Lutero y Kierkegaard - Teólogos de la cruz.pdf

8/10/2019 Lutero y Kierkegaard - Telogos de la cruz.pdf

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Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of

the Cross

CRAIG HINKSON*

Abstract: The theologies of Kierkegaard and Luther begin with hiddennessas a

necessary qualification of deity. Because God is transcendent and human

reason is fallen, he cannot be directly known. To reveal himself, God must

wrap himself in sensuous media that veil his deity while manifesting it. The

indirectcharacter of revelation implies a negativeprinciple of cognition: Gods

nature is not recognizable in its transcendent glory, but rather in the lowliness

and suffering of the cross. This epistemological principle yields virtually

identical results for Kierkegaard and Luther alike, such that the term

theologian of the cross aptly describes each.

While Kierkegaards relationship to Luther has been examined from time to time, it

has not received the same attention that his relationship to, say, Hegel has.** The

reason for this is clear. Whereas the latter exerted a profound influence upon

Kierkegaard during his student years, serving as a favorite foil thereafter, Luther

seems not to have had any direct influence until 1847.1

Certainly an affinity to

International Journal of Systematic Theology Volume 3 Number 1 March 2001

Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK

and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

* Lynchburg, Virginia, USA.** Throughout the article, original language editions of Luther and Kierkegaard are cited

first, followed by the English translation, where available. Unless otherwise noted,quotations of Kierkegaard are from Kierkegaards Writings (KW), ed. Howard V. Hong(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) and Sren Kierkegaards Journals andPapers (JP), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 7 vols. (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 196778). References to the Danish are to the first edition of thecollected works, Sren Kierkegaards Samlede Vrker (SV), ed. A.B. Drachmann,J.L. Heiberg and H.O. Lange, 14 vols. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 190106), and to the secondedition of the papers, Sren Kierkegaards Papirer (Pap), ed. Niels Thulstrup, 22 vols.(Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 196870). Quotations of Luther are generally from Luthers Works(LW), ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, 56 vols. (St. Louis: ConcordiaPublishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955). Original language references are

to D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (LW), 90 vols. (Weimar: 1883).

1 Kierkegaard began a program of devotional reading in Luthers postils during Advent of1847 and was surprised to discover his own subjectivity principle in the very firstsermon: Wonderful! The category for you (subjectivity, inwardness) with which

Either/Orconcludes . . . is Luthers own. I have never really read anything by Luther(Pap VIII1 A 465 [JP 3:2463]).


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Luther can be seen in the writings prior to 1847, and it has from time to time been

acknowledged. Yet it has not been vigorously explored inasmuch as it seemed to

derive from Kierkegaards Lutheran milieu. Moreover, while this milieu must have

influenced him, his relationship to it was, from his earliest years, ambivalent at best.Consequently there has been a tendency, especially in English-speaking scholarship,

to think of Luther as a nominal influence, and to think of Kierkegaard as a Lutheran

theologian scarcely at all. There has, however, been one notable exception to this

rule of neglect. An earlier generation of theologians did see a strong connection

between Kierkegaard and the Reformer. Indeed, Kierkegaard was regarded as

having taken up Luthers mantle as no other theologian of the nineteenth century.

Among these observers the LutherKierkegaard connection not only excited

considerable interest it provoked nothing less than a theological revolution.

I speak, of course, of dialectical theology, whose inaugurator himself paidhomage to Luther and Kierkegaard as two of his principal intellectual ancestors.2

Certainly the mark of both men is everywhere apparent in Barths Epistle to the

Romans. Their renewed presence on the theological scene was, amazingly enough,

in part the result of happenstance. On the one hand, it was the fruit of the German

reception of Kierkegaard during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and on the

other, of the Luther renaissance occasioned not long thereafter by the discovery of

Luthers lostRomansmanuscript and Karl Holls pioneering scholarship on it. Each

event had profound implications for the other, and together they contributed to the

rise of dialectical theology. The central role played by the Romans Lectures in the

Luther renaissance causedKierkegaards works to be read in a unique light: that of

the theology of the cross to which works such as Fragments and the Postscript

possess a startling affinity. And conversely, Kierkegaards writings exerted a

profound influence on the Luther scholarshipof the period directly in the case of

Karl Holl, and indirectly in the case of scholars such as Paul Althaus, who were

influenced by dialectical theology. In short, it was the Kierkegaard-interpretation of

Barth and his circle and the Luther-interpretation of Holl and his followers that

called attention to this common theological horizon shared by Kierkegaard and the

young Luther. Accordingly, one finds in the earlier literature a recognition, if not of

actual dependence upon Luther, then certainly one of deep affinity. Scholars such as

Torsten Bohlin, Walter Ruttenbeck, Emanuel Hirsch and Eduard Geismar all drew

a direct comparison between Kierkegaard and Luther, particularly as regards their

shared conviction of the centrality of the cross for theology.3

2 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (GrandRapids: Zondervan, 1934), pp. 1956.

3 See Torsten Bohlin,Kierkegaards dogmatiska askadning I dess historiska sammanhang(Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokforlag, 1925), p. 487; WalterRuttenbeck, Sren Kierkegaard. Der christliche Denker und sein Werk (Berlin:Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1929), p. 347 n. 473; Emanuel Hirsch,Kierkegaard-Studien, vol. 2(Vadus/Liechtenstein: Topos, 1978), pp. 2867 (pp. 8889 in continuous pagination);and Eduard Geismar, Kierkegaard und Luther in Monatsschrift fur Pastoraltheologie25 (1929), p. 229.

28 Craig Hinkson

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Geismar is the only scholar who has, to my knowledge, taken Luthers

theologia crucis as the key for understanding the significance of Kierkegaards

authorship, though lamentably he did so in the confines of a single article. The

other early scholars offer but passing comments on the similarities betweenKierkegaards and Luthers theologies of the cross similarities that had no doubt

been set in bold relief by the ascendancy of dialectical theology and the Luther-

scholarship of the day, and therefore not in need of greater elaboration. But in the

decades since this first wave of Kierkegaard-scholarship, considerably less notice

has been taken of the theology of the cross as a means of evaluating Kierkegaards

theology vis-a-vis Luthers. This is especially true of English-speaking scholarship.

It might not be too strong a claim were one to maintain that the shared cross

framework of Luther and Kierkegaard, though a foregone conclusion on the

Continent early in the last century, has never been adequately observed in theEnglish-speaking context. The present article seeks to address this deficiency by

delineating the similarities that obtain between Luthers and Kierkegaards

respective theologies.

There are, of course, important differences as well, most notably in each mans

attitude toward corporate and corporeal existence, and certainly any thorough

treatment of Kierkegaards thought vis-a-vis Luthers would have to account for

these. To do so here, however, would extend the articles compass beyond

acceptable bounds. It will therefore deal only with the similarities, which are

numerous and striking. Indeed, so striking are they that they provoke the question,

How did Kierkegaard come to adopt a theological framework so similar to

Luthers? It is a question that, it seems to me, absolutely begs for an answer. Yet

neither does the articles scope admit of a thoroughly argued genetic explanation

(though I am convinced that onecan be given, and that in a single word: Hamann).

For the time being, therefore, let us simply consider the parallels.

Luthers theology of the cross

The theology of the cross is generally thought of as the framework of the young

Luther. Many of its themes are sounded in the first Psalms lectures (151315) and

are restated with increasing refinement in the lectures on Romans (151516),

Galatians (151617) and Hebrews (151718). While Luther, in the 1545 preface to

the Latin edition of his works, traced his reformational breakthrough to a tower

experience occurring toward the end of 1518, it is clear that he had had a great

many reformational insights prior to that time and was in the process of

consolidating these in a unified framework. This work-in-progress of the earlyperiod we know as the theology of the cross. While certain scholars are inclined

to regard it as more prereformational than not due to the still dominant influence

of the devotio moderna and mysticism upon it, others find no clear demarcation

between it and Luthers mature theology of the Word. In his epochal work on the

theologia crucis, Walther von Loewenich argues compellingly that the difference

Luther and Kierkegaard 29



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between the early and the late theology is not so much one of substance as of

emphasis.

What are the distinguishing characteristics of Luthers early theology? Many of

them are enunciated in the programmatic Heidelberg Disputation(1518), which setsforth the distinction between the theologia gloriae and the theologia crucis. The

theology of glory is fallen humanitys attempt to know Gods invisible nature by his

created works. Luther rejects this approach, saying, The one who beholds what is

invisible of God, through the perception of what is made, is not rightly called a

theologian. But rather the one who perceives what is visible of God, Gods

backside, by beholding the sufferings and the cross.4 The pseudo-theologian

referred to is the practitioner of the scholastic method. Since the time of Peter

Lombard (110060) theologians had held that the human intellect, unaided by special

revelation, served as a point of contact with God. By its exercise in concert with thelower faculties, humans could ascend from the visible to the invisible. Luther denies

that such a point of contact exists, indeed, denies the fitness of any approach to God

that would proceed from beneath upward. Since the advent of sin, if God is to be

known at all, this can only occur by an act whereby he stoops to meet us. Luther can

speak of perceiving or understanding God in the visible tokens of the cross and

suffering. Yet such understanding is not that of religious speculation, but offaith.

The sum of the matter is that God cannot be known by works, whether they be

his works in creation or our best efforts at apprehending him. If he is to be known at

all, it can only be by the cross. A certain ambiguity characterizes Luthers use of

both terms. In the explanation of Thesis 21 he speaks of not only Gods created

works, but the ethical works of humans. Similarly, cross refers to not only the

cross of Christ, but that of the Christian.5 The deliberate ambiguity with which he

employs these terms signifies that epistemology and ethics are intimately related,

religious speculation and works-righteousness being theoretical and practical

manifestations of the samedemand for direct intercourse with God.6 Thetheologia

gloriae, like works-righteousness, is an expression of human pride that would attain

to God by its own powers. It is a manifestation of the same sinful impulse that, in

the beginning, rendered creation a closed book to humanity. Luther concludes that

sinful humans cannot, and must not, try to know God by anysort of works, but by

sufferings and the cross. God is known by the means through which hehas chosen

to reveal himself: the cross of Christ, the meaning of which is only disclosed to

those who themselves stand under the shadow of the cross and suffering.

From the preceding it appears that the theoretical basis that Luther gives in

support of his cross principle of knowledge is the circumstance that pride has so

blinded human powers of perception that God can no longer be known from works.

4 Theses 19 and 20 (WA 1, 354, 17ff.) as rendered in Theses for the HeidelbergDisputation, trans. Karlfried Froehlich, inMartin Luther: Selections from His Writings,ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 502.

5 WA 1, 362 (LW31, 53).6 Walther von Loewenich, Luthers Theology of the Cross, trans. J.A. Bouman

(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), p. 20.

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Whatever dim light of nature still remains to humanitys fallen faculties proves

singularly unhelpful, for it is inevitably misused. There seems, however, to be an

even more fundamental reason for the theology of glorys untenability as a

cognitive principle than the debilitating effects of pride, for even in the absence ofpride God remains fundamentally unknowable. The fact that God is transcendent

rules out all knowledge of him as he is in himself. Fundamental to Luthers

rejection of the knowledge of God by his effects, then, is not only the sinful

presumption that vitiates it, but his strong sense of the transcendenceof God, which

can just as easily manifest itself in a manner contrary to what we customarily

regard as Gods effects.

From this it becomes evident that the concept of the hidden God lies at the

heart of the theology of the cross qua cognitive principle. Luther affirms as much

when, in the explanation to Thesis 20, he cites Isaiah 45:15 (Truly, thou art a Godwho hidest thyself ) as warrant for the claim that God is to be found in the cross

and suffering, not works. God is hidden in a twofold respect. In his naked deityGod

is perforce hidden, and in his revealed deity he is again hidden since he can only

reveal himself by an act of veiling. The supreme instance of this is his hiddenness

in Christ, the God hidden in sufferings. The theology of the cross qua cognitive

principle instructs us that if we are to know God at all, this can only occur by his

entry into concealment the concealment of the cross.

The essential hiddenness of God has as its corollary the paradoxical, even

offensive, nature of revelation. Luther glories in this, deliberately referring to the

Heidelberg Disputations theses as theological paradoxes. Yet his was not a love

of paradox for its own sake. The Heidelberg Disputations paradoxes are not

without connection to each other: they have as their focal point the crucified

Christ, the Absolute Paradox (Kierkegaard).7 Christ crucified confounds all

human ways of thinking about God (1 Cor 1:23).Heis the source of scandal and the

ultimate reason that the gospel awakens opposition wherever it is preached, for

nothing but lowliness and shame are to be seen unless one recognizes God under

this veil. Offense at Christ, however, is but a special case of the umbrage that

reason takes at Gods works and words in general. On the one hand, it does not

know what to make of Gods works, and so, is driven to despair.8 On the other, it

finds absurd, unbelievable, and impossible things promised in Gods word.9 Thus

it is scandalized by the divine deportment at every turn.

How is the scandal to be overcome? Luther maintains that it is up to God

alone to give faith contrary to nature, and the ability to believe contrary to

reason.10 Only a divinely-wrought faith can come to terms with the paradoxical,

hidden character of revelation though it does not do so in such a way that the

7 Edmund Schlink, Weisheit und Torheit in Kerygma und Dogma 1 (1955), p. 2.8 WA5, 615, 17ff. and WA19, 195, 31ff., cited by von Loewenich inLuthers Theology of

the Cross, p. 76.9 WA40III, 46 as cited by Paul Althaus in The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C.

Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 68.10 WA 39I, 91 (LW34, 160).




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hiddenness is abrogated by a higher seeing, or the offense once and for all

removed. Both conditions will persist until the veil of revelation is lifted and Gods

mysteries are made manifest by the light of glory. Until then faith must contend

with Gods hiddenness and the offense attendant thereto. Indeed, the very existenceof faithdependsupon such hiddenness. In a well-known passage fromThe Bondage

of the Will, Luther writes:

Faith has to do with things not seen. Hence in order that there may be room for

faith, it is necessary that everything which is believed should be hidden. It

cannot, however, be more deeply hidden than under an object, perception, or

experience which is contrary to it. Thus when God makes alive he does it by

killing, when he justifies he does it by making men guilty, when he exalts to

heaven he does it by bringing down to hell.

11

This passage is most significant because it declares hiddenness to be the sine

qua nonof faith, even asserting that Gods true intentions are the exact opposite of

what we see, sense, and experience.12 God reveals himself under a contrary

appearance or, as Luther can also express it, citing Isaiah 28:21, He does an alien

work [opus alienum] in order to do his own work [opus proprium]. It is this further

feature of revelation that not only is it concealed, but concealed so deeply as to

appear sub contraria specie that accounts for the offense that reason takes at

revelation. In his first Psalms lectures, Luther can even speak in terms of outright

contradiction, observing that since God gives his glory

under his contrary, and contradicts what is signified by the sign itself, it is not

merely profoundly but far too profoundly concealed. For who could realize that

someone who is visibly humbled, tempted, rejected, and slain, is at the same

time and to the utmost degree inwardly exalted, comforted, accepted and

brought to life, unless this was taught by the Spirit through faith?13

Reason is no match for revelation so thoroughly concealed. And because believers

themselves are possessed of reason that is not wholly regenerate, the possibility of

offense is a necessary concomitant of theirfaith.

The hiddenness of faiths realities and resultant severance of faith from natural

reason and experience lead Luther to characterize it as blind. For example, in his

1517 exposition of the penitential psalms, Luther observes that the Christian must

become blind and must give himself to God in true faith. Faith, however, sees

nothing, and the way is dark.14 Prototypical of faith is Abraham, who, letting go of

his own understanding, was led like a blind man along the right way. In like

11 WA 18, 633 (LW33, 62).12 An alternative rendering ofWA 18, 633 that of Packer and Johnston: The Bondage ofthe Will, trans. J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston (Westwood, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1957),p. 101.

13 WA 4, 82, 1421, as cited by Gerhard Ebeling in Luther: An Introduction to HisThought, trans. R.A. Wilson (London: Collins, 1970), p. 236.

14 WA 1, 216, 8ff. (LW14, 201).

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manner, the righteous are instructed to keep their eyes shut since Gods eyes are

always upon them.15 In the Lectures on Romans we are told that enlightened zeal

for God takes place in pious ignorance and mental darkness . . . without

understanding, without feeling, without thinking.16

Such statements are by nomeans limited to the young Luther, who was still under the strong influence of

mysticism. On the contrary, they span his entire career.

In this connection it is important also to observe that faith is insensible not only

of outward states of affairs, but of its own existence as faith. It cannot be otherwise

since faith itself is a divinework, and as such, ahiddenreality. This being the case,

it happens, indeed it is so in this matter of faith, that often he who claims to believe

does not believe at all; and on the other hand, he who doesnt think he believes, but

is in despair, has the greatest faith.17 Because faith is a hidden reality, the presence

of which is compatible with the most palpably felt despair, Christians mustmaintain a resolute ignorance of their own inner condition, placing their

confidence, not in some feeling that they may perchance find in themselves, but

in Gods promise alone. Faith justisa clinging to Gods Word, and in time of trial

it does so blindly, againstreason and experience.

Just as the hiddenness of God determines Luthers understanding of faith, so it

defines his view of justification. Christians are simul iustus et peccator. Visible is

the sinful reality of the old Adam; hidden is their righteousness in Christ. Luther

expresses it thus: A Christian is even hidden from himself; he does not see his

holiness and virtue, but sees in himself nothing but unholiness and vice.18 In a

gloss to Romans 6:8 he asserts that no one knows that he has life or feels that he

has been justified, but he believes and hopes.19 And in a later scholium to Romans

9:3, he enlarges on this, saying: For what is good for us is hidden, and that so

deeply that it is hidden under its opposite . . . So also our wisdom and righteousness

are not at all apparent to us but are hidden with Christ in God. But what does appear

is that which is contrary to these things, namely, sin and foolishness.20

This severance that the theology of the cross effects between faith on the one

hand, and reason and experience on the other, would seem to imply a corresponding

demarcation between faith and knowledge. And so it does. The relationship

between faith and knowledge is given in negative terms: The highest knowledge is

to know that one knows nothing; true faith accomplishes this knowledge.21 If this

15 WA 1, 171, 29ff. (LW 14, 152) and WA 1, 172, 10ff. (LW14, 152).16 WA 56, 413, 22 (LW 25, 404). Such texts could be multiplied at will. von Loewenich

(Luthers Theology of the Cross,pp. 7788) catalogs a host of them, remarking that thefrequency with which Luther enjoins blind faith can at times border upon tedium(p. 113).

17 WA 26, 155 (LW 40, 241). Cf. WA 57

III

, 144 (LW29, 149).18 WA, DB 7, 420 (LW 35, 411). Cf. WA 40II, 24f. (LW27, 212).19 WA 56, 58 (LW25, 52).20 WA 56, 392 (LW25, 3823).21 WA57, 207, 10ff. as translated by W. Pauck inLuther: Lectures on Romans, Library of

Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), p. 287. Cf.WA 18, 489 (LW14, 152).




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be faiths nature, then it is a ventureordare to believe. Riskanddangerare not to

be avoided: To believe means to abandon the viewpoint of reason and of our own

heart and to take a chance on Gods word. As a human act, faith is simply the

taking of a chance: I stake my life on the word.22

Luther can even describe faith bythe metaphor of a leap into the dark. Of death that final, supreme trial of faith

he writes:

If God chose to show us life in death . . . then death would not be bitter; it

would be like a leap over a shallow stream on the banks of which one sees and

feels firm ground. But He does not reveal any of this to us, and we are

compelled to jump from the safe shore of this life over into the abyss where we

feel nothing, see nothing, and have no footing or support, but entirely at Gods

suggestion and with His support.

23

If this be the nature of faith, then its certainty is a fighting certainty, firmitas,

that must be repeatedly won in times of spiritual trial. Luther distinguishes it from

securitas that presumes to possess more than God has deigned to give himself in

concealment. Because faith is a contending, not a possessing, a becoming rather

than a being,24 at no point in this life does the Christian arrive at a settled result.

Hans Joachim Iwand puts the matter in a most Kierkegaardian way when he

remarks: Actually one cannot be a Christian, one can only become one.25 The

theologia crucis is therefore a theologia viatorum, a theology of wayfarers.

Luthers use of this metaphor underscores the fact that this life . . . is not godliness

but the process of becoming godly, not health but getting well, not being but

becoming, not rest but exercise. We are not now what we shall be, but we are on the

way.26 This in transit character of specifically Christian existence has largely to

do with the dialectic of becoming in general. In the first Psalms lectures Luther

observes that

movement is an uncompleted act . . . always lying midway between two

contraries, and belonging at the same time both to the starting-point and to the

goal. If we existed in one only, there would not be any movement. But thispresent life is a kind of movement and passage, or transition . . . a pilgrimage

from this world into the world to come, which is eternal rest.27

22 Althaus,The Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 57 and 60.23 WA 19, 217, 15, as cited by Heinrich Bornkamm in Luthers World of Thought, trans.

Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), p. 87.

24 von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 5th printing, rev. (Witten: Luther-Verlag,1967), pp. 90 and 134.25 Hans Joachim Iwand, Theologia Crucis, in Nachgelassene Werke, ed. Helmut

Gollwitzer et al., vol. 2 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1966), p. 394.26 WA 7, 337, 30ff. (LW32, 24).27 WA 4, 362, 35363, 2, as cited by Ebeling in Luther: An Introduction to His Thought,

pp. 1612. Cf. WA 56, 442 (LW25, 434).

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The dynamic character of existence, combined with Gods hiddenness, makes

possible the recurrent episodes of doubt that characterize the walk of faith.

Christians lack definitive empirical assurance of their standing before God since

whatever actual righteousness they possess is partial, submerged under their greaterunrighteousness. On the other hand, their total righteousness is imputative, so that

their true estate remains hid with Christ in God. As a consequence they are ever

subject to spiritual assault [Anfechtung], the only remedy for which is faiths leap

from judgement to life. The trials that call forth this leap are the most intensive kind

of suffering, occurring at such times as the Christian is unable to penetrate through

the deus absconditus to the deus revelatus, through the opus alienum to the opus

proprium.28 In the absence of faiths experience of God, the Christian is alone with

his or her human experience and bereft of God.

Indeed, matters are worse still. In Anfechtung it is as though God suddenlyturns his back on his children and opposes them, his visage having changed from

that of a loving Father to that of a dread, predestinating deity who more resembles

the devil than God.29 During such attacks, the Christian experiences a God-

forsakenness similar to that felt by Christ on the cross. At such times, Luthers

counsel is to look to him, fleeing from the God that is hidden to the God that is

revealed: Begin from below, from the incarnate Son . . . Christ will bring you to the

hidden God . . . If you take the revealed God, he will bring you the hidden God at

the same time.30 Enlarging on this dual conception of God, Luther instructs the

beleaguered Christian to dare against God to flee to God, to fight most

vehemently against God himself 31

a bold exhortation that suggests that God is

the source of Anfechtung.

And so he is. While it is true that Luther frequently ascribes these assaults to

the devil, this is nonetheless tantamount to an ascription to God, the devil being

Godsdevil, or mask. InAnfechtungwe experience firsthand The Bondage of the

Wills chilling tenet that the hidden God works . . . all in all. Herein lies the

dilemma that Anfechtung poses for faith. If, in Anfechtung, God is our assailant,

then perhaps it is not merelywith his mask that we have to do; perhaps it is with

God himself the angry, predestinating deity so feared by Luther. This

circumstance that God himself assails the Christian is accordingly what makes

Anfechtung so unspeakably horrific, for in the absence of faith the Christian is in

doubt as to the true nature of the deity that assails him. Out of this soul-crushing

desolation to which the believer feels himself abandoned emerges the characteristic

passion of faith: Luther likens it to hanging from a cross, suspended between

28 von Loewenich,Luthers Theology of the Cross, p. 136.29 WA31I, 24950 (LW14, 312). Cf.WA 44, 376, 1ff. and 429, 24f. (LW7, 103 and 175).30 WA TR 5, 294, 24, 34 and 295, 5, cited by Brian Gerrish in To the Unknown God:

Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God, in The Old Protestantism and the New:Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),p. 140. Cf.WA 43, 460, 26ff. (LW5, 46).

31 WA 5, 204, 26 (cited by Gerrish, p. 148) and WA 44, 97, 38ff. (LW6, 131).




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heaven and earth.32 The Christian is, he says, the sort of hero who constantly

deals with absolutely impossible things.33

Gods hiddenness not only assures that Christians will experience Anfechtung;

it means that they will be subject to all manner of negation. Luther interprets thePauline principle of being crucified with Christ as both an inward and an outward

process of dying.34 Inwardly Christians repeatedly suffer the martyrdom of sin-

consciousness, for they are continuously in the process of being condemned and

justified. The practical significance of Christian becoming, however, is not

limited to this, for believers are, themselves, commanded daily to crucify the flesh.

This is symbolized in baptism, a sacramental act that effects the death of the old

man and rising of the new. Yet the reality that baptism signifies is not

consummated once and for all at the beginning of the Christian life; rather, it is

re-enacted daily by putting to death the old man through the mortification of theflesh, that is to say, through asceticism.35

In identifying mortification as one of the forms of suffering that constitute the

believers crucifixion with Christ, we come face to face with a crucial determinant

of Christian suffering: that it is voluntarily incurred. The Christian life is a process

ofwilleddying yet not in such a way that this is something that we accomplish on

our own terms. No, Godsends the suffering, and we may not seek it out.36 Hence,

though Luther had already rejected monasticisms self-chosen works by 1517,37

this was by no means a rejection of the principle of mortification. Henceforth the

secular world was to be the setting for Christian asceticism. The true

mortifications, writes Luther, . . . do not happen in deserts, away from the society

of human beings. No they happen in the household itself and in the government. 38

Accordingly, the theologia crucis finds practical expression in Luthers ethic of

vocation. As he demonstrates in his Treatise on Good Works (1520), ordinary life

offers endless possibilities for the mortification of the flesh. Luthers rejection of

monasticism therefore in no way rescinded the theologia cruciss requirement that

Christians voluntarily embrace suffering.39 Popular belief notwithstanding, his

ethic of vocation does not sanction a comfortable, bourgeois lifestyle in which

Christians avoid self-discipline and persecution.

32 WA 1, 102, 39ff.33 WA 27, 276, cited by Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 59.34 So writes von Loewenich (Luthers Theology of the Cross, p. 121), whose discussion of

The Christian Life as Discipleship in Suffering provides, in the main, the basis forwhat follows.

35 WA 6, 5345 (LW36, 6970). For Luthers view of asceticism, see Paul Althaus, TheEthics of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972),

pp. 224.36 WA 12, 364 (LW30, 10910).37 WA 18, 489 (LW14, 152).38 WA 43, 214, 3ff. (LW4, 109).39 Regarding this, von Loewenich comments: God himself wants us to be conformed in

all things to the image of his Son (WA1, 571, 34ff.;LW31, 153), and do this altogethervoluntarily (WA 4, 645, 21ff.) (Luthers Theology of the Cross, p. 123).

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Mention of persecution reminds us that Christians are not only subject to

struggle, the locus of which lies within; outwardly, too, they contend. They are

Gods elect, and the principle of revelation under the contrary appearance means

that their election outwardly appears to be a curse. It is not evidenced by materialblessing; if anything it is identifiable by the tribulation that follows in its train.40 In

this Christians are completely as their King, who distinguishes himself from all

other kings in that he offers the cross and death. Luther writes:

You must die if you would live under this King. You must bear the cross and

the hatred of the whole world. You must not flee from ignominy, poverty,

hunger, and thirst, in other words, all the evil that floods the earth. For this is

the King who became a fool to the earth and died, and who thereupon destroys

His own with a scepter of iron and smashes them like a potters vessel.

41

Chief among the perils that Christians must endure is the hatred of the whole

world. InOn the Councils and the Church (1539), Luther numberssufferingin all

its forms, but persecution in particular, as an essential mark of the church.42 So

essential a characteristic is it that, if it be absent, we have reason to worry that our

work has not pleased God as yet.43 The inevitabilityof persecution is grounded in

the worlds hatred ofChrist, who himself warned, If they persecuted me, they will

persecute you (Jn. 15:20). In carrying forth the gospel of Christ, then, Christians

expose themselves to certain persecution. This was Luthers experience: We teach

that all men are wicked . . . This is . . . not to curry the worlds favor but to go out

looking for and quickly to find, hatred and misfortune . . . For if we denounce men

and all their efforts, it is inevitable that we quickly encounter bitter hatred,

persecution, excommunication, condemnation, and execution.44

Does this mean that Luther expects Christians to run the risk of martyrdom

within Christendom because of their uncompromising proclamation of the gospel?

Indeed, it does. In his Treatise on Good Works, Luther writes:

If persecution of this kind has become a rarity, it is the fault of the spiritual

prelates who do not awaken the people with the gospel. By doing this theyhave abandoned the very thing on account of which martyrdom and

persecution should arise . . . But if the gospel should be revived and heard

once again, no doubt the whole world would arise and bestir itself.45

In that same treatise Luther goes further, declaring that the petition we make when

we pray the Lords prayer (Hallowed be Thy name) will at such time as God

sees fit to answer it cost blood. Those who enjoy the inheritance of the holy

40 WA31

I

, 249, 15 (LW14, 31);WA 31

I

, 91, 21 (LW14, 58);WA 5, 36 (LW14, 298); WA5, 41 (LW14, 304).41 WA 5, 69 (LW14, 342), emphasis added.42 WA 50, 6289 (LW41, 1645).43 WA 56, 194 (LW25, 177).44 WA 40I, 121 (LW26, 58).45 WA 6, 274 (LW44, 11112).




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martyrs, the inheritance which was won with the blood of martyrs, must in their

turn take on the role of martyr.46

We may summarize our treatment of suffering in its various forms by

reiterating that these eminently practical phenomena possess epistemologicalimport: they are part and parcel of the theologia cruciss necessarily indirect form

of communication whereby God manifests himself under the opposite appear-

ance, namely, that of the cross and suffering. Suffering above all else constitutes

the negative sign that one truly is a child of God.47

Kierkegaards theology of the cross

In Kierkegaard, too, we encounter the centrality of the cross as theologys cognitiveprinciple. In Judge for Yourselves! (1851) he writes, The cross . . . is associated

with everything Christian, adding, Christianity always puts opposites together, so

that the glory is not directly recognizable as glory, but is to be recognized inversely

by lowliness and humiliation.48

These words indicate the central role that the

theologia crucis plays in the mature Kierkegaards critique of Lutheranism. The

situation evoking that critique was not unlike that which gave birth to the

Heidelberg Disputation. Like Luther, Kierkegaard found himself in a situation in

which the sacrament of baptism had come to be regarded as an opus operatum, a

baptismal certificate being the guarantee of ones future bliss.49 Like Luther, he felt

that he must introduce the factor of personal appropriation, or faith, into this

context, reminding the established church that it is God who sovereignly disposes

over salvation, and that the manner of his self-revelation is not under ourcontrol. In

Kierkegaards case, this prophetic task took the form of the pseudonymous

authorship. Because the majority of his readers lived according to hedonistic

categories, he was forced, first, to initiate them into the despair of the aesthetic

lifestyle, and then to give them a rigorous schooling in the ethical. The ethical,

however, was intended only as a way station, for its terminus ad quemis the despair

of the anxious conscience that feels its acute need of grace. Only after one has

reached this extreme state of ethical bankruptcy is one in the position to appropriate

grace, and the grace thus appropriated it goes without saying does notachieve

its effect ex opere operato.

The theory of the stages is thus a process of ethical training, the goal of which

is to bring the reader to the point at which there can first be talk about receiving

grace. It is not without justice that Karl Holl has credited Kierkegaard with having

46 WA 6, 229 (LW44, 534).47 WA 44, 265, 18ff. and 397, 9ff. (LW6, 355 and LW7, 133).48 SV XII 434 (For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! and Three Discourses

1851, trans. Walter Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944], p. 172,slightly amended).

49 Kierkegaard, in fact, uses this very term (Pap XI2 A 25 [JP 1:368]) to describe thestatus that baptism had assumed in his day.

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rediscovered the same impossible ideality of the ethical that lay at the foundation of

Luthers religious experience.50 Yet the ethical bankruptcy at which Kierkegaard

aims is not complete prior to his introduction of the category, sin, by which he

understands a paradoxical transformation of existence whereby the possibility of alltruck with the divine is cut off. Not until this point has been reached can one speak

of Kierkegaards theologia crucis, for it is here that every positive principle of

cognition what Johannes Climacus calls retreat to the eternal via recollection

is cut off. Invoking none other than Luther, Kierkegaard contends that sin is so

profound a corruption of human nature that man must be taught by a revelation

about how deeply he lies in sin.51 The invocation is apt, for Luther hadconceived

of sin as so deep-seated a disturbance of humans cognitive and other faculties that

they are not even aware of its presence.52 The importance of this common

conception of sin and its effects cannot be too strongly emphasized, for it isfundamental to every other point that Luther and Kierkegaard hold in common. If

sin trulydoeseffect an absolute breach between the divine and the human such that

no point of contact remains, then blind faith in an authoritative, paradoxical

revelation is the necessary correlate.

Indeed, Kierkegaard develops the implications of this radically Lutheran

conception of sin in a way that exactly parallels Luther. In the Philosophical

Fragmentswe read that, by virtue of their sin, humans have deprived themselves of

the condition for the truth, with the consequence that God is no longer knowable by

natural human powers: He is the Unknown, a category virtually synonymous with

Luthersdeus absconditusin its absolute sense. Moreover, because Gods absolute

unlikeness cannot even in principle become manifest except by a paradoxical

assumption of likeness (likeness with an unsettling dissonance about it),

Kierkegaard is led to posit Luthers christological sense of hiddenness, as well.

The lowly servant of all, Jesus of Nazareth, is the omnipotent, Lord God of all.

Kierkegaards God incognito and Luthers God hidden in sufferings are

equivalent expressions of the necessity of indirect communication where revelation

is concerned: if God is to manifest himself at all to sinful humans, such

manifestation will necessarily entail an act of condescension that simultaneously

conceals him, preserving intact the essential secrecy of Godhead.53

The paradoxical character of revelation is necessarily scandalousto reason, for

not only is Jesus deity not directly recognizable in his lowly humanity; in so far as

it is veiled under the opposite appearance it stands in contradiction to it. The

possibility of offense is not to be avoided. It must be taken seriously, and

Kierkegaard, like Luther before him, seeks to do so by returning the New

50 Karl Holl, Was verstand Luther unter Religion in Luther, vol. 1 of GesammelteAufsatze zur Kirchengeschichte (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1921),pp. 245.

51 Pap VII1 A 192 (JP 3:2461). Cf. SVIV 298 (The Concept of Anxiety, KWVIII, 26).52 WA 56, 229 (LW25, 21314) and The Smalcald Articles, Part III, art. 1.53 SVXII 127 (Practice in Christianity,KWXX, 136). Cf. SVVII 179, 2047 (Postscript,

KWXII.1, 21314, 2436).




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Testament teaching about scandal or offense ( ) to its rightful

place in theology. In the absence of faith, reason cannot butbe offended at Christ,

for immediately, he is an individual human being, just like others, a lowly,

unimpressive human being, but now comes the contradiction that he is God.54

Notwithstanding the fact that reason cannot help being scandalized, Kierkegaard is

no more kindly disposed toward it than Luther in fact, he quotes Luthers derisive

epithets approvingly: reason is a blockhead and a dunce.55 If reason is to come

to terms with this sign of contradiction, then it will be by a purely negative

understanding: understanding that it cannot be understood.56 Faith alone grasps

the truth of the incarnation, it being a divinely granted insight into the concealed

presence of the deity.57 Seen thus, faith is a wonder in which the person plays no

part, a miracle for which he or she is entirely indebted to God.58 Again, this

echoes Luthers teaching that the person is not the source of faith, but God himself.Kierkegaard concurs with Luthers view of faith in yet another respect: it is not

only against the understanding; it is also against experience. When Abraham

received the command to sacrifice Isaac, he had no unambiguous experience to

which he could appeal. How could he be certain that what he took to be the voice of

God was not a lunatic delusion?59 He could not. Hence, just as Luther can praise

him for having let go of his understanding and letting himself be led like a blind

man along the way, so can Kierkegaard marvel at the manner in which he closes his

eyes, plunging confidently into the absurd.60 He is like a sleepwalker who securely

negotiates the abyss, never wavering while walking his dark way up Mount Moriah

despite God having assumed the cruelest of visages. If, for Luther, such conduct

54 SVXII 118 (Practice in Christianity, KW XX, 1256). Cf. SVXII 79 (KW XX, 82),where Kierkegaard stresses theabsurdityof the incarnation: That an individual humanbeing is God is Christianity, and this particular human being is the God-man. Humanlyspeaking, there is no possibility of a crazier composite than this, either in heaven or onearth . . . or in the most fantastic aberrations of thought. This and like-soundingstatements have brought the charge that Kierkegaard conceived faiths object

intellectualistically as a logical-metaphysical absurdity, where Luther had conceivedit experientially as the refuge of the anxious conscience. Against this it must beobserved that, philosophically, Luther remained ever a nominalist throughout his life;consequently he, no less than Kierkegaard, regarded such doctrines as the Trinity,Virgin Birth, Incarnation, and two natures of Christ as absurdities to reason.

55 SVIV 219 (Fragments, KWVII, 53).56 SVVII 179 (Postscript, KWXII.1, 214). Cf. SVIII 69 and 103 (Fear and Trembling,

KW VI, 17 and 53); SV IV 224 (Fragments, KW VII, 59); SV VII 183 and 495(Postscript, KWXII.1, 218 and 568); SV XII 365 (For Self-Examination, KW XX1,82).

57 See SVIV 233 (Fragments,KWVII, 70), which deals with faiths autopsy. Derivingfrom , self , and , seeing, autopsy literally means seen by its (faiths)self . It is the act by which faith, unaided by reason or experience, penetrates Christslowly servant guise and beholds the God-man.

58 SVIV 22730 (Fragments, KWVII, 626), SVVII 502 (Postscript, KWXII.1, 576).59 SV III 111 (Fear and Trembling, KWVI, 61).60 WA 1,171, 29ff. (LW14, 152) and SVIII 85 (Fear and Trembling, KWVI, 34).

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marks the Christian as a hero who performs impossible exploits, for Kierkegaard it

awakens equal admiration.

The fact that faith exists in the absence of immediate experience and in

defiance of earthly understanding marks it out as the most highly charged ofpassions. Where Luther likens it to hanging from a cross midway between heaven

and earth, Kierkegaard compares it to being suspended over a depth of 70,000

fathoms. For both, faith is a passionate contending. While this ultimately owes to

the hiddenness of faiths object for Kierkegaard and Luther alike, it is also

grounded in their shared, dialectical conception of existence. What is existence?,

asks Johannes Climacus. It is that child who is begotten by the infinite and the

finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is therefore continually striving.61 This

unresolved synthesis of contraries is what provides existence with its dynamic

quality ofbecoming. But, as we have already seen, Luther expressed a similar viewwhen he maintained that the present life is an uncompleted act, always partly

comprehended, and partly still to be comprehended, always lying midway between

two contraries, a kind of movement and passage. This shared dialectic of

becoming entails that faith can never be a finished result, the final outcome of

which is certain, but instead, a striving.

Not surprisingly then, Kierkegaard, like Luther, eschews every false form of

security, be it that of religious speculation or works righteousness. His derision for

the speculative philosophers claims to transcendent knowledge is well known. But

he also rejects the attempt to achieve certainty of salvation by works. Assurance is

attainable only by the repeated appropriation of grace through faith. As such, it

must continually be won anew: Only eternity can give the eternal security of the

forgiveness of sins, Climacus writes, whereas existence has to be satisfied with the

struggling certainty, which is gained not by the battle becoming easier . . . but only

by it becoming harder.62

However, the problematic character of assurance is due not only to the

dynamic character of existence and the hiddenness of faiths object it also stems

from the circumstance that faith itselfis a hidden reality. That being the case, the

individual can never be entirely sure that he or she possesses faith. Kierkegaard

writes:

I cannot get an immediate certainty about whether I have faith for to believe

is, after all, precisely this dialectical suspension that is constantly in fear and

trembling yet never despairs; faith is just this infinite self-concern that keeps

one vigilant in hazarding everything, this self-concern as to whether one also

really has faith and see, just this self-concern is faith.63

61 SV VII 73 (Postscript, KW XII.1, 92, emphasis added). Cf. SV XII 194 (Practice inChristianity, KWXX, 211).

62 SVVII 190 (Postscript,KWXII.1, 226, slightly amended and emphasis added). Cf. SVX 211 and 1778 (Christian Discourses, KW XVII, 211 and 1745) and SV IX 359(Works of Love, KWXVI, 37980).

63 Pap IX A 32 (JP 1:255). The translation is mine.




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words, forhe observes that outwardly [Gods] grace seems to be nothing but wrath

. . . Our opponents and the world condemn and avoid it like the plague or Gods

wrath, and our own feeling about it is not different.72

The fact that Anfgtelse derives from the very nature of the God-relationshipcauses Kierkegaard to refer it to Godrather than the devil. In this (and thevoluntary

nature of Christian suffering) he agrees with Luther without having always

recognized it.73 He refers to Anfgtelse as the Nemesis over . . . [ones] strong

moment. Just when one seems to be on the verge of establishing an absolute

relation to the Absolute, then it is the higher that, seemingly envious of the

individual, wants to frighten him back.74 The similarity to Luthers way of

speaking about the predestinating God who puts on the devils mask in order to test

and strengthen faith is striking.

Anfgtelse, however, is but one form of suffering afflicting those who standbeneath the shadow of the cross. No less than Luther, Kierkegaard is intimately

acquainted with the martyrdom of sin-consciousness. Gods opposition to sin

weighs more heavily . . . than the sleep of death; it effects an annihilating

abasement that prevents one from being able to lift up ones eyes.75

The

condemnation and fear that result from having transgressed Gods law are no

merely provisional state of affairs. Kierkegaard writes: I let the unconditioned

requirementincessantlytransform into worthless rags and wretchedness myself and

what I have become, in so doing, letting the annihilation, the inner annihilation

before God, have its terror, have its pain.76 Luther was, of course, of the same

view. Because the Christian is simul iustus et peccator, he or she is ever in the

process of being condemned and justified, ever subject to the fear that the law

inspires, ever making the transition from death unto life.77

The similarity extends still further, for Kierkegaard points to daily

mortification of the flesh as a salient element of the suffering of the cross, as

well. He calls it dying to immediacy. Because we live in the sphere of the

immediate or finite, we are absolutely enmeshed in relative ends and must

struggle to disentangle ourselves from them. Only thus is it possible to enter into an

absolute relation to the absolute. To this end, self-renunciation is necessary.

