Melt Em a Hi Ska

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Meltem Ahska

Occidentalism: The HistoricalFantasy of the Modern

A place on the map is also a place in history.Adrienne Rich, Notes toward a Politics of LocationOne who goes too far East,Because of geography arrives in the West,The reverse is also true.Ece Ayhan,Yort Savul

Europe has been an object of desire as well asa source of frustration for Turkish national iden-

tity in a long and strained history. Turkey, whohas long been trying to be a member of Europe,1

regarded as an especially critical year in itsrelations with the European Union (EU). Hopingto be given a date for negotiations for fullmembership at the end of the year, the Turkishgovernment concentrated its effort to initiatelegislative reforms concerning human rights.Although the political target of full member-ship to Europe found support in most segmentsof the society, the enthusiasm was neverthe-less shadowed by a doubt whether Europe orthe West would at last accept Turkeys self-consciously crafted Western identity. It turnedout that the anxiety was not without reason. InDecember , the EU leaders meeting came

TheSouth Atlantic Quarterly : / , Spring/Summer .Copyright by Duke University Press.


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to the conclusion that if the European Council in December , on thebasisof a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides thatTurkey fullls the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union willopen accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.2 The ambiguity of the if condition is causing further debates in Turkey as to the possiblereasons of this recurring delay. The debates take new shades given thata pro-Islamic party has been in government since November . How-ever, instead of analyzing the trajectory of the debates, I would like to focuson the year when both the hopes and the anxieties concerning mem-bership in the EU found signicant social and cultural expressions, whichI nd relevant to my discussion of Occidentalism in this article.

One of the striking themes that emerged in the pro-European campaignsemphasizing the urgency of accomplishing the required legislative reformsin echoes the persisting anxiety over the possibility of nally catch-ing the train3 of modern civilization. I remember seeing a comic strip inone of the popular comic magazines in Turkey years ago that brilliantly cap-tures and mocks the train metaphor. The comic strip shows a typicallydressed Kurdish man lazily sitting in a forlorn train station looking at atypically Western-style dressed young woman waiting for the train with a

bigsuitcase.Hesays,Thelasttrainhaslonggone,Miss.So,marryme.Themessage is clear: The train metaphor is functional to deploy the desire fora Western future embodied in the gure of a Western-looking woman, yetthe present is the problem-stricken Turkey unable to deal with its Kurdishor other ethnic-identity problems. Instead of concentrating on the presentproblems and their solutions, the hegemonic imaginary looks beyond thepresent with the aid of an already-late and always-postponed ideal.4 Despitethe apparent emphasis on movement and speed best exemplied in themetaphor of catching the train before it is too late, I argue that there is acertain temporal stasis, even timelessness involved in the way the EU wasperceived in public discussions in . As I discuss later, speed is symp-tomatic of a much earlier condition of modernity in Turkey, which urgesone to think that the emphasis on speed has nothing to do with movement,but rather is static.

My aim in this article is neither to discuss the specic case of the EUmembership of Turkey in its highly contested political and economicaspects, nor to dwell on its long and frustrating history. Instead, I point atthe temporal constructions of modernity appropriated in discussing the EU


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as part of a larger historical framework in order to elaborate the concep-tion and experiencing of modernity in Turkey in relation to theWest. Thepresent cannot simply be reduced to a naturalized and privatized timeembeddedineverydaylifeortoasegmentinthenational-durationaltimeof modern history that connects past and future in the moment. The presenthas its own politics of time and space that is overdetermined by what iscalled history, itself a geographical-temporal representation.

I offer the termOccidentalismto conceptualize how the West gures inthe temporal/spatial imagining of modern Turkish national identity. Fromits initial conception in the processof dening the Turkish national identityin the late nineteenth century to this day, the West has been contrastedto the East in a continuous negotiation between the two constructs. TheWest has either been celebrated as a model to be followed or exorcised asa threat to indigenous national values. I argue that in theorizing the con-struction and representation of Turkish modernity, we can neither unprob-lematically herald the Western model nor dismiss the fantasy of the Westthat informs the hegemonic national imaginary.5 Turkey, which has beenlabeled by both outsiders and insiders as a bridge between the East and theWest,6 has an ambivalent relation not only to the geographical sites of the

East and the West, but also to their temporal signication: namely, back-wardness and progress.Turkey has been trying to cross the bridge betweenthe East and the West for more than a hundred years now, with a self-conscious anxiety that it is arrested in time and space by the bridge itself.In other words, the meaning of the present has a mythical core that has per-sisted over years and which remains as a source of frustration and threat,and as a symptom of internalized inferiority.7

A study of Occidentalism means being receptive to the problems on thevery boundaryof the East-West divide.Therefore, it is neither anemic analy-sis that tries to see things from the actors point ofview,8 noranetic analy-sis that looks at things from imposed frames of reference, such as thosebased onWestern representations. I pursue, rather, a theoretical frameworkthat claims to analyze the gaps and mismatches that emerge on the bound-aries of interconnected projections of the Occident and the Orient. Thisframework attends to questions of modernity in a non-Western context andaims to evoke the historicity of the non-Western other rendered invisible inthe hegemonic conceptions of Western modernity, and even in some exist-ing social theories that attempt to analyze these conceptions.Therefore, the


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the EU for membership. The reforms were not discussedas such, as solu-tions to present social problems, but signied as a code for the desired orfeared Westernization.16 It is striking that the ambivalence persisted evenafter the reforms were nally and miraculously enacted in the nationalparliament at the last minute.17

More concerned with the question How does Europe see us? the publicdiscussions defer the practical-political meaning of the reforms.18 The gapbetween what the reforms implyfor example, the rights given to ethniccommunities to speak and broadcast in their own languageand the con-tinuing political pressures over the same groups becomes disturbing onlyif pointed out by the EU representatives. This makes it more apparent thatthe reforms were not meant for addressing the present problems in Turk-ish society,19 but they were part of a performance geared for the gaze of the West.

The hegemonic imaginary concerning the EU displaces the present andfocuses on the future. Nevertheless, the future is overshadowed by a xedpast. This is best illustrated in the campaign of Europe Movement .This is a civil society20 movement supported by a large number of pri-marily business and trade organizations; the specic campaign consists of

newspaper ads and billboards advocating the urgent need for Turkey tobecome a member of the EU.21 The slogan of the campaign is There is noother tomorrow. The campaign evokes an emphasized feeling of urgencyby both the slogan and the text of the ads. The rst ad uses the old Kemal-ist motto, Turk, be proud, work and trust, and supplements it with thephrase and be quick. It links the present anxiety about the future to thecenturies-long struggle of Turkish nationalists to become part of con-temporary civilization. The stagnant past is revisited in the light of theurgency of choosing a future. The second one accentuates the anxiety witha threat. It portrays a crying baby and, using ironic language, claims thatwithout the European future, Turkey is doomed to stay in the unbearablepresent (past?) crisis. The infantalization of the national identity that des-peratelyneedstheWesttosurviveisagainaresurrectionofapastthemethatwill be addressed later in this article as I develop the theoretical construct of Occidentalism. The third ad is especially signicant in bringing in the pastissues of national identity. Showing identical-twin images of an Oriental-looking man with a moustache, the ad invites us to look at the difference.We learn that the difference, which doesnt show but has a major impact on


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the present, is the difference in the life quality between a Greek who is amember of the EU, and a Turk who is not. The past when the Greeks werepart of the Ottoman Empire, and hence joined in sameness with them, isreclaimed yet cancelled by the national difference, in fact a product of theinvisible mediation of the West.22 The nal ad gives the clues for the long-awaitedsolution.Theheadline Golden Goal makes a reference to Turkeysunexpected victory in the World Cup. It says that with a little willpowerand courage, Turkey will make a nal attack to win the match. Onceagain, the meaning of the reforms ascodewords for the EUare severed fromtheir present meanings (such as the ongoing painful struggles for humanrights in the society)23 and reduced to a clever tactic in a game conductedand viewed by the Western world.

