Naxalism – A Drag on India’s Quest for Great Power Status Captain (now Commodore) Saboor Zaman, Pakistan NavyOctober 2012

This paper was developed by the author while attending the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College in 2011.

V I C E C H I E F O F T H E D E F E N C E F O R C E

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Naxalism – A Drag on India’s Quest for Great Power Status

Introduction

“It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of Naxalism is the single

biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”

Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India1

India’s Naxalite insurgency emerged in 1967 as an uprising of armed peasants in the

West Bengal town of Naxalbari, to protect the rights of poor peasants and create a

classless society.2 In 2006 the Indian Prime Minister noted that large parts of 160 of

the country’s 602 districts were affected by the Maoist movement.3 The number of

affected districts has now increased to 223 of a total of 640 districts and the

movement operates in 20 of India’s 28 states. However, the insurgency is more active

in Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and

Maharashtra.4

After a long factional history of the Naxalite movement due to differences both in

approach and ideology, unification was achieved in 2004 under the leadership of

Ganapathy, who formed the Communist Party of India – Maoists (CPI-M).5 Since

then the movement has turned more lethal in its activities. Deaths related to the

insurgency have increased from 638 in 2008 to 997 in 2009 and 1174 in 2010.6

According to an assessment, the ‘Maoist insurgency is the worst and steadily

worsening of conflict in India’, which accounted for 1180 casualties in 2010

surpassing the combined total of all other insurgent movements in the country.7 The

1 Government of India Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s speech to the 2nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers on Naxalism,13 April 2006, retrieved 18 June 2011, <http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128>. 2 Sohail Jawaid, The Naxalite movement in India: Origin and failure of the Maoist revolutionary strategy in West Bengal 1967-1971, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 30-35. 3 Rahul Bedi, ‘Maoist insurgency spreads in India’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 18, no. 7, July 2006, p. 21. 4 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 5 Bert Suykens, ‘Maoist Martyrs: Remembering the revolution and its heroes in Naxalite propaganda (India)’, Terrorism and political violence, vol. 22, no. 3, 2010, pp. 379. 6 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 7 South Asia Terrorism Portal, India Assessment – 2011, retrieved 19 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html>.

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insurgency has been a source of concern in the country for over four decades and

about 20,000 lives have been lost so far.8

Internal challenges such as the Naxalite insurgency notwithstanding, India has

witnessed steady but uneven economic growth. After the policy changes of 1991, the

economy liberalised and soon growth was averaging more than 5 percent per annum.9

With a population of 1.21 billion and current real GDP growth of 8.4 percent,10 India

aspires to become a great power and is vying for a permanent seat in the UN Security

Council. However, if Naxalism is as big a problem as Prime Minister Singh stated and

many others also think it is, the movement will have serious implications for India,

which will need to balance internal problems with its external ambitions.

Against this backdrop, this paper will analyse India’s Naxalite insurgency and the

state’s response in order to determine the impact of this insurgency on the nation and

its aspirations to become a great power. The first section will define ‘great power’ and

‘regional power’ as well as explore the indicators of great power status. An

examination will then be made of how India perceives itself and how it aspires to be

seen.

In the next section, an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Maoist insurgency

from its beginning until today will determine its nature and characteristics; why and

how it started; why it is still continuing; and, what the causes of its success and failure

are. Moreover, the Indian government’s response will be analysed to make an

assessment about India’s success in dealing with this problem.

The next section will explore the challenges posed by the insurgency as well as its

impact on India’s great power aspirations. This will be followed by an attempt to

identify those major power indicators which would not be realized until India finds a

lasting solution to this problem. This will be followed by an assessment of the future

of the movement. The paper will conclude by explaining how big a hurdle the Maoist

insurgency constitutes for India’s endeavours of achieving great power status.

8 R Bedi, ‘India’s mosaic of conflict’, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 14 July 2004. 9 Daniel Lak, India Express: The future of the new superpower, Palgrave and Macmillan Press, New York, 2008, p. 7. 10 Market Information and Research Section, DFAT, Fact Sheet India, 2011.

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In this paper the term Maoist will be interchangeably used with Naxalite, Naxal or

Communist Party of India - Maoist, which is specific to India. Where reference is

made to other factions of the Naxalite movement active in India or to other Maoist

organizations outside India, the full name and country of origin of these organizations

will be specifically indicated.

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Great Power Status

Indicators of a Great Power

If India desires to become a great power, what does this status involve? As defined in

the Dictionary of International Relations great power refers to:

The ranking of states primarily in terms of their military and economic

capabilities. … In addition to military and economic strength, great powers

have generally global if not universal interests and are usually characterised as

possessing the political will to pursue them.11

The World’s political system consists of different levels of power including great,

middle, small and micro. The term ‘great power’ was first used as a diplomatic

concept when Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia assumed great power status

as a result of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. After World War II, a new term ‘super

power’ was coined and the USA along with the USSR assumed that status. However,

all five members of the ‘nuclear club’ – China, France, UK, US, USSR – were

regarded as being great powers. In the military domain having a nuclear capability

was deemed to be the least criteria for a great power status. This was the reason that,

even after achieving a great economic power status, Japan was not perceived as a

great power.12

Kenneth Waltz defines a state’s power in terms of the application of its capabilities to

change another state’s behaviour while defying the authority of others.13 Hence great

power is considered to be a nation state which can influence the behaviour and

decisions of other smaller powers through various tools of strength at its disposal.

These tools of strength are acquired through a combination of various factors that

constitute the power of a nation and are referred to as the elements of national

power.14 Amongst the tools of strength, diplomatic clout, identity, military capability

11 Graham Evans & Jeffery Newnham, Dictionary of international relations, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1998, pp. 209-210. 12 Evans & Jeffery Newnham, Dictionary of international relations, pp. 209-210. 13 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics, McGraw Hill, Boston, 1979, pp. 191-192. 14 Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, 6th edn, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1985, p.117.

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and economic power stand out. However, in order to achieve great power status a

nation state needs to excel in every field.15

Statesmen generally use the term ‘great power’ for those states which possess

formidable capabilities and influence. A portion of this description refers to material

capacity including a strong economy and extended military reach.16 However, besides

these capabilities, the behaviour of a nation state is also important to achieve great

power status. In other words, it is not enough that a nation state possesses the

capabilities to influence the smaller states but how it uses those capabilities is also

equally important. The behaviour of a nation state is partially reflected in its foreign

policy roles. A great power should be able to effectively play the roles of leadership

by influencing others to follow specific directions, custodianship by maintaining the

desired order, as well as protecting allies from external threats.17

Besides external influence, a nation’s internal situation and the perception of other

major powers about this nation are also important indicators. Infrastructure, economic

growth, general living standard of the people, law and order, internal security and

stability, and ability to deal with internal problems effectively are some of the

important domestic elements which build the image of a country and shape the

perception of other powers. A power which is unable to resolve its internal problems

would have difficulties exerting influence externally as well as maintaining an image

commensurate with great power status.

Regional Power

Regions are political entities comprising a set of states with a common geographic

centre.18 Geographical contiguity or proximity, a sense of unity, and social and

economic homogeneity are some of the key elements of a region.19 Accordingly, a

15 Waltz, Theory of international politics, p. 131. 16 John D. Ciorciari, ‘India’s approach to great power status’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, winter 2011, p. 62. 17 Robert Stewart-Ingersoll & Derrick Frazier, ‘India as a regional power: Identifying the impact of roles and foreign policy orientation on the South Asian security order’, Asian Security, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010, pp. 57-62. 18 David A. Lake, ‘Regional hierarchy: authority and local international order’, Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2009, pp. 35-44. 19 Evans & Jeffery Newnham, Dictionary of international relations, pp. 472-473.

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nation state which seeks to dominate and influence other smaller powers in the region

can be categorised as a regional power. The main criteria that distinguish a regional

power from other powers in a region include a nation’s claim to leadership, power

resources, and employment of foreign policy instruments. It is also important that

smaller powers in the region as well as other great powers in the world accept the

leadership role of that regional power in that particular region.20

Military and economic strength remain the essential ingredients of power at the

regional level also. However, in contrast to great powers, regional powers possess

adequate military and economic capabilities to dominate a distinct geographic area

only and do not have such capabilities on a global scale. Although regional power

status appears to be a more relative phenomenon confined within the perceived

boundaries of a region, this does not mean that regional powers are limited to the

region to which they belong and cannot project power outside the region. In today’s

globalised world, a regional power does have considerable influence beyond the

confines of the region as well. Sometimes circumstances also dictate that regional

powers play a greater role. Great powers also look towards regional powers to further

their interests in the region, in which case they may seek to enhance the capabilities of

the regional power. Hence, regional powers generally have the potential to rise further

which may lead to their aspirations of achieving great power status.

India’s Case

India has not clearly documented its great power aspirations in any concrete or

conclusive way. However, some official government documents have indirectly

hinted at India’s increased role in the region and beyond. Moreover, leading

politicians, on occasions, have made statements suggesting that they want India to

pursue great power status and ultimately to become a great power.

