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BITS Pilani Hyderabad Campus Peer-to-Peer Network Security Chittaranjan Hota Dept. of Computer Sc. & Information Systems [email protected] 1 st March 2013 Symposium on Privacy & Security 2013, IIT, Kanpur

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Peer-to-Peer Network Security. 1 st March 2013 Symposium on Privacy & Security 2013, IIT, Kanpur. Chittaranjan Hota Dept. of Computer Sc. & Information Systems [email protected]. Growth of the Internet. Source: Internet World Stats. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS PilaniHyderabad Campus

Peer-to-Peer Network Security

Chittaranjan HotaDept. of Computer Sc. & Information Systems

[email protected]

1st March 2013Symposium on Privacy & Security 2013, IIT, Kanpur

Page 2: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Growth of the Internet

Source: Cisco VNI Global Forecast, 2011-2016Source: Internet World Stats

Page 3: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Internet bandwidth usage estimation report, 2011

Leading Applications

Source: Sandvine Global Internet Phenomena Report, 2012

Page 4: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Pirate Bay

May 2012

Indian ISPs Unblock Torrent Sites After Madras High Court OrderConsortium of internet providers win fight to access legitimate content on the P2P file-sharing sites. Finally its a sigh of relief from millions of BitTorrent users across India as the Madras High Court has ruled that Indian ISPs should not block the entire website for preventing a single content to be shared online. July 2012

Page 5: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Source: Traffic and Market data report Ericsson, June 2012

Mobile world

By 2020 Each Person Will Own 7+ Connected Devices

Page 6: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Have you ever wondered?

•966 million P2P searches every day.

•800,000 of which include terms like credit cards, tax returns, bank accounts, medical insurance, and passwords.

•966 million P2P searches every day.

•800,000 of which include terms like credit cards, tax returns, bank accounts, medical insurance, and passwords.

Source: www.idtheftcenter.org

Page 7: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Blueprints of Marine One helicopter leaked, SC Magazine, March 2009

WikiLeaks mined popular P2P applications for data in the past, Tiversa Inc, 2011

Some news…

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) notifies close to 100 US organizations about P2P security breach, Feb 2010

Skype used by hackers to attack Windows PC, Times of India, Oct 2012

"lol is this your new profile pic?" 

Page 8: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Cyber security threats reported to CERT-in

Others

Website Intrusion and Malware propagationSpam

Virus/Malicious codeNetwork scanning/Probing

Phishing

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Source: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses task force report, March 2012

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

• Threat alert: Indian Internet systems under attack, Feb 24, 2013 (Bamital trojan)

Page 9: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

What is a P2P Network?

A

D

E F

G

H

FH

GA

EC

C

B

P2P overlay layer

Native IP layer

D

B

AS1

AS2

AS3

AS4

AS5

AS6

Page 10: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Generic P2P Architecture

Capability &Configuration

Peer Role Selection

Operating System

NAT/ Firewall Traversal

Routing and Forwarding Neighbor Discovery Join/Leave Bootstrap

Overlay Messaging API

Content Storage

Search API

Page 11: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Examples of P2P Networks

Page 12: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

DC++

Page 13: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

P2P Traffic Control

Page 14: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Security Gap in P2P

Internet

Peer APeer B

Malicious Peer C

Protected Network

Peer XFirewall

A TCP Port

Page 15: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Effect of NATing on P2P

Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses

Server

P2P Application

Internet

NAT

Page 16: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

NAT Traversal

Private IP Addresses Public IP Addresses

Internet

Private IP Addresses

Application Relay

Page 17: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Security threats: File Pollution

pollution company

polluted content

original content

Page 18: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

pollution company

File sharing network

pollution server

pollution server

pollution server

pollution server

File Pollution

Page 19: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

File sharing network

Unsuspecting usersspread pollution ! Alice

Bob

File Pollution

Page 20: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Index Poisoning

indextitle locationfile1 120.18.89.100file2 46.100.80.23file3 234.8.98.20

file sharing network

120.18.89.100

46.100.80.23

234.8.98.20

Page 21: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Index Poisoning

indextitle locationfile1 120.18.89.100file2 46.100.80.23file3 234.8.98.20file4 111.22.22.22

