freason lluminatesnlyparticularases.Themethodologyfhistoriographicalesearchrogram-messpecifies aysboth for hephilosopher fscience o learnfrom hehistorian fscience nd viceversa.







122 IMRE LAKATOS

But this wo-way raffic eed not alwaysbe balanced.The statute awapproach houldbecomemuchmoremportant hen tradition egener-ates130r a newbad traditions founded.13'n suchcases statuteawmaythwart heauthorityf thecorruptedase law, and slow down or evenreverse heprocess fdegeneration.'32hen scientificchooldegeneratesinto pseudo-science,t maybe worthwhile o forcea methodologicaldebate n thehope thatworking cientists ill earn more fromt thanphilosophers just as when ordinary anguage degenerates nto, say,journalese, tmaybe worthwhileo invoke he rulesofgrammar).133

D. ConclusionIn thispaper haveproposed 'historical'method or heevaluation frival methodologies. he argumentswereprimarilyddressedto thephilosopherf science nd aimed at showing ow he can - and shouldlearnfrom hehistoryfscience.But the ameargumentslso imply hatthehistorianfsciencemust,nturn, ayserious ttention o thephilos-ophyof scienceand decideupon whichmethodology e willbase hisinternal istory. hope to have offered ome strong rguments or the

followingheses. irst, achmethodologyfscience eterminescharac-teristicand sharp) demarcation etween primary)nternal istory nd(secondary) xternal istory nd, secondly, oth historians nd philos-ophers of science must make the best of the critical nterplay etweeninternal nd external actors.

Let mefinally emind he readerof myfavourite and by now well-worn joke thathistory f science s frequentlycaricature f tsrationalreconstructions;hat rationalreconstructionsre frequentlyaricatures

ofactual history; nd that ome histories f science re caricatures othof actual history nd of its rational reconstructions.134his paper, Ithink, nablesme to add: Quod eratdemonstandum.

London chool of Economics

NOTES

* Earlierversions fthispaper wereread and criticized y Colin Howson, Alan Mus-

grave,JohnWatkins,Elie Zahar, and especiallyJohnWorrall.The present aperfurtherevelopssome ofthethesesproposed nmy 1970). I havetried, t the cost of some repetition, o make it self-contained.








1 'Internal istory'susually efineds intellectualistory;externalistory's socialhistorycf. .g.Kuhn 1968)).Myunorthodox,ew emarcationetweeninternal'nd

'external' istoryonsitutes considerableroblemshiftnd maysounddogmatic.Butmy definitionsorm he hardcore ofa historiographicalesearch rogramme;theirvaluationspart ndparcel fthe valuation f thefertilityf thewhole ro-gramme.2 This s an all-importanthift n theproblemf normativehilosophyfscience.The termnormative'o ongermeans ules or rrivingtsolutions,utmerelyirec-tions or he ppraisal f olutionslreadyhere. husmethodologysseparatedromheuristics,athers valueudgmentsrefromughttatements.I owe this nalogy oJohnWatkins.)3 Thisprofusionfsynonymsasprovedo beratheronfusing.4 The epistemologicalignificancef scientificacceptance'nd rejection's, as we

shall ee,far rom eing he ame nthefourmethodologiesobediscussed.'5 Neo-inductivism'emandsnlyprovably) ighlyrobable eneralisations.n whatfollows shall nly iscuss lassicalnductivism;ut hewatered ownneo-inductivistvariant anbe similarlyealtwith.6 Cf. p. 107.7 For a detailed iscussion f inductivistand, n general,ustificationist)riticismcf.my 1966).8 J mnowusing he ermparadigm'n tspre-Kuhnianense.9 ThiscompatibilityaspointedutbyAgassi npp.23-27ofhis 1963).But didhenotpoint ut he nalogousompatibilityithinis wn alsificationististoriography;cf. bove,pp. 98-9.

10 Cf. e.g. Bernal (1965), p. 377.1 Some ogical ositivistselongedo this et: onerecalls empel's orrortPopper'scasualpraise f ertain xternal etaphysicalnfluencespon scienceHempel, 937).12 WhenGerman bscurantistscofft positivism',heyrequentlyean adicalnter-nalism, nd nparticular,adicalnductivism.13 For what here all revolutionaryonventionalism,eemy 1970),pp. 105-6 nd187-9.14 I mainly iscusshere nly ne version frevolutionaryonventionalism,heonewhichAgassi, n his (1966),called unsophisticated':heone which ssumes hatfactual ropositions unlike igeonholeystemscanbe 'proven'.Duhem, or n-stance, raws o cleardistinctionetween acts ndfactual ropositions.)

