SOORDERED.

Quisumbing,** Carpio (Chairperson), Chico­Nazarioand Abad,*** JJ.,concur.

Clemente U. Ugale meted with fine equivalent to his eight(8) months’ salary for incompetence, habitual drunkennessand loafing.

Note.—Courtsarenottheforumtopleadforsympathy—the duty of Courts is to apply the law, disregarding theirfeelingofsympathyorpityforanaccused.(Mejia vs. People,525SCRA209[2007])

——o0o——

G.R.No.163209. October30,2009.*

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM,petitioners, vs. MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and onbehalf of herminor children LESTEREDWARD S. LIM,CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III,respondents.

Civil Law; Family Code; Support; Relying on provisions foundin Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upondefault of parental authority, conceivably either by its terminationor suspension during the children’s minority.—By statutory andjurisprudentialmandate,theliabilityofascendantstoprovidelegalsupporttotheirdescendantsisbeyondcavil.Petitionersthemselvesadmitas

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**DesignatedtositasanadditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJusitce

AntonioEduardoB.NachuraperSpecialOrderNo.755datedOctober12,2009.

***DesignatedtositasanadditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJustice

PresbiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.perSpecialOrderNo.753datedOctober12,2009.

*THIRDDIVISION

692

692 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lim vs. Lim

much—theylimittheirpetitiontothenarrowquestionofwhentheir

liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisionsfound in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on ParentalAuthority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated onlyupon default of parental authority, conceivably either by itstermination or suspension during the children’sminority. Becauseat the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edwardexercisedparentalauthorityover their children,petitionerssubmitthattheobligationtosupportthelatter’soffspringendswiththem.

Same; Same; Same; The obligation to provide support arisingfrom parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial tiesideally lasts during the obligee’s lifetime. Also, while parentalauthority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights)pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its terminationor suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on toascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for thelatter’s inability to provide sufficient support. As we observedanother case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligationto give support in light of the father’s sufficient means.—Neitherthe textof the lawnor the teachingof jurisprudencesupports thissevereconstrictionofthescopeoffamilialobligationtogivesupport.Inthefirstplace,thegoverningtextaretherelevantprovisionsinTitle VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not theprovisionsinTitleIXonParentalAuthority.Whilebothareassharea common ground in that parental authority encompasses theobligation to provide legal support, they differ in other concernsincludingthedurationoftheobligationanditsconcurrenceamongrelatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation toprovide support arising from parental authority ends upon theemancipationofthechild,thesameobligationarisingfromspousalandgeneral familial ties ideally lastsduring theobligee’s lifetime..Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlativeparental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants onlyupon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legalsupport passes on to ascendants not only upon default of theparents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficientsupport.Asweobservedinanothercaseraisingtheancillaryissueofanascendant’sobligationtogivesupport in lightof the father’ssufficientmeans.

693

VOL.604,OCTOBER30,2009 693

Lim vs. Lim

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt. Fortun, Narvasa & Salazarforpetitioners. Bonete Law Office forprivaterespondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review1 is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals,dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio andFilomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to

respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace andMarianoIII,allsurnamedLim(respondents).

The FactsIn 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married

Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl boreEdward three children, respondents Lester Edward,CandiceGraceandMarianoIII.Cheryl,EdwardandtheirchildrenresidedatthehouseofpetitionersinForbesPark,Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother,Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).Edward’s family business, which provided him with amonthlysalaryofP6,000,shoulderedthe familyexpenses.Cherylhadnosteadysourceofincome.

On14October1990,CherylabandonedtheForbesParkresidence,bringingthechildrenwithher(thenallminors),afteraviolentconfrontationwithEdwardwhomshecaught

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1UnderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.

2PennedbyAssociateJusticeElviJohnS.AsuncionwithAssociate

JusticesRubenT.ReyesandLucasP.Bersamin(nowamemberofthis

Court),concurring.