file sharing network

120.18.89.100

46.100.80.23

234.8.98.20

111.22.22.22

Page 22: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Fake Block Attack

Attacker

Genuine Blocks

2. F

ake

BitM

ap

4. F

ake

Blo

ck

3. B

lock

Req

uest

Victim Peer

5. Hash Fail

Genuine Blocks

Genuine Blocks

1. T

CP

Con

nect

ion

Page 23: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Distributed Denial of Service

Page 24: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Node Insertion attack

A node insertion

Victim peer

Page 25: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Continued…

Page 26: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Continued…

Page 27: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Trust Management

Peers

Fully Decentralized P2P

Super-peers

OrdinaryPeers

Hybrid P2P architecture

Peers

Centralized Peers

Page 28: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Testbed Implementation

Page 29: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Dataset

Application Date Time Packets Bytes

DC++ 21/9/2012 12:00 pm 18.4497M 20G

MUTE 23/11/2012 10:00 am 1.385705M 1.6G

HTTP (S) 21/9/2012 14:00 pm 2.655489M 1.93G

SMTP/POP3 21/9/2012 15:00 pm 0.055403M 40M

Page 30: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Portscan using Metasploit

Page 31: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Snort detecting P2P traffic

P2P apps P2P apps running on running on

campus campus detected…detected…

Snort rulesSnort rules

Page 32: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Anonymization

172.16.90.25 is mapped to 1.0.0.1 and172.16.2.163 is mapped to 1.0.0.2 all through

Anontool in execution

Page 33: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Privacy preserving P2P classifier

Approaches for Measuring P2P Classification Efficiency for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems, Jagan Mohan Reddy, Abhishek Thakur, and Chittaranjan Hota, National Conference on Cyber Security, NCCS 2012, Defense Institute of Advanced Technology (DU), Pune, India, 2012.

Protocol, Flags, Payload length

Page 34: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Flow based P2P classification

Feature calculation

Page 35: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

User based feature statistics

Page 36: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Multipath Routing

Sybil Group2

A.E1

A.E2

A.E3

1

2

4

7

10

3

V13

S

12S

14

S

11

S

9

S

5

V

8

S

6S

..

3-1-2-5-6-7-4-13-12

3-1-8-6-7-4-13-12

3-1-8-6-7-4-13-14-12

.

3-4-13-123-4-13-14-123-7-4-13-123-7-4-13-14-12

3

1

Sybil Group1

Honest Group

Safeguarding against Sybil attacks via Social Networks and Multipath Routing, Chittaranjan Hota, Antti Ylä-Jääski, Janne Lindqvist and Kristine Karvonen, International Conference on Communications and Networking in China, Shanghai, China, 2007.

Page 37: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Replication

Sybil Node

Common Storage

Honest NodeFile Owner

file1

file1

file2file2

file3

Detecting  Sybils  in  Peer-to-Peer File Replication Systems, K. Haribabu, Chittaranjan Hota, and  Saravana S, International Conference on Information Security and Digital Forensics, London, UK, 2009.

Page 38: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

Psychometric Analysis

BITS Pilani, Hyderabad Campus

Detecting Sybils in P2P Overlays using Psychometric Analysis Methods, K Haribabu, Arindam Pal, Chittaranjan Hota, IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA), Singapore, 2011.

GAUR: A method to detect Sybil groups in Peer-to-Peer overlays, Haribabu K, Chittaranjan Hota, and A Paul, Int. J. Grid and Utility Computing, IJGUC, Vol. 3, Nos. 2/3, Inderscience, 2012.

Page 39: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

1. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2007/05/23/p2p_networks_hijacked_for_ddos_attacks.htm

2. S Mcbride, and G A Flower, Estimate of Film-piracy cost soars: Hollywood loss is put at $6.1b a year, The Wall Street Journal Europe, may 4 th, 2006.

3. Thomas Karagiannis, Andre Broido, Michalis Faloutsos, Kc claffy, Transport Layer Identification of P2P Traffic, in Proc. 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pp. 121-134, 2004.

4. Subhabrata Sen, Oliver Spatscheck, and Dongmei Wang, Accurate, Scalable InNetwork Identification of P2P Traffic Using Application Signatures, WWW 2004, May 2004.

5. S Sen, Jia Wang, Analyzing Peer-To-Peer Traffic Across Large Networks, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2004.

6. Thuy T T N, and G Armitage, A survey of Techniques for Internet Traffic Classification using Machine Learning, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008.

7. Hassan Khan, S A Khayam, L Golubchik, M. Rajarajan, and Michael Orr, Wirespeed, Privacy-Preserving P2P Traffic Detection on Commodity Switches, Available Online at www.xflowresearch.com

8. Intrusion detection system: At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system.

9. P. Garcia-Teodoroa, J. Diaz-Verdejo, G.Macia-Fernandeza, and E. Vazquezb, Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges, Computers and Security, vol. 28, Issue: 1-2, pp. 18-28, 2009.

10. Gupta R, and Somani A K, Game theory as a tool to strategize as well as predict node’s behavior in peer-to-peer networks , International conf. on PDS, 2005, pp. 244-249.

11. Roberto G Cascella, 2nd ENISA Workshop on Authentication Interoperability Languages held at the ENISA/EEMA European eIdentity conference, Paris, France, June 12-13, 2007.

12. C Wang, Li Chen, H Chen, and K Zhou, Incentive Mechanism Based on Game Theory in P2P Networks, ITCS 2010, pp. 190-193.

13. Sarraute, C., et al., Simulation of Computer Network Attacks, CoreLabs, Core Security Technologies, 2010.

14. http://www.metasploit.com/

15. www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/multi/browser/java_atomicreferencearray

16. www.metasploit.com/modules/auxiliary/dos/windows/rdp/ms12_020_maxchannelids

17. http://www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi

18. Quinlan, J. R, C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993.

19. http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/

20. http://pytbull.sourceforge.net/

21. http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy

22. Massicotte, F. and Labiche, Y, An analysis of signature overlaps in Intrusion Detection Systems, Dependable Systems & Networks (DSN) IEEE/IFIP 41st International Conference, pp. 109-120, 2011.

23. Cheng-Yuan Ho, Yuan-Cheng Lai, I-Wei Chen, Fu-Yu Wang, and Wei-Hsuan Tai, Statistical analysis of false positives and false negatives from real traffic with intrusion detection/prevention systems, Communication Magazine, IEEE, pp.146-154, 2012.

24. Sardar Ali, Hassan Khan, and Syed Ali Khayam, What is the Impact of P2P Traffic on Anomaly Detection?, Proceeding of 13th International symposium, Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID) 2010, pp. 1-7, 2010. 

25. Jeffrey Erman, et al. Identifying and Discriminating Between Web and Peer-to-Peer in the Network Core, WWW 2007, ACM, pp. 883-892.

26. Genevieve B, et al., Estimating P2P traffic volume at USC, Technical Report, USC, June 2007.

27. Alok Madhukar, Carey W, A Longitudinal Study of P2P Traffic Classification, IEEE International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation, CA, 2006, pp. 179-188.

28. Hongwei C, et al., A SVM method for P2P traffic identification based on multiple traffic mode, Journal of Networks, Nov 2010, pp. 1381-1388.

29. K Ilgun, et al, State transition analysis: A rule based intrusion detection approach, IEEE transactions on software engineering, Vol 21, 1995.

30. F Jemili, et al, A framework for an adaptive intrusion detection system using bayesian network, IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics, May 2007, pp.66-70.

References

Page 40: Peer-to-Peer Network Security

BITS, Pilani Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad

Thank You!