Masters thesis_Tatevik

Tatevik RevazianCpr.: 220188-2950Supervisor: Marion PoetzSTU: 177.864 / 74 pages

17 October 2014

Exploring Impact of Government Intervention on Growth in a Multisided PlatformA comparative case study on Copenhagen Airport and Zvartnots Airport

Master ThesisM. Sc. Management of Innovaton and Business DevelopmentCopenhagen Business School 2014

Tatevik RevazianSupervisor: Marion PoetzSTU: 177.864 / 74 pages

17 October 2014

Tatevik Revazian, 17 October 2014 Copenhagen Business School

Page 1 of 74

Abstract

Every day we are surrounded by multisided platforms; when chatting with friends over

Facebook, buying a book at Amazon, booking a room using Airbnb, and paying for our

daily activities using our Visa cards. Although these successful companies sell different

products, they have one important thing in common: They create value by enabling

interactions between two or more customer groups. Furthermore, since successful

multisided platforms have strong network effects, they tend to grow and tip towards a

single dominant platform creating high barriers for entry, thus motivating an increasing

number of policy makers to intervene. This is where the heart of this study lies: Exploring

impact of government intervention on growth in multisided platforms. The research is

based on a comparative case study assessing airports as multisided platforms. Since airports

operate in a highly regulated industry, they serve as a prominent example for government

intervention and growth. This study proposes three growth factors that impact growth in

multisided platforms: I) Government involvement in operations; II) Government control

in market access; and III) Government investment efforts. Where the two first growth

factors display negative impact on growth when governments intervene, growth factor

three reveals positive impact on growth. The purpose of this study is to inspire the

development of an economic model where the discovered growth factors can be tested and

thus complement the limited literature on the topic.

Key words: Multisided platforms; government intervention; airports; aviation industry.


Page 2 of 74

Table of Content

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 3

2. Literature review ...................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Brief insights into multisided platforms ................................................................................... 6 2.1.1 What is a multisided platform? ................................................................................................. 7 2.1.2 Main strategic challenges characterizing MSPs ........................................................................... 9

2.2 Incentives for government intervention ................................................................................ 12 2.2.1 Three central views on state-business evolution .......................................................................... 12

2.3 Government intervention in multisided platforms .............................................................. 16 2.3.1 Determining market power ...................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Antitrust regulation of pricing ................................................................................................. 18

3. Method and case description ................................................................................ 21

3.1 Qualitative research design ....................................................................................................... 21 3.2 Comparative case-study approach .......................................................................................... 22 3.3 Case selection ............................................................................................................................. 24

3.3.1 Case description A: Copenhagen Airport ................................................................................. 25 3.3.2 Case description B: Zvartnots Airport ..................................................................................... 27

3.4 Data collection ........................................................................................................................... 29 3.4.1 Primary data ........................................................................................................................... 29 3.4.2 Archived data ......................................................................................................................... 31

3.5 Data reduction and coding ....................................................................................................... 32 3.6 Drawing conclusions and verifying data ................................................................................ 34

4. Findings and analysis ............................................................................................ 35

4.1 Government involvement in operations ................................................................................ 35 4.1.1 Moving from public- to private management ............................................................................. 35 4.1.2 Is privatization of old state-owned monopolies good or bad for growth? ...................................... 38 4.1.3 Pricing and anti trust .............................................................................................................. 42

4.2 Government control of market access ................................................................................... 46 4.2.1 Assessing government role in market liberalization ................................................................... 47 4.2.2 In the name of national security – constraints on liberalization ................................................. 52

4.3 Government investment efforts .............................................................................................. 54 4.3.1 Attracting sales through promotion .......................................................................................... 56 4.3.2 What comes first: Infrastructure or growth? .............................................................................. 60

4.4 Summary of findings ................................................................................................................. 65

5. Discussion ............................................................................................................. 66

5.1 Academic implications .............................................................................................................. 67 5.2 Managerial implications ............................................................................................................ 69 5.3 Further research ......................................................................................................................... 70

6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 71

6.1 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 72

7. References .............................................................................................................. 73


Page 3 of 74

1. Introduction

In the past two decades, the world economy has been met with significant changes due to

growing globalisation of markets and industries. This has subsequently led to increasingly

fierce competition, changing the existing “rules of the game” and forcing companies to

redefine markets, restructure operations, and modify their business models in order to

survive (Wiersema & Bowen, 2008; Govindarajan & Gupta, 2011). As a consequence of

this period, a “multisided-platform bubble” emerged delivering significantly higher

percentage profit margins than those enjoyed by traditional resellers. Multisided platforms

(MSPs) are defined as technologies, products or services that create value primarily by

enabling direct interaction between two or more customers or participant groups (Hagiu,

2014). Some of the most well known examples of the new business model are eBay (buyers

and sellers), Airbnb (dwelling owners and renters), the Uber app (professional drivers and

passengers), Facebook (users, advertisers, third-party game or content developers), PayPal

(merchants and consumers), shopping malls (retail stores and consumers), Ticketmaster

(event venue and consumers) and many more. The MSP business model differs from the

more-conventional denotation of a “one-sided” market. In one-sided markets, the

merchant acts as an intermediary that buys from sellers and resells to buyers, whereas

multisided platforms act as intermediaries that enable affiliated sellers to sell directly to

affiliated buyers. MSPs are more complex entities than one-sided markets because they

involve more players, each with their own interests to be served. Furthermore, the value

that customers experience on one side of the platform typically increases with the number

of participating customers on another side. This is often referred to as indirect network or

cross-side network effects. Multisided platforms are continuing to play an increasingly

important role in the global economy; as a result, in the past decade, they have become one

of the most active areas of research in economics and strategy, while also drawing a

considerable amount of interest from practitioners (Hagiu, 2014/2011; Hagiu, 2007;

Appold & Kasarda, 2011; Schmalensee, 2010; Bolt & Soramäki, 2008).

The majority of existing literature within the field of multisided platforms is based on what

management can do to design an MSP that serves the needs of all their constituents,

thereby attracting growth. For example, Hagiu (2014) suggests how management can

regulate the behaviour of the platform’s participants by raising questions such as “who is

allowed to join” and “what are the various sides allowed to do?” However, these questions


Page 4 of 74

and the general economics of multisided platforms are also highly relevant and important

for an extensive variety of policy issues. For example governments have played a vital role

in enacting policies concerning antitrust enforcement in MSPs. These policies have

especially dealt with pricing issues to avoid monopolization and vertical contracting. MSPs

are particularly at risk because they are likely to tip towards a single dominated platform

due to network effects (Hagiu, 2006; Rysman, 2009). This study aims to inspire general

growth parameters for an economic model, which could complement the limited findings

on government intervention in MSPs. The idea is to move beyond the traditional

management focus towards exploring what impact policy makers have had on attracting (or

distracting) growth in MSPs. This leads to the research question that this paper will

address:

Figure 1: Contribution to the research field

“How does government intervention affect growth in multisided platforms?”

The research question will be answered through an exploratory comparative case study on

Copenhagen airport (located in Denmark and operating since 1925) and Zvartnots Airport

(located in Armenia and operating since 1961). The cases are found to be highly compatible

because they share an ambitious growth vision, while offering both interesting and

contrasting situations in terms of the changing roles of policy makers. Both airports are

privately operated, however Copenhagen airport was liberalised in 1997, while the domestic

civil aviation sector in Armenia has only recently (October 2013) become liberalized

(DK04_r1; Arka, 2013a). Answering the research question by looking at international

airports through the lens of multisided platforms is interesting because despite

liberalization, the sector is still highly regulated by both national and international policies

affecting potential growth opportunities. Staniland (2003) goes as far as calling airlines

“government birds” because the government has played a crucial role in the evolution of

Multisided

Government

Growth

factors


Page 5 of 74

the industry since the 1920s: “Air service has long been seen as the driver of economic development just

as economic development is a driver of air service” (Appold & Kasarda, 2011: 99). Based on the

mentioned interlink between airports and policy makers, Gillen (2011) and, less directly,

Starkie (2001) have suggested that the MSP framework can provide important insights for

both airport management and policy makers. Both groups have a stake in guiding airports

to add value through active engagement in matchmaking, for example, between airlines on

one side and passengers on the other, rather than acting as passive infrastructure providers

or local monopolists. The reason is that airlines search for and benefit from large passenger

pools, just as passengers search for and benefit from a large choice of airlines and routes.

Both parties obviously gain from each other’s presence and the relationship also

incorporates other wide-ranging MSP constituents, such as retail outlets and hotels. Serving

all sides well is beneficial for both the airport operators and their constituents in terms of

profit-making, as well as for policy makers aiming to increase the passenger flow to the

country, thereby enhancing business and tourism opportunities (Appold & Kasarda, 2011;

Ivaldi et al, 2011). Nevertheless, the discourse surrounding MSPs in regards to airports

remain a controversial topic of discussion, as evident from Fröhlichs (2010) critical

contribution to the topic. However, the discussion is outside the scope of this paper.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section is a literature review divided into three

parts. The first two parts provide an overview of the main components of the paper by

briefing on what multisided platforms are, whilst illuminating three central views on state-

business relations. The learning derived from the first two parts is relevant for

understanding part III, assessing the limited literature on government interventions in

MSPs. The following section illuminates the method and research design that is critical for

understanding on which basis the research question is based upon. Obviously, the heart of

the study lies in the analysis section, where three main propositions (or growth factors) are

suggested for answering the research question. And finally the discussion of the findings

serves as the catalyst linking the theoretical and empirical findings.


Page 6 of 74

2. Literature review

In the past decade, the economics of multisided platforms has been established as a

substantial area of research, leading to the development of rapidly expanding literature in

economics, antitrust and strategic management. Evans & Schmalensee (2013) have

identified more than 200 articles on multisided platforms, which have appeared in print or

in the form of a working paper since they last surveyed this area in 2007. The article list is

available for review in Appendix E. This is not a surprising development considering that

MSPs, such as Amazon, eBay, Facebook and Google, are behind some of the fastest-

growing businesses in the past decade. These companies are playing an increasingly

important role in the global economy, inspiring governments around the world to enact

policies that have implications on heir evolvement. This is for example evident with the

rising popularity of the open source software movement, where governments have been

promoting open software systems at the expense of proprietary systems (Hagiu, 2006).

Nevertheless, at this stage no papers have directly focused on how government

intervention can enable or deter growth in MSPs and this obviously has implications on the

literature review below. The purpose with the first two sections is to serve the

understanding of the two main actors in this study: Section 2.1 will illuminate the

characteristics of multisided platforms and section 2.2 will study the evolution and distinct

views on government-business relations in general. The aim of this section is not to be

exhaustive on the topic, but rather to state the relevance of dealing with government

intervention in businesses. Subsequently, section 2.3 will assess the limited findings of

government intervention in MSPs and exemplify the ambiguity that policy makers are faced

with in terms of multisided platforms compared with traditional businesses.

2.1 Brief insights into multisided platforms

This section will firstly focus on illuminating what multisided platforms are and what

determines whether or not a market is multisided. To gain more profound knowledge of

the topic, the following section will cover Hagiu’s (2014) framework that identifies four

main strategic decision challenges characterizing MSPs. The framework draws on more

than 10 in-depth case studies conducted over the last five years by one of the most quoted

researchers within MSPs.


Page 7 of 74

2.1.1 What is a multisided platform?

Despite the fact that research on MSPs is one of the most active areas of research in

economics and strategy, relevant literature has struggled with the lack of agreement on a

proper definition. Existing definitions suffer from excessive specificity, over-inclusiveness,

or too much vagueness to be of use. This vagueness has left the term to be disconcerted

with the common question “after all, isn’t every market two-sided? (Hagiu & Wright, 2011: 2).

Hagiu (2014) recently proposed a concise and clear definition that is used for this study.

“Multisided platforms are technologies, products or services that create value

primarily by enabling direct interactions between two or more customer or

participant groups (p. 71).

Evans and Schmalensee (2007) propose a less formal definition of MSPs, which has the

purpose to capture the key features of platform businesses: “A multi-sided platform (which

they call an economic catalyst), has (a) two or more groups of customers; (b) who need

each other in some way; (c) but who cannot capture the value from their mutual attraction

on their own; and (d) rely on the catalyst to facilitate value- creating interactions between

them.” Armstrong (2006) uses the term two-sided markets instead of MSPs and defines it

as “two groups of agents who interact via ‘platforms’, where one group’s benefits from

joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform”. It may

confuse the reader that multisided platforms are also often referred to as two-sided

platforms, but in this paper the use of MSPs is more prevalent because the focus on two

sides is unnecessarily restrictive. Also, most use of two-sided markets has referred to

businesses as “platforms” despite that not all platforms are MSPs. Platforms are more

broadly defined as essential products, services or technologies upon which other products

or services can be built (Hagius & Wright, 2011; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). This paper

focuses specifically on MSPs including relevant literature on two-sided markets and not

platforms in general. When the word ‘platform’ is used, this study still refers to ‘multi-sided

platforms’.

As previously stated, MSPs are behind some of the fastest-growing businesses that have

emerged over the past decade. Due to these circumstances the research has drawn

considerable interest from practitioners that are trying to replicate successful business

models based on MSPs (Hagiu, Wright, 2011): “Airbnb was valued at about $2.5 USD in its


Page 8 of 74

private funding round in October 2012. That’s the gold at the end of the multisided platform rainbow that

many seek” (Hagiu, 2014; 79). Nevertheless, most replication efforts fail because building

and managing a winning platform is not an easy gain. Successful MSPs are rather the

exception than the norm because they are based on highly complex organizational

structures that serve the needs of multiple sides simultaneously (Hagiu, 2014). MSPs are

not restricted to regular businesses, but also encompass groups of firms, not-for-profit

organizations and even cities that create a valuable interaction service (e.g. credit card

networks) (Hagiu & Wright, 2011). MSPs differ from the more conventional terms “one-

sided markets” and “input suppliers”. In one-sided markets, as e.g. grocery stores,

merchants act as intermediaries that buy from sellers and resell to buyers, whereas MSPs

act as intermediaries that enable affiliated sellers to sell directly to affiliated buyers. Input

suppliers only have one customer group affiliated as opposed to multiple. An example of a

MSP is the online video platform, Brightcove, which enables media companies such as

Discovery Channel, Fox, Sony Music to create and post high-quality videos on their

websites to be watched by users. However the users do not need to install or subscribe to

Brightcove and can automatically play Brightcove-powered online videos from any website,

while the content providers control all the important aspects of the video. Thus, although

Brightcove enables direct interactions between online content providers and users, there is

no meaningful sense in which users are affiliated with the Brightcove platform (Hagiu,

2007 in Bolt & Soramäki, 2008; Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu & Wright, 2011). Figure 2 simplifies

the key distinctions between MSPs, re-sellers and input suppliers.

Figure 2: Differences between MSPs, re-sellers and input suppliers

Source: Hagiu & Wright (2011)


Page 9 of 74

Amazon.com is one of the best examples to use when distinguishing the three

organisational structures. Initially, Amazon simply started as an online retailer, reselling

books sold by its publishers. Today Amazon’s business model has evolved to

encompassing all three structures. The company acts as a) a re-seller, when it buys and

resells products under its own name; b) an MSP, when it enables third-party sellers to sell

on its website, thereby giving the seller and buyer the opportunity to interact directly while

Amazon simply takes a cut from the corresponding revenues; c) an input supplier, when it

supplies its Amazon Web Services (e.g. data storage, computing power, APIs for e-

commerce applications) to thousands of third-party developers and website operators.

Furthermore, Amazon also serves as a good example of products and services, which are

one-sided, but hold the potential to be expanded into an MSP. Moving from one-sided to

MSPs can be particularly powerful because it can be exceedingly difficult to get both

merchant and consumers to adopt it simultaneously. A business having a strong existing

relationship with either side (merchants or consumers), which can be leveraged, is in a

much better position to become a successful MSP (Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Hagiu, 2006b).

2.1.2 Main strategic challenges characterizing MSPs

As previously stated, Hagiu’s (2014) framework identifies four main challenges that

characterize multisided platforms: The number of sides to bring on board, pricing

structures, multisided platform design and governance rules. The first challenge, the number

of sides to include in the platform, is one of the basic questions that any management team

should consider when building an MSP. In some cases the choice is obvious and

constrained by the industry itself, while in other situations, the management has to face

critical decision-making challenges. Illuminating previous studies on MSPs, one general

assumption seems to be certain: “In practice most successful multisided platforms evolve relatively

slowly […]” (Evans, 2003: 350) because they have to solve the key challenge known in the

literature as the chicken-and-egg problem. This refers to the need to at least attract a critical

mass of users to ratify their existence. The payment card industry provides a clear example,

as the card will be worthless to individuals if few merchants accept it, and likewise

worthless to merchants if few individuals use it. Due to the indirect network effect on the

demand side and fixed costs of establishing the platform, in practice, most successful MSPs

tend to grow and tip towards a single dominant platform creating high barriers for entry

(Evans, 2003; Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Hagiu, 2014).


Page 10 of 74

The second challenge refers to price setting in MSPs, which to this date, is one of the first and

most dominant areas in economics and strategy work on MSPs. One can argue that a

market is multisided if the platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more

to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount.

For example, this is relevant when illuminating the airport industry where passengers are

better off if there are more airlines, and airlines are better off if there are more passengers.

Therefore, it is more attractive for airports if they can earn revenues from both sides by

obtaining a positive margin on the airline side, and negative margin on the passenger side

to encourage an increasing volume of transactions, and thus increasing the total airport

revenue. At first this may seem counterintuitive, but this is not the case when considering

the fact that costs can be cross-subsidized in two-sided markets. From this it can be

derived that there is no meaningful economic relationship between benefits and costs on

each side of the market when considered alone. Change in demand or cost on one side of

the market will inevitably affect the level and relationship of prices on all sides (Hagiu,

2014; Appold & Kasarda, 2011; Evans, 2003). Thus, Hagiu (2014) suggests three pricing

principles that the management is ought to consider in MSPs. Firstly, in multisided

platforms, the price sensitivity should be considered individually for each side of the

platform and can be estimated by the availability of substitute services or simply by

bargaining power. Secondly, if there is no priced transaction between the sides, then the

side that stands to benefit more of the presence of the other side should be charged more.

On the other hand, if there is a priced transaction between two sides, then the side that

extracts most value should be charged more. Selecting the right pricing strategy is difficult

because it includes considerations of multi-faced factors that are strongly ambiguous in a

MSP setting (ibid.).

The third challenge is platform design, which can comprehend a remarkable variety of

functionalities and features that serves its multiple sides by performing two fundamental

functions, which are reducing search costs and reducing shared costs. Search costs are

defined, as costs that are incurred by the multiple sides before they actually interact,

whereas shared costs are costs incurred after the search is over and the transacting parties

have found each other. Search costs can enable the sides to determine the best “trading

partners”, which is the case in a matchmaking context such as eBay, with buyers and

sellers, and Match.com, with men and women. Shared costs (also referred to as duplicate

costs) represent expenses that can be allocated between different members of the relevant


Page 11 of 74

sides of MSPs. PayPal (acquired by eBay in 1999) serves as a good example for reducing

both search and shared costs by offering a convenient way to settle transactions while

reducing asymmetric information through their Feedback Forum. Decisions on which

functionalities and features to include in the MSP when deciding on cost reduction can be

centered on a straightforward cost-benefit analysis: “If the cost of building and implementing is

less than the value created for the multiple sides served, include them” (Hagiu, 2014: 74). The greatest

challenge when designing an MSP is to ensure that all the interests of the sides are served

because it is common that some features can create strategic trade-offs for the MSP

because they generate positive value for some participant groups or for the MSP itself

while creating negative value for other participating groups (Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu, 2006b;

Hagiu, 2014).

The fourth challenge is governance rule, or more specifically nonprice governance rules, that

can play a major role in MSPs because their core value is facilitating interactions between

third parties. These rules can be regulating access (who is allowed to join) and interactions

(what are the various sides allowed to do). There is considerable variance across MSPs in

terms of how loose (or tight) their governance rules are, even within the same industry,

which can clearly affect the entire ecosystem and customer proposition. The purpose of

having tighter governance is often to pursue quality rather than quantity, but the benefits of

higher quality have to be weighed against the costs of implementing tighter governance

rules. This point is well explained when considering the two leading online dating sites in

the US, Match.com and eHarmony. Match.com places minimal restrictions on who can

sign up on their platform and how their members interact, whereas eHarmony has

implemented some of the tightest governance rules among online matchmaking services in

terms of both access and interactions. When visiting eHarmony the users are required to

complete a questionnaire of approximately 250 questions. This information is then

processed and used to screen the applicants in terms of their access criteria. This means

that the platform provider has the option of refusing membership to some applicants, even

if they are willing to pay the membership fee. Furthermore, once granted admission,

eHarmony’s members are not allowed to view profiles and communicate freely. Instead,

the company uses a matching algorithm to generate potential matches for every member,

and each member can communicate only with her or his potential matches. Governance

rules, such as those imposed by eHarmony, are indispensable and should be considered by

the management. Hagiu (2014) mentions three situations where market failure cannot be


Page 12 of 74

regulated through e.g. pricing, and therefore active governance becomes central in order to

prevent the ecosystem from not functioning properly or collapsing: a) Insufficient

information and transparency in the market with respect to the quality of the goods and

services exchanged through the MSP, which can enable low-quality suppliers to drive out

high-quality ones; b) too much competition on one side of an MSP reducing incentives to

invest in developing high-quality products or services; c) without some form of strict

governance by the MSP, each constituent might fail to take actions or make investments

that would have positive spillover effects for the MSP and its other constituents (Hagiu,

2014; Hagiu, 2007).

2.2 Incentives for government intervention

In order to understand the incentives of government intervention and thus meet the

research gap of this study, it is relevant to go back in history and recognize the general

implications of how state-business relations have evolved. The relationship between state

and business can also be referred to as: capitalism versus communism; privatization versus

nationalization; or markets of business versus controls of governments (Mintzberg, 1996).

This section provides a brief and descriptive synopsis, which takes a look at three distinct

views on state-business relations to understand the roots of policies concerning

government interventions today. Examples are provided to establish an even deeper

understanding of these economic theories in practice. The aim of the section is neither to

give thorough definitions of the mentioned terms, nor to distinguish “rights from wrongs”.

Instead, the section provides different perspectives on the nature of interactions between

state and business, and how this relationship has evolved over time. This section will

mostly serve as background knowledge for understanding the challenges and contradictions

that businesses and policy makers face today.

2.2.1 Three central views on state-business evolution

Historical developments reveal that the interrelationship between government and business

is highly relevant to consider in terms of wealth creation. The synergistic interaction

between government and business entities can yield more favorable results. Successful

exchange between both actors can lead to a more effective deployment and allocation of

resources, more appropriate management of industrial policy, the removal of significant

obstacles and barriers to growth, and the creation of a better model for wealth generation


Page 13 of 74

and distribution. Conversely, the failure to collaborate can lead both parties to engage in

harmful behavior, causing social and economic deficiencies and disproportionate wealth

distribution favoring a few beneficiaries (Velde, 2010ab). This points towards a context

where the opportunities for cooperation between the public and private sector are

becoming increasingly prevalent. “Business can learn from government no less than government can

learn from business […]” (Mintzberg, 1996: 83), emphasizing an increasing relevance for an

effective collaboration between the government and business sectors, one that can support

stable economic conditions. Effective government-business relations that support stable

economic conditions are linked to growth and learning through three main functions: a)

addressing market and coordination failures, b) addressing government failures, and c)

reducing policy uncertainty (Velde, 2010ab; Mintzberg, 1996; Lin & Monga, 2010).

British economist John Maynard Keynes (5 June 1883 – 21 April 1946) was the first to

argue for the importance of a balanced partnership between the government and business

to afford welfare in the society: “Keynes thought that capitalism was brilliant, but left to its own

devices it could also go seriously wrong. It was up to the governments to step in and get the economy back on

track” (GD12_v1: 1:18). In his book “General Theory of Employment, Interest and

Money,” Keynes supports government intervention during unstable economic conditions,

where the government bears a responsibility in revitalizing the economy through funding

initiatives, albeit at the expense of incurring debt (Keynes, 1936). Modern Keynesianism is

acknowledged as the government’s attempt to increase control over economy, making it a

controversial and relevant topic of contemporary debate. For the first time since the 1930s,

we are facing the same problems that plagued Keynes’ lifetime: market failure, banking and

financial crises, long-term economic slump, and increased unemployment, to name a few.

Keynes believed that an economy was characterized by unpredictability; when an economy

became predictable, it would most often lead to an economic disaster or shock. This was

apparent in 2007, before the financial sector collapsed after a historical boom, and similarly

in 1929 before the Great Depression. Furthermore, Keynes realized that the market

economy could not stabilize itself without government intervention. He stated that in case

of a crisis, the solution is for government and business sectors to start initiatives together

to save the economy (Keynes, 1936; GD12_v1). The construction of the Hoover Dam is

one of the most iconic examples that represent a period when the economy was failing and

the U.S. government intervened. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt proposed that the

federal government would play the key role in developing the Colorado River as part of the


Page 14 of 74

New Deal (Hiltzik, 2010). President Hoover launched the construction of the dam,

marking it as the largest construction project in the world during that time. Initially,

President Hoover was opposed to the idea of the government generating electricity when

private utility providers could supply it. However, he was under great pressure to create a

federal public works program to create new jobs and revitalize employment (Hiltzik, 2010),

and the 165 ml. USD investment did just that, producing billions in economic growth: “The

Hoover Dam is a monster of cement and steel, but has also become a symbol, conjuring up a time when

politicians could react to economic calamity not with paralysis […]” (GD11_a1: section 2). Although

the project signified the government’s ability to complete such a large-scale undertaking, it

also brought to light the pivotal role of government. The Hoover Dam project intended to

benefit Western states by securing a water supply; however, the very people who benefitted

from the construction of the Dam lost control over managing the resources, such as the

water, provided by the Dam (Hiltzik, 2010). As the main investor, facilitator, and manager

of the Hoover Dam construction, the federal government still maintains control of the

historical infrastructure (ibid.), highlighting the long-term effects of government

involvement. The Hoover Dam project is a helpful example for analyzing and anticipating

both the positive and negative benefits the role of the federal government can play.

Where Keynes is recognized for encouraging government-business interactions, two

additional viewpoints are critical to mention: Free Market and State Control. A free market

economy is based on supply and demand with little or no government control, often

referred to as the “invisible hand”. The Scottish inventor of the term, Adam Smith (5 June

1723 - 17 July 1790), is referred to as the world’s first free market capitalist. Contrary to

Keynes, Smith saw the responsibilities of the government being limited to defense of the

nation, universal education, public works (infrastructure such as roads and bridges) and the

enforcement of legal rights (property rights and contracts) and punishment of crime.

Hence Adam Smith was a major proponent of laissez-faire economic policies (Smith,

1776). One of Smith’s successors in the free market thinking, the Austrian (and later

British) economist and philosopher, Friedrich Hayek (8 May 1899 - 23 March 1992), spent

his life in disputes with John Maynard Keynes, because he believed that trying to solve the

debt problem in the 1930s by incurring even more debt was equivalent to using “fire to

turn off fire”. Hayek believed that almost any government intervention in the market, such

as setting state tariffs to support businesses or manipulating the level of the interest rate,

would end in disaster, even during periods when the economy is troubled. His idea was to


Page 15 of 74

free the market to avoid power becoming centralized in the government. He believed the

market would do a far better work in regulating itself, if only government would leave it

alone (Hayek, 1944; GD12_v2). In his book, “The Constitution of Liberty,” published in

1960, Hayek states, “it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the greatest danger to liberty today

comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in modern government, namely, the efficient

expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regards as the public good” (p.262). More

recently, Mintzberg (1996) argued that looking back in time, the free market and privately

owned corporations have served the distribution of goods and services well by letting the

open-market forces lead the way.

Lastly, the paradigm where the state has full control is predominantly guided by Marxian

and Marx-inspired economics, initially developed by Karl Marx (5 May 1818 – 14 March

1883) and Friedrich Engels (28 November 1820 – 5 August 1895), both born in Germany.

On a basic level, Marx acknowledged and explained the downside of capitalism, stating that

capitalist systems were not the most efficient or functioning. Through his writings, such as

The Communist Manifesto (1848) and Das Kapital (1867–1894), Marx criticized the

capitalistic tendency to overproduce, thus diminishing profit realization. Furthermore, he

pointed out that a capitalist system encouraged pyramidal distribution of wealth, where a

few players at the top of the pyramid were the most profitable at the expense of society.

He claimed that economic success was a more achievable goal if the public and private

sector were one, where government owned and controlled businesses. In his viewpoint, the

market alone is not inherently good for society, and therefore, state control is necessary

through a centralized economy. The establishment of communism and the Soviet Union is

the most notable example of state-controlled economics, such as state ownership of

production supplies and collective farming (Davies, 1994). The economic plans, also

known as the Five-Year Plans, were based on a system of centralized planning to fuel the

national economy, and could be financed by taxes, also known as “centralized social

income” (Manasta, 1968).

The three paradigms of economic thought briefly presented above are meant to display the

different levels of involvement a government can exercise within economic policy making,

while showcasing the development of the relationship between the private and public

sectors. In the face of the current economic crisis, the three views of Keynes, Hayek and

Marx offer varied approaches in considering the dynamic nature of markets, and can


Page 16 of 74

significantly impact future actions taken by both the state and the business. For example,

Mintzberg (1996) argues that the strict state control of all organized activities during the

Soviet era subjected the countries within the USSR to an internal imbalance since there was

little or no counteracting force to promote equilibrium. Nevertheless, Mintzberg believes

that currently, there is a similar imbalance in the West as the opposite effect of the Soviet

era is taking place. Suddenly, companies are treated more favorably than the state, causing

more rights to be compromised as people lose more of their individual freedom (ibid.)

Considering these three views and applying them within this specific context creates an

opportunity for both governments and businesses to further explore a holistic approach in

designing and maintaining effective policies that further promote healthy state-business

relationships, and in turn, can strengthen the current economic state. For the purposes of

this research, the influence of these three views will be indirectly and directly drawn upon

throughout the paper when relevant.

2.3 Government intervention in multisided platforms

Multisided platforms are increasingly playing an important role in the global economy by

delivering significantly higher percentage profit margins than those experienced by

traditional resellers. However, whilst they are prospering, MSPs also bring up several new

challenges that have proven to have implications on social efficiency. This is often

measured by social welfare, which consists of welfares of all parties involved in the market.

Consequently an increasing number of policy makers are starting to devote considerable

attention to some of these markets, with the aim of enacting policies that improve social

welfare distribution. Hence, as in traditional one-sided markets, the government interferes

with regulatory actions in multisided markets with the aim of affecting decisions made by

individuals, groups, or organizations regarding social and economic matters (Hagiu, 2006;

Hagiu, 2013; Rysman, 2009; Hayashi, 2008).

2.3.1 Determining market power

Due to strong network effects, successful MSPs have a tendency to tip towards a single

dominated platform by reaching equilibrium where all agents sign up exclusively to a single

platform (cf. section 2.1.2). This often leads to high entry barriers, which can have

important implications for market power and thus motivate antitrust regulators to

intervene and determine whether the platform has enough power to engage in certain


Page 17 of 74

anticompetitive tactics, and whether those tactics will lead to an increase in market power:

“[…] a firm has monopoly if it has the power to control prices or exclude competition” (Evans, 2003:

p.362). When examining market power in multisided platforms it is important to define

whether the agents choose to single-home, where they connect to only one platform to

transact on, or multihome, where they connect to several platforms (Bolt & Soramäki,

2008). For example, in the payment card industry it is found that consumers prefer single-

home and thus put a great majority of their payment card purchases on a single network.