15 It is importanto note hatmost onventionalistsrereluctantogive pinductivegeneralisations.heydistinguishetween he floorffacts', the floor f aws' i.e.inductiveeneralisationsromfacts') nd the floor f theories'or of pigeonholesystems) hich lassify,onveniently,othfacts nd inductiveaws. Whewell, heconservativeonventionalistnd Duhem, herevolutionaryonventionalistifferessthanmost eople magine.)16 Onemay all suchmetaphysicalrinciplesinductive rinciples'.or an inductiveprinciple' hich roughlypeaking makesPopper'sdegree fcorroboration'aconventionalistppraisal)hemeasure fPopper's erisimilitudetruth-contentinusfalsity-content)eemy 1968a),pp. 390-408 ndmy 1971a), ?2. (Anotherwidelyspread inductiverinciple' aybeformulatedikethis: Whatthegroup ftrained

- orup-to-date,rsuitably urged scientistsecide oaccept s true', strue.")17 Mosthistoricalccounts f theCopernicanevolutionrewrittenromhecon-ventionalistointof view.Few claimed hatCopernicus'heory as an 'inductive







124 IMRE LAKATOS

generalisation'romomefactual iscovery';r thattwasproposeds a boldtheoryto replace hePtolemaicheory hich ad beenrefuted'ysome elebratedcrucial'

experiment.For a furtheriscussion fthehistoriographyftheCopernicanevolution,f.my(1971b).18 Forexample, ornon-inductivististorians ewton'sHypotheseson ingo' epre-sents majorproblem. uhem,whounlikemosthistoriansid notover-indulgenNewton-worship,ismissed ewton'snductivist ethodologys logicalnonsense;butKoyr6,whosemany trong oints idnot ncludeogic, evotedong haptersothe hidden epths' fNewton'smuddle.19 In thispaper I use thisterm o standexclusively or one version ffalsificationism,namely or naivemethodologicalalsificationism',s definednmy (1970), pp. 93-116.20 Since n hismethodologyheconceptf ntuitiveimplicityas no place,Popper

wasableto use the ermsimplicity'ordegree ffalsifiability'.uttheresmore osimplicityhan his: f.my 1970),pp. 131ff.21 For a discussionf.my1970), speciallyp.99-100.22 For furtheriscussionf.pp. 108-09.23 Agassi 1963).24 An experimentaliscoverysa chancediscoveryntheobjective ense f t sneithera confirmingor refutingnstancef ome heorynthe bjective ody fknowledgeof thetime; it is a chancediscoveryn the ubjective ense f t is made (or recognised)bythediscoverereithers a confirmingor s a refutingnstance fsome heoryepersonallyadentertainedtthe ime.25 Agassi 1963),pp.64-74.

26 Withinhe opperianircle,twasAgassi ndWatkins hoparticularlymphasizedthe mportancef unfalsifiabler barely estableempirical'heoriesn providingexternaltimuluso ater roperlycientificevelopments.Cf.Agassi, 964 ndWat-kins, 958.)This dea,ofcourse,salreadyherenPopper's1934) nd 1960).Cf.my(1970),p. 184;but thenewformulationfthedifferenceetween heirpproachndminewhich amgoing ogive n this aperwill, hope,be much learer.27 Popperoccasionally and Feyerabendystematically stressedhe catalytic(external)oleofalternativeheoriesn devisingo-calledcrucial xperiments'.utalternativesrenotmerelyatalysts,hichanbe ater emovedn the ational econ-struction,hey renecessary arts f thefalsifyingrocess. f.Popper 1940)andFeyerabend1965);but f. lsoLakatos 1970), specially. 121,footnote.28

Cf.Popper 1968a) nd 1968b).29 The termsprogressive'nd degeneratingroblemshifts',researchrogrammes','superseding'illbe crudelyefinednwhat ollows formore laborate efinitionsseemy 1968b) ndespeciallymy1970).30 Popper oesnotpermithis:There s a vastdifferenceetweenmy iews ndcon-ventionalism.hold thatwhat haracterisesheempiricalmethod s just this:ourconventionseterminehe cceptance fthe ingular,ot oftheuniversaltatements'(Popper, 934, ection 0).31 Thefalsificationistotly enies his: Learning romxperiences learningromrefutingnstance.herefutingnstancehen ecomes problematicnstance'.Agassi,1964 .201). n his 1969)Agassi ttributedoPopper he tatementhatwe earn rom

experienceyrefutations'p. 169), ndadds that ccordingoPopper ne canlearnonly rom efutationutnot from orroborationp. 167).Feyerabend,ven n his(1969), saysthat negativenstancesufficenscience'. But theseremarksndicate very








one-sided heoryf earningromxperience.Cf. my 1970),p. 121,footnote,andp. 123.)

32 Duhem, s a staunch ositivist ithinhilosophyfscience,would, o doubt, x-cludemostmetaphysics's unscientificnd wouldnot llow t to have ny nfluenceonscience roper.33 Cf.my 1968a),pp. 383-6,my 1968b), p. 162-7, ndmy 1970),pp. 116ff.ndpp. 155ff.34 Cf. Popper 1934), ection 5.35 Cf.Duhem 1906),Part I, Chapter I, ? 10.36 In fact, define researchrogrammes degeneratingven f tanticipatesovelfacts utdoes so ina patched-upevelopmentatherhan y coherent,re-plannedpositive euristic.distinguishhreeypes f d hoc uxiliary ypotheses:hosewhichhaveno excessmpiricalontentver heirredecessor'adhocl'), hosewhich ohave

