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US reliance on other countries causes price spikes, trade disagreements, effect all sectors of the economy and heg

China has a monopoly --- that causes China bashingParthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf Minerals are a subject of much contention. On one¶ hand, the United States remains less prepared for ¶ supply

disruptions, price spikes and trade disagreements related to the global minerals trade¶ than most

experts realize. On the other hand,¶ public concern over reliable access to the minerals required in key

sectors of the U.S. economy , in¶ particular those needed to produce military equipment, is growing. Too frequently, however, such¶ concerns are based on inaccurate assumptions.¶ A sober and informed analysis suggests

there are¶ real vulnerabilities, which place critical national ¶ security and foreign policy

interests at risk . In¶ worst-case scenarios, supplies of minerals that¶ the United States does not produce

domestically¶ may be disrupted, creating price spikes and lags¶ in delivery. Even short of major supply disruptions, supplier countries can exert leverage over the¶ United States by threatening to cut off certain key¶ mineral supplies. The United States may also lose ¶ ground

strategically if it continues to lag in man¶ -¶ aging mineral issues, as countries that consider¶ assured access to minerals as far

more strategically¶ important are increasingly setting the rules for¶ trade in this area¶ China’s rising dominance is at

the heart of this ¶ growing public debate . Its 2010 cutoff of rare¶ earth elements ¶ 2¶ – a unique set of minerals that¶ are difficult to process yet critical to many high- ¶ tech application s – attracted particular attention.¶ After Japan detained a Chinese trawler captain¶ over a skirmish in the East China Sea, Japanese¶ companies reported weeks of stalled shipments of rare earths from China amid rumors of an offi¶ -¶ cial embargo. This may sound like a minor trade¶ dispute, but China currently controls production of¶ about 95 percent of the world’s rare earths, which¶ are critical to building laser-guidance systems for¶ weapons, refining petroleum and building wind¶ turbines.

Coinciding with possessing this incredible leverage over the rest of the world, China has¶ also reduced its export quotas for these minerals. ¶ For its part, the Chinese government contended¶ that it did not

put any formal export embargo in¶ place, and that its plans to reduce exports simply¶ reflect the need to meet growing domestic demand¶ for rare earths. Japan-China relations experienced¶ further strain in their already tense relationship. In¶ the United States, many reporters, policy analysts¶ and decision makers did not foresee this challenge.¶ Feeling blindsided, some in the United States characterized the situation in a manner that demonized ¶ China rather than using the

opportunity to better¶ understand the true nature of U.S. supply chain¶ vulnerabilities.The 2010 rare earths case and others are increasing¶ interest in critical minerals among U.S. policymakers . Congress held hearings on the strategic¶ importance of minerals between 2007 and 2010,¶ and the 2010 National Defense Authorization¶ Act required DOD to study and report on its¶ dependence on rare earth elements for weapons,¶ communications and other systems.¶ 3¶ During a¶ 2009 hearing on minerals and military readi¶ -¶ ness, Republican Representative Randy Forbes of¶

Virginia called minerals, “one of those things that¶ no one really talks about or worries about until¶ something goes wrong . It’s at that point – the point¶ where we don’t have the steel we

need to build¶ MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehi¶ -¶ cles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint¶ Strike Fighter] engine that the stockpile becomes¶ critically important.”¶ 4¶ In October 2010, Secretary of¶ State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that it would¶ be “in our interests commercially and strategically” ¶ to find additional

sources of supply for rare earth¶ minerals, and stated that China’s recent cuts to¶ rare earth exports

“served as a wakeup call that¶ being so dependent on only one source , disruption¶ could occur for natural disaster reasons or other¶ kinds of events could intervene.” ¶ 5¶ In January 2011,¶ Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, Sen. Lisa Murkowski,¶ R-Alaska, and Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., wrote¶ a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates express¶ -¶ ing concern for minerals required for producing¶ defense equipment such as Joint Direct Attack¶ Munitions

(JDAMs), which stated, “Clearly, rare¶ earth supply limitations present a serious vul nerability to our

national security . Yet early indications¶ are that DOD has dismissed the severity of the¶ situation to date.”¶ 6 Additionally, the Department¶ of Energy (DOE) launched a multiyear effort to¶ explore potential vulnerabilities in supply

chains¶ for minerals that will be critical to four distinct¶ areas of energy technology innovation.While concern is growing, the

media and policy¶ -¶ makers often focus too narrowly on what may seem¶ the most compelling indicators – usually import¶

dependence or scarcity – in prescribing solutions to¶ reduce U.S. vulnerabilities, in particular to supply¶ disruptions in critical minerals such as rare earths.¶ This focus is sparking protectionist attitudes ,

with¶ some worrying that import dependence poses an ¶ inherent risk to the U.S. economy . Discussion of¶ minerals also frequently focuses on supply scarcity¶ and resource depletion in absolute terms. However,¶ both the rhenium and rare earth minerals dis¶ - ¶ ruptions of the past five years were triggered by ¶ deliberate decisions made by political leaders to¶ leverage their positions of strength, not by market¶ forces, disorder or scarcities of these

minerals.¶ Countries often revert to hoarding , pressuring¶ suppliers and otherwise behaving as if scarcities¶ are present even when they are not, based solely on¶ concerns that shortages are likely in the near term.¶ In fact, neither scarcity nor import dependence¶ alone is sufficient to signal vulnerability, and a¶ combination of factors including concentration of¶ suppliers is most often required for mineral issues¶ to become security or foreign policy problems.¶ This report, based on two years of research, site visits¶ and discussions with stakeholders, explores how the¶ supply, demand and use of minerals can impair U.S. ¶ foreign relations , economic interests and defense¶ readiness. It examines cases of five individual min¶ -¶ erals – lithium, gallium, rhenium, tantalum and¶ niobium – and rare earth elements, such as neo¶ -¶ dymium, samarium and dysprosium, as a sixth group¶ in order to show the complexity of addressing these¶ concerns. Each of these minerals is critical for defense¶ technologies and U.S. economic growth plans . They¶

share characteristics with minerals that have caused¶ important political or economic concerns for the¶ United States in the past. Additionally, lithium is fre¶ -¶ quently cited in the media and in discussions of how¶

clean energy supply chains are critical to meeting ¶ America’s future economic , energy and environmental goals. Within the past five years, two of these cases¶ – rhenium and rare earth minerals – have involved¶ supply disruptions or important threats of disruptions for the United States and its allies. Each of these¶ minerals will require federal government attention in¶ the coming years.assessing¶ U.S. Vulnerability¶

Analysts vary widely in assessing the implications¶ of U.S. dependence on critical minerals, despite¶ broad

acceptance of the physical reality that mineral resources are finite and the economic realities¶ that requirements are ubiquitous and demand is¶ growing . On one extreme, some analysts believe¶ the 2010 incident between China and Japan sug¶ - ¶ gests an approaching Hobbesian world in which¶

resource demands outstrip supplies for minerals ,¶ nonrenewable energy sources and even food sup¶ -¶ plies.

History indicates that conflict over absolute¶ scarcities is unlikely. At the other end of the¶ spectrum, many still believe that an open market¶ and its invisible hand will continue to determine¶ winners and losers with no serious repercussions¶ or the United States given its purchasing power. In¶ between these extremes, even staunch pragmatists¶ will point to the 2010 China rare earths episode¶ as proof of one basic tenet: The United States and¶ other market-based economies no longer determine all the rules of global trade¶ Central to this narrative is a conundrum for¶ policymakers. Reserve estimates show that¶ global supplies of almost all minerals are ade ¶ - ¶ quate to meet expected global demands¶ over ¶ the long term ¶ , and for decades into the future¶ for most minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey¶

(USGS) indicates, for example, that world sup¶ -¶ plies of rare earths will be adequate for more¶ than 100 years.¶ 13¶ These estimates, however,¶ can be meaningless ¶ in the near term ¶ if supplies ¶ are insufficient, or if

suppliers reduce exports ¶ or otherwise manipulate trade. For example,¶ most experts project that global

production of¶ rare earths will likely be insufficient to meet¶ the world’s demand over the next two to three¶ years . The long-term sufficiency of supplies has¶ no practical effect because it takes years and¶ high capital costs to

start up new mining and¶ processing businesses for rare earths. Thus, the¶ risks of inaction are high . A range of

political,¶ economic and geographic factors can disrupt ¶ supplies and cause price spikes that

can create¶ rifts in bilateral relations , trade disputes , accusations of economic sabotage and

instability in ¶ countries that possess rare reserves of prized ¶ minerals. They can also give supplier countries¶ extraordinary leverage that can alter geopoliti ¶ - ¶ cal calculations, especially when single countries¶ control most world supplies For U.S. policymakers, the risks fall into two rough¶

categories: Disruptions, delivery lags and price¶ spikes that affect military assets and place

unanticipated strains on defense procurement budgets ; ¶ and lack of affordable access to minerals and raw¶ materials preventing important national economic ¶ growth goals. ¶ The defense industrial base in the modern era differs greatly from any previous time. Often, actual¶ scarcity is not required for problems to arise , as¶ concerns about future scarcities

often drive countries to behave as if shortages are occurring

In particular, dependence on China for rare earths results in China bashing and protectionist legislation towards China --- this escalates and collapses relations with China Eastman, 12 March 25, Scott, Policy Mic, “Why Obama And Romney Should Not Alienate China,” http://dev.policymic.com/articles/5929/why-obama-and-romney-should-not-alienate-chinaChina is far too important as a trading partner for elected officials and presidential candidates, such as Mitt

Romney, to alienate for political points. Anti-China rhetoric hurts American citizens by encouraging retaliatory , protectionist policies that discourage trade and make valuable resources more difficult to obtain.¶ The most recent reiteration of China’s importance to the United States has been a trade dispute over access to rare earth metals. The U.S. has joined the European Union and Japan in filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization to protest a Chinese trade policy that caps the amount of rare earth metals it exports. President Barack Obama accused China of breaking trade agreements and driving up the prices of rare earth metals. China is responsible for 90% of the world’s rare earth metal

production, and seven of these metals have been identified by the Defense Department as having military applications.¶ China’s cap on rare earth metal exports should be particularly concerning for America. If our need for these

resources increases dramatically or unexpectedly, China’s export limit will keep America from obtaining these resources until the U.S. finds a more reliable source . Since China controls such a large share of the rare earth metal market currently, however, trade relations with China are all the more important to the U.S. and its ability to

acquire needed resources. For this reason, the U.S. must find ways to promote free trade and discourage

protectionism in its trade relations with China.¶ Villifying China has not worked to promote positive trade

relations in the past. While protectionist policies within China cannot be blamed completely on rhetoric in the United States, there is a noticeable trend linking anti-China rhetoric within American politics and protectionist

trade policies within China that illustrate how “ China-bashing ” can damage U.S.-China trade relations. For example, Dan Ikenson of the Cato Institute suggests that economic hardship in the US amid the recession of 2008

created resentment at China’s comparably better economic status at the time. A feeling among Americans that U.S. policies had too leniently allowed for China’s economic growth led to calls for protectionism that strained U.S.

relations with China . American businesses in China also began to complain about Chinese policies that favored local Chinese businesses, leading these businesses to call for more protectionist policies. Obama acted on these sentiments by enacting a tax on tires to protect U.S. tire manufacturers in September, 2009. Shortly after, China threatened tariffs on American goods, such as chicken meat. This chain of events shows how anti-Chinese rhetoric and calls for protectionism in America have generated protectionist responses from China , which is in neither country’s best interest.¶

Demonizing China is not in the best interest of the U.S. especially given China’s economic importance, as demonstrated by its 90% control of the rare earth metal market, which the U.S. currently relies upon for military purposes. When anti-Chinese sentiment promotes protectionist policies, such as

Obama’s tire tariff in 2009, the U.S. risks losing a vitally important trade partner. Moreover, Americans are forced to bear the costs of protectionism by paying more for Chinese goods that are tariffed, all so politicians can protect American industries from competition.¶ A healthy trade relationship with China is in the economic interest of all Americans, no matter what politicians say. Striving for a more cooperative , less antagonistic

tenor in rhetoric regarding China will do much more to foster a cooperative , healthy trade relationship

with China than making China a political punching bag.

Tit-for-tat measures break down free trade and causes war and WMD terrorism Panzner 8 Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets , disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences . Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap tech nology and the waning threat of American retribution , terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of

their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely

assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel , for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts . Some observers, like John

Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological.

Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles

soaked in blood . Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the

basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or

nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker- busting bombs to cause widespread destruction . Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war .

Independent of protectionism --- shortages and crack-downs cause war --- the US needs its own sustainable supplyHinten-Nooijen, 10 Professor of Economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, “Rare minerals – The treasures of a sustainable economy”, http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/nl/over-tilburg-university/cultuur-en-sport/cwl/publicaties/beschouwingen/minerals/)Driving a hybrid car, using energy from wind turbines or solar panels. That are choices to contribute to the transition to a sustainable economy . Sustainability is the spearhead of many western policy plans. It is regarded as the solution to get out of the crisis. But ironically, the raw materials that are

needed for hybrid cars and wind turbines, for our technological industry as a whole, are not that sustainable. Necessarily required minerals like neodymium and indium are rare . And they are not

available in the west, China has almost all of them . And having this position of power, China wants to use it. That is about strategy. The high-tech raw materials play a central part in the highly industrialised high-wage countries to survive the global competition by technological excellence. Will future wars be about minerals instead of oil, territories or water ? THE BONE

