Mega Puertos

7/30/2019 Mega Puertos

1/8


2/8

Overview

The Megaports Initiative works with foreign customs andother law enforcement agencies, port authorities, terminaloperators, and/or other relevant entities in partner countries tosystematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclearand other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transitingthe global maritime shipping network. In support of thismission, the Megaports Initiative helps partner countries equipmajor international seaports with radiation detection equipment

and alarm communication systems. In addition, the MegaportsInitiative provides comprehensive training for foreign personnel,short-term maintenance coverage, and technical support toensure the long-term viability and sustainability of installedradiation detection systems.

In addition to its international partners, Megaports collaborateswith the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S.Department of State to counter nuclear and radiological threatsto the United States and its international partners by installingradiation portal monitors (RPMs) that can be used by U.S.Customs ofcers to scan high-risk U.S.-bound containers. The

goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scan as much containertrafc as possible (including imports, exports, and transshippedcontainers) regardless of destination and with minimal impactto port operations. The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100seaports with radiation detection systems by 2016, scanningapproximately 50% of global maritime containerized cargo andover 80% of U.S.-bound container trafc.

The Second Line of Defense Megaports Initiative is a key component of a multi-agency, multilayered,

defensive network that strengthens the overall capability of partner countries to deter, detect, and interdict

illicit trafcking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials at key international seaports. This

program is part of the Ofce of International Material Protection and Cooperation in the U.S. Department

of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA).

DOE/NNSA programs combine with Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. and inter-governmental

efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against threats from illicit movement of special nuclear and other

radioactive materials.

The second line o deense against nuclear

prolieration consists o developing an

inrastructure to deter, detect, and respond

to illicit trafcking o nuclear materials and

related equipment. As the A.Q. Khan networkdemonstrated, gaps in the nonprolieration regim

can be exploited to give prolierators or terrorists

an opportunity. As the second pillar o our

nonprolieration strategy, several NNSA programs

work to strengthen international capabilities to

detect, deter, and interdict illicit nuclear material

and nuclear-related smuggling.

Administrator Thomas DAgostino, testimony on

Addressing a New Generation of WMD Threats befo

the House Armed Services Committee, July 2009

Addressing the Threat

The vitality of most national economies hinges upon globaltrade. Over 90% of global commerce is transported through thmaritime shipping network via cargo containers. Approximatel500 million twenty-foot-equivalent unitsa measure ofvolume in the transport of containerstransit the globe

annually through the maritime domain. The global ambitionsof terrorist organizations in todays world has raised concernthat terrorists or states of proliferation concern may attempt toexploit containerized cargo to covertly transport nuclear andother radioactive materials or use it to deliver a nuclear weaponor radiological dispersal device. The Megaports strategy isbased on the assumption that adversaries have the least control

RPM at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium


3/8

over illicit nuclear and other radioactive materials during thetransport stage. The deployment of radiation detection systemsalso deters nuclear smugglers from using the maritime shippingnetwork, forcing them to turn to other, more easily interdictedmeans of transportation.

Engaging Foreign Partners

To select key ports for engagement, a Maritime PrioritizationModel (MPM) was developed that considers both thevolume of container trafc at the port and the threat leveland/or strategic location of the port. In prioritizing portsof interest, the MPM factors in the percentage of scannablevolume at the port, the origin and destination of containercargo movement through a port, the likelihood that nuclearmaterial might be smuggled through a port, and thecountrys willingness to participate in the program.

Once a country has been identied for engagement, DOE/

NNSA personnel participate in bilateral discussions with theforeign government and key stakeholders on the MegaportsInitiative conduct a familiarization tour of the port(s) ofinterest. Joint cooperation on the Megaports Initiative istypically formalized by signing a bilateral agreement.

Implementing the Program

The Megaports Initiative is implemented by DOE/NNSAwith support from DOE national laboratories and qualieddesign, engineering, and construction contractors. TheMegaports Initiative pursues cost-sharing with partner

countries, where possible, for the design and installation ofthe radiation detection systems.

Integrated scanning lane Puerto Cortes, Honduras

The Megaports Initiative makes a concerted effort to implementthe program in a manner that reduces proliferation threatswithout disrupting the ow of commerce. Throughout thedesign phase, Megaports personnel coordinate closely withterminal operators and port authorities, foreign customsofcials, and other stakeholders to ensure that the placement ofradiation detection equipment and the operational proceduresdeveloped to respond to radiation alarms minimize impact toport operations. The goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scanas many containers as possible (including imports, exports,

and transshipped containers) regardless of destination and withminimal impact on port operations. Imports and exports are

Partnering with Homeland Security

DOE/NNSA has established strong, synergistic ties with CBP, whichimplements several programs directly related to radiation detectionand maritime security.