such xcess ontentutnone f t s corroborated'ad hoc2') ndfinallyhosewhichrenot ad hoc n these wo sensesbut do not form n integral artof the positiveheuristic'ad hoc3'). Examples or nadhocihypothesisreprovided ythe inguisticprevaricationsfpseudosciences,rby he onventionalisttratagemsiscussednmy(1963-4), ike monsterbarring',exceptionbarring',monsteradjustment',tc.Afamousexample fan ad hOC2 hypothesiss provided ytheLorentz-Fitzgeraldontractionhypothesis;n example f anadhoc3 ypothesissPlanck's irstorrectionf he um-mer-Pringsheimormulaalsocf.p. 103).Someofthe ancerous rowthncontempo-rary ocial sciences' onsists fa cobweb f suchad hoc3 hypotheses,s shownbyMeehl ndLykken.Forreferences,f.my 1970),p. 175,footnotes and3.)37 Therivalryftworesearchrogrammess,ofcourse, protractedrocess uring

whicht srational o work neitheror, f ne an, nboth). he atter atternecomesimportant,or nstance, hen neofthe ival rogrammessvague nd tsopponentswish odevelopt na sharperormnorderoshow p tsweakness. ewtonlabora-tedCartesian ortex heoryn order o show hatt sinconsistentithKepler's aws.(Simultaneous ork n rival rogrammes,fcourse, nderminesuhn's hesis fthepsychologicalncommensurabilityf rival aradigms.)

Theprogressf oneprogrammes a vital actorn thedegenerationf tsrival. fprogramme1constantlyroducesnovel acts' hese, ydefinition,illbeanomaliesfor he ival rogramme2. IfP2 accounts or hese ovel acts nlynanadhocway,it sdegeneratingydefinition.hus hemore 1progresses,hemore ifficultt s forP2 toprogress.

38 Cf.especially y 1970),pp. 120-1.39Cf.especially y 1968a),p. 385 and 1970),p. 121.40 Forinstance, rival heory, hich cts as an externalcatalyst or hePopperianfalsificationf theory,ere ecomes n nternal actor.n Popper'sandFeyerabend's)reconstructionucha theory,fter hefalsificationf thetheory nder est, an beremoved romherational econstruction;nmyreconstructiont has to staywithinthe nternalistoryest hefalsificatione undone. Cf. note 7.)

Anothermportantonsequencesthedifferenceetween opper's iscussionftheDuhem-Quinergumentndmine; f.on theone handPopper 1934), astparagraphofsection 8and Section 9,footnote ; Popper 1957b),pp. 131-3;Popper1963a),p. 112, ootnote6,pp. 238-9 nd p. 243; and on the ther and,my 1970), p. 184-9.41

Forthe alsificationisthis s a repulsivedea; cf. .g. Agassi 1963),pp.48ff.42 Feyerabendeemsnow todeny hat venthis s a possibility;f. his 1970a) andespecially1970b) nd 1971).







126 IMRE LAKATOS

43 I use verisimilitude'erenPopper's echnicalense, s thedifferenceetweenhetruthontentndfalsityontentf a theory.f.his 1963a),Chapter 0.

44 Fora more eneral iscussionfthis roblem,f.pp. 108-09.45 Also cf.p. 94,96, 98,106,120.46 The readerhould ememberhat n this aper discuss nlynaive alsificationism;cf.note19.47 This s Kuhn's ommentnGalileo's successfulredictionf thephases fVenus(Kuhn,1957, . 224).LikeMill ndKeynes efore im,Kuhn annot nderstandhythehistoricrderf heorynd videncehouldount,ndhe annot ee hemportanceofthe fact hatCopernicansredictedhephasesofVenus,whileTychoniansnlyexplainedhem yposthoc djustments.ndeed, incehe does notseethemportanceofthe act, e does not ven aretomentiont.48 Cf. note36.

49 For a statementfthispositionndan interestingritical iscussionf.Polanyi(1951),pp.4ffndpp.78ff.50 Cf.Popper1963b) ndMusgrave1969).51 Thiswas llustratedonvincingly,yElkana, or he aseofthe o-calledimulta-neousdiscoveryf the onservationfenergy;f.his 1971).52 Also cf.note47.53FortheMertonianrand ffunctionalismas AlanMusgraveointed uttome-priorityisputes onstituteprima aciedisfunctionnd thereforen anomaly orwhichMerton asbeen abouringogivea generalocio-psychologicalxplanation.(Cf.e.g.Merton 957,1963 nd1969.)AccordingoMertonscientificnowledgesnot hericher r thepoorer orhavingredit ivenwherereditsdue:it sthe ocial

institutionf science nd individualmenofscience hatwould ufferrom epeatedfailureso allocate reditustly"Merton, 957,p. 648).ButMerton verdoes ispoint: n mportantases like nsomeofGalileo'spriorityights)herewasmore tstake han nstitutionalnterests:heproblemwaswhetherheCopernicanesearchprogrammeasprogressivernot. Ofcourse, ot llpriorityisputes ave cientificrelevance. or nstance,hepriorityispute etween dams ndLeverrierboutwhowasfirsto discover eptune ad nosuch elevance: hoeveriscoveredt, hedisco-verytrengthenedhe ame Newtonian)rogramme.nsuch asesMerton'sxternalexplanation aywellbetrue.)54Kuhn (1970),p. 239; my talics.55Feyerabend1970),p. 215.

