The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 30 | Number 4 | Article ID 3390 | Jul 26, 2010

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Plausible Denial? Reviewing the Evidence of DPRK Culpabilityfor the Cheonan Warship Incident　　北朝鮮の否定に言い分あり?ーー天安号事件に対する北朝鮮の関わりを再検討する

Mark Caprio

Plausible Denial? Reviewing theEvidence of DPRK Culpability for theCheonan Warship Incident

Mark E. Caprio

The five-page “Investigative Result on theSinking of ROKS Cheonan” (hereafter“Investigative Result”) released by the JointInvestigative Group1 on May 20, just over twomonths after the sinking of the Republic ofKorea (ROK or South Korea) warship Cheonanthat killed 46 sailors, minced few words inblaming the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK or North Korea) for thecatastrophe. “The Cheonan was sunk as theresult of an underwater explosion caused by atorpedo made in North Korea. The evidencepoints overwhelmingly to the conclusion thatthe torpedo was fired by a North Koreasubmarine. There is no other plausibleexplanation,”2 the report stated. Soon after, theROK, backed by the United States and Japan,along with a number of Western statesincluding England, France, and Australia,condemned the attack and vowed “sternaction,” appealing to the United NationsSecurity Council to impose stronger sanctionson its northern neighbor. The United Statesand the ROK also announced plans to conductjoint military drills in the West Sea to deterfurther DPRK aggression. The DPRK, denyinginvolvement and offering to send its own fact-finding team to participate in the investigation,was rebuffed by the ROK. It then repeated its1994 threat to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire”should the ROK penalize it over the incident.

Russia and China, among the few states thathave not s ignaled acceptance of theconclusions drawn by the Investigative Result,urged restraint and further investigation.Russia initiated its own private investigationand found (but has not yet published) resultscontrary to those of the InvestigativeResult.3 China, countering U.S.-ROK plans tohold military drills, on June 20 began its ownsix-day live ammunition drill in the East ChinaSea.

Mainstream media coverage of responses to thefindings has, with rare exceptions, reiteratedthe findings of the ROK report, not only in theUnited States and South Korea but throughoutEurope and the Anglophone world as well.These analyses typically accept at face valuethe report’s findings of DPRK guilt—the“overwhelming” evidence of the torpedo’sDPRK manufacture and markings, two DPRKsubmarines out to sea at the time of theCheonan's sinking, and the absence ofsubmarines from neighboring countries in thearea at the time of the sinking.

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The stern of the Cheonan lifted from thewater

The few critical analyses, published for themost part in blogs and alternative newswebsites, by contrast, have raised questionsabout the evidence and conclusions presentedby the investigative team. A July 23, 2010 LosAngeles Times report was the first to appear ina major American paper to present theevidence calling into question the findings ofthe Investigative Report.4 Some analystsproposed alternative “plausible explanation[s],”such as the Cheonan having drawn friendlyfire, been hit by an exploding mine, or runaground. A third stream of analysis attempts tonavigate between the two sides by examiningshortcomings in the investigative process andquestioning whether the Investigative Resultmeets claims of impartiality and objectivity.Finally, a fourth stream, while acknowledgingthe possibility that the DPRK did sink theCheonan, places the incident in the historicalcontext of similar incidents that have claimedlives from both sides of the demilitarized zone.Clear from these discussions is that reasonabledoubt exists over the Investigative Result’sconclusion that a DPRK torpedo sunk theCheonan. Further investigation involving abroader range of participants situated in afuller context of war and conflict on the Koreanpeninsula is required to determine the cause ofthe tragedy that took the lives of 46 ROKsailors.