Kierkegaard writes:

When God is to love a person, and a person is to be loved of God, then this

person qua selfish will must be totally annihilated. This is to die to, the most

72 WA 31I, 249, 15 (LW 14, 31). See n. 40 above for similar references.73 Pap IX A 292; X1 A 22; X4 A 487; X5 A 39; XI2 A 130 (JP 1:486; 4:4372; 4:4949;

2:1433; 2:1447).

74 SVVII 399 (Postscript, KWXII.1, 459).75 SVXI 266 and 268 (Without Authority, KWXVIII, 130 and 132).76 SVXII 4389 (Judge for Yourself !, KWXXI, 1667), emphasis added.77 Wilfried Joest gives an illuminating discussion of the dialectical alternation between

condemnation and justification in Luther. See his Gesetz und Freiheit. Das Problem desTertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche Parainese, 3rd edn. (Gottingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 605 and 1223.




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intensive agony. But even if the religious person is willing enough according to

his better will, he can neither immediately nor entirely get his will, his

subjectivity, thus into the power of his better will; indeed, the former, after

having initially offered the most desperate resistance, constantly lies in wait,seeking to disturb the entire upheaval by which it was dethroned.78

Dying to self is therefore a daily practice that persists for as long as life lasts.

However, lest it be thought that this is a purely humaneffort, Kierkegaard observes

that the life-giving Spirit is the very one who slays you,79 in words that appear to

be a conscious allusion to those cited earlier from The Bondage of the Will.

Finally, no less than Luther does Kierkegaard regard persecutionas an index of

discipleship. Interestingly, he relates the necessity of persecution to that of dying to

self. And indeed, the two forms of suffering are related inasmuch as the Christianscondemnation ofself-will is tantamount to a condemnation ofall selfishness. This

the world cannot abide. Hence there arises the double danger: dying to oneself

will necessarily entail maltreatment at the hands of ones contemporaries. Not

without justice does Kierkegaard refer this teaching to Luther: This is Christian

piety . . . to deny oneself in order to serve God alone and then to have to suffer for

it . . . It is this that the prototype [Christ] expresses; it is also this, to mention a mere

man, that Luther, the superb teacher of our Church, continually points out as

belonging to true Christianity.80

Kierkegaard goes even further, posing the possibility indeed, the likelihood ofmartyrdomwithin Christendom. Like Luther, he affirms that being a Christian is

neither more nor less . . . than being a martyr; . . . every true Christian is a martyr.81

And like Luther, he can envisage his own martyrdom, not at the hands of the pagans

or Turks, but the Christians! In the late journals he repeatedly observes that the

battle to disabuse Christendom of the delusion that it is Christian will claim

martyrs, the only difference being that these will not bleed as formerly because

they are Christians no, it is almost insane! they will be put to death because they

are notChristians .82 Like Luther, Kierkegaard sees a day approaching when

Christianity will again rise up powerful in the possibility of offense, but blood willagain be required . . . that of the martyrs,83 and speculates that his own situation

may very well become fatal.84

To sum up, all of these kinds of suffering are regarded by Kierkegaard as forms

of concealment of the Christians standing before God. All are negative signs of the

God-relationship.85 Collectively they constitute the cross, the ceremonial court

78 Pap XI2 A 132 (JP 4:4384), translation mine.

79 SVXII 360 (For Self-Examination, KWXX1, 76).80 SVXII 440 (Judge for Yourself !, KWXXI, 169). Cf. Pap X3 A 125 (JP 3:3677).81 Pap IX A 51 (JP 1:481).82 Pap X2 A 460, pp. 3267 (JP 1:516, slightly amended).83 Pap IX B 20, p. 317.84 Pap X1 A 460 (JP 1:383).85 Pap X4 A 456 and 570 (JP 4:4680 and 4682) and Pap X5 A 39 (JP 2:1433).

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dress86 that the Christian puts on in imitation of Christ. The imagery is deliberately

borrowed from Luther, as is the emphasis upon following after [Efterflgelse], in

which Luthers own concept of conformity with Christ reverberates. Kierkegaard

is quick to remind us that Luther did not . . . abolish imitation, nor did he do awaywith the voluntary, as pampered sentimentality would like to have us think about

Luther. He affirmed imitation in the direction of witnessing to the truth and

voluntarily exposed himself there to dangers enough.87

The notion of imitation or conformity with Christ leads to one final

consideration. For Kierkegaard and Luther alike, suffering and discipleship remove

the theology of the cross from the realm of mere cognitive theory (and hence from

the danger of degenerating into a theology of glory) to the personally costly realm

of praxis. By its emphasis upon praxis, Kierkegaardstheologia cruciscombats the

danger of grace being taken in vain within the Lutheran context.88 As such, itassumes the very function that Luthers theology had possessed in an earlier,

Catholic context. Not without justice does Eduard Geismar conclude:

After having gained insight into Luthers theologia crucis it has become easy

for me to say what Kierkegaards primary significance is within the Lutheran

church; just as it is Luthers distinction never to have given up the theologia

crucis, so is it Kierkegaards significance to have reintroduced it at a time

when it had vanished. If one is of the opinion that the Lutheran form of piety

becomes secularized when the theologia crucis is forgotten, we have here astandpoint from which Kierkegaards significance can become clear.89

One might add that the theology of the cross is a self-critical moment of all

theology, a moment that all theology forgets at its own peril.

86 Pap VII1 A 209 (JP 3:2462).87 SVXII 461 (Judge for Yourself !, KWXXI, 193).88 SVXII 314 (For Self-Examination, KWXXI, 24).89 Eduard Geismar,Religionsfilosofi. En Undersgelse af hvad Religion og Kristendom er,

2nd edn. (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1930), p. 342.



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