20 Daniel Flemes, Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African Case, Columbia International Affairs online, June 2007, p. 3, retrieved 20 June 2011, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/giga10014/>.

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According to Yashwant Sinha, former Indian Foreign Minister,

India's self-perception has shifted from that of a weak developing country to that of a

great power in the making. … India has started a confident march in the right

direction and we are determined to succeed in reaching our goal. 21

Making India a great power by 2020 was one of the top items on the agenda of India’s

main opposition party the Bharatiya Janata Party, as cited in its Vision Document

2004 party manifesto prior to the elections.22 Indian Prime Minister Singh mentioned

during an interview, before the US President’s visit to India in 2006, ‘The emergence

of India as a major global power is an idea whose time has come.’23 As such India

perceives itself as a rising power aspiring to become a great power. Indirect sources

and strategic analysts also believe that India wants to become a great power.

Emboldened with its economic gains India started claiming a greater role in the region

and beyond which is indicative of its ambitions for higher status. Successive Indian

governments in recent years have talked about the concept of ‘extended

neighbourhood’ which stretches from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea and

includes within it West Asia, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South East Asia, East

Asia, the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.24 The term first appeared in the

Indian Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 2000 – 2001.25 It was also used by

the then Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, in 2000 when he

mentioned that the global environment necessitated India ensure stability not only on

its borders but also in its extended neighbourhood.26 Moreover, while addressing the

Combined Commanders Conference on 26 October 2004, Prime Minister Singh

mentioned, ‘Our strategic footprint covers the region bounded by the Horn of Africa,

West Asia, Central Asia, South-East Asia and beyond, to the far reaches of the Indian

21 Yashwant Sinha, ‘What it takes to be a world power’, Address to the India Today Conclave, 12 March 2004, retrieved 20 June 2011, <http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/16/stories/2004031604431000 .htm>. 22 Bharatiya Janata Party, Vision Document 2004, 2004, retrieved 20 June 2011, <http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=136&Itemid=1005>. 23 Council on Foreign Relations, Charlie Rose interviews Indian PM Manmohan Singh, 27 February 2006, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/india/charlie-rose-interviews-indian-pm-manmohan-singh/p9986> 24 David Scott, ‘India's “extended neighborhood” concept: Power projection for a rising power’, India Review, vol. 5, no. 2, April 2005, pp. 107-108. 25 Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2000 – 2001, Government of India, New Delhi, p. ii. 26 Ministry of External Affairs, Global security: An Indian perspective - a presentation at National Defence Institute, Lisbon by Mr. Brajesh Mishra, Government of India, 13 April 200, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=51515761>.

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Ocean.’27 The Indian Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2006 – 2007 also mentions

that, due to its enormous size, geographic location and trade links, the country’s

security environment is not limited to the immediate neighbourhood but it extends

from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca including the Central Asian region.28

The demise of the Soviet Union allowed India to build relations with all the major

powers of the world without the restrictions of the past due to its close Cold War

relationship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, India’s rapid economic growth and

progress in information technology has reshaped global perceptions of India’s rising

power. World powers are also interested in India’s rise because it suites their interests.

India is a big market, it has the potential to counterbalance other players and share

some of the responsibilities of other major powers towards regional as well as

international security. It is significant in this regard that leaders of all the permanent

members of the UN Security Council visited India in 2010.29

The United States wants to strengthen India for its own strategic interest of

maintaining its supremacy as a global superpower.30 US efforts to balance China with

the help of India is a case in point.31 Condoleezza Rice, the then US Secretary of

State, told Prime Minister Singh during her visit to India in March 2005 that

Washington's broad aim was ‘to help India become a major world power in the 21st

century.’32 Philip Zelikow, the US State Department official who has been one of the

key architects of the Bush administration policy, shared the same view.33 The India-

US civilian nuclear energy deal further substantiates American efforts in this direction

and is one indication of a strategic partnership between India and the world’s sole

superpower.

27 Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Minister’s address at the Combined Commanders Conference, New Delhi, 26 October 2004, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=37>. 28 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2006 – 2007, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 2. 29 Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘The pragmatic challenge to Indian foreign policy’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 2, Spring 2011, p. 148. 30 Mira Kamdar, Planet India: the turbulent rise of the world’s largest democracy, Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., London, 2007, p. 271. 31 T. V. Paul, ‘Introduction: The enduring axioms of balance of power theory and their contemporary relevance’, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds), Balance of power theory and practice in the 21st century, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, pp. 11-14. 32 Alex Perry, ‘Why Bush is courting India’, Time, 28 February 2006, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1168486,00.html>. 33 Christopher Griffin, ‘What India wants’, Armed Forces Journal, vol. 143. no. 10, May 2006, p. 17.

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There is no doubt about India’s rise. Over the last two decades India has shown

tremendous economic growth. With a 10.4 percent GDP real growth rate, India was

ranked 5th in the world in 2010 and 7th with respect to its foreign exchange and gold

reserves, which were estimated at US $ 284.1 billion.34

India has shown steady progress in the field of defence capabilities. Although its

spending on defence as a share of its GDP has remained relatively steady at 2.5 to 3.0

percent, due to GDP growth, its defence spending has grown by some 64% in real

terms since 2001, reaching $36.3 billion in the 2011–2012 budget.35 Some observers

believe that India is transforming its military to have global reach while ‘sending a

signal that it’s going to be a big player’ and ‘is slowly maturing into a conventional

great power’.36

Moreover, all the three services of the Indian armed forces aspire to project power

beyond India’s borders. The Indian Navy’s Maritime Military Strategy focuses on

development of a ‘blue-water’ navy able to support foreign policy objectives and

national aims.37 The Indian Air Force (IAF) is also aiming to achieve strategic reach

to safeguard national interests.38 The Indian Army is planning to transform its infantry

into an expeditionary force capable of operating in an out of area contingency.39

Although Indian armed forces have all outlined plans to develop certain capabilities in

line with the envisioned goals, these plans appear more ambitious, at least in the near

future.

34 Central Intelligence Agency, The world factbook, India, 14 June 2011, retrieved 23 June 2011, < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>. 35 Gay Ben-Ari & Nicholas Lombardo, ‘India’s military modernization’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1 April 2011, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://csis.org/publication/indias-military-modernization>. 36 William S Cohen & Ashley J Tellis, as quoted in Anand Giridharadas, ‘Land of Gandhi asserts itself as global military power’, The New York Times, 21 September 2008, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22india.html>. 37 Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), Freedom to use the seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, Government of India, New Delhi, May 2007, pp. iv-11. 38 ‘India’s Air Force looks to enhance its reach with upgrades & force multipliers’, Defence Industry Daily, 23 February 2006, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ indias-air-force-looks-to-enhance-its-reach-with-upgrades-force-multipliers-01929/>. 39 ‘Indian Army mulls ambitious war plan’, The Times of India, 18 September 2009, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-09-18/india/28068409_1_indian-army-deepak-kapoor-infantry-school>.

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The Indian Navy, for instance, has plans to develop a three-carrier fleet, one bigger

and two small, by 2018. This would enable the navy to operate one carrier at sea all

the time bearing in mind the maintenance and training cycle. However, it is pertinent

that India would need to operate the bigger and one of the small carriers together to

generate as much power as a single US Nimitz class carrier. 40 And, though large and

growing, the IAF needs more high-tech aircraft with air-to-air refueling capabilities to

fulfill its objective of strategic reach. B K Pandey, a retired IAF Air Marshal

described the present IAF capabilities as token and not significant and its efforts as

‘baby steps towards acquiring the capability of projecting combat power in the

region.’41 The army’s vision of operating in an ‘out of the area contingency’ would

also be limited by the lack of air as well as sea lift capability.42

Regarding India’s current power status, there are various groups with divergent views.

One group considers that India is already a regional power in South Asia. The

proponents of this group argue that, with world’s 4th largest economy measured by

Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and destined to become world’s most populous

country by 2034, India has already achieved the status of a major power in South

Asia.43 Moreover, in relative terms, India enjoys a superior status as other countries in

the region are smaller in almost every respect.44 Hence India is considered to be a

regional great power aspiring to become a world power.45 By some, India is regarded

as an eligible potential great power.46

The other group views India as a rising power which is still a long way from

achieving regional power status. Supporters of this group argue that although India

has achieved certain capabilities in terms of hard and soft power to resist the influence

of others, it has not been able to significantly influence others in the region. The

40 Walter C Ladwig III, ‘India and military power projection: Will the land of Gandhi become a conventional great power?’, Asian Survey, vol. 50, no. 6, 2010, p. 1175. 41 B K Pandey, ‘Indian Air Force of the future’, Indian Defence Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/defence-industry/Indian-Air-Force-of-the-future. html>. 42 Ladwig III, ‘India and military power projection’, pp. 1179-1182. 43 Kamdar, Planet India the turbulent rise of the world’s largest democracy, p. 279. 44 Stephen P. Cohen, India emerging power, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 1. 45 Ashok Kapur, India – from regional to world power, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 7. 46 Michel Fortmann, T. V. Paul and James J. Wirtz, ‘Conclusions: Balance of power at the turn of the new century’, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of power theory and practice in the 21st century, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p. 371.