The DPRK: Guilty as Charged

Those supporting the Investigative Result’sfindings devote themselves to explaining DPRKreasons for the attack and advise strongmeasures in response, rarely evaluating theevidence of DPRK culpability. They stronglycriticize China for not condemning the DPRK’s“heinous act”, in the words of HeritageFoundation analyst Bruce Klinger. GeorgetownUniversity professor Victor Cha, while notingthat relations between the DPRK and ROK havehistorically been anything but tranquil, callsthe Cheonan incident “the most significantattack on the ROK military since the KoreanWar, violating the 1953 armistice.” He lists aspossible DPRK motivations for the torpedoattack the following: “disproportionateretaliation” for a November 2009 ROK attackon a DPRK ship, a “coercive” diplomacy ploy toforce the ROK into negotiations to “extract aidand assistance,” “swaggering” to demonstrateDPRK naval capacities, and a manifestation ofDPRK internal political turmoil. Cha outlineseconomic, military, and political penalties theROK should impose on the DPRK and suggestsways for the ROK to present this latest exampleof “DPRK misbehavior” to the UN SecurityCouncil, while noting the potential of a Chineseveto. He accuses China of acting as the DPRK’s“defense lawyer” and brands its "behaviorregarding the Cheonan” as “clumsy, weak, andanachronistic.”5 Long-time North Koreananalyst Scott Snyder sees the incident as apotential “turning point” for South Korea in itsattempt to pursue an “unprecedented effort tohold North Korea accountable for its actions.”He further suggests that China rethink its“business-as-usual” policy as the DPRK’s“enabler and protector.”6

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow forNortheast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, alsoembraced the conclusions presented in theInvestigative Result, writing: “Now that NorthKorea’s culpability for this heinous act ofaggression has been proven, South Korea and

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the United States must respond resolutely byimposing a comprehensive package ofunilateral and multilateral actions.” Klingnerlists possible responses: tightening economicloopholes that allow the DPRK to receivefinancial assistance from abroad (notablyJapan’s Korean population); terminating SouthKorean joint business ventures with the north,notably the Kaesǒng Project; enhanced defensethrough joint US-ROK anti-submarine exercisesin the Yellow Sea; and sinking any DPRK shipdetected south of the Northern Limit Line (themaritime division between the ROK and DPRKimposed by the United Nations one month afterthe armistice was signed to end the KoreanWar fighting). Klingner also urges the UnitedStates to return the DPRK to the list of statesupporters of terrorism. Like Cha, Klingnerstresses the importance of securing China’ssupport for punishing the DPRK. If Chinadecides to “prop up Pyongyang,” he writes, itwill “hinder the effectiveness of internationalsanctions by providing economic benefits toNorth Korea outside of the conditionality of theSix Party Talks.”7

Cha and Klingner come from the rightwing ofthe US foreign policy establishment.Nevertheless, their views closely match theofficial statements about the Cheonan Incidentvoiced by the ROK, U.S., and Japanesegovernments. With the partial exception of theROK, the mainstream media in these countrieshave done little to examine, still less challenge,the Investigative Results. As with other pastepisodes of alleged DPRK misbehavior,governments and media alike readily acceptROK assertions of DPRK culpability. TheObama administration quickly dispatchedSecretary of State Hillary Clinton to the regionto discuss the situation with her Japanese andSouth Korean counterparts and to persuadeChina to not oppose the three-nation campaignto reprimand and punish the DPRK at the UNSecurity Counci l . Cl inton forceful lydemonstrated US support for the InvestigativeResult. During her brief stop in Tokyo on May

21, she charged that “The torpedo that sunkthe Cheonan . . . was fired by a North Koreansubmarine.” Calling this “an unacceptableprovocation by North Korea, [to which] theinternational community has a responsibilityand a duty to respond,” she demanded that theDPRK “halt its provocations, end its policy ofthreats and belligerence toward its neighbors,a n d t a k e s t e p s n o w t o f u l f i l l i t sdenuclearization commitments and comply withinternational law.”8 The Secretary of Staterepeated these warnings during a second tripin July, this time with Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates, as they toured the DMZ.

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton andSecretary of Defense Robert Gates at the

DMZ, with a DPRK guard observingthrough the window (From “U.S. to add toSanctions on N. Korea” July 22, 2010, New

York Times)

The first political victim in the wake of theInvestigative Result may have been JapanesePrime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. Hatoyama wasforced to resign because of an inability to fulfilla 2008 political campaign pledge to relocatethe U.S. Marine military base in Futenma out ofOkinawa. But Hatoyama's difficulties wereexacerbated by the Cheonan incident, whichled the prime minister to sacrifice his pledge toOkinawa and instead to stress support for theMarine's presence in Japan and voice concerns

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about DPRK threats to regional security. Theprime minister’s apologies to OkinawaGovernor Nakaima Hirokazu for his failure overFutenma carried numerous references to theconfrontation between the two Koreas over theCheonan. Resignation followed soon after.

Former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’sreception in Okinawa (May 5, 2010)

In the ROK, the Cheonan incident may havehad the unintended political effect ofpersuading some voters to back oppositioncandidates in local elections that took placeshortly after the sinking. President Lee Myung-bak’s tough DPRK policy in the first two yearsof his administration, presented as analternative to the “soft policy” preferred by histwo predecessors, appears to have been viewedwith suspicion by a large segment of voters.Though other issues played a role in theelection (such as environmental concerns overa large-scale river diversion project andgovernment attacks on internet-related civilliberties), some apparently regarded policytoward the DPRK as overly harsh and hencedangerous. The election setback may alsoreflect significant public skepticism of theInvestigative Results, doubts that oneprominent South Korean NGO summed up in aletter to the UN Security Council.9 Skepticismwas strong enough to delay passage of aresolution in the ROK National Assembly

condemning the DPRK for sinking the Cheonan.The resolution passed, but over the oppositionof 70 legislators.10

If the Investigative Result’s supportersde tec ted any f l aws i n the r epor t ’ sconclusions—and their writings suggest thatthey did not—the reputation of the DPRK as amalevolent dictatorship encouraged them tooverlook these shortcomings. The ROKgovernment associated the ship's sinking withprevious alleged or actual DPRK terrorist orbelligerent acts directed against the ROK.Rumors circulated that Kim Jong Il himself hadpersonally ordered the operation.11

The DPRK guilty finding may indeed prove tobe correct. However, the evidence presented todate appears far short of demonstratingculpability beyond a reasonable doubt. Even ifthe evidence proves to be sound, its supportershave failed to contextualize a DPRK attack onan ROK naval vessel. This would necessitate farmore than spell ing out the context of“disproportionate retaliation” for an ROKattack of November 2009, as offered by VictorCha. It would be necessary to locate a DPRKattack in the context of the partition and warthat solidified the division that laid thefoundation for repeated threats and conflictover the two Koreas’ postwar history. Theseproblems are exacerbated by the longstandingconflict between the two Koreas, but they areequally the product of policies pursued by otherstates that have influenced Korean peninsulaaffairs over the past six decades, notably theUnited States, Russia and China. The very factthat there are two Koreas, which provides thefoundation for ongoing conflict, is a product ofthe U.S. and Soviet “liberation” of Korea fromJapan’s colonial rule, actions that the twosuperpowers fol lowed by organizingoccupations that divided the Korean peninsulaat the 38th parallel.

Lingering Questions

The most rigorous critics have challenged the

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accuracy of the Investigative Result. Theyargue that not only is the evidence produced ofquestionable validity, the report leaves outimportant information which, if presented,would suggest plausible a l ternat iveexplanations for the sinking. The critics directlyexamine the evidence in the report andspeculate on the omissions. One South KoreanNGO, the People’s Solidarity for ParticipatoryDemocracy (PSPD), raised a number of cogentquestions about the absence of certain kinds ofphysical and medical evidence that should bepresent if a torpedo explosion sunk theship.12 Likewise, two scholars, the physicistSeunghun Lee and the political scientist J. J.Suh, subjected the Investigation Result used todetermine DPRK guilt to rigorous analysis.They concluded that the report failed tosatisfactorily establish that it was an outsideexplosion that sunk the Cheonan, that thereexisted a causal link between the Cheonan’ssinking and the torpedo, and that the torpedowas indeed of DPRK origin. Regarding this lastpoint, Lee and Suh questioned how the Hangulwriting (1bǒn), which the report touted as“critical evidence” to demonstrate the torpedoas having come from a DPRK ship, could haveremained so legible after the explosion. Theyalso note that, even if the writing wasauthentic, it hardly serves as sufficientevidence for establishing culpability sinceKoreans from the north and the south canequally write 1bǒn.13 Scott Creighton, anothercritic of the report, suggested that the torpedothat allegedly sank the Cheonan appears to beless than a “perfect match” to the schematics ofthe DPRK torpedo that the ROK governmentput on display at its May 20 press conference.He suggests the torpedo might be of Germanmake.14 Following his report, the ROK militaryadmitted to a “mix up” that resulted indisplaying the wrong torpedo diagram at theMay 20 press conference.15

Others have proposed alternative scenarios.Shin Sang-Chui, a former officer in the ROKnavy, proposed prior to the completion of the

Investigative Result that the accident occurredafter colliding with an American ship. Shin hadbeen placed on the JIG committee by theopposition party.16 Investigative journalistTanaka Sakai, while cautioning that his is butone theory for an event that “remains anenigma,” suggests that the Cheonan could havebeen sunk by a torpedo, whether from a DPRKsubmarine or by friendly fire. It could also havebeen sunk by an underwater mine. Tanakaspeculates that friendly fire sank the Cheonan,with the deadly torpedo perhaps fired by anAmerican nuclear submarine during anaccidental exchange in the course of anongoing US-ROK joint military exercise.17

Foal Eagle exercise

Map of Paekryong Island (in red) andvicinity (From Tanaka, “Who sank the

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South Korean Warship Cheonan?”)

Like the Investigative Result’s claim ofinvolvement by one of two DPRK submarinessimply on the basis that they were away fromtheir homeport, Tanaka’s contention of possibleU.S. nuclear submarine’s involvement isspeculative. His essay was, however, one of thefirst to provide the critical information that theKey Resolve/Foal Eagle war game exercisesbetween the U.S. and ROK had been extendedand were being held in the area of the ROKwarship’s sinking, a point omitted from theROK’s Investigative Result.18

A second critical piece of information includedin the Tanaka report, as well as by Kim MyongChol,19 but in few (if any) of the major newsoutlets, is the precise location of the Cheonanincident.

Maps showing the location of the Cheonanincident, near Paekryong [Baengnyeong] Island, just south of the maritime extension ofthe demilitarized zone, are particularlyimportant given DPRK contesting of ROK claimto the waters surrounding this island.20 Thefive-page Investigative Result did not include amap or provide the precise coordinates of theCheonan at the time of sinking. Nor did it statewhether the Cheonan was in DPRK, ROK, orneutral waters at the time of the allegedtorpedo explosion. Including this informationwould make plain the obvious risks the ROKmilitary takes any time it dispatches a ship tothis contested and therefore dangerous area,all the more so during a US-ROK joint militaryexercise.

Northern Limit Line

The Investigative Result eliminated competitiveexplanations by narrowing the field of potentialaggressors to the DPRK. It “confirmed that[two] submarines and a mother ship… left aNorth Korean naval base…and returned to port2-3 days after the attack,” and that “allsubmarines from neighboring countries wereeither in or near their respective home bases atthe time of the incident.” The inclusion of“neighboring” in the report no doubt aimed toeliminate the possibility of Russian or Chineseinvolvement. Since its publication, however,other reports have noted that ships belongingto non-neighbors were in the area at the time ofthe Cheonan’s sinking, information onlyrecently acknowledged by official U.S.sources.21 According to one report,

there were 13 Korean and US up-to-date [modern?] ships at theWest Sea near the scene. Theywere conducting a joint militarydrill [Foal Eagle] at that time.Among those 13 sh ips a reCheonan, a warship to detect andf ight with the submarines,torpedoes, airplanes, and missiles,and another warship Aegisspecial ized in deal ing withsubmarines. 2 2

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Had the Investigative Result included thisinformation, it would have led to other follow-up questions, including one asked by severalindependent analysts: “Why couldn’t any of thesuper modern ships detect the attack of theN o r t h K o r e a n s u b m a r i n e s o rtorpedo?”23 Suspicions would also have beenraised over the source of the torpedo that theROK government exhibited, as well as over thepossibility that the Cheonan was sunk by atorpedoe, mine or another of the weapons thatlitter the seabed in this sensitive area followingyears of war exercises. This evidence lendsitself to alternative explanations, including thepossibility that the ship drew friendly fire, hitan exploding mine, or ran aground prior tosplitting.

Russia and China, both of whom remainnoncommittal on whether the evidence provesDPRK guilt, have called for restraint by bothsides to allow for a thorough investigation todetermine the exact cause of the ship’s sinking.Russia from the beginning was “unconvincedby the evidence,”24 and its independentinvestigation allegedly failed to demonstratethat the Cheonan was sunk by a DPRK torpedo.China, which hosted DPRK Premier Kim Jong Ilin the days following the Cheonan incident,vowed not to protect “whoever sank thewarship.” But it refrained from condemning theDPRK until an “objective and fair” investigationwas completed, thus suggesting indirectly thatit found the Investigative Result at bestinconclusive.25 Beijing University professor ZhuFeng revealed in a recent interview with theKorea Times that the majority of Chineseofficials and intellectuals believe theInvestigative Result’s findings “do not holdwater.” Zhu noted further that the ROKgovernment’s reaction to the incident was“very emotional.” China regards the Cheonanincident as one of many conflicts that haveerupted over the past sixty-five years of divisionand war, rather than as an “unprovoked attack”as described by the U.S. and ROK. The issue athand, Zhu suggested, is how best to “leave the

scene behind” and move on.26

ROK President Lee Myungbak and ChinesePrime Minister Wen Jiabao conferring in

May 2010. (The Hankyoreh, May 29, 2010)

For a Broader Invest igat ion andAppropriate Contextualization

Since the Cheonan sank on March 26, 2010 theROK government has conducted aninternational campaign to rally support againstthe DPRK over its participation in what DonaldKirk has called the ROK’s 9/11. The multi-national team gathered to investigate theincident assembled experts from fivecountries—the United States, Australia, UnitedK i n g d o m , S w e d e n , a n d S o u t hKorea.27 President Lee Myung-bak traveled toSingapore to give a keynote address at theAsian Security Summit, in which he soughtsupport for stiffer international sanctionsagainst the DPRK.28 Lee gained the sympathiesof the Group of Eight countries who, as a body,supported the Investigative Result and calledfor “appropriate measures to be taken againstthose responsible.”29 His administrationappealed to the United Nations SecurityCouncil for some form of punishment buteventually had to settle for a Security Councilpresidential statement that did not specificallyassign blame to the DPRK. Lee's defense

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minister declared anyone attempting to pose acounter argument, that the DPRK did not sinkthe Cheonan, guilty of “cyber terrorism.”30 Thisremark was perhaps aimed at the PSPD, theNGO which had urged the UN Security Councilto make a “fair and reasonable decisionconsidering all the grounds.” The PSPD letterdrew heavy criticism, particularly from ROKPrime Minister Chung Un-chan, who appealedfor the “whole country to show a single, unifiedstance” in the face of this tragedy.31

Challenges to the Investigative Result’sfindings have succeeded in injecting doubt intoits primary argument of DPRK culpability.These do not, indeed can not, necessarily addup to proof that the DPRK did not sink theCheonan. Determining that the torpedo differsfrom that generally used by the DPRK does notrule out the possibility that it was indeed firedfrom a DPRK submarine. These challenges do,however, indicate the urgent necessity forfurther investigation by a broad range ofexperts to establish the truth behind theCheonan's tragic fate. Such an investigationmust, of course, aim to uncover the facts,rather than attempt to establish DPRK blame,as appears to have been the primary objectivein the ROK's May 20 Investigation Result. It isunacceptable to hold the DPRK guilty, as didthe head of the Washington, D.C.-based AsianStudies at the Institute of Foreign PolicyAnalysis, James Schoff, on the basis of the viewthat “[the incident] is consistent with NorthKorea’s behavior in the past. It fits the goal ofthe conservatives [within the government],which is to try to raise awareness of a securitythreat."32 A comprehensive investigation, inaddition to establishing the facts of the sinkingand the place of the incident in the long historyof ROK-DPRK incidents, might also recommendways to reduce the chances of future crises inthe West Sea and in other areas of contentionbetween the two Koreas.

Korean War specialist Bruce Cumings suggestsa context for a more comprehensive

investigation. After noting the rather highprobability that a DPRK submarine did indeedfire the deadly torpedo, he describes theincident as “just another tragedy laid at thedoor of a division of Korea.” He continues:

And this particular incident is justripped out of context, the contextof a continuing war that has neverended. Just an armistice holds thepeace. But in the case of thispart icular inc ident , whichhappened very close to the NorthKorean border , we ’ve hadincidents like this… with large lossof life, going back more than tenyears. In 1999, a North Koreanship went down with thirty sailorsl o s t a n d m a y b e s e v e n t ywounded…. And last November aNorth Korean ship went down inflames….This is a no man’s land, orwaters, off the west coast of Koreathat both North and South claim.33

Why, one might ask, has this particular incidentdrawn so much more attention than those thatsank DPRK ships? Why, despite the series offatal incidents occurring in this hotly contestedarea, has there been so little discussion aboutresolving the disputed maritime line ofseparation?

Confrontational conditions have existed alongthe Korean peninsula since its division at theend of World War II in 1945. The exceptionallyaggressive attitude taken by the present ROKregime increases the potential for more tragicincidents—planned or accidental—between thetwo Koreas, which may also pull in allies onboth sides. The US-ROK refusal to participatein negotiations until Pyongyang apologizes foran incident it insists it did not commit, andtheir decision to pressure the DPRK by holdingmassive new joint war exercises and byinflicting still more economic sanctions,

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demonstrates macho but also greatly increasesthe possibility of more Cheonan-like incidents,and in the gravest scenario a second KoreanWar. The cause of the ROK warship’s sinking,whether hit by a DPRK torpedo, friendly fire, oras a result of other factors, runs deeper thanthe events that occurred on March 26, 2010. Itis but the latest in a series of tragic events thatmark the 65-year history of war, division andunresolved ideological and military battles.Th i s p laces respons ib i l i t y f o r th i sincident—regardless of its immediate cause—ina much broader perspective than simply DPRKmisbehavior. Investigation into the Cheonanincident thus must address the event as a pieceof this history, while remembering that, likeother events of this history, the decisions madewill impact future inter-Korean and greatpower relations.

Mark E. Caprio is a professor of history atRikkyo University in Tokyo and a Japan Focusassociate. He is the author of JapaneseAssimilation Policy in Colonial Korea,1 9 1 0 - 1 9 4 5(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0295989017/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20). He can be reached atcaprio@rikko.ac.jp. He wrote this article forThe Asia-Pacific Journal.

Recommended citation: Mark E. Caprio,"Plausible Denial? Reviewing the Evidence ofDPRK Culpability for the Cheonan WarshipIncident," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 30-4-10,July 26, 2010.

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T h e H a n k y o r e h(http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html), Russia’s Cheonaninvestigation suspects that the sinking Cheonanship was caused by a mine in water. July 27,2010.

S e u n g h u n L e e a n d J . J . S u h (

http://japanfocus.org/-JJ-Suh/3382), “Rush toJudgment: Inconsistencies in South Korea’sCheonan Report,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 28,1, July 12, 2010

D a v i d C y r a n o s k i(http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100708/full/news.2010.343.html ), “Controversy overSouth Korea’s Sunken Ship,” Nature, July 14,2010

J o h n M c G l y n n (http://japanfocus.org/-John-McGlynn/3372 ),"Politics in Command: The 'International'Investigation into the Sinking of the Cheonanand the Risk of a New Korean War," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 24-1-10, June 14, 2010

T a n a k a S a k a i(http://japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3361),“Who Sank the South Korean WarshipCheonan? A New Stage in the US-Korean Warand US-China Relations,” The Asia-PacificJournal, May 24, 2010

Notes

1 The Joint Investigative Group was composedof ROK civilian and military experts andrepresentatives from the United States, UnitedKingdom, Sweden, and Australia.

2 “Investigative Result on the Sinking of ROKSCheonan.” According to Hillary Clinton, this isthe shorter or summary version of a 400-pagereport that South Korea has neither released tothe public nor acknowledged. See JohnMcGlynn, "Pol i t ics in Command: The'International' Investigation into the Sinking ofthe Cheonan and the Risk of a New KoreanWar," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 24-1-10, June14, 2010.

3 Russia announced these results to the UnitedStates and China, but not the ROK whichlearned of the results indirectly through thesetwo countries. Lee Yeoung-in, “Governmentprotests Russia’s Conflicting Cheonan

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findings,” Hankyoreh.

4 Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubtssurface on North Korea’s role in ship sinking,”July 23, 2010, Los Angeles Times.

5 Victor Cha, “The Aftermath of the Cheonan,”Center for Strategic & International Studies(May 25, 2010).

6 S c o t t S n y d e r(http://yaeglobal.yale.edu/content:cheonan-attack-torpedoing-chance-of-peace), “The CheonanAttack: Torpedoing Chance of Peace?”YaleGlobal Online.

7 Bruce Klingner, “U.S. Must Respond Firmly toNorth Korean Naval Attack” (June 3, 2010).Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online.

8 Quoted in Democracy Now! The War andPeace Report (May 27, 2010). and TaniaBranigan and Justin McCurry, “Hillary ClintonCondemns North Korean Torpedo Attack,” TheGuardian, May 21, 2010 .

9 This letter was sent by People’s Solidarity forParticipatory Democracy (PSPD), a SouthKorean NGO that i s current ly underinvestigation by the ROK government.

10 The Seoul National Assembly consists of 291legislators. The final tally of the vote was 161for, 70 against, and 4 abstentions. Thus 54legislators, probably members of the oppositionDemocratic Party who walked out withoutparticipating, did not cast a vote. “NationalAssembly Condemns Cheonan Sinking,” ChosunIlbo (June 30, 2010) .