694

694 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lim vs. Lim

with the in­housemidwife ofChuaGiak inwhat the trialcourtdescribed“averycompromisingsituation.”3

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners,Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in theRegional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trialcourt)forsupport.ThetrialcourtorderedEdwardtoprovidemonthlysupportofP6,000pendente lite.4

The Ruling of the Trial CourtOn31January1996,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgment

ordering Edward and petitioners to “jointly” provideP40,000 monthly support to respondents, with EdwardshoulderingP6,000andpetitionersthebalanceofP34,000subjecttoChuaGiak’ssubsidiaryliability.5

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3CARollo,p.99.CherylfiledcriminalchargesagainstEdward(for concubinage, physical injuries, and grave threats) which,however, the investigating prosecutor dismissed. It appears thatEdward,inturn,suedCherylforthedeclarationofnullityoftheirmarriage(CivilCaseNo.99­1852)whichtheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati City, Branch 140, granted. Cheryl’s appeal of the rulingawaitsresolution.

4InanOrderdated28June1991.5 The dispositive portion of the ruling provides (Records, pp.

1021­1022):WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

renderedasfollows: 1. Defendant/s EDWARD N. LIM and Spouses

PRUDENCIOandFILOMENANGLIMareorderedtojointlyprovidemonthlysupport fortheplaintiff,Ma.CherylS.Limand the three (3) minor children, in the total amount ofFORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) Pesos to be adjusted asmaybeneeded,andtobegiveninthefollowingmanner:

a) Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos to be paid bydefendantEDWARDN.LIM;

b) The remaining balance of Thirty FourThousand (P34,000.00) Pesos shall be shouldered bydefendant/spouses PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA NGLIM,

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Lim vs. Lim

The defendants sought reconsideration, questioningtheir liability. The trial court, while denyingreconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua GiakwereheldjointlyliablewithEdwardbecauseofthelatter’s“inabilityxxxtogivesufficientsupportxxx.”6

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they,beingintheremoterlinepursuanttoArticle199

of the Family Code. However, in the event that spouses

Prudencio and FilomenaNg Lim fail to provide plaintiffs

the amount they are entitled to receive, the obligation

shall bebornebyCHUAGIAK,being thegrandmother of

defendantEdwardLim;

c) The payment of the aforesaid monthly support

shouldbemadewithinthefirstfive(5)daysofeachmonth;

2. The custody of the three (3) minor children, namely,

LesterEdward,CandiceGraceandMarianoIIIshallbeawarded

totheparentwithwhomeachoneshallchoosetolivewith,they,

beingoverseven(7)yearsofage;

3. Defendants are directed to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s

fees in the amount of FIFTYTHOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,

plus FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS for each Court

appearance,andthecostofthesuit.

6ThedispositiveportionoftheOrderprovides(Id.,atp.1058):

Inthelightoftheforegoing,itemNo.1inthedispositivepartofthe

Decision of this Court dated January 31, 1996, is hereby amended to

readasfollows:

“(1.a) DefendantEdwardN. Lim is ordered to continue providing

the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as his monthly

supportfortheplaintiffs;

(b) Considering the inability of defendantEdwardN.Lim to give

sufficientsupport,defendants/spousesPrudencioandFilomenaNgLim

being in the remoter line (Art. 199,FamilyCode), are ordered to give

the amount of THIRTY­FOUR THOUSAND (P34,000.00) PESOS as

their monthly support for the three (3) minor children. In case of

default,theobligationshallbebornebydefendantChuaGiak;

(c) The payment of the aforesaid monthly support shall be made

withinthefirstfive(5)daysofeachmonth.”

696

696 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lim vs. Lim

PetitionersappealedtotheCourtofAppealsassailing,among others, their liability to support respondents.Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income isinsufficient,thelawitselfsanctionsitseffectsbyprovidingthatlegalsupportshouldbe“inkeepingwiththefinancialcapacityofthefamily”underArticle194oftheCivilCode,asamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.209(TheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines).7

The Ruling of the Court of AppealsInitsDecisiondated28April2003,theCourtofAppeals

affirmedthetrialcourt.Ontheissuematerialtothisappeal,that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, asEdward’s parents, liablewithhim to support respondents,theCourtofAppealsheld:

“ThelawonsupportunderArticle195oftheFamilyCodeisclearonthismatter.Parentsandtheir legitimatechildrenareobligedtomutuallysupportoneanotherandthisobligationextendsdowntothelegitimategrandchildrenandgreatgrandchildren.