The level of concentration only varies slightly with the choice of network or consumer

characteristics such as income, education, and spending. This means that the only way for

the other side (the merchant) to reach those agents (the consumers) is through their

preferred platform. Thus, in the case of single homing, the MSP has substantial market

power over the merchant. On the contrary, the power of the platform becomes

considerably less when assessing agents that multi-home. In practice, however, only few

consumers regularly use multiple networks; therefore, one can argue that the majority of

MSPs are characterized by closed, proprietary and monopolistic platforms with high entry

barriers (Rysman, 2007b; Song, 2013).

In terms of social efficiency (defined in section 2.3), there is a widely held view among

policy makers and economists that open platforms are intrinsically more desirable than

closed, proprietary and monopolistic platforms. Competition among platforms is favored

because by encouraging competition, policy makers can hinder monopolists in earning

abnormal profits at the expense of consumers and society. Despite being against

government interventions, Friedrich Hayek (cf. section 2.2.1) would have supported the

this view on competition. He believed that every market participant faces knowledge

problems due to imperfect information, but that these problems can be solved with the

help of competition (Lindstadt, 2009).

Today, the necessity for policy makers to regulate multisided platforms that devise

anticompetitive strategies is not different than in one-sided market platforms, but the

implications are more complex, less transparent and not fully understood. Antitrust studies

on multisided platforms have surprisingly found that, because of the two-sidedness,

encouraging competition in one or both sides (consumer or merchant) may negatively

affect social efficiency. Welfare analyses in two-sided markets follow a very different logic

from those in one-sided markets and may lead to counterintuitive conclusions (Carbó-


Page 18 of 74

Valverde, 2009). One example is linked to when the United States’ government strongly

considered intervening with Microsoft’s growing market power. Intuitively the tens of

thousands of software applications that run on Windows demonstrate the existence of

significant entry barriers and market power, which could directly lead to antitrust issues.

Nevertheless, the government viewed their growth as socially efficient and pro-competitive

because it made the platform product more valuable for all customer communities. Hence

the government decided to look at the Windows platform as an efficient structure because

it enabled welfare of all parties involved in the market. Conventional competition policies

would have disrupted welfare because regulating business monopolies can hinder the

emergence of a platform and deprive consumers of benefits (Rysman, 2006a/2009/2007b;

Evans, 2003; Hayashi, 2008). This learning has implications on what is the most optimal

intervention approach for governments in terms of multisided platforms. Two main

approaches that are prevalent are: ‘The Rule of Reason’, which tends to analyze each case

individually and ‘Per Se Rules Approach’, which sets up rules for antitrust authorities to

follow when evaluating competition issues. In terms of MSPs, Christiansen and Kerber

(2006) suggest a competition policy that lies between the two mentioned approaches. That

is having a certain set of rules, which are applied, but also leaving space for case specific

analysis in order to do justice for the differentiation of individual cases. This solution has

two advantages because on one hand it considers differences and complexity, which is

missing when applying per se rules, and on the other hand it limits the time and costs spent

for purely single case analysis (Lindsta dt, 2009).

2.3.2 Antitrust regulation of pricing

The section above stated the importance for policy makers to determine market power in

terms of deciding when to intervene in multisided platforms. However, understanding the

price structure is one of the most conventional and direct tests of market power. When

considering traditional one-sided markets, policy makers can simply determine market

power by testing whether the price increases in markets with less competition. In this case,

economic theory predicts that prices will go up if the market becomes more concentrated,

leading consumers to be worse off. In terms of policy makers the situation could be

relevant in case of mergers where the antitrust authorities often play an active role in

approving or disapproving the merger strategy based on the outcome. Nevertheless, it is

significantly more complex for policy makers to evaluate the pricing structure and its


Page 19 of 74

implications on social welfare when looking through the lens of a MSP (Rysman, 2009;

Song, 2013). For example, the Canadian newspaper industry has been empirically tested on

whether prices for circulation and advertising has gone up following their mergers, and it

was found that greater concentration did not lead to higher prices on either side of the

market. Furthermore, welfare calculations on magazines in Germany (serving readers on

one side and advertisers on the other side) shows that despite higher ad prices, advertisers

were not necessarily worse off as magazines usually obtained “enough” extra readers with

lower copy prices. In fact, the results showed that larger reader bases may even increase

advertisers’ demand to a level where magazines can still attract more advertisers with higher

ad prices.

Hence the economics of platform businesses suggests that certain practices that may

appear anti-competitive – recouping losses from “low prices” on one side through “high

prices” on the other side – are natural, pro-competitive practices. This can have important

implications on when and how policy makers should decide to intervene in MSPs. It can

especially be confusing because in certain situations MSPs can act as traditional businesses

that raise their prices to exploit their market power, while in other cases they can instead

choose to subsidize prices to attract more agents on one side and thus make even higher

profits from agents on the other side. If attracting one group of agents (say sellers) makes

the platform particularly attractive to the other group (say buyers), then sellers will be

subsidized (Song, 2013; Hagiu, 2014; Armstrong & Wright, 2005). This is for example the

case with American Express. In 2004, the firm reported that it had earned 71 percent of its

card-related revenues from the merchant side of the business, whereas in contrast

cardholders paid no annual fees. If the industry is particularly important for the function of

the society, then local governments or the local business community are sometimes willing

to subsidize low costs in order to increase output, although the practice sometimes runs

afoul of competition laws. This is the case for the aviation sector where governments have

subsidized costs to increase the flow of tourists (Appold & Kasarda, 2011; Weiner &

Wright, 2005; Song, 2013; Rysman, 2007b; Evans, 2003;). John Maynard Keynes would

most likely have supported such a wider perspective and intervention in multisided

platforms, especially during times of crisis.

From the findings identified above, it can be derived that in terms of MSPs, policy makers

should be aware that analysing the price structure of one market in isolation without


Page 20 of 74

considering the other market might be misleading. Therefore an emerging literature on

two-sided networks focuses on the appropriate pricing to coordinate the two sides, and

thus induce participation while maximizing the intermediary’s profit (Bakos &

Kastsamakanas, 2008). At this stage, studies have found that the most efficient pricing

structure that maximizes social welfare can create strategic trade-offs generating positive

value for some participant groups or for the MSP itself, while creating negative value for

other participating groups. For example, considering the payment card industry again,

consumers who use alternative payment methods instead of cards (such as cash and

checks) would most likely be worse off, if the product price they face is higher due to the

introduction of payment cards. To avoid such a situation, merchants can price differentiate

(or in other words surcharge) between payment methods, thereby maximizing social

welfare. This pricing policy has been implemented in the payment card industry in

Australia, Switzerland, Sweden1 and the United Kingdom. In order for this pricing policy to

become effective, it requires widespread practice among merchants, which is not always the

case. “Empirical evidence from other countries, such as Netherlands and Sweden, suggests that although

merchants are allowed to set different prices to their customers, many of them do not do so” (Hayashi,

2008: 11). According to the Reserve Bank of Australia, surcharging card customers is

becoming more common among merchants, but larger merchants are more likely to

surcharge than smaller counterparts. Hence, the experience in these countries may imply

that setting prices across payment methods is costly for merchants. Furthermore, in order

to effectively set different prices, merchants need to know the exact level of both merchant

fees and cardholder fees, which can be difficult to attain. In the United States, for example,

even the “average” cardholder fees in the industry as a whole are difficult to obtain

(Hayashi, 2008). In summary, it can be concluded that pricing in MSPs are strongly

ambiguous, thus making it highly demanding for policy makers to evaluate the price

settings in terms of welfare.

1 Today, surcharging is not allowed in Sweden (Hayashi, 2008)


Page 21 of 74

3. Method and case description

In the previous section, existing literature on government interventions in multisided

platform was elaborated. It was learned that government impact on growth in MSPs has

not systematically been addressed in prior research. Therefore this study is likely to be the

first to systematically explore how government interventions impact growth in multisided

platforms. This finding has convincing implications on the chosen research design

illuminated in figure 3. However the figure below does not attempt to fully imitate the

research process, but rather aims at easing the readers understanding with a structured

approach.

Figure 3: Illustration of research design

3.1 Qualitative research design

In order to meet the research gap of this paper a qualitative research design was adopted

with the aim of discovering how policy makers have caused or deterred growth in

multisided platforms. To reach this objective an inductive approach was used to identify

the unknown variables in the research question. The inductive approach is a systematic

method for analysing qualitative data, which is highly suitable considering the lack of

previous experience from similar projects. This approach is appropriate when the aim is to

seek new insights, to ask questions, assess phenomena in a new light and gain knowledge

about a topic of interest. Notwithstanding, that no clear theoretical framework was


Page 22 of 74

deduced in the literature review section, in practice the paper has included some elements

from the deductive approach. This is was for example the case when developing a theory-

based interview guide (cf. section 3.4.1).

Using the inductive method, no propositions were found at the initial stages of the research

and the researcher was not sure about the type and nature of the findings until the study

was completed. Consequently, the research process was iterative rather than linear with on-

going feedback between data collection and data analysis enabling the flexibility to alter the

direction of the research when it was necessary (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012;

Eisenhardt, 1989; Huberman & Miles, 2002). The basic idea of the inductive approach is to

move from the specific to the general; most inductive studies report a model that has

between three and eight main categories in the findings. Correspondingly, this study has

discovered three main growth factors related to government intervention in MSPs (cf.

figure 4 in section 4.4). In search for these categories the researcher began with specific

observations gathered at the initial stage of research, more specifically during her feasibility

visit to Armenia in April 2014. The process then moved into the development of tentative

propositions that were identified and explored during in-depth data collection. Throughout

this stage important, themes, patterns and relationships created the foundation for the

growth factors to be discovered (Robson, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2009;

Huberman & Miles, 2002; Thomas, 2003). When gathering qualitative data, the researcher

held an epistemological position called interpretivism, which respects the difference

between people and objects of the natural science and therefore requires the social scientist

to grasp the subjective meaning of social action. Simply put, the epistemological position

indicates that we know something exists because of the knowledge we have about it and it

answers the questions that begin with “how” or “what”. In contrast, a quantitative study

consists of sampling numerical data and exhibiting the relationship between theory and

research through deductive reasoning (Bryman & Bell, 2003, Lor, 2011).

3.2 Comparative case-study approach

Considering the complexity and changing nature of the research question and the context

in which it operates, the research is applied to case studies. The reason is that the case

study approach has the ability to deal with “how and “why” questions that often explain

contemporary events. The broadly acknowledged definition of case studies is provided by


Page 23 of 74

Yin (2009): “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth

and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not

clearly evident” (p. 18). In this study, the comparative case study approach has deliberately

been selected to fill in the missing gaps in the analysis and not to seek a direct replication

of a case (Eisenhardt, 1989). Nevertheless, in any case study research, two important

factors have to be considered: The choice of the cases and the number of cases selected.

Beginning with the latter, the number of case studies selected in comparative case study

approach is closely related to the chosen research design. Qualitative-oriented researchers

as in this paper tend to see advantages of few-case comparisons in relation to more

quantitative-oriented researchers who seek to conduct variable-oriented studies of many

cases. In this paper two case studies have been selected to look more closely into the

complexities of the research question. By contrast in variable-oriented studies many cases

are studied and the focus is on a limited number of variables removed from the concrete

reality and context of the cases studied (Lor, 2011; Ragin, 1987). The weakness of

quantitative many-case comparisons are that the variables tend to be conceptualized and

measured at a shallow level. The findings can show some degree of confidence that

relationships exist between the variables, but this may not tell much about the nature of the

relationships, which can be more easily determined with the few-case selection (Lijphard,

1975 in Lor 2011). On the other hand, while the qualitatively oriented case-study research

may include several cases, the number of cases is limited by the extent to which they can be

investigated intensively. Numerous scholars argue that few-case selection cannot represent

a valid sample of the population, bluntly criticizing and showing skepticism towards its

ability to generalize. However, Flyvbjerg (2006) and Lor (2011) state that it is possible to

generalize from case studies if cases are strategically selected, meaning that they are strongly

related to the problem identified in the research question. Hence few carefully selected

cases can compensate with the inability to sample from a large population. Therefore one

of the most critical questions for qualitative-oriented researchers is to ask themselves,

which case studies they should select in order to make the study useful for generalization

(ibid.).


Page 24 of 74

3.3 Case selection

The research question will be answered through an exploratory comparative case study on

Zvartnots Airport (located in Armenia and operating since 1961) and Copenhagen airport

(located in Denmark and operating since 1925), because despite their similar vision they

offer interesting and contrasting situations in relation to the research question. Sartori

(1991) states, that in order for entities to be compared they should both have shared and

non-shared attributes. Hence they should at the same time be “similar” and

“incomparable”. It is intuitively obvious that there is little point in comparing entities that

are so different that hardly any commonality can be found. Neither is it useful to compare

entities that are so similar that little difference of interest can be found (Lor, 2011). Both

airports are serving small nations with ambitious growth visions. Copenhagen Airport

envisions to become the preferred gateway to Northern Europe and Zvartnots Airport has

an ambitious vision to connect Europe to Asia due to its lucrative location. Both airports

are known in their regions for high quality, efficiency and precision. Furthermore in 2014

they have shown impressive, record-breaking growth rates, and now they work towards

their goals of serving almost twice as many passengers in the future. By working towards

those goals, both airports have a special focus on attracting more transit passengers by

investing largely in space and better facilities (e.g. Intv_DKae1; Intv_AMae1). Although

they are highly different in the number of annual passengers they serve, it is found that

their similar vision and objectives make them highly compatible for a comparison.

Having stated the similarities, Copenhagen and Zvartnots airport differ in terms of the key

research area: Government impact on growth. However, these differences are timely

bound, because where the role of the Danish government changed substantially in the 90s

due to airport privatization and market liberalization, the same changes came later in

Armenia. Zvartnots Airport was privatized in 2002 and the Armenian domestic civil

aviation sector has only recently (late October 2013) become liberalized. Before that, due to

state regulated market, the airport experienced immense challenges attracting growth (e.g.

Intv_AMae2; Intv_DKpm1). Moreover, since growth in the aviation sector is highly

impacted by government policies enabling economic development in the country, it is

important to understand the context the airports operate in. Both countries are small and

independent, but where Denmark is a developed country in the West representing world-

leading firms in pharmaceuticals, maritime shipping and renewable energy; Armenia is a

developing country that only recently (in 1991) became independent from the Soviet


Page 25 of 74

Union, still struggling with a narrow export base, and pervasive monopolies in important

business sectors and is continuously highly depended on Russia (DK13_w1; AM13_w1).

These differences have strong implications for understanding the context of the analysis.

As a final note, it shall be mentioned that in addition to both cases being carefully selected

for the purpose of this study, a determining factor was simply that the researcher is familiar

with both cases and has been able to get access to relevant data (Lor, 2011).

3.3.1 Case description A: Copenhagen Airport

Copenhagen International Airport (CPH) was founded in 1925 and is considered one of

the first civil airports in the world. The airport serves the small, but modern and

prosperous country, Denmark. The Kingdom of Denmark is located in Northern Europe

bordering the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and borders Germany on a peninsula (Jutland) in

the south. The country size is 43,094 sq. km and the population in July 2014 was estimated

to be 5,569,077. The country has been a member of the EU since 1973 and therefore the

Danish aviation market was liberalized along with other member states in the 90s.

Copenhagen airport is located on the island of Amager, just a 12-minute train ride to the

heart of Copenhagen, and 20-minute train-ride to the center of the Swedish city Malmö

(DK14_w1, w2; w15). The airport handles 60 scheduled airlines and has set a passenger

record in 2013 with 24.1 million passengers (62,000 per day), which corresponds to a year-

on-year growth rate of 3.1% and passenger record for the third consecutive year. This

makes the airport the busiest international airport in Scandinavia, and the preferred hub of

Northern Europe. Furthermore, the growth numbers at Copenhagen Airport are higher

than most other European hub airports (DK14_w1; DK14_r2, r3). More recent numbers

indicate that 2014 will likewise become a record year for CPH. From January to June 2014,

the airport increased the number of passengers with 7.3 pct. (serving 12.36 ml. passengers)

compared to the same period in 2013. Furthermore June 2014 became the busiest month

in the history of Copenhagen Airport with a flow of more than 2.5 million passengers

(DK14_a2).

The initial foundation for growth was established from a strong collaboration with its

Scandinavian peers. After the Second World War, the big dream was to reach the USA;

however, due to financial constraints in reaching this goal, the Scandinavian states decided

to collaborate. The hub airline, Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), that was founded by the three


Page 26 of 74

states, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, soon became the first airline company to fly over

the Northern pole (DK13_v1). The growing SAS enabled tremendous growth to

Copenhagen Airport due to an agreement signed in 1946 between the three Scandinavian

governments. In the agreement, SAS meant “infrastructure” for Norway and an “industrial

company” for the Swedes, while the main objective of Denmark was to make Copenhagen

airport a big workplace: “When we were joking in SAS. We said the Danes get the traffic, the Swedes

get the head office and the Norwegians had the option to be proud of it. This was a joke between the Danes

and the Swedes and the Norwegians didn’t like the joke” (Troels Rasmussen, SAS 1985-2005,

Chief of Information in DK13_v1). Today the collaboration has changed substantially and

Gardermoen airport in Oslo and Arlanda airport in Stockholm have become one another’s

competitors. Where the airports in Norway and Sweden have remained government-owned

the Danish authorities only holds a minority share 39.2 pct. The majority share of 57.7 pct.

is owned by the holding company, Copenhagen Airports Denmark, which is jointly owned

by the Canadian Pension Fund Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board (OTPP) and

Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund III (MEIF3) (DK14_w16; w17; w9; DK14_r4).

Unlike the other Scandinavian airports, a considerable share of the passengers at

Copenhagen Airport are international: “On a flight from CPH to Bangkok often only 40% of the

passengers are from Denmark or Southern Sweden: The remainder have flown in from the rest of the

Nordic region, Germany, the Baltic States or elsewhere in Europe” (DK14_r3: 11). Copenhagen

Airport has become a hub for Scandinavian Airlines, Norwegian Air Shuttle and EasyJet.

This coupled with the airport’s 23,000 employees serving in the many companies has made

Copenhagen Airport one of the highest-ranking airports in the world (DK14_r2). In 2013,

Copenhagen Airport received a number of awards for the “world’s best security

processing”, for being “the most efficient airport in Europe” and “the world’s best airport

at route development” in the 20-to-50-million passenger category. Furthermore, CPH was

the proud winner of three of the prestigious Food & Beverage Awards “FAB Awards” at

the 2013 ceremony held in Dubai (DK14_r3). The worldwide recognition of CPH is

important in terms of attracting growth and reaching the ambitious plan revealed by the

management team in 2012, under the title “World Class Hub”. The plan aims at handling

almost twice as many passengers (around 40 ml. passengers) per year. However, it is

unclear when the goals will be reached. According to the CEO, Thomas Woldbye, it may

take 15 or 25 years (DK14_a3/a8; DK14_r3). In connection with this goal a recent


Page 27 of 74

agreement affirmed that Copenhagen Airports A/S would invest 250bl. in expanding the

capacity of CPH. All these steps, and the collaboration with airlines, passengers, policy

makers and business community, are vital for moving towards reaching their ambitious

growth plan, that will further put Denmark on the map as an international metropolis

(DK14_r2). Hence Copenhagen Airport is constantly evolving and much has happened

since the airplanes landed on the few grassy meadows kept short by a herd of sheep in

1925. Today the airport would be unrecognizable for the many Copenhageners who found

the airport an extraordinary attraction in the pioneering years, where flying was only for the

privileged few (DK14_w2).

3.3.2 Case description B: Zvartnots Airport

Zvartnots International Airport began its operations in 1961 solely serving the territory of

the Soviet Union. Nevertheless Armenia’s aviation history dates back to 1933 where the

first regular flight from Yerevan to Tbilisi was carried from Southern Airfield (former name

of Erebuni Airport). Today Zvartnots Airport has become the main port to the Republic

of Armenia. The airport is located 12 km west of the capital city, Yerevan, and it takes

around 20 minutes to reach the city center by taxi. Currently driving is the only possible

means of transportation to the airport (AM14_w4; AM14_v1; AM13_a1; AM04_a1).

Armenia is a developing, unexplored and “young” economy in the sense that it declared its

independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The country is placed in the Southwest

Caucasus region, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It is bordered by Georgia to the

north, Azerbaijan to the east, Iran to the south, and Turkey to the west. Placed in a

landlocked location with limited road and train connectivity the civil aviation is vital for the

country. Armenia’s land area is 29,800 square kilometers (the size of Belgium) and the

population consists of 3.1 million inhabitants. Nevertheless, it is estimated that more than

10 million Armenians live abroad (primarily in Russia, USA and France) and they are

behind most of the traffic at Zvartnots and thereby act as an engine of growth for the

airport (AM13_r1; AM10_p1; AM14_w1). The owner of Zvartnots Airport, Eduardo

Eurnekian, is a member of the widespread Diaspora being a second-generation exile born

in Argentina who has amassed a $1 billion portfolio of businesses, including 53 airports in

the world. His company Corporatión América (CASA) is an Argentine investment group

active in airport business, cargo, fuelling terminal and more. The company is the parent of

Armenian International Airports (AIA) that in 2001 signed a 30-year concession agreement


Page 28 of 74

with the Armenian government for the management of operations at the airport. When the

company took over Zvartnots Airport, it was in a very bad condition and needed

completely new facilities in order to meet its natural position as the stopping point between

east and west, between Asia and Europe, as well as north and south, between the Middle

East and Russia. Therefore, the building of a new terminal started later same year and was

finalized in 2011 (AM14_w3; AM14_v1; AM09_w1). The new terminal is now based on

the highest international standards comprising a two-story building with departure and

arrival halls, registration offices and shops. The building is entirely wrapped in glass, giving

it an ethereal beauty, while also specially designed to keep the building cool in the summer

and retain heat in the winter, thus cutting down the energy use. Before the renovation,

Zvartnots Airport could serve two million passengers annually, now the airport has the

capacity to serve three million passengers per year (AM09_w1; AM09_a1). Furthermore,

the CEO of the airport states that the infrastructure is built in a flexible way that makes it

easy to double in size: “This airport was built for many more passengers than we actually have, so this

is what we are expecting and what we are working towards” (AM14_v1: 02:45). One of the main

reasons for the expected growth is that the domestic civil aviation sector in Armenia has

recently (in late October 2013) become liberalized (AM03_a4). Before the liberalization the

Armenian hub airline, Armavia announced its bankruptcy and the airport lost a key

customer that flew 100 times a week to over 40 destinations in 20 countries. But

surprisingly, the vast gap was instantly filled in, and as a result of the “open sky” policy,

Zvartnots airport has experienced substantial growth in the first 6 months of 2014 with an

increase of more than 25% in the number of passengers and flights. Comparing the month

of June in 2013 and 2014 the number of flights rose by 42% moving from 1,405 flights to

1,995 flights. Almost all airlines increased their frequencies to all destinations and six new

companies started operating on a regular basis; one of the most recent examples is Etihad

Airways (AM14_a1; AM14_a3). In 2013, Zvartnots Airport was named the best airport in

the category of “Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic

States” in the context of the 2nd Annual Airports Conference and Exhibition held in Dubai,

and furthermore the airport has demonstrated best practices in energy management and

environmentally sustainable design in the region and beyond (AM10_p1; AM09_w1).


Page 29 of 74

3.4 Data collection

The data collection in this paper is three fold: a) in-depth interviews, b) selected, public

archival data. Furthermore there are a limited number of non-publicly available documents.

3.4.1 Primary data

In order to study the research question interviews have deliberately been conducted with

two distinct groups of stakeholders: “Airport experts” consisting of airport management,

consultants and airline representatives, and “policy makers” representing the main

government bodies dealing with the local airports in both Denmark and Armenia.

Understanding both groups and their relationship serves well in terms of MSPs because it

enables the researcher to understand the indirect network effects that link them (Evans &

Schmalensee, 2013). In total eight semi-structured open-ended interviews and five

unstructured interviews were conducted with both airport experts and policy makers. Table

1 and 2 in Appendix A provides an overview of their positions, the institutions they

represent and the interview- date, format, evidence and coding. Due to the discretion of

the respondents, the names are marked confidential. Furthermore, respondent

‘Intv_DKam2’ requested special discretion, and therefore the institution he represents is

also marked confidential. Moreover, the results of the confidential interview are only used

as background knowledge and are not directly referred to in the paper. To meet this gap

the researcher has deliberately identified other sources stating the same arguments.

The interviews were primarily conducted face-to-face in Danish/English in Denmark, but

also Armenian/Russian/English during the feasibility trip to Armenia (cf. section 3.1), and

the majority of the meetings required between one to two hours with each respondent.

Overall, the respondents representing both countries approached the interviews with high

openness and interest and followed up on their contributions at later stages with additional

data. However, it must be noted that despite the openness of the respondents, some

findings may have been lost or misinterpreted, because recordings and extensive transcripts

are not available for all interviews. Furthermore, the interviews were conducted in four

different languages with different audible features such as intonations and emphasis. These

factors can obviously prevent the accuracy of the findings, particularly in the case of the

unstructured interviews (Heaton, 2004; Saunders et al., 2009).


Page 30 of 74

Together the conducted interviews represent the core of the data collection aiming at

answering the research question. The semi-structured interview guide (cf. section 3.1.) can

be found in Appendix B and was constructed with broad theme related questions followed

by more concrete questions facilitating the respondent to more easily understand the core

question. This format was chosen as the main and most valuable method for inductive

learning because it guided the respondents to express them freely while staying focused on

the core topic defined by the research question. The semi-structured interview method also

permitted the interviewee to discuss the answers of the respondent more in depth.

However, this method does not come without disadvantages. Even though the same

interview guide has been the guiding point in the semi-structured interviews, the exact

same questions have not been posed to all the respondents. The questions have been asked

in a different order and pursued to varying degree of depth because of the respondents’

different level of expertise (Heaton, 2004; Saunders et al., 2009). In terms of the

unstructured interview, the researcher attempted to follow up by requesting a skype

interview, but was not successful due to professional and timely reasons. Nevertheless,

although the interviews were unstructured, they contributed more or less during all phases

of research. In total, ten unstructured interviews were conducted during the feasibility trip

to Armenia, but only half were found relevant after the formulation of the research

question.

For each interview, the researcher spent substantial time preparing to understand the

professional context of the respondent, with the aim of increasing the credibility around

the research and creating a safe environment for the respondents to share data. The

researcher also managed expectations by clearly communicating the requirements of each

interview with the interviewee (cf. Appendix B). Details such as time duration, interview

approach, and interview objectives were clearly communicated before the interview.

Furthermore, the full transcripts of the semi-structured interviews were sent to the

respondents allowing them an opportunity to review their answers. It was not possible to

send the notes from the unstructured interview to all the respondents (Bryman & Bell,

2003; Kvale, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009).


Page 31 of 74

3.4.2 Archived data

The archival data applied in this study is primarily, publicly available data, and too much

lesser extend, non-publicly available documents. More details on both types of sources and

their availability can be found in Appendix C that consists of an extensive list with 200

selected and registered data sources used in this study.

In this study, non-publicly available data is limited and comprises of internal documents as

email attachments provided by the respondents’ of the primary data interviews or their

colleagues. This data is strictly confidential and can only be requested by the academic

advisor of this study. Furthermore, non-publicly available documents and primary data are

challenging to validate because: “While organizations may argue that their records are reliable, there

are often inconsistencies and inaccuracies” (Saunders et al., 2009: 274). These inaccuracies are

difficult to detect, but when in doubt, the researcher has looked for pressures on the

original source that might have biased the data. Therefore, the researcher was also impelled

to collect public archived data for this study.

The purpose of collecting the publicly available archival data was to put own findings

within a more general context and increase the validity. When possible the findings were

triangulated with other independent data sources, because where data from two or more

independent sources suggest similar conclusions, one can have more confidence that the

data on which they are based are not distorted. This is also sometimes referred to as

crosscheck verification. In this study the publicly available archival data was based on

browsed news articles and reports from nearly all acknowledged sources covering almost

30 years of publicly available data, running from January 1987, which was the year before

the initial liberalization processes started in Denmark until 15th October 2014. Dealing with

data collected during a large span of years and in two distinctively different geographical

locations, has created immense boundaries for interpretation and comparison. For

example, the liberalization processes started in 1987 in the EU, but only recently in

October 2013 in Armenia. During these years, major structural changes have occurred in

the EU (relevant in terms of Denmark), and Armenia has become independent from the

Soviet Union. When applicable, these boundaries have been mentioned in the findings

section. While browsing all data sets, the main search words used were Copenhagen

Airport, Zvartnots Airport in connection with regulation and government policy. The

results were further used for identifying more specific search inquiries at later stages during


Page 32 of 74

the analysis. Though many more examples can be provided, more specific searches were

done on the airport owners: Eduardo Eurnekian, Corporación América, Ontario Teachers’

Pension Plan and Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund. These searches have been

found worthwhile as the airport sector and its constituents are frequent users of the media

to inform the public or/and put pressure on their peers during negotiations

(intv_DKpm1). This has been apparent when browsing through the main databases used

for this study, Factiva Inc. and Infomedia. It was clear to see that the highest peaks in

number of available articles both in Denmark and Armenia were correlated with important

historical years as e.g. 1997 and 2014 when the market liberalization was fully implemented

in Denmark and Armenia, and in 1990 and 2001 when the Danish and Armenian

government took the first nascent steps to move from government ownership to private.

Finally, it shall be stated that quality national newspapers or online sources are also often a

good source to identify summaries of recent government and country reports. These types

of reports have been highly relevant in terms of understanding the context in which the

data has been shaped (Saunders et al., 2009).

3.5 Data reduction and coding

During the initial stage the researcher aimed at identifying a research question that had not

previously been dealt with in academic literature; as a result, a vast amount of papers on

multisided platforms were investigated. During the same period of time, in April 2014, the

researcher had the opportunity to embark on a feasibility visit to Armenia where she

conducted 10 unstructured interviews (cf. 3.4.1) that later became an important source of

inspiration for formulating an academic research question close to recent industry

developments: “The use of interviews can help you to gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to

your research question(s) and objectives. Where you have not yet formulated such a research question and

objectives, and interview or interviews may help you achieve this” (Saunders et al., 2009: 318). After

the research question was formalized the researcher understood the necessity to identify

comparative cases to reach the essence of the problem. The next phase of preparing,

collecting and analysing data was where the heart of the study was developed. The process

of preparing and collecting data was time-consuming because the researcher had to first

identify the key experts within aviation and the relevant government officials in both

Denmark and Armenia, convince them of the importance of the study and then adjust to

their busy schedules over the summer. Simultaneously, the archival data collection was


Page 33 of 74

conducted and all relevant data sets were saved electronically. In order to ease the

understanding of the extensive and complex raw data derived from using the inductive

approach, twelve summary themes were developed. In practice the new patterns emerged

after reading full interview transcripts and notes and then highlighting the arguments in

archival data that either supported or obstructed the preliminary patterns. Hence only data

that was supported by more than two sources were included in the findings section

(Thomas, 2003). After closer examination of the summary themes, three main growth

categories were identified and compared to existing theoretical research, and during this

process the researcher observed that only one growth category had previously been

examined in relation to government intervention in MSPs: User charges and their

implications on antitrust legislations. Before commencing to the findings section of this

study, all data sets, including interviews, were manually codified in an Excel spreadsheet to

enable the reader to distinguish data by country, date, type and expertise. As seen in

Appendix A, the interviews were codified with [Intv_country abbreviation_background].

Country abbreviation was defined as either DK for Denmark, AM for Armenia and the

background of the interviewees were defined as ae for airport expert and pm for policy

maker. Archival data was codified with [Country abbreviation_year_type]. The country

abbreviation was kept the same as the latter and the year was coded between 19902 and

2014, but referred to as 90, 91, 92 and proceeding consistently in this manner. When the

data was not related to any country, it was coded GD for general data. The data types were

denoted to as a - article; r - report; w - website; v - video; p - presentations and m - public minutes. At

the final stages of the study, excess raw data was discarded because during closer

examinations the data sets were found either not appropriate for this study or identified as

repeating data.

