Legprof Midterms

7/27/2019 Legprof Midterms

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January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR O F THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1

submitted its Report dated

November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of thesaid Reportand the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526

2of the Court, and

"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of

Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and

Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as

possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the

Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to

existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of

as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written

oppositions were admitted,3

and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written

memoranda.

4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to

the matter of the integration of t he Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide

sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration

for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the

Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed

by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as

Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme

Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine

Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards

of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable

the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,

out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to

carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be

necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual

appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Reportof the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar

integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability

and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,

comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative

to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission

and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis

as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the

Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the i ntegration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar

integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on

Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the

entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This

requires membership andfinancial support(in reasonable amount) of

every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the

retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names

appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)

perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity withpower to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting

up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal

profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the

court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of

justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers,

and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the

promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the

principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and

regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:


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(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,

learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the

Bench and to the public, and pub lish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and

adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the

legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and

prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining

and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting

officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself exceptwithin its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may

level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and

independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting

officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly

of local practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up

lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may

not lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to

obtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for

practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession

throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees

schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and

obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the

functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide

involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifariousproblems that afflict the nation.

Anent thefirst issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the

exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules

concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice

of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional

authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to

effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power

nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the

integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the

standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to

discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional

hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of

association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on

Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.


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In all cases where the validity o f Bar integration measures has been put in

issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of

law.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,

moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties notonly to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,

and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions

of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is

far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure

compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective

action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body;

no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;

therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute tothe support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions,

the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a

rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated

Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of

his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to

associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed

the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an

official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and

incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He

is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter

or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body

compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to

pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question ofcompelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary

membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating

the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving

the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme

Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the

quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving

the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries

of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of

the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is jus tified as an exercise of the police

power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as aproper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the

inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the

authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean

that the Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation,

while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to

regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose

a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push

through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the

concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily

includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the

regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public

interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the

inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his

required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject

in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions

taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to

which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his

freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon

membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it

should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to

fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.


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The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a

"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection

would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The

conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might

refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end

condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of

private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the

compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because

although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will

give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not

had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they

have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in

a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.

Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory

power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and

old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new

regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not

unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the

Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the

advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration

has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2)

greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of

the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and

services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership

campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession;

and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to

its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences areenvisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,

Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;

cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will

become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar

integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in

England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has

been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored

public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's

responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved t he administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled

by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national pollrecently conducted by

the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090

lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555

(or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted

against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local

Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and

other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a

single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally,

of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration

Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.

5All these

clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments

adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data

contained in the exhaustive Reportof the Commission on Bar Integration, that the i ntegration

of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the

context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to

raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable

the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII ofthe Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance

with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,vs.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,

SECRETARY, respondents.

Reyes, Lozada and Sabado for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:

This petition for review on certiorariinvolves the right of a public official to engage in the

practice of his profession while employed in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. OnOctober 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90

against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum


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Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58

and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code

of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression,

misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or

Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged

in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,

Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in

relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8,

1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against CityEngineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with

Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several

criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in

violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY

MAYORS, KLGCD REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON

SANGGUNIAN SESSIONS,PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING

AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on

Local Government Personnel Administration which affects certain

provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to amend said Memorandum

Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of Circular

No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of

1973 stated inter alia that "members of local legislative bodies, other than

the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep regular office hours."

"They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or the

city or municipal council" and that provincial board members are not even

required "to have an office in the provincial building." Consequently, they

are not therefore to required to report daily as other regular government

employees do, except when they are delegated to perform certain

administrative functions in the interest of public service by the Governor

or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason, they may, therefore, be

allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority

. . . first be secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to MemorandumCircular No. 74-58, provided, however, that no government personnel,

property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their

professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they

should as much as possible attend regularly any and all sessions, which

are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they were elected as

members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors

who are called upon to save a life. For this purpose it is desired that they

always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions, regular or special of

their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of

lawyers and Sanggunian sessions can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice theirprofession shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in

Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any profession

should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a

body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the

case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30,Rollo.)