MARROW OF MODERN ECONOMY Minerals are an indispensable material pillar of our current economies and societies. They are the natural product of geological processes and occur in the crust of the planet. Only a fraction of the known minerals exists in greater quantities. Some of these are mined, refined and processed; are broken up into their elemental components, which are recombined into different types of materials. These materials are used to manufacture products that form the backbone of our modern economies : from LCD displays to fighter

jets, from smart phones to electric cars. Without minerals, industrial society and modern technology would be inconceivable. That seems unbelievable, because we hardly hear or read about them in the media - whereas several research reports have been published recently. But imagine that by reading this article on printed paper or at your computer screen, minerals like nickel, chromium, molybdenum, gallium, selenium, aluminium, silicon and manganese were needed! And all these elements have to be first extracted from minerals, which in turn need to be mined from the earth's crust. CHINA'S GREEN DEAL In recent years, the world economy has grown enormously, and many new high-tech applications have been made. Moreover, the demand for minerals has exploded . Mining

tried to meet the demand. A global competition between countries and companies over rare mineral

resources started. Prices have shot up, countries have created strategic stockpiles or imposed export restrictions in order to secure supplies of these valuable resources. Mineral scarcity concerning the industry seems to be more of an economic issue than an issue set by limited resources. Minerals are getting evermore difficult to find and costly to extract - while they are the key to advanced sustainable technologies. Talking about sustainability seems not talking about China, because China is still building many polluting coal-fired power plants, and the social circumstances there are poor. However, recent developments also show progress concerning sustainability. And in a country like China these developments go faster than in many western democracies. Where we in the west talk and dawdle, they think and act strategically. In the United States, president Obama has to explain the Americans that forms of the New Green Deal are inevitable - like the situation in the thirties of the last century, when President Roosevelt made the so-called New Deal to reform the economy. Many Americans do not want the government to influence the market. They radically believe in the free market. In China, by contrast, the ideological separation between market and government does not exist. There is no Wall Street with greedy bankers, no neoconservative Grand Old Party that dreams of the cowboy economy. Decisions are taken quickly. And besides, they have to feed one billion people and develop a country that lived in Mao-ist poverty before. The Chinese are successful, after all, also in creating a sustainable economy: China does not only build old polluting power stations but uses the latest technology, with CO2- catch and -storage. And they are working on alternatives: windmills. In the next five years, they will build 100,000 windmills in the Gobi desert. Did they hate the wind in that area before, now they consider it the new gold. In the north-west area of China, the province of Gansu, the Qilian-mountains pass into the Gobi desert. There China is building the biggest windmill and solar panel park in the world. Six windmill parks with a capacity of ten gigawatts each are built, making China the biggest market of technology of wind energy, defeating the United States. "Red China becomes green China", party officials are saying. China has to grow, and so has the contribution of wind, water and sun at the energy market. This market would be interesting for foreign investments. According to Chinese officials they are welcome and can get subsidies. But, Beijing has decided that 70 percent of the windmills have to be made and designed in China. So it can be questioned if European and American companies have a fair chance in tendering for a contract. China considers itself a developing country and thinks that the western countries should contribute money to China to reduce the CO2 discharge. While America thought that energy saving is not worthwhile, China has taken an enormous energy-technological lead. The authoritarian and undemocratic but intelligent China exposes a variant of the New Deal. THE OPEC OF THE RARE MINERALS The example of China shows us that sustainable economy has everything to do with strategy and power. In a few decades China has been flooding the market of rare metals. The legend goes that president Deng Xiaoping had already predicted this in 1992, during a tour in the south of China: "They [the Mid East] have oil, but we in China have rare minerals". Nowadays, China indeed has 95 percent of the global supply of rare minerals. How did it do that? It was a result of good strategy: in the nineties, China flooded the world market with the rare minerals, although there was not that much demand. The west thought it okay because getting the minerals was a very expensive production process and the environmental legislation was very strict. The western competitors went bankrupt and they closed their mines. China became powerful. One of the centres of the rare mineral supply is around the city Baotou, an industrial city of two million people in Inner Mongolia. Here the states concern exploits almost half of the world storage of neodymium. DISRUPTION OF THE MARKET The lack of raw materials is not particularly a result of the geological availability but of disruptions in the market, because the developments of the

world wide demand for rare minerals are not recognised in time - as part of the stormy development of the Chinese economy and the expansion of technical developments - and because the minerals occur in only a few countries. Experts have predicted that in the next few decades the demand of neodymium will increase by a factor 3.8. China uses 60 percent of its exploitation for its own economy. What's more, the Chinese export quota become stricter every year . What happens?

Sudden peaks in the demand can lead to speculative price movements and a disruption of the market. "2010 will be the year of the raw materials", according to Trevor Greetham, Asset Allocation Director of Fidelity. Indium, a silver-white metal, which is not found directly in nature, but is a residual product of thin and zinc, is used in LCD displays for TVs, computers, mobile phones, and for led lights and the ultrathin and flexible solar panel. The price of this mineral multiplied tenfold between 2003 and 2006 from 100 to 980 Dollars per kilogram. The price of neodymium decreased from 11.7 dollar per kilogram in 1992 to 7.4 dollar in 1996. The market volume rose. In 2006 almost all of the world production of 137,000 tons came from China. By scaling back the export, prices rose, up to 60 dollar per kilogram in 2007. Imagine that for a hybrid car, like the Toyota Prius or the Mercedes S 400, you need at least 500 grams of neodymium for the magnetic power of the engine; and for the newest generation of wind turbines, the ones that are 16 meters high, you need about 1000 kilogram. That makes 60,000 dollars - for just a little bit of metal! Big business for China. At the same time, China makes further strategic investments: it took an interest in oil and gas fields. In August 2009, PetroChina paid 41 billion dollar to gain access to an enormous field of natural gas in front of the coast of Australia. And in September that year, it obtained a stake of 60 percent in the exploitation of fields of tar sand in Alberta, which might hold one of the biggest oil reserves in the world. And because China considers titanium a growing market, it took an interest of 70 percent in a titanium mine in Kenia - not only to build the Chinese 'Jumbojet', but also to provide Boeing with 2000 tons of titanium each year. By doing so, China might beat the competition in the battle for the market in green technologies. The 'free' market can be questioned. The mineral policies of China and the US both mention the usage of administrative barriers. These nontariff barriers involve regulations that seek to protect the national mineral extraction industry. As a result, it is much harder for foreign companies, if not impossible, to invest and gain a foothold in the national mineral extraction industry in these countries. The search for rare metals has become a global race: a mine in California has also been reopened, the mine of Mountain Pass. In 2008, it was bought by

a group of investors, the partnership 'Molycorp Minerals'. The process of bringing the old mines into use costs much time and money. What does this mean for us? Do we get more dependent of China? The 'Innovationplatform' in Rotterdam planned to build a unique windmill park in the sea, further from the coast and in the strongest sea wind than anywhere in the world. To build these windmills, we need rare minerals, the export of which is dominated by China. Part of the project is Darwind, which designed enormous windmills for at sea. But the umbrella company, of which Darwind is part, Econcern, was about to go bankrupt. Then, in

mid-August 2009 it was saved by the, surprisingly, Chinese XEMC. THE THREAT OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY

The transition to a sustainable economy involves underexposed elements like deficiency in minerals and shifting balances of power . They are the ideal receipt for geopolitical

instability. The new world order will be a balance between countries that do have particular

raw materials and ones that do not. The lack of indispensable minerals sharpens the relations in the world. The access to critical minerals is more and more an issue of national security, concluded the 'The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies' (HCSS) in its report about the scarcity of minerals (January 2010). The US, Japan and China are making a policy that tries to secure the supply of these raw materials. That will disturb the free market activity. HCSS thinks that large concerns will, with support of the government, compete more intensively with each other for access to these raw materials, e.g. by direct investments in areas rich in raw materials. Mineral scarcity will be an issue in the next decades, though it is uncertain when and to what extent. And we have to do something because a change in supply of rare minerals directly affects our current modern lives.

US-China war causes extinctionWittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S . government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in

Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between

nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred,

for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked,

they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense.

Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while

leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands.

Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

The recent WTO ruling failed to stop China from still implementing protectionist legislation --- China will continue to protect their industries and the US will begin to act outside the legal system --- the aff is key to solveWu, 4/2 Mark, assistant professor of law at Harvard Law School, where he specializes in international trade., “A Free Pass for China,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/a-free-pass-for-china.html?_r=0 Cambridge, Mass. — A World Trade Organization panel ruled last week that China’s export restraints on rare earth elements and other metals violate W.T.O. rules because they are discriminatory. Rare earth minerals are critical in a wide range of industries, from electronics and hybrid automobiles to petroleum and chemicals. Should the ruling stand, China will have to dismantle the discriminatory policies or face trade sanctions.¶ This ruling may appear , at first glance, to be a vindication of the strategy of turning to the W.T.O. to

fight Chinese protectionism. But litigation victories do not always translate into economic

victories, especially when the W.T.O. is concerned.¶ In 2010, China imposed quotas and other restraints to sharply limit exports of rare earths. Because more than nine-tenths of the world’s production of rare earths

occurs in China, price shocks hit foreign producers who rely on the Chinese minerals. Complaining that the export restraints were discriminatory and illegal, the United States, the European Union and Japan all filed complaints before the W.T.O.¶ China defended its actions by arguing that the export limits were necessary because of the environmental hazards associated with rare earths production. That environmental harm can occur is undoubtedly true, but the W.T.O. panel found this was just an excuse. The export restraints, it ruled, were designed to achieve industrial policy goals rather than promote conservation. In other words, China sought to limit its export of rare earths to give a leg up to Chinese manufacturers. It also sought to use cheaper domestic prices to entice foreign companies dependent on rare earths to relocate production to China.¶ The strategy worked. Chinese manufacturers in several industries relying on rare earths, such as wind turbines and chemicals, made formidable inroads against their foreign competitors. Foreign companies making products relying on rare earths, such as camera lenses and touchscreen glass, shifted some production to China.¶ Although the W.T.O. panel ruled against China, it did not require China to pay compensation. By design, the W.T.O.’s remedies are not retrospective. Workers who lost their jobs because firms outsourced production to China would receive no damages. In fact, so long as China eliminates the discriminatory elements of its policies going forward, there are no remedies available for the United States or the other countries. The main goal of W.T.O. dispute settlement is to force compliance with the law rather than provide economic justice for past harm.¶ The W.T.O., in effect, provides countries with a free pass to breach its rules temporarily. So long as a violating country ends its illegal policy

in a reasonable period of time following a final judgment, it need not worry about being punished.¶ W.T.O. rulings do little to dissuade China from continuing to take advantage of the free pass to

advance other unfair and illegal policies when the gains are large enough . China has done this in industry after industry, from semiconductors to electronic payment services. The approach typically involves contravening trade rules just long enough to allow domestic players to build up their market position without incurring W.T.O.

sanctions. China then undoes the policy and claims that it is respectful of W.T.O. judgments. But undoing China’s gains

afterward often proves difficult.¶ Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story¶ Continue reading

the main story¶ It may seem as though the solution to China’s flouting of trade rules would be to push for more robust remedies at the W.T.O. But retrospective remedies are not necessarily in the interest of other big countries like the United States. That is because they also lose cases at the W.T.O.¶ Beyond the simple calculation of whether China’s competitors would gain or lose more

with stricter punishments, there is also the political difficulty of implementing such a solution . Imagine

that having lost a cotton subsidies case to Brazil, the United States was ordered to pay compensation. Would the government claw back these subsidies from cotton farmers? Or would it try to convince the American public to shoulder the burden on behalf of cotton farmers through higher taxes or greater deficit spending?¶ Relying on the W.T.O. alone to fight back against Chinese protectionism is a losing strategy . The United States should employ an array of tools to ensure

that, even when our companies face discriminatory policies overseas, they are not tempted to relocate.¶ The United States should undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the minerals critical for strategic interests. The government then should play a major role in re-establishing a robust domestic supply

chain for such minerals . Such a strategy will take time to execute. In the meantime, stockpiles should be built to guard

against future attempts to use rare earths as economic leverage. The American Congress would do well to hasten its review of the bills introduced to reduce foreign mineral dependency.¶ Careful consideration should be given to whether government procurement policies can be altered to dissuade companies from succumbing to resource-based extortion by other countries. This may provide an opening to make it clear that companies that shift technology or jobs overseas in response to discriminatory export restrictions may hamper their chances of winning government contracts.¶ While court victories are satisfying, they are often not enough. This is doubly true when the legal system’s remedies are inadequate . When faced with unfair

competition, companies develop comprehensive plans beyond litigation to push back against such threats. So too should

governments. Otherwise, W .T.O. victories will prove hollow .

2AC REE = War

Reliance on China for rare earth elements initiates resource fights that cause WWIIIAnthony, 11 Sebastian, “Rare earth crisis: Innovate, or be crushed by China,” Lead editor at Ziff Davis, Inc. Owner at SA Holdings Past Columnist at Tecca Editor at Aol (Weblogs, Inc) Education University of Essex Extreme Tech, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/111029-rare-earth-crisis-innovate-or-be-crushed-by-china The rare earth apocalypse¶ The doomsday event that everyone is praying will never come to pass, but which every Western nation is currently planning for, is the eventual cut-off of Chinese rare earth exports. Last year, 97% of the world’s rare earth metals were produced in China — but over the last few years, the Chinese government has been shutting down mines, ostensibly to save what resources it has, and also reducing the amount of rare earth that can be exported. Last year, China produced some 130,000 tons of rare earths, but export restrictions meant that only 35,000 tons

were sent to other countries. As a result, demand outside China now outstrips supply by some 40,000 tons per year, and — as expected — many countries are now stockpiling the reserves that they have.¶ Almost every Western country is now digging around in their backyard for rare earth-rich mud and sand, but it’ll probably be too little too late — and anyway, due to geochemistry,

there’s no guarantee that explorers and assayers will find what they’re looking for. The price of rare earths are already going up , and so are the non-

Chinese-made gadgets and gizmos that use them. Exacerbating the issue yet further, as technology grows more advanced, our reliance on the strange and magical properties of rare earths increases — and China, with the world’s largest workforce and a fire hose of rare earths, is perfectly poised to become the only real producer of solar power photovoltaic cells, computer

chips, and more.¶ In short, China has the world by the short hairs, and when combined with a hotting-up cyber front, it’s not hard to see how this situation might devolve into World War III . The alternate,

ecological point of view, is that we’re simply living beyond the planet’s means. Either way, strategic and logistic planning to make the most of scarce metals and minerals is now one of the most important tasks that face governments and corporations. Even if large rare earth deposits are found soon, or we start recycling our gadgets in a big way, the only real solution is to somehow lessen our reliance on a finite resource. Just like oil and energy, this will probably require drastic technological leaps. Instead of reducing the amount of tantalum used in capacitors, or indium in LCD displays, we will probably have to discover completely different ways of storing energy or displaying images. My money’s on graphene.

2AC AT: No China Monopoly

China has monopolyDillow, 11 Clay, “Massive Undersea Discovery of Rare Earth Elements May Break Chinese Monopoly,” http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-07/japanese-researchers-claim-massive-rare-earths-discovery-deep-pacific-seabedThen there's the question of whether undersea mining of rare earths is commercially viable? It may be that getting to these seabed deposits is so expensive as to be prohibitive. Or the discovery might lead to the development of entire fleets of seafloor mining robots. Whatever the future developments may be, the immediate impact is limited: China's grip on the rare earths market is no less strong today as it was yesterday , and it's not likely to

change in the foreseeable future .

The US is currently reliant on rare earth elements---that threatens national security as China can cut down on them---we need to have our own sourcesHays, 12 Jeffrey, Facts and Details, “RARE EARTHS OUTSIDE OF CHINA: OLD AND NEW SOURCES, URBAN MINING AND ALTERNATIVES TO RARE EARTHS,” http://factsanddetails.com/world/cat51/sub325/item2399.html¶ Foreign companies and governments are scrambling to find new sources of rare earths as China threatens to further tighten restrictions or even ban exports of some elements and close mines.

