START DEPP Linking Preparedness Resilience & Reponses

(LPRR) 2010 Floods Case Study, Sindh, Pakistan

Authors: Rebecca Murphy, Mark Pelling, Emma Visman & Simone Di Vicenz

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Contents Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3

Context…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3

Disaster & Intervention…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6

Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8

Findings………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...9

Challenges & Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………………………….10

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………27

Next Steps…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..27

References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..29

Executive Summary

This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the

humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the Pakistan

2010 Sindh Province flood response.

This paper is one of a collection of eight START DEP Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience

(LPRR) case studies exploring a range of humanitarian interventions in the Philippines, Kenya,

Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, Myanmar, DRC and Bangladesh. LPRR is a START Disaster and

Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP) Department for International Development (DfID)

funded 3 year, consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming

for more resilient communities. Specifically this case study has been developed as part of the

humanitarian strand of the LPRR project which focuses on developing a practical method for

improved, resilience informed humanitarian response.

This particular World Vision program included an immediate response, recover and then

rehabilitation phase and mapped out how each of the five resilience principles and Bene et al’s

(2012) AAT framework plays out differently in different phases of the project.

This papers findings illustrate that the disaster and humanitarian intervention is thought to have

increased social togetherness and cohesion, challenge cultural norms to offer more equal

opportunities and increased the level of participation, learning and preparedness throughout the

community as the program developed in time. It also served to bridge relationship with the

community and local government and support the community to bounce back.

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However the majority of participants did not feel that the community had effectively bounced back

better and outlined a number of challenges that were felt to contribute to this. The fist was the

feudal system and unequal power that the landlords and land owners have over community

members. The second was the lack of trust felt towards both the government and community

members. Furthermore political, ethnic and religious differences along with poor communication

around beneficiary selection was thought to cause tension throughout the community.

Recommendations from both field staff and community members included:

1. Enabling and empowering community members to be decision makers and lead emergency

response initiatives

2. Train and build the capacity of the local government,

3. Educate girls and tackle power inequalities, ask the community what they want and how they

would like it to be done and build social cohesion and togetherness across caste and religion.

Provide community training to tackle root causes of vulnerability and inequality.

4. In addition it is felt imperative by participants to hand programs over to the local government or

department of social welfare at the end and run a thorough hand over period.

5. Lastly, participants requested the need for psychological support for both the community/

survivors and field staff. This would also include community motivation and future vision

development.

Ultimately it is clear that the World Vision 2010 Pakistan Flood Response Program illustrates success

and challenges. Whilst the resilience principles mapped out appear to have been challenging to

implement in the immediate response they have all appeared to have developed throughout the

timeframe of the project.

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The 2010 Flood Response, Sindh, Pakistan

1. Introduction

This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the

humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the 2010

World Vison flood response in the Sindh province of Pakistan. This paper does not provide a

comprehensive analysis of the case study’s level of resilience building but aims to act as a

communication piece outlining participants’ reflections and recommendations. A second paper will

be developed critically analysing the impact this example can have on resilience building.

This paper is one of a collection of Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response in Emergency

Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis papers. LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergency

Preparedness Programme (DEPP) Department for International Development (DfID) funded 3 year,

consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more

resilient communities. It is important to note that this project recognises the term ‘community’ as a

collective group of at risk, exposed residents.

The LPRR consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help Age,

Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of focus

include Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic Congo, Colombia, Indonesia and the

Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The project has three strands focusing on; resilient

informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and learning and capacity

building.

Specifically this case study has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand of the LPRR

project which focuses on developing a practical method for improved, resilience informed

humanitarian response. In order to do this, eight case studies of past humanitarian response

interventions will be explored. This particular paper focuses on World Vision’s 2010 response to the

Sindh floods.

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2. The Context

First, in order to provide a clear picture of the context and environment that this specific

humanitarian program was working in, this section will map out Pakistan and specifically Sindh’s

economic, environmental, political and social background, the disaster and the subsequent

intervention.

2.2 Pakistan

Pakistan has an estimated population of more than 184 million people with a diverse socioeconomic

makeup; including diverse ethnic groups, 2 national languages and tens of regional dialects. The

main religion is Muslim and whilst Pakistan is ruled under national law it has heavy Islamic influence.

Pakistan faces a number of economic and social challenges which have been intensified and

(re)produced by recurring crises and protracted ongoing conflict. Pakistan ranks 147 out of 188

countries in the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) with most indicators lower than most

countries in South Asia. Pakistan has one of the world’s largest numbers of refugees with a

registered 1.5 million Afghan refugees. A sharp decline in economic growth in 2006 put the country

under significant strain. Combined with multiple disasters (5 major floods and multiple earthquakes

since 2005) and protracted ongoing conflict and tension both within Pakistan and with neighbouring

countries is thought to have contributed to 49.4 per cent of the population living in multi-

dimensional poverty. Furthermore access to education remains low in Pakistan with one of lowest

rates of primary school education competition in the world. Health rates have improved at a slow

rate however nutrition has not improved for two decades; 45% of children are stunted in growth and

16% of children under five suffer from malnutrition. Nevertheless, Pakistan has made substantial

progress in reducing poverty. However the number of people living near to the poverty line makes

rates of vulnerability to poverty very high (World Bank, 2016).