Astheadsthemesshow,thecampaignconveysadiscoursedeeplyshapedand burdened by the past, yet never passing, symbolic crises of Turkishnational identity. It tells much about the temporal constructions of moder-nity and national identity. The urgent call to the future reinscribes thepast as the immutable and timeless origin of the present, which shouldbe annihilated by a radical leap into a future that has no connections withthe present. The present time is denied in its heterogeneous experiential

terms and reduced to a permanent crisis that the Turkish national elite hasstruggled to evade from the very beginning.The present is very much haunted by beginnings.24 The timeless fantasy

of the West in contrast to the East is not a construction in void. It has itsdialogical references to the fantasy of the East produced in the historicalencounteroftheWestandEast,asaccountedbyEdwardSaidsOrientalism.25The fantasy still informs the present images of Turkey utilized by Western-ers. It is not at all a coincidence that Western journalists also made refer-ence to the beginnings of Turkish national identity in their commentson Turkeys membership to the EU.26 For example, their envisaging Turkeyas the sick man of Europe implies a double meaning: While pointing tothe presentto the poor condition of health of Blent Ecevit (then primeminister of Turkey)it invigorates the late-nineteenth-century phrase thatthe Europeans used to denigrate the Ottoman Empire. Another classicaltype of comment that came from the Western journalists and inltrated theTurkish media raises doubt about the authenticity of Turkish modernity. Itreads that Turkey, after the enactment of the reforms, is nowlikeEurope.27

Once again, this is not a new perspective. The Western model and Turk-


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ish copy have been recurring themes not only in journalistic representa-tions but also in social theory for a long time. The distinction historicallymade between the model and the copy lies at the heart of the hegemonicimaginary concerning the constructs of the East and the West. The Turkishhegemonic imaginary has been structured within an encounter with theWest, which imposed a model for modernity in its colonialist and imperi-alistic history, and which has always reproduced itself through insufficientcopies.

Letusnowlookbrieyathowtheconceptsof modelandcopygure visiblyor invisibly in theories that address Turkish modernity.

The Time Difference between the Model and the Copy

Modernization theorists regarded the process of Westernization and/ormodernization as a movement of Western values and techniques from thecenter of modernity to its developing margins.28 In this Eurocentric con-ception, the complexity and the crisis of modernity are neglected, beingreduced to a model which is taken as an exclusively Europeanphenome-non.29 However, as longas the so-calledmodernizing mission is integral to

this view, the linear-time model ofmodernity that is expected to travel fromthe modern to the traditional is paradoxical. The homogenizing attempt of modernization is premised upon a differentiation that, according to PeterOsborne, must rst be recognized in order to be negated, so that theresults of synchronic comparisons are ordered diachronically to produce ascale of development which denes progress in terms of the projection of certain peoples presents as other peoples futures, at the level of the devel-opment of history as a whole.30 In this sense, the linear time model isalso an invisibly spatial one.31 The resulting paradox is that the movementof time is cancelled by the stasis of space. Modernization is bound to bedistorted in the end because of the essential particularities of the specicspace under consideration.This means that modernization theories, whichpreach that modernization is possible in non-Western contexts, at the sametime posit an opposition of time and space, which is not resolvable withintheir paradigm.32 The essential space of the non-West is stagnant and isdened in opposition to time and change.33 For example, it is not surpris-ing that Bernard Lewis, who celebrated the emergence of modern Turkeymore than thirtyyears ago, recently evaluated the Turkish case asstill facing


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important choices between the Middle East and the West.34 Turkey is notthere yet because catching up with the modern world means more thanborrowing or buying modern technology.35 For Lewis, too, Turkey couldnot still cross the bridge. As can be clearly seen from this example, mod-ernization theory is quite ambivalent about the inevitability of modernityin places such as Turkey. Modernity does not have its inherent dynamicin non-Western sites but is always dependent on an ever-appearing criticalchoice between the East and the West, which is paradoxically inscribed onits essential space.

Recent research on modernity and nationalism in Turkey is very criticalof modernization theories. In opposition to classical modernization theo-ries that celebrated the asymptotic adoption of Western modernity in Tur-key, critiques of this approach publicly debate and criticize the Kemalistdoctrine asa patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from above that hasnegated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey.36

Whereas modernization theories saw a more or less successfulexample37 of universal modernity in the Turkish case, the critique treats this case as afailure to achieve a democratic and modern society.38 However, both viewsshare the referencepoint of the implicit model.Whether the history of West-

ernization is designated as a success or failure, both versions imply thatTurkey, which imitated the West, is an exceptional case: an inept vehiclefor Western modernization. It is bound to be a copy.

Furthermore, in recent critical approaches there isa tendencyto interpretthe making of the Turkish nation in terms of fabrication from a model.39

This seems to be a mirror image of the nationalist ideology that prioritizesthe successful initiative of the political and cultural leadership in the inter-connected processes of nationalization/modernization/Westernization. If theofficialnationalist representation emphasizesgoodintentions, thecri-tique points to the dictatorial intentions of the initiative. According to thelatter view, the Turkish modernizing elite voluntarily adopted the modelof Western civilization and forcefully imposed it on the masses, which,of course, falls short of the democratic Western model. Both views dealwith Turkish identity within a problematic of imitation, hence maintainingthe necessary temporal/spatial difference between the model and the copy.Even those scholarswho are criticalof Western dominance pursue the samelogic to emphasize the evils of imitation. According to Kevin Robins, forexample,Turkish culture hasbeen imitative and derivative in itsemulation


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of the European model. But, of course, he continues, however good thesimulation, it does not amount tothe real thing .40 The West is posited as theoriginal stage for modernity to play out its concepts and institutions. Thisapproach renders Turkish modernity a nonhistorical and nonsociologicalphenomenon.

So, one is confronted with several questions deriving from the above per-spectives concerning Westernization/modernization in Turkey: the prob-lem of how one might conceive of impact and inuences; the problemof what imitation may mean; and, of course, the problem of what thereal thing is. These questions pose a theoretical, practical, and politicalchallenge. Obviously, the problem of model and copy is not unique to Tur-key.This very challenge is addressed, for example, in postcolonial theories.Postcolonial theories attempt to deconstruct the historical representationsof the model/copy or the self/other by attending to the colonial history of these dichotomous oppositions.41 However, what can be considered uniqueto Turkey is itsuneasy relation to colonialismand its consequent invisibilityin postcolonial theories.

The Turkish case has not really attracted the attention of postcolonial crit-ics.42 Modernization theories have more to say on this case; they advance

the idea that Turkey was Westernized without being colonized.43

It thenbecomes worthwhile to ponder Turkeys invisibility in postcolonial criti-cism. It is even more striking that Edward Said omitted Turkey in his studyof Orientalism, given that his critical investigation of the Western concep-tions of the non-West made a big impact on studies of modernity, includingpostcolonial criticism. Not only does Said skip the long Ottoman historythathas been the object ofOrientalist visionsofdesire and derision inmanyareas such as philosophy, travel writing, and art;44 he also does not addressthe complications of the defeat of Turkey and the Wests appropriation of its former imperial possessions45 after the First World War. Saids silenceon this issue is signicant, since he describes the same period as a timewhen the Orient increasingly appeared to constitute a challenge . . . tothe Wests spirit, knowledge and imperium.46 Said primarily locates theOriental other in the Arabic world to which he partially belongs, and hisneglect of the Turkish case implies that Turkey stands in a very problem-atic relationship to the Arab world, the Ottoman Empire being the formercolonial power there. This may reect Saids own ambivalence toward thehistory of the Ottoman colonization of Palestine: the Ottoman Empire dis-


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rupts the binary oppositions of East and West, colonizer and colonized thatinform his analysis.