Dudely Kingsnrth, an Australia-based independent rare earth analyst, told AFP, “ It’s crunch time , In the next few years, we

are going to be in a situation where [export and production] quotas are reduced and unless

we have sources outside China , more companies are going to have to relocate to China to secure access.Ӧ In the wake of China's tougher restrictions, alternative mines have been explored across the globe. However, economists predict that the world will rely on China for dysprosium in the foreseeable future. There are rare earth mines with minimal production in Russia, India and Brazil. Deposits are also being developed in Australia and United States. These will

produce about 50,000 tons of rare earths by 2014. This is not enough to keep up with demand , with some

analyst predicting a tight market starting in 2012 and severe problems if there are delays in the Australian

and U.S. projects.¶ James Lifton, an independent U.S.-based rare earths analyst, told AFP, “China’s goal is to create jobs in China and create goods in China . We need to start producing these metals here [in the United States] as we did in the past. If we don’t do that,

China will be the only country manufacturing devises using rare earth by the year 2015 .”¶ Ren Xianfang, a Beijing-based economist with IHS Global Insight, told AFP, “The government hopes the restrictions could prompt the transfer of advanced rare earth processing technologies into China. Whether this resource-in-exchange-for-technology strategy will

work in favor of China remains to be seen.”¶ Rare Earths and Other Countries¶ search for rare earths Although China

currently monopolizes rare earth mining (with 36 percent of the world's reserves), other countries have deposits too. Russia has the largest reserves of rare earths after China. According to U.S. government data it holds 19 percent of the world’s 99 million tons of commercially viable rare earths. The United States has 13 percent. Australian has five percent. Namibia, Mongolia, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Canada have substantial deposits as well. Kazakhstan is the world’s second largest producer of rare earths, but it produces only about 4.5 percent of the world’s supply. The United States and Australia mined rare earths in the past but stopped mining them because of cheaper competition from China.¶ Global rare earth reserves (total 99 million tons); 1) China (36 percent ); 2) former Soviet countries (19 percent); 3) the United States (13 percent); 4) Australia (6 percent ); 5) India (3 percent ); 6) Others (23 percent). [Source: Japan’s Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry, 2009]¶ Companies in Australia, Canada and Brazil are on the hunt for rare earth sites. Heightened interest in alternative sources has also been an impetus to plans to reopen or establish new rare earth mines in a handful of countries around the world, including South Africa, Russia Australia and Canada. An additional 40,000 tons is expected to come form non-Chinese sources in coming years.¶ The Lynas Corp, won the right to mine world’s richest non-Chinese deposit of rare earths, in Australia. It will be at least until 2012 before it is capable of mining the deposit. Other rare earth companies include China Rare Earth Holdings, Arafura resources, Alkane resources and Greenland Minerals and Energy¶ rare earths Brazil has the world’s largest know deposit of niobium. It is said to be

large enough supply the world for 500 years at current consumption rates. Some in Russia claim that Yakutia’s Tontorskoye in Siberia “is many times bigger in volume and quality than Brazil’s famous deposits.”¶ The European Union said it might 1) start stockpiling rare earths; 2) strengthen ties with African countries that have rare earth deposits; 3) take measures to discourage speculation of rare earths; and and consider nullifying most-favored-nation treatment to countries (i.e. China)that try to restrict supplies of rare earths and other strategically important raw materials.¶ Yoichi Saito of Mitsui believes that China will use it monopoly status in rare earths to crush competition. Although other places have reserves of rare earths, few places have significant refinery capacity. Refineries require a lot of investment to set and China could easily undercut prices of materials produced by rival sources. Saito told Times, “Many people are looking at establishing alternative refineries and sources outside China, but the investment is not necessarily a sound one because of the threat of price revenge by China. If new projects emerge as they have recently in Malaysia and Australia, China could just drop its prices and rivals are out of business.” China is also taking steps to corner the marker globally. In early 2009, for example, it acquired 25 percent of Arafura Resources, a Australian rare earth miner.¶ Some suggest recycling existing rare earths materials---known as "urban mining." Others are considering using substitute materials such as aluminum, copper and iron in place of rare earths.¶ Rare Earths in Greenland and the Sea¶ 20111201-Molycorp Pr_214px.jpg¶ Recently a large source of rare earth was found in southwestern Greenland in geological strata called the Ilimaussaq Intrusion. The find could enrich Greenland and make China’s monopoly on rare earth a thing of the past. The Ilimaussaq Intrusion lies on a desolate plateau and is thought to contain the largest known reserves of rare earths. An Australian mining company has the rights to mine the site and it plans to process about 50,000 tons of rare-earth-bearing ore by 2010.¶ In July 2011, Japan announced it had found abundant rare earth elements on the sea floor of the Pacific ocean. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported: “Mud on the seafloor in certain areas of the Pacific Ocean contains about 800 times the amount of rare earth elements found in deposits on land, a Japanese research team has reported in the electronic version of the British magazine Nature Geoscience. The nine-member team, which includes University of Tokyo Associate Prof. Yasuhiro Kato, said it located the deposits in ocean-floor mud at depths of 3,500 meters to 6,000 meters in central and southeastern areas of the Pacific Ocean.” [Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, July 5, 2011]¶ 20111201-Molycorp Pm_214px.jpg¶ The group believes deep-sea mud constitutes a highly promising source of these elements."If the technology to exploit them efficiently is developed, it would be possible for the deposits to become an alternative to land-based rare earth elements," Kato said. The group analyzed the elemental composition of more than 2,000 seafloor sediments, sampled from a wide stretch of areas in the Pacific Ocean during international deep-sea drilling projects in which Japan and the United States participated. [Ibid]¶ It found high concentrations of rare earth minerals, equivalent to those found in mines on land, in deep-sea mud 23.6 meters thick in the central Pacific Ocean, including near the Hawaiian Islands. It also found such deposits in southeastern waters around the French Polynesian island of Tahiti, in mud eight meters thick. Estimating from points where the sediments were sampled, the group believes the deposits are distributed over an area of about 8.8 million square kilometers in the central Pacific and an area of about 2.4 million square kilometers in the southeastern Pacific. [Ibid]¶ Rare Earths and Japan¶ Japan imports of rare earths from China accounted for about 82 percent of Japan's imports of rare earths in 2010.The Economist reported: “Japan imports more rare earths than any other country. Its electronics, fine-chemicals and car industries rely on them. A disruption of supply could paralyse the Japanese economy as much as an oil embargo or food blockade. And because Japan dominates some of the technological processes that use rare earths’such as polishing hard-drive platters with cerium oxide---interrupted access would be felt worldwide. [Source: The Economist, January 20, 2011]¶ Japan is the largest consumer of rare earths. It uses a fifth of the world’s supply. It is predicted to face a rare shortage of 11,300 tons in 2011. China’s rare earth exports (50,000 tons in 2009); 1) Japan (56 percent); 2) the United States (17 percent); 3) France (6 percent); 4) Others (21 percent) [Source: Japan’s Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry]¶ Japan gets 90 percent of its rare earths from China. Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, “Japanese companies generally avoid discussing their mineral holdings. But experts say that some manufacturers have been stockpiling rare earths, building inventories ranging from a few months’ to a year’s worth. In September 2010 the Japanese trade minister, said the government was considering starting a stockpile of rare earths as a buffer against trade interruptions. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ China Bans Rare Earth Exports to Japan¶ In early September 2010, when a major diplomatic row broke out between Japan and China over a group of disputed islands after a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard, China effectively imposed a ban on the export of rare earths and silicon---materials critical in the electronics and automobile industry and of which China is one of the sole suppliers---by initiating customs procedures such as requiring documents to be in Chinese, a deviation from usual practices, that halted the shipments. All 31 Japanese companies involved in the rare trade said their businesses had been hampered by the Chinese export restrictions.¶ Customs restrictions in rare earths remained in place even after the captain of the Chinese ship at the center of the dispute was released. An industry official said, though a trickle of shipments seemed to be seeping out as a result of uneven enforcement of the ban by customs officers at various ports. China has allowed exports of Chinese-made rare earth magnets and other rare earth products to Japan, but not semi-processed rare earth ores that would enable Japanese companies to make products. Finally, about five days after the captain was released China began to back down. The rhetoric was toned down. Customs procedures returned to normal and shipments or rare earths and materials resumed. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times, “Even before the Then came the trawler event. Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports were already in violation of agreements China made before joining the World Trade Organization. But the embargo on rare earth exports to Japan was an even more blatant violation of international trade law...Oh, and Chinese officials have not improved matters by insulting our intelligence, claiming that there was no official embargo. All of China’s rare earth exporters, they say---some of them foreign-owned---simultaneously decided to halt shipments because of their personal feelings toward Japan. Right.” [Source: Paul Krugman New York Times, October 17, 2010]¶ Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, The cutoff has caused hand-wringing at Japanese manufacturers, from giants like Toyota to tiny electronics makers, because the raw materials are crucial to products as diverse as hybrid electric cars, wind turbines and computer display screens. Japan’s trade minister, Akihiro Ohata, said he would ask the government to include a “rare earth strategy” in its supplementary budget for this year. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ “So what are the lessons of the rare earth fracas?” Krugman asked. “First, and most obviously, the world needs to develop non-Chinese sources of these materials. There are extensive rare earth deposits in the United States and elsewhere. However, developing these deposits and the facilities to process the raw materials will take both time and financial support. So will a prominent alternative: “urban mining,” a k a recycling of rare earths and other

materials from used electronic devices.” [Krugman, Op. Cit]¶ Japan Responds to Chinese Rare Earth Quotas¶ The Economist reported: “Two decades of economic impotence have convinced many observers that Japan is cautious and slow to change. But the country can move quickly when sufficiently provoked?...for example by... “China’s hoarding of rare earths. Since shipments of rare earths were cut off over the island dispute in September 2010 Japan Inc has sprung into action. [Source: The Economist, January 20, 2011]¶ “The big trading houses such as Sojitz, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi are securing alternative supplies, supported by state financing. Companies such as Toyota, Hitachi, Nidec and TDK are working to reduce or eliminate the rare-earth elements needed in devices. Recycling programmes are being studied. The government earmarked $1 billion from a stimulus package in November to secure supplies, including funding university research and projects such as robotic deep-sea mining.” [Ibid]¶ “A national stockpile of the kind that already exists for rice, cereals and petrol has been mooted. There is even talk of creating a generously funded agency to acquire stakes in non-Chinese producers, possibly using the country’s vast foreign-exchange reserves (at $1 trillion, the world’s largest after China’s). Japan’s prime minister has met his Vietnamese and Mongolian counterparts to discuss new production.” [Ibid]¶ “Japan has been suddenly spurred to action before. The environmental crisis in the 1960s, the oil shocks of the 1970s and the strong yen in the 1980s rallied bureaucrats, politicians, business leaders, the media and the public. High energy prices forced Japan to become one of the world’s most energy-efficient countries....Japan will remain dependent on Chinese rare earths for some time. The country’s resource mandarins say they have no specific target for reducing this dependency, though they reaffirm an earlier goal that Japan should control 50 percent of its mineral needs, including rare earths, by 2030. “[Ibid]¶ Japan Seeks Alternative Source of Rare Earths¶ The fallout over the Chinese fishing boat in waters of the disputed Senkaku islands in September 2010 and the blocking of rare earth exports, accelerated Japan’s quest for alternative sources of rare earths and development of technologies that didn’t need rare earths so it wasn’t so dependant on China for them.”¶ Days after the effective export on rare earths from China to Japan was imposed the Japanese Economy and Trade Minister Akihiro Ohata established a new rare earth policy aimed at diversifying Japan supply and stockpiling the materials. Ties were firmed up with Kazakhstan, the world’s second largest producer of rare earths after China, and Vietnam and Mongolia, two other large rare earth producers. Kazakhstan was told to send representatives to Japan as soon as possible to negotiate and expand its rare earth deal with Japan.¶ In November 2010, Sojitz, a large Japanese conglomerate, announced a deal with Lynas, an Australian mining company, to secure rare earths through 2020s. According to the agreement Sojitz would receive 70 percent of Lynas’s annual 22,000 ton annual rare earth capacity. In March 2011, a consortium of Japanese and South Korean companies---including Nippon Steel and JFE Steel of Japan and POSCO of South Korea’said they were buying a 15 percent stake in Companhia Brasileira de Meltalurgiae Mineracao (CBMM)---a major rare earth mining firm and producer of niobium in Brazil for about $1.7 billion. Sojitz is also negotiating the rights to a rare earth mine in Vietnam. The industrial conglomerate Sumitomo plans to work with Kazakhstan’s government to recover rare earth elements from uranium ore residues.¶ The Japanese companies Mitsui and Sumitomo Corp., are exploring the possibility of mining rare earths from deposits in Siberia that weren’t expected to be exploited until 2030. The company talked with government officials in Yakutia---an area of northeastern Russia the size of India with frigid winters and only about 1 million people “about mining deposits of niobium and scandium. [Source: Bloomberg]¶ Geoff Bedford of the rare-earth-processor Neo Technologies, told AFP, “We do not have a customer in Japan whose research and development group is not working overtime to figure out how to reduce, or eliminate, rare earths in their products.”¶ Japan has budgeted $1.25 billion---equal to the total annual rare earth market value---in 2011 to secure non-Chinese supplies. In October 2010, Japan and the United States agreed to cooperate to diversify suppliers after China announced it was going to curb exports. In February 2011, the Japanese government decided to give $360 million to 169 projects to encourages firms to cut their use of rare earths,¶ Japan Seeks Recycled Rare Earths from Urban Mining¶ The National Institute for Materials Science, a government-affiliated research group, says that used electronics in Japan hold an estimated 300,000 tons of rare earths. Though that amount is tiny compared to reserves in China, tapping these urban mines could help reduce Japan’s dependence on Chinese sources. Reporting from Kosaka, Japan, Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, “Two decades after global competition drove the mines in this corner of Japan to extinction, Kosaka is again abuzz with talk of new riches. The treasures are not copper or coal. They are rare-earth elements and other minerals that are crucial to many Japanese technologies and have so far come almost exclusively from China, the global leader in rare earth mining. This town’s hopes for a mining comeback lie not underground, but in what Japan refers to as urban mining---recycling the valuable metals and minerals from the country’s huge stockpiles of used electronics like cellphones and computers.” “We’ve literally discovered gold in cellphones,” said Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, a former land minister on a visit to Kosaka’s recycling plant.” [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ “In Kosaka, Dowa Holdings, the company that mined here for over a century, has built a recycling plant whose 200-foot-tall furnace renders old electronics parts into a molten stew from which valuable metals and other minerals can be extracted. The salvaged parts come from around Japan and overseas, including the United States. Besides gold, Dowa’s subsidiary, Kosaka Smelting and Refining, has so far successfully reclaimed rare metals like indium, used in liquid-crystal display screens, and antimony, used in silicon wafers for semiconductors. The company is trying to develop ways to reclaim the harder-to-mine minerals included among the rare earths---like neodymium, a vital element in industrial batteries used in electric motors, and dysprosium, used in laser materials.” [Ibid]¶ “Various players have tried to recycle rare earths and metals in Japan. Last year, Hitachi began to experiment to extract rare earths from magnets in old computer hard drives, though the company said the project was not expected to go into operation until 2013. But it is Dowa, the company that has mined in Kosaka since 1884, that has emerged as the field’s early leader. And it could not come a moment too soon for this town of 6,000, which is littered with the remnants of its old ore mines: tunnels overgrown with weeds, old railroad tracks, and an abandoned bathhouse where miners once sponged off the grime from their long days underground. The mines operated up to 1990, until a surging yen and international competition drove operations out of business. Now, portions of the old red-brick ore processing factories serve as part of Dowa’s recycling plant, which started fully operating two years ago.” [Ibid]¶ “It is important for Japan to actively tap its urban mines,” Kohmei Harada, a managing director at the National Institute of Materials Science, told the New York Times. He is an enthusiastic supporter of recycling efforts like the one in Kosaka. Apart from rare metals and earths, Mr. Harada estimates that about 6,800 tons of gold, or the equivalent of about 16 percent of the total reserves in the world’s gold mines, lie in used electronics in Japan. “Japan’s economy has grown by gathering resources from around the world, and those resources are still with us, in one form or another,” he said.¶ “But this form of recycling is an expensive and technically difficult process that is still being perfected. At Dowa’s plant, computer chips and other vital parts from electronics are hacked into two-centimeter squares.