A number of conflict drivers are thought to exacerbate and fuel an ongoing level of insecurity.

Drivers of conflict include; inequality and poverty, social issues such as religious divides, cultural

communal divides, youth alienation, failure of justice (both formal and informal systems face

criticism), militancy from armed rebel and terrorist groups, political participation, feudalism,

governance and military rule (UNICEF 2016). Further to this, Pakistan’s geography is also thought to

contribute to governance challenges. The mountains of Baluchistan, FATA, NWFP, and the desert

areas in southern Punjab, eastern Sindh and parts of Baluchistan, pose significant challenges to

transport, communication, the delivery of goods and services, and the provision of administration

and security (Initiative for peace building, 2007).

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2.3 Sindh

This case study focused on Sukkur in the Sindh province. The Initiative for Peace Building describes

Sindh province as socially, culturally and economically diverse. Sindh is thought to be negatively

associated with urban – rural inequalities, unequal wealth and intense struggles for political power.

Sindh has the largest population of non-Muslims in Pakistan many of whom face marginalisation.

Ethnic tensions are exacerbated through political party’s affiliations. Rural Sindh has a traditionally

tribal and feudal system which can cause severe challenges for service provision such as education

for girls (UNICEF, 2016). Sindh was the worst affected area in the 2010 floods; which caused mass

displacement and loss of life, housing, livelihoods and infrastructure; further exacerbating

inequalities and poverty.

Map: Sindh Flood Impact 2010 Source: UNOCHA

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3. The Disaster

On the 29th July 2010 Pakistan was hit with unusually heavy monsoon rains which caused severe

flash floods and landslides. The flooding continued into August and was ranked as the worst flooding

Pakistan has experienced in 80 years (IFRC).

The over-all damage was estimated at 885 billion rupee (8.44 billion US dollars) (Christian Aid, 2010)

with over 44% of damages reported in the Sindh province. 880, 000 houses were completely or

partially damaged, killed 200, 000 people, 1.2 million livestock and displaced 1. 8 million people

(Thomas Reuters Foundation, 2011).

4. The Intervention

The initial needs assessment conducted by World Vision Pakistan informed the design of the DEC

(Disasters and Emergencies Committee) funded program and included three core areas:

1. Destruction of community infrastructure

2. Lack of livelihood opportunities

3. Clean water/adequate sanitation and hygiene practices

Target community selection criteria

All targeted villages were severely affected by the floods and are now hosting a large number of IDP

“returnees” as well as the flood affected population that opted to stay in the aftermath of the

floods. Villages were selected for a comprehensive and integrated early response programme across

multiple sectors. The criteria used to select these villages were as follows:

Heavily damaged by the floods and with a population facing significant needs in multiple

sectors: WASH, Health, Education, Livelihoods

Other NGOs/INGOs not responding in these areas

WV Pakistan’s operational presence – WV implemented relief interventions (NFI, Food,

Health, WASH, Protection) in these areas, thus building grounds to implement a

comprehensive recovery programme.

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Target beneficiary selection

The bulk of this DEC project consisted of rehabilitation of community infrastructure (community

centres, livelihoods infrastructure and other social services infrastructure e.g. health / education).

Whole communities benefited from access to these rehabilitated assets, including children, women,

the elderly, differently-abled, etc. Overall, 4000 most vulnerable families in Sukkur, Shikarpur &

Khairpur were assisted with the implementation of this project.

IDP returnees

Although the targeted villages are predominantly comprised of flood IDP returnees, this World

Vision project will benefit both returnees as well as “stayees” who remained throughout the floods.

The floods affected both displaced and non-displaced households: thus beneficiaries will be selected

according to their level of need and vulnerability, not displacement status.

Women

Given frequent incidences of low participation of women in relief/recovery projects in Pakistan, WV

aimed to create space to increase participation. Women’s Village Development Committees were

formed to encourage and maximize Women’s participation and decision-making within the

community. Village rehabilitation grants were also prioritized to increase the access of women and

girls to resources and development. Special attention was given to female-headed households in

beneficiary selection. Additionally, specific CFW activities will be designed to favour women’s

involvement including for example: nurseries raising/plants production; orchards rehabilitation, etc.

5. The Project strategy

A summary of the project’s different phases is outlined in the diagram below. The core focus of the

project included cash for work, cash transfers, water filters, and community involvement, local

market strengthening, Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Building.