Hence, the status of Turkey in relation to the history of colonialism isfurther complicated by the fact that the Ottoman Empire was itself a colo-nizing force.47 The major challenge to Ottoman rule came from the so-called West starting in the eighteenth century. The invasion of Westernsciences, know-how, and artifacts, which contested Islamic and traditionalwaysof life and invoked the existence ofa lack, was accompaniedby actualWestern enterprises that established and monopolized certain trades andindustries. Thereafter Ottoman rule underwent a period of decline, whichcan be described as the colonization of the colonizer.48 The impact of thisperiod, either the Western colonization of Ottoman life or the problem of the Ottoman colonies, was not openly addressed in the Kemalist discoursethat reigned after the foundation of the Turkish Republic.49 The Kemalistrupture that tried to set a zero point in time has contributed to the pre-dominantly ambivalent attitude toward both the West and the Ottoman pastin Turkey. In parallel to the maneuver of the Kemalist discourse that ren-dered the dynamics of the colonization of the colonizer Ottoman invisible,social theory has also not fully addressed the complexities involved. Con-

sequently, the Turkish replica of modernity is either taken too literally orremains invisible in theories of modernization, Orientalism, and postcolo-nial criticism.

The Meaning of the Present: Alternative or Multiple Modernities

If the postcolonial critique is mostly oblivious to the case of Turkey, a lineof critique that stems from postcolonial criticism but frees itself from thedialogism of self and other celebrates the hybrid and multiple (or alterna-tive) modernities in Turkey and other non-Western countries. This is, in asense, a partial liberation from the burden of the history of modernity andcolonialism. The oppressive framework of model and copy is refuted.Instead, a site-based reading of modernity50 is privileged. According toDilip Parameshwar Goankar, modernity today is global and multiple andno longer has a governing center and master narratives to accompany it.51

But of course, this does not mean for the authors who engage with the ideaof alternative or multiple modernities that the Western discourse of moder-nity could or should be abandoned. A mere celebration of cultural differ-


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ence would be too naive. In order to overcome the difficulty of dening theuniversal and the local meanings of modernity, a distinction betweensocietal modernization and cultural modernity has to be made albeit ina dialectical way. In Taylor and Lees words, A viable theory of multiplemodernities has to be able to relate both the pull to sameness and the forcesmaking for difference.52 Hence, it is posited that societal modernizationprovides the axis of convergence for the divergent site-specic creativeadaptations Goankar advances on this distinction to pursue the mean-ing(s) of modernity.53 Inspired by Foucaults reading of Kant, he primarilyargues that modernity is best understood as an attitude of questioning thepresent.54

This perspective is an attempt to negate the inherent paradox of modern-izationthat I discussedearlier. In oppositiontomarkingspace inhegemoni-cally represented temporal terms (such as the wordsbackwardor progressimply), space is treated as a differential and productive constituent of modernity. Non-Western localities should be thought of as the site wherepeople make themselves modern, as opposed to being made modern byalien and impersonal forces.55 If modernity is a form of relationship to thepresent and to oneself that emerges everywhere aroundthe globe, then the

analysis of modernity is based no longer on sequential chronology but oncoeval time.56 Such a conception of modernity may have liberatingeffects,especially for non-Westerners. However, my contention is that within thisframework, the theoretical and political problems that inict the modern-ization approach are not totally resolved, if not simply reversed.

The effort to rethink yet maintain the distinction between societal mod-ernization and cultural modernity along the axis of convergence/diver-gence remains highly problematic. Although divergence is thought to bepossible within the limits of convergence, and divergence is treated as pro-ducing similarities at the limits, this framework does not really address theproblem of the worn-out but still alive historical representations of moder-nitynot only in scholarly texts but in discourses that continue to justifypower regimes in both the West and the non-West. The emphasis on coevaltime and differential space reduces the power-stricken texture of history toa at surface on which sameness and difference operate indenitely. Theimplicit spatial factor in the linear-time model of modernization theories is,in a way, reversed. In the framework of multiple or alternative modernities,modernity appears to be a desired nal destination the latecomers have


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their own creative ways of approaching. Yet one has to be sensitive to thelanguage and lessons of Western modernity for a theory and practice of creative adaptation.57 Then, the chronology of Western modernity is notonly assumed without questioning its historical construction and represen-tation, but it is also implicitly taken asa model.The implicit chronologyren-dered invisible in the site-specic reading of modernity once again affirmsthe legacy and the model of Western modernity.58

The most intriguing question, however, for the specic problems raisedin this article on the Turkish case is the question of the present. Modernityas an attitude or an ethos for interrogating the present runs counter to myargument so far, that the meaning of the present is displaced in Turkey. Atthis point, it would be worthwhile to look at how the framework of mul-tiple modernities is applied to Turkey. Nilfer Gle argues that there is anindigenization of modernity in Turkey and other non-Western contexts,which implies a divorce of Westernization and modernization.59 In herelaborate theoretical discussion on the problems and promises of multiplemodernities, she rightly points to a new conceptual awareness in the effortto read non-Western modernities differently. According to Gle, postulatessuch as . Decentering the West; . Introducing coeval time; . Replacing

the perspective of lack with extra modernity; . Dissonant traditions canprovide some methodological foundations for an approach in terms of thenon-Western modernities,60 may, to some extent, be meaningful in theo-retically combating the oppressive model of Western modernity. Gle pro-vides examples, especially regarding the Islamic experiences of modernityinTurkey, thatpoint at the heterogeneity of the modern. However, I wouldargue that the hybridity and heterogeneity of modern identities boil downto the historical markers of East and West to the extent that these identitiesare appropriated within the limits of national identity. Identities are alwayshybrid and ambivalent but they are, at the same time, totalized withinboundaries and bear the violence and the burden of history as well as possi-bilities for resistance within themselves. Hence, the limiting and the total-izing hegemonic imaginary may not be at all congruent with the efforts of creative adaptations of modernity practiced by the heterogeneous socialgroups in the society. I contend that what is thought to belong to the pastof Turkish modernity, and is assumed to be surpassed (i.e., the Westernhegemony; the perspective of lack; the noncontemporaneous perceptionof time; the binary opposition of traditional/modern) is very much present


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in the hegemonic deployment of what modernity means. I have already dis-cussed the present mode of discussing the EU membership in Turkey as asignicant example of this.

Gle too easily equates the new theoretical awareness with the dissolu-tion of the East-West divide. For example, she argues that decentering theWest would replace the Western mirror of identity with one that providesan opportunity to read our experiences in the reection of each others his-torical experience and social practice.61 This immediately brings to mindthe question of whether, in this case, the often-referenced Turkish-Greekenmity will be dissolved, and Turks and Greeks will read their experiencesin the reection of each others experiences, which are historically inter-twined. Many current examples, including the portrayal of the Greek andTurkish men in the Europe Movement campaign discussed earlier,make one think that the West is still a powerful mediator in the con-struction of national identities62 that may encapsulate local experiences ina mythical time. What is called history is not easy to disentangle in theory,which is itself a challenge to theory.

The Mythical Time of Occidentalism

A new theoretical conceptualization is necessary in order to comprehendthe historical interdependence between Turkey and theWest withouteithercollapsing particular differences into a dubious universalism or celebrat-ing particularisms for their own sake.63 This new perspective is especiallyrelevant for Turkey, which has been regarded as an ideal space where Eastand West meet. But it was, at the same time, where the boundary betweenEast and West was demarcated and consequently reproduced.64 The historyof Turkish nationalization/modernization/Westernization provides a richaccount to study the persisting reproductions of the East-West divide. I willpresent snapshots from this history in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical framework of Occidentalism.

The late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of Turkish nationalism inthe Ottoman Empire.65 When the Empire was invaded and partitioned byBritish, Italian, French, and Greek forces after being defeated in the FirstWorld War, most of the Turkish nationalists who opposed the policies of theOttoman government in Istanbul, and were denounced as godless athe-ists waging war against the caliph,66 took refuge in Anatolia, where they


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participated in the National Struggle. Halide Edip Advar, a rare femalegure represented in the National Struggle, had been assigned the duty tovisit different villages and report the violence done by the Greeks to Turk-ish populations.67 She mentions, in her memoirs, a conversation with anold peasant woman at that time. The peasant woman complained to HalideEdipthatherwritingreportswasinvain.Shesaid,Whydoyouwrite?Whatcould writing mean for a people who are being slaughtered?68 Then shecontinued: I have asked for pity from the Greeks. . . . They told us that theyhave been sent by Avrope [Europe; in Turkish,Avrupa]. So, my girl, pleasetell that man called Avrope to leave us alone, we didnt do anything bad tohim, tell him not to disturb us.69

The old peasant womans painful words on Europe give a sense of whatthe West or Europe could mean for the people of Anatolia during theimperialist invasion. It represented a threatening force that was involvedin conspiracies striving to destroy the traditional order of things. But forHalide Edip herself, the writer, Europe always was an abstract concept,ambivalent in many aspects. While actually ghting the Western forces,Halide Edip and other Turkish intellectuals discussed and wrote on the pos-sibilities of Westernization as a synonym of modernization. There was a

wide gap between how the intellectuals and the local communities inter-preted the West.70 The national discourse was not monolithic. It was pro-duced and reproduced by continuous negotiations between the West andthe Orient. Also, it was not a voluntarily created set of ideas, as the imita-tion problematic would say. Westernization and modernization had beenbrought onthe agendaof the Turkishnationalelite by means ofa threat, byconvincing Turks of past and present inadequacy.71 The constitutive lackwas there, right at the center of national identity.

The Turkish national identity propagated as the official identity of thenew Turkish State after had to assume many dimensions that werethought to belong to the nation but were absent.72 Turkish national dis-course, as regulated and disseminated by the elite, was an eclectic mix of diverse elements: ideas taken over from past generations of nationalists;concepts, tools, and techniques borrowed from the West; unique solutionsto deal with the pressing current political, ethnic, social, and economicproblems; and much after-the-fact theorizing. Despite its pragmatic u-idity,73 the consequent national discourse was structured in and througha fantasy. The diverse realm of relations with the Western countries was


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translated into a marker called the West; in a similar manner, the hetero-geneous realm of the population was signied as the people, which repre-sented the Orient in terms of backward Islamic and Arabic inuences.74

The Occidentalist fantasy evoked a lack in the people uponwhichitorga-nized the desire to ll it.This was in close connection to the lack projectedonto the Turkish by the Orientalist fantasy.They function in the same econ-omy of identity and desire.

If Orientalism is a representation that is informed by historical andmaterial power congurations75 but also conveys the desire of the Westernsubject, how the Orientals answered back to their representation by theWest brings to view a complex eld of subjectivity. Then, what is the subjec-tivity of the other? Furthermore, if the creation of the Orient . . . signiesthe Wests own dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented,narrativized, as being outside,76 then what does the concept of the Westproduced by non-Westerners present and dislocate?

TheconceptofOccidentalismthatIwanttointroduceisdifferentfromanidea of internalized Orientalism or a defensive reaction against the West.77

Instead, it points to the specic mechanisms that Orientals employ to cre-ate their subject status (not at all a homogeneous entity) and also to the

common sky that structures different horizons. The other is representednot only by the Western subject, as the theory of Orientalism would put it.Occidentalism also denotes the subjectivity of the other in relation to Ori-entalism. It opens a space for the positivity of the otherits experiences,utterances, and practicesinsteadof adopting the often negative denitionof the other in theories of Orientalism. But it also shows how the subjec-tivity of the other is encapsulated in the discursive realm of the other that isdenied the real thing of modernity. The others inhabiting the space of theother and speaking for itself occurs in the same universe of signication.But the double reection (the viewpoint of the Western representationthat is, how the non-Western imagines that the West sees itselfis incor-porated in the reection on its own identity) complicates the identicationprocess. Hence the critical study of Occidentalism not only deals with theambivalent identity of the non-Western but also conveys that the imaginedWestern gaze is an integral part of this identity. It attends to how centerand periphery, or model and copy, are already inscribed in the concep-tion of modernity.

IdonotmeantosuggestthatOccidentalismrepresentstheother,assuch,


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as a unitary and separate entity; that it designates a (libertarian, or non-repressive and nonmanipulative)78 alternative to Orientalism; or that it ismerely a ctive representation of the other othered byWestern domination.I argue that the termOccidentalismcan be best understood as describingthe set of practices and arrangements justied in and against the imaginedidea of theWest in the non-West.On the one hand, it signies a projectiveidentication with the threatening power of the West. On the other hand,it implies a demarcation of internal and external boundaries.

Westernization in Turkey cannot be understood as an objective processin which certain things, including manners, were imported from the West.Neither was it merely a subjective orientation that shaped events in linewith the willpower of the ruling elite. It was a process in which the non-Westerners were othered and subjected to unequal power relations but alsoproduced their subjectivity in that very encounter.Occidentalismrefers toa eld of social imagination through which those in power consume andreproduce the projection of the West to negotiate and consolidate theirhegemony in line with their pragmatic interests. The hegemony operatesby employing the mechanisms of projection that support the fantasy of theWest. Projection, in its psychoanalytical meaning, operates both as the dis-

placement of what is intolerable inside into the outside world, thus as arefusal to know; and as introjection of what is threatening in the externalworld so as to contain and manage it. Therefore it designates at the sametime what the subject refuses to be and desires to be. In Turkey, projec-tion, in its double process, gures in the conception of the people on theone hand, and in the conception of the West on the other. Members of the national elite constituted their identity through a projection of the Westin affirming their construction of a modern society. They organized thedesire to be modern around the marker of the West, which they claimedto possess. By doing this they introjected the imagined nation into theirsubjectivity. But they displaced what is disturbing for them, such as thethreatening power of the West, by assuming a guardian role that modern-izes but at the same time protects the lesscivilized and infantile popula-tion from the dangers of too much Westernization. The virtual viewpointof the West, which is the product of double projection, oscillates betweenrecognition and rejection, leading to a series of splits.

It must be observed that Kemalists in early Turkish history were quiteambivalent about the possible impact of Westernization. While Western


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civilization was acknowledged as superior to the Ottoman heritage, it was,at the same time, despised for several reasons associated with its morality,the presence of dangerous class struggles and the existence of imperialisttendencies, and so on. It was seen as a source of both progress and threat.Civilization, in Mustafa Kemals words, stands out as a erce force thatdestroys those who resist or stay indifferent to it; it is aggressive, threat-ening, and all-powerful.79 The feelings of panic raised by its progress andthe fear of being late are accompanied by a feeling of inferiority inictedon those who are not part of Western civilization. The lethargic mentalityof the past centuries should be abandoned, said Mustafa Kemal; the newstandards should be based on speed and movement that dene our cen-tury.80 In a similar manner, the rst sociologist of the nation, Ziya Gkalp,had said, We shall skip ve hundred years and not stand still.81

The impact of the West, therefore, was more than a mere import of con-ceptsand techniques for Turkish nationalists. Itwas not just a movement of modernity in time and space. It was a performance for the imagined West-ern audience. It was also a totally new conception of time, which proceededviolently. It was a threat that the Turkish nationalists had to acknowledgeand adapt to with high speed. erif Mardin points to a feeling of urgency

on the part of the Kemalists to work for something which did not exist asif it existed and make it exist.82 Nation and Western civilization werefundamental code words for this.

There is no need to say that Turkish economy, politics, and social lifeunderwent major changes from the s to the present. However, themythical time of Occidentalism remains to this day without much alter-ation. Mythical timeis the recurrence of the same appearing as new anddesirable.83 The past reappears as the desirable future in the Occidentalistfantasy. It is primarily a lack of historicity, a refusal to know the realm of forces thatproduce thingsastheyare. It is a modeofrepresentationofsocialreality reducing its complexity and heterogeneity in a national idiom thatis captured in the timeless polarity of West and East. It is reproduced aslong as it sustains its hegemonic power and sets the limits and terms of thesubjectivities of various social groups in society.

The case of the present signications that restrict the EU debate in Tur-key to timeless markers of East and West indicates that the Occidentalistfantasy is still at the heart of the hegemonic imaginary. I do not intend tounderestimate the material interests in power struggles. But signications


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and representations also have a complex role in shaping power strategies.Just as the West always refers to the notion of the East to assert its hege-mony,Turkeyreproduces the reied images of the West to justify its regimeof power in its boundary management of dividing spheres, regions, andpeople along the axisof Eastand West.Occidentalist fantasy nurtures powerstrategies. It is not simply an admiration for the West or hatred against it.The reied image of the West for Turkish in this context can have bothpositive and negative meanings. For example, a government in Turkey maybring the problem of human rights to the agenda with reference to the sen-sitivity of the West on this issue, as in the EU case. But when confrontedwith an accusation of human rights violations, the same government maywarn people against the dangers of Western interference. Occidentalismmakes the conicting statements possible, justifying every act and state-mentwithreferencetoanimaginedWesternness.Itshouldnotbeforgottenthat Kenan Evren, the general who seized power after the military coup in

, commented that Turkey is an integral part of democratic and freeEurope and intends to remain so. And he ironically objected to any West-ern criticism targeted to the military regime and massive human rightsviolations.

I have argued in this article that modernity is a historical construct, andits historicity is displaced in the polarity of East and West. Hence the his-torical path of modernity in Turkey, very much intertwined with the devel-opment of world capitalism, colonialism, and nationalism, remains unac-knowledged. Instead a fantasy of the modern, as the West, is replaced inthe hegemonic imaginary. I have also argued that social theories such asmodernization, by sustaining the polarity of East and West, have contrib-uted to this fantasy. On the other hand, recent critical stances of alternativeor multiple modernities miss the role of the fantasy by too easily dissolv-ing the poles of East and West. I have suggested that one should addressthe symptoms of tension involved in the re-production of the polarity, inboth itsparticular historicalmanifestations and universal relevance.Occi-dentalism provides examples of this tension. Occidentalism is an answer-ing practice to the constructions of the West, which operates in the mythi-cal time of reied representations. It may produce a resistance to Westernpower, but operates within its discursive terms to maintain a system of gov-ernment that endorses its hegemony. The desire of the nationalist elite inTurkey to become both Western and anti-Western and Turkish resonates


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with the Western desire to see Turkey as a bridge that never crosses the dis-tance between the West and the East. But Occidentalism also brings to lightsymptoms of mismatch and excess not pinned down in this timeless cir-cularity. Therefore, a critical study of Occidentalism may illustrate how theprojections of the West by non-Westerners hover over the universal prin-ciples of Western modernity as a deferred echo that challenges and altersits universal and local meanings.

I have also argued that the emphasis on speed in Westernization/modernization based on the idea of a time lag paradoxically blocks possiblechanges in the structure of social life in Turkey. It is in the notion of speedthat the reied, thinglikecharacter of modernity associated with the West issustained. The idea of speed encapsulates energies that could otherwise bespent in dealing with frozen identities and problematics. The metaphor of catching the train of Western civilization both channels and frustrates thedesires of the people to be modern.The anxiety of being late putsa barrierto critical and creative thinking that could have attended to the questions of the present. Most burning questions in Turkey today are deferred or madeinvisible by their displacement in Occidentalism, including human rightsviolations, gender inequalities, ethnic problems, and political Islam.

It is never easy to resist reication at either the level of the production of commodities or that of representations. But it is worth the effort. If we canunderstand andanalyze the inner contradictions, the tensions of modernitythat produce the intertwined histories of Orientalism and Occidentalism,then maybe we can revive the buried promise ofmodernitythe practice of critique. It is time that we reach out for the emergency brake84 in the trainof Western civilization.

Notes

Turkey rst became a candidate for membership in the EEC (European Economic Com-munity) in the s. After a long period of indeterminacy, Turkey was declared an offi-cial candidate for full membership to the EU (European Union) with twelveother coun-tries in December . Although most of the other candidates are proceeding toward anal decision in their negotiations with the EU, Turkey is the only candidate still waitingfor approval from the EU to start negotiations for full membership.

In the Web journalEnlargement Weekly(December , ) the decisions of the Copen-hagen Meeting of EU leaders December , , are reported. According to thesereports, notonly is the starting date of the accession negotiations with Turkey postponedto ,butitisalsomadedependentonthefulllmentofcertainconditions,which,this


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time also include the implementation of legislative reforms. See www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement.

This metaphor has been widely used in Turkish media for years to point at Turkeys

belated relationshipto Western civilization.Currentlyithasgained further prominencein the discussions over the question of the EU. For example, a distinctively pro-Europeannewspaper,Radikal, has turned the phrase into a logo for its specic campaign for theEU: AB Treni Kamasn [Dont let the EU train run away].

The concepthegemonic imaginaryis inspired by Cornelius Castoriadiss conceptsocialimaginary. SeeCorneliusCastoriadis,TheImaginary Institution of Society, trans. KathleenBlamey (Cambridge: Polity, ).Hegemonic imaginaryrefers to the realm of signica-tions and representations that constitute and provide a historical mode of social beingforindividuals in the society. The imaginary is hegemonic to the extent that it is reinforcedby power relations as the dominant mode of being and channels the desires of people toappropriate that mode of being.Turkishness in relation to the Western world is a signi-cant element of the hegemonic imaginary in Turkey.

Whilehegemonic imaginaryregards the signications and representations that providethe social mediation for being a social agent,fantasyrefers to the psychopolitical dynam-ics in the constitution of subjectivities in a certain historical context. Postcolonial theoryinformed by psychoanalysis makes use of the concept to address the splits and projec-tions in the processesof subject constitutionand identication ina colonialand postcolo-nial situation. For signicant examples, see Ashis Nandy,The Intimate Enemy: Loss andRecovery of Self under Colonialism(Delhi: Oxford University Press, ); Frantz Fanon,Black Skin, White Masks, trans. C. L. Markmann (London: Pluto, ); Homi Bhabha,Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition, inColonial Discourseand Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader , ed. P. Williams and L. Chrisman (New York: Colum-bia University Press, ). Mladen Dolar argues that fantasy is a useless tool to explainits object. Yet it can shed light upon its producers and adherents. It projects onto thescreen of this distant Other our own impasses and practices in dealing with power, andstages them. Mladen Dolar, The Subject Supposed to Enjoy, inThe Sultans Court:European Fantasies of the East, by Alain Grosrichard, trans. L. Heron (London: Verso,

), xiv. In the s August Comte wrote to the Grand Vizier Reit Paa: The world has been

divided into two oppositional worlds, Asia and Europe, for centuries; it is time that thisopposition should be overcome; that there must be a common civilization in the world.Comteregarded Turkeyas the only countrywith the capacity, inhistorical and geographi-cal terms, to realize the synthesis between the two worlds. Mehmet Kaplan,NesillerinRuhu(Istanbul: Hareket Yayn, ), .

A Turkishsocialscientistcapturesthis structureofsentiment, whichhe, like most others,cannot manage to deal with critically: Of all the nations in the world, Turkey is uniquein having failed to forge a consistent image of herself. Is she of Europe or of the East? Isshe a modern nation-state or a feudalist [sic ] association wallowing in the Middle Ages?Is she a popular democracy or a camouaged group dictatorship? Aware of their lack of

articulateness in international discourse, theTurks blame themselves for theconfusion.


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Nuri Eren,Turkey Todayand Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization(London: PallMall, ), .

Clifford Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures(London: Fontana, ), . Nilfer Gle, Global Expectations, Local Experiences: Non-Western Modernities, in

Through a Glass, Darkly, ed. Wil Arts (Leiden: E. J. Brill, ), . Halil Nalaolu, Devrimci rencilerin zgl Fantezi Uzam,Toplum ve Bilim

( ): . See also Gregory Jusdaniss elaborate account of belated modernityin Greece: Gregory Jusdanis,Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing NationalLiterature(Minneapolis: Oxford, ).

According to Nalaolu, the symptomatic signicance of the train metaphor is not thatwe are late to it, but we arealwayslate to it. Nalaolu, Devrimci rencilerin, .

Ibid. Peter Osborne dwells on the temporal dialectic of modernity, arguing, Insofar asmodernity is understood as a periodizing category in the full sense of registering abreak not only from chronologically dened period to another, but in the quality of his-torical time itself, it sets up a differential between the character of its own time andthat which precedes it. This differential formed the basis for the transformation in thelate eighteenth century in the meaning of the concepts of progress and development,whichmakes them the precursors of later, twentieth-century concepts of modernization.For the idea of thenon-contemporaneousnessof geographically diverse, but chronologicallysimultaneous, times which thus develops, in the context of colonial experience, is thefoundation for universal histories with a cosmopolitan intent. Peter Osborne,ThePoli-tics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde(London: Verso, ), .

For a long time the debate centered on whether Turkey wishes to commit itself to thereforms required by the EU for membership, such as the ban of capital punishment andthe right of Kurdish people to speak and broadcast in their mother tongue. It must bestated that no one party in the Turkish political arena was consistently for or against thereforms.The alliances on either front do not t to the apparent political divisions in Tur-key: while the big bourgeoisie, liberal intellectuals, Kurds, most Islamists, the new left-ist movements, human rights activists, and those Kemalists that are devoted to Westerncivilization argue for the EU; the extreme right, the right conservatives, Turkists, radi-cal Islamists and some Kemalists keen on national independence, leftist nationalists,and radical socialists argue against it. Oya Baydar, Yaln Kl ABye Doru,Radikal,June , .

According to Ahmet nsel, the ambivalent attitude toward the EU functions as a hege-monic power strategy that xes Turkish society in a twilight zone, investing in hopeless-ness disguised as postponed hope. Even the leftist DP (Freedom and Solidarity Party),heargues, is part of the hegemonic ideology, as itsambivalentattitudesummarized in theslogan, ABye Havet [Nesto EU,Nesmeaning a combination of yes and no] illustrates.Ahmet nsel, AB Kaps Kapanrken,Radikal, June , .

Mesut Yeen, AB Kartlar: Sancl Sa,Radikal, July , . Whilethe pro-EuropeannewspaperRadikalandtheEurope Movement celebrated

their own contribution to having a place in history, the newspapers, includingRadi-


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kal, continued to publish articles that emphasize the uncertainty of the present situationwith reference to whether the recent legal initiative would be adequate for membership.WhileRadikalconcentrated on the possible reactions coming from the EU, interestinglytheIslamicnewspaperYeni afakintroduced moreradical questions regarding themean-ing of the reforms and questions the link between modernization and Westernizationoften taken for granted. It argued that Turkey should get rid of its platonic love relation-ship with Europe and face its own identity as the other of the West, while getting readyto be a member of the EU. Yusuf Kaplan, ABye Taraf Olarak Bertaraf Olmak m; YoksaYzleerek Varolmak m?Yeni afak, August , .

Avni zgrel states that the debate over the EU in Turkey is informed by the questionWhat does Europe think? By giving a historical account of the problem of the Westerngaze, he argues that the question has a history of years. Avni zgrel, OsmanldanBalayp Bugne Kadar Gelen Yllk Bir Soru . . . Avrupa Ne Dnyor?Radikal,August , .

For example, while the enactment of the reforms were celebrated, not much attentionwas paid to what will happen to the university students who have been penalized due totheir demands of education in their mother tongue, namely Kurdish.

The conceptcivil societygained prominence in Turkey in the late s. Its meaningsvary in different conceptions, from being associated with the interests of the society inopposition to the state, to being positioned as the new agent of modernization. In mostcases,civil societydenotes the business and trade organizations, as in the case of EuropeMovement . Tanl Bora and Seda alar critically discuss the role of the so-calledcivil society organizations as the new agents of modernization and Westernization inModernleme ve Batllamann Bir Taycs Olarak Sivil Toplum Kurulular, inMod-ern Trkiyede Siyasi Dnce: Modernleme ve Batclk, ed. Uygur Kocabaolu (Istanbul:letiim Yaynlar, ).

The campaign was specically designed for creating a public opinion, especially on theneed for enacting the reforms, as a condition for membership to the EU. However, it con-tinued after the enactment of the reforms stressing the current problems that should beaddressed in the process of becoming a member. The campaign had wide publicity inprint media, as well as a Web site petition inciting individuals to enroll in the movement.

Greece and Turkey are not only engaged in a feud over territorial claims, such as in thecase of the Aegean Islands or in Cyprus, they also compete for being considered West-ern. For example, when Greece was accepted in the EEC, a Turkish newspaper wrote:They have become Europeans and we have remained Asians. The feeling of inferioritytriggeredby Greecesmembershipwasaddressed by MmtazSoysal, a Turkishacademicand politician, in a signicant remark: This is the most opportune time to rid ourselvesof the complex of being considered European. . . . We are Turks from Turkey. Turkey isa country with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia. . . . We must realize this andaccept this as such, and we must turn this embarrassment into a sense of superiority.DavidKushner, Westernismin Contemporary Turkey, inAtatrk and theModernizationof Turkey, ed. J. M. Landau (Boulder, CO: Westview, ), . On the other hand,

Herzfeld points at the constitution of the Greek identity by inventing a Greek traditionthat was supposed to be Western in opposition to the foreign local Turkish culture.


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Michael Herzfeld, Hellenism and Occidentalism: The Permutations of Performance inGreek Bourgeois Identity, inOccidentalism: Images of the West, ed. J. G. Carrier (Oxford:Clarendon, ).

In its press declaration on August , , after the enactment of the reforms, IHD(Human Rights Organization) reiterated that the ban of capital punishment cannot beregarded as a momentary decision. So many people have been struggling over decadesfor this end in Turkey, and they paid a price for it. Some were convicted and some werekilled. So we should not forget the struggles that have been going on in the society byequating the recent reforms with the EU demands (www.ihd.org).

Homi Bhabha argues with reference to Michel de CerteausThe Writing of History(NewYork: Columbia University Press, ), Beginnings can be the narrative limits of theknowable, the margins of the meaningful. Homi Bhabha, The World and the Home,in Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives, ed. A. McClintock,A. Mufti, and E. Shohat (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ), .

Edward Said,Orientalism(London: Penguin, ). TheLondon Times, the Economist, and Die Welthave recently talked about Turkey as the

sick man of Europe. The translated articles appeared inRadikalas part of the discus-sions on the EU membership. Avrupann Hasta Adam,Radikal, July , (LondonTimes, July , ); Tkenmi Babakana Yer Yok,Radikal, July , (Economist,July , ); Dietrich Aleksander, Hasta Adamn zgveni Yerinde,Radikal, July ,

(Die Welt, July , ). One comment, quoted from an Italian communist newspaper,Manifesto, clearly under-

lines the interplay of projections between Turkey and the West. The sarcastic commentreads, the New Turkey is nowlike Europe. Nilgn Cerraholu, Trkiyeye Evet Ama,Cumhuriyet, August , .

For classical examples of modernization theory applied to Turkey, see Daniel Lerner,ThePassing of Traditional Society(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, ); Bernard Lewis,The Emer- gence of Modern Turkey(London: Oxford University Press, ).

Enrique Dussell, Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Moder-nity, inThe Cultures of Globalization, ed. F. Jameson, M. Miyoshi (Durham: Duke Uni-versity Press, ), .

Osborne,The Politics of Time, . Osborne argues that it is in the repressed spatial premises of the concept of modernitythat its political logic is to be found. Osborne,The Politics of Time, .

This is due to the conceptions of space and time in hegemonic forms of modernity, inwhich time is associatedwith movement and politics and space is dened asstasis. Spaceand time opposition is also gendered along this axis; space is feminine, time is male.See Doreen Massey, Politics and Space/Time, inPlace and the Politics of Identity, ed. M.Keith, S. Pile (London: Routledge, ).

Saidsaccountof Orientalism(in hisOrientalism) illustrates this point.Hispath-breakingstudy illustrates how the Western scholars attempt to travel to, to penetrate into, and torepresent the Orient produced an objectied and essentialized Orient.

Turkey today stands before important choices. It may choose, as some of its leaderswould clearly prefer, to turn its back on the West and return to the Middle East, this time


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not leading but following, in a direction determined by others. It may choose, as otherTurkish leaders would clearly prefer, to tighten its ties with the West and turn its back onthe Middle East, except for those countries that share Turkeys westward orientation and

democratic aspirations. Bernard Lewis,The Future of the Middle East(London: Phoenix,), . See also Lewis,The Emergence of Modern Turkey.

Lewis,The Future of the Middle East, . SibelBozdoanand ReatKasaba,introductiontoRethinkingModernityandNationalIden-

tity in Turkey(London: University of Washington Press, ), . The fact that Europe is already an example bound with the history of domination over

others inscribes a hierarchy between the examples in Europe and those elsewhere. AsDerrida puts it, Europe has the privilegeof being the goodexample, for it incarnates in itspurity the Telos, of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, innite traditionality,and so forth; . . . The empirical types of non-Europeansocieties, then, are onlymoreor lesshistorical; at the lower limit, they tend towardnonhistoricity. JacquesDerrida,TheOther Heading: Reections on Todays Europe, trans. P. Brault (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, ), .

Keyder argues that Turkish nationalism is an extreme example of a situation in whichthe masses remained silentpartners and the modernizing elite didnotattempt to accom-modate popular resentment. alar Keyder, Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkeyin the s, in Bozdoan and Kasaba,Rethinking Modernity and National Identity inTurkey, .

For example, Kadolu, who makes use of Chatterjees perspective to analyze Turkishnationalism, argues that the emerging new Turkish identity . . . was distinguished by itsmanufactured character. Aye Kadolu, The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and theConstruction of Official Identity, inTurkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, ed. S. Kedourie(London: Frank Cass, ), . Despite the fact that Partha Chatterjee insists on thecolonial dynamics of imagining the nation in India, Kadolus statement reects theexceptionalism that has been so widely internalized by the Turkish people. See ParthaChatterjee,Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse(London:Zed, ).

Kevin Robins, Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe, inQuestions of Cultural Identity,ed. S. Hall and P. du Gay (London: Sage, ), ; emphasis added.

For example, Bhabhas concern is to overcome the given dichotomous model/copy orself/other poles of identity by pointing to the hybridity and ambivalence in colonial dis-course. He argues that the narrative of colonial mimicry maintained a recalcitrant differ-ence, a difference that is almost the same but not quite, which is similar to the function-ing of modernization narratives.Homi Bhabha, Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalenceof Colonial Discourse,October ( ): . Bhabha thinks that the necessary hetero-geneity in the narrative provides a medium of intervention. The in-between rewritingof the narrative, which produces not a copy of the original but a misappropriation of it,is capable of interrupting the hegemonic narrative and exposing its ambivalence.

Although Turkey does not really t into a postcolonial model due to the fact it was never

overtly colonized, and also because of the complications of its own colonial past, it is stillpossible toargue that it ismoreor lessa properobject of study for postcolonial criticism if


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we accept Bart Moore-Gilberts broad denition: In my view, postcolonial criticism canstill be seen as a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as pre-occupied principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reect

upon the relationsof domination and subordinationeconomic, cultural and politicalbetween (and often within) nations, races or cultures, which characteristically have theirroots in the historyof modernEuropeancolonialismand imperialism and which,equally,characteristically, continue to be apparent in the present era of neo-liberalism. BartMoore-Gilbert,Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics(London: Verso, ), .

For example, Gellner argues that the Turkish case is unique in that sense: Turkey . . .can claim that its commitment to modern political ideas owes nothing to alien imposi-tion, and everything to anendogenous development.Turkey chose itsdestiny. It achievedpolitical modernity: it was not thrust upon it. Ernest Gellner,Encounters with National-ism(Oxford: Blackwell, ), . For Gellner, the commitment to elective and consti-tutional government testies for this. The military coups, in his view, although signs of not an easy ride in liberal democracy, were just necessary lapses in democracy, sincethey have always ensured that democracy is eventually restored. In this approach, thecompromises in democracy, and a whole historyof suffering that accompaniedthem,areshadowed as negligible while the commitment to Westernization is privileged.

Alain Grosrichard studies the European fantasies of the East focusing on seventeenth-and eighteenth-century writings on the Ottoman Empire. InThe Sultans Court, he ana-lyses the Western image of Oriental despotism in terms of the Lacanian concept of fantasy. Mladen Dolar, in the introduction to the English translation of the book, statesthat Said consciously limitshimself to the Arab world, the NearEast,while Grosrichardssources mostly treat the Ottoman Empire (still a very real threat at that time) (x).

Moore-Gilbert,Postcolonial Theory, . Said,Orientalism, . The power regime in the Ottoman Empire was highly centralized but exible enough to

hold different ethnic and religious communities over a large territory from Balkans tothe Arabicpeninsulaunder control by allowing some cultural autonomy to each commu-nity.The peculiar mechanisms and rationale of the Ottoman rule in its colonies is a vastsubject for Turkish and Western scholars that lies beyond the scope of this article.

The Western capital inltrated the Ottoman social, economical, and political life startingin the nineteenth century. The low tariff rates in trade during the Tanzimat era led to aoodof imported Europeangoods,whichdealt a blow tosmallcraft industries.erif Mar-din,TrkiyedeToplumveSiyaset(Istanbul: letiimYaynlar, ), .Economiccapitu-lations given to Westernpowers and the treaties that endowed European merchants witheconomic privileges reduced the Turkish government to the status of the gendarmesof foreign capital. Feroz Ahmad,The Making of Modern Turkey(London: Routledge,

), . In addition to economic colonization, the social life was also colonized dueto factors such as the constitution of Western schools and organizations, the invasion of Western technologies and ideas, and the political power enjoyed by Western embassies.See Ahmad,The Making of Modern Turkey, ; Roderic H. Davison,Essays in Ottoman

and Turkish History, : The Impact of theWest(London: SAQI Books, ). MeteTuncay makes the point that, despite the nationalist struggle against foreign privileges,


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the position of foreigners in economic, social, and political life was not dramaticallyaltered in the rst ten years after the foundation of the Republic. Mete Tuncay,TrkiyeCumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Ynetiminin Kurulmas(Ankara: Yurt Yaynlar, ), .

The only exception to this is a group of Kemalist intellectuals around the journalKadro,which began publication in and was forced to suspend publication in . Accord-ing to Feroz Ahmad, their aim was the creation of an ideology original to the regime.Ahmad,The Making of Modern Turkey, . Ahmad explains that they dwelled on the eco-nomic and politicalaspectsof colonialism and reckoned their ideology to be useful for allcolonies and semicolonies (a term they used to dene the Turkish past) emphasizing theoriginal character of the Turkish revolution. One of the prominent members of Kadro,Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu, has continued to be an almost haunting critical voice of Kemalist reforms by evoking the self-deception of the cultural elite and their alienationfrom the people in his novels and essays.

Dilip Parameshwar Goankar, On Alternative Modernities,Public Culture ( ): .Goankaredited thePublic Culturespecial issue onAlter-native Modernities inwhichdif-ferentcultures in Asia, Africa, and Australia areanalyzedwith analternative-modernitiesapproach.

Ibid., . From Charles Taylor and Benjamin Lees working draft on the Multiple Modernities

Project, cited by Gle, Global Expectations, . Goankar, Alternative Modernities, . Ibid., . Ibid., . Gle, On Global Expectations, . Goankar, Alternative Modernities, . Those who submit to that rage for modernity are not nave; they are not unaware of

its Western origins, its colonial designs, its capitalist logic, and its global reach. In hap-hazardly naming everything modern, they are exercising one of the few privileges thataccrue to the latecomer: the license to play with form and regure function according tothe exigencies of the situation. Thus, in the face of modernity one does not turn inward,one does not retreat; one moves sideways, one moves forward. All of this is creative adap-tation. Non-Western people, the latecomers to modernity, have been engaged in thesemaneuvers for nearly a century. Goankar, Alternative Modernities, .

Gle, On Global Expectations, ; see also Nilfer Gle,The Forbidden Modern:Civilization and Veiling (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ); Nilfer Gle,Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,Ddalus ( ).