2 In section 3.4.2, it was stated that the browsed news articles and reports covered almost 30 years of publicly available data, running from January 1987, which was the year before the initial liberalization processes. However, it shall be noted that no relevant data sources were identified between 1987 and 1989 (both years included).


Page 34 of 74

3.6 Drawing conclusions and verifying data

The case study approach has often been subject for criticism and is referred to as a

challenging method to construct validity and generalize from. In this study a vital question

to answer is whether the comparative cases selected will be applicable to other multisided

platforms. The critical scholars point out that single or few cases cannot contribute to

scientific development because the researchers involved in case studies often fail to

develop a sufficiently operational set of measures, and “subjective” judgments are used to

collect the data (Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2009) state that

findings derived from the case study method are not necessarily intended to be repeatable

since they reflect the dynamic and complex reality at the time they were collected.

However, according to Yin (2009) this criticism is based on the comparison with survey

research in which a sample is intended to generalize to a larger universe. However, this

analogy to samples and universe is incorrect when dealing with case studies because survey

research relies on statistical generalization, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely

on analytical generalization: “In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a

particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 2009: p43). Therefore, some scholars suggest

that the qualitative data derived from case studies may directly suggest theory and is

suitable at understanding the rationale underlying relationships. In the circumstances where

the case study researcher is able to relate the study to existing theory, it will be possible to

demonstrate findings that can have a broader theoretical significance that moves beyond

the cases selected for the study (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009; Flyvbjerg,

2006). Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is not to establish generalizability in its

traditional sense through survey research, but rather conduct in-depth research and identify

growth factors that are easily transferable and valid for other contexts. Nevertheless,

generalization is not a natural endeavor and the findings must be replicated and tested in

other MSPs, but this would require additional studies.


Page 35 of 74

4. Findings and analysis

Based on the exploratory research design and the selected research question, three growth

factors have been identified and thus serve as the catalyst structuring this section. The

structure is as follows: Government involvement in operations (section 4.1); government

control of market access (section 4.2); and government investment efforts (section 4.3). All

three government impacts are recognized generally as government interventions. Each

section ends with a proposition I-III. A graphical illustration (figure 4) for quick overview

can be found in section 5.

4.1 Government involvement in operations

4.1.1 Moving from public- to private management

Major changes are occurring in the global aviation sector in terms of public and private

management and its impact on operations and industry growth. For most of the 20th

century, with an exception of the United States, the standard practice within aviation was

that government bodies owned and operated both airports and airlines (Staniland, 2003).

Now the trend has changed towards governments withdrawing the aviation business by

privatizing airlines and airports. The reason for this is the presence of greater competitive

pressures, which requires them to reduce costs (notably labor costs), while making new

large-scale investments and forming strategic alliances in order to survive. The execution of

these procedures is more feasible for a private company to enact because a private

company generally has fewer political and financial constraints. Hence, a “destatization”

process is occurring, leading to less involvement by the government in airport operations

(Staniland, 2003; Neufille & Odoni, 2013; GD12_v1). This evolvement is illustrated in four

airport ownership and management models presented by Neufille & Odoni (2013). Where

the first two models, “a branch of a national government” or “a branch of a local or

state/regional government”, were dominant in the past, today the global trend is moving

towards partial or full airport privatization. This is either done through airport model three

or four “a company specializing in airport management, acting as a contractor to a national,

state, or local government” or “a corporate entity, often known as an airport authority,

created especially for the purpose of acting as an airport operator”. An airport operator is

referred to the organisational or corporate entity that has management control of an


Page 36 of 74

airport, hence responsibility for developing and maintaining the airport’s infrastructure and

operating the airport on a daily basis (Neufille & Odoni, 2013).

Elaborating on the latter airport model 4, Copenhagen Airport serves as a good example.

Until 1990, Copenhagen Airports (consisting of Copenhagen- and Roskilde airports) were

operated by a public corporation under the Danish Ministry of Transport. Since then, the

government ownership has gradually decreased to 39.2%. The airport has become a for-

profit company and today, Copenhagen Airports Denmark ApS (CAD) owns the majority

share of 57,7%, which is jointly controlled by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTTP) and

Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund III (MEIF3) (Gillen, 2010; DK14_w9/w10/w11;

DK05_a2/a3; DK14_r4; GD12_a1; Intv_DKae2). Before the takeover, it was feared that

the investment funds might have plans of draining the company in order to recoup their

investment and enhance the private actors, leaving Denmark with no benefit. However,

despite commercial interests, the private investors had the same objectives as the Danish

government; which was simply to attract growth (DK05_w1). Airport Expert II confirmed

this notion:

“It would never happen, because that would be offering the customers a bad product.

And when you offer a bad product then the customers have a tendency not to come

back” (18:57).

After the privatization of the airport, the role of the government has decreased

considerably in both daily operations, as well as in long-term strategizing. Today, the

Executive Management is in charge of the day-to-day management of Copenhagen Airport,

while the Board of Directors lays down guidelines and directions. The role of the

government has become two-fold. On one hand, the Danish Ministry of Finance handles

the commercial aspects of the relationship as a shareholder in Copenhagen Airport,

whereas the Transport Authority, operating under the Danish Ministry of Transportation,

manages aviation regulations and monitoring (Intv_DKpm1; DK14_w12/14; DK14_w4).

In general, the ownership form applied by Copenhagen Airport (cf. airport model four) is

known to be applicable for some of the busiest airports in Europe and has proven to be

largely successful in partially insulating airports from political interference and in

promoting effective management (Neufville & Odoni, 2013). This statement complies with

Copenhagen airport (cf. section 3.3.1).


Page 37 of 74

Zvartnots Airport is also referred to as privatized, but this term is not a particularly

accurate description. In December 2001, the Armenian Government signed an agreement

with the Argentinian billionaire, Eduardo Eurnekian, placing Zvartnots Airport under his

control for the next 30 years. This means that Zvartnots Airport remained 100% state-

owned, whereas Mr. Eurnekian’s company, Corporacion America S.A., (CASA), the

mother company of Armenian International Airports, was granted management rights

(Intv_AMae2). These rights generally include developing, maintaining and operating the

airport during the concession period, and in return, having the rights to residual income

from airport property, referring to any profits that are generated from the airport. Hence,

more simply affirmed, the airport operators of Zvartnots were given the right to act as a

contractor for the Armenian Government. This decision did not come without criticism.

Within a year after signing the concession agreement, government bodies claimed that the

aviation sector had become uncontrollable, with over 60% of flights carried out by foreign

companies, rising tariffs, the dismissal of 1,000 employees, and thriving corruption

(AM01_a1/a2; AM03_a3/a4/a5; Neufille & Odoni, 2013). Nevertheless, the Government

kept its trust to the management of the airport, most likely because the owner of

Corporacio n America, Mr. Eurnekian, is Armenian by descent and had a long-term almost

personal interest in getting the concession (Intv_AMae3). Mr. Eurnekian himself confirms

this:

“During my life, I have built many airports and buildings. I have made investments

all around the world. I can say only one thing for certain. In no other place nor on

any occasion have I felt as much satisfaction and joy as my initiatives in Armenia.

[…]” (AM11_a1).

Nevertheless, when asking Airport Expert III whether the project is philanthropic in

nature, the answer is a clear no. His Armenian roots have played an important role for

Eurnekian wanting to take on the project, but as Airport Expert III states: “I wouldn’t go as

far as saying it is a money losing charity project. […] I think he runs it so it’s profitable. Which is a good

thing because it ensures it’s sustainable in the long-term” (34:15). In comparison to his investments

in 52 other airports around the world (cf. section 3.3.2), Airport Expert III states that

Zvartnots Airport might not be the most profitable business. However, Mr. Eurnekian has

a collection of interests in Armenia, including investments in banking, the postal service,

wine, and real estate. Therefore, his investment in the Airport is also seen as a business


Page 38 of 74

decision contributing to the expansion of his portfolio of assets in Armenia (Intv_AMae3;

AM11_a1; GD12_a1; AM14_w5).

Albeit the Armenian government still owns the airport infrastructure, the role of the

government has become significantly less since the 30-year concession agreement was

signed. Similar to Denmark, the airport operators are responsible of daily operations and

strategy formation, whereas the Ministry of Economy of Armenia is responsible of the

commercial aspects of Zvartnots Airport. Furthermore, the government-owned entity,

General Department of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Armenia, deals with aviation

regulations and monitoring (Intv_AMae2; Intv_AMpm3). Although it may be contradicting

with the fact that Zvartnots airport is still government owned, the management team

appointed by Mr. Eurnekian seems to have more decision-making power than the

Executives in Denmark. The Armenian Executives are both in charge of daily operations

and strategy formation, whereas in Copenhagen Airport, the Members of the Board are

responsible for long-term strategizing. The four Armenian Board Members selected by

Corporacio n America are only informally involved during major decision-making

(DK14_c1).

In general, the ownership form of Zvartnots Airport (cf. airport model 4) enables the local

government to obtain expert airport management, as well as work with a contractor that is

responsive to local conditions and cognizant of best practices elsewhere. Historically, this

ownership format has been best applied to secondary airports in developed countries or to

major airports in some developing nations (Neufville & Odoni, 2013). This description

complies with Armenia being a developing country (cf. section 3.3.2).

4.1.2 Is privatization of old state-owned monopolies good or bad for growth?

The Danish Government began their modernization programme in 1983 with the purpose

of conveying tasks from the public sector to the private sector if firms rather than public

institutions could better solve those tasks. One of the major differences between private

and public ownership was their views on growth. Where private firms were able to generate

profits, the public sector was constrained to execute tasks at the lowest possible expense

without the purpose of generating profits. In the 1990s, many executives, including the

Deputy Director at Dong A/S, Hans Duus Jørgensen, encouraged the government to

generate profits from government-owned firms and only partly use the profits to


Page 39 of 74

consolidate growth inside the firm, releasing the remaining amount as government payout,

just as in private firms. At the time, this idea was controversial; but looking at the current

developments, one can argue that the Danish government has slowly started to move

towards that direction. According to the Ministry of Finance, at the end of 2013, the

Danish government either partially or fully owned shares in 19 firms where profits were

highly welcomed. The list of the companies is available in Appendix E. Interestingly, four

of the firms are related to aviation: Copenhagen Airport, Navair (air traffic management),

Scandinavian Airlines and Air Greenland. Hence the government holds stakes in both

airport infrastructure and airlines (DK90_a1/a2; DK93_a1; DK14_r4).

In Armenia, the privatization process started after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,

during which the country started transitioning from plan economy, where government

ownership was more strongly encouraged than a market-oriented economy (complying

with Marx’s perspectives cf. section 2.2.1). The dissolution of the old system took place in

a rather short period of time, whereas building up new links, new products and new

production methods demanded immense resources. Moreover, because many market

institutions are still not fully developed, the Armenian market is volatile with high

uncertainty about future developments. This makes it difficult to provide a fair valuation of

assets, resulting in bottlenecks during the process of privatization (Mygind, 2011).

In general, when assessing privatization of government-owned monopolies in Denmark

and Armenia, there are different perspectives among policy makers on what is considered

good or bad. In both countries, some policy makers argue that government engagement in

commercial activities should be limited to only include tasks that cannot be solved by the

private sector, while other policy makers explain that there is a need for government

ownership in areas that have significant societal impacts on the country (DK02_a1;

AM06_a1). In this study, ten out of thirteen respondents were asked to reflect on their

opinion on airport privatization and nine of them, consisting of both Danish and

Armenian airport experts and policy makers, confirmed that privatization has overall been

good for the operational efficiency and growth in the airport (Intv_AMae1/2/3;

Intv_DKae1/2/4; Intv_AMpm1/ Intv_DKpm1/2). Following statements were prevalent

in terms of airport operations:


Page 40 of 74

“With the current ownership structure the airport is a well managed company. It is

efficient and customer focused. Its livelihood depends on the customer. I also worked

in the airport when it was state-owned and the attitude was that: ‘this is how it

works here and if you do not wish to be here then leave’. […] State organizations

have never been good at doing business. Now only the best is good enough. That’s a

big ambition” (Intv_DKae1: Q5).

“I came here 10 years ago. We received the airport in a very bad condition. We

we’re working, building the airport, teaching all the employees how to work, how to

develop the schemes, and at the end we have the results and we see this through the

award [“Best Emerging Airport”]. It had different meaning to everybody – for the

country, all the people that are working at the airport are very happy, very proud”

(AM14_v1: 01:31)

The developments in Cases A and B support the general arguments that there are no

examples of successful running businesses initiated by the Government. That is why many

countries leave aviation business and give it to private owners, that are better at serving the

ever-changing needs in a fast manner, which governments are not able to (AM03_a4;

Intv_DKae1; DK08_a4). Government owned and operated airports are, for the most part,

known for lacking flexibility, large centralized bureaucracies, limited responsiveness to local

issues, limited control over airport-specific finances, and have few incentives to increase

revenues or reduce costs (Neufville & Odoni, 2013; Intv_DKae1). Nevertheless, the

Danish Airport Expert III showed concerns related to the Danish Government only

holding minority shares in the airport, even though he is usually against government-owned

monopolies. The respondent argued that the Danish government should not have sold the

ownership of such a vital piece of the country’s infrastructure, also representing Denmark’s

largest workplace. He also mentioned that, considering the valuation of Copenhagen

Airport, it is too late to recover from this mistake because the Government will never be

able to buy the shares back (Intv_DKae3). The opinion of the respondent highly correlates

with a number of the reasons explaining why the Danish government is showing no

interest in selling their minority shares, continually claiming to keep 39,2 pct. ownership of

Copenhagen Airport. According to a number of policy makers, privatization does indeed

enable efficiency, but this does not mean that the government should sell all of its shares in

firms that are vital for the country (DK06_a1; DK07_a1; DK05_l1).


Page 41 of 74

In general, government shares, also referred to as “golden shares,” have become more

ubiquitous since privatization and are enabling governments to maintain influence with the

power to block foreign takeovers despite owning a minority share in the company. Hence,

the Danish government argues that they can still continue driving the airport towards a

direction that serves the interest of Danish society (DK05_a1; DK03_a1; DK05_m1).

However, one can also argue the opposite, considering the composition of the Board of

Directors at Copenhagen Airport. The Board consists of nine members, including six

members elected by the company during General Meetings and three members elected by

the employees. Although the Danish government has the largest standalone share in

Copenhagen Airport, there is no government representation in the board and management.

Consequently, the government has no direct impact on the overall strategic management of

the airport. The Danish Ministry of Finance advocates that the board of Copenhagen

Airports consists of professional members and not ministry officials, retired politicians and

ambassadors, as was the case in the beginning of the millennium. Nevertheless, during the

latest General Meeting held in April 2014, Mr. Rasmus Lønborg, who is representing the

Danish State's ownership of shares in Copenhagen Airport, stated that Copenhagen

Airports does not fulfill the Danish rules for “good governance”. The expertise of the

candidates was not criticized, but the composition of the Board of Directors as such does

not meet the recommendation that half of the six members elected at the General Meeting

must be independent. Currently, four out of six elected members are employed as

executives in the two investment funds that have shares in the airport (DK14_w12;

DK14_w13; DK14_r1; DK00_a1).

In the case of Zvartnots Airport, limited public information can be found about the Board

of Directors because the airport is not publicly traded, and therefore, the Armenian law

does not require this form of transparency. Nevertheless, during a follow up conversation,

Airport Expert II stated that the four board members are not government officials and

these representatives have been appointed by the concessioner, Corporación América

(Intv_AMae2).

In summary, the section above clearly argues that currently, due to privatization, the local

governments in both Cases A & B have limited or no direct influence on airport operations

and growth. Nevertheless, the nature of the aviation sector implies government regulations

of particular business strategies that may enable or constrain growth. This could include


Page 42 of 74

regulation on e.g. aircraft noise, emissions, wildlife, safety and more (Neufville & Odoni,

2013). In the two cases in this study, government regulations on users’ charges are found to

be the most evident examples on growth. This is illuminated in the section below.

4.1.3 Pricing and anti trust

User charges at airports are classified into two categories: aeronautical and nonaeronautical. As

the name suggests, the former are charges for services and facilities related directly to the

processing of aircraft and their passenger and cargo (e.g. landing fees, aircraft parking,

security), whereas the latter refers to charges related to the numerous ancillary commercial

services, facilities and amenities that are often available at an airport (aviation fuel and oil,

car parking, shops) (Neufville & Odoni, 2013: 220). Since privatization, both airports have

been subject to ongoing criticism from airlines arguing that the high airport fees are

constraining their growth: “The low cost carrier, Easy Jet says it is the high charges that prevents them

from expanding their activities [in Copenhagen airport]” (DK13_a7: line 1). What is more, on

March 6, 2012, the Armenian national carrier, “[Armavia] went on strike saying that services of

Yerevan's Zvartnots Airport are too expensive” (AM12_a2). As a response to the claims, the

airport experts representing Copenhagen and Zvartnots Airports implied that this is a

general misconception in the industry. They argued that the airport fees are very fair,

especially, when the regions in which they operate, are taken into consideration. Further

they argued that no matter how low the prices go, airlines are motivated to lower them

even further (intv_DKae1; intv_AMae1/a2).

When evaluating pricing and potential conflicts in the aviation industry, it is vital to

understand whether airports are following the recommendations of the International Air

Transport Association (IATA), in terms of applying non-discriminatory charges to airlines.

This means assessing whether airports have different charges for e.g. national and

international carriers operating in the market. Performing on-the-surface assessment of the

pricing structures in both Cases A and B, the airport operators seem to be following the

IATA recommendations. For example, the Armenian Airport Expert II argues: “[…] our

tariffs are public, they are published, so we don’t have any hidden tariffs. They are established considering

the ICAO Airport Manual Economics standard requirements, so we do not discriminate between airlines

and our tariffs were established when we signed the concession agreement” (56:32). Additionally, Danish

Airport Expert I illustrates with an example: “There are only price differences in relation to transit

passengers (where the charge is half the regular charges), domestic passengers and of course in our low cost


Page 43 of 74

terminal “GO”, because the airlines get a less attractive location” (Q8). Nevertheless, it is observed

that the airport operators do attempt to support their local hub airlines. Airport Expert III

representing Scandinavian Airlines says: “We do get a big discount. Not many people in SAS know

the exact agreement. I don’t. But it is clear that there are some major customer benefits” (Intv_DKae3:

23:24), and Airport Expert II from Armenia supports this statement: “All the airports try to

find some ways to support those airlines that take the biggest share of operations, because if you are someone

that is looking for five flights per day and there is someone that wants one flight per week, it’s quite fair to

give some special discounts to this particular company to encourage them to do more […] (1:13:38).

It is not surprising that both airports in Cases A and B have pricing challenges in common.

The root of the problem seems to be the fact that the regulatory and statutory framework

of international civil aviation lacks specificity when it comes to the subject of user charges,

because each individual airport or national government must determine their own policies,

cost bases, and revenue targets. Hence the question of user charges is a global problem,

which has led to widespread conflicts between airlines and airport operators (Neufville &

Odoni, 2013). Nonetheless, despite disagreements, airports are natural monopolies, and in

the Cases A and B the prices are subject for additional supervision with the purpose of

protecting airlines and passengers against their dominant position. For example, it is

common procedure in Denmark that the Danish Transport Authority observes the user

charge negotiations between airlines and Copenhagen Airport to facilitate any possible

conflicts. As a government institution, they have the authority to approve or disapprove

negotiated user charges, while also applying a “forth back” model authorizing them to set a

price in the case that the parties do not reach an agreement. (Intv_DKpm1; Intv_DKae2;

Intv_AMae2). Hence, in case of conflicts, the local government can have an impact on

enabling or deterring growth through interventions. However, Danish Airport Expert III

added that only recently Copenhagen Airport ended its successful negotiations with its

customers, and government intervention was not needed:

“At this moment there is a voluntary agreement between us and the airlines. The

negotiations have been good and we have decided that the agreement will last for five

years. This means that the prices are fixed and will not be touched upon” (31:12)

The pricing in the aviation industry in Armenia is likewise regulated and monitored. For

example, since fuel is only provided at the airport, the State Commission for Protection of


Page 44 of 74

Economic Competition in Armenia supervises the airport charges on fuel (AM08_a4). Fuel

prices are of high importance in the industry. When Armenian Airlines management

(Airport Expert IV) was asked what could be the potential barriers of establishing a new

route to Armenia, the answer was clear:

“[…] there is a fueling monopoly in Armenia. Fueling is high here compared to for

example Tbilisi airport. For us, 40% of the operating costs are fueling”

(Intv_AMae4: Q5).

However, Airport Expert I and III argued that fueling is expensive in Armenia because the

country is landlocked and the only port for fuel is through neighboring Georgia, who

charges the fuel price plus an additional 120 USD for each transit (Intv_AMae1/ae2/ae3).

Based on the above, it may be argued that there is a need for government price regulations

and monitoring to protect airlines, and thereby indirectly support growth in airports.

However, considering the Cases A and B, the evidence for this is weak, because no

examples on positive results, from government interventions in price regulation and

monitoring, have been identified. In contrast, situations where the local government has

directly threatened growth by imposing special taxes have been identified. Generally, IATA

argues that unjustified taxes and charges imposed by local governments around the world

place a risk on the benefits gained by users of aviation services and the wider economy:

“Governments can best achieve their economic objectives by reducing airport costs/charges to stimulate

growth, not by penalizing the aviation industry that acts as a major catalyst for this growth” (GD07_r1:

11). In Armenia, the local government has imposed a 10,000 AMD charge (20 EUR3) per

passenger in state duty tax, more conventionally referred to as “air tax”. As a response to

the introduction of the tax in 1998, the president of the national carrier Armavia, Mr.

Mikhail Baghdasarov, said that the “so-called air tax” is unfair and “repels” tourists.

Initially (before March 2009) the tax was paid upon departure by each traveller leaving

Armenia, but has later been added to the flight ticket (Intv_AMae2; AM08_a3; AM07_a1.).

“If you buy a ticket now to Armenia, you will see the [10,000 AMD] tax in your

electronic itinerary. So probably you will [think] that the airport charge this. Or at

least you will think that this money is paying for aviation infrastructure. But in our

3 Armenian Central Bank interest rate October 3th 2014: 1 EUR = 514.62 AMD (AM14_w6).


Page 45 of 74

case that money is charged by the government and spent somewhere else. They

[government] artificially increase the final price for the user” (Intv_AMae2:

58:02).

Data received from Zvartnots Airport for this study states that 454,795 passenger have

departed the airport from January – June 2014 (both months included) (AM14_e2). This

means that the government has collected more than 23.4m EUR worth of state duty tax.

However, when asking Airport Expert II what the tax is for, he replied that he does not

know. This question was not posed to the Armenian policy makers due to the unstructured

manner of the interviews. Nevertheless, in general it is common that the aviation industry

can be seen as an easy target for taxes, sometimes with no direct relation to the industry

itself (GD07_r1).

Similar taxation disputes were prevalent in Denmark regarding a charter tax or a so-called

“sunshine” tax imposed by the government on the airlines operating charter routes. The

tax was introduced in 1977 and further expanded to include discounted tickets in the

beginning of 1990. The airlines were charged 300 DKK (40 EUR) for flights in Europe

and 400 DKK (54 EUR) for flights outside of Europe and the government had expected to

collect 600b DKK (80b EUR) from the tax in 19904. However, 17 major airlines such as

Lufthansa, British Airways and Air France boycotted the charge, and the charter companies

in Denmark could not understand why their industry was imposed while travels by bus,

trains and cars were not touched upon. Together, with the airlines, the charter companies

claimed that the Danish government was violating the European Economic Community5

legislation on free competition. This situation had an immense impact on growth.

According to the CEO of SAS, Michael Mørch, the sales of SAS’s discounted tickets in the

Nordics fell in 1989 from 46,426 to 8,687 tickets: “What is the purpose of selling tickets of 600-

800 DKK from Copenhagen if we have to put 300 DKK in taxes on top?” (DK90_a4: 1). In 1991,

the government finally decided to abolish the tax, but suggested alternative, cheaper

4 Danish Central Bank interest rate October 3th 2014: 1 EUR = 7.44 DKK (DK14_w18) 5 The EEC later changed its name to the EC (from ‘the European Economic Community’ to ‘the European Communities’). This change was made with effect from 1 November 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty came into force. The change of name reflects the fact that the cooperation was no longer merely economic in nature, but was gradually extended to include fields such as transport policy, taxes and excise duties, social policy, employment policy, education, culture, health and consumer protection, research, the environment and development aid. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union and extended cooperation by making provision for an economic and monetary union, a common foreign and security policy for the EU, cooperation on justice and home affairs, a social dimension, etc. (DK08_w1)


Page 46 of 74

charges that were imposed (DK91_a1; DK90_a3/a4/a5/a6). Based on the these findings

regarding government intervention in airport operations, the following proposition is

suggested in terms of multisided platforms:

Proposition I: Government involvement in operations of privately

managed multisided platforms decreases growth.

4.2 Government control of market access

For decades, government regulation of airline fares and services has constrained market

access and growth of passenger traffic. The regulatory framework from the aviation sector

existed before the first airlines were setup (and in fact, before World War I), inspired by the

fear that foreign aircrafts might attack domestic cities and military installations. This meant

that every country gained absolute sovereignty over use of its air space. However, with

commercial flights it later emphasized the need to trade rights for passing traffic between

countries. Furthermore, The Chicago Convention in 1944 discouraged competition in the

airlines industry in Europe by adopting a general policy that each country could operate

only one airline. A web of bilateral air service agreements shaped the industry by specifying

routes and airports, agreed aircraft types, fares and frequencies, and designated carriers. In

effect, capacity on the majority of routes were artificially restricted, fares were offensively

high, and entry into markets by non-flag carrier airlines was virtually impossible. This

caused low productivity, lack of innovation in route development, and absence of low-cost

airports and airlines. The turning point for the industry transpired after the implementation

of the U.S. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and has since spread to most regions in the

world (Neufville & Odoni, 2013: 21; Doobory, 2005; Staniland, 2003; Sinha, 2001;

DK04_r1). Today, the political and economical deregulations including implementation of

“open-skies” bilateral agreements are becoming increasingly widespread. These agreements

between countries remove most of the regulatory constraints on the scheduling and pricing

of international services. They effectively allow airlines to operate flights between any two

points in the countries involved. For example, this means that SAS can serve any airport

they wish and are not constrained to serving the Scandinavian countries exclusively. This

degree of freedom contrasts with previous conventions, which limited foreign airlines to a

few gateway airports in each country (Neufville & Odoni, 2013: 15).


Page 47 of 74

4.2.1 Assessing government role in market liberalization

Beginning with one of the most recent liberalization examples in the global aviation

industry, the liberalization of the Armenian aviation market was implemented in late

October 2013. Hence, only a year ago, the Armenian market was highly regulated and

controlled by the local government, national airlines and the aviation authorities. In

practice, this meant that international carriers would only be able to enter the Armenian

market if they could find an agreement with the national carriers

(Intv_AMae1/ae2/pm1/pm3). This was the case with Polish Airlines (LOT) when they

started their route to Armenia in 2011. Because the market was not yet liberalized they

requested permission from the national carrier, Armavia, to start operating their flights. In

order to receive this permission, the airlines made an agreement that LOT could fly as

many times per week as they wanted, and in exchange, Armavia was entitled to a number

of seats on each flight, including the profits of those seats. While Armavia collected their

earnings from LOT, they did not fulfill their part of the contract of paying the taxes and

expenses calculated for each seat: “So at the end, LOT dropped the route in 2012, and the

explanation was ‘it is because Armavia cheated us...they owe us 80,000 dollars’” (Intv_AMae2: 18:29).

This example clearly illustrates how the monopolized market situation constrained growth

in Zvartnots Airport, which resulted in higher prices and fewer flights.

In 2012, Armavia started having financial problems (Intv_AMae1; DK13_a4) and for many

people this was not surprising: “I doubt with Armavia in various capacities including as a customer.

It was an incredible badly managed company, so I am not surprised that they we’re growing very fast, but

couldn’t manage the financing” (Intv_AMae3: 38:59). Furthermore: “For Armenians the most

important factor is the price. Other important factors are trust, frequency, cancelation and time. Armavia

was not good at this; they had many delays and offered no compensation to the passengers” (Intv_AMae1:

Q11). Despite the ongoing conflicts that ascended from the restricted market, the

Armenian government continuously wanted to protect Armavia, which led to heated

discussions: “Everybody was fighting because of the government’s self interest in the local carrier and they

didn’t want the deregulation, the fight lasted more than one year” (Intv_AMae1: Q1). Nevertheless,

despite the recent discussions, the notion of a deregulation in the Armenian market is not

novel:


Page 48 of 74

“For the past decade, it’s been an idea that people have talked about; during the

last five years the pressure has increased; and then after the collapse of Armavia it

became possible to pull it off“ (Intv_AMae3: 40:08).

The airport management played an important role in convincing the government to

consider market liberalizing. On one hand, they argued that more flights and reduced

prices would essentially help in developing the tourism sector, and improving the overall

economic situation in the country. On the other hand, the management made it clear to the

policy makers that the opportunities of the newly built terminal (cf. section 3.3.2), that was

set to be completed in the same year (in 2011), would end up being useless without market

liberalization. Finally, in 2013, when the contract between Armavia and the government

expired, the government accepted the airport operator’s demands and decided to declare

“open skies” later the same year (in October 2013). This meant new market entrants,

changes in traffic patterns, and increasing competition:

“Now everyone can come without restrictions, all airlines are increasing frequencies,

they don´t have to ask anymore, tickets are going down, in Moscow mostly. New

airlines can only ask and they will get the permission to fly to Zvartnots Airport”

(Intv_AMae1).

Armavia filed for bankruptcy 1st of April 2013 (AM13_a9), less than six months before the

market became liberalized. Despite the fact that the company had a considerable share of

the operations at Zvartnots Airport (100 flight per week to over 40 destinations in 20

countries), the bankruptcy has not stopped the Airport in experiencing extraordinary

growth. Currently, almost all already-operating airlines are increasing their frequencies to all

destinations, and six new companies have started flying on a regular basis. Hence, the slots

that became available after Armavia’s bankruptcy were filled in rapidly by other airlines

(Intv_AMae1/a2 and e.g. AM14_a5; AM14_a6). The liberalization in the Armenian market

for aviation has resulted in 32% increase in the number of passengers in the first 6 months

of 2014, and when comparing the months of June in 2013 and 2014, the number of flights

has risen by 42% (Intv_AMae2; AM14_a1).

On the contrary, the liberalization processes in Denmark was not encouraged by the

airport’s management, but instead imposed by the European Union (EU). Becoming a

member state of the EU in 1973, The Danish market was liberalized alongside with other


Page 49 of 74

member states. The European Commission started the deregulation process in December

1987 and ended it 1st of April 1997 with the purpose of implementing a “Single European

Sky”. As a result, European carriers obtained practically unlimited freedom to choose their

routes, capacity, schedules, and fares. Interference from national governments in these

decisions was reduced to a minimum. Commercial considerations became the primary

incentive for airlines to open/close a new route, to add/reduce capacity, and to

increase/lower fares. Furthermore, it gave the European aviation industry the opportunity

to diversify outside its core business and into the international market. (Sinha, 2001;

Doobory, 2005; DK04_r1). In Denmark, liberalization meant that the old “Danair-

monopoly” consisting of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), Maersk Air and Cimber Air lost

their exclusive rights in the Danish market. However, upsettingly, while the big European

airports were drowning in applications from airlines requesting new flight routes, the

interest for new routes to Denmark was very limited, and liberalization seemed to have

failed for Copenhagen Airport (DK95_a1; DK97_a1/a2; DK98_a1). Furthermore, the

survival of the main and most successful national carrier, Scandinavian Airlines, was highly

questioned, putting the airport in an even bigger threatening situation.