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Immediate Response

•Tents, shelter and food

Recovery

•Food and other basic goods distibuted

•Houses began to be re-developed

Cash for work

•World Vision dentified target beneficiaries amongst the most vulnerable groups. It will target villagers who have limited opportunities for livelihoods restoration

•The targeting criteria as well as the wage (15 days at a rate of $5) prioritised the most vulnerable.

Cash Vouchers

•The extremely vulnerable in the communities were targeted for cash vouchers

Water Filters

•WV tested water quality in all villages and identify those households with the highest levels of arsenic in household water usage.

•These recieved appropriate arsenic filtration systems and weretrained on their use.

Community Grants

•The Village Rehabilitation Grants were allocated according to the size of the villages as well as the level of damage affecting community centres.

•Local community involvement was central to the implementation of the Village Rehabilitation Grants. Communities were be directly involved in the decision-making process as well as the implementation of the rehabilitation grants

DRR & Resilience

•The rehabilitation of community infrastructure (schools, health facilities of irrigation channels, etc) will allow communities to recreate a sense of normality and restart their social, economic and spiritual life in dignity

•The project will reduce the vulnerabilities of the target communities through the enhancement of safe drinking water sources and the provision of sanitation facilities and hygiene awareness.

•Skills enhancement training sessions will be conducted to support CFW reconstruction and rehabilitation activities as well as household shelter reconstruction activities

•Community capacity to prioritize their needs, plan actions, make decisions and solve problems will be reinforced through the creation and mobilization of village development committees (VDCs).

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6. Research Methodology

The following research methodology was then employed to explore the different phases, challenges

and opportunities that the program faced throughout its life span/

6.1 Research Aims

1. To explore the World Vision (and partners) response to the 2010 floods

2. To explore both the response & rehabilitation, to capture lessons learnt; recommendations and

challenges of smoothly aligning resilience informed response and rehabilitation phases to

strengthen community resilience

3. With the over-all project aim of developing recommendations for global resilience informed

humanitarian response

6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling

The LPRR research team spent two weeks in the Sindh province researching World Vision’s response

to the 2010 floods in Sindh. This research is underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) conceptual

framework which outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with

change. A comprehensive and detailed outline of the methodology can be found in the LPRR learning

google drive and project box account. Links to both can be found in the bibliography. Ultimately five

core resilience principles have underpinned the research methodologies. These include:

1. There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation of local

knowledge in resilience building projects

2. There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising that resilient

systems take a cross-scalar perspective

3. The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with preparedness activities

enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards

4. There are spaces and places for continuous learning

5. A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a

system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any approach to building

resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a

stable state to which they should return after a disturbance.

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6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling

Taking a triangulated approach this research adopts a mixture of methods including; semi structured

interviews with key informants and household interviews and focus group discussions with

community members which included risk and resilience mapping as the primary data collection

methods. The case study sites have been selected by World Vision as good examples of lessons

learnt. Purposive sampling was adopted for participants in order to gain a diverse range of

participants.

6.3 Data Analysis

Data was analysed through thematic analysis, drawing out core aligning and opposing themes and

perceptions around the identified resilience variables and additional core factors. A further, more in-

depth phase of analysis will be conducted after all case studies have been captured.

6.4 Limitations

Due to the security situation in Pakistan it was felt more appropriate for the KCL team to conduct the

data collection remotely. A local researcher was hired and trained in Islamabad by the KCL team on

the LPRR methodology alongside a number of World Vision and partner staff. This research team

then conducted the two week data collection.

On the one hand this was felt to strengthen the quality of data due to the cultural acceptance of

community members being interviewed by familiar World Vision staff. However, on the other hand

it meant that the KCL research team was not able to directly access the community.

Furthermore the research team reported the heat to be a major challenge in data collection; with

temperatures reaching 40 degrees Celsius this limited the amount of time you could spend in the

field. Furthermore it was difficult to track down project officers who had implemented the project as

they had moved on to work in different places.

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7. Findings

Resilience Principles

Community Reflections

“I came out of the mouth of death” (Community member)

“The 2010 flood was the worst in the history of our village. We were

helpless” (Community Member).

“Nothing was left behind but mud and water” (Community member)

Next the five core principles underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) theoretical conceptualization of

resilience have been explored. Community members, field staff, local government officials and other

key stakeholders have been asked to reflect on the five core principles; map out the challenges that

existed and opportunities and recommendations for where resilience could be introduced into

preparedness, response and recovery and rehabilitation.

Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values

and appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects

Community Reflections

The community appear to have mixed thoughts around the level of participation that the

humanitarian response program achieved. On the one hand a number of community members

explained that World Vision were very inclusive and conducted household visits for need

assessments and helped to set up a village committee who they met with regularly and learnt about

what the village needs were, what local knowledge could be shared and how the community wanted

to project to be implemented. For example during the Women’s FGD participants explained how

women from the NGO’s came into their homes to talk to the women and ensure they were not being

left out.