56 Ibid.57 Cf. note2.S8 I do,of ourse, ot laim hatuchdecisions renecessarilyncontroversial.n suchdecisionsne has touse lsoone'scommonense.Commonensethats, udgmentnparticularaseswhichsnotmade ccordingomechanicalules ut nly ollowseneralprinciples hicheave omeSpielraum)lays role n all brands fnon-mechanicalmethodologies.heDuhemianonventionalisteeds ommonense odecidewhentheoreticalrameworkasbecomeufficientlyumbersomeo bereplacedy 'simpler'one.ThePopperianalsificationisteeds ommonense odecidewhen basic tate-ments to be accepted',rto which remisehemodusollenssto bedirected.Cf.my(1970),pp. 106ff.) utneitheruhem,norPopper ives blank heque o common

sense'.Theygivevery efiniteuidance. heDuhemianudgedirectsheury fcom-monsense o agreeon comparativeimplicity;hePopperianudgedirectshe uryto lookoutprimarilyor, ndagree pon, ccepted asic tatementshichlashwith








acceptedheories.My udgedirectsheury oagree n appraisalsfprogressivenddegeneratingesearch rogrammes.ut,for xample,heremaybeconflictingiews

aboutwhethernaccepted asic tatementxpressesnovel act r not.Cf.my1970),p. 156.Althought s mportanto reach greementn suchverdicts,heremust lso bethe

possibilityfappeal. n such ppeals narticulatedommon ense s questioned,rti-culatednd criticised.Thecriticism ay ven urn rom criticismf aw nterpreta-tion nto criticismf the aw tself.)59 Most onventionalistsave lso an intermediatenductiveayer f laws' betweenfacts ndtheories;f.note15.60The propositionthe Proutian rogramme as carried hrough"ooks like a'factual' roposition.ut here reno factual' ropositions:hephrase nly ame ntoordinaryanguageromogmaticmpiricism.Scientificfactual'propositionsre heory-

laden: the theoriesnvolvedre observationalheories'. istoriographicalfactual'propositionsre alsotheory-laden:he heoriesnvolved remethodologicalheories.In thedecisionboutthe ruth-valuef the factual' roposition,theProutian ro-gramme as carriedhrough,'womethodologicalheoriesreinvolved. irst, hetheoryhat heunits f scientificppraisal re researchrogrammes;econdly,omespecificheoryfhow o udgewhetherprogrammeas in fact' arriedhrough.orall these onsiderationsPopperiannternal istorian illnotneed o take ny nterestwhatsoevern the ersonsnvolved,r n their eliefsbouttheirwn ctivities.61The first orld' s that fmatter,he second' heworld ffeelings,eliefs,on-sciousness,he third' heworld fobjective nowledge,rticulatednpropositions.This s an age-old ndvitallymportantrichotomy;ts eadingontemporaryropo-

nents Popper.Cf.Popper1968a), 1968b) ndMusgrave1969) nd 1971a).62 Ofcoursewhat,n this ontext,onstitutesfalsebelief'or false onsciousness'),dependsnthe ationalityheoryfthe ritic: f.pp. 94,96 and 98. Butnorationalitytheoryan ever ucceedn eading o true onsciousness'.63 If thepublicationf Bohr'sprogrammeadbeendelayed ya fewyears, urtherspeculation ightvenhave ed to the pinproblem ithouthepreviousbservationofthe nomalous eeman ffect.ndeed,Compton aised heproblemnthe ontextof theBohrian rogrammen his 1919).64 Jfirstpplied his xpositionalevicenmy 1963-4); used tagain n givingdetailed ccount ftheProutian nd theBohrian rogrammes;f.my1970), p. 138,140,146.Thispracticewas criticisedt the 1969Minneapolisonferencey some

historians. cMullin, or nstance,laimed hat hispresentation ay lluminatemethodology,ut ertainlyotrealhistory:he ext ells he eaderwhat ught o havehappened nd thefootnotes hat n facthappenedcf.McMullin, 970).Kuhn'scriticismfmy xpositionanessentiallyn the ame ines:hethoughthat t was aspecifically hilosophical xposition: "a historianwould not include inhisnarrativefactual eport hich eknows o befalse. fhehaddone o, hewouldbe so sensitiveto theoffencehathecouldnotconceivablyompose footnotealling ttentionoit." Cf.Kuhn,1970, . 256.)85 Cf. L. P. Williams1970).66 Perhaps should mphasizehedifferenceetweenn the onehand, nductivisthistoriographyfscience, according to which scienceproceedsthroughdiscovery f

hard actsinnature) nd possibly)nductiveeneralisations,nd,onthe ther and,theinductivistheory fhistoriographyf scienceaccording to whichhistoriographyfscience roceedshroughiscoveryfhard actsinhistoryfscience) nd possibly)