SAS was established in 1946 by the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian states and at that time

there was almost no competition. The successful company pioneered in flights over the

Atlantic Ocean to reach New York, the North Pole, Los Angeles, and Tokyo, being the

first to fly nonstop to the Far East. SAS was a national symbol of Scandinavia and was

known for its traditional values as security, quality, attractive destinations and well-educated

staff. However, the turning point from a successful to struggling airline came as a

consequence of liberalization and the entry of low-cost companies. In the beginning of the

90s (few years before liberalization was fully achieved), there was no doubt that the major

companies, British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France, would survive the new forms of

competition, whereas SAS, KLM, Swissair and Austrian Airlines were expected succumb to

it. As a result, steps were taken to merge the four weakest airlines to create a strong

European airline that could survive and become the biggest airline in Europe. This idea

was highly welcomed by the Danish government and the former Minister of Finance,

Mogens Lykketoft, stated that an agreement would have the potential to secure the future

of SAS and Copenhagen Airport. Nevertheless, the agreement never happened due to

operational issues at KLM that are not relevant for this study (DK93_a2/a3/a4;

DK12_a1). This meant that the initial discussions about the potential sale of SAS emerged


Page 50 of 74

among policy makers. In 2008, however, the management of Copenhagen Airport warned

the Prime Minister on the societal consequences it would have for Denmark in case of

selling SAS. The Danish ownership in SAS was particularly important for Copenhagen

Airport to maintain its hub status. Two Danish respondents confirmed this:

“If you do not have a hub, what is Copenhagen Airport then? What do they really

have to offer? They will only be able to sell some fuel and do baggage handling”

(Intv_DKam1: 1:04:49) and “[…] as a country we clearly have strong interest in

supporting Copenhagen Airport. The situation between the airport and SAS is like

an old marriage. You have SAS that pays 60-70% of the expenses at Copenhagen

Airport, and if SAS is gone then the airport has a problem” (Intv_DKae3:

51:09).

Among other reasons, this meant that alongside the most dominant EU member states, the

Danish government did not welcome the consequences of liberalization and therefore

exposed resistance by pursuing interventionist policies to secure public interests. They

perceived the transport sector as too vital for the economy to be left to the market forces.

This perception is still prevalent among Danish policy makers:

“The Danish Ministry of Transportation has a clear position in terms of

Copenhagen Airport, which does not necessarily go towards 100% liberalization,

but rather a mix of monopoly and liberalization. Despite that Copenhagen Airport

requests this, from a political point of view free competition is not possible”

(Intv_DKpm1: 57:43).

Therefore, since liberalization until today, the Danish government has been actively

supporting SAS in avoiding bankruptcy. In the early ages of liberalization it was feared that

SAS would suffer the same future as the national carrier for Belgium, Sabena Airlines, who

went bankrupt and was replaced by a less ambitious company. The new Belgian carrier lost

one third of the market, closed a number of intercontinental flights to Brussels and 17,000

people were fired from their jobs, and as a result Belgium’s BNP declined with one percent

(DK14_w15; Mitra et al, 2007; Sinha, 2001; Doobory, 2005; DK08_a1; DK12_a1).

Therefore, since liberalization, the Scandinavian governments and owners of SAS have

used government subsidies to save the company from severe bankruptcy threats. However,

this is a very sensitive area for the EU and they have been assessing whether the subsidies


Page 51 of 74

of many airports and airlines comply with EU regulations. The most recent and relevant

example was prevalent three month ago, when the EU commission responded to a subsidy

complaint received from European Low Fares Airlines Association (ELFAA) against the

state warranty of three billion DKK (almost 404m EUR6) issued to SAS in 20127 by the

Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments. The ELFAA secretary general, John

Hanlon stated: “The credit concerned is being deployed to support an ambitious program of fleet renewal

and expansion of the SAS network, significantly distorting competition with SAS’s competitors which have

no recourse to such state support” (DK13_a1). This was not the first time that ELFAA filed a

complaint again SAS. It also happened in 2009 and 2010, when SAS received a total of 11

billion DKK (almost 1.5b EUR) in government shares. Nevertheless, despite that the

actions of SAS were considered severe, in all three cases the EU confirmed that the

subsidies did comply with EU legislations because they did not give SAS a considerable

advantage (Intv_DKae3; DK14_a5; DK10_a1; DK13_a1/a2/a3).

In summary, looking at the short-term impacts of liberalization in terms of airport growth,

it is clear to see that it had negative implications for Copenhagen Airport. However, recent

data confirms that Copenhagen Airport has achieved passenger records for the third

consecutive year with a year-on-year growth rate of 3.1%. This can obviously be explained

by the fact that the global aviation industry is growing. However, had Denmark not taken

part in the liberalization processes in the 90s, they would probably not have gained as

much from the current industry growth (DK04_r1; Intv_DKae1). Moreover, one can argue

that due to liberalization, Copenhagen Airport is no longer as dependent on SAS for

growth:

“In principle, Lufthansa could easily serve all of Scandinavia. 15 million people is

not a problem at all. One must admit that in the long-term Scandinavia may be too

small to have its own airline. To put the numbers into perspective the city of

Manchester, alone serves more passengers than all of Scandinavia (Intv_DKpm1:

1:04:49).

With the adoption of liberalization, Case A and Case B portray contrasting developments in

growth; however, one must not forget that 17 years have passed since the Danish market was

6 Danish Central Bank interest rate October 3th 2014: 1 EUR = 7.44 DKK (DK14_w18) 7 The state warranty was not needed and therefore cancelled 4th March 2014.


Page 52 of 74

liberalized, and the EU as an institution has foregone major changes. Nevertheless, when

assessing the current situation, liberalization has enabled both airports to experience

immense growth deriving from a rapidly thriving industry.

4.2.2 In the name of national security – constraints on liberalization

The section above argued that both the Danish and Armenian markets are no longer

constrained in terms of scheduling and pricing of international services, and that both have

benefited greatly in terms of growth. Nevertheless, one can argue that liberalization is

increasingly constrained due to safety regulations imposed by policy makers. The incidents

of September 11, 2001 have changed the way countries look at aviation security:

“Aviation security has truly become a national security issue (Zellan, 2003: 34).

Historically, policy makers have maintained that providing security is the responsibility of

airlines and airports as part of their cost of doing business, but this has recently stirred

immense criticism due to the crash of Malaysian Airways MH17 in Ukraine on July 18th

2014. Safety authorities in the United States and Europe had warned pilots and airlines in

April about potential risks flying in or near Ukrainian airspace. Nevertheless, both

Malaysian Airways and other operators continued to fly across the zone because it was the

quickest, and therefore cheapest, route (GD14_a1). The crash has resulted in heated

discussions questioning who should have the responsibility for providing security at

airports: local governments, ICAO8, IATA9, airlines or airports? (GD14_a2/A3; Zellan,

2003) According to Chief Executive at Emirates, Sir Tim Clark: "We cannot continue to say

'Well, it's a political thing'. We have to do something. We have to take the bull by the horns"

(GD14_a3: 1).

In the case of Denmark, liberalization or no liberalization, the Transport Authority has the

responsibility to approve any entry to Copenhagen Airport, and to follow up on existing

players utilizing the infrastructure of the airport. In this decision-making process, the risk

acceptance in the field equals zero, where this is not the case with railways and roads in

Denmark (Intv_DKpm1). This has obviously resulted in constraints and implications on

growth. For example, in December 2003, the US issued a requirement to enable the use of

8 ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization 9 IATA: International Air Transport Association


Page 53 of 74

armed air marshals on transatlantic flights from Europe. An air marshal is a security officer

who travels undercover on commercial flights to prevent hijacking. Though many

European member states accepted the requirement, the Danish government objected,

viewing guns on board planes as increasing the security risks (DK08_a5; DK06_a3).

Nevertheless, in 2011 WikiLeaks published documents revealing that the US Embassy in

Copenhagen had been advising the US Government on how to put pressure on Danish

policy makers to allow armed air marshals on board planes leaving from Denmark to the

US. For example, as a result of this advice, the US Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet

Napolitano, visited Denmark in November 2009 with the purpose of discussing the case.

One year later, on December 2010, the Danish Minster of Justice published following

statement in the media:

“I can confirm that the Government intends to enter into an agreement with the

United States on the use of so-called ‘air marshals’ (armed guards) on flights

between Denmark and the United States” (DK11_a3: p.5).

This statement seems to contradict with a recent situation explained by Danish Airport

Expert I, who stated that an Israeli airline has shown interest in establishing a route to

Copenhagen, but the Danish government has rejected this request due to the presence of

armed air marshals. Despite the airport management’s efforts to convince the government

to approve the route, they did not succeed. This implies that there is still an ongoing

political game in the aviation sector although the Danish market has become liberalized.

Case B provides a different example, but re-confirms the implication of a political game. In

2011, it was announced that a new regular flight route would be established from

Stepanakert (located in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh) to Armenia. The inaugural flight

was planned on May 9th 2011, but was obstructed due to threats from the neighboring

country, Azerbaijan. The Azeri government claimed that they would shoot down any

civilian plane leaving from Stepanakert because they consider the sky over Nagorno-

Karabakh to be Azerbaijani space. This threat occurred despite that members of the

International Civil Aviation organization (ICAO), including Armenia and Azerbaijan, made

a commitment to never shoot down civilian aircrafts (AM11_a2/a3/a4/a5; AM13_a11;

AM14_a20). Nagorno-Karabakh is a landlocked mountainous region with an ethnic

Armenian majority and the region is the subject of an unresolved dispute between


Page 54 of 74

Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 1988, towards the end of Soviet era, Azerbaijani troops and

Armenian secessionists began a bloody war, which left the de facto independent state in

the hands of ethnic Armenians when a ceasefire was signed in 1994. So far the negotiations

aimed to produce a permanent peace agreement have failed, and the dispute remains one

of Post-Soviet Europe's "frozen conflicts” (AM11_a4; AM13_a12). Although numerous

policy makers in Armenia argue that the threats from Azerbaijan are not grounded, it has

still created a climate of fear among the people who could become potential passengers of

Yerevan-Stepanakert flights. As a response to the fears, the president of Armenia, Serzh

Sargsyan, has volunteered to be the passenger of the first flight to scatter doubt and

phobias in society in relation of safety. However, this flight has not yet occurred

(AM13_a11). The example clearly portrays how the aviation sector is a vital component in

national security, which can lead to constraining growth.

Proposition II: Government control of access to markets in which multisided platforms

operate decreases growth.

4.3 Government investment efforts

Looking at the rapid developments in the aviation sector, economists have reached a

general consensus that airports share a strong relationship with the economic

developments of cities, regions and countries:

“Just as in the past, shipping, railway and the highway systems have played vital

roles in determining a city’s economic power, global air transportation systems will

do so in the future for cities, regions and countries” (GD99_a1: 1).

Air travel not only connects people, but also economies across borders through its rapidly

moving transportation network. On a global scale, the annual economic impact in 2013

from aviation (direct, indirect, induced and tourism catalytic) was estimated at $2.4 trillion,

equivalent to 3.4% of world gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, these numbers

are expected to grow at a fast rate. 100 years have passed since the first commercial

passenger boarded a plan, and since then, 65 billion passengers have been served.

However, considering the rapid developments, the next 65 billion passengers will be

reached within the next 15 years (GD14_r1). Based on these impressive numbers,

governments around the world are investing in projects that enhance and support their


Page 55 of 74

growth - regardless whether the airports are owned by private or public entities. They

understand that the airport either serves or can serve as an economic magnet attracting

higher income, employment, capital investments and tax revenues, all of which can lead to

spin-off effects, such as business and tourism development. On a global scale, the total

value of goods transported by air in 2013 represented 35% of all international trade.

Furthermore, statistical findings demonstrate that 52% of all international tourists travel by

air. Nevertheless, it is challenging and unclear what determines the exact cause-and-effect

between airports and economics (GD14_r1; Neufville & Odoni, 2013).

Looking at Cases A and B (cf. case description, section 3.3), both airport operators have

similar ambitions aiming to double the number of annual passengers. For example, the

target of Copenhagen Airport is to increase from serving 24 million passengers (in 2013) to

serving 40 million passengers within the next 15 or 25 years (cf. 3.3.1). This will increase

the number of people employed in the airport from 23,000 to 40,000. In general figures the

airport management states that 1 million passengers create 950 new jobs at the airport,

while 550 jobs are created outside of the airport (Intv_DKae2; DK14_r3; DK14_w19;

DK14_a7). As previously mentioned this will result in a more competitive economy that

benefits from more tourists and international corporate investments:

“We know that depending on its type, one new route can bring around 60 – 200

million DKK [8.1 – 26.9m EUR 10 ] in value for the Danish society

(Intv_DKae2: 04:08).

In the case of Armenia, an Economic Impact Study based on the expected results from

liberalization, estimates to bring $330 and $410 million [262m EUR – 325m EUR11] in

GDP in 2016, while the creation of 18,000 to 23,000 new jobs are projected, mostly in the

aviation and tourism sectors (AM14_a18). The numbers illuminate that the economic

benefits in both Denmark and Armenia are expected to be immense, and by understanding

the effect, policy makers can enhance their decision making processes in terms of which

potential areas to invest in: 1) Direct or indirect promotion of new routes; 2) new airport

facilities, 3) off-site infrastructure such as road or rail links. In this paper, investments (or

funding) are simply defined as time, money and effort. In practice, although all

10 Danish Central Bank interest rate October 3th 2014: 1 EUR = 7.44 DKK (DK14_w18) 11 European Central Bank Interest rate October 8th 2014: 1 EUR = 1.26 USD (GD14_w5)


Page 56 of 74

governments recognize the national, regional, and local benefits generated by airports, the

extent to which they provide direct or indirect funding varies greatly around the world

(Neufville & Odoni, 2013; Graham, 2003; GD14_r1; GD99_a1). The following paragraphs

will illuminate the most significant examples about investments made in Cases A and B

aimed to attract growth. The results of those efforts will be included when applicable.

4.3.1 Attracting sales through promotion

All thirteen respondents from Case A and Case B agreed that in general terms, both

Copenhagen Airport and Zvartnots Airport are fully treated as commercial businesses.

Therefore, the key processes to attract routes are performed by the airports’ sales people

visiting airline headquarters and meeting with potential partners, a practice, which was

formerly determined by political interests and influence. Nevertheless, looking at specific

situations, cf. the findings in Analysis B, one may argue that there are indirect, political

impacts from government regulations. However, this will not be elaborated any further in

this section. In practice, the aviation industry is one of the most transparent industries in

the world, and the analysts working in airports and airlines have access to precise statistics

on global traffic flows that they can use to determine their expansion strategy: “It is tough

business decisions for airlines where they decide to develop a route” (Intv_DKae2: 04:08). The World

Route Conference held every year in September is usually highly fruitful in terms of

creating sales leads for the future. When discussing growth, the conference was one of the

first things airport experts from both countries mentioned:

“First thing what we do, we always participate at these conferences, where we meet

the airlines, we discuss with them, so this is one of the best tools; even, just to know

key people in different airlines, to know if they are interested to fly or not”

(Intv_AMae2: 07:18).

This year, the conference was held in Chicago between September 20-23 with

approximately 3000 delegates, 300 airlines, 800 airports and 200 tourism authorities.

Delegates from both Copenhagen- and Zvartnots Airports were among the guests. This

year, the delegates from Copenhagen airport held the impressive number of 93

presentations (DK14_e1) during the three-day conference, and were highly commended. In

2013, during the World Route Conference, Copenhagen Airport had the honor of being

awarded the “Best Airport at Route Development” award among the category of airports


Page 57 of 74

serving 20-50 million passengers a year. The decision was made by airlines that found

Copenhagen Airport best in determining whether a new route would be profitable or not

(Intv_DKae1/ae2/ae3; Intv_AMae2; DK14_a6). However, comparing the less famous

airport, Zvartnots, that has just liberalized its market, to a major airport like Copenhagen

would be unjustifiable in terms of the World Route Conference: “It’s not easy to represent

Armenia because it’s not a well-known destination, even if we show them that it’s interesting there is some

possibility, there is a potential, it takes some time for the airlines to really discover us on the map, and then

they have to go farther to make those decisions. In case of Etihad it took them like three years to come”

(Intv_AMae: 09:11).

Looking more towards the government in terms of attracting growth, both Danish and

Armenian policy makers have a more facilitating role:

“For example when I travel to meet an airline I can take with me either a local

travel agency to help me present some tourism parts or I can take someone from

government to have more influence […], [we] always try to collaborate [with the

government]” (Intv_AMae2).

This is also the case for Copenhagen airport that collaborates with the Danish Foreign

Ministry in terms of organizing a feasibility visit to a country where there is an interesting

potential for routes development:

“If we are for example interested in establishing a route to India, then we ask the

Foreign Ministry to organize a delegation to India that consists of, for example, a

Danish CEO, an Ambassador, Minister, a representative from Wonderful

Copenhagen, Confederation of Danish Industry and so on” (Intv_DKae1: Q2).

The purpose of such delegations consisting of leading policy makers and representatives

from the industry is to strengthen the position and arguments for establishing a new route.

However, contrary to Zvartnots Airport, Copenhagen Airport has to pay the Foreign

Ministry a consultancy fee for their collaboration. Zvartnots Airport simply covers the

travel costs of policy makers from time to time (Intv_DKae1; Intv_AMae2). Nevertheless,

the respondent representing Danish policy makers argues, that the most important role the

government can play is to do what the commercial players are not able to - lobby for


Page 58 of 74

changes in the EU that can make it more commercially attractive to operate in Copenhagen

Airport:

“We do a lot of lobbyism work in terms of EU and in the future I think we should

do more. The reason is that in the EU there are strong countries like France,

Germany and the United Kingdom. They invest a lot of resources in driving the

EU legislation in their direction, […] and therefore it is important to know when

our “visiting hours” are, when can we have an impact, when are decisions made. If

we are not there we do not have an impact” (Intv_DKpm1: 39:08).

An older example linked to Policy Maker I’s recommendations, occurred in connection

with liberalization efforts in 1993, where the Danish business authority recommended the

policy makers to ensure that local transport suppliers were not worse off than their

colleagues in other EF (EU) countries in terms government aid, which could distort

competition (DK93_a5).

Where the paragraph above illuminates the general processes of attracting growth, this

paragraph will assess specific government activities that have been executed and their

results. Case B presents a clear agreement among airport experts that a close collaboration

between government and airport is important in terms of activating the market and

attracting growth. However, there is a disagreement among experts in determining the

expected level of government effort:

“I think the government here could do more in attracting new airlines. A good

example of this is when the president of Georgia sent 20 letters to Alitalia

proposing that they should fly to Georgia and then it happened. I believe the

government can do something (Intv_AMae1: Q3).

In contrast, Airport Expert III argued a more positive outlook on the government’s efforts

in using its diplomatic channels to attract a higher number of carriers. When airline

operators were pulling out of the Armenian market, the government was trying to help by

reaching out to their embassies with the purpose of lobbying for the route in the home

market. Nevertheless, their efforts were not successful because the most common reason

for airlines not operating in the Armenian market is purely due to business. For example,

British Midland (BMI) used to fly to Armenia, but they pulled out of the market after


Page 59 of 74

British Airways acquired them. The new owners decided that the flights to Yerevan did not

meet their required demand for business class travels, which was their most profitable

service at the time (Intv_AMae3; AM12_a1):

“[…] they had the choice between Georgia and Armenia and they chose Georgia

because there was more demand there. The government tried to intervene, but these

companies are very business driven so it does not help very much”

(Intv_AMae3: 22:07).

Furthermore, a more recent example of government effort is based on Armenia’s presence

at the “Route Silk Road 2014 Forum” held in Tbilisi in July. The purpose of the forum was

to unlock aviation and tourism potential of Asia, the CIS, Central and Eastern Europe and

the Middle East. Armenia’s participation was organized by the private-public organization,

The National Competitiveness Foundation of Armenia (NCFA)12, jointly with the Ministry

of Economy, and the event was highly successful with market entry negotiations with 12

airlines (AM14_a18). However, as the event is recent, the actual results, whether or not the

airlines will open routes, are not yet visible.

Looking at government efforts in Denmark the most clear and recent examples can be

derived from the Global Connected Route Development Partnership Program 13 .

According to records from the end of August 2014, the program has attracted 12

international routes to Copenhagen, whereas six of them are intercontinental flights to

growth-markets, such as Toronto with Air Canada, Dubai with Emirates, Bahrain with

Gulf Air and Shanghai, Tel Aviv and San Francisco with SAS. The project has attracted

200,000 extra international inbound passengers to Copenhagen and the expected return in

2012-2013 is, in regional tourism revenues, estimated at around 1.9 billion DKK [255,4m

EUR]. Obviously, not all efforts of Global Connected were successful. For example the

route to Bahrain closed down after 19 months and the marketing efforts targeted the

Russian market did not lead to any new routes (DK13_a5/a6). Nevertheless, the Danish

Airport Experts I & II are both very positive towards the efforts of Global Connected

12 The National competitiveness Foundation of Armenia (NCFA) is an independent, public-private entity founded through a partnership between the Government of Armenia and a group of leading representatives of the private sector from the United States, Russia, the European Union and the Middle East has been working with the mandate to achieve bring development opportunities to the country and enhance its competitiveness in key areas of economic activity (AM14_a18; AM14_a19). 13 Global Connected is a route development partnership program between The Capital Region of Denmark, Copenhagen Municipality, The Zealand Region, Ministry of Business and Growth, VisitDenmark, Copenhagen Capacity, The Skåne Region, Wonderful Copenhagen and a number of private companies (DK13_a6).


Page 60 of 74

because they “warm up the market” and assist the airport in making the business case

better towards the airlines. For example, this could be by subsidizing marketing awareness

campaigns in the target country in order to ensure that flights are filled up and become

successful (Intv_DKae2). The Danish Airport Expert III informs:

“There is no doubt that it is expensive to start-up a new route. One cannot fill up a

plane from day one. At least it is very rare in these days because of competition.

[Subsidizing] is something you do in all airports. It is not unique for Copenhagen

(01:50).

From the above it can be concluded that growth in Cases A and B are generally derived

from commercial sales activities where the government only has an indirect, facilitating

role. However, there are examples where both the Danish and Armenian governments

have actively pursued attracting growth to the airports.

4.3.2 What comes first: Infrastructure or growth?

In the section above, the processes of how the airport operators and policy makers have

pursued growth were specified. This section will focus on the importance of meeting the

infrastructure needs of passengers in terms of airport growth. The Council of International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) highly supports government policies aimed at

financing airport infrastructure: […] practically every nation in the world subsidizes to some extent,

directly or indirectly, the development of infrastructure at its airports (Neufville & Odoni, 2013:

p.219). However, one of the key questions that challenge both airport operators and policy

makers is what comes first: Infrastructure or growth? According to Airport Expert I (Q8)

in Case A, the answer is clearly growth:

“We invest when there is a need. We do not believe in ‘just’ building an airport”

The airport expert argues that, indirectly, the customers are paying for infrastructure

expansions through user charges (cf. Analysis A), and since the user charges are

government regulated, it is not possible to invest in large-scale projects that result in

overcapacity issues, as it is seen in Asia. The user charges have to reflect the value that is

delivered: “We take small steps at a time […] because we have a responsibility towards our customers

and it is unnecessary to make it expensive for them. This means that we cannot spend money on ‘maybe’

projects” (Intv_DKae1: Q4). The airport expert illuminated with an example:


Page 61 of 74

“[…]” we have been criticized for not having runways that are ready to receive F-

category planes, but if our customer, for example SAS, do not need it, there is

nothing in it for us. Those who have F83 planes have given the criticism, but it does

not matter if there is no commitment from their side. Normally route developers meet

with the directors and it is only when there is 95% security that we start acting”

(Intv_DKae1: Q4).

In strong contrast, Zvartnots Airport invests first and expects growth thereafter. In July

2009 (more than three years before market liberalization), the airport operator invested in a

new terminal that stood ready two years later in 2013. Before the reconstruction, the

airport could serve 2 million passengers, whereas the new terminal is designed with a

capacity to serve 3.5 million annual passengers. However, assessing total passenger

numbers between 2009 and 2013, the numbers range from slightly less than 1.5 million

passengers to almost 1.7 million passengers. Hence when the airport operators started

building the terminal, they had not yet reached their full capacity (Intv_AMae2; AM14_e2;

AM09_a1). However, investing first, despite its risks, has meant that the airport operators

are ready for the growth generated by the liberalized market. Airport Expert I stated: […]

we have 50 landings and take offs every day, we can do 100 every day. […]” (Q4). And the airport

management is ready to finance an expansion when needed: “We can have even more flights

than the current capacity allows us, if it is necessary, because we have some land around the airport that the

government has reserved for us” (Intv_AMae1: Q4). On the contrary, this is an example of a

contemporary challenge for Copenhagen Airport. Despite high growth ambitions, the

airport infrastructure is not yet ready to serve the growing number of passengers.

When asking the respondents regarding the government’s role in terms of airport

infrastructure investments, both airport operators in Case A and Case B stated that they do

not receive any financing (Intv_DKae2; Intv_AMae2). The previous President of The

Regional Council of Copenhagen, Vibeke Storm Rasmussen, criticizes this: “The situation is

that growth and development follows a good infrastructure, not the other way around” (DK12_a1: 3). She

depicts the example of the transformation of Dubai from a desert to a transport hub,

which was enabled by political willingness. “These traffic hubs are crucial in terms of growth”

(ibid.) Despite this, governments have no financial influence in terms of investments and

instead, in both Cases A and B, policy makers have an important role in terms of

approving infrastructure changes (Intv_AMae1; Intv_DKae1/ae2; AM02_a1). Airport


Page 62 of 74

Expert I from Denmark states:

“Generally when we make changes in the airport infrastructure we need to have a

convincing case towards the authorities. […] In the framework of ‘Expanding

CPH’ we are conducting countless negotiations, doing studies on environmental

impacts […]. [For example] we are looking towards a future with more bad

weather conditions, which demands our attention. If we make the runway more

difficult to land and take off from, the airport will more often be closed due to bad

weather” (Q1).

These topics are currently discussed between Copenhagen Airports, the airlines, and the

Transport Authority (Intv_DKae1). The processes to approve infrastructure changes are

similar in Armenia, but there is a recent example where the government approved a

change, which was then overruled by the municipality. The conflict is linked to ongoing

discussions about demolishing the old terminal building, which does not meet modern

standards of air navigation and is a dangerous construction due to its low seismic

resistance. The decision to demolish the building was approved as part of the “master

plan” for Zvartnots Airport for 2013-2017. Nevertheless, the Armenian Public Council, an

advisory body formed by the President of Armenia, appealed to the government with the

requirement to reject the decision on demolishing the building. This resulted in the Mayor’s

Office-affiliated urban planning council to unanimously reject the application for the

demolition of the building. The old terminal, Building N1, which Yerevan citizens refer to

as the “round building” or “tower,” is considered one of the best samples of Soviet

postmodernism architecture, which is why many citizens feel an emotional attachment to

the building. In January 2014, the prime minister informed that they are considering

various architectural options to solve the issue (AM14_a4). This example reflects the

amount of power and influence the government has regardless of privatization.

The section above examined the processes around investments in airport infrastructure. It

was found that the governments in both Cases A and B are important in terms of

providing permits for infrastructure changes, but they do not participate in any financing.

This section will elaborate on the role of the government in off-site infrastructure

investments, more specifically, in the surrounding transportation system. This is of high

importance because most airports cannot achieve the desired scale of passengers by


Page 63 of 74

attracting only those in close proximity to the airport. Besides accommodating the needs of

local citizens, they also need to go further afield to achieve a profitable scale of operations

by appealing to passengers from other airports in neighboring countries. In the past, policy

makers have played a crucial role in developing road network infrastructure and rail

connections to airports in order to improve their catchment areas: “Catchment area for a

facility includes all the places that have easier access to it, in terms of time, distance and expense”

(Neufville & Odoni, 2013: 116; DK12_r2).

In terms of Case A, Copenhagen Airport ranks as one of the best airports in Europe

served by public transportation. In 2012, more than 58% of departing passengers travelled

to the airport by public transport. That equals to roughly five million departing passengers

that annually use public transport to get to the airport (DK14_r3). Nevertheless, according

to Danish Airport Expert II, calculations on catchment area illuminate that Copenhagen

airport is significantly weaker than neighboring Hamburg. The number of people that can

reach the Airport within two hours transportation time calculates within the catchment

area. The airport in Hamburg serves 13 million passengers annually and 10 intercontinental

routes, whereas Copenhagen Airport serves 24 million passengers and 27 intercontinental

flights. However, where the catchment area of Hamburg is 10 million passengers per year,

it is only 4 million in Copenhagen Airport:

“We usually say ‘we are punching above our weight’” (Intv_DKae2: 15:30).

With the growth ambition of serving 40 million passengers per year, at least nine million

travelers are expected to take the bus, train or Metro to the airport, which is a significant

increase of 80% (DK14_r3). Considering the number of the current catchment area, the

transport infrastructure surrounding the airport is not ready to handle such a growth.

Moreover, due to the required length of time to plan and build infrastructure, Copenhagen

Airport management urges local and national politicians in both Denmark and Sweden to

take joint action now (DK14_r3): “With more passengers, pressure will increase on Metro and train

services, which will have to be expanded over time. In the long term, the airport should also be linked to the

European high-speed rail network, a matter that requires immediate political attention” (DK14_r3: 32:

33). According to Airport Expert II, it is extremely important that politicians are aware that

there is a weakness and Copenhagen Airport is standing on a fragile foundation. The

government has a crucial role to play in terms of expanding the catchment area and thus


Page 64 of 74

ensuring that the airport development is more robust. The Fehmarnbelt that links

Scandinavia and Germany will be one of the world’s longest automobile routes through a

tunnel, and serves as a good example of what Copenhagen Airport needs in order to grow

(DK14_a8; DK12_a1). Copenhagen Airport Managing Director, Thomas Woldbye argues

that the tunnel will be a growth catalyst for the Airport: “Our attitude is essentially that improved

infrastructure is a good thing for Copenhagen Airport. It should be remembered that the trains’ travel in

both directions, and anything that can expand our catchment area is a good thing. It is our job as a region

and as an airport to make us so attractive that more people come here than leave” (DK14_a8: 1). The

Director strengthens his points by linking the project to Oresund, which is the best

example of the synergistic opportunities that infrastructure investments can trigger. He

argues that the fixed link across Oresund has had a huge positive impact on the whole

region. Over half of the largest Swedish companies are located in southern Sweden, and

they see Copenhagen Airport as their preferred airport instead of Stockholm’s Arlanda. The

Oresund link has created a region, and the Fehmarnbelt link has the potential to do this as well

(DK14_a8: 3).

In Case B, the government is interested in making Zvartnots Airport a “multi model hub”.

This includes getting a railway linkage and better ground transportation to the Airport.

The idea is that the project could be an offshoot of The Eurasian North-South Transport

Corridor Program, which has a potential route to link India to Russia via Iran and Central

Asia. The goal is catalyze trade across Eurasia by linking expansive markets while

significantly reducing transport costs. This project is of high importance for Armenia, as it

would allow truck traffic to come easily from neighboring Iran to the airport and the

railway (AM14_a21; Intv_AMae2). Although a passenger railway would be beneficial, the

interesting aspect of the project is to establish a station at the airport for cargo shipments.