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the

complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their

respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his

practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, SecretarySantos replied as follows:

1st Indorsement

September 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within

letter dated September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his

practice of law for reasons therein stated, with this information that, as

represented and consistent with law, we interpose no objection thereto,

provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his

official functions.

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81

setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal

Mayors, Regional Directors and All Concerned.

SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private

Employment of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards for Public Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In

addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescribed in the

Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited


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acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby declared to

be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials . . . during their incumbency shall not:

(1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,

broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,

supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2)

Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to

conflict with their official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated

September 4, 1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept

private employment in any capacity and to exercise profession, to any

government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry

(Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the

Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides,in part, that:

No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or

profession . . . without a written permission from the

head of the Department: Provided, that this

prohibition will be absolute in the case of those

officers . . . whose duties and responsibilities requirethat their entire time be at the disposal of the

Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is

granted permission to engage in outside activities, the

time so devoted outside of office should be fixed by

the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not

impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or

employee . . . subject to any additional conditions

which the head of the office deems necessary in each

particular case in the interest of the service, as

expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service

Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be

observed in the grant of permission to the practice of profession and to

the acceptance of private employment of local elective officials, to wit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of

Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors

whose duties and responsibilities require that their

entire time be at the disposal of the government in

conformity with Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the

Local Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to

engage in the practice of their profession and to

accept private employment during their incumbency:

3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to

practice their profession or engage in private

employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the

Secretary of Local Government, subject to existing

laws and to the following conditions:

a) That the time so devoted

outside of office hours should be

fixed by the local chief executive

concerned to the end that it will

not impair in any way theefficiency of the officials

concerned;

b) That no government time,

personnel, funds or supplies shall

be utilized in the pursuit of one's

profession or private employment;

c) That no conflict of interests

between the practice of profession

or engagement in private

employment and the official dutiesof the concerned official shall arise

thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the

Secretary deems necessary to

impose on each particular case, in

the interest of public service.

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on

the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are

unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate

the practice of law.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public

respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was

signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal

mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any

occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief

executives.


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(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any

occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That

sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1)Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case

wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,

or instrumentality of the government is the adverse

party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an

officer or employee of the national or local

government is accused of an offense committed in

relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in

administrative proceedings involving the local

government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government

except when the sanggunian member concerned is

defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official

hours of work only on o ccasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials

concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. (Emphasis

ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana

thereupon filed this petition for certioraripraying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-

38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared

unconstitutional and null void because:

(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the

admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance

to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and

inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be

uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,

or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts

andquasi-judicialbodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by theSupreme Court.

(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical

professions for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the

exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians,

morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]).

In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner

submitted a Reply. After deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to

dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of

administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also

for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and

regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA

199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the present case, we find no grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local

Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in

denying petitioner's motion to dismiss t he administrative charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to

the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express

constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed

by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the

City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is acouncilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a

judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees

and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner

violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)

prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if

such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG

Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is

completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme

Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government

Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for publicofficials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the

private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors.

It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any

occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their

professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If

there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the

professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of

public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.


8/17

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,vs.

ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1and a supplemental affidavit

2for

disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana

P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on

Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on

June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by

Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and

Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my

daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an

unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I

ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my

daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at

the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a

child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli RamonaValencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the

Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their

daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia

were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona

Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our

needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling

because of financial constraints.

x x x x

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same

affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not

only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x

x

In his Counter-Affidavit,3Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way

of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to

Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married

Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all

his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and

Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.

Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together,

they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty.

Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,

emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from

college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.4Atty. Garrido

alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for thepast ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member

of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia

on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a

lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,5Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She

explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between

them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with

Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship

between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this

silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second

family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of

her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia

also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceeding s6in view of the criminal

complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of

Nullity

7

(of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBPCommission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
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Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8the complaints after the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an

absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents

argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also

alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido

was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to

the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.9

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the

respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is

the father of her six (6) children.10The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied thismotion.