CBPs Container Security Initiative (CSI), which handles over85% of container cargo coming into the United States, is activeat 58 ports, many of which are operational Megaports or ports

of interest. The Megaports Initiative collaborates with CBPwhere Megaports and CSI overlap to improve CSI inspectionteams ability to identify high-risk U.S.-bound containers. TheMegaports Initiative has committed to providing a radiationdetection capability to all CSI ports to serve as an additionalscreening tool in assessing high-risk containers.

DOE/NNSA and CBP are jointly implementing the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), the goal of which is to scan 100% of U.S.-boundcontainers with radiation detection and imaging systems at select foreign ports. The Megaports Initiative provides RPMs withoptical character recognition technology, communications systems, and integrated RPM/imaging data for CBP and host nation

personnel at SFI ports. Currently SFI is operational at the ports of Salalah, Oman, and Port Qasim, Pakistan.

Operat iona l M egapor ts Implementati on Underway Future Megaports

Freeport

Zeebrugge

Antwerp

Cartagena

Caucedo

Piraeus

Puerto Cortes

Ashdod

Haifa

Kingston

Port Klang

Rotterdam

Salalah

Port Qasim

Colon

Balboa

Manzanillo

Lisbon

Singapore

Busan

Algeciras

Colombo

Kaohsiung

Laem Chabang

Southampton

Santos

Halifax

Montreal

Vancouver

Hong Kong

Shenzhen

Alexandria

Le Havre

Marseilles

Bremerhaven/Bremen

Hamburg

La Spezia

Leghorn/Livorno

Naples

Kobe

Nagoya

Tokyo

Durban

Gotenborg

Chi-Lung

Jebel Ali/Dubai

Felixstowe

Liverpool

Thamesport

Tilbury

Brazil

Canada

Canada

Canada

China

China

Egypt

France

France

Germany

Germany

Italy

Italy

Italy

Japan

Japan

Japan

South Africa

Sweden

Taiwan

UAE

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Buenos Aires

Shanghai

Genoa

Gioia Tauro

Yokohama

Tanjung Pelepas

Barcelona

Valencia

Argentina

China

Italy

Italy

Japan

Malaysia

Spain

Spain

Bahamas

Belgium

Belgium

Colombia

Dominican Republic

Greece

Honduras

Israel

Israel

Jamaica

Malaysia

Netherlands

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Panama

Panama

Portugal

Singapore

South Korea

Spain

Sri Lanka

Taiwan

Thailand

United Kingdom

*SFI Ports

Status of Megaports Cooperation with CSI and SFI


4/8

Transshipment

Whereas gate trafc can be easily captured by taking advantage

o existing chokepoints into and out o a port, transshipped

cargo continues to present a signifcant challenge or Megaports

implementation. Because o shorter dwell times or containers,

space constraints, lack o shipping data, and the difculty o

identiying non-disruptive permanent RPM sites within terminals,

capturing transshipments without seriously impacting port

operations oten requires new and creative solutions. DOE/NNSA

has been innovative in its technological approach to scanning

transshipped containers where permanent RPM installations are

not possible due to terminal confgurations:

A prototype Radiation Detection

Straddle Carrier (RDSC) was developed

to scan rows o containers stacked up

to three high. The prototype consists

o an o-the-shel straddle carrier

that has been stripped o its liting

mechanisms and reconfgured withradiation and spectroscopic portal

monitors. The RDSC was successully

piloted in Freeport, Bahamas, where

it was proven capable o scanning

85% o transshipment containers.

Subsequently, DOE/NNSA awarded a contract to build

additional systems to be deployed to ports that primarily rely

on straddle carriers or container movement.

The Mobile Radiation Detection

and Identifcation System

(MRDIS) consists o radiation

and spectroscopic portalmonitors mounted on a mobile,

sel-propelled rame. The MRDIS

can relocate to scan containers

as they are transerred between

ships or to the container stacks.

Once parked, the MRDIS is used in the same manner as

fxed RPMs. The MRDIS is being piloted at the Port o Salalah,

Oman. Additional systems will be built in the uture and

deployed to heavy transshipment ports.

DOE/NNSA, in close partnership

with CBP and DNDO, is

analyzing the integration oradiation detection technology

into spreader-bar equipment

used to lit containers. DOE/

NNSA and CBP conducted

tests at the Ports o Tacoma

and Oakland, and Los Alamos

National Laboratory. DOE/NNSA, CBP, and DNDO continue to

evaluate the eectiveness o spreader-bar-based detection

technologies in scanning transshipped containers.

Secondary Inspection and

Identifcation Equipment

Handheld Equipment

Personal Radiation Detectors

Radioisotope IdentifcationDevices (RIIDs)

Radiation Survey Meters

High Purity Germanium Detectors

TSA Survey Meter Thermo IdentiFINDER

Germanium-based

ORTEC Detective

typically captured by installing radiation detection equipmentat the entrance and exit gates o port acilities. Scanningtransshipped containers can be challenging and oten requiresinnovative solutions. U.S. contractors selected by DOE/NNSAoversee construction and installation o the Megaports systemsater the detailed design has been accepted by all stakeholders.When cost-sharing, the partner nation typically unds the

design, construction, and installation o the Megaports systemswith assistance rom U.S. engineers and construction experts.

Additionally, the Megaports Initiative trains partner nationofcials to operate and maintain the systems, and helps partnercountries establish an indigenous training capability to ensuresystem operators and maintenance personnel have the requisiteknowledge and technical profciency to support the long-termoperation o the installed systems. The training plan otenincludes technical classes held at DOE/NNSAs HAMMERTraining Center in Richland, Washington, as well as extensiveon-the-job training at the port.

Spectroscopic portals

Personal Radiation Detector

RDSC Freeport, Bahamas

MRDIS Salalah, Oman

Spreader Bar Detection Prototype


5/8

Ensuring Long-Term

Sustainability

In addition to establishing anindigenous training program, thesupply o preventative maintenance andemergency repair support, critical spareparts, data analysis support, and systemperormance testing are other importantelements o the sustainability approachemployed by the Megaports Initiative.Under most Megaports agreements,DOE/NNSA commits to providingmaintenance and training support orthree years, ater which time the partnercountry takes ull responsibility oroperating and maintaining the systems.Moreover, the Megaports Initiative hosts

regional Megaports workshops withpartner nations annually or as needed toencourage inormation sharing betweenregional partners and to exchange lessonslearned. For our prospective Megaportsparticipants, the regional workshops alsoinclude a tour o an operational Megaport.

Cost-Sharing

Where possible, the Megaports Initiative employs cost sharing in the Megaports implementation process. The primary dividend of csharing is buy-in from the host government and terminal operator. Although no set formula for cost-sharing is available, the termin

operator or port authority often pays for design, construction, engineering, installation, or a combination of those costs. Cost-sharin

arrangements are site-specic and negotiated differently for each port.

Layout and trafc control Excavation Foundation placement Conduit installation


6/8

Looking Ahead:

2010 and Beyond

Looking ahead, the MegaportsInitiative will:

Install radiation detection equipment at

100 ports, scanning approximately 50%o global container trafc by 2016.

- Complete 14 ports in FY 2010,bringing the cumulative number ooperational Megaports to 41

Initiate new partnerships and establishormal agreements or Megaportscooperation

Provide mobile detection systems toselect transshipment ports

Develop response protocols with

select nations to address nuclear andradiological threats

Provide training to partner nationofcials, helping to ensure appropriateuse and long-term sustainability o thesystems

Provide specialized equipment and/or training to select ports to enhancepartner nation capability or detection,response, and recovery eorts

Transition operational Megaports

to partner nation ofcials ater thesustainability transition period.

Many of our host nation partners have paid for some or all of the construction

and installation process. The typical construction process is illustrated here.

n Bollard placement Camera installation Restoration Completed gate


7/8

Detection, Response, and Recovery

The radiation detection systems deployed under the Megaports Initiative better equip partner countries to detectradiation, respond to alarms, and safely recover improperly-disposed radioactive sealed sources and/or dispositioncontaminated scrap metal. The following photos are examples of real detections using Megaports equipment thatrequired response from partner countries.

AmBe source Cs-137 source Testing for radiation Testing for contamination Frisking individuals for

contamination

Orphan Sources in Scrap Metal Contamination

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Yearly Metric

Cumulative Metric

FY2004

FY2005

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

Megaports goal of

100 ports by 2016

Megaports Initiative Yearly and Cumulative Metrics


8/8

For more information, contact:

William E. Kilmartin, Megaports Program Manager

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585T: 001-202-586-0513

F: 001-202-586-7110

Email: [email protected]

PNNL-SA-74476 September 2010

Documents

Mega Puertos