The complete technical design for using existing routes and creating new routes to connect

Zvartnots to the central railway station in Yerevan is ready on paper and the government is

keen on implementing the project. The problem is finding and securing the financial

resources: “I think the government is eager, but they are poor” (Intv_AMae3: 09:39). They are not

able to generate enough tax revenue for various reasons, resulting in a constant strain to

search for privatization deals around concerting of rights that would incentivize others to

invest. Airport Expert III participated in the negotiations with the Southern Caucasus

Railway Company, which is the Russian company that manages the railway system in

Armenia. However, the Russian operator did not seem to have any real incentives to invest


Page 65 of 74

in the project, even when presented with a business case that would generate revenue. This

means that everything is left on the airport operator, who would bear sole responsibility to

finance the project. However, they were not interested in putting all the financing

themselves (Intv_AMae3: 14:15). This is apparent by the fact that although the government

encouraged airport operators to invest in a cold storage facility, only 50% of the facility is

being used currently. The government believed that if the infrastructure was already built, it

would produce more activity. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case, as it is

insufficient to build a facility without establishing accompanying economical developments.

This was very discouraging for the airport management (Intv_AMae3: 09:39)

Proposition III: Government investment efforts in projects linked to multisided platforms

increase growth

4.4 Summary of findings

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore how government interventions

impact growth in multisided platforms. During the research process, three growth factors

were developed to guide the analysis. Figure 4 summarizes the findings from the

exploratory study of Cases A and B in a graphical illustration to facilitate a quick overview.

Figure 4: Government impact on growth in multisided platforms

The first growth factor discovered, government involvement in operations, is based on the

progressive shift from public to private management in airports. The findings display that

general airport operations have significantly improved since privatization. The majority of


Page 66 of 74

the respondents (airport experts and policy makers) argue that during government

management, airport operations were highly bureaucratic, lacked flexibility and disregarded

the customer. It was further confirmed that government interventions aimed at improving

social efficiency through price regulations, seemed to have the opposite effect. The second

growth factor, government control of market access, elaborates on the transition from a

restricted market, based on regulatory constraints on scheduling and pricing to protect

local airlines, to a liberalized market, where competition is welcomed and restrictions are

relaxed. Recent abnormal growth numbers experienced in both Cases A and B can be

interpreted as the direct results of the local governments’ willingness to liberalize the

market. Nevertheless, it is seen that despite liberalization, policy makers can still restrict

market access in the name of national security. The third growth factor, government

investment efforts, indicates that policy makers can positively impact growth by investing

in general projects that expand transport access and connectivity. However, where the first

two growth factors are confirmed by historical data, the third factor is based on recent or

current initiatives and therefore principally displays expectations rather than actual results.

These considerations are mentioned in section 3.6 as limitations derived from conducting

case studies.

5. Discussion

In the previous section, the three growth factors discovered in this study were summarized.

The following section relates the findings to existing literature in order to question whether

the growth factors are applicable to other multisided platforms. This endeavor is

challenging because as mentioned in the literature review (cf. section 2.1.2), multisided

platforms lack a proper definition, provoking the common question: “After all, isn’t every

market two-sided?” To meet this challenge and increase the validity of the findings, the

discussion will only include examples of MSPs that have been cited in numerous studies.

Furthermore, to enhance the level of clarity, each growth factor is assessed through both

the lenses of traditional resellers and multisided platforms. It is especially important to

determine whether there may be a difference in the treatment by governments of

multisided platforms versus one-sided markets.


Page 67 of 74

5.1 Academic implications

Assessing growth factor I and II, it is clear that even though both airports in Cases A and B

are no longer publicly managed and the aviation markets have become liberalized, local

governments continuously impact business strategies through imposed industry

regulations. The government interest to regulate can be explained historically by looking at

the aviation industry, but more importantly, it is because airports are considered natural

monopolies with high entry barriers. Consequently, airport operators may be motivated to

charge higher prices, restricting access through high entry barriers, and as a result,

distorting social welfare. These findings comply with the vast literature on antitrust in

multisided platforms. Due to strong network effects, successful MSPs tend to tip towards a

single dominated platform generating significantly higher profit margins than those enjoyed

by traditional resellers. In other words, the constituents of multisided platforms prefer to

single-home, where they connect to only one platform to transact on, rather than multiple.

For example, in the payment card industry, consumers prefer to single-home, thus placing

a great majority of their payment card purchases on a single network. This means that the

only way for the other side (the merchant) to reach those agents (the consumers) is through

their preferred platform (cf. 2.3.1). This has shown to have important implications on

governments’ motivation to intervene. Nevertheless, the interest to regulate multisided

platforms is not different from traditional one-sided markets that have enough market

power to engage in anticompetitive processes, but the assessment process is significantly

different in MSPs. The widely held view among policy makers and economists is that open

platforms encouraging competition are intrinsically more desirable than closed, proprietary

and monopolistic platforms. However, antitrust studies on MSPs show the exact opposite.

Encouraging competition in one or both sides (consumer or merchant) in MSPs may

negatively affect social efficiency and thus welfare. In section 2.3.1 in the literature review,

the situation is illustrated well in the example of the United States’ government assessing

Microsoft’s growing market power. The tens of thousands of software applications that run

on Windows demonstrate significant entry barriers and market power, which could directly

lead to antitrust issues. However, unlike traditional one-sided markets, the government

viewed Microsoft’s growth as socially efficient and pro-competitive because it made the

platform product more valuable for all customer communities. Conventional competition

policies would have disrupted welfare because regulating business monopolies can hinder

the emergence of successful platforms and deprive the constituents of benefits. The


Page 68 of 74

findings in this study support this notion. For example, the argument for policy makers to

intervene in airport operations is to improve social efficiency by enacting policies that

protect airlines and passengers from excessive airport charges. However, one can argue

that governments cause more harm than good because they use their authority to

subsequently impose a number of taxes on both the airport operators and airlines. In

general, the aviation industry can be seen as an easy-target for new taxes, sometimes with

no direct relation to the industry itself. These taxes have proven to be harmful not only for

the aviation industry, but also for the greater economy. For example, in the context of

multisided platforms, when governments charge the airport more, it naturally drive airline

charges to increase, leading to higher ticket prices for passengers and a decreasing number

of available flights. Furthermore, experts in the field argue that even marginally small

changes in price can have a significant impact on the greater economic value created by the

aviation industry. As mentioned in the literature review (cf. section 2.1.2), the purpose of

having tighter governance is often to pursue quality, but the benefits of higher quality have

to be weighed against the costs of implementing tighter governance rules.

The third growth factor indicates that government investment efforts can impact growth

positively. In Cases A and B, local governments invest in, or at least encourage the

expansion of, transport access and connectivity, since it can significantly increase the

number of passengers and positively impact regional development. In general, it is found

that airports cannot achieve the desired scale of passengers by attracting only those very

close to the airport. They also need to appeal to passengers from other airports in

neighboring countries, and this requires government investment efforts (cf. 4.3.2).

However, deciding which projects to invest in can be highly challenging for policy makers

because they have to consider the overall welfare effects, and these can be contradicting in

MSPs. On one hand, their investments can create strategic trade-offs for the MSP and

some participant groups, but on the other hand, it can create negative value for other

participating groups. This is in contrast to one-sided markets, where the effects of the

investment will be more obvious for the policy maker. Hence, in the MSP literature it is

found that investment strategies must optimize output by harvesting the indirect network

effects available on both sides. Historically, policy makers have played a crucial role in

developing road network infrastructure and rail connections to airports. However,

infrastructure investments are often long-term, include various stakeholders, and entail

substantial risks: What if infrastructure is built, but never utilized? Who should take the risk


Page 69 of 74

and invest? This challenge is referred to as the chicken-and-egg problem, which is one of

the most difficult challenges to solve in MSPs. It means that no side will join without the

other. For example, in Case B, the government failed to finance a new railway route

connecting Zvartnots Airport to the central railway station in Yerevan, the capital city of

Armenia. This meant, that despite that the airport operators had shown interest in possibly

co-financing the project, they did not want to bear the sole responsibility. In other words,

the project failed because one of the sides failed to finance the project, although the other

side was ready (cf. 4.3.2).

In summary, while governments do not always practice it, there is an incentive to treat

multisided platforms differently from one-sided markets when considering growth factor I,

II and III.

5.2 Managerial implications

The managerial implications in this study may be applied in general, but in this section they

are demonstrated focusing on the two main target groups of this study: Airport operators

and policy makers. Major changes in the global aviation industry points to emerging

challenges that aviation stakeholders must consider. For example, increasing competition

has led to a current, trend in the global aviation industry where an increasing number of

governments are withdrawing from the aviation business by privatizing airlines and airports

(cf. section 4.1). Subsequently, the incidents of 9/11 and more recently, the crash of MH17

in Ukraine, have changed the way governments and airport operators look at aviation

security (cf. 4.2.2). Therefore, the industry is regaining its status as an important

component in national security discussions, leading to a dialogue about how governments

can secure national security through privately owned or managed airports. Furthermore,

airports are viewed as an important economic driver attracting tourists and businesses to

the country (cf. 4.3), eliciting a discussion about what role, if any, governments should play

in attracting growth for commercial airports. Considering the current processes in the

aviation industry, the most plausible solution to these challenges would be for policy

makers to enact new policies, or modify existing policies and regulations, which meet the

emerging challenges. However, in this study, regulations have weakened growth in both

Cases A and B. Therefore, policy makers and airport operators are suggested to assess the

challenges through the lens of multisided platforms. This can help policy makers develop


Page 70 of 74

policies that support social efficiency and growth rather than taking the “obvious” one-

sided market decision. Subsequently, airport operators can better argue for or against

regulations imposed on them by the government. Moreover, if airport operators and policy

makers better understand the dynamics in the aviation industry, together they can better

lobby for changes in e.g. international legislations, thus benefitting the local airport in

becoming more commercially attractive.

5.3 Further research

As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to discover growth factors

that can complement the limited literature on government intervention in MSPs. Illustrated

in figure 4 above, this study proposes three growth factors that can be applied in an

economic model for further research on the same topic. However, at this stage these

factors are not quantitatively measurable and therefore require relevant proxies to be

identified. Furthermore, as the economic model seeks to explain growth in MSPs, it will

also be relevant to discuss how growth can be measured considering all the constituents.

Below, possible proxies are suggested.

Beginning with the latter, it is vital for the researcher to determine how to measure growth

in MSPs. In relation to Cases A and B, it would be convenient to use only the growth in

passenger numbers as a proxy. However, it is acknowledged that this does not necessarily

reflect the aggregated growth of the MSP. Therefore it can be suggested to use the change

in revenues of the MSP as growth proxy, as it is comprised of quantity and price. While

growth is a measurable factor, it can be a challenge to find quantitative proxies for

government intervention. Proposition I suggests that government intervention in

operations will have a negative impact on growth in the MSP. In section 4.1.3, examples

for both Case A and Case B were related to government intervention in pricing with weight

on special taxes. Thus, a fair proxy could be state imposed taxes that only the MSP or its

constituents are subject to. In Case A and B this could be the tax imposed on the aviation

sector, but not competing transportation forms such as the railway. The second

proposition indicates that governments controlling market access will decrease growth in

MSPs. The examples on this issue are single incidents of airline routes that have been

prohibited by government. Because these incidents are far apart in time and often based on

political and subjective decisions, it is difficult to suggest a measure. A way to mitigate this


Page 71 of 74

issue could be to use a dummy variable, depending on whether there is government control

or not. From the findings in section 4.2, the anticipation is that government control of any

kind will make a dummy variable in an economic model decrease the expected growth.

Finally, proposition III indicates that government investment efforts positively affects

growth in MSPs. This does not necessarily demand a proxy, as investments can be

measured directly in monetary form. It is up to the researcher to define and filter

government investments to the MSP and the constituents that are relevant for the model.

6. Conclusion

On 1 January 1914, Abram C. Pheil, former mayor of St. Petersburg, Florida became the

world’s first fare-paying airline passenger. Little did he know that 100 years and some 65

billion passengers later, air transport would shape the lives of people all over the planet.

Equally nobody would have guessed, that from its founding 10 years ago, Facebook would

start changing the way billions of people communicate on a global scale. For better or

worse, airports, Facebook and other multisided platforms are evolving today from simple

infrastructure providers to complex multiproduct, multiservice enterprises that drive

economic development and wealth creation. Nevertheless, governments around the world

do not seem to be prepared for their extensive growth and impact. Policy makers are

attempting to enact policies that will support their success, while aiming to ensure overall

welfare for society. However, it can be questioned whether governments are causing more

harm than good in multisided platforms. The results of this study can only provide an

ambiguous and rather speculative answer to the question. In terms of government

intervention, the findings comply with the disagreements prevalent among leading

macroeconomists and traditional businesses. Some argue that governments should

intervene during times of crisis; others are more strongly against any interventions that are

not related to, e.g. defending the nation and building roads and bridges; and finally, a more

extreme perspective encourages state-ownership and control. While this study can endorse

that state control of (at least privately-owned) multisided platforms is not a sustainable

model, it is more difficult to make a distinction between arguments for a free market or a

balanced partnership between government and business. The two first growth factors

identified in this study: I) government involvement in operations and II) government control in market

access indicate that government intervention has a negative impact on growth. The third


Page 72 of 74

growth factor: III) government investments efforts exposes a positive impact on growth.

However, the positive results of growth factor III could be linked to the fact, that airports

are considered an important element of a country’s infrastructure and national defense

system. These types of government interventions are even supported by more extreme

“free market” thinkers. Nevertheless, for more clarification, this research hopes to inspire

the development of an extensive economic model where the growth factors from this

study, including other relevant growth factors, can be tested.

6.1 Acknowledgements

I would like to express my profound gratitude and deepest thanks to my advisor, Marion

Poetz, for her exemplary guidance throughout the course of this thesis. This work would

not have been possible without her guidance and support. I feel incredibly privileged to

have her as my supervisor. Furthermore, I am grateful for this golden opportunity made

possible by Danish and Armenian airport experts and policy makers, who have shared with

me their extensive knowledge and insights throughout this amazing journey. Their

willingness and dedication to help has been a great source of inspiration for me in my

intellectual growth. Moreover, I gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions, comments

and thoughts provided by Shoushan Tavlian, Stina Moquist, Victor Moquist, Kirsten Bruun

and Monica Villaume. Their unequivocal support would fill me with enthusiasm and energy

during times when I needed it most. And finally, a warm thank you to my parents, who

have given me their blessing, help, and guidance throughout my studies. Especially for

supporting (or sometimes accepting) my eagerness to learn from unconventional paths,

often including interesting, but risky, projects and travels. This will carry me a long way in

the journey of life on which I am about to embark.

Thank you to you all — Mange tak til alle — Շնորհակալ եմ ձեզ բոլորին։


Page 73 of 74

7. References Appold Stephen J. & Kasarda John D. (2011):

Seeding growth at airports and airport cities: Insights from the two-sided market literature. Research in Transportation Business & Management, vol. 1, pp 91-100.

Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian (2005): Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts. Springer-Verlag.

Bakos, Yannis; Katsamakas, Evangelos (2008): Design and Ownership of Two-Sided Networks: Implications for Internet Platforms. Journal of Management Information Systems.

Bolt Wilko & Soramäki Kimmo (2008): Competition, bargaining power and pricing in two-sided markets, working paper, no 181, De Nederlandsche Bank.

Brymann, Alan & Bell, Emma (2003): Business Research Methods, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carbó-Valverde, Santiago; Chakravorti, Sujit; Fernández, Francisco Rodriguez (2009): Regulating Two-sided Markets: An Empirical Investigation. European Central Bank, working paper series.

Davies, R. W. ed. (1994): The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945. Cambridge

Doobory, Rubina (2005): Deregulation Of The Airline Industry In Europe. Printed in Baltimore by Publish America, LLLP.

Eisenhardt, Kathleen M (1989): Building Theories from Case Study Research. Stanford University, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14. No 4. 532-550.

Evans, David S; Schmalense, Richard (2013): The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-sided Platform Businesses. Oxford University Press.

Evans, David S (2003): The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets. Yale Journal On Regulation.

Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006): Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 219-245.

Fröhlichs Karsten (2010): Airports as two-sided markets? A Critical Contribution, working paper.

Gillen, D. (2011): The evolution of airport ownership and governance. Journal of Air Transport Management, 17, 3–13.

Graham, Anne (2003): Managing airports – an international perspective. Second edition. Printed in Burlington by Elsevier Butterworth Heinemann.

Hagiu, Andrei (2014): Strategic Decisions for Multisided Platforms. MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 55, No. 2

Hagiu, Andrei (2013): Three-Dimensional Strategy: Winning the Multisided Platform. Harvard Business School.

Hagiu, Andrei; Wright, Julian (2011): Multi-Sided Platforms. Harvard Business School, working paper.

Hagiu, Andrei (2006a): Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency. Harvard Business School working paper.

Hagiu, Andrei (2006b): Multi-Sided Platforms: From Microfoundations to Design and Expansion Strategies. Harvard Business School working paper.

Hayasi Fumiko (2008): The Economics of Payment Card Fee Structure: Policy Considerations of Payment Card Rewards, working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. (1960): The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: U of Chicago. Print.

Hayek, Friedrich A. Von. (1944): The Road to Serfdom. Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, 1994. The University of Chicago Press.

Huberman, Michael A. & Miles, Matthew B. (2002): The qualitative researcher’s companion. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Heaton, Janet (2004): Reworking Qualitative Data. Printed in London by SAGE Publications Ltd.

Ivaldi Marc, Sokullu Senay & Turo Tuba (2011): Airport Prices in a Two Sided Framework: An Emperical Analysis, working paper.


Page 74 of 74

Keynes, John Maynard (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Print.

Kyrou, Dinos (2000): Lobbying the European Commission – The case of air transport. Printed in Burlington by Ashgate Publishing Company.

Kvale, Steinar (2008): A Qualitative Stance. Printed in Gylling by Narayana Press.

Hiltzik, M. (2010). Colossus: Hoover Dam and the making of the American century. New York: Free Press.

Lijphart, Arend (1975): The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research. Comparative political studies 8(2) 158-177.

Lindsta dt, Nadine (2009): Multisided Media Markets: Applying the Theory of Multisided Markets to Media Markets. University of Southern Denmark.

Lor, Peter (2011): International and Comparative Librarianship. Chapter 4: Methodology in comparative studies, draft.

Manasta, Albert (1968): The Soviet Experiment in Collective Economy. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economy. Vol. 39 Issue 3, p 435- 468

Mintzberg, Henry (1996): Managing Government, Governing Management. Harvard Business Review

Ragin, Charles C (1987): The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkely: University of California Press.

Robson, Colin (2002): A Real Research. Oxford: Blackwell

Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean (2003): Platform Competition in Two-sided Market. Journal of the European Economic Association.

Rysman, Marc (2009): The Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Journal of Economics Perspectives, volume 23, number 3, page 125-143

Rysman, Marc (2007b): The Empirics of Antitrust in Two-sided Markets. Competition Policy International

Sartori Giovanni (1991): Comparing and Miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 3, no 3, pp 243-257

Saunders, Mark; Lewis, Philip; Thornhill, Adrian (2009): Research methods for business students. Financial Times Prentice Hall, fifth edition, page 2-526.

Sinha, Dipendra (2001): Deregulation and Liberalisation of the Airline Industry – Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania. Printed in Wiltshire by Ashgate Publishing Company.

Smith, Adam (1776): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Electronic Classics Series, 2005.

Song, Minjae (2013): Estimating Platform Market Power in Two-sided Markets with an Application to Magazine Advertising. Simon Graduate School of Business.

Staniland, Martin (2003): Government Birds – Air Transport and the State in Western Europe. Printed in Maryland by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Starkie, D. (2001). Reforming UK airport regulation. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 35, 119–135.

Thomas, David R (2003): A general inductive approach for qualitative data analysis. University of Auckland, New Zealand.

Velde, Dirk Willem te (2010b): Effective state-business relations, industrial policy and economic growth. ODI publications.

Weiner, Stuart E & Wright, Julian (2005): Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants.

Wiersema, Margarethe F. & Bowen, Harry P. (2008): Corporate diversification: the impact of foreign competition, industry globalization, and product diversification, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 29, no 2, pp 115-132.

Yin, Robert K (2009): Case Study Research – Design and Methods. Fourth edition. Printed in Thousand Oaks by SAGE Publication Ltd.

Zellan, Jennifer (2003): Aviation security - Current Issues and Developments. Printed in New York by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Appendix A-E

Appendix A Primary Data Collection (2 pages) Appendix B Interview Guide (2 pages) Appendix C Archived data (14 pages) Appendix D Danish Government Ownership (1 page) Appendix E Literature on Multisided Platforms (14 pages)

Page 1 of 2

Appendix A: Primary data collection (part 1)

Table 1: Interview with airport experts

Interviewee Institution Position Date Media/place Format Evidence Coding

Confidential Zvartnots Airports

Management 28 Apr. 2014 Face-to-face,

Yerevan Unstructured

(English) Notes

Intv_AMae1

Confidential Zvartnots airport

Management 17 Jul. 2014 Skype Semi-structured

(English)

Recording Transcript

Intv_AMae2

Confidential Zvartnots Airport

Consultant 7 Aug. 2014 Skype Semi-structured

(English)


Intv_AMae3

Confidential Air Armenia Management 26 Apr. 2014 Face-to-face,

Yerevan Unstructured

(English, Armenian) Notes

Intv_AMae4

Confidential Copenhagen Airport

Management 16 July 2014 Face-to-face, Copenhagen

Semi-structured (Danish)

Notes Problem

with recording

Intv_DKae1

Confidential Copenhagen Airport

Management 4 Sept 2014 Face-to-face, Copenhagen



Intv_DKae2

Confidential Scandinavian Airlines




Intv_DKae3

Confidential Politikens Turen går til



Recordings Transcript

Intv_DKae4

Page 2 of 2

Appendix A: Primary data collection (part 2)

Table 2: Primary data collection: Interview with policy makers

Interviewee Institution Position Date Media/place Format Evidence Coding

Confidential Ministry of Economy of Armenia

High level (Two respondents)

26 Apr. 2014

Face-to-face, Yerevan

Unstructured (English,

Armenian, Russian)

Notes

Intv_AMpm1

Confidential Ministry of Economy of Armenia

High level 28 Apr.

2014 Face-to-face,

Yerevan


Armenian)

Notes

Intv_AMpm2

Confidential

General Department of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Armenia (GDCA)

High level (Two respondents)

28 Apr. 2014

Face-to-face, Yerevan


Armenian, Russian)

Notes

Intv_AMpm3

Confidential The Danish Transport Authority

High level 6 Aug. 2014 Face-to-face, Copenhagen



Intv_DKpm1

Confidential Confidential High level 4 Aug. 2014 Face-to-face, Copenhagen


Notes

Intv_DKpm2

Page 1 of 2

Appendix B: Interview guide for airport experts & policy makers Introduction I am very pleased to meet you and thank you very much for taking your. My name is Tatevik Revazian and

I am a student at Copenhagen Business School, studying a double degree in Management of Innovation and Business Development & International Management. I am really passionate about airports both as a frequent traveller and as my possible work place in the future. I actually worked in Copenhagen Airport during my bachelor studies at the check in desk, boarding, translating Russian documents and even guarding planes when that was relevant! I love the environment and “stress” around airports and this is what has motivated me to dig deeper into this area with my master thesis.

Our connection I was recommended by […] to meet you; I found your profile very relevant on Linkedin and noticed that

we have […] as a mutual friend. Pitch line for Armenian respondents

I visited Zvarnots airport with 25 innovation students from Copenhagen Business School along with an associate professor in 2012 during a study trip I organized to Armenia. I still remember how inspired and impressed we all were and I am excited to getting to know you and the airport better.

Pitch line for Danish respondents

I consider Copenhagen Airport as my second home. When working there I didn’t notice the daily changes, but now its very clear to me that there are constant investments to improve the infrastructure, and I have noticed a lot of positive changes making the workflow more efficient at the check-in area.

Practical information The interview will take around 1 – 1.5 hours and I will not follow all the questions slavishly, but would prefer that we have an informal conversation guided by the questions. Is that ok with you? Please stop me if you have questions or comments on the go. Also, if you wish I can sign a confidentiality clause and will not share the thesis without your consensus.

Questions

[…] is either Zvartnots/Armenia/Armenian or Copenhagen/Denmark/Danish

Topic A: Basic information

Before we start could you please shortly introduce yourself? a) What is your background and how did you end up dealing in the aviation sector? b) Please describe what your main tasks are during the day c) In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses of your job?

What are the main characteristics of the […] aviation industry?

a) Please classify […] airport according to its economic impact. Choose between: International gateway airport, national hub airport, regional airports, tourist generator airports, tourist receiver airport and transit and interline airports.

b) How do you picture the development of the […] aviation industry and the role of […] airport in this development?

Topic B: Attracting growth to multisided platform considering the role of public policies

How are constituents (e.g. airlines and passengers) attracted to […] airport?

a) How are routes attracted to […] airport and which role (if any) do policy makers play in this? b) It is often said that airports are economic drivers of a country. Can you please elaborate on this

thought in connection to the vision of […] airport in developing or/and sustaining a hub airport? Please define what role (if any) policy makers’ play in developing an airport hub.

c) Does […] airport have the infrastructure needed to handle an increase in number of travelers? In any case consider this question in relation to investments. Please describe what role policy makers’ play or have previously played in attracting investments for e.g. airport expansion, building new hotels, railways etc. In other words is there a chicken and egg problem in the airport-government relationship when considering investments, and if so how do you solve it. Please use examples.

d) Considering the airport ownership structure, do you think it enables or hinders growth? Please elaborate on previous questions (e.g. relationship between ownership structure- and attracting

routes; investments and developing a hub. How does the future look like – will […] airport have more or less governmental ownership/management power?

e) Consider the recent political developments with the EU/Eurasian Economic Union. Do you

think this will influence the growth of […] airport, or at least the direction you will look towards? If so, how?

f) In your general opinion what is more prevalent: Public policies enabling or hindering growth in […] airport.

Page 2 of 2

Can you please describe factors that have impacted the design of […] airport?

a) Do you have examples where policy makers have helped […] airport reduce search-, transaction- or/and product development costs? If so, please argue which, how and why.

b) Have you experienced conflicts between […] airport and constituents (e.g. airlines & passengers) because the constituents felt that their needs have not been properly served? If so, did the airport management or/and policy makers assist in resolving the conflict and how? Please provide examples.

Can you please describe the pricing structure in your platform?

a) Where do you get most of your revenue from: aeronautical or non-aeronautical charges? Are the aeronautical charges dependent on non-aeronautical charges?

b) Are the aeronautical charges for hub airlines (such as SAS, Air Armenia) different from regular airlines? If so, how and why? Furthermore please answer the question considering any governmental ownership in hub airlines.

c) Considering the price sensitivity of airlines and passengers, are your aeronautical charges low, medium or high compared to industry averages and do you get any governmental support to keep the prices down?

d) How does competition (or the lack of competition) influence airport charges? Please relate this question to situations where policy makers have protected local airlines through investments and legislations.

e) In general are you subject to international legislations (e.g. EU, ICAU) on how you charge different platform constituents (e.g. airlines & passengers). Please describe the process and identify strengths and weaknesses considering your growth.

How loose or tight are the governance rules in the airport? a) In percentage how much of your daily work is approximately regulated by national and

international policy makers and how big of an influence does the airport management have? Please consider the ownership structure of the airport in your response. In your opinion, is the future more or less regulated by the government?

b) Please elaborate specifically on policies that may regulate access to- and interactions on the airport platform: 1. What are the selection criteria when attracting routes and which role (if any) do policy makers play in

determining these criteria? Please consider the process of developing bilateral agreements with countries around the world

2. What determines how many sides can join the airport platform? What are the limitations (if any) based upon? Do policy makers have a role in constraining access?

3. Who develops internal airport policies for constituents who already have access to the platform (e.g. security policies, environmental impacts, ground handling policies and many more).

4. Furthermore how do you e.g. allocate time slots for airline companies – please answer the question by considering situations where the governments are shareholders in local airlines.

c) Do you consider the airport-government relationship structure hierarchical or flat? Especially relate this to the internal processes established for information and knowledge to flow. Do you consider the efficient internal flow of information between airport-government as an important growth factor?

d) In your opinion do you have access to vital knowledge from the global airport industry? Please elaborate whether the political situation in you country has an influence on your access to global industry information?

Topic C: Additional data

Can you please share any data (could be established practices, rules, laws and standards, reports, airport charges, data on passengers, future estimations etc.) that you may have access to.