128 IMRE LAKATOS

inductive eneralisations.Boldconjectures',crucial egative xperiments',ndeven'progressivenddegeneratingesearchrogrammes'ay eregardeds hard istorical

facts' y ome nductivististoriographers.ne oftheweaknessesfAgassi's1963) sthathe omittedoemphasizehisdistinctionetweencientificndhistoriographicalinductivism.67 Cf. Popper 1957b), ection 1.68 Thisthesismplieshat hework fthoseexternalists'mostlyrendysociologistsof cience')whoclaim o do socialhistoryf ome cientificiscipline ithoutavingmasteredhedisciplinetself,nd ts nternalistory,s worthless.lso cf.Musgrave(1971a).69Unfortunatelyhere s only nesingleword n most anguageso denote istory1(the etofhistoricalvents) ndhistory2a setofhistoricalropositions).nyhisto-ry2 s a theoryndvalue-ladeneconstructionfhistory,.70 That s,a hypothesisis scientificnlyftheres a number such hat (h, e) = qwhere is the vailable videncendp(h, ) = q canbeproved.t s rrelevanthetherp isa Carnapian onfirmationunctionr a Popperianorroborationunctions longasp h, e) = q is allegedly roved.Popper's hird oteoncorroboration,fcourse,sonly curiouslipwhichs outof unewith isphilosophy:f.my 1968a),pp. 411-7.)

Probabilism as never eneratedprogrammefhistoriographicaleconstruction;it has never merged rom rappling unsuccessfullywith hevery roblemstcreated.As an epistemologicalrogrammethas beendegeneratingor long ime;as a historiographicalrogrammetneverven tarted.71 Popper1934), ections 1 nd85.Alsocf. he ommentnmy 1971a), ootnote3.

Themethodologyfresearchrogrammesoois, nthefirstnstance,efineds a

game; cf. specially p. 99-100.72 This wholeproblemrea s the ubject fmy 1968a),pp. 390ff,ut speciallyfmy 1971a).73 Cf.Popper1934), ections and11.Popper's efinitionfscience s, of course,hiscelebrateddemarcationriterion'.74 Foranexcellent iscussionf thedistinctionetweenominalismndrealismor,asPopper referso call t, essentialism')nthe heoryfdefinitions,f.Popper1945),vol. I, chapter 1, nd 1963a),p. 20.75 Popper1934), ection 1.76 Ibid.77 Popper1934), ection . ButPopper, nhisLogikderForschungeverpecifies

purpose f thegameofscience hatwouldgo beyondwhat s containedn itsrules.Thethesis hat he imofsciences truth,ccurs nly n hiswritingsince1957.Allthat esaysn hisLogik er orschungsthat he uest or ruth ay ea psychologicalmotivefscientists.or a detailed iscussionf.my 1971a).78 Thisflaw s themore eriousince opper imselfasexpressedualificationsbouthiscriterion.or instancen his [1963a]he describesdogmatism',hat s, treatinganomalies s a kind fbackgroundoise', ssomethinghats tosome xtent ecessa-ry' p. 49). Buton thenextpage he identifieshisdogmatism' ith pseudoscience'.Is then seudoscienceto some xtentecessary'?lso, f.my1970), . 177, ootnote.78a Cf.Popper1963),pp. 33-7.79 Popper1934), ection 9.

80 Thisapproach, fcourse, oes not mply hatwe believehat he cientistsbasicjudgments'reunfailinglyational; t onlymeans hatwe accept hem n order ocriticise niversalefinitionsfscience.If we wereto add that no suchuniversal








definitionasbeenfound ndnosuchuniversalefinitionill ver efound,he tagewouldbe setfor olanyi'sonceptionf the awless losed utocracyfscience.)

Mymeta-criterionaybe seen s a 'quasi-empirical'elf-applicationfPopperianfalsificationism.introducedhisquasi-empiricalness'arliernthe ontextfmathe-matical hilosophy.We mayabstract romwhat lowsn the ogical hannels fadeductiveystem, hethert s somethingertainrsomethingallible, hethertistruthnd falsehood r probabilitynd improbability,r even moralor scientificdesirabilitynd undesirability:t is thehowof theflowwhich ecideswhetherhesystems negativist,quasi-empirical',ominatedymodus ollens r whethert isjustificationist,quasi-Euclidean',ominatedymodusonens.Cf.my 1967).)This'quasi-empirical'pproachmaybe appliedto anykindof normativenowledge:Watkins as already pplied ttoethics n his 1963)and (1967).But now preferanotherpproach: f.note122.

81 Itmaybenoted hat hismetacriterionoesnot have o beconstrueds psycholo-gical, r naturalistic'nPopper's ense.Cf.his 1934), ection 0.)Thedefinitionfthe scientificlite' snot implynempirical atter.82 Popper1963a),p. 38,footnote; my talics. his,ofcourse,s equivalento hiscelebrateddemarcationriterion'etweeninternal,ationallyeconstructed]cienceandnon-scienceor metaphysics').he lattermaybe [externally]influential'nd hastobebrandeds pseudosciencenly f tdeclarestself o be science.83 Cf.my 1970),pp. 100-1.84 Cf.e.g.his 1934), ection 8.85 Cf.my 1970), speciallyp. 135ff.86 Ibid., pp. 138ff.87