This feedstock then must be smelted in a furnace that reaches 1,400 degrees Celsius before various minerals can be extracted. The factory processes 300 tons of materials a day, and each ton yields only about 150 grams of rare metals. Though Dowa does not disclose the finances of its Kosaka recycling operations, the company says that after a year of operating at a low capacity, the factory now turns a profit. Over all, net income at Dowa Holdings, which deals in industrial metals and electronic materials, almost tripled in the quarter ending June 30, to 6.52 billion yen, or $78.2 million, as global industrial production rebounded.” [Ibid]¶ Utaro Sekiya, the manager of Dowa’s recycling plant, said, “It’s about time Japan started paying more attention to recycling rare earths...If we can become a leader in this field, perhaps China will be the one coming to us to buy our technology.” Tabuchi wrote: “As Dowa has turned its attention to rare earths, a priority is developing ways to render neodymium, which is used in powerful magnets. Its extraction has proved costly. Neodymium is found only in tiny quantities in parts used in the speakers of cellphones, for example, making it a challenge to collect meaningful amounts, said Sekiya... Finding enough electronics parts to recycle has also grown more difficult for Dowa, which procures used gadgets from around the world. A growing number of countries, including the United States, are recognizing the value of holding onto old electronics. And China already bans the export of used computer motherboards and other discarded electronics parts.” [Ibid]¶ Rare Earths in the United States¶ Until the 1980s, the United States led the world in rare earth production, thanks largely to the Mountain Pass mine in California. "There was a time we were producing 20,000 tons a year when the market was 30,000 tons," Mark A. Smith, president and CEO of Molycorp, an American company that reopened a rare earth mine at Mountain Pass, told National Geographic. "So we were 60-plus percent of the world's market."¶ Tim Folger wrote in National Geographic, “American dominance ended in the mid 1980s. China, which for decades had been developing the technology for separating rare earths... entered the world market with a roar. With government support, cheap labor, and lax or nonexistent environmental regulations, its rare earth industries undercut all competitors.” Mountain Pass was closed in 2002 after an industrial accident and because of competition from China and environmental concerns. [Source: Tim Folger, National Geographic, June 2011 ]¶ The California deposit was discovered in the 1940s by uranium prospectors. It became the world's largest supplier of rare earths as the demand for europium, which is used for color television screens, surged in the 1960s. When the mine closed it left behind mounds of tailings, or leftover dirt, around the property.¶ Many wonder how the United States could let itself become so dependant on its rival China---and vulnerable to supply cut offs --- for strategic minerals like rare earths. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times, “You really have to wonder why nobody raised an alarm while this was happening, if only on national security grounds .

But policy makers simply stood by as the U.S. rare earth industry shut down. In at least one case, in 2003---a time

when, if you believed the Bush administration, considerations of national security governed every aspect of U.S. policy---the Chinese literally packed up all the equipment in a U.S. production facility and shipped it to China. [Source: Paul Krugman New York Times, October 17, 2010]¶ “The result,” Kugman wrote, “was a monopoly position exceeding the wildest dreams of Middle Eastern oil-fueled tyrants. And even before the trawler incident, China showed itself willing to exploit that monopoly to the

fullest . The United Steelworkers recently filed a complaint against Chinese trade practices,

stepping in where U.S. businesses fear to tread because they fear Chinese retaliation. The union put

China’s imposition of export restrictions and taxes on rare earths---restrictions that give Chinese production in a number of industries an important competitive advantage---at the top of the list.” [Ibid]¶ In October 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing research to address the supply of rare earths, saying the minerals were critical to energy, military and manufacturing technologies. The U.S. rare earths industry is hoping domestic mines will open. The U.S. Geological Survey has identified several sites, including Music Valley in Southern California, where rare earths could be mined. Congress is considering proposals, some pushing for loan guarantees for rare earths suppliers, to encourage more domestic research and production. [Source: New York Times, Los Angeles Times]

***Clean Tech Advantage

1AC Clean Tech

We are in a new race and Sputnik has just launched --- US is losing out on the clean tech race Friedman, 9 Thomas, won three Pulitzer Prizes for the NYT, NYT Foreign Affairs Op-Ed columnist, “The New Sputnik,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27friedman.html ///BDSYes, China’s leaders have decided to go green — out of necessity because too many of their people can’t breathe, can’t swim, can’t fish, can’t farm and can’t drink thanks to pollution from its coal- and oil-based manufacturing growth engine. And, therefore, unless China powers its development with cleaner energy systems, and more knowledge-intensive businesses without smokestacks, China will die of its own development.¶ What do we know about necessity? It is the mother of

invention. And when China decides it has to go green out of necessity, watch out . You will not just be

buying your toys from China. You will buy your next electric car, solar panels, batteries and energy-efficiency software from China.¶ I believe this Chinese decision to go green is the 21st-century equivalent of the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik — the world’s first Earth-orbiting satellite. That launch

stunned us, convinced President Eisenhower that the U.S. was falling behind in missile technology and spurred America to make massive investments in science, education, infrastructure and networking —

one eventual byproduct of which was the Internet.¶ Well, folks. Sputnik just went up again: China’s going clean-

tech. The view of China in the U.S. Congress — that China is going to try to leapfrog us by out-polluting us

— is out of date. It’s going to try to out-green us . Right now, China is focused on low-cost manufacturing of solar, wind and batteries and building the world’s biggest market for these products. It still badly lags U.S. innovation. But research will follow the market. America’s premier solar equipment maker,

Applied Materials, is about to open the world’s largest privately funded solar research facility — in Xian, China.¶ “If they invest in 21st-century technologies and we invest in 20th-century technologies, they’ll win, ” says David

Sandalow, the assistant secretary of energy for policy. “If we both invest in 21st-century technologies, challenging each other, we all win.”¶ Unfortunately, we’re still not racing. It’s like Sputnik went up and we think it’s just a shooting star. Instead of a strategic response, too many of our politicians are still trapped in their own dumb-as-we-wanna-be bubble, where we’re always No. 1, and where the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, having sold its soul to the old coal and oil industries, uses its influence to prevent Congress from passing legislation to really spur renewables. Hat’s off to the courageous chairman of Pacific Gas and Electric, Peter Darbee, who last week announced that his huge California power company was quitting the chamber because of its “obstructionist tactics.” All shareholders in America should ask their C.E.O.’s why they still belong to the chamber.¶ China’s leaders, mostly engineers, wasted little time debating global warming. They know the Tibetan glaciers that feed their major rivers are melting. But they also know that even if climate change were a hoax, the demand for clean, renewable power is going to soar as we add an estimated 2.5 billion people to the planet by 2050, many of whom will want to live high-energy lifestyles. In that world, E.T. — or energy technology — will be as big as I.T., and China intends to be a big E.T. player.¶ “For the last three years, the U.S. has led the world in new wind generation,” said the ecologist Lester Brown, author of “Plan B 4.0.” “By the end of this year, China will bypass us on new wind generation so fast we won’t even see it go by.”¶ I met this week with Shi Zhengrong, the founder of Suntech, already the world’s largest manufacturer of solar panels. Shi recalled how, shortly after he started his company in Wuxi, nearby Lake Tai, China’s third-largest freshwater lake, choked to death from pollution.¶ “After this disaster,” explained Shi, “the party secretary of Wuxi city came to me and said, ‘I want to support you to grow this solar business into a $15 billion industry, so then we can shut down as many polluting and energy consuming companies in the region as soon as possible.’ He is one of a group of young Chinese leaders, very innovative and very revolutionary, on this issue. Something has changed. China realized it has no capacity to absorb all this waste. We have to grow without pollution.”¶ Of course, China will continue to grow with cheap, dirty coal, to arrest over-eager environmentalists and to strip African forests for wood and minerals. Have no doubt about that. But have no doubt either that, without

declaring it, China is embarking on a new, parallel path of clean power deployment and

innovation . It is the Sputnik of our day . We ignore it at our peril.

China’s monopoly enables them to decimate US military, economic, industrial, and greentech primacy --- we need our own domestic supplyFLOYD G. BROWN, has written for the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Times, Townhall.com and WND.com. His latest book is Killing Wealth/Freeing Wealth, published in 2010 by WND Books, Floyd writes a weekly syndicated column about politics, culture and the economy, China is One Breath From Disarming the Entire U.S. Military, Western Journalism, 7-8-2013, http://www.westernjournalism.com/chinas-dangerous-rare-earths-monopoly/2///BDSOf all the power that China wields in the world today, its monopoly over rare earth minerals could have the most frightening impact. You see, rare earth resources are essential for producing high-tech products, renewable energy technologies and advanced weapons systems. In fact, without rare earth minerals, the United States would face a full-blown national security crisis. It was only a few

decades ago, during the Cold War, that the United States was an undisputed leader in the field. Yet as vital as these minerals are to our future, Barack Obama’s administration has no plan for re-building America’s capacity to produce and refine them. How quickly the mighty have fallen… Our supreme leader has no idea,

or even any desire, to get us back in the game. In fact, Team Obama doesn’t have a clue how to develop a domestic rare

earth supply. And That’s Not All Even beyond our ability to build arms, the rare earth shortages prevent us from building a sustainable, green energy future. Rare earth minerals are indispensable for building wind turbines and hybrid/electric vehicles. The Obama administration’s only solution to our vulnerabilities is bringing a case against the Chinese at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S. Trade Representative lodged a formal complaint with the WTO about Chinese trade restrictions on the rare earths, including export duties and quotas. These measures brought down prices for the minerals in China, although they increased prices for foreign firms. As a result, Team Obama is alleging unfair competition. Unfair competition is putting it mildly, in my opinion. The Communist party has understood for years now that rare earths are an area of strategic advantage. Deng Xiaoping made a cryptic statement all the way back in 1992 about his designs for the future: “There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China.” With huge rare earth deposits and world power – rather than profit – in mind, China began supplying our need for rare earths at dirt-cheap prices, which our own companies couldn’t match. Part of the Chinese strategy is to force American and Japanese manufacturers to relocate to China. Industries that depend on rare earth minerals also have the added benefit of having access to China’s supply at a lower cost. So medical device makers, automotive parts firms and green energy firms have pulled up stakes around the world and relocated to China. America needs a plan to restore our leadership. We need the capability to mine and process the minerals here. Sadly, even the ores mined here by our domestic producer, MolyCorp Inc., are sent to China for processing. Once our American ore is processed in China, it becomes subject to the Chinese export restrictions. Obama has resisted developing a strategic plan, and the reason is likely his slavish devotion to radical environmentalist interests that dislike any company with the name of mining or refining in it. Ironically, the lack of a domestic supply of rare earth minerals is stunting the growth of the green energy firms these same environmental interests are always touting. Members of the Armed Forces House and Senate Committees are deeply concerned, and they have some ideas. U.S. Senator Roy Blunt of Missouri recently said, “By encouraging the domestic production and refinement of rare earth minerals, we can reduce our dependency on other countries and encourage economic development here in the U.S.” The bottom line is, we need a strategy,

and the Obama Administration is failing to provide it. Congressional members must step in and take the lead. Until we have a strategy, we are hostage to the Chinese, and can only hope they don’t cut our supplies the same way they cut Japan’s after a territorial dispute in 2010. Right now, the Chinese have us over a dangerous barrel. Your Eyes on the Hill. Floyd G. Brown

REEs give the US the capabilities to transition to a green economy and renewable industries like solar and windInvestor Intel 13 (Investor Intel Admin, More please: The critical contributions of Rare Earth Elements to the ‘new’ economy, Investor Intel, 10-10-2013, http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/please-critical-contributions-rare-earth-elements-new-economy///BDS)Let me begin by clarifying, I am not an environmentalist, unless it makes sense economically. Irrespective of the deeply divided political squabbling in the US about the importance of renewable energy and clean technology to long-term economic and environmental challenges, there is a strong consensus among governments, the corporate sector, and investors that renewable energy will drive economic growth. However, even the most optimistic among

us regarding this developing industry (still very much in its early stages) must acknowledge one harsh reality: the sector faces challenges. Exceptional challenges. Long-established, highly profitable reigning industries (with tremendous influence among influencers), coupled with challenging financing hurdles are obviously obstacles to clean-tech expansion. But another drawback for clean technology is one that hasn’t received enough attention. In order to transition towards a cleaner,

healthier and more robust economy fueled by renewable energy and clean technology, rare earth elements (or REEs, subdivided into two categories; light rare earth elements or LREEs, and the more-valuable heavy rare earth elements or HREEs) have to be mined. REEs are needed to produce the requisite green energy infrastructure and associated products. That is a

bit of an understatement. Rare earth elements (metals, oxides, phosphors and other REE derivatives) are absolutely essential ingredients for creating the technologies that reduce US and global dependence on hydrocarbon energy sources. As most InvestorIntel readers are already aware, thanks to Publisher, Editor-in-Chief and ‘Queen of Rare Earths’ Tracy Weslosky, what makes rare earths ‘rare’ is not the relative scarcity (i.e. oil). Rare earth elements are considered rare because they occur, widely dispersed in the earth’s crust, rather than in concentrated ores. REEs (and graphite

and, soon, graphene will) provide critical contributions to renewable energy technology, including in

solar power, wind turbines, lithium-ion batteries, and all electric motors. Some wind turbines contain over 500 pounds of rare earth elements. Each and every Prius that rolls off the Toyota assembly line in Tokyo carries almost 30 pounds of REEs (Tesla Motors wasn’t able to respond by the publication deadline of this article). More people need to know that without rare earth elements, it would be completely impossible to manufacture the building blocks that operate these technologies. According to industry experts, with more supply, demand for REEs will increase. And, obviously, more REEs will be required as these technologies (still in their

respective early stages) become more and more mainstream. Wind turbines and electric vehicles, in

particular, rely on rare earths neodymium and dysprosium. A recent study conducted by a US private research

university concluded that global demand for neodymium and dysprosium will outstrip supply over the

medium- and mid-term if worldwide production does not increase by 8% for neodymium and 14% for

dysprosium. The conclusion? Present rare earth production is not increasing at a sustainable level. The problem of future access to rare earth resources is exacerbated by China’s recent imposition of REE

export quotas, which caused some users of REEs to charge REE surcharges to their customers. A shrinking supply of

REEs guarantees higher costs for industries desperate to be more cost-competitive and that are striving to improve performance, while lowering price (remember, the world expects the price of a particular technology to come down over time). The end result? This conundrum could set back wind and solar at a time when we need to advance them. Who, in their right mind, could say we do not need more energy diversity — especially in the long term?

US clean tech leadership is key to hegemony and warming --- the aff is key to turn America into a green-hegemon Klarevas, 9 Louis Professor of Global Affairs, Professor at the Center for Global Affairs – New York University, December 15, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony”, Huffington Post, 12-15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html

By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is

squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to

come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming

environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from

global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to

replace it as the international system's hegemon . But the greening of American strategy must

occur soon . The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time , unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon . Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding

and cheating global obligations . Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current

problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers.

The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens

American primacy and global stability . Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national

economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions . So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years .

That likely means more devastating water shortages , droughts , forest fires , floods , and storms. In

other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability.

Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this,

the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a

tremendous economic boom , while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check.