Closing Is there anything more you would like to add? The hand-in date for the thesis is October 17th and I will gladly share the findings with you. Thank you so much for taking your time

DK=Denmark; AM= Armenia, GD = General data

a= article; w= website; r= report; v= video; m= minutes; p= presentation

Code Source Title Date Availability Accessed Language

AM99_a1Asbarez

Armenian News

International Civil Aviation Organization to Help

Zvartnots13-07-1999

http://asbarez.com/40271/international-civil-aviation-organization-

to-help-zvartnots/26-08-2014 English

AM00_a1Arka News

agency

Armenia and Iran have no disagreements as to the

project of construction of…19-05-2000 Factiva Inc., arka000020010804dw5j0006e 29-08-2014 English

AM00_a2Snark News

agency

Cargo Terminal of Zvartnots Airport to be given to

private operator03-07-2000 Factiva Inc.,snarkn0020010817dw73001f5 29-08-2014 English

AM01_a1Asbarez

Armenian NewsArgentine Tycoon to Run Armenia’s Airport 24-09-2001

http://asbarez.com/45499/argentine-tycoon-to-run-armenias-

airport/26-08-2014 English

AM01_a2Asbarez

Armenian NewsCouncil of Europe Concerned for Press in Azerbaijan 17-12-2001

http://asbarez.com/45975/council-of-europe-concerned-for-press-

in-%20azerbaijan/26-08-2014 English

AM01_a3Dow Jones

Newswires

DANISH PRESS: Copenhagen Airports

Monopoly Under Fire05-12-2001 Factiva Inc.,dji0000020011205dxc5000n8 29-08-2014 English

AM02_a1Arminfo news

agency

Armenia’s Government expand territories adjacent to

airport07-06-2002 Online Factiva Inc., armbbe0020020613dy67000gp 28-08-2014 English

AM02_a2Asbarez

Armenian NewsKocharian Says Ban On Dual Citizenship Must End 20-05-2002

http://asbarez.com/46878/kocharian-says-ban-on-dual-citizenship-

must-end/26-08-2014 English

AM03_a1Arka news

agency

In September RA opposition to undertake legislative

initiative for ceasing abuse in16-07-2003 Factiva Inc., arka000020030711dz7a0018j 28-08-2014 English

AM03_a2Arka news

agency

Current situation in the Armenian Civil Aviation

threatens the country’s national security16-07-2003 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020030717dz7g0002p 29-08-2014 English

AM03_a3Arminfo news

agency

State of Armenia’s Civil Aviation poses threat to the

country’s national security 201110-07-2003 Online Factiva Inc., armnfe0020030710dz7a000rv 28-08-2014 English

AM03_a4Arka News

agency

Private management of aviation sphere is more

rational than state, RA Minister of Justice12-11-2003 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020031112dzbc000h0 24-08-2014 English

Code intepretation secondary data

Appendix C: Archived data

Page 1 of 14

Appendix C continued


AM03_a5Arka News

agency

Armenian Ramkavar-Azatakan Party is concerned

about the current state of civil aviation21-08-2003 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020030827dz8l00002 28-08-2014 English

AM04_a1Arminfo news

agency

RA Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan has

congratulated aviators on Aviation Day 201130-09-2004 Online Factiva Inc., ARMNFE0020040930e09u001bd 29-08-2014 English

AM05_a1Arka News

agency

RA Government thinks to build apartment blocks

covering about 15 thsd square meters for the people

settled near Zvartnots Airport

25-08-2005 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020050825e18p000rt 24-08-2014 English

AM05_a2Arka News

agencyRA Spec approvs new margin for aviation fuel 19-10-2005 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020051019e1aj001gv 24-08-2014 English

AM06_a1Arka news

agencyArmenia needs advanced system of airport 10-02-2006 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020060210e22a0002u 24-08-2014 English

AM06_a2Arminfo news

agency

Yerevan, November 1. ArmInfo. A new safety fee - 2

EUR - has been introduced at Zvartnots Airport.01-09-2006 Factive Inc., ARMNFE0020061101e2b10008e 24-08-2014 English

AM07_a1Arminfo news

agencyState threatens to abolish "air tax" in Armenia 12-02-2007 Factiva Inc., ARMNFE0020070212e32c000dx 24-08-2014 English

AM08_a1Arka News

agency

Digest. Free Trade Zone for Agricultural Produce to

be Formed in Armenia27-11-2008 Factiva Inc.,ARKA000020081127e4br0005n 24-08-2014 English

AM08_a2Asbarez

Armenian News

Armenia Faces Trade Blockade as Georgia Conflict

Widens11-08-2008 http://asbarez.com/58385/ 26-08-2014 English

AM08_a3Asbarez

Armenian News

Armenian Carrier Cuts Fares amid Falling Fuel

Prices11-12-2008 http://asbarez.com/59736/ 26-08-2014 English

AM08_a4Arka News

agency

Digest. Armenia's anti-monopoly commission to fine

Zvartnots Airport16-10-2008 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020081016e4ag000b9 29-08-2014 English

AM08_a5 Foreign AffairsThe Five-Day War - Managing Moscow After the

Georgia Crisis01-12-2008

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64602/charles-king/the-

five-day-war09-10-2014 English

AM09_a1Arminfo news

agency

US$160 million to be invested in construction of new

passenger terminal at Zvartnots airport till 2011 25-07-2009 Factiva Inc., ARMNFE0020090725e57p00001 13-07-2014 English

AM09_v1 BBC Armenia: the cleverest nation on earth 18-10-2009 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p004j7zg 27-09-2014 English

AM09_a2Arka News

agency

Diamond and Jewerly Exchange to be set up in

Armenia02-06-2009 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020090602e5620005m 24-08-2014 English

Page 2 of 14



AM09_a3Arka News

agency

Free Economic Zone Project to be ready in Armenia

this year11-06-2009 Factiva Inc.,ARKA000020090611e56b000jj 24-08-2014 English

AM09_a4Asbarez

Armenian News

Armenia May Establish Diamond Exchange at

Zvartnots Airport16-07-2009 Factiva Inc.,http://asbarez.com/68020/ 26-08-2014 English

AM09_w1Business

ExcellenceZvartnots International Airport 01-09-2009 http://www.bus-ex.com/article/zvartnots-international-airport 01-08-2014 English

AM10_a1Asbarez

Armenian News

UN Report Warns Of New Wave of Emigration

From Armenia11-05-2010 http://asbarez.com/80603/ 26-08-2014 English

AM10_p1

Asian

Development

Bank

Zvartnots Airport Expansion, Armenia - ready for

take off01-05-2010

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:o-

lXquBrS9MJ:cleanairinitiative.org/portal/system/files/presentations

/ADB_Shantanu_Chakraborty_-

_Armenia_airport_presentation_0.pdf+&cd=2&hl=da&ct=clnk&gl

=dk

18-09-2014 English

AM10_r1

PUM

Netherlands

senior experts

An advice to the Armenian government on how they

might be able to develop their private agricultural

sector by stimulating usage of agricultural equipment.

13-03-2010Unpublished data: Access provided by Armenian airport expert

respondent.07-08-2014 English

AM10_r2

PUM

Netherlands

senior experts

Business Model for Development Agriculture and

export of fresh Products by Free Economic Zone

Republic Armenia

01-02-2010Unpublished data: Access provided by Armenian airport expert

respondent.07-08-2014 English

AM11_a1 Hetq.amEurnekian: "My New Zvartnots Terminal Must

Serve as Example for Diaspora Investment"17-09-2011

http://hetq.am/eng/news/4465/eurnekian-my-new-zvartnots-

terminal-must-serve-as-example-for-diaspora-investment.html27-08-2014 English

AM11_a2Regnum new

agency

Баку грозит сбивать самолеты, летящие в

Степанакерт, Карабах называет это

"саботажем"

16-03-2011 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1384438.html 07-10-2014 Russian

AM11_a3Regnum new

agency

Депутаты и общественные организации

Азербайджана призывают сбить самолет Сержа

Саргсяна

01-04-2011 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1390118.html 07-10-2014 Russian

AM11_a4

Radio Free

Europe, Radio

Liberty

Azerbaijan Threatens To Shoot Down Karabakh

Planes16-03-2011

http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_threatens_to_shoot_down

_karabakh_flights/2340659.html07-10-2014 English

AM11_a5 News.amAzerbaijan’s statements quite unacceptable, U.S.

Ambassador says23-03-2011 http://news.am/eng/news/52467.html 07-10-2014 English

Page 3 of 14



AM12_a1 News.am British Airways stops operating flights to Armenia 20-08-2012 http://news.am/eng/news/117800.html 26-09-2014 English

AM12_a2Arka News

agency

Armenian National Air Carrier Needs No Services

From Zvartnots Airport Weather Center06-11-2012 Factive Inc., ARKA000020121106e8b6000gq 13-07-2014 English

AM13_a1Arka News

agency

Armenia-International Airports to invest $102

million in facility 26-12-2013 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020131226e9cq0005m 13-07-2014 English

AM13_a2Arka News

agency

Musella and secret wishes named winners of

Armenia’s third hackaton contest 24-12-2013 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020131224e9co000gp 13-07-2014 English

AM13_a3Arka News

agency

Switching to open skies policy will make Zvartnots

airport cut its ground service prices – study10-12-2013

http://arka.am/en/news/economy/switching_to_open_skies_policy

_will_make_zvartnots_airport_to_cut_its_ground_service_prices_st

udy/

18-07-2014 English

AM13_a4Arka news

agency

Switch to “open skies” to secure 1.5 percent of

additional gdp growth for Armenia10-12-2013 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020131210e9ca0008e 13-07-2014 English

AM13_a5Eduardo

Eurnekian

Corporación América received an award for the

Zvartnots airport terminal in Armenia06-02-2013

http://www.eduardoeurnekian.com/en/corporacion-america-

received-an-award-for-the-zvartnots-airport-terminal-in-armenia/01-08-2014 English

AM13_a6Asbarez

Armenian NewsArmenia Hopes ‘Open Skies’ Will Boost Economy 23-10-2013 http://asbarez.com/115306/ 26-08-2014 English

AM13_a7Arminfo news

agency

Armenian and Argentinean businessmen search for

ways to cooperate17-10-2013 ARMNFE0020131017e9ah000bc 29-08-2014 English

AM13_a8Arka News

agency"Expensive" Armenian Sky 08-08-2013 Factiva Inc., ARKAF00020130808e98800001 13-07-2014 English

AM13_a9Arka News

agency

Armenian "Armavia" goes bankrupt: Future of

national air traffic under question02-04-2013 Factiva Inc., ARKAF00020130402e94200001 06-10-2014 English

AM13_a10 Euroasianet Azerbaijan Again Threatens Karabakh Flights 08-01-2013 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66370 07-10-2014 English

AM13_a11 Georgia Times Flying to Stepanakert you can be shot down? 05-02-2013 http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/interview/86371.html 07-10-2014 English

AM13_a12 BBC Nagorno-Karabakh profile 05-10-2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325 07-10-2014 English

AM14_a16Asbarez

Armenian NewsFirst Tax Haven in Armenia Launched 29-07-2013 http://asbarez.com/112173/ 26-08-2014 English

AM13_r1Armenian

GovernmentInvestment guide, Armenia 2013 01-01-2013 http://mineconomy.am/uploades/20120211155136922.pdf 31-07-2014 English

Page 4 of 14



AM13_w1 Forbes Armenia 01-12-2013 http://www.forbes.com/places/armenia/ 18-09-2014 English

AM14_a1 Armenpress42% increase in flights recorded in “Zvartnots”

Airport 03-07-2014 Factiva Inc., ARMENE0020140703ea7300002 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a2Arka news

agency

“Open skies” policy to boos tourism and passenger

flow, minister 20-05-2014 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020140520ea5k000gr 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a3Arminfo news

agency

Armavia air company still has debts to Zvartnots

airport 17-05-2014 Factiva Inc., ARMNFE0020140517ea5h0002u 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a4 Armenia NowThe fate of the “round” building of Zvartnots

International Airport is still uncertain 25-01-2014

http://www.armenianow.com/society/51617/zvartnots_internation

al_airport_round_building_architect_minasyan13-07-2014 English

AM14_a5 Manila BulletinEtihad Airways' inaugural flight to Yerevan touches

down08-07-2014 Factiva Inc., MABULL0020140707ea780004e 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a6

News Bites -

Russia and the

CIS

UTair Launches New Route between Krasnodar and

Yerevan25-01-2014 Factiva Inc.,NBRUSR0020140125ea1p00007 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a7 Aravot50% increase in flights and 46,000 (37%) more

passengers 04-06-2014 http://en.aravot.am/2014/06/04/165544/ 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a8 LragirПассажиропоток через ереванскии аэропорт

«Звартноц» в июле увеличился на 35%25-08-2014 http://www.lragir.am/index/rus/0/country/54688/37594 25-09-2014 English

AM14_a9Arminfo news

agency

Armenia and Egypt discuss cooperation in the field of

aviation21-02-2014 Factiva Inc.,ARMNFE0020140221ea2l00001 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a10 Hetq.amԲաց երկինք. ուղևորահոսքի 35 տոկոս

աճ է գրանցվել04-08-2014

http://hetq.am/arm/news/55931/bac-erkinq-uxevorahosqi-35-

tokos-atch-e-grancvel.html25-09-2014 English

AM14_a11 Hetq.amՈւղեւորահոսքի 19 տոկոս աճ`

նախորդ մարտի համեմատ | Հետք04-04-2014

http://hetq.am/arm/news/53827/uxevorahosqi-19-tokos-atch-

nakhord-marti-hamemat.html25-09-2014 English

AM14_a12 Hetq.amՈւղեւորահոսքի 10 տոկոս աճ`

նախորդ փետրվարի համեմատ | Հետք04-03-2014

http://hetq.am/arm/news/32926/uxevorahosqi-10-tokos-atch-

nakhord-petrvari-hamemat.html25-09-2014 English

AM14_a13 Armenpress Armenia has potential to attract large tourist markets 22-05-2014 Factiva Inc., ARMENE0020140522ea5m00007 13-07-2014 English

AM14_a14 Chess.24 Carlsen tours Armenia with Aronian 24-06-2014https://chess24.com/en/read/news/carlsen-tours-armenia-with-

aronian27-09-2014 English

AM14_a15 News.am Armenia children among happiest in the world 04-09-2014 http://news.am/eng/news/227015.html 27-09-2014 English

Page 5 of 14



AM14_a17 PanArmenianNet12 Airlines to Discuss Entry to Armenian Market

with NCFA07-07-2014 http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/180545/ 27-09-2014 English

AM14_a18 Routes onlineRoutes Silk Road: Open Skies Policy Drives

Armenia's Future Connectivity07-07-2014

http://www.routesonline.com/news/29/breaking-

news/242466/routes-silk-road-open-skies-policy-drives-armenias-

future-connectivity/

28-09-2014 English

AM14_a19

National

Competitiveness

Foundation of

Armenia

About the Foundation 01-01-2014 http://www.cf.am/eng/index.php?other=7 28-09-2014 English

AM14_a20Arminfo news

agency

Dmitry Adbashyan: Stepanakert Airport makes no

international flights27-06-2014

http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=EC71DBB0-FDF0-

11E3-A3900EB7C0D2166307-10-2014 English

AM14_a21 The ArmeniteThe North-South Highway – Transportation

Infrastructure in Armenia: Part II10-04-2014

http://thearmenite.com/newsdesk/transportation-infrastructure-in-

armenia-part-ii-north-south-highway/09-10-2014 English

AM14_e1 Zvartnots airportComparative table for A 320 passenger aircraft,

Airport and Ground Handeling charge01-01-2014

Unpublished email attachment from Armenian Airport Expert. Data

can be provided upon request.21-07-2014 English

AM14_e2 Zvartnots airport Passenger traffic by arrival and departure 01-01-2014Unpublished email attachment from Armenian Airport Expert. Data

can be provided upon request.25-07-2014 English

AM14_v1 Civilnet TVZvartnots Best Emerging Airport – an interview

with General Manager, Marcelo Wende (10:18)05-02-2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2JkjKKJPFHI 13-07-2014 English

AM14_w1Armenian

DiasporaArmenian Population in the world 01-01-2014 http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html 31-07-2014 English

AM14_w2Corporación

América S.ACompany overview 01-01-2014

http://www.bnamericas.com/company-

profile/en/Corporacion_America_S,A,-CASA01-08-2014 English

AM14_w3Eduardo

EurnekianBusiness Activity 01-01-2014 http://www.eduardoeurnekian.com/en/categoria/business-activity/ 01-08-2014 English

AM14_w4 Zvartnots About us 01-01-2014 http://www.zvartnots.aero/en/about-us 30-07-2014 English

AM14_w5Corporacion

America53 Airports in Latin America and Europe 01-01-2014 http://www.corporacionamerica.com/en/aeropuertos 12-09-2014 English

AM14_w6Central Bank of

ArmeniaInterest Rates 3/10/2014 (AMD and EUR) 03-10-2014 https://www.cba.am/en/sitepages/default.aspx 05-10-2014 English

AM14_w7Armenian

Government

Adjunct bodies - General Department of Civil

Aviation01-01-2014 http://www.gov.am/en/adjunct-bodies/23/ 07-10-2014 English

Page 6 of 14



DK90_a1Berlingske

TidendeNår staten skærer kagen 03-02-1990 Infomedia, AZ170151 21-08-2014 Danish

DK90_a2Berlingske

TidendeBedst og billigst er ministerens mål 13-01-1990 Infomedia, AZ170151 21-08-2014 Danish

DK90_a3Berlingske

TidendePolitiker vil kulegrave virkningen af charterafgift 20-07-1990 Infomedia, AZ196321 21-08-2014 Danish

DK90_a4Berlingske

TidendeIgen stor turbulens om charterafgiften 20-07-1990 Infomedia, AZ196320 05-10-2014 Danish

DK90_a5Berlingske

TidendeSAS sar tvivl om charterskatten 06-10-1990 Infomedia, AZ210351 05-10-2014 Danish

DK91_a1 Politiken Politikere i strid om rejseafgift 22-03-1991 Infomedia, A0129099 05-10-2014 Danish

DK90_a6Berlingske

TidendeKrisen i luften 24-02-1991 Infomedia, AZ229102 05-10-2014 Danish

DK92_a1 Ritzaus Bureau SAS klar til 'luftkrigen' om Europa 12-06-1992 Factiva., A0159818 21-08-2014 Danish

DK93_a1Berlingske

TidendeKronik: Tør staten tjene penge? 03-12-1993 Infomedia, A0190549 21-08-2014 Danish

DK93_a2 Ritzau SAS flyver mod delvis fusion 27-04-1993 Infomedia, D0004329 21-08-2014 Danish

DK93_a3 BT Carlzons drøm er styrtet ned 21-11-1993 Infomedia, AZ459978 21-08-2014 Danish

DK93_a4 Politiken Højtflyvende ambitioner hos luftens gamle kæmper 28-04-1993 Infomedia, D0013018 21-08-2014 Danish

DK93_a5 Ingeniøren Danmark som transportcentrum 03-12-1993 Infomedia, D0147132 21-08-2014 Danish

DK94_a1 Ritzau Valuta-uro og krise i luftfarten satte spor 16-02-1994 Infomedia, D0160892 21-08-2014 Danish

DK95_a1 Politiken I dag gives det danske luftrum frit 01-10-1995 Infomedia, D0514369 21-07-2014 Danish

DK95_a2 Politiken Ledende artikel: LufthanSAS 13-05-1995 Factiva Inc., D0428140 21-08-2014 Danish

DK96_a1Berlingske

TidendeLufthavn lægger an til trafikvækst 17-06-1996 Infomedia, AZ658122 21-08-2014 Danish

DK97_a1Berlingske

TidendeDanmark bænkevarmer i luftfartens rivegilde 17-06-1997 Infomedia, AZ738043 21-08-2014 Danish

DK97_a2 Politiken Frihed i luften - bragende fiasko 01-05-1997 Infomedia, Z1682478 21-08-2014 Danish

Page 7 of 14



DK98_a1Hvem Hvad

HvorLuften over Danmark 01-01-1998 Infomedia, Z2544526 21-08-2014 Danish

DK00_a1 Nyhedsmagasin Dumpekarakter til statens bestyrelser 29-05-2000 Infomedia, Z6535305 21-08-2014 Danish

DK02_a1Berlingske

TidendePolitisk magtkontrol 22-09-2002 Infomedia, AY426220 21-08-2014 Danish

DK03_a1Dow Jones

Newswires

Europe To Unleash Two-Pronged Assault On

Golden Shares04-02-2003 Factiva Inc., dji0000020030204dz24000un 29-08-2014 English

DK04_a1Berlingske

TidendeSadan bliver København endnu mere Wonderful 14-09-2004 Infomedia, e0269d66 21-08-2014 Danish

DK04_a2 Politiken Ledende artikel: Flyvende svin 22-09-2004 Infomedia, e0272788 21-08-2014 Danish

DK04_a3 Jyllandsposten Leder: Connie-effekten 25-09-2004 Infomedia, e11ea783 21-08-2014 Danish

DK04_r1

European Low

Fares Airline

Association 2004

Liberalisation of European Air Transport: The

Benefits of Low Fares Airlines to Consumers,

Airports, Regions and the Environment

01-01-2004 http://www.elfaa.com/documents/ELFAABenefitsofLFAs2004.pdf 25-09-2014 English

DK05_a1 Direkt-dkKøbenhavns Lufthavn: Macquarie gennemfører

købstilbud 14-12-2005 Factiva Inc., MKETW00020051214e1ce000rt 29-08-2014 Danish

DK05_a2Dow Jones

Newswires

EU Oks Australia’s Macquarie To Buy

Copenhagen Airports06-12-2005 Factiva Inc., DJI0000020051206e1c6000hr 29-08-2014 English

DK05_a3 Agence Europe EU/Competition 07-12-2005 Factiva Inc., AGEU000020051208e1c80000u 29-08-2014 English

DK05_a4Berlingske

TidendeLufthavne skruer bissen pa i skærpet konkurrence 28-09-2005 Infomedia, e0472995 21-08-2014 Danish

DK05_m1Danish Ministry

of Finance

Svar på Finansudvalgets spørgsmål nr. 3 ad §7

Spørgsmål , offentligt07-11-2005

http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/almdel/fiu/pgf/7/spm/3/svar/2

02856/217045.pdf12-09-2014 Danish

DK05_w1Copenhagen

Airport

Declaration by the Board of Directors of Københavns

Lufthavne A/S in connection with Macquarie

Airports Copenhagen ApS’ tender offer

23-06-2005

http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/investor/Stock-exchange-

releases/declaration-by-the-board-of-directors-of-kobenhavns-

lufthavne-as-in-connection-with-macquarie-airports-copenhagen-aps-

tender-offer/

10-09-2014 English

Page 8 of 14



DK05_w2Macquarie

Airports

Macquarie Airports Launches Recommended Tender

Offer for Copenhagen Airports - Release by

Macquarie International Infrastructure Fund

Limited's Investment in Macquarie Airports

26-10-2005

http://www.macquarie.com/dafiles/Internet/mgl/miif/news/2005

/docs/26-10-2005-miif-macquarie-airports-tender-offer-copenhagen-

release.pdf?v=1

10-09-2014 English

DK06_a1 Nyhedsmagasin Privatisering til tiden? 21-06-2006 Infomedia, e06129f9 21-08-2014 Danish

DK06_a2Arka News

agency

Armenian Aviation Department Instructed to settle

fuel problems20-12-2006 Factiva Inc., ARKA000020061220e2ck0002v 24-08-2014 Danish

DK06_a3 Ritzaus Bureau Bevæbnede vagter pa fly til Danmark 01-08-2006 Infomedia, e06e7afd 07-10-2014 Danish

DK07_a1Berlingske

TidendeSynspunk: Begræns statens branduudsalg 13-10-2007 Infomedia: e0b9fcd1 22-08-2014 Danish

DK08_a1Berlingske

TidendeLedende artikel: Staten kan godt slippe taget I SAS 27-09-2008 Infomedia: e13c8233 21-08-2014 Danish

DK08_a2 Politiken Fri konkurrence i luftrummet 29-03-2008 Infomedia, e0ea099b 22-08-2014 Danish

DK08_a3 Politiken Lufthavn under politisk pres 16-10-2008 Infomedia, e1419b0c 22-08-2014 Danish

DK08_a4 Ritzaus Bureau Politisk pres pa Københavns Lufthavne 14-10-2008 Infomedia, e1413ce8 14-10-2008 Danish

DK08_a5 Ritzaus Bureau EU siger ok til bevæbnede vagter pa civile fly 16-01-2008 Infomedia, e0cba6a7 06-10-2014 Danish

DK08_w1Danish

ParliamentHow did the EU begin? 25-08-2008 http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/2/?print=1 05-10-2014 English

DK10_a1Berlingske

TidendeNordiske staters SAS-støtte på kanten af det ulovlige 10-02-2010

http://www.business.dk/transport/nordiske-staters-sas-stoette-paa-

kanten-af-det-ulovlige25-09-2014 Danish

DK11_a1 Agence EuropeEU Competition: OTTP and Macquarie Group

take control of Brussels and Copenhagen Airports16-09-2011 Factiva Inc., AGEU000020110916e79g00011 29-08-2014 English

DK11_a2 Fyens Stiftidende Nej til privatisering 05-04-2011 Infomedia, e29ab64a 22-08-2014 Danish

DK11_a3 PolitikenRekonstruktion: Sadan gav Danmark efter for tungt

amerikansk pres04-03-2011 Infomedia, e2867bf1 07-10-2014 Danish

DK12_a1 Weekendavisen Vær der, når det sker 16-11-2012 Infomedia, e3842821 22-08-2014 Danish

DK12_a2 Jyllandsposten Lufthavn opgiver udebanen 30-05-2012 Infomedia, e3423891 22-08-2014 Danish

DK14_a4 Information Sa meget er SAS skrumpet gennem tiderne 12-09-2012 http://www.information.dk/telegram/316779 25-09-2014 Danish

Page 9 of 14



DK12_r1 Dansk Luftfart Redegørelse fra udvalget om dansk luftfart 01-03-2012

http://www.trm.dk/~/media/Files/Publication/2012/Luftfartsudv

alget/REDEG%C3%98RELSE%20FRA%20UDVALGET%20OM

%20DANSK%20LUFTFART.pdf

18-07-2014 Danish

DK12_r2Copenhagen

EconomicsAirport Competition in Europe 01-06-2012

http://www.copenhageneconomics.com/Files/Filer/Publikationer/

Copenhagen%20Economics%20Study%20-

%20Airport%20Competition%20in%20Europe.pdf

09-10-2014 English

DK13_a1 BloombergSAS Faces EU Subsidy Complaint From Low-

Fare Airlines Group02-07-2013

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-07/sas-faces-eu-

subsidy-complaint-from-low-fare-airlines-group.html26-09-2014 Danish

DK13_a2 InformationEU-kommission undersøger om SAS har fået ulovlig

støtte19-06-2013 http://www.information.dk/telegram/464257 26-09-2014 Danish

DK13_a3Berlingske

TidendeSAS-plan indklaget for ulovlig statsstøtte 07-02-2013

http://www.business.dk/transport/sas-plan-indklaget-for-ulovlig-

statsstoette26-09-2014 Danish

DK13_a4 Hetq.am A history of problems 31-03-2013http://hetq.am/eng/news/24996/armavia-reimagined-solutions-for-

a-successful-armenian-national-carrier.html27-08-2014 Danish

DK13_a5 Check-in.dk 22 mio. kroner til markedsføring af flyruter 04-01-2013http://www.check-in.dk/22-mio-kroner-til-markedsfoering-af-

flyruter-opd-#.VCawlCl_thM21-07-2014 Danish

DK13_a6Wonderful

Copenhagen

Danske forretningsrejsende hædrer Global Connected

for nye flyruter07-03-2013

http://www.visitcopenhagen.dk/da/kobenhavn/danske-

forretningsrejsende-haedrer-global-connected-nye-flyruter21-07-2014 Danish

DK13_a7 Børsen Høje takster bremser flere ruter 13-12-2013

Børsen Business

Net,http://borsen.dk/nyheder/avisen/artikel/11/69044/artikel.htm

l

12-07-2014 Danish

DK13_r1Transportministe

rietLuftfartsloven 29-08-2013 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=158058 07-10-2014 Danish

DK13_r2 Danske regionerRegional turismeudvikling skaber vækst i hele

Danmark01-01-2013

http://www.regioner.dk/~/media/Mediebibliotek_2011/REGION

AL%20UDVIKLING/Kultur%20og%20turisme/Regional%20turis

meudvikling%20skaber%20v%C3%A6kst%20i%20hele%20landet.as

hx

27-09-2014 Danish

DK13_v1 Danmarks Radio Documentary: SAS størst, bedst og smukkest 15-09-2013http://www.dr.dk/tv/se/sas/sas-stoerst-bedst-og-

smukkest/#!/22:0612-07-2014 Danish

DK13_w1 Forbes Denmark 01-12-2013 http://www.forbes.com/places/denmark/ 18-09-2014 English

Page 10 of 14



DK14_a1 PolitikenPriskrig pa New York-rute: Flybilletter koster nu

under 2.700 kroner20-08-2014

http://politiken.dk/rejser/nyheder/flyoglufthavne/ECE2370429/pr

iskrig-paa-new-york-rute-flybilletter-koster-nu-under-2700-kroner/20-08-2014 Danish

DK14_a2 RitzauLufthavn sætter rekord: 2,5 mio passagerer i juni.

Børsen 10-07-2014

Børsen Business Net,http://borsen.dk.esc-

web.lib.cbs.dk/nyheder/generelt/artikel/1/286716/lufthavn_saetter

_rekord_25_mio_passagerer_i_juni.html#ixzz37MJrEeTs

12-07-2014 Danish

DK14_a3 Ritzau Københavns Lufthavn bygger ud for kvart mia kr 07-07-2014

Børsen Business Net,http://borsen.dk.esc-

web.lib.cbs.dk/nyheder/virksomheder/artikel/1/286435/koebenhav

ns_lufthavn_bygger_ud_for_kvart_mia_kr.html#ixzz37MnBMJ4F

12-07-2014 Danish

DK14_a5 Danmarks Radio EU: SAS har ikke faet ulovlig statsstøtte 09-07-2014 http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Penge/2014/07/09/0709114738.htm 25-09-2014 Danish

DK14_a6 Routes online World Routes Marketing Awards 22-09-2014 http://www.routesonline.com/awards/39/world-routes-2014/ 28-09-2014 English

DK14_a7Wonderful

Copenhagen

Knudepunkt og nye ruter sikrer fremgang i

Københavns Lufthavn15-01-2014

http://www.visitcopenhagen.dk/da/kobenhavn/knudepunkt-og-

nye-ruter-sikrer-fremgang-i-koebenhavns-lufthavn30-08-2014 Danish

DK14_a8 Femern.com Fehmarnbelt tunnel to boost Copenhagen Airport 16-09-2014

http://www.femern.com/service-menu/press--

documents/newsletters/femern-as-newsletter-september-

2014/fehmarnbelt-tunnel-to-boost-copenhagen-airport

09-10-2014 English

DK14_c1

Follow up

conversation

with

Intv_AMae2

Regarding ownership structure 18-09-2014 Unpublished data: Informal conversation by skype 18-09-2014 Armenian

DK14_ue1Copenhagen

AirportHistorie 1924 - 2013, total passengers 01-01-2014 Unpublished data: Access provided by Intv_DKae1. 03-10-2014 Danish

DK14_r1Copenhagen

Airport

Minutes of General Meeting: Københavns Lufthavne

A/S 08-04-2014

http://www.cph.dk/Global/2014%20-

%20CPH%20AGM%20minutes%20(FINAL)%20(2).pdf01-08-2014 English

DK14_r2Copenhagen

AirportCPH Group Annual Report 2013 25-02-2014

http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/investor/Stock-exchange-

releases/announcement-of-group-annual-report-2013/13-07-2014 English

DK14_r3Copenhagen

AirportExpanding CPH. The Gateway of Northern Europe 01-01-2014

http://www.cph.dk/Documents/Om%20CPH/Profil/Expanding%

20CPH%20-%20UK.pdf13-07-2014 English

Page 11 of 14



DK14_r4Danish Ministry

of FinanceState-owned companies 01-06-2014

http://www.fm.dk/publikationer/2014/statens-selskaber-

2014/~/media/Publikationer/Imported/2014/Statens%20selskaber

%2014/statens%20selskaber%202014_web%20a.pdf

11-09-2014 Danish

DK14_r5Copenhagen

AirportHistorical pax figures 2000-2013 01-01-2014 Unpublished data: Access provided by Danish airport expert 03-10-2014 English

DK14_e1Copenhagen

AirportEmail regarding World Route Conference 2014 18-09-2014

Unpublished email from Airport Expert updating on the plans of

Copenhagen Airports during World Route Conference18-09-2014 Danish

DK14_w1

Central

Intelligence

Agency

The World Factbook: Denmark 22-06-2014https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/da.html01-08-2014 English

DK14_w2Copenhagen

AirportHistory 01-01-2014 http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/profile/History/ 13-07-2014 English

DK14_w3Copenhagen

AirportA Quick Overview 01-01-2014

http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/profile/Facts-about-CPH/A-

quick-overview/13-07-2014 English

DK14_w4

Danish

Transport

Authority

About the Danish Transport Authority 01-01-2014 http://www.trafikstyrelsen.dk/en.aspx 07-09-2014 English

DK14_w8 Navair NUAC - Nordic Unified Air Traffic Control 01-01-2014 http://www.naviair.dk/--nuac.294.aspx 05-09-2014 English

DK14_w9Copenhagen

AirportFrom Public to Private Ownership 01-01-2014

https://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/investor/Share-

information/From-Public-to-Private/09-09-2014 English

DK14_w10

Macquarie

European

Infrastructure

Funds

Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund III

(MEIF3)01-01-2014 http://www.macquarie.co.uk/mgl/uk/meif/meif-3 09-09-2014 English

DK14_w11Teachers'

Pension PlanInfrastructure Portfolio 01-01-2014

http://www.otpp.com/investments/asset-

groups/infrastructure/portfolio09-09-2014 English

DK14_w12Copenhagen

AirportBoard of Directors 01-01-2014

http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/investor/corporate-

governance/Board/11-09-2014 English

DK14_w13Copenhagen

AirportList of Board of Directors 01-01-2014


governance/Board/bod/11-09-2014 English

DK14_w14Copenhagen

AirportExecutive Management 01-01-2014


governance/Executive-Management/12-09-2014 English

Page 12 of 14



DK14_w15 European Union Denmark 01-01-2014http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-

countries/denmark/index_en.htm17-09-2014 English

DK14_w16 Swedavia A Sustainable Airport group 01-01-2014 http://www.swedavia.com/about-swedavia/this-is-swedavia/ 18-09-2014 English

DK14_w17 Avinor About the company 01-01-2014https://beta.avinor.no/en/corporate/about-us/the-avinor-

group/#!522018-09-2014 English

DK14_w18Central Bank of

DenmarkInterest Rates 3/10/2014 (DKK and EUR) 03-10-2014 http://www.nationalbanken.dk/da/Sider/default.aspx 05-10-2014 English

DK14_w19Copenhagen

AirportEmployees 01-01-2014 http://www.cph.dk/en/about-cph/csr/Employees/ 09-10-2014 English

GD99_a1Pricewaterhouse

Coppers

Airports as Engines of Economic Development:

Great Airports are Critical for a Region 01-07-1999 http://www.strategy-business.com/article/19372?gko=43f2b 18-07-2014 English

GD07_r1 IATAThe Effect of Charges and Taxes on the Wider

Economy01-02-2007

Unpublished data: Access provided by Assistant Manager for

operations at IATA, Juliana Nakano via email correspondence. Data

can be provided upon request.