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failure of Indian efforts to persuade others to isolate Pakistan is a case in point.47

Moreover, by looking at the GDP real growth rate only, one gets a blurred picture.

Indeed, India’s wealth is so unevenly distributed it was ranked 163rd in the world in

2010 in terms of GDP per capita (PPP) which figured at US $ 3500.48 As India’s

economic growth is mainly driven by services, the large portion of India’s population

living in rural areas which depend on agriculture has not benefited.49

According to Indian Planning Commission Poverty Estimates for 2004-05, 27.5

percent of the total population of about 1.2 billion lives below the poverty line of $

0.4 a day.50 This number triples to more than 700 million if the poverty line is taken

as $ 2 per day.51 Thus, India faces a number of challenges before it can claim to have

achieved great power status in the region. These challenges are mainly due to

poverty.52 Some other proponents of this group contend that although India has made

progress achieving capabilities commensurate with a regional power, its behaviour

does not conform to that status. India has not been able to play the roles of leadership

and custodianship in the region.53

There is a general consensus that India is rising and the indicators also support this

view. However, India has a long way to go from being a rising power to attaining

great power status. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate India’s potential as

well as the capacity of world powers which have joined together to propel India to

greater heights.54 Equally, an examination of the Naxalite movement suggests that

India needs to successfully deal with this major insurgency before it can start to be

considered a great power.

47 George Perkovich, ‘Is India a major power?’, in Alexander T. J. Lennon and Amanda Kozlowski (eds.), Global powers in the 21st century: Strategies and relations, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 3. 48 Central Intelligence Agency, The world factbook, India, 14 June 2011, retrieved 23 June 2011, < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>. 49 Perkovich, ‘Is India a major power?’ p. 5. 50 Government of India Press Information Bureau, Planning Commission Poverty Estimates for 2004-05, 21 March 2007, retrieved 18 June 2011, < http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=26316>. 51 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), India, retrieved 20 June 2011, < http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/india/>. 52 Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Understanding the rise of India’, India Review, vol. 6, no. 3, July – September 2007, pp. 225-226. 53 Stewart-Ingersoll & Derrick Frazier, ‘India as a regional power’, pp. 57-60. 54 Aseema Sinha and Jon P. Dorschner, ‘India: Rising power or a mere revolution of rising expectations?’, Polity, vol. 42, no. 1, January 2010, p. 99.

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Naxalite Insurgency

Evolution

It is important to probe into the historical background and evolution of the Naxalite

insurgency in order to evaluate the relatively successful current phase of the

movement and the challenges posed by its rise. The movement has its roots in the

Communist Party of India (CPI), which first emerged in 1920 in the Indian

Subcontinent, carrying a Marxist ideology. Later the CPI divided into factions. Some

supported Chinese and some Soviet ideology. The other difference was in approach –

political process or violent revolution. This led to the formation of Communist Party

of India (Marxist) or CPI (M) mostly by the younger pro-Chinese members of the old

CPI.55

Ideological differences started to grow as soon as the CPI (M) was formed when some

of the members proposed becoming part of political process. The Indo-Pakistan war

of 1965 provided an opportunity to the proponents of political process who

immediately condemned Pakistan and its ally China. This led to the victory of some

of the CPI (M) members in the 1967 state elections in West Bengal, who joined the

coalition of parties under the United Front banner which defeated the Congress Party

for the first time after independence. Two of the CPI (M) leaders managed to secure

the cabinet positions of the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Land Revenue.56 More

radical elements of the CPI (M) were, however, antagonised by this development and

an encounter between police and armed peasants took place in the West Bengal town

of Naxalbari the same year.57 The term ‘Naxalite’ originated from this encounter.

Later, on 1st May 1967, the Naxalites formed their own party CPI (Marxist Leninist)

or CPI (ML) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar.58 This Naxalbari portion of

West Bengal is strategically located in the narrow Siliguri corridor that runs between

the main portion of India’s landmass and its seven north-eastern states, and which

corridor adjoins Sikkim (beyond which lies Chinese Tibet), Bhutan in the north,

55 Dipak K. Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India: Birth, demise, and reincarnation’, Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, p. 166. 56 Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India’, p. 168. 57 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April, 2011. 58 Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India’, p. 170.

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Nepal in the west and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in the east. Some analysts

believe that one of the factors for the emergence of Naxalism in this area is that

external powers and adjoining states wanted to destabilise India by promoting

secessionist tendencies.59 However, others categorise the insurgency as home

grown.60

Inspired by Mao’s slogan ‘encircle the cities from the villages’,61 Mazumdar

proclaimed that revolution in India must come from the rural peasants and not from

the urban centres. Moreover, he presumed that the country was ready for revolution

by landless peasants against an oppressive social and political system and only a spark

was needed to set it off. He therefore argued that building of mass organisation was

not necessary and class hatred should be stimulated by killing village landlords and

moneylenders.62 Some differed with Mazumdar over the need of building a mass

organisation resulting in further division. The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)

emerged out of this division in the 1970s which later, in 2003, became the Maoist

Communist Centre of India (MCCI).63

During the years 1967-72, the Naxalite movement achieved successes through a

campaign of terror and its ideology spread across West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra

Pradesh. However, the movement was later suppressed by police action. Mazumdar

was arrested in July 1972 and died in police custody in Calcutta. The subsequent

years saw a period of fragmentation for CPI (ML) and Naxalite activities remained

somewhat dormant till 1991. The party was split into various factions, mainly on the

basis of differences in ideology and practice. Most significant of these were the

People’s War Group (PWG) and CPI (ML) Party Unity (CPI (ML) PU). PWG

59 Jawaid, The Naxalite movement in India, pp. 30-32. 60 Y K Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, United Service Institution of India Journal , vol. 139, no. 577, July-September 2009, p. 365. 61 Manoranjan Mohanty, Revolutionary violence: A study of the Maoist Movement in India, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, as cited in Dipak K. Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India: Birth, demise, and reincarnation’, Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 168. 62 Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India’, p. 169. 63 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011.

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emerged in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 and CPI (ML) PU was established in Bihar in

1982.64

Mupalla Lakshmana Rao, alias Ganapathy, who laid the foundation of the present day

CPI-Maoist, became the leader of PWG in 1992. A pragmatic personality, he realised

that the success of the revolution lay in unity.65 He embarked upon the unification of

the party and was able to achieve a merger of the PWG and CPI (ML) PU to form the

CPI (ML) People’s War or PW in 1998. Later, PW and MCCI were merged in 2004 to

form CPI-Maoist or CPI-M, with Ganapathy as its leader.66

The evolution of Naxalism in 1967 in the Naxalbari area and its subsequent

subsistence can be attributed to a number of factors which are mainly socio-economic.

These include the caste system, poverty, feudalism, unequal wealth distribution, lack

of infrastructure development particularly in rural areas, tribal culture in West Bengal,

and jungle terrain conducive to insurgent activities. Traditionally, small farmers in

villages were forced to give up 50 percent of their harvest to their jotedars or

landlords and were also exploited by the moneylenders who provided them loans at

very high interest rates.67 The situation was further aggravated due to the caste system

which is still prevalent in Indian society.68 The 9th Congress of the CPI-Maoist

characterised ‘the specific character of Indian feudalism/semi-feudalism as being

deeply interwoven with the caste system.’69 Landowners generally belong to upper

castes, particularly in the agricultural states of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.70 The

landless poor people of rural areas generally belong to lower castes and the Adivasis

(aboriginal) community. These ‘lesser’ people are usually not allowed to drink water

from the well reserved for the upper castes and have, at times, been subjected to

64 Keith J. Harnetiaux, ‘The resurgence of Naxalism: How great a threat to India?’, Thesis – Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, June 2008, p. 44. 65 Rediff on the net, The Rediff Interview/Ganapathy, retrieved 20 June 2011, <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/07gana.htm >. 66 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 67 Jawaid, The Naxalite movement in India, pp. 40-41. 68 Kamdar, Planet India the turbulent rise of the world’s largest democracy, p. 232. 69 South Asia Terrorism Portal, CPI-Maoist press release on the 9th Congress, January-February 2007, 19 February 2007, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries /india/maoist/documents/papers/19feb07.htm>. 70 Jason Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest: Tracking India’s separatist rebels’, The Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 84, no. 3, Summer 2008, p. 113.

15

lynching and burning for petty matters.71 Few people in India appear to be bothered

about crimes against lower caste people, which are generally not reported in the

media. Upper caste police do not register crime reports and upper caste journalists

generally overlook the incidents.72

Another important factor encouraging Naxalism is the tribal culture prevailing in

India’s north-east and the centre. The tribal people of India are called Adivasis,

meaning indigenous people. Generally, they are poor and under privileged. About 15

million of India’s total of 80 million tribal people live in north-east India, while the

rest are in the centre of the country. The Adivasis are very possessive of the land they

occupy, which is generally rich in minerals. They resist government’s development

and mining projects on their ancestral land.73 Moreover, the Dandakaranya region,

where most of the rural poor and tribal people live, is a heavily forested area of

central India and stretches across several states.74 Naxalites give protection to forest

dwellers in return for their support.75

The Naxalite movement exploited the widespread discontentment and frustration

amongst poor and landless peasants and motivated them to take up arms against

higher-caste landlords and moneylenders. Hence, a complex heterogeneous social

structure served as a recruiting base for the Naxalite movement which still exploits

cracks in society to its advantage.