<insert warming impact>

2AC Dependence Bad

In particular, shortages and reliance on China for rare earth’s decks the clean tech development Vidal, 12 John, Global Research, “Shortages of rare minerals: China’s strategic control over terbium, yttrium, dysprosium, europium and neodymium,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/shortages-of-rare-minerals-china-s-strategic-control-over-terbium-yttrium-dysprosium-europium-and-neodymium/29033China’s near-exclusive access to terbium and yttrium sent prices soaring in 2011, potentially

hobbling clean energy industry ¶ Shortages of a handful of rare minerals could slow the future growth of the burgeoning renewable energy industries, and affect countries’ chances of limiting greenhouse gas emissions, business leaders were told at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week.¶ Last

year, prices of many scarce minerals exploded , rising as much as 10 times over 2010 levels before dropping back,

said PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).¶ Terbium, yttrium, dysprosium, europium and neodymium are widely used in the manufacture of wind turbines, solar panels, electric car batteries and energy-efficient lightbulbs. But because these “rare earths” are mined almost exclusively in

China , it is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to source them in the required

quantities . ¶ In a survey of some of the largest clean energy manufacturers, 78% told PwC said they were

already experiencing instability of supply of rare metals, and most said they did not expect shortages to

ease for at least five years. Currently, 95% of the rare earth minerals needed by clean tech industries come from China which has set strict export quotas. Last year China reserved most for its own for its domestic

wind, solar and battery industries, shifting costs to the US and Europe which do not mine any of the minerals.¶ Scarcity of the mineral resources could affect disrupt entire supply chains and countries’ attempts to meet emissions targets, said PwC. “The energy sector could face very great problems if the world turns to

[renewables] in a big way. In the short term, there will be major supply problem s. The availability of these metals

will define the growth of these industry sectors. There are so far not many alternatives ,” said Rob Mathlener, author of a report that urged companies to build future strategies around recycling and reusing resources.¶ Last December, Janez Potočnik, the EU commissioner for the environment, warned that the waste of valuable natural resources threatens to produce a fresh economic crisis.¶ None of the minerals is likely to physically run out, but it can take 10 years for countries to open new mines. In the US there has been growing concerns that China dominates the supply of the materials considered crucial for the expansion of the US defence, computer andrenewable energy sectors.¶ A series of US government reports have urged an immediate increase in production of rare minerals. By mid-2012, US mining company Molycorp Minerals aims to produce 20,000 tonnes a year of nine of the 17 rare minerals, or about 25% of current western imports from China.¶ Malcolm Preston, PwC’s global sustainability leader,

said: “ It’s a time bomb . Many businesses now recognise that we are living beyond the planet’s means. If these industries, supply chains and economies are disrupted by shortages in supply, then the ‘luxury of choice’ lifestyle many in the Western world have become accustomed to, will also be affected.”

2AC REEs Key

Rare earth supply problems kill renewable developmentJones 13 (Nicole, 18 November 2013, “A Scarcity of Rare Metals Is Hindering Green Technologies,” http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_scarcity_of_rare_metals_is_hindering_green_technologies/2711/, ADL)A shortage of "rare earth" metals, used in everything from electric car batteries to solar panels to wind turbines, is hampering the growth of renewable energy technologies. Researchers are now

working to find alternatives to these critical elements or better ways to recycle them. by nicola jones With the global push to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it’s ironic that several energy- or resource-saving technologies aren’t being used to the fullest simply because we don’t have enough raw materials to make them. For example, says Alex King, director of the new Critical Materials Institute, every wind farm

has a few turbines standing idle because their fragile gearboxes have broken down. They can be fixed, of course, but that takes time – and meanwhile wind power isn’t being gathered. Now you can make a more reliable

wind turbine that doesn’t need a gearbox at all, King points out, but you need a truckload of so-called "rare earth" metals to do Rare earth metals recycling Haruyoshi Yamaguchi/Bloomberg These bits of critical elements are bound for

recycling at a Mitsubishi subsidiary in Japan. it, and there simply isn’t the supply. Likewise, we could all be using next-generation fluorescent light bulbs that are twice as efficient as the current standard. But when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) tried to make that switch in 2009, companies like General Electric cried foul: they wouldn’t be able to get hold of enough rare earths to make the new bulbs. The move toward new and better technologies — from smart phones to electric cars — means an ever-increasing demand for exotic metals that are scarce thanks to both

geology and politics. Thin, cheap solar panels need tellurium, which makes up a scant 0.0000001 percent of the

earth’s crust, making it three times rarer than gold. High-performance batteries need lithium, which is only easily

extracted from briny pools in the Andes. In 2011, the average price of 'rare earth' metals shot up by as much as 750 percent. Platinum, needed as a catalyst in fuel cells that turn hydrogen into energy, comes almost exclusively

from South Africa. Researchers and industry workers alike woke with a shock to the problems caused by these dodgy supply chains in 2011, when the average price of "rare earths" — including terbium and europium, used in fluorescent bulbs; and neodymium, used in the powerful magnets that help to drive wind turbines and electric engines — shot up by as much as 750 percent in a year. The problem was that China, which controlled 97 percent of global rare earth production, had clamped down on trade. A solution was brokered and the price shock faded, but the threat of future supply problems for rare earths and other so-called "critical elements" still looms. That’s why the Critical Materials Institute, located at the DOE’s Ames Laboratory, was created. The institute opened in June, and the official ribbon-cutting was in September. Its mission is to predict which materials are going to become problems next, work to improve supply chains, and try to invent alternative materials that don’t need so many critical elements in the first place. The institute is one of a handful of organizations worldwide trying to tackle the problem of critical elements, which organizations like the American Physical Society have been calling attention to for years. "It’s a hot topic in Europe right now," says Olivier Vidal, coordinator of a European Commission project called ERA-MIN — one of a handful of

European initiatives that are now ramping up. "It's really urgent," says King. "We're facing real challenges today — we need solutions tomorrow, not the day after." Despite the high cost and high demand of metals critical for energy technologies, very little of this metal is recycled: In 2009, it was estimated that less than one percent of rare earth metals was recovered. Ruediger Kuehr, head of the Solving the E-waste Problem (StEP) initiative in Bonn, says that 49 million tons of e-waste are produced each year, from cell phones to refrigerators. Of that, perhaps 10 percent is recycled. It’s ridiculous to simply throw so much valuable material away, says Diran Apelian, founding director of the Metal Processing Institute in Worcester, A Belgian company now recycles 350,000 tons of e-waste a year, including photovoltaic cells. Massachusetts. "There’s something like 32 tons of gold in all the world's cell

phones," says Apelian. "There's a huge goldmine in our urban landfills." Getting the metals out of modern technology is a pain, since they are incorporated in tiny amounts into increasingly-complex

devices. A circa-2000 cell phone used about two dozen elements; a modern smart phone uses more than 60. "We’re making things more difficult for ourselves," says King. Despite the relatively high concentrations of rare earths in technology, he says, it’s actually chemically easier to separate them from the surrounding material in simple rocks than in complicated phones.

***Hegemony Advantage

1AC Industrial Base

Aside from clean tech, Dependence on other countries for REEs cause price rises that eviscerates our defense industrial base and economic competitiveness Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf The 2010 rare earths case and others are increasing¶ interest in critical minerals among U.S. policymakers. Congress held hearings on the strategic¶ importance of minerals between 2007 and 2010,¶ and the 2010

National Defense Authorization¶ Act required DOD to study and report on its¶ dependence on rare earth elements for weapons,¶ communications and other systems.¶ 3¶ During a¶ 2009 hearing on minerals

and military readi¶ -¶ ness, Republican Representative Randy Forbes of¶ Virginia called minerals, “one of those things that¶ no one really talks about or worries about until¶ something goes wrong . It’s at that point – the point¶

where we don’t have the steel we need to build¶ MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehi¶ -¶ cles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint¶ Strike Fighter]

engine that the stockpile becomes¶ critically important.”¶ 4¶ In October 2010, Secretary of¶ State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that it would¶ be “in our interests commercially and strategically”¶ to find additional sources of supply for rare earth ¶

minerals, and stated that China’s recent cuts to¶ rare earth exports “served as a wakeup call that¶ being so

dependent on only one source , disruption¶ could occur for natural disaster reasons or other ¶

kinds of events could intervene.”¶ 5¶ In January 2011,¶ Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, Sen. Lisa Murkowski,¶ R-Alaska, and Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., wrote¶ a letter to

Defense Secretary Robert Gates express¶ -¶ ing concern for minerals required for producing¶ defense equipment such as Joint Direct Attack¶ Munitions (JDAMs), which stated, “Clearly, rare¶

earth supply limitations present a serious vul nerability to our national security . Yet early indications¶ are that

DOD has dismissed the severity of the¶ situation to date.” ¶ 6 Additionally, the Department¶ of Energy (DOE) launched a multiyear effort to¶ explore potential vulnerabilities in supply chains¶ for minerals that will be critical to four distinct¶ areas of energy technology innovation.¶ While concern is growing, the media and policy¶ -¶ makers often focus too narrowly on what may seem¶ the most compelling indicators – usually import¶ dependence or scarcity – in prescribing solutions to¶ reduce U.S. vulnerabilities, in particular to supply¶ disruptions in critical minerals such as rare earths.¶ This focus is sparking protectionist attitudes, with¶ some worrying that import dependence poses an¶ inherent risk to the U.S. economy. Discussion of¶ minerals also frequently focuses on supply scarcity¶ and resource depletion in absolute terms. However,¶ both the rhenium and rare earth minerals dis¶ -¶ ruptions of the past five years were triggered by¶ deliberate decisions made by political leaders to¶ leverage their positions of strength, not by market¶ forces, disorder or scarcities of these minerals.¶ Countries often revert to hoarding, pressuring¶ suppliers and otherwise behaving as if scarcities¶ are present even when they are not, based solely on¶ concerns that shortages are likely in the near term.¶ In fact, neither scarcity nor import dependence¶ alone is sufficient to signal vulnerability, and a¶ combination of factors including concentration of¶ suppliers is most often required for mineral issues¶ to become security or foreign policy problems.¶ This report, based on two years of research, site visits¶ and discussions with stakeholders, explores how the¶ supply, demand and use of minerals can impair U.S.¶ foreign relations, economic interests and defense¶ readiness. It examines cases of five individual min¶ -¶ erals – lithium, gallium, rhenium, tantalum and¶ niobium – and rare earth elements, such as neo¶ -¶ dymium, samarium and dysprosium, as a sixth group¶ in order to show the complexity of addressing these¶ concerns. Each of these minerals is critical for defense¶ technologies and U.S. economic growth plans. They¶ share characteristics with minerals that have caused¶ important political or economic concerns for the¶ United States in the past. Additionally, lithium is fre¶ -¶ quently cited in the media and in discussions of how¶ clean energy supply chains are critical to meeting¶ America’s future economic, energy and environmental goals. Within the past five years, two of these cases¶ – rhenium and rare earth minerals – have involved¶ supply disruptions or important threats of disruptions for the United States and its allies. Each of these¶ minerals will require federal government attention in¶ the coming years.¶ assessing¶ U.S. Vulnerability¶ Analysts vary widely in assessing the implications¶ of U.S. dependence on critical minerals, despite¶ broad acceptance of the physical reality that mineral resources are finite and the economic realities¶ that requirements are ubiquitous and demand is¶ growing. On one extreme, some analysts believe¶ the 2010 incident between China and Japan sug¶ -¶ gests an approaching Hobbesian world in which¶ resource demands outstrip supplies for minerals,¶ nonrenewable energy sources and even food sup¶ -¶ plies. History indicates that conflict over absolute¶ scarcities is unlikely. At the other end of the¶ spectrum, many still believe that an open market¶ and its invisible hand will continue to determine¶ winners and losers with no serious repercussions¶ or the United States given its purchasing power. In¶ between these extremes, even staunch pragmatists¶ will point to the 2010 China rare earths episode¶ as proof of one basic tenet: The United States and¶ other market-based economies no longer determine all the rules of global trade¶ Central to this narrative is a conundrum for¶ policymakers. Reserve estimates show that¶ global supplies of almost all minerals are ade¶ -¶ quate to meet expected global demands¶ over¶ the long term¶ , and for decades into the future¶ for most minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey¶ (USGS) indicates, for example, that world sup¶ -¶ plies of rare earths will be adequate for more¶ than 100 years.¶ 13¶ These estimates, however,¶ can be meaningless¶ in the near term¶ if supplies¶ are insufficient, or if suppliers reduce exports¶ or otherwise manipulate trade. For example,¶ most experts project that global production of¶ rare earths will likely be insufficient to meet¶ the world’s demand over the next two to three¶ years. The long-term sufficiency of supplies has¶ no practical effect because it takes years and¶ high capital costs to start up new mining and¶ processing businesses for rare earths. Thus, the¶ risks of inaction are high. A range of political,¶ economic and geographic factors can disrupt¶ supplies and cause price spikes that can create¶ rifts in bilateral relations, trade disputes, accusations of economic sabotage and instability in¶ countries that possess rare reserves of prized¶ minerals. They can also give supplier countries¶ extraordinary leverage that can alter

geopoliti¶ -¶ cal calculations, especially when single countries¶ control most world supplies¶ For U.S. policymakers, the risks fall into two rough¶ categories: Disruptions, delivery lags and price¶ spikes that affect military assets and place unanticipated strains on defense

procurement budgets ; ¶ and lack of affordable access to minerals and raw¶ materials preventing important national economic¶ growth goals. ¶ The defense industrial base in the modern era differs greatly from any previous time. Often, actual¶ scarcity is not required for problems to

arise , as¶ concerns about future scarcities often drive countries to behave as if shortages are

occurring . The¶ National Academies recently reported, “The risk¶ of supply interruption arguably has increased or,¶ at the very

least, has become different from the¶ mor---e traditional threats associated with the more ¶ familiar ideas of war and conflict.”¶ 14¶ During World¶ War I and World War II, for example, governments¶ counted on domestic steel production – and even¶ civilian willingness to

contribute scrap materi¶ -¶ als for reuse and recycling – for tanks and other¶ equipment. In contrast, modern warfare relies on¶ globalized and privatized supply chains rather than¶ a primarily domestic (and often government-run)¶ network. Vulnerability to mineral supply disrup¶ - ¶ tions is likewise far broader and more complicated ¶ than it was in previous eras.¶ Policymakers should also consider minerals that¶ play uniquely important roles in the American¶ economy. Rare earths, for example, are important¶ in petroleum refining, which today

enables the¶ smooth functioning of the economy . Looking to¶ the longer term, much concern is turning

toward¶ minerals that may see booming demand as the ¶ economy develops a greater reliance on energy¶ efficiency and renewable energy technologies ,¶ such as the lithium used in advanced batteries¶ and hybrid and electric vehicles.