01-08-2014 English

GD11_a1 The Economist Revisiting the Hoover Dam 22-10-2011 http://www.economist.com/node/21533393 01-08-2014 English

GD12_a1

Momberger

Airport

Information

Who owns and manages privatised airports? 01-03-2012 http://www.air-trans-source.com/linked/manage-bk.pdf 10-09-2014 English

GD12_r1 ICAOICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air

Navigation Services01-01-2012 http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9082_9ed_en.pdf 03-10-2014 English

GD12_v1 BBC series Documentary: Master’s of Money – John Maynard

Keynes and the Keynesianisme (50 minutes)01-01-2012

http://www.dr.dk/tv/se/pengenes-herrer/pengenes-herrer-1-3

between 14 - 22 August 201418-08-2014 English

GD12_v2 BBC series Documentary: Master’s of Money – Hayek and the

free market (52 minutes)01-01-2012

http://www.dr.dk/tv/se/pengenes-herrer/pengenes-herrer-2-3

between 15 - 23 August 2014 18-08-2014 English

GD12_v3 BBC series Documentary: Master’s of Money - Karl Marx (45

minutes)01-01-2012

http://www.dr.dk/tv/se/pengenes-herrer/pengenes-herrer-3-

3#!/00:0718-08-2014 English

GD14_a1 Business InsiderPilots Continued Flying Over Ukrainian War Zone

Because It Was The Fastest And Cheapest Route18-07-2014

http://www.businessinsider.com/why-malaysia-airlines-was-flying-

over-a-war-zone-2014-707-10-2014 English

GD14_a2 CNBC Aviation safety in spotlight after MH17 tragedy 19-07-2014 http://www.cnbc.com/id/101850010#. 07-10-2014 English

Page 13 of 14



GD14_a3 SBS'MH17 changed everything': world aviation chiefs to

discuss flight safety29-07-2014

http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/07/29/mh17-changed-

everything-world-aviation-chiefs-discuss-flight-safety07-10-2014 English

GD14_a4International

Airport Review

Foreword: Celebrating 100 years of commerical

aviation09-10-2014

http://www.internationalairportreview.com/17819/international-

airport-review-magazine/past-issues/issue-5-2014/foreword-

celebrating-100-years-of-commerical-aviation/#.VD7-SYusVhM

15-10-2014 English

GD14_a5 CNN 5 ways Facebook changed us, for better and worse 31-01-2014http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/31/tech/social-media/facebook-

changes/15-10-2014 English

GD14_p1

International Air

Transport

Association

Presentation: Airport privatization by Brian Pearce,

Chief Economist 01-01-2014

Unpublished data: Access provided by Assistant Manager for

operations at IATA, Juliana Nakano via email correspondence. Data

can be provided upon request.

01-08-2014 English

GD14_r1Air Transport

Action Group

Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders: Powering global

economic growth, employment, trade links, tourism

and support for sustainable development through air

transport

01-04-2014http://aviationbenefits.org/media/26786/ATAG__AviationBenefits

2014_FULL_LowRes.pdf28-09-2014 English

GD14_w1Boston

University Marc Rysman, Professor of Economics 01-01-2014 http://sites.bu.edu/mrysman/ 10-08-2014 English

GD14_w2 Routes onlineWorld Routes 2014 - The 20th World Route

Development Forum01-01-2014 http://www.routesonline.com/events/170/world-routes-2014/ 17-09-2014 English

GD14_w3Harvard

Business School

Andrei Hagiu - Associate Professor of Business

Administration01-01-2014 http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=337239 19-09-2914 English

GD14_w4European

CommissionAirport charges 19-05-2014

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/airports/airport_charges_

en.htm03-10-2014 English

GD14_w5European

Central BankInterest Rates 8/10/2014 (USD and EUR) 08-10-2014

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxr

ef-graph-usd.en.html09-10-2014 English

Page 14 of 14

Appendix D: Danish State Ownership

Page 1 of 16

Appendix E: Literature on Multi-Sided Platforms

This list displays literature on multi-sided platforms through 2012. It is available in David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee’s paper “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-sided Platform Businesses” revised 30th January 2013.

Ackerberg, Daniel A. and Gautam Gowrisankaran (2006), Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 738-761.

Affeldt, Pauline L. (2011), Tying and Bundling in Two-Sided Markets: Why Tying WMP and the Windows OS Increases Total Welfare, Master’s Thesis, Tilburg University.

Affeldt, Pauline, Lapo Filistrucchi, and Tobias J. Klein (2012), Upward Pricing Pressure in Two-Sided Markets, TILEC Discussion Paper 2012-029.

Albuquerque, Paulo and Polykarpos Pavlidis, Udi Chatow, Kay Yut-Chen, and Zainab Jamal (2012), Evaluating Promotional Activities in an Online Two-Sided Market of User-Generated Content, Marketing Science, 31(3): 406-432.

Alexandrov, Alexi, George Deltas, and Daniel F. Spulber (2011), Antitrust and Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7(4): 775-812.

Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Bilana, Edward Tsang, and Andreas Krause (2011), Market Structure and Information in Payment Card Networks, International Journal of Automation and Computing, 8(3): 364-370.

Aloui, Chokri and Khaireddine Jebsi (2010), Optimal Pricing of a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform with a One-Sided Congestion Effect, International Review of Economics, 57(4): 423- 439.

Ambrus, Attila and Rossella Argenziano (2009), Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets, American Economic Journal: Micoeconomics, 1(1): 17-52.

Ambrus, Atilla, Emilio Calvano, and Markus Reisinger (2012), Either or Both Competition: A ‘Two-Sided’ Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships, Working Paper (Duke University, Bocconi University, and WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management).

Amelio, Andrea and Bruno Jullien (2012), Tying and Freebies in Two-Sided Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(5): 436-446.

Anderson, Robert M., Glenn Ellison, and Drew Fudenberg (2010), Location Choice in Two- Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents, Games and Economic Behavior, 69(1): 2-23.

Anderson, Simon P., Regulation of Television Advertising, in Paul Seabright and Jurgen von Hagen (2007), The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 189-224.

Anderson, Simon P. and Stephen Coate (2005), Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis, Review of Economic Studies, 72(4): 947-972.

Anderson, Simon P. and Andre de Palma (2009), Information Congestion, RAND Journal of Economics, 40(4): 688-709.

Anderson, Simon P., Oystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, and Martin Peitz (2012), Media Market Concentration, Advertising Levels, and Ad Prices, International Journal of Industria

Organization, 30(3): 321-325. Anderson, Simon P. and Jean J. Gabszewicz, The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-

Sided Markets, in Victor Ginsburgh and David Throsby (2006), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.

Antonielli and Lapo Filistrucchi (2012), Collusion and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers, TILEC Discussion Paper 2012-014.

Argentesi, Elena and Lapo Filistrucchi (2007), Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of Newspapers, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7): 1247-1266.

Argentesi, Elena and Marc Ivaldi, Market Definition in Printed Media Industries: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for Broadcasting, in Paul Seabright and Jurgen von Hagen (2007), The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 225-254.

Argenton, Cedric and Jens Prufer (2012), Search Engine Competition and Network Externalities, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 8(1): 73-105.

Armstrong, Mark (2006), Competition in Two-Sided Markets, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 668-691.

Armstrong, Mark and Julian Wright (2007), Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks, and Exclusive Contracts, Journal of Economic Theory, 32(2): 353-380.

Ashlagi, Itai, Benjamin Edleman, and Hoan Soo Lee (2010), Competing Ad Auctions, Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 10-055.

Athey, Susan and Joshua S. Gans (2010), The Impact of Targeting Technology on Advertising Markets and Media Competition, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 100(2): 608-613.

Athey, Susan, Emilio Calvano and Joshua S. Gans (2012), The Impact of the Internet on Advertising Markets for

Page 2 of 16

News Media, Working Paper (Harvard Univeristy, Bocconi University, and University of Toronto).

Bakos, Yannis and Evangelos Katsamakas (2008), Design and Ownership of Two-Sided Networks: Implications for Internet Intermediaries, Journal of Management Information Systems, 25(2): 171-202.

Baldwin, Carliss Y. and C. Jason Woodard, The Architecture of Platforms: A Unified View, in Annabelle Gawer (2009), Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Baraldi, A. Laura (2004), Equilibrium Size in Network with Indirect Network Externalities, Rivista Italiana Degli Economisti, 9(3): 475-494.

Bardey, David, Helmuth Cremer, and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (2010), Competition in Two- Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities, IDEI Working Paper Number 578.

Bardey, David, Helmuth Cremer, and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (forthcoming), Doctors’ Remuneration Schemes and Hospital Competition in a Two-Sided Market, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy.

Bardey, David and Jean-Charles Rochet (2010), Competition among Health Plans: A Two-Sided Market Approach, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19(2): 435-451.

Baxter, William (1983), Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(3): 541-588.

Bedre-Defolie, Ozlem and Emilio Calvano (2012), Pricing Payment Cards, Working Paper (European School of Management and Technology and Bocconi University).

Behringer, Stefan and Lapo Filistrucchi (2011a), Hotelling Competition and Political Differentiation with More Than Two Newspapers, Working Paper (Unversitat Bonn and Tilburg University).

Behringer, Stefan and Lapo Filistrucchi (2011b), Predatory Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: Lessons from the UK Quality Newspapers in the ‘90s, Working Paper (Unversitat Bonn and Tilburg University).

Belleflamme, Paul (2005), Versioning in the Information Economy: Theory and Applications, CESifo Economic Studies, 51(2-3), 329-358.

Belleflamme, Paul and Nicolas Neysen, Coopetition and Infomediation: General Analysis and Application to e-Tourism, in A. Matias, P. Nijkamp, and M. Sarmento (2009), Advances in Tourism Economics, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 217-234.

Belleflamme, Paul and Martin Peitz (2010), Platform Competition and Seller Investment Incentives, European

Economic Review, 50(8): 1059-1076.

Belleflamme, Paul and Eric Toulemonde (2004), B2B Marketplaces: Emergence and Entry, CORE Discussion Papers, Number 2004/78.

Belleflamme, Paul and Eric Toulemonde (2009), Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two- Sided Markets, International Economic Review, 50(1): 245-272.

Beltran, Fernando and William W. Sharkey (2008), A Dynamic Model of Next-Generation Networks with Two-Sided Platform Competition, TPRC Conference Paper.

Bergh, Harald Nygard, Hans Jarle Kind, Bjorn-Atle Reme, and Lars Sorgard (2012), Competition between Content Distributors in Two-Sided Markets, CESifo Working Paper, No. 3885.

Birke, Daniel (2009), The Economics of Networks: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(4): 762-793.

Bohme, Enrico (2012), Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets, MPRA Working Paper 40951.

Bolt, Wilko (2007), Retail Payments and Card Use in the Netherlands: Pricing, Scale, and Antitrust, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 257-270.

Bolt, Wilko and Sujit Chakravorti (2008), Economics of Payment Cards: A Status Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 32(4): 15-27.

Bolt, Wilko, Elizabeth Foote, and Heiko Schmiedel (2011), Consumer Credit and Payment Cards, DNB Working Papers, No. 332.

Bolt, Wilko, and Kimmo Soranaki (2008), Competition, Bargaining Power, and Pricing in Two-Sided Markets, DNB Working Papers, No. 181.

Bolt, Wilko and Alexander F. Tieman (2006), Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 103-117.

Bolt, Wilko and Alexander F. Tieman (2008), Heavily Skewed Pricing in Two-Sided Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(5): 1250-1255.

Bomse, Stephen V., and Scott A. Westrich (2005), Both Side Now: Buyer Damage Claims in Antitrust Actions Involving 'Two-Sided' Markets, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 643-666.

Borestam, Ann and Heiko Schmiedel (2011), Interchange Fees in Card Payments, ECB Occasional Paper, No. 131.

Boudreau, Kevin J. (2010), Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control, Management Science, 56(10): 1849-1872.

Boudreau, Kevin J. (forthcoming), Let a Thousand

Page 3 of 16

Flowers Bloom? An Early Look at Large Numbers of Software ‘Apps’ Developers and Patterns of Innovation, Organization Science.

Boudreau, Kevin J. and Andrei Hagiu, Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators, in Annabelle Gawer (2009), Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Boudreau, Kevin J. and Lars B. Jeppesen (2011), Unpaid Complementors and Platform Network Effects, Working Paper (London Business School and Bocconi University).

Bourreau, Marc, and Marianne Verdier (2010), Private Cards and the Bypass of Payment Systems by Merchants, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(8): 1798-1807.

Brown, Jennifer, and John Morgan (2009), Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites, Journal of Political Economy, 117(4): 668-700.

Brown, Thomas P., and Kevin L. Yingling (2007), Antitrust and Real Estate: A Two-Sided Approach, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 225-235.

Budzinski, Oliver and Janina Satzer (2011), Sports Business and Two-Sided Markets: Towards a New Analytical Framework? IME Working Paper, No. 109/11.

Cabral, Luis M.B. (2006), Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 15-25.

Caillaud, Bernard, and Bruno Jullien (2001), Competing Cybermediaries, European Economic Review, 45(4-6): 797-808.

Caillaud, Bernard, and Bruno Jullien (2003), Chicken and Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers, RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2): 309-328.

Calabrese, Armando, Massimo Gastaldi, Irene Iacovelli, and Nathan Levialdi Ghiron (2008), Innovation and Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Systems, International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 1(1): 1-20.

Calabrese, Armando, Irene Iacovelli, Nathan Levialdi Ghiron, and Massimo Gastaldi (2008), Ultrabroadband Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Communications and Strategies, Special Issue, November 2008: 131-148.

Calvano, Emilio (2011), Note on the Economic Theory of Interchange, Comment to the Federal Reserve on Proposed Regulation II: Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing.

Calvano, Emilio and Bruno Jullien, Issues in Online Advertising and Competition Policy: A Two-Sided Market Perspective, in Joseph E. Harrington and Yannis Katsoulacos (2012), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, Cheltenham, UK:

Edward Elgar, 179-197.

Canon, Carlos (2009), Regulation Effects on Investment Decisions in Two-Sided Market Industries: The Net Neutrality Debate, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics).

Canon, Carlos (2011), Matching and Information Provision by One-Sided and Two-Sided Platforms, NET Institute Working Paper, No. 11-20.

Cantillon, Estelle and Pai-Ling Yin (2011), Competition between Exchanges: A Research Agenda, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(3): 329-336.

Cantillon, Estelle and Pai-Ling Yin (2011), Competition between Exchanges: Lessons from the Battle of the Bund, Working Paper.

Cao, Wen and Qinyang Sha (2011), Platform Competition at an Online Two-Sided Market – Evidence from eBay, Working Paper (The Chinese University of Hong Kong and Indiana University).

Carbo Valverde, Santiago, Sujit Chakravorti, and Francisco Rodriguez Fernandez (2011), Regulating Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Investigation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2009-11.

Carlton, Dennis W. (2010), Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence: A Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, The Changing Retail Payments Landscape: What Role for Central Banks?

Carlton, Dennis W. and Alan S. Frankel (2005), Transaction Costs, Externalities, and 'Two- Sided' Payment Markets, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 617-642.

Carrillo, Juan D. and Gofu Tan (2006), Platform Competition: The Role of Multi-Homing and Complementors, NET Institute Working Paper No. 06-30.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Hanna Halaburda (2012), When Does a Platform Create Value by Limiting Choice? Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-030.

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Gaston Llanes (2012), Investment Incentives in Proprietary and Open-Source Two-Sided Platforms, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-114

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda (2009), Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-058.

Caves, Kevin W. (2012), Modeling the Effects of Net Neutrality Regulation: A Comment on Economides and Tag, Information Economics and Policy, 24(3-4): 288-292.

Chakravorti, Sujit (2003), Theory of Credit Card Networks:

Page 4 of 16

A Survey of the Literature, Review of Network Economics, 2(2): 50-68.

Chakravorti, Sujit (2010), Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, The Changing Retail Payments Landscape: What Role for Central Banks? 99-124, reprinted in Review of Network Economics, 9(2): 1-26.

Chakravorti, Sujit, and Roberto Roson (2006), Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 118-142.

Chandra, Ambarish (2009), Targeted Advertising: The Role of Subscriber Characteristics in Media Markets, Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(1): 58-84.

Chandra, Ambarish and Allan Collard-Wexler (2009), Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18(4), 1045-1070.

Chandra, Ambarish and Ulrich Kaiser (2011), Targeted Advertising in Magazine Markets and the Advent of the Internet, Working Paper (University of Toronto and University of Zurich).

Chang, Howard, David S. Evans, and Daniel D. Garcia Swartz (2005), The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia, Review of Network Economics, 4(4).

Chao, Yong and Timothy Derdenger (forthcoming), Mixed Bundling in Two-Sided Markets in the Presence of Installed Base Effects, Management Science.

Chen, Kong-Pin and Yen-Chi Huang (forthcoming), A Search-Matching Model of Two-Sided Platforms, CESifo Economic Studies.

Chen, Kai and Edison Tse (2007), Long Term Dynamics of Differentiated Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Stanford University).

Chen, Kai and Edison Tse (2008), Dynamic Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Stanford University).

Choi, Jay Pil (2010), Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing, Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(3): 607-626.

Choi, Jay Pil and Byung-Cheol Kim (2010), Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives, RAND Journal of Economics, 41(3): 446-471.

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Stephen Martin (2010), Exclusivity and Exclusion on Platform Markets, Purdue University Economics Working Papers, No. 1254.

Claussen, Jorg, Tobias Kretschmer, and Philip Mayrhofer (2012), Incentives for Quality over Time – The

Case of Facebook Applications, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1133.

Constantine, Lloyd, Jeffrey I. Shinder, and Kerin E. Coughlin (2005), In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation: A Study of Market Failure in a Two-Sided Market, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 599-614.

Cortade, Thomas (2006), A Strategic Guide on Two-Sided Markets Applied to the ISP Market, Communications and Strategies, 61.

Corts, Kenneth S. and Mara Lederman (2009), Software Exclusivity and the Scope of Indirect Network Effects in the U.S. Home Video Game Market, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2): 121-136.

Crampes, Claude, Carole Hartchabalet, and Bruno Jullien (2009), Advertising, Competition, and Entry in Media Industries, Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(1): 7-31.

Cremer, Helmuth, Philippe De Donder, Francois Boldron, Denis Joram, and Bernard Roy, Social Costs and Benefits of the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal Market, in Paul R. Kleindorfer and Michael A. Crew (2008), Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 23-35.

Curchod, Corentin and Nicholas Neysen (2009), Disentangling Positive and Negative Externalities on Two-Sided Markets: The eBay Case, CRE CIS Working Paper, No. 02-2009.

Cusumano, Michael, and Fernando Suarez, The Role of Services in Platform Markets, in Annabelle Gawer (2009), Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Damiano, Ettore and Hao Li (2007), Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching, Journal of Economic Theory, 30(2): 243-263.

Damiano, Ettore and Hao Li (2008), Competing Matchmaking, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(4): 789-818.

Danilov, Vladimir I., Gleb A. Koshevoy, and Christine Lang, Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models, in Murat R. Sertel and Semih Koray (2003), Advances in Economic Design, Berlin: Springer, 103-125.

Danilov, Vladimir I., Gleb A. Koshevoy, and Christine Lang (2004), Competitive Two-Sided Markets with Complements, NCCR FINRISK Working Paper, No. 193.

De Corniere, Alexandre, and Greg Taylor (2012), Integration and Search Engine Bias, Working Paper (Nuffield College and Oxford Internet Institute).

De Grauwe, Paul, Laura Rinaldi, and Patrick Van Cayseele (2006), Towards a More Efficient Use of Payment Instruments, Working Paper (University of Leuven).

Page 5 of 16

Derdenger, Timothy (2009), Vertical Integration and Two-Sided Market Pricing: Evidence from the Video Game Industry, Ph.D. Dissertation.

Devine, Kristine L. (2008), Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Google? North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, 10(1): 59-118.

Dewenter, Ralf, and Juergen Roesch (2012), Market Entry into Emerging Two-Sided Markets, Economics Bulletin, 32(3): 2343-2352.

Dewenter, Ralf, Justus Haucap, and Tobias Wenzel (2011), Semi-Collusion in Media Markets, International Review of Law and Economics, 31(2): 92-98.

Dietl, Helmut, Tobias Duschl, Egon Franck, and Markus Lang (2012), A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Economics and Statistics, 232(3): 336-359.

Ding, Ke, and Jiutang Pan (2011), Platforms, Network Effects, and Small Business Dynamics in China: Case Study of the Shanzhai Cell Phone Industry, IDE Discussion Paper, No. 302.

Doganoglu, Toker and Julian Wright (2006), Multihoming and Compatibility, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(1): 45-67.

Doganoglu, Toker and Julian Wright (2010), Exclusive Dealing with Network Effects, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28(2): 145-154.

Donze, Jocelyn and Isabelle Dubec (2009), Paying for ATM Usage: Good for Consumers, Bad for Banks, Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(3): 583-612.

Dou, Jiangli and Bing Ye (2011), Multi-homing, Product Differentiation, and Competition, Working Paper.

Dube, Jean-Pierre H., Gunter J. Hitsch, and Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2010), Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects, Marketing Science, 29(2): 216-249.

Economides, Nicholas and Benjamin E. Hermalin (forthcoming), The Economics of Network Neutrality, RAND Journal of Economics.

Economides, Nicholas, and Evangelos Katsamakas (2006), Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry, Management Science, 52(7): 1057-1071.

Economides, Nicholas and Joacim Tag (2012), Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two- Sided Market Analysis, Information Economics and Policy, 24(2): 91-104.

Economides, Nicolas, and Joacim Tag (2012), Modeling the Welfare Effects of Network Neutrality Regulation: A Response to Caves's Comment, Information Economics and

Policy, 24(3-4): 293.

Eichhorn, Christoph, and Marco Sahm (2010), Why Were FIFA World Cup Tickets so Cheap? Monopoly Pricing, Demand Quality, and Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(2): 212-217.

Eisenmann, Thomas R., Geoffrey Parker, and Marshall Van Alstyne (2006), Strategies for Two-Sided Markets, Harvard Business Review, October 2006.

Eisenmann, Thomas R., Geoffrey Parker, and Marshall Van Alstyne, Opening Platforms: How, When, and Why? in Annabelle Gawer (2009), Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Eisenmann, Thomas R., Geoffrey Parker, and Marshall Van Alstyne (2011), Platform Envelopment, Strategic Management Journal, 32(12): 1270-1285.

Eliaz, Kfir, and Ran Spiegler (2011), A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing, Economic Journal, 121(556): F329-F339.

Ellison, Glenn, and Drew Fudenberg (2003), Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4): 1249-1278.

Ellision, Glenn, Markus Mobius, and Drew Fudenberg (2004), Competing Auctions, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(1): 30-66.

Ellman, Matthew and Fabrizio Germano (2009), What Do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias, Economic Journal, 119(537): 680-704.

Emch, Eric, and T. Scott Thompson (2006), Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 45-60.

Epstein, Richard A. (2005), The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-Tuning Gone Awry, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 551-597.

Etro, Federico, Leadership in Multi-Sided Markets and Dominance in Online Advertising, in Joseph E. Harrington and Yannis Katsoulacos (2012), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 214-236.

Evans, David S. (2003a), Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries, Review of Network Economics, 2(3): 191-209.

Evans, David S. (2003b), The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, Yale Journal on Regulation, 20(2): 325-381.

Evans, David S. (2006a), Two-Sided Platforms and Analysis of Single-Firm Conduct, Submission to the Joint DOJ-FTC Section 2 Hearings, Project No. P062106.

Evans, David S. (2006b), Interchange Fees: Is There a

Page 6 of 16

Competition Problem, and If So, How Do We Approach Solving it? Working Paper Based on a Presentation Given at the OECD Meeting on Payment Cards, Paris, 5 June 2006.

Evans, David S. (2008), Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, 102: 285-306.

Evans, David S., How Catalysts Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups, in Annabelle Gawer (2009), Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Evans, David S. (2009), The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3): 37-60.

Evans, David S. (2010), The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets, and Competition Policy, Concurrences Competition Laws Journal, 2010(2).

Evans, David S. (2011), The Antitrust Economics of Free, Competition Policy International, 7(1): 71-89.

Evans, David S. (2011), Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

Evans, David S. (2011), Interchange Fees: The Economics and Regulation of What Merchants Pay for Cards. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

Evans, David S. (2012a), Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 27(2), 1201-1250.

Evans, David S. (2012b), Two-Sided Market Definition, in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory and Case Studies.

Evans, David S. (forthcoming), Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms and its Implications for Antitrust Analysis, Journal of Competition Law and Economics.

Evans, David S. (forthcoming), Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms, Competition Policy International.

Evans, David S., Andrei Hagiu, and Richard Schmalensee (2006), Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Evans, David S. and Michael D. Noel (2005), Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3), 667.

Evans, David S. and Michael D. Noel (2008), “The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multisided Platform Businesses,” Journal of Competition Law and Policy, 4(3), 101-134.

Evans, David S. and Peter Passell (2003), Everything You Wanted to Know about Two-Sided Markets, Milken Institute Review, Second Quarter 2003: 36-43.

Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2005), The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What Role for Public Authorities?

Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2005), Paying with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing, 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2007a), The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, Competition Policy International, 3(1), 151-179; reprinted as Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2008), Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 667 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

Evans, David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee (2007b), Catalyst Code: The Strategies behind the World’s Most Dynamic Companies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2010), Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses, Review of Network Economics, 9(4): 1-26.

Fan, Ying (forthcoming), Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the U.S. Daily Newspaper Market, American Economic Review.

Faratin, Peyman (2007), Economics of Overlay Networks: An Industrial Organization Perspective on Network Economics, Working Paper (MIT).

Faratin, P., and T. Wilkening (2006), Interconnection Discrimination: A Two-Sided Markets Perspective, Proceedings of the Fifth Hot Topics in Networks.

Farhi, Emmanuel, and Andrei Hagiu (2008), Strategic Interactions in Two-Sided Market Oligopolies, Working Paper (Harvard University).

Fath, Gabor and Miklos Sarvary (2003), Adoption Dynamics in Buyer-Side Exchanges, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 1(3), 305-335.

Farrell, Joseph (2006), Efficiency and Competition between Payment Instruments, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 26-44.

Ferrando, Jorge, Jean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel, and Nathalie Sonnac (2008), Intermarket Network Externalities and Competition: An Application to the Media Industry, International Journal of Economic Theory, 4(3): 357-379.

Fiedler, Ingo (2010), Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: Is Competition Always Desirable? Berkeley Law and

Page 7 of 16

Economics Working Paper Series (University of Hamburg).

Filistrucchi, Lapo (2005), The Impact of the Internet on the Market for Daily Newspapers in Italy, EUI Working Paper ECO No. 2005/12.

Filistrucchi, Lapo (2008a), A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets: Some Theoretical Considerations, Tilburg University Working Paper (Tilburg University).

Filistrucchi, Lapo (2008b), A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Media, NET Institute Working Paper, No. 08-34.

Filistrucchi, Lapo (2010), How Many Markets Are Two-Sided? Competition Policy International Antitrust Journal, July 2010(2).

Filistrucchi, Lapo, Tobias J. Klein, and Thomas Michielsen (2010), Merger Simulation in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of the Dutch Daily Newspapers, NET Institute Working Paper, No. 10-15.

Filistrucchi, Lapo, Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme, S. Keunen, Tobias J. Klein, Thomas Michielsen, and John Wileur (2010), Mergers in Two-Sided Markets – A Report to the NMa, Nederlanse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands Competition Authority), The Hague, Netherlands.

Filistrucchi, Lapo, Luigi Luini, and Andrea Mangani (2012), Banning Ads from Public TV: Lessons from France, NET Institute Working Paper, No. 12-23.

Filistrucchi, Lapo, Damien Geradin, and Eric van Damme (2012), Identifying Two-Sided Markets, TILEC Discussion Paper, No. 2012-008.

Filistrucchi, Lapo, Tobias J. Klein, and Thomas Michielsen (2012), Assessing Unilateral Effects in a Two-Sided Market: An Application to the Dutch Daily Newspaper Market, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 8(2): 297-329.

Fleischer, Raphael, and David A. Smith (2012), Two-Sided Markets in the EU: An Attempted Demystification, University of Chicago Working Paper (University of Chicago).

Fletcher, Amelia (2007), Predatory Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: A Brief Comment, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 221-224.

Foer, Albert A. (2010), Electronic Payment Systems and Interchange Fees: Breaking the Log Jam on Solutions to Market Power, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper (American Antitrust Institute).

Frankel, Alan S., and Allan L. Shampine (2006), The Economic Effects of Interchange Fees, Antitrust Law Journal, 73(3): 627-673.

Gabszewicz, Jean, Victor Ginsburgh, and Didier Laussel (2010), Acquiring Foreign Languages: A Two-Sided Market Approach, ECARES Working Paper, No. 2010-007.

Gabszewicz, Jean J., and Xavier Y. Wauthy (2004), Two-Sided Markets and Price Competition with Multi-Homing, CORE Discussion Paper, No. 2004/30.

Galariotis, Ionnis (2011), Exclusive Contracts in Two-Sided Markets, Master’s Thesis

(Tilburg School of Economics). Gale, Stephen and Ben Gerritsen (2011), Competition Policy and Credit Card Interchange

Fees in New Zealand, Working Paper (Casalia). Galeotti, Andrea and Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez (2009), Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products, European Economic Review, 53(4): 417-428. Gallaugher, John M. and Yu-Ming Wang (2002), Understanding Network Effects in Software

Markets: Evidence from Web Server Pricing, MIS Quarterly, 26(4): 303-327. Gans, Joshua S. and Stephen P. King (2003a), Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in

Payment Systems, Review of Network Economics, 2(2). Gans, Joshua S. and Stephen P. King (2003b), The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in

Payment Systems, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 3(1). Gao, Ming (2010), When to Allow Buyers to Sell? Bundling in Mixed Two-Sided Markets,

Working Paper (Tshinghua University). Gaudeul, Alexandre and Bruno Jullien, E-Commerce, Two-Sided Markets, and Info-

Mediation, in Eric Brousseau (2007), Internet and Digital Economics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 268-290.

Gaze, Pierre and Anne-Gael Vaubourg (2011), Electronic Platforms and Two-Sided Markets: A Side-Switching Analysis, Journal of High Technology Management Research, 22(2): 158-165.

Genakos, Christos and Tommaso Valletti (2011), Testing the ‘Waterbed’ Effect in Mobile Telephony, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(6): 1114-1142.

Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro, and Michael Sinkinson (2012), Competition and Ideological Diversity: Historical Evidence from US Newspapers, Working Paper (University of Chicago and Wharton).

Gick, Wolfgang (2009), Platforms or Franchisors? Two Contractual Forms When Consumers Care About Quality, Working Paper (Harvard University).

Gil, Ricard and Daniel Riera-Crichton (2012), Price Discrimination and Competition in Two- Sided Markets:

Page 8 of 16

Evidence from the Spanish Local TV Industry, Working Paper (Johns Hopkins Business School and Bates College).

Gil, Ricard and Frederic Warzynski (2011), Vertical Integration, Exclusivity, and Game Sales Performance in the U.S. Video Game Industry, Working Paper (University of California Santa Cruz and Aarhus School of Business).