Aims and Objectives

Article 4 of the Party Constitution of the CPI-M lays down its aims and objectives as:

The immediate aim is to accomplish the New Democratic Revolution in India

by overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic

capitalism only through the Protracted People’s War and establish the people’s

democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat. It will further

71 Sumanta Banerjee, In the wake of Naxalbari: A history of the Naxalite movement in India, Prabartak Printing & Halftone Ltd., Calcutta, 1980, pp. 7-8. 72 R Bedi, ‘India’s mosaic of conflict’, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 14 July 2004. 73 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 113. 74 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 75 John Harriss, ‘What is going on in India’s “red corridor”? Questions about India’s Maoist insurgency’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 84, no. 2, June 2011, p. 315.

16

fight for the establishment of socialism. The ultimate aim of the party is to

bring about communism by continuing the revolution under the leadership of

the proletariat and thus abolishing the system of exploitation of man by man

from the face of earth.76

The CPI-M has clearly indicated its objective to replace the alleged oppressive

capitalist administration with a communist regime comprising the working masses

using revolutionary guerrilla tactics on the lines of Mao’s protracted ‘people’s war’.

The movement has also enunciated its long term aim to spread communism so as to

build a classless society.

Strategy and Tactics

The strategy and tactics employed by Naxalites have witnessed an evolutionary

process over the past four decades. During the early stages, Mazumdar followed the

strategy of annihilating class enemies through terrorist tactics employed by small

combatant groups while avoiding mass organisations as he believed that the country

was ready for a revolution for which only a spark was needed.77 Fearful that the

passion to use of firearms could distract the peasants from their revolutionary

activities, Mazumdar restricted their use to the party leadership only.78 After

Mazumdar’s death in 1972, the CPI (ML) factionalised, with each following a

different strategy. Some groups continued with the annihilation strategy and others

started considering building up mass organisations. Those espousing annihilation also

encouraged the use of modern weaponry.79

After the merger in 2004, the CPI-Maoist reiterated its commitment to the classical

Maoist strategy of 'protracted armed struggle' with the objective of seizure of political

power. According to Article 31 of the Party Constitution, area wise-primary units

designated as cells were made responsible to involve ‘militant activists and party

followers in the revolutionary war against the autocratic semi-colonial, semi-feudal

state system’ to function according to ‘the strategy and tactics of the Protracted

76 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Party Constitution CPI (Maoist), 21 September, 2004, retrieved 21 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/partyconstitution .htm>. 77 Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India’, pp. 169. 78 Harnetiaux, ‘The resurgence of Naxalism’, p. 24. 79 Harnetiaux, ‘The resurgence of Naxalism’, p. 45.

17

People’s war.’80 The 9th Congress of the CPI-Maoist held in January-February 2007

reaffirmed the strategy of ‘protracted people’s war’ through an agrarian dominated

‘new democratic revolution’ in order to turn guerrilla zones into base areas, then

expanding them to cities, with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the ‘comprador

bureaucrat bourgeoisie’ regime.81 During an interview, Ganapathy indicated that, for a

relatively long time, their war would be part of self defence, but their ultimate goal

remains to seize state power.82 The concept of a protracted war is contrary to

Mazumdar’s perception that the revolution only needed a spark.

Affected Areas

There has been an increase in the areas affected by the Maoist activities after the

merger of various groups in 2004. PWG was earlier active in the states of Andhra

Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. The MCCI was

strong in Bihar, with a presence in western Jharkhand, northern West Bengal and

northern Orissa. However, after the merger, CPI-M has extended its reach and is now

active in several other states. These include Uttar Pradesh and Haryana in the north;

Assam in the north-east; Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the south; and Gujarat,

Punjab, and Rajasthan in the west.83

In 2003, CPI-M was active in 55 districts of 9 states.84 The government stated in

December 2009 that the CPI-M had a presence in more than 223 districts across 20

states.85 Official records show that Maoists are now present in 190 districts in 21

states.86 A map showing Maoist affected areas as in April 2009 is shown in Figure 1.

80 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Party Constitution CPI-Maoist, 21 September, 2004, retrieved 21 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/partyconstitution .htm>. 81 South Asia Terrorism Portal, CPI-Maoist Press Release on the 9th Congress, January-February 2007, 19 February 2007, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries /india/maoist/documents/papers/19feb07.htm>. 82 Indian Vanguard, Interview with Ganapathy, General Secretary CPI-Maoist on 24 April 2007, posted 13 May 2007, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://naxalresistance.wordpress.com/2007/05/13/ interview-with-ganapathy-general-secretary-cpimaoist/>. 83 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 84 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2003 – 2004, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 3. 85 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 86 Bureau of Police Research and Development, Executive summary – Genesis and spread of Maoist violence and appropriate state strategy to handle it, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,

18

Figure 1 – Map of Naxal Affected Areas87

The main objective of the expansionist designs of Naxalites has been to establish a

Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) spreading from Nepal through Bihar to Andhra

Pradesh.88 Generally known as the ‘red corridor’, this is now taking shape.

Significantly, it is almost twice the size of the other two insurgency-affected areas of

India: the north-east and Kashmir.89 Indeed, Maoists now affect up to 40 percent of

India’s land area and one third of its population.90

Assessment of Naxalite Activities

There has been a steady increase in the activities of Maoists/Naxalite insurgents.

While there are some variations in the data of Naxalite activities quoted in different New Delhi, 2011, p. 4, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://bprd.nic.in/writereaddata/mainlinkFile /File611.pdf>. 87 Institute for Conflict Management, Map of Naxal affected areas, April 2009, retrieved 26 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap2009.html>. 88 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2003 – 2004, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 41. 89 Harriss, ‘What is going on in India’s “red corridor”’, p. 315. 90 Robert M Cutler, ‘Naxalites drill away at India’s wealth’, Asia Times online, 20 May 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE20Df02.html>.

19

sources, the following table depicts official records of state-wise incidents of violence

carried out by Naxalites.

State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Andhra Pradesh 461 346 577 310 535 183 138 92 66 100

Bihar 169 239 250 323 186 107 135 164 232 307

Chhattisgarh 105 304 256 352 385 715 582 620 529 625

Jharkhand 355 353 342 379 312 310 482 484 742 501

Maharashtra 34 83 75 84 94 98 94 68 154 94

Madhya Pradesh 21 17 13 13 20 6 9 35 1 7

Orissa 30 68 49 35 42 44 67 103 266 218

Uttar Pradesh 22 20 13 15 10 11 9 4 8 6

West Bengal 9 17 6 11 14 23 32 35 255 350

Others 2 18 16 11 10 12 17 14 5 4

Total 1208 1465 1597 1533 1608 1509 1565 1619 2258 2212

Table 1: State-wise Maoist-related incidents91

As per official sources, state-wise casualties in Maoist-related incidents are tabulated

in Table 2. The situation has generally worsened in all states over the years with the

exception of Andhra Pradesh.

State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Andhra Pradesh 180 96 140 74 208 47 45 46 18 24

Bihar 111 117 128 171 96 45 67 73 72 97

Chhattisgarh 37 55 74 83 168 388 369 242 290 343

Jharkhand 200 157 117 169 119 124 157 207 208 157

Maharashtra 7 29 31 15 53 42 25 22 93 45

Madhya Pradesh 2 3 1 4 3 1 2 26 – 1

Orissa 11 11 15 8 14 9 17 101 67 79

Uttar Pradesh 12 6 8 26 1 5 3 – 2 1

West Bengal 4 7 1 15 7 17 6 26 158 256

Others – 1 – 1 8 – 5 4 – –

Total 564 482 515 566 677 678 696 747 908 1003

Table 2: State-wise casualties in Maoist-related incidents92

91 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports 2003 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi.

20

According to South Asia Terrorism Portal, there were 997 casualties in 2009 and 1180

in 2010.93 The casualty ratio between the security forces personnel and Naxalites was

about 1:2 during 1999 to 2006, which turned in favour of the insurgents in 2007 and

2008 and ranged from 1:0.6 to 1:0.8.94 For the last three years the ratio has

consistently been in the range of 1:2 in favour of the Naxals.95 This is a surprising

statistic, given India’s long experience dealing with insurgencies.

The number of casualties in Maoist-related incidents has consistently been more than

the casualties in Kashmir for the last four years.96 When compared to casualties in the

insurgency in India’s north-east, the number of Maoist-related casualties has been

more for the last two years.97 Moreover, both the insurgencies in Kashmir and in the

north-east have been generally confined in terms of geographic area, whereas the

Naxalite insurgency is expanding geographically. Similarly, the Naxalite movement is

largely a domestic undertaking, with little substantial and/or obvious external support

for the insurgents being in evidence. By contrast insurgency in Kashmir, which is

motivated chiefly by people’s strong desire for autonomy, has a clear international

dimension. This has enabled India conveniently, but falsely, to deflect much attention

away from its shortcomings – administrative, economic and political – in the Kashmir

Valley. Instead, India has been able to blame the ‘foreign hand’, i.e. Pakistan, for

fomenting and sustaining this anti-Indian uprising. No such luxury exists in relation to

the Naxlaite problem. The ideology of the Naxalite movement is different and

Naxalism is totally domestic.

The number of Naxalite activists has also increased. As per government sources their

strength was assessed to be 9300 in 2004.98 Now their strength is estimated to vary

92 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports 2003 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi. 93 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Maoist Datasheets, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.satp.org /satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/maoist_datasheet.html>. 94 Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, p. 371. 95 Bhavna Vij-Aurora, ‘Armed and dangerous; A home ministry report reveals it will take three lakh security personnel 20 years to contain the Maoists’, India Today, 25 April 2011 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 96 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Jammu and Kashmir assessment – year 2011, retrieved 23 June 2011, < http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html>. 97 South Asia Terrorism Portal, India fatalities, 2011, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www .satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/indiafatalities.html>. 98 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2004 – 2005, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 3.

21

from 10,000 to as many as 25,000.99 According to other sources, they have about

10,000 armed cadres, with other workers ranging from 45,000 to 50,000.100 Another

source estimates their strength to be 14,000 full-time fighters with many more semi-

trained activists.101 According to some other reports, CPI-M has about 40,000

permanent armed cadres, in addition to 100,000 militia members.102 The bottom

figure suggests that this movement has some strength; the top figures suggest that

India faces a significant enemy.

The Maoists armed wing is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) and its

largest component is the base force known as the People’s Militia, which comprises

ordinary villagers.103 The Maoists carry out coordinated attacks involving several

hundred members of the People’s Militia. An attack involving 500 armed rebels in

Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh killing 75 police personnel in April 2010 is a case

in point.104 Reportedly, they have also established their own intelligence wing, the

People’s Security Service (PSS), with the aim of penetrating the information loop of

the government agencies to access classified information on counter insurgency

operations.105

Naxalites are believed to possess about 15,000 assorted weapons including assault

rifles, machine guns and mortars.106 They also use improvised explosive devices

(IEDs) effectively, thus injecting an element of arbitrariness into their activities while

also restricting the mobility of the security forces.107 Naxalites target landlords,

moneylenders, security forces personnel and their informers. They levy taxes on

99 Bureau of Police Research and Development, Executive summary – Genesis and spread of Maoist violence and appropriate state strategy to handle it, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 2011, p. 4, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://bprd.nic.in/writereaddata/mainlinkFile /File611.pdf>. 100 Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, p. 369. 101 ‘India’s Naxalite insurgency: Not a dinner party’, The Economist, 25 February 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, < http://www.economist.com/node/15580130>. 102 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 103 Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 104 Siddarth Srivastava, ‘Maoist attacks mount in India’, Asia Times online, 20 May 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MA28Df03.html>. 105 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 106 Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, p. 369. 107 Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011.

22

companies operating in Maoist controlled areas.108 They have also established a

parallel administrations and ‘Kangaroo’ courts known as ‘Jan Adalats’ (Life Courts)

in their area of influence.109 These provide some justice for traditionally poorly

treated lower caste members of backward parts of India.

Naxalites have also started focusing on infrastructure targets. They are eager to

exploit people’s grievances against the central government’s plans to establish Special

Economic Zones (SEZ), which appear to benefit some influential people at the cost of

the poor.110 The government lacks credibility amongst local people who think that

adequate compensation is not paid to acquire their land for development or mining

projects. There have been instances when same people were displaced again and again

with the launch of new projects.111 For example, about 14 villagers were killed and 71

injured in Nandigram, West Bengal, in March 2007, during police firing when they

were protesting against the establishment of an SEZ on their land.112 A similar

incident occurred in 2006 in Singur, in West Bengal where a protest rally by peasants

was ruthlessly crushed by the government to facilitate land acquisition for Tata

Motors.113 Ganapathy labeled the government’s planned SEZs as ‘neo-colonial

enclaves’ aimed at snatching the fertile farmlands of the poor peasants and pledged to

launch a struggle against these often unpopular plans.114

External Links

Both MCCI and PWG have been maintaining links with the Communist Party of

Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) since July 2001 through the Coordination Committee of

108 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 109 ‘Maoist Kangaroo courts executed 21 people this year: Chidambaram’, The Times of India, 2 October 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-10-02/india/28246162_1_kangaroo-courts-home-minister-maoists>. 110 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 113. 111 Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, p. 367. 112 Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian villagers resist corporate land grab’, Asia Times online, 17 Novemeber 2007, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK17Df07. html>. 113 Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian villagers resist corporate land grab, Asia Times online, 17 November 2007, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK17Df07.html>. 114 Indian Vanguard, Interview with Ganapathy, General Secretary CPI-Maoist on 24 April 2007, posted 13 May 2007, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://naxalresistance.wordpress.com/2007/05/13/ interview-with-ganapathy-general-secretary-cpimaoist/>.

23

Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).115 These relations

have been strengthened after the merger of various Naxalite factions to form CPI-M,

which has been sharing men, materiel and training facilities with CPN-M.116

According to one report, relations between the two groups weakened when CPN-M

decided to abandon its armed struggle in 2007 and participate in the political

process.117 However, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu reportedly conveyed to

Nepalese authorities in 2010 that close cooperation exists between the two

organisations. Although the Nepalese Maoists deny any such links, there are reports to

the contrary.118 Nevertheless, while downplaying any tangible cooperation, both sides

acknowledge having ideological links, and the CPI-M spokesperson expressed

optimism for continuation of relations as before.119 New Delhi feels that both the

organizations have some kind of ‘working relationship.’120 Moreover, Maoists are

also believed to have some sympathizers in China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal,

who may supply some weapons. It is important for CPI-M to maintain external links

because defeating an insurgency with sanctuaries across borders is extremely complex

for the Indian government.

Assessment of Government Response

The central government initially downplayed the incident of Naxalbari in 1967. While

addressing the Lok Sabha on 13 June 1967, Home Minister Y. B. Chavan regarded

the issue as ‘lawlessness’.121 Moreover, as per Article 256 and State List II of India’s

Constitution, states are responsible for law and order, except in the case of an

emergency when Article 356 of the Constitution authorises the central government to

115 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 116 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2004 – 2005, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 44. 117 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 118 P V Ramana, ‘Linkages between Indian and Nepalese Maoists’, Indian Review of Global Affairs, 9 November 2010, retrieved 27 June 2011, <http://www.irgamag.com/?page=Linkages_10112010>. 119 CPI-Maoist Information Bulletin – 2, Interview with CPI-M spokesperson,10 May 2008, p. 5, retrieved 28 June 2011, <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPIMIB/MIB-02-080510.pdf>. 120 Siddarth Srivastava, ‘India probes Maoists’ foreign links’, Asia Times online, 11 November 2009, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KKI1Df03.html>. 121 Sumanta Banergee, ‘Naxalbari: Between past and future’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 37, no. 22, 1-7 June 2002, p. 2115, retrieved 25 June 2011, <http://www.cscsarchive.org: 8081/MediaArchive/audience.nsf/(docid)/56DF271A23C92EDAE5256BFF00102E37> .

24

take responsibility for dealing with internal disturbances under President’s Rule.122

When violence erupted in the major city of Calcutta, the central government imposed

President’s Rule in West Bengal in 1970. Subsequently, the Indian Government

launched ‘Operation Steeplechase’ against Naxalites in 1971, which was a

coordinated drive by the Indian Army, the Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) and

the local police.123 New Delhi also launched a number of rural development and land

reform schemes.124 The security situation began to improve, and with Mazumdar’s

arrest and subsequent death in 1972, the movement subsided. However, as it later

proved, the insurgency was not completely extinguished.

During the 1970s, the government dealt with the insurgency aggressively and almost

crushed it.125 Subsequently, the movement remained dormant and during the 1990s

the central government regarded the Naxalite insurgency as a local law and order

problem without any significant threat.

After the resurgence of the Naxalite movement in 2004, some government circles

remained complacent about the danger it posed. Shivraj Patil, the then Union Home

Minister, said in the Lok Sabha on 14 August 2007 that ‘the Naxal movement is little

more than in the past’.126 This statement was made even after the Prime Minister in

2006 regarded the movement as the single biggest internal security challenge ever

faced by India.127 The resultant dichotomy of perception weakened the government’s

resolve to implement policies to tackle effectively the growing Naxalism problem.

122 Ministry of Law and Justice, The Constitution of India, Government of India, New Delhi, Modified up to 1 December 2007. 123 Amarnath K. Menon, ‘Red corridor: 60 revolutions – Naxalite movement’, India Today, 20 December 2007, retrieved 25 June 2011, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/ Red+corridor/1/2726.html>. 124 Report of the Expert Group, Chapter on People’s discontent and system failure: Development issues to deal with causes of discontent, unrest and extremism, Planning Commission Government of India, published in Main Stream, vol. XLVI, no. 26, 14 June 2008, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article760.html>. 125 Raman Dixit, ‘Naxalite movement in India: The state’s response’, Journal of Defence Studies, vol.4, no.2, April 2010, p. 22. 126 Ajai Sahni, ‘Heart of the Red Corridor’, Outlook India, 4 September 2007, retrieved 25 June 2011, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235474>. 127 Government of India Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s speech to the 2nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers on Naxalism,13 April 2006, retrieved 18 June 2011, <http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128>.

25

An examination of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) annual reports from

2003 until 2011 reveals that the Union Government in New Delhi still regarded the

Naxalite insurgency as a law and order and socio-economic problem. Indeed, it was

mentioned consistently in the last eight reports that Maoists operate in the vacuum

created by gaps in on-the-ground governance and administration. They exploit the

discontent and frustration due to perceived neglect and injustice amongst the deprived

and poor segments of the society. Accordingly, in broad terms the government has

employed a multi-pronged strategy of dealing with the problem on political, social,

economic and security fronts over the last eight years. In line with this strategy, the

government has instituted various measures which include the constitution of several

committees, groups, commissions, task forces, schemes etc., and the number of such

bodies has been on the rise over the years.128 The government also formulated a 14-

point policy in 2006, which was somewhat similar to the policy outlined in various

MHA annual reports.129

Overall, the Indian government has resorted to broad ranging measures to tackle the

problem of Naxalism. This shows strengthening government resolve to deal with the

insurgency in a systematic manner. Conversely, the formulation of multiple

committees, commissions and groups has sometimes resulted in a lack of coordination

amongst the affected states, leading to confusion, overlapping of responsibilities and

duplication of effort.130 Moreover, the formulation of policies is one thing but their

successful implementation is another. Individual states affected by Naxalism

sometimes either lack the will to implement the central government’s policies or do

not endorse the Centre’s approach. The central government also does not appear to

have completely understood the complexity of the problem and there is little harmony

of opinion between central and state governments.131 For instance, Andhra Pradesh,

Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu were quick to ban the CPI-M in line with government

128 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports from 2003 to 2011, Government of India, New Delhi. 129 P V Ramana, ‘A critical evaluation of the Union Government’s response to the Maoist challenge’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 33. no. 5, p. 746. 130 Gen (R) V P Malik & P V Ramana, ‘Policy to fight Naxalism: Need for political consensus’, Observer Research Foundation, 3 April 2006, retrieved 26 June 2011, <http://www.orfonline.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=2561&mmacmaid=818>. 131 Naxalite Violence Seminar Report no. 232, Naxalism and internal security in India, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 4 August 2007, retrieved 26 June 2011, <http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/naxalite-violence/naxalism-and-internal-security-in-india-672.html>.

26

policy, whereas this was met with resistance from Orissa and West Bengal.132 A study

sponsored by the Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home

Affairs, has indicated that:

‘States have shown remarkable similarity in ineffective handling of the

situations at different stages. This is helpful to the Maoists as the States do not

seem to learn from each other’s experience and prefer to be satisfied with

short term measures.’133

Coordination and information sharing remain an ongoing problem for Indian counter-

insurgency operatives.

In order to address the socio-economic issues, significant measures initiated by the

government include filling up critical infrastructure gaps under the scheme for special

infrastructure in Naxal-affected areas, institution of monitoring mechanism,

recognition of occupation rights of traditional forest dwellers, giving incentives to

Naxal militants who surrender their arms, and institution of the central scheme for

assistance to civilian victims of Naxal violence.134 The problem with implementation

of such schemes is that the government first needs to secure the areas under Maoist

control without which no development can take place.135 Moreover, the government

still lacks the capacity to effectively implement its policies. According to one analyst,

the observation of a Steering Group of the Planning Commission made in 2001 is still

valid that ‘the government machinery at the cutting edge level was too thinly spread,

poorly trained and ill equipped to implement programmes.’136 The Parliamentary

Standing Committee on Home Affairs mentioned, with respect to Naxal-affected

areas, in its 126th Report in 2007 ‘there is no perceptible change on the socio-

economic front.’137

132 Gen (R) V P Malik & P V Ramana, ‘Policy to fight Naxalism: Need for political consensus’, Observer Research Foundation, 3 April 2006, retrieved 26 June 2011, <http://www.orfonline.com /cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=2561&mmacmaid=818>. 133 Bureau of Police Research and Development, Executive Summary – Genesis and spread of Maoist violence and appropriate state strategy to handle it, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 2011, p. 12, retrieved 22 June 2011, <http://bprd.nic.in/writereaddata/ mainlinkFile/File611.pdf>. 134 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2010 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi, pp. 25-31. 135 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 116. 136 Ramana, ‘A critical evaluation of the Union Government’s response’, p. 749. 137 Ramana, ‘A critical evaluation of the Union Government’s response’, p. 749.

27

In the security domain, a number of reforms have been initiated by the centre to

augment the efforts of state governments. Significant amongst these include the

provision of Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs), Commando Battalions for

Resolute Action (CoBRA) and India Reserve (IR) battalions for troubled areas as well

as initiation of some training and up-grading programmes.138 Moreover, states have

been encouraged to create an elite anti-Maoist force on the lines of Andhra Pradesh,

which raised a specially trained force known as ‘Greyhounds’. Although, Greyhounds

have been successful in Andhra Pradesh, some observers believe that they simply

pushed the Maoists into neighbouring states.139 The central Cabinet Committee on

Security has also proposed the use of the IAF for surveillance and logistics, as well as

the employment of Indian Army personnel in advisory roles.140 So far, IAF has

employed four helicopters to ferry security forces personnel. However, other than

training the police and paramilitary forces, the Indian Army is reluctant to play any

role against Maoists that would distract it from its focus of national security and

defence.141 All these security measures are yet to yield positive results.

The government policy of encouraging local resistance groups at grass roots level142

has backfired, at least in Chhattisgarh where Salwa Judum was launched with state

support in Dantewada district in 2005 to protect the people from the Naxalites.143

Salwa Judum is a civilian militia comprising ill-trained youth designated as Special

Police Officers. Since its creation, members of Salwa Judum have been involved in

gross human rights violations including torture, murder and rape, which is aimed at

forcefully shifting villagers to camps in order to protect them from Maoist

influence.144 As a result, some 50,000 people have been displaced and forced to live

in makeshift refugee camps.145

138 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2010 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi, pp. 24-25. 139 Bhavna Vij-Aurora, ‘Armed and dangerous; A home ministry report reveals it will take three lakh security personnel 20 years to contain the Maoists’, India Today, 25 April 2011 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 140 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 141 ‘No consensus on role of armed forces in Naxal ops’, The Times of India,11 June 2010 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 142 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2003 – 2004, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 43. 143 Subash Mohapatra, ‘Maoist movement in India and Salwa Judum – State sponsored paramilitary movement’, Asian Tribune, WIAS vol. 11, no.72, retrieved 25 June 2011, <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/1141>. 144 Asian Centre for Human Rights, The Adivasis of Chhatisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite movement and Salwa Judum campaign, New Delhi, 17 March 2006, p. 4. 145 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 104.

28

There are varying reports about the strength of security forces deployed in Maoist

affected areas. In 2004, the central government planned to deploy 23 to 25 CRPF

paramilitary battalions comprising 20,000 to 25,000 personnel over the next 3 to 5

years across 55 districts having strong Maoist activity.146 The on-ground security

presence in affected states, however, has remained thin. There are 54 police for every

100 square kilometres in Bihar, 31 in Jharkhand and 17 in Chhattisgarh.147 Some

states lack the will to crackdown on Maoists due to some vested interests. For

instance, the government in Jharkhand came to power partially due to Maoist support

and therefore remains reluctant to crush the insurgents.148 Maoists enjoy some support

from state politicians in Bihar also.149

In late 2009, the central government launched its biggest all out offensive against the

Naxalites named ‘Operation Green Hunt’. Initially, more than 100,000 federal

paramilitary forces were planned to participate in the operation, which officials

termed as the ‘battle to the finish’.150 According to another report, 60,000 personnel

were initially deployed, who were later augmented with 15,000 additional

personnel.151 Moreover, IAF deployed four Mi-17 helicopters to ferry the security

forces personnel.152 Maoists responded with their deadliest attack on 6 April 2010

killing 76 armed policemen.153 Operation Green Hunt met with varying degree of

success in different states. However, according to some reports, it was doomed to fail

without air support.154 Major General (Retd) G D Bakshi noted that ‘The results of

146 R Bedi, ‘India’s mosaic of conflict’, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 14 July 2004. 147 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 104. 148 William Magioncalda, ‘A modern insurgency: India’s evolving Naxalite problem’, South Asia Monitor, no. 140, 8 April 2010. 149 ‘Non-state armed groups, India’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 26 April 2011. 150 Siddarth Srivastava, ‘India plans all-out attack on Maoists’, Asia Times online, 29 September 2009, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI29Df01.html>. 151 ‘Politics with bloodshed: A slaughter reveals the inadequacy of India’s counterinsurgency effort’, The Economist, 8 April 2010, retrieved 27 June 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/15869400>. 152 ‘No consensus on role of armed forces in Naxal ops’, The Times of India,11 June 2010 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 153 Siddarth Srivastava, ‘Maoist attack stiffens India’s resolve’, Asia Times online, 8 April 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD08Df02.html >. 154 Robert M Cutler, ‘Naxalites drill away at India’s wealth’, Asia Times online, 20 May 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE20Df02.html>.