These minerals¶ will directly affect U.S. economic competitiveness, and plans for improving

economic growth ¶ and job development. ¶ This vulnerability is not a new concern. Since the¶ early 1900s, U.S. defense analysts and national¶ policymakers

have worried about U.S. vulnerabili¶ -¶ ties to supply disruptions of the minerals critical¶ to manufacturing defense systems, from tanks¶ and munitions to communications equipment.¶ These concerns were generally heightened in war¶ -¶ time. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting¶ Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and related oil cri¶ -¶ ses of the 1970s further brought into question the¶ assumption that the United States could depend¶ on imports, as it became apparent that broader¶ global conditions and political decisions by other¶ countries could dramatically hinder the U.S. abil¶ -¶ ity to openly purchase sufficient commodities at¶ affordable costs. This conclusion was reinforced¶ when supply disruptions and threats of disruptions¶ by apartheid-era South Africa, the hostile Soviet¶ Union and its satellites led to a

wave of congressio¶ -¶ nal hearings, government reports and independent¶ analysis of the conditions contributing to U.S.¶ vulnerability Following these Cold War-era events, policy¶ - ¶ makers held hearings and commissioned studies ¶ in order to understand which specific factors¶ were most important in signaling that U.S. eco ¶ nomic and security interests may be in jeopardy.¶ American analysts generally agreed that the following factors were the most important to track:¶ Level of substitutes and the uniqueness of spe¶ -¶ •¶ cific minerals.¶ Level of U.S.

domestic supplies and dependence¶ on foreign sources. ¶ Geographic concentration of supplies.¶ •¶ Stability of producing countries and

their region.¶ •¶ Distances and routes of supply chains.¶ •¶ Availability of technology to recover and process¶ •¶ the minerals.¶ Economic price of the resources themselves.¶ •¶ Inability of foreign governments to coordinate¶ •¶ minerals policies.¶ Level of domestic demand in producing¶ •¶ countries.¶ Some of these concerns remain today, but changes¶ in technology, economics and the international¶

security environment will pose new challenges as¶ well. Analysts often pinpoint China’s rising resource¶ Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of

U.S. Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 12¶ |¶ demand as the major new cause for concern, yet¶ limited transparency and the changing nature of¶ the defense industrial base and the broader economy will also affect U.S. mineral supplies in the¶ coming decades. Looking forward, major concerns¶ for the U.S. government will include: Lack of suffi¶ - ¶ cient information for policymakers ; understanding¶ the evolving energy

paradigm; increasing exploration of space and seabed territory ; and a changing¶ defense industrial base.¶ Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of U.S.

Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 12¶ |¶ demand as the major new cause for concern, yet¶ limited transparency and the changing nature

of¶ the defense industrial base and the broader econ¶ -¶ omy will also affect U.S. mineral supplies in the¶ coming decades. Looking forward, major concerns¶ for the U.S. government will include: Lack of suffi¶ -¶ cient information for policymakers; understanding¶ the evolving energy paradigm; increasing explora¶ -¶ tion of space and seabed territory; and a changing¶ defense industrial base.¶ Poor information is a

major obstacle to address¶ -¶ ing critical mineral vulnerabilities, and it is¶ creating conditions in which hype could drive¶ policy debates. For example, the media and oth¶ -¶ ers focused heavy attention throughout 2009¶ and 2010 on Bolivia’s potentially large lithium¶ supplies, often noting the populist, and at times¶ erratic,

behavior of the Bolivian president as¶ a reason for great concern over future lithium¶ availability. In reality, many independent experts¶ agree that reliable exporters such as Chile and¶ Argentina will prove to be the most important¶ lithium suppliers for years, and supply gluts in¶ the lithium market will continue for the foresee¶ -¶ able future even in the face of rising demand. Yet¶ the popular media focus on lithium rarely, if ever,¶ includes this market information.¶ 16¶ Identifying when and how mineral supply disrup¶ -¶ tions (or threats of disruptions) could affect U.S.¶ defense industries or foreign relations is further¶ complicated by both often-long global supply chains¶ and the nature of transactions. In some cases, natu¶ -¶ ral disasters or strikes halt production at specific¶ mines that produce large proportions of global¶

supplies. In murkier cases, “disruptions” manifest¶ as long contracting or legal delays (often intentional,¶ for pricing or political reasons) or long lags in¶ delivery. Whether disruptions are abrupt and clear,¶ or long and uncertain, delivery times and prices of¶ important energy technologies and military equip ¶ - ¶ ment can rise

significantly . Today’s global supply¶ chains are incredibly efficient, as companies have¶ worked to reduce the slack in their transit

routes¶ and shipping plans. This efficiency can save energy¶ and money, but as infrastructure, routes and people¶ are taken out of service, it also reduces

options when¶ things go wrong.¶ 17¶ Four other trends are changing the ways in which¶ minerals affect U.S. security and foreign policy¶ interests.¶ Rare earth minerals are key to clean tech and electric grid

security ¶ Efforts to develop alternative energy sources¶ will influence the global demand for

minerals .¶ Governments around the world are promoting a¶ more sustainable , lower-carbon

energy paradigm ¶ that includes increasing adoption of renewable¶ energy sources, energy efficiency technologies,¶ advanced batteries and other products . Just as¶ rare earths and other minerals are critical to¶ petroleum production, developing and manufac¶ - ¶ turing wind turbines , solar energy systems

and¶ efficient batteries on a large scale will drive new ¶ mineral demands. In particular, energy

storage¶ will be critical in the coming decades for military- ¶ specific energy innovation ,

electric grid security ,¶ clean energy development and much more. As¶ a result, the Obama administration has already¶ identified

energy storage as a key technology area¶ for research and development investment. The¶ Department of Energy has increased loans and¶ grants related to energy storage, and DOD has¶ begun fielding

renewable energy generation and¶ advanced energy storage units in Afghanistan.¶ Such significant investments in research and¶ development are likely to produce new technolo¶ - ¶ gies that trigger major changes in global mineral ¶ requirements over the decades ahead, making it¶ crucial for the U.S. government to monitor min ¶ - ¶ eral supply chains¶ Due to requirements for advanced technologies¶ and components that can withstand extreme¶ conditions, the expansion of countries’ space¶ capabilities over the coming decades will

influence¶ demand for critical minerals. A range of nations¶ – from India to Iran – aim to bolster their reputa¶ -¶ tions as space powers and develop more advanced¶ satellite systems and launch capabilities. The¶ U.S. government must therefore expect demand¶ growth (and potentially growth that is not linear¶ or predictable) for minerals like rare earths that¶ are critical in space technologies. On the supply¶ side, many countries are considering the possibil¶ -¶ ity of mining space objects, and even the 2010 U.S.¶ National Space Policy suggests that the United¶ States should “identify potentially resource-rich¶ planetary

objects.”¶ Given the state of the modern defense industrial¶ base, the National Academies of Science deter¶ -¶ mined in 2008, “The Department of Defense¶ appears not to fully understand its needs for ¶ specific materials or to have adequate information¶ on their supply.” ¶ 19¶ In the information age, the U.S.¶ military increasingly relies on dual-use equipment and depends on globalized supply chains .¶ Military equipment for the

modern battlefield¶ includes communications technologies , robotics ,¶ computer systems and

space assets that are used¶ by DOD, civilian government agencies and private ¶ enterprises alike. Indeed, a 2008 Defense Science¶ Board report noted, “Military-relevant technol¶ -¶ ogy will continue to change rapidly and will be¶ increasingly global.”¶ 20¶ Defense supply chains are,¶ therefore, less distinct from those in the broader¶ economy as they once were, and the dual-use¶ nature of a broad range of

assets also means that¶ many supply chains are more globalized t han ever . ¶ Moreover, “higher risk of and

uncertainty about¶ supply disruptions owing to the fragmentation ¶ of global supply chains” ¶ 21¶

can further threaten¶ assured access to critical minerals . Much of¶ today’s defense equipment is purchased directly¶ from civilian vendors and designed to

meet both¶ civilian and military needs. Consider modern¶ warfare’s dependence on computer systems, ¶ satellites, radar and Global Positioning System.¶ The National Academies study notes, “The glo¶ -¶ balization of materials production and supply¶ has radically changed the ability of the

United¶ States to produce and to procure materials vital to¶ defense needs,” and that the stockpiling system is¶ inadequate given today’s global supply systems¶ These risks, coupled with long-enduring vulnerabilities, are heightening concerns about U.S. ¶ access to minerals . We

can gain an even deeper¶ understanding of the security challenges involved¶ by examining specific minerals in detail.

The industrial base formulates the underpinning of US military powerNational Aerospace Week 10 September 18, “Aerospace and Defense: The Strength to Lift America,” http://www.nationalaerospaceweek.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/whitepaper.pdf The beginning of a new decade presents the defense industry with challenges that aren’t new, but are becoming more urgent.

Developing a national strategy to ensure a robust industrial base and modernizing our

military hardware must become frontburner priorities . The health of the industrial base is at

the heart of our ability to supply our nation with the weapons systems it requires . As we wrote in our landmark study on the industrial base in 2009: “Military technologies used to be much more closely related to civilian technologies. They even used common production processes. But because DOD is today the sole customer for industry’s most advanced capabilities, the defense industrial base is increasingly specialized and separate from the general manufacturing and technology sectors. That means even a healthy general economy will not necessarily help underwrite the industrial capabilities DOD most needs.” A huge step forward was made this year when the industrial base was included in the Quadrennial Defense Review as a factor to be considered in its long-term planning. We’re optimistic that the next step — inclusion of industrial base considerations in program plans and policy — will be executed as directed by the QDR — ensuring that it becomes incorporated into long-range

defense plans. However, we remain concerned about the fragility of the supplier base. With another round of acquisitions and consolidations imminent along with a projected decline in defense

spending, the supplier base remains particularly vulnerable . These small businesses are critical to the primes and to the government. They face multiple challenges overcoming barriers to federal contracting and once they leave the contracting base, they and their unique skills cannot be recovered. 2010 Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. 4 Along with our concern about the industrial base is the long-term issue of modernizing our military hardware. The 1980s defense build-up is now 25 years old, and systems acquired then are in need of replacement. The decade of 2010-19 is the crucial time to reset, recapitalize and modernize our military forces. Not only are many of our systems reaching the end of their designed lives, but America’s military forces are using their equipment at many times the programmed rates in the harsh conditions of combat, wearing out equipment prematurely . Delaying modernization will make it even harder to identify and effectively address global threats in the future . The requirement s identified in the QDR — for the United States to overmatch potential adversaries and to execute long-duration campaigns in coming years against increasingly capable potential opponents — will require complex and expensive aerospace capabilities. This is a concern that the Defense Department recognizes. Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has said that the department is looking to develop a “family of systems” for future strike options that will be supported by the “family of industry.” 9 This is welcome news. However, defense modernization is not optional. While the fiscal 2011 budget request is a reasonable target that takes into account funding needed to fight two wars, the pressure on the procurement and research and development budget is sure to increase in the future. At the same time, America must adapt its defenses to new kinds of threats. A large-scale attack on information networks could pose a serious economic threat, impeding or preventing commerce conducted electronically. This would affect not only ATM transactions, but commercial and governmental fund transfers and the just-in-time orders on which the manufacturing sector depends. It could even pose threats to American lives, interrupting the transfer of medical data, disrupting power grids, even disabling emergency communications links. In partnership with the government, our industry is on the forefront of securing these networks and combating cyber attack. The American people also demand better security for the U.S. homeland, from gaining control of our borders to more effective law enforcement and disaster response. The aerospace industry provides the tools that help different forces and jurisdictions communicate with each other ; monitor critical facilities and unpatrolled borders, and give advance warning of natural disasters, among other capabilities. In many cases, government is

the only market for these technologies. Therefore, sound government policy is essential not only to maintain current capabilities, but to ensure that a technology and manufacturing base exists to develop new ones.

Strong industrial base is critical to naval power Eaglen and McGrath, 11 Mackenzie,- research fellow for national security studies Brian,- retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia “Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy” 5-16 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy) Recapturing Innovation and a Sound Industrial Policy. Despite the fact that “industrial policy” became a dirty word from its

association with socialist governments during the Cold War, Congress needs to prevent the loss of innovation

in defense-related research and development. Members should already know and be alarmed that the U.S. military has no manned aircraft under development—a first in the history of aviation. Similarly, no surface ships or attack submarines are in the design phase. With development cycles lasting 20 years or longer, elected leaders need to ensure that the Defense Department is not losing critical skills that will be needed to imagine and

build the next generation of ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons for the U.S. Navy . The critical workforce ingredients needed to sustain an industrial base capable of building next-generation systems are specialized design, engineering, and manufacturing skills. The growth of the defense industry after World War II peaked in the late 1950s when defense production became a leading sector of the national economy, a trend that continued well into the 1980s. This period was also marked by an increased focus on developing advanced defense technologies. By 1960, the federal government was responsible for 58 percent of the nation’s research and development investments. This emphasis required a new level of engineering skills and capabilities within the industry to develop the complex defense systems the government sought to build. Since World War II, the

United States has benefited from the skills of a robust defense industrial and manufacturing workforce. For more than six decades, various U.S. defense strategies have emphasized the benefits of a technologically superior military to help to deter and win wars . The U.S. military has pursued this “technical overmatch” for decades in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the U.S. in conflict and to reduce risk and loss of life on the battlefield. When the Cold War ended in 1991, the sudden apparent dissolution of national security threats prompted a period of intense downsizing and consolidation. Whereas more than 50 major defense firms dominated the market in the early 1990s, only six prime contractors remain today. Contrary to popular perception, 60 percent to 75 percent of work programs in the aerospace and defense industries are performed by sub-prime companies and lower-tier suppliers, not the big defense contractors. These small companies are increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of defense budgets, and reductions in

defense research and development will cause them to disappear along with their tooling and skills. An expected, the emerging round of consolidation of the defense industry has increased the burden on the small collection of defense companies. The consolidation of major defense contractors has generally reduced the number of available workers. Already at a turning point, the potential closure of major defense manufacturing lines in the next five years with no additional scheduled production could shrink this national asset even further. While the manufacturing workforce alone should not dictate congressional defense acquisition decisions, Congress needs to consider the potential defense “brain drain” when determining whether or not to shut down major production lines permanently, particularly in shipbuilding and aerospace. More often than not, once these highly skilled workers leave the federal workforce, they are difficult to recruit back and even more expensive to retrain. This dynamic creates significant project gaps.

Naval power solves hegemony, alliances, SLOC insecurity, and global conflictCropsey 10- Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, (Seth Strategic Analysis Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2010, 35–45)The cooperative arrangements with foreign navies envisioned by the Navy’s cur- rent maritime strategy may perhaps moderate problems of failing states and terror. But is this enough to manage other challenges? Is the Navy’s current organization capable of addressing both conventional and asymmetric threats? Can today’s highly structured and inflexible system for designing and building ships adapt quickly and cost-effectively to changes in the strategic environment? What, for example, do globalization, the growing dependence of the United States on sea-borne transit for strategic resources and minerals, and the likelihood of more dislocations such as con- tinue from Somali piracy mean for the future of US national security? American maritime strategy has played a major role in binding together the international system that US foreign policy has aimed to establish since the begin- ning of the twentieth century. What are the consequences for the United States and its allies if those bonds crumble as a result of a shrinking Navy with reduced international presence, and a weakening ability to project power, provide stabilizing presence, and respond to serious crises? The widely-shared current

assumption that the immensity of US–China trade eliminates the possibility of serious Sino-American conflict recapitulates the United Kingdom’s decision a century ago that alliance with Japan was prudent

and sufficient to secure the Crown’s interests in the Far East. If this assumption proves wrong the consequences for US influence in the Pacific would be as disastrous for us as they were for Great Britain. The historically unprecedented half century of relative naval peace in the Mediterranean may continue indefinitely, but such a prolongation would be a freak of history . The re-deployment of major United States naval force from the Mediterranean to support operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, added to the declining US naval fleet would leave us with terrible choices if, for example, Tur- key’s drift towards Islamism yields a naval force with ambitions similar to those of her fifteenth century Ghazi Ottoman rulers. What are the long-term consequences as our ability to maintain a global naval presence which heretofore has been judged benefi- cent erodes? The size, shape, and strategy of the US Navy are a critical element of America’s position as the world’s great power . Our ability to protect or rend asunder the globe’s ocean-going lines of communication is inseparable from our position as the world’s great power. But very few outside a small community of naval officers and selected military/foreign policy analysts appreciate the strategic results of American sea- power’s slow but steady diminution. The eventual impact of this weakening includes, but is not limited to, a major shift of power away from American influence in Asia; the shattering of such key maritime alliances and partnerships as those we currently maintain with Australia, India, Japan, and Singapore; the rise of China as a hegemonic power; a debilitating loss in America’s ability to shape the future global strategic environment; and a powerful reinforcement of the perception that the United States is in decline. Globally, the

continued attrition of US naval force also means a serious threat to the security of the world’s sea lines of communication and the choke points – such as the Straits of Hormuz – through which pass an increasing

volume of global com- merce, the departure of a visible and stabilizing American presence from allied ports as well as potential worldwide flashpoints , and the international perception that the United States is

abandoning the critical element of military capability that under- girded the world system American policy has sought for over a century, seapower.