However a number of community members also explained that they were not involved in the design

or implementation of the program but that it was the village Syed’s (the land owners and leaders of

the village) who were selected to participate; leaving the poor and vulnerable out of decision making

and information sharing.

In reflection of this the community members recommended that NGO’s focused on building the

capacity of the CBO’s and community themselves (not the Syed/ landowners) to be able to

effectively prepare for and respond to an emergency. The community members felt that they should

be the ones who run the emergency response with the support of the government.

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“The Syed decided what our needs were, there was a community

meeting with the male members of the community and Syed”

(Community member)

“No my household was not asked what we need. I think it would be

better if they came straight to the people to ask us” (Community

member)

“We were not involved, neither were any of the other women we know.

Now I suggest it is better to select a person who lives in the village not

the Syed as we will have the local knowledge” (Community member)

Field Staff Reflections

Next, when exploring the field staff’s reflections on community participation there appears to be a

difference between the levels of participation throughout the different phases of the program. Field

staff explained that they feel that in the immediate response community members were not

engaged with but that in the recovery and rehabilitation it became more feasible to empower the

community to be involved, to learn from the community’s local knowledge and allow them to make

decisions on their future. In particular participants explained that there was a sudden increase in

female participation in the recovery and rehabilitation phase of the program. Here, it was felt that

World Vision made a specific effort to ensure female community members were being engaged

with.

Furthermore, field staff explained that they feel that the relationship between the community and

NGO’s was challenging and that it was difficult to engage with the community members at the start

of the program. It was felt to be hard work motivating people to come together and work together.

In particularly field staff feel that in the beginning there was reluctance to come together with

members of the village who were from different areas, religions and castes in the village.

In addition one field staff explained that He felt that there was a lack of trust in the beneficiaries and

explained that a lot of community members could not be trusted as ‘those who have always want

more and more. This thing was there; greed’ (Field staff). This was felt to be particularly true with

community leaders (The Syed). Further to this, the same field staff explained that community

members do not have the same level of understanding as a CBO and so cannot fully partake in

decision making.

However other field staff explained that it was the nature of immediate response which made them

unable to include participation in the initial response. Here field staff felt that they were just focused

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on distribution but as the project timeframe went on the field staff had the capacity to engage with

the community members more and include them in decision making. Despite this it was felt that the

project did include some participation and when it did it was felt to be effective in including all

sectors of society; male, female, young, old and different caste etc.

In reflection of community leadership a number of field staff explained that they do not like working

with the community leaders. It was explained that in Sindh the ‘Syed’s’ or land lords/ land owners

are the community leaders, they have a great hold and power and hold over the community

therefore World Vision prefers to go straight to the community members. However it was explained

that this is challenging to do without angering the Syed’s.

“Leaders in Sindh are not true leaders, they are not advocating for the

people, they always have their own personal interest” (Field staff).

Other field staff disagreed with this and explained that these leaders played a very good and

important role in mobilising the people and making decisions on their behalf and for their interests.

Some field staff even stated that they feel that the program supported a change of thinking

throughout the leaders who began to think more carefully and for the benefit of the whole village.

“This program changed the mind-set of the leaders” (Field staff).

With regards to social values; a number of field staff explained that whilst the earlier phases of the

program did not have the capacity or time to think about social values; the rehabilitation phase did

aim to incorporate social values. For example the program created women’s groups and developed a

team of female field staff who would visit the women who do not leave their home compounds to

ensure the female members of the community were included. Here, the program aimed to ensure

that the livelihood capacity building projects were in keeping with the local social values and norms

and could include the female community members as well as the male. The community here are felt

to have engaged 100%.

“The rehabilitation was all about what the community needed and

wanted” (Field staff).

Recommendation

One recommendation made here was that a practical, time efficient way of engaging with

community members needs to be developed from the very beginning. It is felt that the community

should be asked what they need and would like first. NGO’s and government should be guided by

the community members. Field staff explained that local knowledge could have prevented a number

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of mistakes such as distributing Pulse (daal) as the food response which the community members

didn’t eat because they were not use to it.

“Ask the community what they want and what they need” (Field staff).

“If we don’t ask the community what they want then how can we expect

the design to be fruitful in the long term?” (Field staff).

Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion

and recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective Community Reflections

In general the community feel that the 2010 flood and World Vision’s program bridged links

between the community and the government and enabled a relationship and trust to be developed.

The community feel that they are now more aware about their rights and more confident in

speaking the government officials because of the program. However a number of village members

stated that they would need more confidence and training to feel able to advocate to the

government for something. Community members also explained that both the flood and programme

brought the community closer together, ended the internal conflict and tensions between

households and strengthened community cohesion.

“The community have more togetherness but the government thinking is

still the same” (Community Member)

However the community have split perceptions on how the government were involved in the

project. On the one hand the majority of participants explained that the government were first to

give out meals twice a day and then supported households by giving them a ‘wattan’ cash card

which they could use for everyday needs. However a small number of community members

explained that they did not receive any help from the government at all.