Godes, David, Elie Ofek, and Miklos Sarvary (2009), Content vs. Advertising: The Impact of Competition on Media Firm Strategy, Marketing Science, 28(1): 20-35.

Goldberg, Victor P. and Richard A. Epstein (2005), Introductory Remarks: Some Reflections on Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3), 509-514.

Goldfrain, Katerina and Eugen Kovac (2007), On Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (University of Bonn).

Gomes, Renato (2011), Optimal Auction Design in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics). Gomes, Renato and Alessandro Pavan (2011), Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics and Northwestern University).

Greiner, Tanja and Marco Sahm (2011), How Effective Are Advertising Bans? On the Demand for Quality in Two-Sided Markets, CESifo Working Paper No. 3524.

Guo, Xunhua, Yannan Zhao, Yan Jin, and Nan Zhang (2010), Theorizing a Two-Sided Adoption Model for Mobile Marketing Platforms, ICIS Proceedings Paper 128.

Guthrie, Graeme and Julian Wright (2007), Competing Payment Schemes, Journal of Industrial Economics, 55(1): 37-67.

Gyselen, Luc (2005), Multilateral Interchange Fees under E.U. Antitrust Law: A One-Sided View on a Two-Sided Market? Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 703-721.

Hagiu, Andrei (2006a), Multi-Sided Platforms: From Microfoundations to Design and Expansion Strategies, Working Paper (Harvard Business School).

Hagiu, Andrei (2006b), Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 720-737.

Hagiu, Andrei (2006c), Proprietary vs. Open Two-Sided Platforms and Social Efficiency, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 06-12.

Hagiu, Andrei (2007), Merchant or Two-Sided Platform? Review of Network Economics, 6(2): 115-133.

Hagiu, Andrei (2009), Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures, Journal of Economics and

Management Strategy, 18(4): 1011-1043.

Hagiu, Andrei (2011), Quantity vs. Quality: Exclusion by Platforms with Network Effects, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-125.

Hagiu, Andrei and Hanna Halaburda (2011), Expectations, Network Effects, and Platform Pricing, Working Paper (Harvard University).

Hagiu, Andrei and Bruno Jullien (2011a), Search Diversion, Rent Extraction, and Competition,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, No 11-124.

Hagiu, Andrei and Bruno Jullien (2011b), Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search? RAND Journal of Economics, 42(2): 337-362.

Hagiu, Andrei and Robin S. Lee (2011), Exclusivity and Control, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20(3): 679-708.

Hagiu, Andrei and Daniel Spulber (2011), First Party Content, Commitment, and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Harvard University and Northwestern University).

Hagiu, Andrei and Julian Wright (2011), Multi-Sided Platforms, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-024.

Halaburda, Hanna and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski (2011), Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms, Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 10-098.

Halaburda, Hanna and Yaron Yehezkel (2011), Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information, Working Paper (Harvard Business School and Tel Aviv University).

Halaburda, Hanna and Yaron Yehezkel (2012), Platform Competition under Partial Belief Advantage, Working Paper (Harvard Business School and Tel Aviv University).

Hatchuel, Armand, Pascal Le Masson, and Benoit Weil (2009), Platforms for the Design of Platforms: Collaborating in the Unknown, in Annabelle Gawer Platforms, Markets, and

Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Elgar. Hausman, Jerry and Julian Wright, Two Sided Markets with Substitution: Mobile

Termination Revisited, in Gerald R. Faulhaber, Gary Madden, and Jeffrey Petchey (2012), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 284-314.

Hayashi, Fumiko (2006), A Puzzle of Payment Card Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card Payments, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 144-174.

Hayashi, Fumiko (2009), The Economics of Payment Card Fee Structures: What Drives Payment Card Rewards? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper No. RWP 08-07.

Page 9 of 16

Hayashi, Fumiko and Stuart E. Weiner (2006), Interchange Fees in Australia, the UK, and the United States: Matching Theory and Practice, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Third Quarter 2006: 75-112.

Heimler, Alberto (2010), Payment Card Pricing Patterns: The Role of Antitrust and Regulatory Authorities, Working Paper.

Hendel, Igal, Aviv Nevo, and Francois Ortalo-Magne (2009), The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com, American Economic Review, 99(5), 1878-1898.

Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael L. Katz (2006), Your Network or Mine? The Economics of Routing Rules, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 692-719.

Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael L. Katz (2011), Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two-Sided Benefits, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20(2): 379-408.

Hesse, Renata B. (2007), Two-Sided Platform Markets and the Application of the Traditional Antitrust Analytical Framework, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 191-195.

Hesse, Renata B., and Joshua H. Soven (2006), Defining Relevant Product Markets in Electronic Payment Network Antitrust Cases, Antitrust Law Journal, 73(3): 709-738.

Hildebrand, Thomas (2011), Two-Sided Markets in the Online World, Ph.D. Dissertation (European School of Management and Technology).

Hildebrand, Thomas (2012), Estimating Network Effects in Two-Sided Markets Without Data on Prices and Quantities, Economics Letters, 117(3): 585-588.

Hogendorn, Christiaan and Ka Yat Yuen (2009), Platform Competition with ‘Must-Have’

Components, Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(2): 294-318. Horton, John J. (2010), Online Labor Markets, Working Paper (Harvard University). Hossain, Tanjim, Dylan Minor, and John Morgan (forthcoming), Competing Matchmakers:

An Experimental Analysis, Management Science. Howell, Bronwyn (2007), Unveiling ‘Invisible Hands’: Competition in Two-Sided Health

Care Markets, Working Paper (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation).

Ida, Takanori and Toshifumi Kuroda (2009), Considering Fixed-Mobile Convergence Service as a Two-Sided Market, Working Paper (Kyoto University and Tokyo Keizei University).

Ida, Takanori and Toshifumi Kuroda (2011), Optimum

Pricing Strategy for Fixed-Line Internet and Mobile Phone Services: A Two-Sided Market Approach, Empirical Economics Letters, 10(8).

Ivaldi, Marc and Estelle Malavolti-Grimal (2006), TV on Mobility: A Two-Sided Market Analysis, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics).

Ivaldi, Marc, Sennay Sokullu, and Tuba Toru (2011), Airport Prices in a Two-Sided Framework: An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics).

Ivaldi, Marc, Senay Sokullu, Tuba Toru, Are Airports Two-Sided Platforms? A Methodological Approach, in James Peoples (2012), Pricing Behavior and Non-Price Characteristics in the Airline Industry (Advances in Airline Economics, Volume 3), Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 213-232.

Jaag, Christian and Urs Trinkner, Pricing in Competitive Two-Sided Mail Markets, in M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (2008), Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Jeon, Doh-Shin and Nikrooz Nasr Esfahani (2012), News Aggregators and Competition among Newspapers in the Internet, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics).

Jeon, Doh-Shin and Jean-Charles Rochet (2010), The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two- Sided Market Perspective, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(2): 222-255.

Jeon, Jin (2006), Three Essays on Bundling and Two-Sided Markets, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Florida).

Jeziorski, Przemyslaw (2012), Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of U.S. Radio Industry, Working Paper (Haas School of Business).

Jin, Ginger Zhe and Marc Rysman (2012), Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions, Working Paper (University of Maryland and Boston University).

Jonker, Nicole (2011), Card Acceptance and Surcharging: The Role of Costs and Competition, Working Paper (De Nederlandsche Bank).

Jullien, Bruno (2005), Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries, CESifo Economic Studies, 51(2-3): 233-260.

Jullien, Bruno, Pricing and Other Business Strategies for e-Procurement Platforms, in Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga, and Giancarlo Spagnolo (2006), Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 249-266.

Jullien, Bruno (2008), Price Skewness and Competition in Multi-Sided Markets, IDEI Working Paper No. 504.

Jullien, Bruno (2011), Competition in Multi-Sided Networks:

Page 10 of 16

Divide-and-Conquer, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(4): 1-35.

Jullien, Bruno, Two-Sided B2B Platforms, in M. Peitz and J. Waldfogel (2012), Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 161-188.

Jullien, Bruno and Alessandro Pavan (2012), Platform Competition under Dispersed Information, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics and Northwestern University).

Kaiser, Ulrich and Minjae Song (2009), Do Media Consumers Really Dislike Advertising? An Empirical Assessment of the Role of Advertising in Print Media Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2): 292-301.

Kaiser, Ulrich and Julian Wright (2006), Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Magazine Industry, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(1): 1-28.

Karrberg, Patrik (2010), A Two-Sided Market Approach to Value Chain Dynamics in Telecom Services: A Study Lens for Mobile Platform Innovation and Pricing Strategies, 2010 Ninth International Conference on Mobile Business, 505-509.

Katiyar, Akshaya (2011), Price Structure in a Two-Sided Platform, International Journal of Management and Tourism, 19(2): 159-169.

Kennes, John and Aaron Schiff (2008), Quality Infomediation in Search Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(5): 1191-1202.

Kim, Byung-Cheol, Jeongsik “Jay” Lee, and Hyunwoo Park (2012), Two-Sided Platform Competition in the Online Daily Deals Promotion Market, Working Paper (Georgia Institute of Technology).

Kim, Kihoon and Edison Tse (2011), Dynamic Competition Strategy for Online Knowledge- Sharing Platforms, International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 16(1).

Kind, Hans Jarle, Marko Koethenbuerger, and Guttorm Schjelderup (2008), Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6): 1531-1539.

Kind, Hans Jarle, Marko Koethenbuerger, and Guttorm Schjelderup (2009), On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets, Economic Letters, 104(2): 86- 88.

Kind, Hans Jarle, Marko Koethenbuerger, and Guttorm Schjelderup (2009), Should Utility- Reducing Media Advertising be Taxed? Working Paper (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and University of Copenhagen).

Kind, Hans Jarle, Tore Nilssen, and Lars Sorgard

(2009), Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue? Marketing Science, 28(6): 1112-1128.

Kind, Hans Jarl, Tore Nilssen, and Lars Sorgard (2011), Channel Coordination and Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Norwegian Schools of Economics and University of Oslo).

Kind, Hans Jarle and Frank Stahler (2007), Another Tale of Two-Sided Markets, University of Otago Economics Discussion Paper No. 0708.

Kind, Hans Jarle and Frank Stahler (2010), Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(2): 205-211.

Klein, Benjamin, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy, and Lacey L. Plache (2006),

Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees, Antitrust Law Journal, 73(3), 571-626.

Koeksal, Emin (2010), Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: A Two-Sided Market Analysis, Working Paper (Bahcesehir Universitesi).

Kotsogiannis, Christos and Konstantinos Serfes (2010), Public Goods and Tax Competition in a Two-Sided Market, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(2): 281-321.

Kourgiantakis, Markos and Emmanuel Petrakis (2007), Modelling B2B E-Marketplaces: The Role of Intermediaries, Working Paper (University of Crete).

Krueger, Malte (2009), The Elasticity Pricing Rule for Two-Sided Markets: A Note, Review of Network Economics, 8(3): 271-278.

Kumar, Ravi, Yury Lifshifts, and Andrew Tomkins (2010), Evolution of Two-Sided Markets, Proceedings of the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, 311- 320.

Kurucu, Gokee (2007), Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach, Working Paper (Boston College).

Landman, Vandit and Stefan Stremersch (2011), Multi-Homing in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Inquiry in the Video Game Console Industry, Journal of Marketing, 75(6).

Lee, Robin S. (2011), Dynamic Demand Estimation in Platform and Two-Sided Markets: The Welfare Costs of Software Incompatibility, Working Paper (Stern School of Business).

Lee, Robin S. (2012a), Competing Platforms, Working Paper (NYU Stern School of Business).

Lee, Robin S., Home Videogame Platforms, in M. Peitz and

Page 11 of 16

J. Waldfogel (2012), Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 83-107.

Lee, Robin S. (2012b), Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Stern School of Business).

Lee, Robin S. and Tim Wu (2009), Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design: Zero- Pricing and Net Neutrality, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3): 61-76.

Leonello, Agnese (2009), Horizontal Mergers in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (European University Institute).

Levin, Jonathan, The Economics of Internet Markets, in D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano, and E. Dekel (forthcoming), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society.

Li, Shengli, Yipeng Liu, and Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay (2010), Network Effects in Online Two-Sided Market Platforms: A Research Note, Decision Support Systems, 49(2): 245-249.

Li, Ting (2009), Tying in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics).

Li, Lixiang, Yueting Chai, and Yi Liu (2011), Inter-Group and Intra-Group Externalities of Two-Sided Markets in Electronic Commerce, Journal of Service Science and Management, 4: 52- 58.

Lin, Mei, Shaojin Li, and Andrew B. Whinston (2011), Innovation and Price Competition in a Two-Sided Market, Journal of Management Information Systems, 28(2), 171-202.

Lindstadt, Nadine (2009), Multisided Media Markets: Applying the Theory of Multisided Markets to Media Markets, University of Southern Denmark Working Paper 96/09.

Litan, Robert E. and Alex J. Pollock (2006), The Future of Charge Card Networks, AEI- Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-03.

Liu, Qihong and Konstantinos Serfes (forthcoming), Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.

Lowe, Philip (2005), Payments System Reform: The Australian Experience, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Proceedings – Payments Systems Research Conferences, 269-278. Luchetta, Giacomo (2012), Is the Google Platform a Two-

Sided Market? 23rd

European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunication Society. Manenti, Fabio M. and Ernesto Somma (2011), Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Payment Systems, Manchester School, 79(6): 1099-1125.

Marcu, Mircea I. (2008), Quality Provision in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Managed Care, Working Paper (University of Florida). McAndrews, James and Zhu Wang (2008), The Economics of Two-Sided Payment Card Markets: Pricing, Adoption, and Usage, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper WP 12-06.

Mel’nyk, Yuliia (2008), Health Economics: A Two-Sided Approach, Master’s Thesis, Universitat Aut`onoma de Barcelona.

Miao, Chun-Hui (2009), Limiting Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets, Review of Network Economics, 8(4): 346-364.

Miklos-Thal, Jeanine and Markus Reisinger (2010), Operating System Adoption Decisions in the Presence of Indirect Network Externalities, Working Paper (Simon School of Business and University of Kaulbachstr).

Mooney, Catherine T. (2010), A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Radio Ownership Caps, Working Paper (University of Oklahoma).

Mooney, Catherine T. (2010), Market Power, Audience Segmentation, and Radio Advertising Levels, Working Paper (University of Oklahoma).

Motta, Massimo and Helder Vasconcelos (2012), Exclusionary Pricing in a Two-Sided Market, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9164.

Mueller, Christopher and Enrico Boehme (2011), The Monopoly Benchmark on Two-Sided Markets, MPRA Working Paper 34987.

Muris, Timothy J. (2005), Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of Two-Sided Markets, Columbia Business Law Review, 2005(3): 515-550.

Musacchio, John and Dohoon Kim (2009), Network Platform Competition in a Two-Sided Market: Implications to the Net Neutrality Issue, TPRC Conference on Communication, Information, and Internet Policy.

Musacchio, John, Galina Schwartz, and Jean Walrand (2009), A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, Review of Network Economics, 8(1): 22-39.

Njoroge, Paul, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Nicolas Stier (2009), Competition, Market Coverage, and Quality Choice in Interconnected Platforms, Proceedings of NetEcon.

Njoroge, Paul, Asuman Ozdaglar, Nicolas Stier, and G, Weintraub (2010), Investment in Two-Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate, Working Paper (MIT and Columbia University).

OECD Competition Committee (2009), Two-Sided Markets, DAF/COMP(2009)20, available at

Page 12 of 16

http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf.

Ordover, Janusz A. (2007), Comments on Evans and Schmalensee’s ‘The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,’ Competition Policy International, 3(1): 181-189.

Orman, Wafa H. (2008), The Effects of Compatibility on Competition between Proprietary and Open Two-Sided Platforms, Working Paper (Baylor University).

Ozman, Muge (2008), The Two Face of Open Innovation: Network Externalities and Learning, Working Paper (Telecom and Management SudParis).

Parker, Geoffrey G. and Marshall W. Van Alstyne (2000), Internetwork Externalities and Free Information Goods, in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 107-116.

Parker, Geoffrey and Marshall W. Van Alstyne (2002a), Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design, Working Paper (Tulane University and University of Michigan Ann Arbor).

Parker, Geoffrey and Marshall W. Van Alstyne (2002b), Unbundling in the Presence of Network Externalities, Working Paper (Tulane University and University of Michigan Ann Arbor).

Parker, Geoffrey and Marshall W. Van Alstyne (2005), Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, Management Science, 51(10): 1494-1504.

Parker, Geoffrey and Marshall W. Van Alstyne (2009), Six Challenges in Platform Licensing and Open Innovation, Communications and Strategies, 74: 17-36.

Peitz, Martin and Tommaso M. Valletti (2008), Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay- TV versus Free-To-Air, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(4): 949-965.

Peitz, Martin, Sven Rady, and Piers Trepper (2011), Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets, GESY Discussion Paper No. 365.

Pezzino, Mario and Giacomo Pignataro (2008), Competition in the Health Care Market: A ‘Two-Sided’ Approach, Working Paper (University of Manchester and University of Cantania).

Polanski, Arnold and Eyal Winter (2010), Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(1).

Pollock, Rufus (2008), The Control of Porting in Platform Markets, Working Paper (University of Cambridge).

Ponce, Jorge (forthcoming), The Quality of Credit Ratings: A Two-Sided Market Approach, Economic Systems.

Poolsombat, Rattanasuda and Gianluigi Vernasca (2006), Partial Multihoming in Two-Sided Markets, University of York Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 2006/10.

Pranger, Robin A., Mark D. Manuszak, Elizabeth K. Kiser, and Ron Borzekowski (2009),

Interchange Fees and Payment Card Networks: Economics, Industry Developments, and Policy Issues, Working Paper (Federal Reserve Board).

Raivio, Yrjo and Sakari Luukkainen (2011), Mobile Networks as a Two-Sided Platform – Case Open Telco, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 6(2): 77- 89.

Rasch, Alexander (2007), “Platform Competition with Partial Multihoming under Differentiation: A Note,” Economics Bulletin, 12(7), 1-8.

Rash, Alexander and Tobias Wenzel (2011), Piracy in a Two-Sided Software Market, Working Paper (Universitat Dusseldorf).

Ratliff, James D. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2010), Online Advertising: Defining Relevant Markets, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 6(3): 653-686.

Reisinger, Markus (2004), Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities, Munich Discussion Paper No. 2004-27.

Reisinger, Markus (2011), Unique Equilibrium in Two-Part Tariff Competition between Two- Sided Platforms, Working Paper (University of Munich).

Reisinger, Markus (2012), Platform Competition for Advertisers and Users in Media Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(2): 243-252.

Reisinger, Markus, Ludwig Ressner, and Richard Schmidtke (2009), Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities, Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(1): 32-57.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2002), Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, RAND Journal of Economics, 33(4): 549-570.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2003a), An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, Review of Network Economics, 2(2): 69-79.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2003b), Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4): 990-1029.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2006a), Externalities and Regulation in Card Payment Systems, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 1-14.

Page 13 of 16

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2006b), Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 645-667.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, Competition Policy in Two-Sided Markets, with a Special Emphasis on Payment Cards, in Paolo Buccirossi (2008), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 543-582.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2008), Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(6): 1333-1347.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2011), Must-Take Cards: Merchant Discounts and Avoided Costs, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3): 462-495.

Rochet, Jean-Charles and Julian Wright (2010), Credit Card Interchange Fees, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(8): 1788-1797.

Roger, Guillaume (2012), Two-Sided Competition with Differentiation, Working Paper (University of New South Wales).

Roger, Guillaume and Luis Vasconcelos (2012), Platform Pricing Structure and Moral Hazard, Working Paper (University of New South Wales and University of Essex).

Rooney, William H, and David K. Park (2007), The Two-Sided Market Literature Enriches Traditional Antitrust Analysis, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 211-219.

Roson, Roberto (2005), Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey, Review of Network Economics, 4(2), 142-160.

Roson, Roberto (2006), Equilibrium Size in Network with Indirect Network Externalities: A Comment, Working Paper (University of Venice).

Ruhmer, Isasbel (2011), Platform Collusion in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (University of Mannheim).

Rust, John and George Hall (2003), Middlemen versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange, Journal of Political Economy, 111(2): 353-403.

Rysman, Marc (2004), Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages, Review of Economic Studies, 71(2): 483-512.

Rysman, Marc (2007a), An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage, Journal of Industrial Economics, 55(1): 1036.

Rysman, Marc (2007b), The Empirics of Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 197-209.

Rysman, Marc (2009), The Economics of Two-Sided

Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3): 125-143.

Rysman, Marc and Julian Wright (2012), The Economics of Payment Cards, Working Paper (Boston University and National University of Singapore).

Salim, Claudia (2010), Platform Standards, Collusion, and Quality Incentives, Working Paper (University of Berlin).

Schmalensee, Richard (2002), Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(2): 103-122.

Schmalensee, Richard (2011), Why is Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed? Review of Network Economics, 10(4): 1-11.

Schuett, Florian (2010), Network Neutrality: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Review of Network Economics, 9(2): 1-13.

Schuh, Scott, Oz Shy, and Joanna Stavins (2010), Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations, Working Paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Consumer Payments Research Center).

Schwartz, Marius and Daniel R. Vincent (2006), The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 72-102.

Seamans, Robert and Feng Zhu (2011), Technology Shocks in Multi-Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on Local Newspapers, Working Paper (Stern School of Business and Marshall School of Business).

Seamans, Robert and Feng Zhu (2012), Market Shocks and Product Positioning in Multi- Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on Local Newspapers, Working Paper (Stern School of Business and Marshall School of Business).

Semeraro, Steven (2007), Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, George Mason Law Review, 14(4): 941-1002.

Sen, Soumya, Roch A. Guerin, and Kartik Hosanagar (2011), Functionality-Rich versus Minimalist Platforms: A Two-Sided Market Analysis, Computer Communication Review, 41(5).

Shy, Oz (2011), A Short Survey of Network Economics, Review of Industrial Organization, 38(2): 119-149.

Shy, Oz and Zhu Wang (2011), Why Do Payment Card Networks Charge Proportional Fees? American Economic Review, 101(4): 1575-1590.

Sidak, J. Gregory and Hal J. Singer (2008), Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, Journal of Competition Law

Page 14 of 16

and Economics, 4(3): 697-751.

Sidak, J. Gregory and David J. Tecee (2009), Rewriting the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition, George Mason Law Review, 16(4): 885-894.

Small, John and Julian Wright (2002), The Bilateral Negotiation of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, Working Paper (NECG and University of Auckland).

Snyder, Chris and Johnathan Zinman (2007), Consumer Homing on Payment Cards: From Theory to Measurement, Working Paper (Dartmouth College).

Sokullu, Senay (2011), Nonparametric Analysis of Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (University of Bristol).

Soltani, Houda (2008), Vertical Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (ERMES, Universite Pantheon-Assas Paris).

Song, Minjae (2011), Estimating Platform Market Power in Two-Sided Markets with an Application to Magazine Advertising, Working Paper (University of Rochester).

Spulber, Daniel F., Firms and Networks in Two-Sided Markets, in Terry Hendershott (2006), Handbook of Economics and Information Systems, Volume 1, 137-200.

Spulber, Daniel F. (2008), Consumer Coordination in the Small and in the Large: Implications for Antitrust in Markets with Network Effects, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 4(2): 207-262.

Spulber, Daniel F. (2010), Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and Coordination in Internet Markets, Northwestern University Law Review, 104(2): 537-592.

Stein, Alex (2006), Healthcare Intermediaries, Regulation, 29(4), 20-25.

Stuehmeier, Torben and Tobias Wenzel (2011), Getting Beer during Commercials: Adverse Effects of Ad-Avoidance, Information Economics and Policy, 23(1): 98-106.

Stuehmeier, Torben and Tobias Wenzel (2012), Regulating Advertising in the Presence of Public Service Broadcasting, Working Paper (Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Heinrich-Heine_Universitat Dusseldorf and European University Institute).

Sun, Mingchun (2006), Dynamic Network Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University.

Sun, Mingchun and Edison Tse (2007a), Sustainable Growth of Payment Card Networks: A Two-Sided Market Approach, Journal of Business Strategies, 24(1).

Sun, Mingchun and Edison Tse (2007b), When Does the Winner Take All in Two-Sided Markets, Review of Network Economics, 6(1): 16-40.

Sun, Mingchun and Edison Tse (2009), The Resource-Based View of Competitive Advantage in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Management Studies, 46(1): 45-64.

Tag, Joacim (2009), Paying to Remove Advertisements, Information Economics and Policy, 21(4): 245-252.

Tang, Weijun, Hongmin Chen and Li Xu (2011), The Sequential Platform Competition in the Two-Sided Market with Cases from the E-Payment Industry, 2009 International Conference on Machine Learning and Computing, IPCSIT Volume 3 (2011), 392-396.

Tarantino, Emanuele (2011), Vertical Search Engine Foreclosure, Working Paper (University of Bologna).

Toza, Katarzyna (2009), Payment Card Systems as an Example of Two-Sided Markets – A Challenge for Antitrust Authorities, Working Paper (University of Warsaw).

Tracer, Daniel M. (2011), Overcharge But Don’t Overestimate: Calculating Damages for Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, Cardozo Law Review, 33(2): 807-840.

Tregouet, Thomas (2007), Two-Sided Platforms in Search Markets, Working Paper (Iniversite de Cergy-Pontoise).

Tregouet, Thomas (2012), Integration and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Universite de Cergy-Pontoise).

Tumpel-Gugerell, Gertrude (2005), Interchange in a Changing Market: Observations from the Euro Area Perspective, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Proceedings – Payments Systems Research Conferences, 279-288.

Tucker, Catherine (2005), Empirically Evaluating Two-Sided Integrated Network Effects: The Case of Electronic Payments, Working Paper (MIT).

Tucker, Catherine (2008), Identifying Formal and Informal Influence in Technology Adoption with Network Externalities, Management Science, 54(12), 2024-2038.

Tucker, Catherine and Juanjuan Zhang (2010), Growing Two-Sided Networks by Advertising the User Base: A Field Experiment, Marketing Science, 29(5): 805-814.

Tuunanen, Virpi Kristina (2011), A Model for Analyzing ICT Intensive Service Innovation in n-Sided Markets, Proceedings of the 2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.

Valletti, Tommaso (2006), Mobile Call Termination: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets, Communications and Strategies, 61: 61-77.

Van Cayseele, Patrick and Jo Reynaerts (2011), Complementary Platforms, Review of Network Economics, 10(1): 1-31.

Page 15 of 16

Van Cayseele, Patrick and Stijn Vanormelingen (2009), Prices and Network Effects in Two- Sided Markets: The Belgian Newspaper Industry, Working Paper (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven).

Van Raalte, Chris and Harry Webers (1998), Spatial Competition with Intermediated Matching, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34(3): 477-488.

Vannini, Stefano (2008), Bargaining and Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Global Distribution Systems (GDS) in Travelport’s Acquisition of Worldspan, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 2: 43-50.

Veiga, Andre and E. Glen Weyl (2012), Multidimensional Product Design, Working Paper (Toulouse School of Economics and University of Chicago).

Verdier, Marianne (2006), Retail Payment Systems: What Can We Learn from Two-Sided Markets? Communications and Strategies, 61.

Verdier, Marianne (2008), Payment Card Systems in Europe: Convergence or Disappearance? Communications and Strategies, 69: 127-147.

Verdier, Marianne (2010a), Interchange Fees and Incentives to Invest in the Quality of a Payment Card System, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28(5): 539-554.

Verdier, Marianne (2010b), Interchange Fees and Inefficiencies in the Substitution between Payment Cards and Cash, Working Paper (Universite Paris Ouest Nanteere).

Verdier, Marianne (2011), Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems: A Survey of the Literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, 25(2), 273-297.

Vicens, Maria Fernanda (2008), Essays in Two-Sided Platforms, Ph.D. Dissertation, Universidad Carlos III De Madrid.

Vickers, John (2005), Public Policy and the Invisible Price: Competition Law, Regulation and the Interchange Fee, Competition Law Journal, 4: 5-16, reprinted in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What Role for Public Authorities?

Viecens, Maria Fernanda (2009), Pricing Strategies in Two-Sided Platforms: The Role of Sellers’ Competition, Working Paper (FEDEA).

Vogelsang, Michael (2010), Dynamics of Two-Sided Internet Markets, International Economics and Economic Policy, 7(1): 129-145.

Von Weizsacker, Carl Christian (2009), Antitrust Problems of Four Party Credit Card Systems, Working Paper.

Wang, Zhu (2010), Market Structure and Payment Card Pricing: What Drives the Interchange? International Journal

of Industrial Organization, 28(1): 86-98.

Wang, Zhu and Julian Wright (2012), Ad Valorem Platform Fees and Efficient Price Discrimination, Economics of Networks eJournal, 4(70).

Waverman, Leonard (2007), Two-Sided Telecom Markets and the Unintended Consequences of Business Strategy, Competition Policy International, 3(1): 249-256.

Weiner, Stuart E. and Julian Wright (2005), Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants, Review of Network Economics, 4(4): 290-323.

Weisman, Dennis L. and Robert B. Kulick (2010), Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation, Working Paper (Kansas State University and George Washington University).

Weyl, E. Glenn (2008a), Double Marginalization in Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (University of Chicago).

Weyl, E. Glenn (2008b), Monopolies in Two-Sided Markets: Comparative Statics and Identification, Working Paper (University of Chicago).

Weyl, E. Glenn (2009), Monopoly, Ramsey, and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003), Economics Letters, 103(2): 99-100.

Weyl, E. Glen (2010), A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, American Economic Review, 100(4): 1642-1672.

White, Lawrence J. (2006), Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks: Some Comments and Considerations, Review of Network Economics, 5(1): 61-71.

White, Alexander (2012), Search Engines Left Side Quality versus Right Side Profits, Working Paper. (Tsinghua Unviersity)

White, Alexander and Kamal Jain (2010), The Attention Economy of Search and Web Advertisement, Working Paper (Tsinghua University and Microsoft Corporation).

White, Alexander and E. Glen Weyl (2012), Insulated Platform Competition, Working Paper (Tsinghua University and University of Chicago).

Wilbur, Kenneth C. (2008), A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television Advertising and Viewing Markets, Marketing Science, 27(3): 356-378.

Wotton, John (2007), Are Media Markets Analyzed as Two-Sided Markets? Competition Policy International, 3(1): 237-247.

Wright, Julian (2003a), Optimal Payment Card Systems, European Economic Review, 47(4): 587-612.

Wright, Julian (2003b), Pricing in Debit and Credit Card

Page 16 of 16

Schemes, Economic Letters, 80(3): 305-309.

Wright, Julian (2004a), The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(1): 1-26.

Wright, Julian (2004b), One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets, Review of Network Economics, 3(1): 44-64.

Wright, Julian (2010), Why Do Merchants Accept Payment Cards? Review of Network Economics, 9(3): 1-6.

Wright, Julian (2012), Why Payment Card Fees Are Biased Against Retailers, Working Paper (National University of Singapore).

Xu, Li and Hong-min Chen (2005), Multihoming and Compatibility in Asymmetric Two-Sided Markets, Working Paper (Shanghai Jiao tong University).

Yao, Song and Carl F. Mela (2011), A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising, Marketing Science, 30(3): 447-468.

Zhao, Wugang and Edison Tse (2011), Competition in Search Engine Market, Journal of Business Strategies, 28(2): 123-150.

Zhou, Yiyi (2012), Failure to Launch in Two-Sided Markets: A Study of the U.S. Video Game Market, Working Paper (State University of New York at Sony Brook).

Zhu, Feng, and Marco Iansiti (2012), Entry into Platform-Based Markets, Strategic Management Journal, 33: 88-106.

Zywicki, Todd J. (2010), The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, ICLE Financial Regulatory Program White Paper Series.