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A p r i l 2 0 1 2

Tajta: Cv Wa lg EcA l E x E y M A l A s h E n k o

n Ater signing the Agreement on Peace and National Accord with the opposition in 1997, President Rahmon

about building an authoritarian regime in Taiistan.

n Today, the authorities ace several internal challenges: an economic crisis, regionalism, domestic political con

rontation, and radical Islam.

n It will be dicult, i not impossible, to organize Maidan Tahrir-type mass protests o the ind that too p

on Cairos main square and toppled Hosni Mubaras regime in Egypt in the spring o 2011.

n None o the external players today has an interest in radically escalating the situation in the country, much

in provoing Taiistans collapse. Russia hopes to eep the country within its sphere o infuence by particip

ing in ey proects there and providing military aid.

S u m m a

V.14ue 3

BriEFinG

M O S C O W C E N T E R

CARNEGIE

In terms of internal and externalsecurity, ajikistan has been amongthe most problematic countries inCentral Asia. It is the only state in theregion to have gone through a pro-tracted civil war (1992-1997), which,

according to various estimates, killedbetween 23,500 and 100,000 peo-ple1 (perhaps even more) and let theeconomy in ruins. Te causes o thiswar were rooted not only in politicalconrontation, but also in conronta-tion between dierent regions, clans,and personalities, as well as conronta-tion within Islam between those who

sought to build a secular state andthose who wanted an Islamic state.

ajikistan is an ethnic and lin-guistic exception in Central Asia.Unlike most o the regions popula-tion, which is o urkic origin, the

ajiks belong to the Iranian groupand, though they have many ea-tures in common with their neigh-bors, nonetheless maintain a uniqueethnic and cultural identity o theirown. Te ajiks are a settled people,which makes their traditions, men-tality, and behavioral norms dierentrom those o their (until recently)


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2 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 3 ]

alexe mlshenko,

proessor, holds a doctorate

in history and is a member

o the Carnegie Moscow

Centers Research Council andco-chairman o its Religion,

Society and Security program.

nomadic neighbors. Te ajiks aremore religious, hence the earlier andmore intensive revival o Islam thatbegan during the late Soviet periodand steadily became politicized. It

was in ajikistan that the rst andonly remaining legal religious partyin the post-Soviet area was ormed,the Islamic Revival Party (IRP).

Events in Aghanistan (where eth-nic ajiks make up 27-38 percento the population) have a greaterimpact on ajikistan than on any

other Central Asian country. Te1,400 km-long ajik-Aghan borderzone is one o the most volatile inthe Central Asian region. More thanany country, ajikistan wants to seepeace in Aghanistan. Te conict in

Aghanistan resounds in a constanttragic echo across ajikistan. At thesame time, ew remember now that

in the mid-1990s, Aghan politiciansin turn had worried about ajikistanscivil war. It was in Kabul in 1995 thatthe rst real peace talks took placebetween the warring parties in a-

jikistans conict, under an initiativeorganized by then Aghan PresidentBurhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad-shah Masoud, a distinguished Aghan

o ethnic ajik descent. Renownedlm director and public gure DavlatKhudonazarov, who took part in thetalks, said that the choice o Kabul asvenue or the talks was ortunate alsoin that Te very atmosphere o thiscity in ruins was a warning signal tothe ajiks to give up armed conron-tation and seek peace.2

In 1997, the civil war ended ina compromise between the Popu-lar Front and the United ajik Op-position (UO), at the oundationo which was the IRP. Te two sidessigned the Agreement on Peace andNational Accord. Te Popular Fronthowever, saw this deal as a victoryPresident Emomali Rakhmonov (helater de-russied his last name byremoving the ov at the end) setabout building an authoritarian re-gime. Tree circumstances made him

condent o success: rst, ordinarypeople yearned above all or securityand stability ater the civil war yearsand most o society thought a rmhand at the top could bring themthese things; second, Russia, whichin act had supported Rakhmonovboth during his battle with the oppo-sition and as a mediator at the peace

talks, tacitly backed the idea o anauthoritarian regime (essentially a dic-tatorship) in ajikistan; third, Rakh-monov, like the other Central Asianpresidents, had positioned himsel asthe bulwark against Islamic extrem-ism and the only person who couldsave ajikistan rom going down thealiban road (the aliban came to

power in Aghanistan in 1996.)Rakhmon had been head o statesince 1992, when he became chair-man o the republics Supreme SovietIn 1994, he was elected to a ve-yearterm as president, was re-elected in1999 and again in 2006, (to a 7-yearterm; the Constitution was amendedaccordingly in 2003.) Consolidating