Interestingly, here the ‘Syed’s’, the landlords and landowners and leaders of the village offered

support through donating money and through providing small loans to community members

throughout the recovery. On the one hand the community explained that this brought the landlords

and villages closer together; however on the other some community members felt that it reinforce

the inequalities and power dynamics and the community highlighted the World Vision savings

programme as much better for them than receiving loans from the Syed.

“Syed went to the government for help and got them to give us food and

aid at the beginning” (Community member)

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“The government and the NGO’s helped us, they cared for us after the

flood, I don’t know who they were but they were angels from the sky to

us” (Community member)

“Before the flood there was no togetherness and people fought each

other all the time. We were a village of strangers. Now we love each

other and are a strong community working together with our community

committee” (Community member)

“During the flood we helped each other, we are united, we respect and

love one another” (Community member)

“The government took no interest in us after the flood” (Community

member)

“We don’t know how to meet with serious government officials”

(Community member).

“The landlords got help from the government after the flood but the

poor did not” (Community member).

Field Staff Reflections

“People came forward to develop their own community” (Field staff)

In addition to this the field staff reflected on their perceptions of leadership, cohesion and

governance. Firstly, the lack of trust between the people and the government is felt to have been a

huge challenge. Interestingly, field staff feel that this lack of trust was the reason that community

members did not act upon the government’s flood warning.

However there also appears to be a difference in opinion between field staff about the

governments’ involvement. On the one hand field staff also explained that the government was not

involved in World Visions’ work with the communities before the flood, however the 2010 mega

flood brought the INGO’s, NGOs and government together.

Furthermore a number of field staff explained that they feel the program supported relationship

building between the community and government and NO’s and government. Here, field staff

explained that they feel that the government were attempting to reach out to the community and

support them and work with the INGO’s to do so.

However on the other hand a number of field staff disagreed and said the government was not

involved in anyway other than providing police for the aid distribution. A number of field staff also

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explained that after the initial disaster response the government went back to being disconnected

from the communities and a challenge for the INGOs and NGOs.

Nevertheless, the majority of field staff explained that they feel the disaster and program increased

community social cohesion and togetherness. The disaster and program is felt to have put a stop to

tension, conflict and intolerance of each other and create an environment of support, love and

respect. This was seen less so in the immediate response but significantly throughout the

development of the program.

One core success reflected on by the field staff was the way in which World Vision developed a

community committee which brought the community together to decide how the recovery and

rehabilitation should be run. Field staff also reiterated the fact that working with the village leaders

(the Syed’s) was often challenging. There was often a complete lack of communication between the

local leaders and whilst sometimes the leaders would help but other times they would completely

block the NGO’s work.

Recommendations

A core recommendation was made here to support government capacity development, work

through and hand over to the local government, encourage relationship building between the

government and the community (and CBO’s) and build the confidence of people to meet with

government officials and explain their concerns and needs. It was agreed amongst field staff that

this had begun “Now they (the community) can raise their voice for their right” (Field staff).

However more work is needed to ensure everyone was heard. A second recommendation made by

field staff includes supporting and encouraging the community to develop a vision for the future and

a goal to work towards.

Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is

accepted with preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of

future unexpected hazards Community Reflections

The community explained that they felt that they were not prepared before the flood. In particular

the community explained that they did not trust the government when they issued the Early

Warning before the 2010 flood hit. The community thought that it would be the same level of

severity as flooding they experienced each year.

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However the community explained that the trainings that World Vision ran had created increased

awareness, preparedness, and access to information and trust for warning information in the future.

The community feel that that they know risks are likely to change in the future and that they now

take information about risk much more seriously.

“No one can face the disaster. The community was not

prepared…everyone ignored the warning and information because we

thought it would be the same as all the small floods we have every year”

(Community member)

“There was rumour of a flood but we ignored the warning as we thought

it would be the same as every year and not so bad” (Community

member)

“I do feel the World Vision Project helped us, not only to prepare better

but also to think for the future” (Community member).

“We didn’t know how the water suddenly came” (Community member)

“We have plans and we are prepared now” (Community member)

“Before they (the community) don’t listen to the government but now

they take them more seriously” (Field staff)

Field Staff Reflections

Field staff went on to reflect on community preparedness before and after the flood and whether

they feel future risk is understood and effectively communicated throughout the community. All

field staff interviewed feel that the community was not prepared before the 2010 flood. Field staff

explained that they feel the community did not have the awareness that a mega flood could happen

and did not trust their sources of information.

However after the flood; field staff feel that the community’s preparedness has significantly

increased due to a combination of the experience of the mega flood, the training and awareness

raising from WV and strengthened relationships with the government. It was also explained that

due to the stronger relationship with the government the community now have access to

information through the radio, television, mobile phones and newspapers and take information on

risk more seriously. Furthermore the government also send text messages with warnings, use

mosque loud speakers to give warnings and distribute information pamphlets.