29

Operation Green Hunt have been cause for alarm and have highlighted the under-

preparedness of the Central Police Organisations for the task.’155

Causes of Failure and Success of Maoists

It is important to examine the causes of failure of the movement in the 1970s and

current success in order to determine its future prospects and the challenges it poses to

the government. The initial rise and rapid growth of Naxalism after its emergence in

1967 until the death of Mazumdar in 1972, can be attributed to a number of reasons.

Unrelenting poverty, unequal wealth distribution leading to a growing gap between

rich and poor, a society based on an unequal and discriminatory caste system,

administrative failure and exploitation of farmers by landlords were all sources of

discontentment for the poor and neglected segments of society. As such, the

environment was ripe for an uprising. Many deprived peasants were so frustrated that

they were ready to embrace any alternative form of governance or ideology. However,

the rise of Naxalism in the late 1960s was short-lived, for which the movement’s

leadership was mainly responsible. Conflicting ideology and approaches led to

fragmentation.

Mazumdar’s false perceptions and flawed strategy and tactics steered the movement

to its ultimate failure. His assumption that the country was ready for a revolution and

needed only a spark was totally baseless. His strategy of annihilation through small

combatant groups without the use of firearms and aversion to mass organization based

on a flawed assumption also proved to be wrong. Moreover, the government’s

aggressive approach in the 1970s played a significant role in destroying the

organization, and its support base, and subsequently kept it marginalized until its

resurgence.

The resurgence of the Naxalism and the credit for their current success mainly goes to

its leadership. Ganapathy has been instrumental in unifying various Naxalite factions

and keeping them together. In contrast to Mazumdar, Ganapathy has been successful

155 Bhavna Vij-Aurora, ‘Armed and dangerous; A home ministry report reveals it will take three lakh security personnel 20 years to contain the Maoists’, India Today, 25 April 2011 (Obtained from ProQuest database).

30

in resolving the differences amongst different groups through his pragmatic approach.

Although Ganapathy has also exploited the vacuum created by social injustice and

economic deprivation of the masses, particularly in rural areas, he has adopted a

different approach to achieve the objective. Contrary to Mazumdar, who was waiting

for an imminent revolution thus denouncing the idea of mass organisation, Ganapathy

has rallied Naxalite activists under the idea of a people’s protracted war. Moreover,

the Maoist leadership appears to be flexible and able to adapt to changing

circumstances. Consequently, their strategic emphasis has shifted from fighting

against landlordism to opposing a more contemporary issue of land grabbing by the

government for SEZs.156

156 Harriss, ‘What is going on in India’s “red corridor”’, p. 318.

31

Impact of Naxalite Movement on India and Its Aspirations of Great Power

Status

Naxalism has broad ranging implications for India. It is not only a significant law and

order problem, but it has socio-political, security, stability and economic dimensions.

In some poor states with large tribal populations like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and

Orissa, the insurgency has become a major political force to be reckoned with.157

Maoists’ activities and resultant casualties are a clear indication of security

implications in the affected areas. Their campaign of targeting infrastructure will have

serious repercussions for India’s rapid economic growth. Some of India’s significant

natural resources are located in these areas, and an inability to exploit them freely due

to Naxal activities is also a concern for New Delhi.

Economic Implications

Naxalism is likely to hurt most in the economic domain. The insurgency has the

potential to retard, and possibly even reverse, India’s fast growing economy.

Economic development is one of the fields where India has made tremendous

progress and boasts some parity with major economic powers.

The Indian government has rightly identified that Naxalites are making systematic

efforts to prevent the government from implementing developmental projects by

targeting infrastructure including railways, roads, telecommunication, energy and

power, in order to expose the government’s inefficiency and ineffectiveness.158 For

instance, the Maoists destroyed three 132 KVA electricity transmission towers in

Naraynpur district in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh in May 2007 resulting in loss of

power in the region for a complete week.159 The movement has also threatened the

energy and mineral sectors in the affected states. In order to boost investment and

economic activities, the Indian government announced the concept of SEZs in its

Export-Import Policy 2000. However, the Maoists pledged to disrupt government 157 ‘India’s politics: Maoist rebels are causing trouble across much of the country’, The Economist, 19 March 2007, retrieved 27 June 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/8875555?story_id=8875555>. 158 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2010 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 21. 159 ‘Red storm rising – India’s intractable Maoist insurgency’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 15 May 2008.

32

plans aimed at developing infrastructure, steel plants and mining projects. During the

9th Unity Congress, the Maoists outlined various planned and ongoing projects as their

potential targets, including a bauxite mining project in Visakhapatnam, Andhra

Pradesh, the Polavaram irrigation project, steel plants proposed in Chhattisgarh by

Tata, Essar and Jindal, the Centre's proposed railway line on the Rajhara-Raighat-

Jagdalpur sector, Posco's steel plants in Orissa, power plants proposed by the

Ambanis, a proposed steel plant in Jharkhand by the Mittal Group and the Kosi

irrigation project in northern Bihar.160 Due to the fear of Maoist attacks, various

companies are reluctant to carryout their activities161 and multi billion dollar industrial

projects are being delayed.162 A two-day blockade by Maoists in Jharkhand in 2007

completely shut down rail links and mining operations, resulting in the loss of about

US $ 37.5 million to the state.163 Total economic losses in the recent years, due to

Maoist activities are estimated at around US $ 475 million.164

India’s power generation is mainly based on coal and 85 percent of India’s coal

reserves are located in the five states where Maoists are strongest.165 Due to its rapid

economic growth coupled with industrialization, India is increasingly becoming

dependent on energy resources. In future, the country will need the raw materials and

resources in Naxalite affected states even more than in the past.

If the Naxalite activities and expansion are not checked, their effects will start

appearing in India’s macro-economic indicators. The Maoists have the potential to

slow India’s economic growth. A strong economy being an important indicator of

great power status, this would also slow down India’s rise.

160 Rajat Kumar Kujur, ‘From CRZ to SEZ: Naxal reins of terror’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Naxal Violence Articles no. 2271, 21 April 2007, retrieved 28 June 2011, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/from-crz-to-sez-naxal-reins-of-terror-2271.html>. 161 ‘India’s revolutionaries: The east is red and so is the centre’, The Economist, 12 April 2006, retrieved 27 June 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/6805972?story_id=E1_GRDVJSN>. 162 Robert M Cutler, ‘Naxalites drill away at India’s wealth’, Asia Times online, 20 May 2010, retrieved 11 July 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE20Df02.html>. 163 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 104. 164 ‘Red storm rising – India’s intractable Maoist insurgency’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 15 May 2008. 165 ‘India’s politics: Maoist rebels are causing trouble across much of the country’, The Economist, 19 March 2007, retrieved 27 June 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/8875555?story_id=8875555>.

33

Security and Stability

Naxalism is clearly a threat to security and stability in the affected areas. Over 6,800

people have lost their lives in more than 16,500 violent incidents during the last 10

years.166 The statistics indicate an increase in violence over the last 3 to 4 years.

Moreover, the Naxalite activities are aimed at destroying infrastructure and targeting

development projects. This, in turn, hampers the government’s endeavours to reach

out to the neglected segments of the rural areas and exposes the government failure.

To make the things worse, India’s approach towards the Maoist problem is biased

towards being ‘security-centric’ rather than towards winning hearts and minds or on

socio-economic change, which is bound to result in collateral damage. This further

alienates people who become Maoist sympathizers. Due to growing concern, Prime

Minister Singh in 2010 again described the problem as being a major threat to India’s

internal security.167 According to some observers, Naxalism ‘is one of the biggest

internal armed conflicts in the world’, and has the potential to destabilize political

order in the country as people increasingly lose their faith in the state because it is

unable to ‘provide human development for its citizens.’168

A regional power is expected to play the role of custodian by ensuring its desired

order in the region. However, if a nation is not able to maintain the desired level of

security and stability in large parts of its geographic boundaries, it is distracted, which

makes it difficult for the nation to exercise its influence outside its borders and over

smaller states of the region. This raises the key question of credibility and capability.

India first needs to put its own house in order before assuming the role of a great or

even a regional power.

Social Implications

The fragile socio-economic condition of the neglected segments of the society

particularly in the countryside has been one of the root causes for the emergence of

166 Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Reports 2003 – 2011, Government of India, New Delhi. 167 PR Chari, ‘Countering the Naxalites: Deploying the Armed Forces’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, no. 89, April 2010, p.4. 168 Lennart Bendfeldt, ‘Naxalism: The Maoist challenge to the Indian State’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung India, July 2010, p. 37.