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TAjIkISTAN: CIVIL WARS LONG ECHO 3

his regime, he set about purposeullyremoving his rivals rom the ormerUO, thus renouncing the nationalreconciliation policy, and graduallyremoved rom power those amongeven his allies who looked capable obecoming potential rivals. Te list opoliticians removed rom the stageincludes Abdumalik Abdulladzha-nov (prime minister in 1992-1993),Saarali Kenzhayev (ounder o thePopular Front, killed in 1999),Yakub Salimov (ormer interior

minister), and Abduzhalil Samadov(prime minister in 1993-1994, diedin Moscow in 2004).

Rakhmon used carrot and sticktactics. Many o the prominent op-position gures, including eld com-manders, received large land hold-ings, enterprises, and control o somelocal markets ater 1997. Tis was

payment in exchange or abandoningpolitical activities. Head o the UOSaid Abdullo Nuri, who moved intoa ne villa in the center o Dushanbe,also took a passive stance. Te IRPhad two seats in the ajik parliament.Gradually however, Rakhmon startedtaking tougher measures in order toremove real and potential rivals. In

2009, or example, ormer head othe countrys Emergency SituationsMinistry, Mirzo Zeyev, one o themost prominent gures in the UO,died under unknown circumstances.

Pressure on the media increased.As well-known opposition journalistDododzhon Atovulloyev put it, a-jikistan had a ree press beore Rakh-

mon Under Rakhmon Nabiyev[the previous president A.M.], eachtime our newspaper, Charogi Ruz,came out, wed get calls at our o-ce rom the head o the presidentialadministration dozens o ofcials

were red. Ministers trembled whenthey got a visit rom our papers jour-nalists. [President] Rakhmons arrival

in power was the day that marked thedeath knell or our ree press.3 Tereedom o the press index published

by Reporters without Borders placedajikistan at number 122 o 179countries in 2011-2012 (previouslyit had been at number 115.)

Te ruling regime faces severalinternal challenges: a permanenteconomic crisis, regionalism, do-mestic political conrontation, andthe presence o radical Islam. Tese

dangers are all closely interwoven.o a great extent, political conron-tation is rooted in contradictionsbetween the regions (the Sogd,Garm, Kulyab, and Gorny Badakh-shan) and radical Islam, espousedby the opposition, which has itsbase primarily in the Garm andGorny Badakhshan regions. During

i tem tea ad etea ecut, Tajta

a bee amg te mt bematc cute

Ceta Aa. it te tate te eg t ave

ge tug a tacted cv wa (1992-1997), wcaccdg t vau etmate, ed betwee 23,500

ad 100,000 ee (ea eve me) ad et te

ecm u.


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the civil war, separatist tendencieseven emerged in the Gorny Badakh-shan Autonomous Region (thoughthe regions ethnic diversity wouldhardly make it realistic to actuallycarry out such ideas).

Ater an initial lull ollowing thecivil wars end, the Islamists gradu-ally stepped up their activity onceagain. Rakhmon at rst pretendedthat the problem concerned no morethan a ew criminal groups, but since2007 he has been using various pre-

texts to send troops into the RashtValley, where the Islamist oppositionorces have the biggest support (in2009, or example, troops were sentthere ostensibly to destroy the poppycrop, although poppies had neverbeen grown in the valley in the rstplace.)4 Te situation worsened in2010 when rebels emerged in parts

o the country under the leadership

o intransigent eld commandersAbdullo Rakhimov and AlovuddinDavlatov, who were dubbed the a-

jik aliban. Tey engaged in armedclashes with army orces in whichboth sides suered losses (specicallyaround 50 servicemen killed and doz-ens captured by the rebels).

Abdullo Rakhimov (Sheikh Ab-dullo), one o the most prominentgures in the UO, reused to signthe Peace and National Accord Agree-ment in 1997. In 1999, he let orAghanistan, returned to ajikistanin 2009, and resumed his struggleagainst the current regime. Tere arearound 300 armed rebels active inthe country, but, depending on thecircumstances, they could be joinedby tens o thousands o the discon-tented, and could receive support

rom abroad.Te IRPs position inuences the

relations between the Islamic oppo-sition groups and the regime. Sincethe death o Said Abdullo Nuri in2006, the IRP has been headed byMohiddin Kabiri, who espouses re-ormist views and can be seen as apragmatic opposition gure willing

to engage in dialogue with the au-thorities. What is interesting is thatone o the actors prompting thisdialogue is the increasing popularityo the unrecognized Hizb at-ahrirparty and the Bayat organization,which act independently rom theIRP and want to establish a CentralAsian caliphate. Tis runs counter

to the ideology promoted by theIRP, which wants to build an Is-lamic ajik state. Kobiris inuenceamong Muslims has increased in re-cent years. It is telling, too, that hehas concentrated much eort o lateon supporting ajik migrants work-ing in Russia, coming to Russia tohold meetings with them.

Cdatg egme, ram et abut

ueu emvg va m te me

Uted Taj ot, tu eucg te ata

eccat c, ad gadua emved m

we te amg eve ae w ed caabe

becmg teta va.


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Tee ae aud 300 amed ebe actve te cut

but, deedg te ccumtace, te cud bejed b te tuad te dcteted, ad

cud eceve ut m abad.

A struggle or Islam is underwaytoday in ajikistan, with each sidebattling or the right to be the soletrue guardian o tradition, speak onbehal o Islam, and use it as a po-litical instrument. Rakhmon triedto monopolize Islam and deepenits hold on society, setting up a sys-tem o religious education controlledby him, building a huge mosque inDushanbe that can hold 100,000people (some say 150,000 people),and proessing Hana Islam while

trying to diminish the inuence oother currents, above all Sala Islam.He proclaimed 2009 the year o theGreat Imam5 (in this sense, one candraw a parallel between Rakhmonand Chechen leader Ramzan Kady-rov, who, though a secular politician,is a proponent o Chechnyas totalIslamization.)

However, Rakhmons declared Is-lamization policy then began to spinout o his control. A parallel religiouseducation system developed that wasnot controlled by the president, andthe sermons read in the mosqueswere not always in line with HanaIslam or with the ofcial ideology.Not all o the clergy has been loyal to

the regime. Rakhmon soon realizedthat he had ailed in his bid to bringIslam under his own control, and asa result Islams increasing inuencein society began to threaten the re-gime itsel. He then took measures tocurtail religions political inuence.In 2010, he started closing mosquesin which non-loyal clerics preached,6

ordered 1,400 students studying inIslamic institutes abroad to returnhome (including 200 rom Iran),7and banned women rom wearingtraditional Muslim clothing in pub-lic places, above all in state institu-tions. Tis de-Islamization reacheda peak in 2011 with the adoption othe law on Parental Responsibilityor the Education and Upbringing oTeir Children, which bans children

under 18 rom attending mosquesunless accompanied by older amilymembers.8 Te law drew erce criti-cism rom Muslim aithul and has

been violated en masse.Having lost in the Islamic eld,

Rakhmon continued to strengthenhis authoritarian regime, trying to re-move any real competition to himsel.A total o 70.6 percent o the voterssupported the presidential NationalDemocratic Party in the February2010 parliamentary election, and it

won 52 o the 85 seats. Te IRP gottwo seats (it came in second placewith 8.2 percent o the vote), as didthe Communist Party, the Party oEconomic Reorm, and the AgrarianParty. Not without justication, theopposition accused the authoritieso alsiying the elections, and Rakh-matullo Zairov, leader o the Social


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Te Taj dug tacg maa, wc cude

a zeabe umbe bueaucat, a a

eug wt te tatu qu. Tu, te t

de ucceed gazg ma tet, te

w ecute t etace. rate ta eadg

t a ae egme cage, a ew ctat cud

ue a ew cv wa.

Democratic Party, which did notmake it into the parliament, spoke oa usurpation o power.9

Rakhmons desire or absoluterule has sometimes gone to absurdlengths. It is now customary in a-

jikistan to address the president asChanobi Oli, an expression iden-tical in meaning to Your Majesty.Te political system has taken thenepotistic turn typical o Central

Asian regimes, with practically every

member o Rakhmons amily (andhe has nine children) getting a highofcial post.

ajikistans regime looks similarin some respects to Kurmanbek Ba-kiyevs toppled regime in Kyrgyzstan.Te ajikistan News website eaturesvery telling and even provocativecomparisons between the two coun-

tries. Te author o one commentwrote, Te Kyrgyz agreed amongthemselves, got together, and within aday sent Bakiyev packing. Yes, people

were injured, there were victims, butthey achieved their goal, and kickedhim out!10

Ater going through a stabilizationperiod, ajikistan has once again re-

turned to the crisis point it was at inthe early 1990s, when open strugglesbetween the central government andthe regional elites spilled over intocivil war,11 wrote journalist and ana-lyst Sanobar Shermatova in 2010.

In 2010-2011, Rakhmon ap-parently realized (prompted byhis survival instinct) that it wouldbe dangerous to tighten the screwsany urther, all the more so with thecountry in such a difcult economicsituation. According to the National

Bank o ajikistan, per capita incomein 2009 came to $879 as calculatedat current price levels.12 ajikistanhas 45 percent o its people livingbelow the poverty line. Tere was aslight improvement in the economyin 2011, but this had practically noimpact on living standards or mosto the population.

In any event, in a hint o the re-gimes new willingness to liberalizea little, it began dismantling thepersonality cult that had built uparound Rakhmon. Photos and post-ers o Rakhmon disappeared romthe streets in March 2011. Severalrebels were amnestied at around thesame time. In August 2011, coincid-

ing with the 20th anniversary o a-jikistans independence, Rakhmonsigned a law that made possible thebiggest amnesty the country hadseen yet: 15,000 prisoners were eli-gible under its provisions, o whicharound 4,000 were reed. Makhmad-said Abdullayev, speaker o the up-per house o parliament and mayor


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i 2010-2011, ram aaet eazed (mted

b uvva tct) tat t wud be dageu t

tgte te cew a ute, a te me wt

te cut uc a dcut ecmc tuat. pubcdctet ctue t gw ad ca te t

u g.

o Dushanbe, made a call to protectpersonal rights and act within thelaw. Rakhmon proposed remov-ing articles 135 and 136 (slanderand deamation) rom the Crimi-nal Code and including them in theCivil Code instead, which could beseen as opening the way to greaterreedom o the press (however, onJanuary 12, 2012, an attempt wasmade on the lie o independentjournalist and opposition gureDododzhon Atovulloyev, though it

is practically impossible to nd outwho exactly was behind this crime.)

Finally, in response to rising oodprices in February 2011, Rakhmongave the order to top up the market

with stocks o buckwheat, rice, andour rom the countrys strategicreserves. Tese, however, have onlybeen hal measures. Public discon-

tent continues to grow and socialtension still runs high. Dodod-zhon Atovulloyev said that the only

way to change the current regimewould be to organize our own a-jik ahrir.13

o replicate the mass protests onCairos main square that toppledEgyptian President Mubaraks re-

gime in the spring o 2011, however,would be difcult, i not impos-sible. Rakhmons regime does haveits supporters, above all among thenumerous bureaucrats, who in turnare all backed by their own clans.Te president can count on the sup-port o the region around his hometown Kulyab, too. Te ajik drug

trafcking maa, which includes asizeable number o bureaucrats, isalso happy enough with the status

quo. Tus, i the opposition doessucceed in organizing mass protests,they will encounter sti resistance.Te situation in this case wouldbe more reminiscent o the con-rontation just beore the civil warbegan, when the so-called Islamic-democratic opposition gathered onShakhidon, one o Dushanbes twomain squares, and the regimes sup-

porters gathered on the other mainsquare, Ozodi. Rather than leadingto a painless regime change, a newconrontation could usher in a newcivil war.

Even i the opposition were suc-cessul, it is by no means clear who

would come to power. Te IRP, theregional clans, who eel slighted

by Rakhmon and his team and areed up with the Kulyab clan hold-ing power, and the local drug ma-as all have their eyes on power. Ahypothetical victory o the opposi-tion would not bring down the levelo internal instability. Te IRP sawits inuence grow considerably in2010-2012, and its support among


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Mcw wat t ee Tajta wt t ee

fuece b tag at e ject tee

(eeca eeg) ad vdg mta ad.

Mgat te te bg act g Tajta

t rua. oe tee Taj ame a at eat e

am membe wg abad, te vat majt

tem rua.

the public now surpasses the 5-10percent that experts were giving itbeore. Islamist victories ollowing

the Arab revolutions in the MiddleEast have clearly played a part here.Te IRP sees itsel as their ideologi-cal ally and is ready to take on theresponsibility o government oncethe authoritarian regime alls. Tepartys criticism o the regime has be-come noticeably stronger and moreuncompromising in 2011-2012.

What impact on the situation in

ajikistan do outside actors have:China, Russia, the United States,and immediate neighbors, in par-ticular Uzbekistan? None o thesecountries would want to see a sharpescalation o the situation in ajiki-stan, not to mention the countryscollapse. First, this would destabi-lize the entire Central Asian region;

second, it could open the way or

radical Islamists with ties to theirideological allies in Aghanistan totake the stage and turn the countryinto another base or internationalterrorism; and third, it would in-evitably provoke a new ood oreugees streaming in dierent di-

rections, and their presence couldaect the situation in neighboringcountries as well as in Russia.

Tus, no matter what the stateo relations between outside actorsand Rakhmon and his regime, noone is prepared to provide supportto his opponents. Some experts saythat ajikistan is trying to win itselthe status o a Chinese province,14

and Beijing is perectly happy withthis. Washington has been increas-ing nancial aid to the ajikistani

government, incorporating it intoits security strategy or the regionNeither the United States nor Chinahave any interest in a potential a-

jik spring.Russia, o course, by no means

wants anything o the kind eitherMoscow wants to keep ajikistan

within its sphere o inuence by tak-

ing part in key projects there (espe-cially energy projects) and providingmilitary aid. Te oundations orthis military cooperation betweenthe two countries were laid in theperiod o civil war, when Russia paidhal the costs or deending the a-

jik-Aghan border.15 Tis mutuallyadvantageous cooperation played a

big part in helping Rakhmon stayin power. Rakhmon was later ableto count on the support, albeit tacit,o Russias 201st Division, whichremained in ajikistan and becamethe backbone o the Russian mili-tary base established there in 2004.

Ater Moscows decision to up-grade the bases arms and equip-


9/12


n eg act rua, Ca, te Uted state,ad Tajta mmedate egb, atcua

Uzbeta wud wat t ee a a ecaat

te tuat Tajta, t t met

te cut cae.

ment, Russian military hardwareworth an estimated $1 billion willbe handed over to ajikistan, in-

cluding 160 tanks (-62, -72),140 armored personnel carriers,169 inantry carrier vehicles, anartillery repair and maintenancecomplex, a portable surace-to-airmissile Igla, 30 Shilka and Osa airdeense systems, and 4 helicopters.16Tese weapons, though outdated,nonetheless provide great supportor the regime in its ght against

domestic opponents and can helpto protect the borders, includingby acting as a deterrent in ajik-Uzbek relations.17

Migration is the other big actorlinking ajikistan to Russia. One inthree ajik amilies has at least oneamily member working abroad,the vast majority o them in Rus-

sia. According to the ajikistan Mi-gration Control Directorate, there

were 1.032 million ajiks in Rus-sia at the end o 2011 (since thespring o 2012, a special newspaperor them,Mukhodzhir, even startedcoming out in Dushanbe.) In 2011,the migrants sent $2.96 bln home,

which came to 45.4 percent o a-

jikistans GDP.18

A conict erupted between Rus-sia and ajikistan in 2011 over thedetention and arrest o Russian pilotVladimir Sadovnichy (who was ar-rested together with Estonian citizen

Alexey Rudenko). Te two were ac-cused o smuggling aviation-relatedspare parts, illegally crossing the

border and violating internationaltransport regulations. Te pilot wassentenced to eight-and-a-hal years

in prison, which provoked an ex-tremely negative reaction on behalo Russian politicians (includingPresident Medvedev) and uellednationalist sentiment in Russiansociety. Some State Duma deputiesdemanded that Russia deport ajikmigrants and introduce visas as ameans o punishing ajikistan.

Te tension abated ater Rakhmondecided to release Sadovnichy and

let him return home. Still, the actthat Moscow showed its willing-ness to use migration as a means oexerting pressure on ajikistan willcertainly have a negative impact onuture relations between the twocountries and orce Dushanbe toput more emphasis on a multi-vec-tor policy and the search or alter-

native partnerships.Whats more, the conict overthe Russian pilots arrest came at abad time or Moscow (in the sec-ond hal o 2011, when the Krem-lin was actively promoting the Cus-toms Union and Eurasian Unionprojects and trying to engage a-

jikistan as well). Te authorities in


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Dushanbe have barely even con-sidered the possibility o joiningthese organizations at a high level

and have so ar only hinted at thehypothetical possibility that theymight participate.

On the issue o ajikistan join-ing the Customs Union, let alonethe Eurasian Union, ajik analystsalso take into consideration Uz-bekistans negative attitude towardthese projects, and think that it

would not be particularly advanta-

geous or ajikistan to join both othese organizations i Uzbekistanis not also involved. O course,ajikistans participation would re-move obstacles in the way o mi-grants going to Russia and reducethe costs o energy imports, grain,and some other goods, but it wouldalso deal a blow to cheap imports

rom China, Iran, and urkey, andspell nancial ruin or the busi-nesspeople involved in trade withthese countries. As ajikistans For-eign Minister Khamrokhon Zarisaid, I ajikistan were to join theCustoms Union now the benets

would be insignicant.19 None-theless, Russia still hopes to see

ajikistan reach a positive decisionwith regard to the new orms o co-operation within the ramework othese organizations.

ajikistan will hold a presiden-tial election in 2013. No one cansay yet exactly what it will looklike. Under the constitution, Rakh-mon cannot stand or another

term in ofce, but the practicein the Central Asian countries isor their rulers to get around this

law by adopting amendments tothe constitution to allow them tostay in power. It is not yet known

whether Rakhmon will take thisroad. Whatever the circumstances,i he does decide to relinquish thepresidency to whomever it be, he

will demand rm guarantees o se-curity or himsel and his relativesrom his successor.

Another possibility would beto carry out a rotation along thelines o Russias tandem solution,

with the next president just llingthe seat or Rakhmon, who wouldthen return to ofce in seven yearstime. Tis, however, is an unlikelyscenario because the coming yearsin unstable ajikistan could bring

events that would cut Rakhmon andhis clan out o power or good.

I events ollow the constitution,ajikistan will have a new president,

who will have the job o tacklingthe problems let by his predecessorand making changes to the politicalsystem. We cannot say yet whetherthe new president will continue to

bolster the authoritarian regime orwill take the risk o at least partiallydrawing on Kyrgyzstans reormexperience.