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“They (the community) are aware now. They will not follow their

mistakes of the past, they have experience and training now” (Field

Staff).

Interestingly, field staff also highlighted mental strength of the community members as a core issue.

Whilst field staff explain that the community is more prepared and physically strong, they feel that

the community is mentally weak and fragile and do not believe in themselves to have the power,

agency and an influence over their future or potential risks. One example of this was given by a field

staff who explained that the community members preferred keeping their temporary shelters as

they are worried that if they invested time and money into building a permanent house it could

wash away and be lost in a future flood;. This therefore limits resilience building or longer term

development. Here, recommendations were made for programs to include training on confidence

building, motivation and empowerment.

Field staff also feel that religion, combined with the scale and shock of the 2010 floods has left some

of the community feeling hopeless and that it is God’s will. “They (the community) say what will

happen, will happen as it is God’s will and we cannot do anything” (Field staff). “Their (community)

thinking must change” (Field staff).

Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning Community Reflections

Community members explain that there were a number of trainings and capacity building sessions

around preparedness, health and hygiene, livelihoods and savings throughout the 2010 flood

response program. This was one of the most helpful aspects of the project and feel much more

aware and knowledgeable now because if them. However one recommendation made by

community members was to also include the local government in training and capacity building.

Furthermore, the community felt that the World Vision training also challenged cultural beliefs and

traditional way of life in a positive way. It was explained that WV taught participants how important

girls’ education is and would like to see a girls’ schools in their community and challenged the

concept of child marriage. Community members felt that these negative aspects of their way of life

needed to be challenged for a positive, resilient future.

“Before the flood we do early childhood marriages and we fight each

other but now we don’t. We learnt.” (Community member).

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“World Visions’ training booted us to build capacity, think wider and

more holistically” (Community member).

“World vision gave us lots of training on health, hygiene, savings and

preparedness. This was the most helpful thing we got. We received know

how knowledge and in result of that we feel encouraged” (Community

member).

“They (World Vision) taught us how to save ourselves in a flood. We are

now more confident that we can respond to save ourselves if it happens

again” (Community member).

Field staff

Further to this field staff reflected on their experiences of opportunities to learn throughout the

program. Whilst it was clear that the field staff feel that the community was given a lot of training

and that this training was put into practice effectively, it appears that the NGOS did not prioritise

their own learning, reflections or capacity building.

A number of field staff also recommended that the government should be given capacity building

and that the DRR training should last for at least two hours as appose to the short session that the

community received. It is also felt by field staff that this should also be done regularly to update the

community on changing risks and it should not just be a one off session. Furthermore field staff

explained that they did not feel like they had the power or position to reflect or change the program

once it had begun. “We did not have the power to change the design” (Field staff).

Field staff recommendations included training the community to run emergency response

programme themselves, conduct disaster drills and ensure basic needs are met before conducting

training. One example was given of community members who hadn’t eaten for days sitting through

trainings hungry.

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Principe 5: A high degree of social and economic equity exists in

systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are

acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Any

approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of

restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to

which they should return after a disturbance.

Community Reflections

A number of community members explain that they do not see much difference in their community

when the compare their lives before the 2010 flood and after. The community agrees that they were

able to bounce back and that there are a few improvements around preparedness; such as increased

awareness, access to information and raised houses. However there were also a number of

negatives such as the contamination of farm land from the salt water. The community feel that crop

yielding is poor in comparison to before the flood.

However a small number of community members do feel that the village has bounced back better

and has improved through this training, increased preparedness, community cohesion and

togetherness, changed perceptions and through enhancing the community to take control and make

decisions through a CBO not the landowners.

“The community is better now; we feel change inside the community.

World Vision enhanced the community with the committee and the

training” (Community member)

“I feel a big change in the community because we are aware and we

have our savings” (Community member)

“The community is better now; we feel change inside the community.

World Vision enhanced the community with the committee and the

training” (Community member)

In addition to this, the community explained that they feel everyone was equally exposed to the

floods; however those with land and savings were able to cope better in the aftermath. Throughout

the community mapping exercise it was clear that before the flood there were risks but the

community were not prepared. Furthermore there was no community committee and there was

conflict between community members, a lack of togetherness and a lack of trust between

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community members. The Syed (land owners) did not help the villagers and were removed from the

community.

Straight after the flood, everything was completely destroyed however the community came

together, the Syed (land owners) hosted them in their houses and gave them money as is was Eid.

The government and NGO’s then brought aid and supported them. The NGO’s helped them to

rebuild their lives.