34

the Naxalite insurgency. Instead of any improvement, these conditions have further

deteriorated. The plight of the Adivasis of Chhattisgarh is a case in point, where more

than 50,000 people have been displaced and forced to take refuge in camps.169

According to another estimate, more than 1000 Adivasis have lost their lives, more

than 700 villages have been burnt and more than 300,000 people have so far been

displaced during the campaign against Naxlaites.170 In such circumstances, the

concept of society and social structure is losing its value. These areas already lack

infrastructure, and whatever exists or is planned by the government becomes the

target of Naxalites. As a result, the government often remains handicapped in

rendering humanitarian assistance and reaching out to the people in order to play its

role effectively.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a country to claim great power status when its own

people are suffering due to an ongoing state of serious internal conflict, while the

government has been unable to mitigate their sufferings and implement any

significant development projects because of its inability to successfully end the

turmoil.

Political Implications

Naxalism has become a de facto political force to be reckoned with in the affected

areas. Maoists run a parallel government in the affected areas, challenging the writ of

the government.171 Another concern for the Indian government is the geographic

expansion of the movement. The Naxalites have so far been restricted to the rural

areas. However, they have always harboured the ambition of expanding their

activities to the cities also. Mazumdar was inspired by Mao’s slogan ‘encircle the

cities from the villages’.172 Their objective is seizure of political power and such

power is located in the cities. Accordingly, CPI-M has laid down a detailed strategy to

169 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 104. 170 Bendfeldt, ‘Naxalism: The Maoist challenge to the Indian State’, p. 31. 171 Manzoor Ali Kazmi, ‘Indian Naxalites: A spectre troubling India’, Pakistan Observer, 17 March 2011 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 172 Manoranjan Mohanty, Revolutionary violence: A study of the Maoist movement in India, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, as cited in Dipak K. Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist movement in India: Birth, demise, and reincarnation’, Democracy and Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 168.

35

expand to urban areas in a document titled ‘Urban Perspective’.173 Although it seems

to be a remote possibility, if Naxalism is able to generate significant appeal and

support amongst the urban masses in India, the consequences could be devastating for

India’s political stability.174

Maoists have been supportive of the insurgency in India’s north-eastern states of

Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.175

The 9th Congress of the CPI-M commended the efforts of insurgent activists in the

north-east and pledged that the CPI-M would render all possible support to these

insurgencies.176 Reportedly, the CPI-M has bought weapons from the United

Liberation Front of Assam, which is active in the north-east.177 Moreover, a CPI-M

Central Committee member has been appointed to organize the Maoist movement in

Assam.178 This is in line with Maoists’ expansionist desires.

This continuing strength of Naxalism and its damaging effect on infrastructure and

social cohesion pose an on-going threat to India and its ambitions regarding its place

in the world. In simple terms, in order to claim great power status, India first needs to

ensure political stability within its own boundaries. The expansionist trends of CPI-M

and the possibility of it linking up with other insurgencies creates the potential to

damage the political image of the nation in the future and with it aspirations of Indian

great power status.

173 South Asia Terrorism Portal, CPI-Maoist Urban Perspective: Our work in urban areas, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/Urbanperspective. htm>. 174 For similar views see Harnetiaux, ‘The resurgence of Naxalism’, pp. 93-104. 175 Shahid R Siddiqi, ‘Insurgency movements in India: Failure of the Indian government to address the root causes could lead to a domino effect in South Asia’, Axis of Logic, 26 December 2010, retrieved 28 June 2010, <http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_61885.shtml>. 176 South Asia Terrorism Portal, CPI-Maoist Press Release on the 9th Congress, January-February 2007, 19 February 2007, retrieved 23 June 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries /india/maoist/documents/papers/19feb07.htm>. 177 ‘Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M)’, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 10 June 2011. 178 ‘Red storm rising – India’s intractable Maoist insurgency’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 15 May 2008.

36

Future Projection

“Men and women will not rebel, risking their lives and property, without good reason

– the occupation of their country by foreign armies, economic crisis, a tyrannical

political regime, great poverty, or great social discrepancy between rich and poor.”

Walter Laqueur179

Although the Indian government has rightly identified the root causes of the Naxalite

movement and formulated broad range of policies to deal with it, the full

implementation of these policies is still lacking. Indeed some of government

initiatives, for instance local armed groups like Salwa Judum and establishment of

SEZs necessitating acquisition of land from the natives have yielded negative results.

In some areas people do not even trust the government’s development initiatives and

are derisory when someone talks about paying compensation for their land.180

India’s economic growth has mainly benefited the rich and middle classes, and the

gap between the rich and poor is widening. This is also true for urban areas where

slums are like ‘cities within cities.’181 About 80 percent of India’s total population –

some 836 million people – lives on less than $ 0.5 a day.182 Some regard the small

rich section of the country as ‘the citizens of enclave India’ and argue that this section

cannot race ahead of the much larger poor section for long.183 Poverty is a root cause

of many other social problems and does not have a quick fix. The benefits of the latest

economic boom have not trickled down to the larger poor and neglected segment of

the society. India has not been able to resolve its socio-economic problems in more

than sixty years of independence.

The Maoists exploit the grievances of the people. They champion the cause of the

poor, the landless, the oppressed, the neglected and the tribal. As long as such sections

179 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A historical and critical study, Western Press, London, 1984, p. 387, as cited in Prakash Singh, The Naxalite movement in India, 2nd edn, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2006, p. 253. 180 Gera, ‘Naxalism: A threat to India’s security’, p. 367. 181 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 111. 182 Motlagh, ‘The Maoists in the forest’, p. 110. 183 Prakash Singh, The Naxalite Movement in India, 2nd edn, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2006, pp. 254-255.

37

form part of the Indian society, Maoists will not have difficulty in finding recruits.

The Indian government’s drive against the Maoists in the security domain has not

been successful either. The Home Minister recently admitted that operations against

the Maoists were at a stalemate. As per an official of the Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘it

requires continued deployment of at least three lakh (300,000) personnel for 20 years

to contain the Maoist threat’.184 Some analysts are of the view that the insurgency is

so deeply embedded in the society in large parts of central and eastern India that it is

not easy to crush the movement as was the case in the late 1960s and early 1970s.185

Despite strenuous efforts by the Indian establishment the Maoists have grown in

number. The intensity and extent of their activities has increased, and they have also

expanded their geographic area. The indicators therefore point to the Naxalites

continuing to expand their influence and operations. In the next ten years, they are

likely to pose further serious challenges for India.

184 Bhavna Vij-Aurora, ‘Armed and dangerous; A home ministry report reveals it will take three lakh security personnel 20 years to contain the Maoists’, India Today, 25 April 2011 (Obtained from ProQuest database). 185 Harriss, ‘What is going on in India’s “red corridor”’, p. 326.

38

Conclusion

After its resurgence, the Naxalite insurgency has certainly become a serious problem

for the Indian government to the extent that it has been repeatedly regarded as the

single biggest security challenge ever faced by the country.186 The Naxalite movement

has expanded after its resurgence in 2004. Despite the best efforts of the Indian

government, the insurgency has increased in size and strength, and has enlarged its

area of influence. Violent activities carried out by Naxalites have also been on the

rise. Moreover, addressing the root causes of poverty and social injustice from which

the movement draws its strength is a long, drawn out and tenuous process. The

insurgency poses serious challenges to the country at least in the next decade.

India’s rise is driven mainly by its rapid economic growth and expanding defence

capabilities. However, the Naxalite movement is hurting India most in the economic

domain and has the potential to further affect its economic rise as Naxalites control

the areas which are rich in mineral and energy resources. In future, India will become

increasingly dependent on raw material and energy resources and being unable to

exploit domestic resources will definitely impact on its economic growth.

The insurgency also has implications for internal security and stability in the affected

areas. Already categorized as the biggest security challenge confronting India, the

continuous spread of the insurgency coupled with its violent activities would further

complicate New Delhi’s problems. Moreover, when seen along with other

insurgencies in the north-east and Kashmir, the Indian government could be perceived

as ineffective and weak due to its inability to successfully confront home-based, anti-

social insurgent movements. This could damage India’s image and credibility among

the international community and have implications for its aspiring great power status.

The analysis with respect to India’s great power status concludes that India still has a

long way to go. As noted above, in order to achieve great power status a nation state 186 Government of India Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s speech to the 2nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers on Naxalism,13 April 2006, retrieved 18 June 2011, <http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128>. Also see PR Chari, ‘Countering the Naxalites: Deploying the Armed Forces’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, no. 89, April 2010, p.4.

39

needs to excel in every field.187 Even to claim the status of being a regional power,

India needs to be able to be more assertive and to resolve its own serious problems. At

best, India is a rising power which is faced with challenges. The Naxalite movement

is one of the most significant internal challenges India needs to deal with successfully

before it can assume great power status. In the final analysis, it can be concluded that

the expansion of the Naxalite insurgency has the potential to slow down India’s rise.

It is a drag on India’s quest for great power status.

187 Waltz, Theory of international politics, p. 131.

40

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