In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) oftheFamilyCodeclearlyprovidesthatshouldthepersonobligedtogivesupportdoesnothavesufficientmeanstosatisfyallclaims,theother persons enumerated inArticle 199 in its order shall providethenecessarysupport.Thisisbecausetheclosertherelationshipofthe relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, theobligationtosupportisimposedfirstupontheshouldersofthecloserrelatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to thenextnearerrelativesandsoon.”8

_______________

7Thisprovisionreads: “Support compriseseverything indispensable

for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and

transportation,inkeepingwiththefinancialcapacityofthefamily.

Theeducationof thepersonentitled tobe supported referred to in

theprecedingparagraphshallincludehisschoolingortrainingforsome

profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.

Transportationshallincludeexpensesingoingtoandfromschool,orto

andfromplaceofwork.”

8Rollo,pp.27­28.

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VOL.604,OCTOBER30,2009 697

Lim vs. Lim

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court ofAppeals denied their motion in the Resolution dated 12April2004.

Hence,thispetition.The Issue

The issue iswhetherpetitionersareconcurrently liablewithEdwardtoprovidesupporttorespondents.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify theappealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability to theamount ofmonthly support needed by respondentsLesterEdward,CandiceGraceandMarianoIIIonly.

Petitioners Liable to Provide Supportbut only to their Grandchildren

By statutory9 and jurisprudential mandate,10 theliability of ascendants to provide legal support to theirdescendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admitasmuch—theylimittheirpetitiontothenarrowquestionofwhen their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.Relyingonprovisions11foundinTitleIXoftheCivilCode,as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorizethattheirliabilityisactivatedonlyupondefaultofparentalauthority,conceivablyeitherby

_______________

9 Article199,CivilCode,asamended,provides:

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the

liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein

provided:

(1) Thespouse;

(2) Thedescendantsinthenearestdegree;

(3) Theascendantsinthenearestdegree;and

(4) Thebrothersandsisters

10Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, 20 November 2006, 507

SCRA438.

11Articles214and216,CivilCode,asamended.

698

698 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lim vs. Lim

its termination12 or suspension13 during the children’sminority.Becauseatthetimerespondentssuedforsupport,CherylandEdwardexercisedparentalauthorityovertheirchildren,14petitionerssubmitthattheobligationtosupportthelatter’soffspringendswiththem.

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching ofjurisprudencesupportsthissevereconstrictionofthescopeoffamilialobligationtogivesupport.Inthefirstplace,thegoverningtextare therelevantprovisions inTitleVIIIoftheCivilCode,asamended,onSupport,nottheprovisionsinTitleIXonParentalAuthority.Whilebothareasshareacommongroundinthatparentalauthorityencompassestheobligation to provide legal support,15 they differ in otherconcerns including the duration of the obligation and itsconcurrence among relatives of differing degrees.16 Thus,although the obligation to provide support arising fromparental authority ends upon the emancipation of thechild,17 the same obligation arising from spousal andgeneral familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee’slifetime..Also,whileparentalauthorityunderTitleIX(andthecorrelativeparentalrights)pertainstoparents,passingtoascendantsonlyuponitsterminationorsuspension,the

_______________

12 See Articles 228(1), 229(4) and (5), and 232, Civil Code, as

amended.

13SeeArticles230and231,CivilCode,asamended.

14 Respondents Lester Edward (born on 11 June 1981), Candice

Grace (born on 23 October 1985) andMariano III (born on 31 August

1986)havesincereached theage ofmajority, thus emancipating them

from their parents’ authority (see Article 228(3), Civil Code, as

amended).

15 Article209inrelationtoArticle220(4),CivilCode,asamended.

16Theorderingofpersonsobligedtoprovide support inArticle199

isdifferent fromthepreferenceofrighttoreceive itunderArticle200,

par. 3. Thus, the Court of Appeals, while correctly affirming the trial

court’s ruling,aswedo,misapplied the latterprovisionasbasis for its

rulingsustainingpetitioners’concurrentobligationtoprovidesupport.

17Article228(3),CivilCode,asamended.

699

VOL.604,OCTOBER30,2009 699

Lim vs. Lim

obligationtoprovidelegalsupportpassesontoascendantsnotonlyupondefaultoftheparentsbutalsoforthelatter’sinability to provide sufficient support. As we observed inanother case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendant’sobligationtogivesupport in lightof the father’ssufficientmeans:

“Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannotdemand support directly from their grandparents if they haveparents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable ofsupporting them.ThisissobecausewehavetofollowtheorderofsupportunderArt.199.Weagreewiththisview.

xxxxThereisnoshowingthatprivaterespondentiswithout means

to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove thatpetitioner,as thepaternalgrandmother,waswillingtovoluntarilyprovide for her grandson’s legal support. x x x”18 (Emphasissupplied;internalcitationsomitted)

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable todischargeherobligationtoprovidesufficient legalsupporttoherchildren,thenallschool­bound.Itisalsoundisputedthat the amount of support Edward is able to give torespondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meetrespondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward andCheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts aportionoftheirobligationtotheascendantsinthenearestdegree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal19

lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To holdotherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is tosanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extremematerial deprivation of children because of parentalinability to give adequate support even if ascendants onedegreeremovedaremorethanabletofillthevoid.

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18Supranote10at448­449.

19 Respondents no longer sought support from the children’s

maternal ascendants because at the time respondents filed their

complaint, they were living with, and received support from, Cheryl’s

mother.

700

700 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Lim vs. Lim

However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligationextendsonlytotheirdescendantsasthiswordiscommonlyunderstoodtorefertorelatives,bybloodoflowerdegree.Aspetitioners’grandchildrenbyblood,onlyrespondentsLesterEdward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to thiscategory.Indeed,Cheryl’srighttoreceivesupportfromtheLim family extends only to her husband Edward, arisingfrom their marital bond.20 Unfortunately, Cheryl’s sharefromtheamountofmonthlysupportthetrialcourtawardedcannot be determined from the records. Thus, we areconstrained to remand the case to the trial court for thislimitedpurpose.21

Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under

Article 204 of the Civil Code, as AmendedAsanalternativeproposition,petitionerswishtoavailof

theoptioninArticle204oftheCivilCode,asamended,andpray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation bymaintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence.Theoptionisunavailabletopetitioners.

TheapplicationofArticle204whichprovidesthat—

“Thepersonobligedtogivesupportshallhavetheoptiontofulfilltheobligationeitherbypayingtheallowancefixed,orbyreceivingandmaintaininginthefamilydwellingthepersonwhohasarighttoreceivesupport.The latter alternative cannot be availed ofin case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.”(Emphasissupplied)

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20Thus,shouldtherulingofthetrialcourtinCivilCaseNo.99­1852

(declaring thenullity ofCherylandEdward’smarriage)beaffirmedon

appeal, themutualobligationtoprovidesupportbetweenthemceases.

SeePelayo v. Lauron,12Phil.453,457(1908)(holdingthatin­laws“are

strangerswithrespecttotheobligationthatrevolvesuponthehusband

toprovidesupport”tohiswife).

21Afterthetrialcourt’sdetermination,theEdwardandpetitioners’

liabilityshould be reckoned from the time the trial court rendered its

judgmenton31January1996.

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VOL.604,OCTOBER30,2009 701

Lim vs. Lim

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons

entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildrenand daughter­in­law. Granting petitioners the option inArticle204willsecuretothegrandchildrenawell­providedfuture; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to thehousewhich,forher,isthesceneofherhusband’sinfidelity.Whilenotrisingto the levelofa legal obstacle,as indeed,Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did notprosperforinsufficientevidence,hersteadfastinsistenceonitsoccurrenceamountstoamoralimpedimentbringingthecasewithintheambitoftheexceptionclauseofArticle204,precludingitsapplication.

WHEREFORE,weDENYthepetition.WeAFFIRMtheDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,dated28April2003,andits Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with theMODIFICATIONthatpetitionersPrudencioandFilomenaLimareliabletoprovidesupportonlytorespondentsLesterEdward,CandiceGraceandMarianoIII,allsurnamedLim.We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court ofMakatiCity,Branch140,forfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisruling.

SOORDERED.

Quisumbing,** Chico­Nazario, Peralta and Abad,*** JJ.,concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Supportmust be demanded and the right to itestablished before it becomes payable, for the right tosupport does not arise from themere fact of relationship,evenfromtherelationshipofparentsandchildren,butfromimperativenecessitywithoutwhichitcannotbedemanded,and the law presumes that such necessity does not existunless support isdemanded. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 541SCRA371[2007])

——o0o——

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**DesignatedadditionalmemberperSpecialOrderNo.755.

***DesignatedadditionalmemberperSpecialOrderNo.753.

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