Cf.Popper1934), ection 4.88 Cf. my 1970), specially p. 140ff.89 In general opper tubbornlyverestimateshe mmediatetrikingorce fpurelynegativeriticism.Oncea mistake,ra contradiction,spinpointed,herean benoverbal vasion: tcanbe proved,nd that s that" Popper, 959,p. 394).He adds:"Fregedidnottry vasivemanoeuvreshenhereceived ussell's riticism." utofcoursehedid. Cf.Frege's ostscripto the econd dition f hisGrundgesetze.)90 nterestingly,s Kuhnpoints ut, a consistentnterestnhistoricalroblemsnda willingnessoengagenoriginal istoricalesearchistinguisheshemen Popper]hastrained romhemembersf ny therurrentchoolnthe hilosophyf cience"(Kuhn1970, . 236).Fora hint ta possiblexplanationf the pparent iscrepancy

cf.note129.91For instance, e claims hat perpetualmotionmachinewould refute'on histerms)hefirstawofthermodynamics1934, ection 5).But howcan one nterpret,on Popper'sownterms,he tatementhatK is a perpetualmotionmachine' s a'basic', thats,as a spatio-temporallyingulartatement?92 I amreferringoFeyerabend's1970)and 1971).93 Cf.Popper 1934),Section 0 andPopper 1945),Vol. II, pp. 220-1.He stressedthat instein'sroblem ashow oaccount or xperimentsrefuting'lassical hysicsandhe"didnot .. setout o criticiseur onceptionsf pace nd time."ButEinsteincertainlyid.HisMachian riticismf ur oncepts f pace ndtime, nd, nparticularhisoperationalistriticismf the oncept f imultaneitylayed n importantole n

histhinking.I discussed herole oftheMichelson-Morleyxperimentst somelengthn my(1970).







130 IMRE LAKATOS

Popper's ompetencenphysics ouldnever,fcourse, ave llowed im odistortthehistoryfrelativityheorys much s Beveridge,howantedopersuadecono-

mists oanempiricalpproach y ettinghem instein s an example. ccordingoBeveridge'salsificationisteconstruction,insteinstartedinhiswork ngravitation]from acts which efuted ewton's heory,hat s,]from hemovementsf heplanetMercury,he unexplainedberranciesf the moon' (Beveridge, 937).Of course,Einstein's ork ngravitationrew ut from 'creativehift'n thepositive euristicof hisspecial elativityrogramme,ndcertainlyotfrom onderingverMercury'sanomalous erihelionr themoon'sdevious, nexplainedberrancies.94 Popper 1963a),pp. 220,239,242-3and 1963b), . 965.Popper, fcourse,s leftwith heproblem hycounterexamples'that s, anomalies)renotrecognisedmme-diatelys causes or ejection.or nstance,epoints utthat n the ase ofthebreak-downofparitythere adbeenmany bservations that s, photographsfparticle

tracks fromwhichwemight avereadoff heresult,ut he bservationsadbeeneithergnored rmisinterpreted"1963b,p. 965). Popper's external explanationseems obethat cientistsavenotyetearned o besufficientlyriticalndrevolution-ary.But s not t a better and internal explanationhat he nomalies ad to beignored ntil ome rogressivelternativeheory asoffered hich urnedhe ounter-examplesnto xamples?95Op. cit.,p. 246.96 As I mentioned,nePopperian, gassi, id write bookon thehistoriographyfscienceAgassi, 963).The bookhas some ncisive riticalections loggingnductivisthistoriography,uthe endsup by replacingnductivist ythologyy falsificationistmythology.orAgassi nlythose acts ave cientificinternal)ignificancehich an

beexpressednpropositionshichonflictithome xtantheory:nly heir iscoverydeserves hehonorificitle factual iscovery';actual ropositions hich ollow romratherhan onflictithnown heoriesre rrelevant;o arefactual ropositionshichare independentfthem. f somevaluedfactual isoverynthehistoryfsciencesknown s a confirmingnstancerchancediscovery, gassiboldly redictshatonclose nvestigationheywill urn ut to berefutingnstances,ndheoffersive ase-studiesosupport is laimpp. 60-74).Alas,on closernvestigationt turns utthatAgassigotwrong ll thefive xampleswhich eadduced s confirmingnstances fhishistoriographicalheory.n fact llthe ivexamplesinournormativeeta-falsifica-tionistense) falsify'ishistoriography.97 Cf.Duhem 1906),Popper 1948) nd 1957),Agassi 1963).

98 Ofcourse,n inductivistayhavethe emerityo claim hatgenuinecience asnotyet tartedndmaywrite historyf xtantcience sa historyfbias, uperstitionandfalse elief.99Cf.Popper 1934), ection 9.100 Cf. Polanyi (1951), p. 70.101Kuhn (1957). Also cf. Price 1959).102 Cohen 1960),p. 61. Bernal,nhis 1954), aysthat [Copernicus's] easons or[his]revolutionaryhangewere ssentiallyhilosophicnd aestheticthats, n thelight fconventionalism,cientific];"ut n ater ditions e changes is mind: [Co-pernicus's]easonsweremysticalatherhan cientific."103 Fora moredetailed ketchf.my 1971b).104

Other ypes fcriticismfmethodologies ay, f course, e easilydevised.Wemay, ornstance,pply he tandardsfeach methodologynotonly alsificationism)to itself. he result, ormostmethodologies,illbe equally estructive:nductivism








cannot e provednductively,implicityillbe seenas hopelesslyomplex.Forthelatter f. nd of note106.)