Today, the community explain that sometimes they still feel unsafe and afraid of the river. However

they feel more prepared, they keep their houses higher, the put important belongings up high in

houses and know what to do if a flood warning is given. The community explain that they have more

facilities now than they did before the 2010 flood and more access to information through SMS

messages and the TV and radio. It is felt that the education is better, the community togetherness is

better, the community has more information and awareness, the relationship with the Syed and

government is better, services and local leadership is better and they feel stronger and more

independent due to the savings initiative. The community explained that their awareness around

rights and hygiene had also increased. For example the community now had latrines and no longer

practiced open defecation.

However, the community explained that in order to have truly bounced back better and be resilient

they would like to have seen their community action group turned into an emergency response

committee and have the training and resources to run the initial emergency response themselves.

To do this the community felt that they would also need life jackets, a life boat, swimming lessons,

an evacuation center, an ambulance and health center. The community feel that they would also

need flood walls and stronger, higher houses with emergency exits to feel resilient against future

floods. In addition to this the community also wanted independence. To these community members

independence means reliable livelihoods, a village market and the opportunity for local people to be

elected as government officials.

Lastly, the community discussed the need for education and schools for girls. Field staff commented

on this and through that it could be argued that challenging the cultural norm of not education

females could be an example of transformational change.

“There will be no issues if we can plan our community with our own

hands and minds” (Community member)

“After the committee was made it changed our thinking to work better

together” (Community member)

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Images: Community Mapping.

1. Before the 2010 Floods

2. Immediately after the 2010 Floods

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3. Community today (now)

4. Future (Resilient) Community

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Field Staff Reflections

Field staff agreed and explained that whilst the communities’ risk perception, awareness and

preparedness had increased, the people still need confidence building to speak to government

officials and advocate for their needs. Further to this it is felt by field staff that both community

members and government officials need capacity building and relationship strengthening.

Field staff went on to reflect on the social inequalities throughout the community. It is felt by the

field staff that whilst economic issues were tackled and addressed by the World Vision program; the

social inequalities were ignored. Issues of power and perceptions of difference; from caste to

religion and whether or not participants are land owners are thought to create divisions and

(re)produce social inequalities. For transformative resilience building a number of field staff felt that

the social perceptions that have been deeply imbedded in Pakistani culture needed a radical change.

Here, even field staff felt religions and cultures should be separated when recommending the British

funding should help the Christians and Hindus and Pakistani’s should stick together with government

aid. A second requirement for building back better would include advocating for the eradication of

poverty and the promotion of human rights throughout the legal system. This would include in

particularly ensuring that the relationship between the governments’ police and the people is more

positive. Ultimately in reflection of the fact that it was the land owners made the initial decisions

and were consulted from the offset and it was land owners who had the power to offer support, aid

and loans; the program could be thought to (re)inforce the communities’ unequal power dynamics.

Challenges and Recommendations

Lastly, the community members and field staff were asked to map out any challenges and

recommendations that they feel the project f aced or should have included.

Challenges Recommendations

Field staff explained that just looking after the community and survivors was a big challenge. NGO’s helped us with rehabilitation and psychologists came and helped with trauma.

There was a lot of sickness after the floods

Health, livelihoods, community emergency response committee and savings.

Disease, rats and water animals were a problem

Lack of interest from villagers

Lack of trust of Early Warnings

People should be given psychological education and support

Ask the people themselves what they need, who is at risk, what they want. They know.

Check and double check with the people what is needed

Include everyone regardless of religion or caste

Bridge gaps between community and government and community and NGOs and NGOs and government

The government needs to take responsibility. Field staff would suggest that they take four government officials from each province and work together to develop a comprehensive emergency and disaster preparedness and response plan.

Don’t just leave at the end but help build the capacity of a social welfare department and hand over

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7. Bene et al (2012) Absorb (cope), Adapt, Transform Analysis

In reflection of Bene’s (2012) Resilience Absorb, Adapt, Transform (AAT) observations, it was felt

important to gauge the community’s perception of what resilience means to them and explore how

the field officers and other stakeholders felt that the intervention impacted on the community’s

resilience. The graphs below illustrate the participants’ reflections on the intervention’s phases in

relation to the resilience principles. The x axis maps out the efficiency vs. equity through inclusivity

and participation whereas the y axis maps out Bene’s (2012) AAT stages of resilience and the way in

which the community and intervention supported the stabilisation of the community and

strengthening of resilience. The numbers illustrate the five resilience principles and are mapped out

in the graph’s key. It is important to note that whilst this is an overview an in-depth analysis of the

data collected in this case study will be presented in a second paper.

Gap in communication between the (I)NGO’s and people

Access to the community – both physically and reluctance from the community and government to have us there

Religious segregation even amongst team: “I would recommend that the British should help the Hindu and Christian and the Muslims should help each other” Field staff

Tension in the refugee camp due to different tribes and castes having to come together to live in the same place

Government should provide opportunities for regular learning and updates for the community members

Lack of communication with the beneficiaries “If we don’t receive assistance and others do and we don’t know why we become very disheartened, sad and angry” (Community member)

Build social cohesion across caste and religion

Ensure psychological support for both the community/ survivors and field staff

Develop trainings with the community to tackle root causes of vulnerability, exclusion and inequality

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What does this table show?