11

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating

Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents

disbarment.12

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of

Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution

No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the

applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks

the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby

DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia ishereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He

submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would

warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the

IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain

his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead anupright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty.

Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition.

She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the

view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took

responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of

nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case

has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors

against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings

and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of

desistance by the complainantdo not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications

and fitness for membership in the Bar.13

We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason

to depart from this ruling.14

First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the

administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the

public.15

The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of

the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for

the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may

inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a

direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her

own;16

effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the

attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and

the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido

when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a

member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the actscomplained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As

we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17

the possession of good moral character is both a

condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to

retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a

subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental

or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer .18

Admission to the practice

only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to

become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even

after admission to the Bar.19

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary

authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's

exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of

this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly

states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by

the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the

oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment

proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the

effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea

is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed

her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now

available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by

her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance,not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
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(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly

relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral

indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the

community.20

Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or

so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such

scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency .21

We

make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires

grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an

unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23

the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and

subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of

misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society

looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the

survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a

whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24

the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage

with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second

marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral

character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the

Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25

where the respondent secretly

contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the

respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the

Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect

and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty,

justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His

conduct was not only corrupt o r unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest d egree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and

during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to

represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and

the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already

married to Constancia.26

This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman

into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the

subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not o nly of an illegal liaison, but

of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two

marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional

implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by

his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death

of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not

then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was

not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong

in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage

was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had

sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also

led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the

position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his

responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge,

to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the

present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,

specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules

of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission

to the Bar.27

As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,28

Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules

of Court,29

and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30

all of which commonly

require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of

bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was

subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to

Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all

times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
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adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private

life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would

set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he

violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he

discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of

convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In

this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms

expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code

of Professional Responsibility.31

Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of

legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing .32

Lawyers

are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation .33

Needless to

state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined

and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should

be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when

they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is

required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction

whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private

life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve

respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was

subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct

which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality .36

To

have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It

is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertainedabout a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she

is known.37

The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1)

to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective

clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.38

Each purpose is as important as

the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia

already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea),

and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the

moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with

him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married

Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. Thesecircumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character;

even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential

advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not

aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice,

thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and

family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and

void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children.

Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a

married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she

should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaisonwith Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his

relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias

presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third

marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of

law.1avvphi1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second

marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this

may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the

nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this

expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the

country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty.

Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,

contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.

Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his

capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in

Hongkong39

leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the

added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage

outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia

afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her

"husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and

cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.

Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman.

This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly

immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man

who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions

were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido,

she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the

subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct

could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of

decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family

build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her

husband with the woman of his second marriage.
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We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.

She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of

morality.40

In Barrientos v. Daarol,41

we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not

only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and

must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty.

Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she

became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by

law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where

circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qual ifications required of

lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena

P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to

disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that

seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an

officer of the Court.42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one ofthem. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that

demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them

for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the

court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his

children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his

demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional

Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of

character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocallydemonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside

without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of

the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the

circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents

crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of

the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of

Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and

Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.

Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBPAdministrative Case No. MDD-1)

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of

Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In

the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending

to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for

"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution

notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said

resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,

Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29,

the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued

delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including

a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the

delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the

action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the

Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and

letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his

refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
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On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to

reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were

required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was

thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the

propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence

conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A

(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the

Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP

By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the

removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section

24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order

applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six

months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,

and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for theremoval of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of

Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of

the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national

body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of

all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the

Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay

such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the

approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of

his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to

maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the

corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said

organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the

rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent

concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of nolegal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the

Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by

the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues

that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to

regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license

granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the v ery same issues raised in a previous case before the

Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration

of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively

considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar

of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous

pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the

arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials

and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the

Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar

is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership

in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of

the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as

well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction

of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to

be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the

Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective

discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or

professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by

the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment ofthe offending member.

2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of

public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally

justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal

convenience of individual lawyers.3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the

Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over

an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege

moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to

his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, andtakes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justic

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