105 Cf.Polanyi1958),Kuhn 1962),Holton 1969),Feyerabend1970)and 1971).should lsoaddLakatos 1963-4),1968b), nd 1970).106 Kuhn 1957).Suchhistoriographicalriticisman easilydrive omerationalistsinto n rrationalefencef heir avouritealsifiedationalityheory.uhn'shistorio-graphicalriticismf the implicityheoryf theCopernicanevolutionhocked heconventionalististorian ichardHall so much hathepublished polemicrticlenwhich esingledutandre-assertedhose spects fCopernicanheory hich uhnhimselfadmentioneds possibly aving claim ohigherimplicity,nd gnoredherest fKuhn's valid argumentHall, 1970).No doubt, implicityanalways ede-fined or nypairoftheories1 ndT2 n uch way hat he implicityfT1 sgreaterthan hat fT2.

Forfurtheriscussion fconventionalististoriographyf.my1971b).107 ThusPolanyis a conservativeationalistoncerningcience,ndan irrationalist'concerninghephilosophyfscience.But,ofcourse, hismeta-'irrationalism's aperfectlyespectablerand frationalism:oclaim hat he oncept f scientificallyacceptable'annot e furtherefined,ut nly ransmittedy he hannelsfpersonalknowledge',oesnotmake neanoutrightrrationalist,nly noutrightonservative.Polanyi's osition n thephilosophyfnaturalcience orrespondslosely o Oake-shott's ltra-conservativehilosophyf oliticalcience.For eferencesnd nexcellentcriticismf the atter f.Watkins1952)).Also cf.pp. 120-122.108 Ofcourse, oneof the ritics ere ware fthe xact ogicalcharacterfmeta-methodologicalalsificationisms explainednthis ectionnd noneofthempplied

it ompletelyonsistently.ne of hemwrites:At this tagewe havenotyet evelopeda generalheoryf riticismven or cientificheories,et lonefor heoriesfration-ality: hereforefwewant ofalsify ethodologicalalsificationism,ehave odo itbefore aving theoryf howto do it' Lakatos, 970, . 114).109 I usedthe riticalmachineryevelopedn this aper gainst eyerabend'spiste-mologicalnarchismnmy 1971b).110Kuhn'svisionwas criticisedrommany uarters; f.Shapere1964 and 1967)Scheffler1967) andespeciallyhecritical ommentsyPopper,Watkins, oulmin,FeyerabendndLakatos and Kuhn'sreply in Lakatos ndMusgrave1970).Butnoneofthese riticspplied systematicistoriographicalriticismo hiswork.Oneshould lsoconsult uhn's1970 ostscripto the econd dition fhis 1962)andits

review yMusgraveMusgrave,971b).I1" Cf.Feyerabend1970a,1970b nd1971); nd Kuhn 1970).112 For nstance,ne may efero the ctualmmediatempact f t east ome great'negativerucial xperiments,ikethat fthefalsificationf theparity rinciple. ronemayquotethehighrespect orat leastsome ong,pedestrian,rial-and-errorprocedureshichccasionallyrecedehe nnouncementf major esearchrogram-me,whichnthe ight fmymethodologys, tbest,immaturecience'.Cf.my1970),p. 175;also cf.L. P.Williams's eferenceo thehistoryf pectroscopyetween870and1900 nhis 1970)).Thus heudgmentf he cientificlite, noccasions,oes lsoagainstmy niversalules oo.113 There s a certainnalogy etweenhis atternndthe ccasionalppealprocedure

ofthe heoreticalcientistgainst heverdict f the xperimentalury; f.my 1970),pp. 127-31.114 This atterriterionsanalogous o the xceptionaldepth' f theoryhichlashes







132 IMRE LAKATOS

with ome basic statementsvailable t thetime nd,at theend,emergesrom heclashvictoriously.Cf. Popper's,1957a) Popper's xamplewas theinconsistency

between epler'sawsandtheNewtonianheory hich et out toexplain hem.115 Conventionalism,fcourse,had performedhishistoric oleto a great xtentbefore opper's ersionffalsificationism.116Van derWaerdenhad thoughthattheBohr-Kramers-Slaterheorywas bad:Popper's heoryhowedt tobegood.Cf. VanderWaerden1967), . 13 andPopper(1963a),pp.242ff; or critical iscussionf.my 1970), . 168, ootnote andp. 169,footnote.117 The attitudefsomemodem ogicianso thehistoryf mathematicss a typicalexample; f.my 1963-4), . 3.118 ThisformulationassuggestedomebymyfriendMichael ukale.119 Cf. my 1970), ection (c).120 Cf.my 1970),pp.

138-73.121 Duhemhimselfives nly neexplicitxample: hevictoryfwaveoptics verNewtonianptics1906),Chapter I, ? 10 also seeChapterV, ? 4).Butwhere uhemrelies n ntuitivecommonense', rely n ananalysisf rivalproblemshiftscf.my(1972)).122 One may ntroducehenotion f degree fcorrectness'ntothemeta-theoryfmethodologies,hichwouldbe analogous o Popper's mpiricalontent. opper'sempiricalbasicstatements'ouldhaveto bereplaced y quasi-empiricalnormativebasic tatements'like he tatementhat Planck's adiationormulas arbitrary').

Let mepoint uthere hat hemethodologyfresearchrogrammes ay eappliednotonly onorm-impregnatedistoricalnowledgeut o anynormativenowledge,

includingven thicsnd esthetics.hiswould henupersedehenaive alsificationist'quasi-empirical'pproachs outlinednNote 80.123 Cf.text onote9. (Thetermwild peculation's,ofcourse, termnheritedrominductivist ethodology.t shouldnowbe reinterpreteds 'degeneratingrogram-me'.)124 The fact hat ven egeneratingxternalistheories avebeen ble toachieveomerespectabilityas to a considerablextentue to theweaknessftheir reviousnter-nalist ivals.UtopianVictorianmoralityither reates alse, ypocriticalccountsfbourgeoisecency,radds fuel otheview hatmankindstotally epraved; topianscientifictandardsitherreate alse, ypocriticalccountsf cientificerfection,radd fuel otheview hat cientificheoriesrenomore hanmere eliefs olsteredy

somevestednterests.hisexplains he revolutionary'ura which urroundsomeofthe bsurddeasofcontemporaryociology fknowledge:omeof tspractitionersclaim ohaveunmaskedhebogusrationalityf science,while, t best, hey xploittheweakness foutdatedheories f scientificationality.125 Forexamplesf.Cantor1971) nd theForman-Ewaldebate Forman, 969 ndEwald,1969).126 I call historiographicalositivism'heposition hathistoryan be writtens acompletelyxternalistory.orhistoriographicalositivistsistorys a purelympiricaldiscipline. heydeny he xistence fobjectivetandardss opposed omere eliefsabout tandards.Ofcourse,heyooholdbeliefsbout tandards hich eterminehechoice ndformulationf heir istoricalroblems.)hispositions typicallyegelian.

Itisa special ase ofnormativeositivism,fthe heoryhat etsup mights the rite-rionofright.For a criticismf Hegel's thical ositivismf. Popper1945),Vol. I,pp. 71-2,Vol. II, pp. 305-6and Popper1961).)Reactionary egelian bscurantism








pushed alues ackcompletelynto heworld ffacts; husreversingheireparationby Kantian hilosophicalnlightenment.

127 Kuhn eems obe n twomindsbout bjectivecientificrogress.havenodoubtthat, eing devoted cholar nd scientist,epersonallyetests elativism.uthistheoryan either e interpreteds denyingcientificrogressnd recognisingnlyscientifichange; r,as recognisingcientificrogressut s progress'markedolelyby hemarch factualhistory.ndeed, nhiscriterion,e wouldhave o describehecatastrophe entionednthe ext s a properrevolution'. am afraid hismight eone cluetotheunintendedopularityfhistheorymongheNewLeft usily repar-ring he1984revolution'.128 The technicalermEuclidean' orratherquasi-Euclidean') eans hat nestartswith niversal,ighevel ropositions'axioms') atherhan ingularnes. suggestedin my1967) nd 1962)that hequasi-Euclidean'ersusquasi-empirical'istinction

is more seful han he a priori' ersusa posteriori'istinction.Some of the apriorists're,of course, mpiricists.ut empiricists aywellbeaprioristsor,rather,Euclideans') nthemeta-levelere iscussed.129 Somemightlaim hatPopperdoes notfall nto his ategory. fterll, Popperdefinedscience' nsuch way hat t hould nclude he efutedewtonianheoryndexclude nrefutedstrology, arxismndFreudianism.130 This eems obe the ase nmodernarticlehysics;raccordingo somephilos-ophers ndphysicistsven n theCopenhagenchool f quantum hysics.131 This s the asewith ome f hemain chools fmodemociology,sychologyndsocialpsychology.132 This,ofcourse, xplainswhy good methodology 'distilled' rom hemature

sciences mayplay n importantoleformmaturend, ndeed, ubious isciplines.While olanyiitecademicutonomyhould edefendedor epartmentsf heoreticalphysics,tmustnotbe tolerated,ay, n nstitutesorcomputerisedocial strology,scienceplanning r social imagistics.For an authoritativetudy fthe atter, f.Priestley1968).)133 of course, critical iscussion f scientifictandards, ossiblyeading ventotheirmprovement,s impossible ithoutrticulatinghem n general erms;ustas ifonewants o challenge language, ne has to articulatetsgrammar. either heconservativeolanyi or he onservativeakeshotteem o havegraspedor tohavebeen nclined ograsp) he ritical unctionf anguage Popperhas. Cf. especiallyPopper1963a),p. 135).

134 Cf.e.g. my 1962),p. 157ormy 1968a),p. 387,footnote.

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Williams, . P. (1970),Normal cience nd tsDangers', nCriticismnd theGrowthofKnowledgeed. by . Lakatos nd A.Musgrave), p. 49-50.

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