Indicator Response Recovery Rehabilitation

Community involvement (participation) 2 5 1 0

3 5 3 1

5 5 4 3

1 Mean 2 3 4

Community Cohesion 0 5 0 0

2 5 1 1

4 5 4 3

2 Mean 1 2 4

Strengthen Links to Government 0 0 0 0

2 5 1 1

4 5 4 3

3 Mean 0 2 4

Understanding of risk strengthened 0 5 0 0

4 5 0 1

4 5 4 5

4 Mean 1 2.5 4.5

Access to information increased 0 4 0 0

2 4 1 2

4 4 3 5

5 Mean 1 2 4

Preparedness 0 1 1 0

0 1 3 1

5 4 4 5

6 Mean 0.5 1 4

Learning throughout 0 0 0 0

1 0 2 2

4 4 4 5

7 Mean 0 1 4

Building Back Better as a focus 1 4 1 3

3 4 2 3

3 4 5 3

8 Mean 2 3 4

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It is clear that this table of scores demonstrate how the eight resilience indicators changed and

developed throughout the three phases of the project. For the response phase all indicators are at 0

(non-existent) apart from a small amount of participation and community cohesion building.

The table illustrates how these indicators begin to be applied more throughout the recovery phase

of the program. In particular participation and a focus on bouncing back better strengthening are

increased however the focus on preparedness and learning is still low.

Furthermore the table outlines the final rehabilitation phase where participant’s scores indicate that

all of these resilience indicators have developed into a level 4. Here it is clear all of these core

resilience factors have been taken into consideration and acted upon during the rehabilitation

period. A second paper will be developed analysing what blockages and limitations prevent these

resilience indicators from being implemented from the offset and if they should and how they could

be included earlier on in programming in the future to community support resilience building.

7. Conclusions

In conclusion this case study paper has explored the World Vision 2010 Flood Response program in

Sindh, Pakistan. As part of the LPRR START DEPP project this case study aims to make up part of a

collection of up to 10 past humanitarian interventions and map out how the sector can better link

humanitarian response, longer term development and resilience building.

This particular World Vision program included an immediate response, recover and then

rehabilitation phase and mapped out how each of the five resilience principles and Bene et al’s

(2012) AAT framework plays out differently in different phases of the project.

This paper’s findings illustrate that the disaster and humanitarian intervention is thought to have

increased social togetherness and cohesion, challenge cultural norms to offer more equal

opportunities and increased the level of participation, learning and preparedness throughout the

community as the program developed in time. It also served to bridge relationship with the

community and local government and support the community to bounce back.

However the majority of participants did not feel that the community had effectively bounced back

better and outlined a number of challenges that were felt to contribute to this. The fist was the

feudal system and unequal power that the landlords and land owners have over community

members. The second was the lack of trust felt towards both the government and community

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members. Furthermore political, ethnic and religious differences along with poor communication

around beneficiary selection was thought to cause tension throughout the community.

Recommendations from both field staff and community members included:

1. Enabling and empowering community members to be decision makers and lead emergency

response initiatives

2. Train and build the capacity of the local government,

3. Educate girls and tackle power inequalities, ask the community what they want and how they

would like it to be done and build social cohesion and togetherness across caste and religion.

Provide community training to tackle root causes of vulnerability and inequality.

4. In addition it is felt imperative by participants to hand programs over to the local government or

department of social welfare at the end and run a thorough hand over period.

5. Lastly, participants requested the need for psychological support for both the community/

survivors and field staff. This would also include community motivation and future vision

development.

Ultimately it is clear that the World Vision 2010 Pakistan Flood Response Program illustrates success

and challenges. Whilst the resilience principles mapped out appear to have been challenging to

implement in the immediate response they have all appeared to have developed throughout the

timeframe of the project.

Next steps

Next a further 3 case studies will be captured from DRC, Colombia and Bangladesh. Finally all 8-10

case studies will be critically analysed and a global approach for resilient informed humanitarian

response will be developed, piloted and rolled out. For any questions please contact Becky Murphy

the LPRR Resilience Learning and Capacity Building officer at rmurphy@christian-aid.org.

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References

LSE (2012) Linking Preparedness Resilience and Resilience in Emergency Contexts: A Comparative

Analysis of Humanitarian Interventions, LSE, London

Bene, C., Wood, R., Newsham, A., Davies, M., (2012) Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny?

Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability

Reduction Programmes, IDS, 40

UNICEF (2016) http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Social-Cohesion-

Analysis-Summary-20160321.pdf

http://news.trust.org//spotlight/Pakistan-floods-2010

UNOCHA (2010) https://pakistanifloodrelief.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/sindh-flood-impact-

profile-as-of-14-sept-2010.jpg

World Bank (2016) Pakistan Country Profile

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview