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Does the moral truth fundamentally depend on our attitudes? Are the attitudes in question beliefs? Do moral claims express beliefs? Error Theory Relativism/Subjectivism Quasi-Realism Is moral knowledge possible? Moral Skepticism Can moral terms be defined in non-moral terms? If moral and non-moral terms co-refer, do they name the same property? Analytic Naturalism * Can the reference-fixing relation for any moral term be described wholly in non-moral terms? If moral terms cannot be defined or have their reference- fixing relations described in non-moral terms, might they still refer to properties that are identical with/constituted by/constitutive of one(s) named by non-moral term(s)? ??? Anti-Realism Is moral knowledge a priori? IS THERE MORAL TRUTH? Realism Non-Naturalism * Intuitionism Moral Sense Theory KEY Line Color: General Border Color: Border Corner Color: Green = Yes Blue = Metaphysics Red = Actual View Red = No Orange = Semantics Black = Possible View Purple = Continue Green = Epistemology Non-Cognitivism (except Quasi-Realism) and Fictionalism (some forms) If a moral term has a non-moral definition, do the term and the definition name the same property? Non-Reductive Analytic Naturalism *‡ * (Non-)Naturalism is the standard label for these views. Technically, we need another level of questions to determine whether the properties in question are natural or non-natural. We could then distinguish, e.g., Analytic Naturalism from Analytic Non-Naturalism, or (standard) Non-Naturalism from “Autonomous Naturalism.” Since these distinctions are rarely, if ever, discussed, I set this issue aside here. You will see no more epistemic green on this branch of the chart. Typically, epistemic access on synthetic naturalism involves both (a priori?) access to the correct reference-fixing relation and either a priori or a posteriori access to the relevant relata. Setting aside the possibility of reduction without property identity. Synthetic Naturalism *† Reductive Analytic Naturalism * Reductive Synthetic Naturalism * Non-Reductive Synthetic Naturalism *‡ Can we say anything informative about the metaphysical nature of these non-natural properties? Robust Realism Quietism

Metaethics Flowchart

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Page 1: Metaethics Flowchart

Does the moral truth fundamentally depend on our attitudes?

Are the attitudes in question beliefs?

Do moral claims express beliefs?

Error Theory

Relativism/Subjectivism Quasi-Realism

Is moral knowledge possible?

Moral Skepticism

Can moral terms be defined in non-moral terms?

If moral and non-moral terms co-refer, do they name the same property?

Analytic Naturalism*

Can the reference-fixing relation for any moral term be described wholly in non-moral terms?

If moral terms cannot be defined or have their reference-fixing relations described in non-moral terms, might they still refer to properties that are identical with/constituted by/constitutive of one(s) named by non-moral term(s)?

???

Anti-Realism

Is moral knowledge a priori?

IS THERE MORAL TRUTH? Realism

Non-Naturalism*

Intuitionism Moral Sense Theory

KEY Line Color: General Border Color: Border Corner Color: Green = Yes Blue = Metaphysics Red = Actual View Red = No Orange = Semantics Black = Possible View Purple = Continue Green = Epistemology

Non-Cognitivism (except Quasi-Realism) and Fictionalism (some forms)

If a moral term has a non-moral definition, do the term and the definition name the same property?

Non-Reductive Analytic Naturalism*‡

* (Non-)Naturalism is the standard label for these views. Technically, we need another level of questions to determine whether the properties in question are natural or non-natural. We could then distinguish, e.g., Analytic Naturalism from Analytic Non-Naturalism, or (standard) Non-Naturalism from “Autonomous Naturalism.” Since these distinctions are rarely, if ever, discussed, I set this issue aside here. † You will see no more epistemic green on this branch of the chart. Typically, epistemic access on synthetic naturalism involves both (a priori?) access to the correct reference-fixing relation and either a priori or a posteriori access to the relevant relata. ‡ Setting aside the possibility of reduction without property identity.

Synthetic Naturalism*†

Reductive Analytic Naturalism*

Reductive Synthetic Naturalism*

Non-Reductive Synthetic Naturalism*‡

Can we say anything informative about the metaphysical nature of these non-natural properties?

Robust Realism Quietism