Te new president will have toact in two seemingly mutually ex-clusive directions: maintain a rag-ile stability, yet at the same timecarry out reorms and ght corrup-


11/12


tion and the drug maa. o undertake these two tasks simultaneously willbe quite a challenge.

noTEs:

1Te demographic consequences o ethnic and regional conicts in the CIS [De-mogracheskie posledstvia etnicheskikh i regionalnykh koniktov v SNG], Popula-tion and Society, no. 27 (April 1997); A. Niyazi, ajikistan: regional aspects o theconict (1990s) [ajikistan: Regionalnie aspekty konikta (1990s)], Ethnic andRegional Conicts in Eurasia, Book 1: Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Moscow: VesMir, 1997), p. 52.

2

A. Lyakhovsky and V. Nekrasov, Citizen, politician and soldier, (Moscow: 2007),p. 270.

3 M. Yanovskaya, 100th anniversary o the press gets journalists let o going toprison [ajikistan: V chest 100-letia pechati zhurnalistov reshili ne sazhat], http://www.ergananews.com/article.php?id=7308&print=1.

4 S. Shermatova, What is happening in ajikistan and how should we view it?[Chto proiskhodit v ajikistane i kak k etomu sleduyet otnositsia?], http://www.ergananews.com/article.php?id=6801.

5Reerence to ounder o the Hana school, 8-9th century theologian and jurist Abu

Hania.6 Some mosques closed or purely economic reasons, as well, when some communi-ties, especially those in rural areas, could not raise the unds or their upkeep.

7 A. Dubnov, ajikistan: a new opposition or an old president [ajikistan: No-vaya oppozitsia staromu presidentu], Rossia v globalnoy politike, no. 2 (March-April2011): pp. 134-137.

8 D. Sariyev, Stable instability [Stabilnaya nestabilnost], Oazis, no. 24 (164) (De-cember, 2011).

9 http://tjknews.com/?p=1497.

10 http://http://tjknews.com/?p=2060.

11 Shermatova, What is happening?

12ajikistan Country Report, http://www.gmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/165-tajikistan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz1qsi82UH.

13 http://www.ergananews.com/article.php?id=7260?print=1.

14 M. Gusarov, Acquired ajik-deciency syndrome [Sindrom priobretennogotajikidetsita], Eurasia Center, February 23, 2011.


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15 R. Masov, Current problems in the ajik peoples historiography and history(Dush-anbe: 2005) p. 227.

16 V. Georgiyev, ajikistan: Russian arms will make Rakhmonovs regime more eec-tive [ajikistan: Rossiiskoe oruzhie sdelayet rezhim Rakhmonova bolee deesposob-nym], http://www.ergananews.com/article.php?id=5396.

17 A. Kazanstev, Te Russian military base in ajikistan is needed above all orajikistans own security [Rossiiskaya voyennaya baza v ajikistane nuzhna dlya bezo-pasnosti prezhde vsego samogo ajikistana], Russian Council or International Aairs,http://russiancouncil.ru/?id4=234.

18Cross-Media(A Euromoney Institutional Company), March 29, 2012. Accordingto other estimates, ajiks send home rom $3.5 billion to $4 billion, which comes to35-40 percent o the countrys GDP.

19 D. Sariyev, All possible alliances, [Vse vozmozhnye soyuzy], Oazis, no. 23 (163)

(December 2011).

www.caege.u

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el: +7 (495) 935-8904

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E-mail: [email protected]

http://www.carnegie.ru

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International Peace, with head-

quarters in Washington D.C., is

a private, nonprot, nonpartisan

organization dedicated to conduct-

ing independent policy research and

advancing cooperation between

nations. In 1993, the Endowment

launched the Carnegie MoscowCenter to help develop a tradition

o public policy analysis in the coun-

tries o the ormer Soviet Union and

improve relations between Russia

and the United States.

In 2007, the Carnegie Endow-

ment announced its New Vision

as the rst multinational and

ultimately global thin tan, add-

ing operations in Beiing, Beirut,

Brussels and Almaty to its existing

oces in Moscow and Washington.

The Endowment uses its experi-

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o the Carnegie Endowment or International Peace or the Carnegie Moscow Center.

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MalashenkoBrifing 14-3-12 Eng Web