Gle, On Global Expectations, . Ibid. I have already cited Herzfeld and Jusdaniss research that points at the complexities of

the Western mediation in the constitution of Greek national identity. Deniz Kandiyotimakes an important point stressing howrevolving aroundtwoopposed

narrativestwosidesof the same discursive coin brings us full circle to posting notions

of lost authentic indigeneity and inviting forms of neo-Orientalism that are inimicalto an understanding of complex historical processes. Deniz Kandiyoti, Gendering the


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Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity, inRethinking Modernity, .

Turkish national identity was constituted and continuously modied at the margin

between being a bad and a good example of modernity. Islam has been a very impor-tant factor that contributed to the ambiguity. For Islam was seen to contradict Western-ization and modernity, by both Westerners and Turkish nationalists who aspired to beWesternized.Yet, as Bobby Sayyid argues, Turkish nationalists, Kemalists, found them-selves in a paradoxical situation: to be western one had to reject the Orient, but theirrejection of the Orient relied on them being able to articulate and perpetuate an orien-tal identity . . . The only way to manage this paradox of westernizing and orientalizingwas for the Kemalists to x upon Islam the representation of orientalness. BobbySayyid,A Fundemental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism(London: Zed, ),

. A group of people who call themselves laicists in Turkey today argue against theIslamic fundamentalism they think takes Turkey backward in modernity.

The rise of Turkish nationalism, the debates within its different advocates, and its con-nections to the rise of other nationalisms in and out of the former Ottoman Empire, suchas Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian, Albanian, and Arab nationalisms, are extensivelydocumented. References include Feroz Ahmad,The Young Turks(London: Oxford Uni-versityPress, ); Suavi Aydn,Modernlemeve Milliyetilik(Ankara: Gndoan, );UrielHeyd,Foundationsof Turkish Nationalism:TheLifeand Teachingsof ZiyaGkalp(Lon-don: Luzac and Co., Harvil Press, ); Ercmend Kuran, The Impact of Nationalismon the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century, inBeginnings of Modernization in theMiddleEast: TheNineteenth Century, ed.W. Polk and R. L.Chambers (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, ); erif Mardin,The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought(Princeton:Princeton University Press, ); Ali Engin Oba,Trk Milliyetiliinin Douu(Ankara:mge Kitabevi, );OsmanOkyar and Halil nalck, eds.,Social and EconomicHistory of Turkey: (Ankara: Hacetepe University, ); Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel KuralShaw,History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. ,Reform, Revolution, andRepublic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

); Eric Zrcher,The Unionist Factor, the Role of the Committee of Union and Progressin the Turkish National Movement: (Leiden: E. J. Brill, ).

Ahmad,The Making of Modern Turkey, . Halide Edip is a signicant gure in early Turkish literature. She wrote many novels and

essays in Turkish, as well as in English. She was, at the same time, a militant nationalistwho took part in the national struggle in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Halide Edip Advar,Trkn Atele mtihan(Istanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, ), . Ibid. Yakup Kadri, who also wrote on the war years in Anatolia, says: The difference between

a person educated in Istanbul and an Anatolian peasant is greater than an EnglishLondoner and an Indian from Punjab. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanolu,Yaban(Istanbul:letiimYaynlar, ), .The intellectuals felt that as they went deeper into the coun-try which they call their own, their alienation from their origins grew bigger. In return,

the peasants labeled them as strangers.Should the national struggle endin victory, saidYakup Kadri, then the intellectuals had to make the nation by bridging the gap.


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Davison,Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, . The West, which had been a threatening force against the nationalist movements and

reforms in the Ottoman Empire, was heralded as a natural ally. Ahmad,The Making of

Modern Turkey, . The national dream was to bridge the gap between the West and Tur-key, between the national elite and the local Muslim population, between the economicpower concentrated in the hands of non-Muslim communities and the politics centrallycontrolled by the national elite, and between the authoritarian regime in practice and animage of a civilized democratic republic.

Hasan nder claims that the philosophy of Kemalism can best be described as pragma-tism. He argues that pragmatism has been functional to maintain a distance against theWestern techniques and principles that were instrumentalized in government, to sus-tain a position of being bothWestern and anti-Western. Hasan nder, Trk DevrimininFelsefesi,Mrekkep ( ): .

A Kemalist spokeperson wrote in his memoirs that to be Westernized meant at thesame time to escape from being Arabicized; it meant being Turkied. Falih Rfk Atay,ankaya(Istanbul: Doan Karde Basmevi, ) . Koak dwells critically on thisarguing that the internationalization of Turkey was an escape from the East to theWest in order to guardagainstArabicization/Calibanization.OrhanKoak, Ata, Meri,Caliban, Bandung- Evrensellik ve Ksmilik zerine bir Taslak, inTrk Aydn ve Kim-lik Sorunu, ed. S. en (Istanbul: Balam Yaynlar, ), . The ethnic and religiousminorities in the population, such as the Kurds, Armenians,Greeks, and Jews yet estab-lished another kind of other, which posed a threat to the idea of a homogeneous nationalunity.

Said,Orientalism, . RobertYoung,WhiteMythologies:WritingHistoryand theWest(London: Routledge, ),

.Occidentalismhas been given different meanings by different scholars. Some employ theterm to denote anti-Westernism. For example, in his afterword to the edition of Orientalism, Said talks about the reception of his work by some circles assuggestinganti-Westernism. Said disowns this stance, equating itwith Occidentalism.Onthe otherhand,Iranian historian Mohamed Tavokoli Targhi criticizes Said for contributing to the silenc-ing of the other. Hestudies the self-fashioned experiences of modernity in Iranin the veinof postcolonial criticism. In this context Occidentalism is perceived as a means of revers-ingOrientalism.MohamedTavokoli Targhi,Refashioning Iran: Orientalism,OccidentalismandHistoriography(Hampshire,UK:Palgrave, ). Ina similar manner, Xiaomei Chenattends to the question of a counter-discourse in post-Mao China by utilizing the termOccidentalism. Xiaomei Chen,Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post MaoChina(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).CouzeVennsuseof the term,Occidental-ism, however, sets another, completely different example. Venn regards Occidentalismin relation to the process of becoming-West of Europe and the becoming-modern of theworld. Couze Venn,Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity(London: Sage, ), .The conception of Occidentalism conveyed in the articles included in James Carriers

book comes closest to my understanding of the term. Carrier says that Occidentalismsand orientalisms serve not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line


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Occidentalism379

within them . . . this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in societies that self-consciously stand on the border between occident and orient. James Carrier, introduc-tion toOccidentalism: Images of the West(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), . I havedeveloped my framework of Occidentalism in Meltem Ahska, Occidentalist Fantasy:TurkishRadio andNational Identity (Ph.D. diss.,Goldsmiths College,Universityof Lon-don, ).

Said, in his introduction toOrientalism, mentions his hope that there will be furtherresearch tackling those questions left beyond the scope of his own work. He says, Per-haps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alter-natives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a lib-ertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective ( ).

The imagery of Western civilization that appears in Mustafa Kemals speeches is strik-ing: It is futile to try to resist the thunderous advance of civilization, for it has no pityon those who are ignorant or rebellious. . . . We cannot afford to hesitate any more. Wehave to move forward. . . . Civilization is such a re that it burns and destroys those whoignore it. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk,Atatrkn Sylev ve Demeleri II (Ankara: Trk TarihKurumu, ), .

Ibid., . Ziya Gkalps words are cited in Lerner,The Passing of Traditional Society, . erif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, inAtatrk: The Founder of a Nation

State, ed. A. Kazancgil and E. zbudun (London: C. Hurst and Co., ), . Benjamin makes a connection between the myth of progress and the eternal recur-

rence of the new in commodity fetishism. I use the concept of mythical time evokingBenjamins critique of progress. Walter Benjamin,The Arcades Project, trans. HowardEiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, ).

Countering Marxs idea of revolutionsbeingthe locomotivesofworldhistory, Benjaminsays, in his notes to Theses on History, that perhaps revolutions are the reaching of humanity traveling in this train for the emergency brake. Cited in Susan Buck-Morss,The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project(Cambridge: MIT Press,

), .

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