11 U.S. intelligence circulated this rumor,adding that it was “based on their sense of thepolitical dynamics there [in the DPRK] ratherthan hard evidence.” See “Report: Kim Jong Ilo r d e r e d C h e o n a n a t t a c k ”(http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/05/23/R e p o r t - K i m - J o n g - I l - o r d e r e d - C h e o n a n -attack/UPI-99521274593888/) (May 23, 2010).

12 “[Cheonan Warship Report 2] Eight questionsneeding answers on the Investigation of theSunken Naval Corvette Cheonan” (June 4,2010) .

1 3 Seunghun Lee and J.J. Suh, "Rush toJudgment: Inconsistencies in South Korea’sCheonan Report," The Asia-Pacific Journal,28-1-10, July 12, 2010.

1 4 Scott Creighton, “The Sinking of theCheonan: We are being lied to,” (May 24,2010), .

15 “Cheonan Investigators Presented WrongTorpedo Diagram,” Chosun ilbo (June 30,2010), .

1 6 D a v i d C y r a n o s k i(http://www.nature.com/news/2010/080710/full/news.2010.343.html) “Controversy over SouthKorea's sunken ship” (July 8, 2010), NatureNews.

17 Tanaka Sakai, "Who Sank the South KoreanWarship Cheonan? A New Stage in the US-Korean War and US-China Relations," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 21-1-10, May 24, 2010.

18 The continuation of these war exercisesthrough the time of the Cheonan’s sinking wasreported three days after the incident in“Korea, US Mount Largest Joint RescueOperations.” The Korea Times (March 29,2010), .

19 Kim Myong Chol, “South Korea in the line offriendly fire,” Asia Times (May 26, 2010) .

20 The DPRK does not recognize the NorthernLimit Line (NLL), which was established onAugust 30, 1953 by the United Nations after itfailed to reach agreement with the DPRK onpossession of the waterways surroundingPaekryong and other islands determined to beROK territory by the armistice signed onemonth earlier by China, the United States, andNorth Korea. Thus, the DPRK disputes the NLL

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rather than the ROK’s possessions of islandsnorth of the 38th parallel, as stipulated by thecease-fire armistice.

21 “S.Korea-U.S anti-submarine drill conductednight of Cheonan sinking,” The Hankyoreh(June 10, 2010) .

22 “Some Korean Religious Leaders QuestionConclus ions of the Cheonan s inkinginvestigation” (May 28, 2010) .

23 Ibid.

24 “Russia Wants ‘100% Proof’ N. Korea SunkShip” (May 27, 2010), Yahoo News; and“Russian Experts Unconvinced by CheonanE v i d e n c e , ”(http://www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/06/russian-experts-unconvinced-by-cheonan-evidence/)Intelligence Quarterly June 18,2010).

25 Christine Oliver, “China vow on S Koreanwarship strike” (May 28, 2010), FinancialTimes.

26 Sunny Lee, “China has different view onCheonan” (July 18, 2010), .

27 Various sources have noted division betweeninternational and ROK investigators, andparticularly the reluctance of the Swedish

participant to accept the findings. SeeMcGlynn, "Politics in Command.”

28 The ROK president used the history of hiscountry’s conflict with the DPRk as backgroundfor the present tragedy, and to request theinternational community’s continued support inits petition to the United Nations SecurityCouncil. “Keynote Address, Lee Myung-bak,The International Institute for Strategic Studies(June 4, 2010) .

29 “G-8 Countries Confirm Seoul’s CheonanStance,” Joongang Daily (June 28, 2010) . Thisresponse apparently did not gain Russia’ssupport.

30 "Defense Chief Calls Internet Rumors onCheonan 'Cyber Terrorism,'" Napsnet DailyReport (June 9, 2010), .

31 “Civic Group Challenges Cheonan Report atUN, JoongAng Daily (June 15, 2010) , Thegroup has been investigated over its letter tothe UN. “Gov’t Goes after Civic Group,”JoongAng Daily (June 18. 2010) ,

32 David Cyranoski “Controversy over SouthKorea's sunken ship”

33 Bruce Cumings’ interview is found atDemocracy Now (May 27, 2010).

(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0295989017/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20)

APJ | JF 8 | 30 | 4

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