Economic competitiveness is key to hegemony --- that solves great power war Khalilzad 11 Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992. "The Econom and National Security" Feb 8 www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/259024Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly . The continuation of these two trends

could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system , leading in turn

to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers .¶ The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years.¶ Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions . If interest rates were to rise significantly,

annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.¶

Such scenarios would reshape the international order . It was the economic devastation of Britain

and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench , reducing its military spending and shedding

international commitments .¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political,

social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours , and this could

alter the global distribution of power . These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new

international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern

history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable , with their competitive dynamics resulting in

frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international

systems produced both world wars. ¶ American retrenchment could have devastating

consequence s. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an

attempt to balance against emerging threats . Under this scenario, there would be a heightened

possibility of arms races, miscalculation , or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict .

Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

Aside from the Industrial Base, Rare Earths are critical to the military Humphries, 10 Marc, September 30th, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply China”, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uzkYstWv_HYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=rare+earth+mineral+manufacturing&ots=w8pgQRrBjf&sig=J-FDykOT6QCEPUhMgKpkveim6rY#v=onepage&q=rare%20earth%20mineral%20manufacturing&f=falseCurrent government policies pertaining to the acquisition of certain minerals for defense purposes are addressed, in part, in several different legislative initiatives, including the Defense Production Act (P.L. 81 -774). National Defense Stockpile (Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) 98-h-^a)].1 Bay American Act (41 U.S.C. I0-I0d), Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. 2533a), and the Specialty Metal provision (10 U.S.C. 2533b). However, these policies do not present a unified opinion on whether every mineral is considered "critical," "strategic," or necessary for national security purposes, and there is a certain lack of cohesion to the application of these policies. As an example, rare earth elements (and rare earth metals) fall outside of the scope of the Berry Amendment and the Specialty Metal provision." The primary defense application of rare-earth materials is their use in four types of permanent magnet materials commercially available: Alnico. Ferrites, Samarium Cobalt, and Neodymium Iron Boron. With the exception of Neodymium Iron Boron, all of ihc materials are domestically produced. The United States has no production capabilities for Neodymium Iron Boron. Neo magnets, the product derived from Neodymium Iron Boron, and Samarium Cobalt, are considered important to many defense products. They are considered one of the world's strongest permanent magnets and an essential element to many military weapons systems , as

described in the following examples. • Jet fighter engines and other aircraft components, including samarium-

cobalt magnets used in generators that produce electricity for aircraft electrical systems: • Missile guidance systems, including precision guidance munitions, lasers, and smart bombs;'' • Electronic countermeasures systems; • Underwater mine detection systems; • Antimissile defense systems; • Range finders, including lasers; and • Satellite power and communication systems, including traveling wave tubes (TWT) rare earth

speakers, defense system control panels, radar systems, electronic counter measures, and optical equipment.1" Many scientific organizations have concluded that certain rare earth metals are critical to U.S. national security and becoming increasingly more important in defense applications.11 Some industry analysts are concerned with an increasing dependence on foreign sources for rare earth metals; a

dwindling source of domestic supply for certain rare earth metals; and the emergence of a manufacturing supply chain that has largely migrated outside of the United States. In July 2010, the China Ministry of Commerce announced that China would cut its export quota for rare earth minerals by 72%, raising concerns because of estimates that China controls approximately 97% of the global production of rare earth minerals.11 It is also estimated that by 2012 China's domestic consumption will outpace China's domestic production of rare earth minerals. Some experts are concerned that DOD is not doing enough to mitigate the possible risk posed by a scarcity of domestic suppliers. As an example, the United States Magnet Materials Association (USMM A), a coalition of companies representing aerospace, medical, and electronic materials, has recently expanded its focus to include rare earth metals and the rare earth magnet supply chain. In February 2010. USMMA unveiled a six-point plan to address what they describe as the "impending rare earth crisis" which they assert poses a significant threat to the economy and national security of the United States ." However, it appears that DOD's position assumes that there are a sufficient number of supplier countries worldwide to mitigate the potential for shortages.

2AC Deterrence

A healthy domestic industrial base is key to mobilization and deterrence McCormick, 8 Beth, Acting Director, Defense Technology Security Administration, Department Of Defense, LexisThe third goal of my agency is to assure the health of the defense industrial base. U.S. national security depends on a

strong U.S. industrial base that can easily mobilize to support military capabilities and deter

potential adversaries . The United States must maintain a technology superiority and highly

competitive defense industrial base to support increased global competition. DTSA will continue to

balance national security interests while being receptive to the needs of the U.S. industrial base.

2AC REEs Key

Securing rare earth independence from China is key to U.S. military capabilitiesCoppel 11 (Emily, Feb 1 2011, "Rare earth metals and U.S. national security," americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Rare-Earth-Metals-and-US-Security-FINAL.pdf, ADL)Rare earth metals are essential for he United States’ military and economic well-being. Yet the U.S. has been particularly lax when it comes to securing the supply of these metals. The U.S. has gone

from the world’s top producer and supplier of rare earths to being completely dependent on one country – China – for its supply. China’s dominance in the rare earths market will have profound implications for U.S. national security in the next couple of years. As it is, some analysts already believe it is too late to avoid a global shortage of rare earth metals, placing

the U.S. in greater risk. The U.S. needs to take steps now to remedy this situation. Background There are 17 rare earth metals. Contrary to their name, rare earth metals are not rare at all. In fact, all of them are as common in the earth as silver. Some are even more abundant than lead.1 Their name stems from the fact that, despite their relative abundance, they are difficult to extract from ore and the extraction process is costly and more environmentally damaging than for other elements. Rare earth metals have a wide variety of applications. They are used in

hybrid car motors, computer hard drives, cell phones, and wind turbines. They are also essential for military equipment. Jet engines, smart bombs and guided missiles, lasers, radar, night vision goggles, and satellites all depend on rare earth metals to function. The vast majority of these metals are produced by China, which owns approximately 97% of the global market in rare earth metals.2 China also has 35% of the world’s reserves in rare earth metals, and supplies almost all of the world’s demand. China’s stronghold in the rare earths market is due to strong government support, cheap labor, and relatively loose environmental laws. These factors make it much more economical to mine and produce rare earth metals in China. The United States has the world’s second-biggest deposit of rare earth metals. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. has “approximately 13 million metric tons of rare earth elements,” mainly located in western states such as California, Alaska, and Wyoming.3 Until the 1980s, the U.S. was the chief supplier of rare earth metals to the rest of the world, when production and mining facilities began to move to China.4 Today, the U.S. no longer produces any rare earth metals, having sold off its last domestic producer of rare earth magnets (used in smart bombs) in 2003. The last U.S. rare earth mine, located at Mountain Pass, California, closed in 2002. Before it closed, Mountain Pass was one of the world’s largest rare earth mines. National Security Risks Many analysts fear that there will be a shortage of rare earth metals as early as 2012, although most believe the shortage will not occur until 2014. This

makes U.S. dependence on China for rare earths extremely problematic. U.S. dependence poses both economic and national security risks. Military: The United States’ reliance on technology, particularly for military applications, is the biggest cause for concern. Although the Pentagon claims that the U.S. only uses 5% of the world’s supply

of rare earth metals for defense purposes,5 the fact is that the U.S. is completely reliant on China for the production of some of its most powerful weapons. Peter Leiter, a former trade advisor at the Department of Defense, echoed this concern

when he stated, “The Pentagon has been incredibly negligent…there are plenty of early warning signs that China will use its leverage over these materials as a weapon.”6 Even commercial uses of rare earth metals, such as cell phones and laptops, have military applications and are critical to operating current military platforms. Yet top U.S. defense officials are unaware of just how dependent they are on rare earths. According to a U.S. National Defense Stockpile report, “[U.S.] defense leaders do not necessarily know exactly which minerals they use in which systems in what amounts, [and] where the minerals came from…”7 Likewise, the U.S. does not track rare earth metals in its weapons systems or

platforms.8 A shortage of rare earths will affect the strength and readiness of the U.S. military until current systems are no longer in operation. However, it will also affect future production: newer systems rely just as much, if not more, on computers and other electronic equipment. The U.S. is developing itself into greater dependence on rare earth metals.

REEs vital to hegemonyGreen 12 – Jeffery A. Green is the founder of the Strategic Material Advisory Council and an adjunct scholar with the National Center for Policy Analysis (8/2/12, “The Defense Implications of Rare Earth Shortages,” http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ib112, ADL)Rare earth elements are used in everyday products: smart phones, hard disc drives, flat-screen televisions and advanced batteries. They are essential to such “green” technologies as wind turbines, compact fluorescent lights and hybrid cars. In today’s world, which emphasizes cutting-edge and environmentally-friendly technologies, rare earths are everywhere. Furthermore, a range of highly advanced defense systems depend on rare earth phosphors, metals, alloys and magnets

for their unique functionality. For example: The Ground Laser Target Designator, which allows

infantrymen to guide munitions onto targets and estimate ranges, depends on neodymium-doped yttrium-aluminum garnets. Advanced jet aircraft engines rely upon thermal barrier coatings utilizing yttria-

stabilized zirconia to shield metal components from extreme heat. Samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron (“neo”)

permanent magnets are used to move the fins of precision-guided munitions and, in combination

with a terbium-iron-nickel alloy (with some dysprosium, also known as Terfenol-D), to mute rotor sound in helicopter stealth systems.1 Possible shortages of some rare earths, therefore, threaten our nation's defense systems. The Defense Implications of Rare Earth ShortagesRare Earth Supply Chain. During the Cold War, U.S. companies encompassed the entire rare earth supply chain, from mining and chemical separation to metal-making and component manufacture. The Mountain Pass mine in California dominated rare earth production and General Motors invented the bonded neo magnet. Today, no U.S.-produced rare earth metals are sold commercially and only two firms can produce limited amounts of rare earth alloys. Two other companies can manufacture rare earth permanent magnets, but only of the samarium-cobalt type. Only one U.S. company mines and separates rare earths into oxides; however, this company reportedly intends to ship to China for processing unspecified amounts of its heavy rare earth concentrates — the feedstock for additives to samarium-cobalt and neo magnets.2 Today, as a direct consequence of active government support for the rare earth industry since the 1980s [see Figure I below]: 3 China produces more than 94 percent of the world’s rare earth oxides, virtually 100 percent of all commercially available rare earth metals and more than 90 percent of the rare earth alloys. China manufactures three-fourths of the world’s samarium-cobalt magnets and 60 percent of the neo magnets. China has leveraged this quasi-monopoly to extract rents from the market by manipulating production and export quotas. For example: In 2002, the export quota for rare earth oxide-equivalents was 40,000 metric tons for domestic Chinese companies, and there was no quota for joint ventures with foreign companies. Since 2002, the quota has declined to 22,712 metric tons annually for domestic Chinese companies and 7,472 metric tons for joint ventures.4 Simultaneously, China shifted from offering a value-added tax rebate to export rare earths in 2005 to imposing duties of 10 percent and 25 percent for certain products, progressively including more value-added rare earth products.5 The resulting volatility in prices, unavailability and two-tiered pricing structure (for exports versus domestic consumption) cast doubt upon the ability of today’s supply chain to fulfill U.S. commercial or military requirements. A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted very real national security concerns, noting that rebuilding the domestic supply chain from mining to magnet manufacture could take up to 15 years and was contingent upon capital investment and the expiration of certain patents.6 Other reports — before and after the recommissioning of the Mountain Pass mine — echoed the GAO’s concerns about the availability of critical materials.7

***Manufacturing Advantage

1AC / 2AC Manufacturing

The US needs to develop its own domestic supply of REEs to sustain the entirety of the manufacturing industry --- the alternative is collapse Leybovich 10 (Ilya Leybovich, 10/12/10, “Will the Rare-Elements Shortage Cripple Industry?,” http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2010/10/12/will-the-rare-elements-shortage-cripple-industry/, ADL)The U.S. supply of rare-earth elements, necessary for the production of many manufactured goods, is dwindling. How will American firms overcome their reliance on China to compensate for the shortage? The planet

has a limited supply of certain important elements, particularly the 17 “rare earth” elements. Several of these rare elements

are crucial for advanced manufacturing, including the production of electronics, energy technologies and a range of defense goods. Concerns are on the rise that the United States’

diminishing supply of these critical elements may cripple some industries or increase the reliance on China, the world’s largest supplier of rare-earth elements. Although rare-earth elements may be less recognizable than other resources, they play an integral role in modern life. For example, tantalum is found in cell phone capacitors; neodymium is used for powerful lightweight magnets found in hard drives, automobiles, communications systems and countless miniaturization applications; europium is used in both color televisions and computer screens; and lithium is crucial for electronic batteries and hybrid car engines. “Increasingly important to

technology, they’re also playing a larger role in geopolitical maneuvering. Today, more than 95 percent of all rare-earth elements come from China, while the United States produces at most 2 percent,” Popular Mechanics reports.

“That disparity makes some experts twitch. After all, what happens when Chinese industry needs so much of the rare-earth elements mined in that country that there’s nothing left to export?” According to a report from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. did not mine any rare-earth elements in 2008 and 2009, but imported quantities worth $186 million and $84 million, respectively. U.S. reserves of these elements currently stand at 13 million tons. By comparison, China mined 120,000 tons of rare earth elements in both 2008 and 2009, while its reserves are at 36 million tons. Ninety-one percent of U.S. rare-earth elements imports came from China between 2005 and 2008. An analysis released in July from the Congressional Research Service found that global demand for rare-earth elements is roughly 134,000 tons per year, while production is at 124,000 tons per year. Although stockpiles currently make up for the difference, demand is expected to rise to 180,000 tons annually by 2012 and 200,000 by 2014, “while it is unlikely that new mine output will close the gap in the short term.” At the current rates of production and consumption, a worldwide shortfall seems inevitable. Apart from the economic repercussions, such a shortage could also pose a risk to U.S. defense capabilities, as the military relies on rare-earth elements for a broad range of devices, such as missile-guidance systems, lasers and aircraft electronics. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Government and industry officials have identified a wide variety of defense systems and components that are dependent on rare-earth materials for functionality and are provided by lower-tier subcontractors in the supply chain. Defense systems will likely continue to depend on rare-earth materials, based on their life cycles and lack of effective substitutes.” China’s dominance of the rare-earth elements market may pose serious problems for countries that depend on its exports, as Chinese consumption of rare-earth metals increases and availability is curtailed. Last month, a political dispute led China to block all shipments of rare-earth materials to Japan, forcing Japanese manufacturers to introduce recycling and reclamation to meet basic production needs. “Concern over China’s hoarding of rare earths has also been spreading to the United States,” the New York Times reports. “Although China has not specifically blocked shipments to any place but Japan, it had already tightened its overall export quotas of the minerals, announcing in July that it would reduce them by 72 percent for the rest of the year.” Japan and other countries, such as South Korea, are instituting government initiatives to secure more stable rare-earth supplies and research possible alternatives. The U.S. is also evaluating new rare-earth elements policies, with Congress considering a bill known as the Rare Earths and Critical Materials Revitalization Act of 2010, which would establish a $70 million program to conduct research and development to increase access to these elements. U.S. industry groups support the measure.

A collapse of advanced manufacturing kills semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnologiesMcConaghy and Swezey 11 - Ryan and Devon, respectively, of the "Third Way Fresh Thinking" and "Breakthrough" Instiutes of the Schwartz Initiative on American Economic Policy (October 2011, "Manufacturing Growth: Advanced Manufacturing and the Future of the American Economy," thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf, ADL)However, despite these relative declines, manufacturing remains a sizeable contributor to our economy and directly employs over 11.5 million people.8 Paradoxically, even as manufacturing’s relative share of employment and GDP has decreased in recent decades, manufacturing has actually become

even more important to sustaining American prosperity. Manufacturing is the most capital-intensive and productive sector of the economy, and it is key to developing and commercializing new technologies. Manufacturing also has the largest employment and output multipliers of any sector of the economy, creating many indirect jobs and making it a key catalyst of broad economic growth. Moreover, a healthy manufacturing sector is central to the United States’ ability to reduce its large and persistent trade deficit. The changes in the employment, industrial focus, and workforce skills associated with the new manufacturing should be viewed as the growing pains that accompany any significant metamorphosis. The most recent evolution in manufacturing has resulted in key differences between advanced and traditional activities. These differences have profound implications for the role of manufacturing in our economy

and the design of national policy toward manufacturing. New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of

revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers.10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm,11 making the return on manufacturing R&D

significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing.12 Because of the technological complexity of many modern, science-based industries, technology development often requires interactions among experts from many

different disciplines. It is therefore supported by “geographic clustering” of related manufacturing, supply chain, research, and educational facilities. 13 According to a 2004 report by President Bush’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), “design, product development, and process evolution all benefit from proximity to manufacturing, so that new ideas can be tested and discussed with those working ‘on the ground.’”14 As a result, when a high-tech manufacturing cluster forms, it often attracts the co-location of R&D activities and helps sustain the global competitiveness of the entire region. This is why Intel recently decided to build a new state-ofthe- art R&D facility near Portland, Oregon where it has long had a high-tech manufacturing presence, as well as related silicon manufacturers, suppliers, and a high-skilled workforce.15

Pharmaceutical manufacturing is key to solve pandemics and bioterror attacksComstock 8 - Pharmaceutical Online Editor (Kristen, 4/10/08, "Pharmaceutical And Biotechnology Industries Intersect At INTERPHEX 2008," www.pharmaceuticalonline.com/doc/pharmaceutical-and-biotechnology-industries-i-0001, ADL)The panel discussion From Pandemics to Bioterrorism: The Role of Bio Manufacturing in Global Healthcare addressed the vital importance of concentrating on pandemics and bioterrorism in pharmaceutical manufacturing. The panel included Parrish Galliher (founder, president, and CTO, Xcellerex, Inc.), Melissa Hersh (VP of global risk intelligence strategies and resiliency solutions, MARSH), Patrick Lucy (global business development leader, Dowpharma), and Dr. Diana M. Lanchoney (executive director of world strategic integration, Merck Vaccine Division & Infectious Disease). Melissa Hersh, Patrick Lucy, Parrish Galliher, and Dr. Diana Lanchoney answer questions from Moderator Anne Montgomery during the

INTERPHEX's panel discussion. The panelists agreed that it is the responsibility of government, local municipalities,

countries, health organizations, corporate partnerships, and the biomanufacturing industry to develop solutions to quell pandemics or bioterrorism attacks. As Dr. Diana M. Lanchoney explained, "The

[biomanufacturing] industry has an incredible role in preventing pandemics, and we need a broad range of public and private organizations to help develop solutions."

Impending disease and bioterror require nanotechTreder 05 (Mike, March 2, 2005, "Early Development," crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/what_we_believe/page/31/, ADL)

"We at WHO [World Health Organization] believe that the world is now in the gravest possible danger of a pandemic," states Dr. Shigeru Omi, the WHO’s Western Pacific regional director. He says the world is "now overdue" for an influenza pandemic, since mass epidemics have occurred every 20 to 30 years. It

has been nearly 40 years since the last one. For many reasons, including thronging urban populations and high rates of overseas travel, health and government officials fear that an imminent flu pandemic could kill many millions. New diseases such as the avian flu continue to be a threat to the human race. Naturally occurring diseases could be more devastating than any pandemic in decades, and an engineered disease could conceivably wipe out most of the human race. It is becoming increasingly important to have a technology base that can detect new diseases even before symptoms appear, and create a cure in a matter of days. Molecular manufacturing will enable such a rapid response. With complete genomes and proteomes for humans and for all known pathogens, plus cheap, highly parallel DNA and protein analysis and sufficient computer

resources along with new MM-based monitoring and diagnostic tools, it will be possible to spot any new pathogen almost immediately and begin aggressive countermeasures. This isn't a guarantee that diseases and

epidemics won't occur, but clearly it could save millions of lives and untold human suffering.

2AC Uniqueness

China’s stranglehold on rare earth elements will kill the US manufacturing supply chainGoldenberg 10 (Suzanne, 12/26/10, “Rare earth metals mine is key to US control over hi-tech future,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/26/rare-earth-metals-us, ADL)It's a deep pit in the Mojave desert. But it could hold the key to America challenging China's technological domination of the 21st century. At the bottom of the vast site, beneath 6 metres (20ft) of bright emerald-green water, runs a rich seam of ores that are hardly household names but are rapidly emerging as the building blocks of the hi-tech future. The mine is the largest known deposit of rare earth elements outside China. Eight years ago, it was shut down in a tacit admission that the US was ceding the market to China. Now, the owners have secured final approval to restart operations, and hope to begin production soon. "We will probably never be the largest [mine] in the world again. It will be hard to overcome China's status in that regard, but we do think we will be a very significant supplier," Mark Smith, chief executive of Molycorp Minerals which owns the mine, told reporters during a tour of the site. So far as the Obama administration is concerned, the mine can't open soon enough. A US department of energy

report warned on 15 December that, in the absence of mines such as this one, America risks losing control over the production of a host of technologies, from smart phones to smart bombs, electric car batteries to wind turbines, because of a virtual Chinese monopoly on the rare earth metals essential to their production. China controls 97% of global rare earth metals production. Such total domination of a

strategic resource became impossible to ignore in October when China cut exports of rare earth elements by more than 70% over the previous year, disrupting manufacturing in Japan, Europe and the US. Prices of even the cheapest of the 17 rare earth elements rose 40%. Now America, like Japan and Europe, is desperate to

find alternatives. "Reopening domestic production is an important part of a globalised supply chain," David Sandalow, the energy department's assistant secretary for international affairs told a seminar in Washington. For Smith, the official recognition of the strategic importance of the metals was a long time coming. "I've been going out to Washington DC every other week for about two years trying to tell the rare earths story," he said. They are listening in Washington now. At the 15 December seminar at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, one PowerPoint presentation lingered on a slide that showed only the Chinese flag. The room filled with nervous laughter. By 2015, global

demand for rare earths is expected to reach 205,000 tonnes. "If we don't get alternative supplies up and running we are going to have this supply gap that is going to cause a lot of issues," Smith said. Those issues forced their

way onto the government's agenda this autumn when China began squeezing raw material exports of rare earth minerals. Some US media reports have speculated China is trying to use its control over the supply lines for political leverage. But a number of analysts say China is trying to get better control over an expensive, dirty and dangerous mining process, and to get more factories to set up shop inside the country. Rare earths are extracted through opencast mining and generate radioactive waste. "I don't believe that China is trying to chop the west off at the knees but it has a growing internal market that is driving the demand," said Gareth Hatch, an analyst at Technology Metal Research. "That reduces the amount they are willing to export." That is where Molycorp – the frontrunner for now in a global race to develop alternative production of rare earth materials – hopes to step in. Since going public last July, the company has raised more than $500m (£323m) to expand its production facilities at Mountain Pass, a collection of rusting buildings that date from the 1950s. This month, Sumitomo Corp of Japan invested $130m in return for guaranteed supplies of rare earths for the next seven years. The company has also applied for department of energy loans. By mid-2012, Molycorp aims to produce 20,000 tonnes a year of nine of the 17 rare earths or about 25% of current western imports from China. Smith suggested the company could possibly ramp up production to 40,000 tonnes within the next 18 months. He says Molycorp has exposed just 55 acres of the 2,200 acre site. But even

production on that scale may not be enough to guarantee the supply of metals needed to move to a clean energy economy: lanthanum for batteries for hybrid cars, neodymium for the permanent magnets for wind turbines, especially offshore, europium for energy efficient lighting. "You would need seven mines the size of Molycorp's just to meet the demand for wind turbines and that would mean no neodymium for motors or any other applications," said Jim Hedrick, who until last year was the rare earth expert at the US Geological Survey. "Obviously there is a demand for 10 or 20 mines through the world to meet all the different demands for these products." Some companies, such as General Electric, are already moving to reduce their use of rare earths. "What we are going to absolutely have to do is diversify our sources and optimise the use of these materials in manufacturing," said Steve Duclos, who heads GE's global research division. In Japan, meanwhile, Hitachi has started a recycling effort to recover rare earths from hard drives and other materials. Aside from raw materials, it is also unclear whether the US still has the expertise for the complicated process of turning minerals into usable clean tech components. Such challenges were unthinkable half-a-century ago when prospectors looking for uranium stumbled instead on a rich deposit of rare earths about an hour's drive from Las Vegas. By the 1960s, the mine was booming, largely through sales of europium, used to produce the bright red tones of colour televisions. But prices fell as China came on the market, with its low production costs. A pipeline accident in the late 1990s, which leaked radioactive fluid into the desert and a nearby town, led to an expensive clean-up. The mine closed in 2002. The central pit in the 55-acre site became a pool of bright green water. White bales of minerals – some mined eight years ago – were stockpiled until such time as prices would rise. This time around, however, Molycorp claims it has a fighting chance against China, especially if it is able to meet its goal of complete mines-to-magnet processing at the Mountain Pass facility. The company is also confident it can head off competition from a slew of new mines due to begin coming online from Australia, Wyoming, Quebec and South Africa. "The growth in demand for these minerals is just phenomenal," Smith said. "A 6% average growth rate for us would be very, very good but when you start adding things like hybrid vehicles and wind turbines to the rare earth sectors now you are talking about double digit growth, and you still don't know where that will end." At this point, though, Molycorp is not even at the beginning. "The road to the green world of the future starts from the black earth. But first you have to get the materials out of the ground," said Hatch. "The whole clean-tech energy

industry is hinging on it." The "rare earth elements" are a group of 17 naturally occurring metallic elements used in small amounts in everything from high-powered magnets to batteries and

electronic circuits. The materials (including scandium, yttrium and a group of elements called the lanthanides) have chemical and physical properties that make them useful in improving the performance of computer hard drives and catalytic converters, mobile phones, hi-tech televisions, sunglasses and lasers.

2AC Spillover IL

Manufacturing sectors are interconnected Pisano and Shih, 12 [September, Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs a Manufacturing Renaissance [Kindle Edition], Harry E. Figgie Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School. He has been on the Harvard faculty for 23 years, Professor of Management Practice. He joined the Technology and Operations Management Unit in January 2007, p. amazon kindle] The rough and tumble of international competition means we should expect industries to come and go. Even if this is sometimes painful, it is, in fact, a healthy process by which resources flow to their most productive uses. When a commons erodes, however, it represents a deeper and more systematic problem. It means the foundation upon which future innovative sectors can be built is crumbling . When the semiconductor production business moved to Asia in the 1980s, it brought with it a whole host of capabilities—electronic-materials processing, deposition and coating, and sophisticated test and assembly capabilities—that formed an industrial commons needed to produce a whole host of advanced, high-valued-added electronic products such as flat-panel displays, solid-state lighting, and solar PV. In this book, we will examine the dynamics that underlie both the rise and decline of commons, and the consequence of those declines. Our argument is built around

three core themes. Theme 1: When a Country Loses the Capability to Manufacture, It Loses the Ability

to Innovate Innovation and manufacturing are often viewed as residing at the opposite ends of the economic spectrum—innovation being all about the brain (knowledge work) and manufacturing all about brawn (physical work). Innovation requires highly skilled, highly paid workers, and manufacturing requires low-skilled, low-paid workers; innovation is a high-valued-added specialty, and manufacturing is a low-value-added commodity; innovation is creative and clean, and manufacturing is dull and dirty. Such a view of manufacturing is a myth and is based on a profound misunderstanding of how the process of innovation works and the link between R&D and manufacturing. R&D is a critical part of the innovation process, but it is not the whole thing. Innovation is about moving the idea from concept to the customer’s hands. For some highly complex products (flat-panel displays, PV cells, and biotechnology drugs, to name a few) the transfer from R&D into production is a messy affair, requiring extremely tight coordination and the transfer of learning between those who design and those who manufacture. If you do not understand the production

environment, you have a harder time designing the product. In these settings, there are strong reasons to co-locate R&D and production. It is a lot easier for an engineer to walk across the street to the plant or drive

down the road than to fly halfway around the world to troubleshoot a problem. This helps to explain why the American company Applied Materials, a leading maker of equipment for manufacturing semiconductors and solar panels, moved its chief technical officer from the United States to China.14 Because most of its large customers are now in China, Taiwan, and South Korea, it makes sense for the company to do its research close to the factories that use its equipment. Applied Materials is now moving much of its manufacturing operations to Asia as well. In chapter 4, we will offer a framework for determining when it matters whether R&D and manufacturing are located near each and when it does not. Theme 2:

The Industrial Commons Is a Platform for Growth The industrial commons perspective suggests that a

decline of competitiveness of firms in one sector can have implications for the competitiveness of firms in another . Industries and the suppliers of capabilities to the industries need each other. Kill a critical industry, and the suppliers probably will not survive for long; other industries in

the region that depend on those suppliers will then be jeopardized. When the auto industry declines, it causes an atrophy of capabilities (such as casting and precision machining) that are also used in industries such as heavy equipment, scientific instruments, and advanced materials. The unraveling of a commons is a vicious circle. As capabilities erode, it is harder for companies that require access to stay in business . They are forced to move their operations or their supplier base to the new commons. As they move, it is harder for existing suppliers to sustain themselves. Ultimately, they must either close shop or move their operations. Even worse, the loss of a commons may cut off future opportunities for the ¶ emergence of new innovative sectors if they require close access to the same capabilities. Four decades ago, when US consumer electronics companies decided to move production of these “mature” products to Asia, who would have guessed that this decision would influence where the most important component for tomorrow’s electric vehicles—the batteries—would be produced? But that is what happened.15 The offshoring of consumer

electronics production (often contracted to then-little-known Japanese companies such as Sony and Matsushita) led to the migration of R&D in consumer electronics to Japan (and later to South Korea and Taiwan). As consumers demanded ever-smaller, lighter, and more powerful (and power hungry!) mobile computers and cell phones, electronics companies were pushed to innovate in batteries. In the process, Asia became the hub for innovation in the design and manufacturing of compact, high-capacity, rechargeable, lithium ion batteries, a technology that was invented in America. This explains why Asian suppliers have become the dominant source of the lithium ion battery cells used in electric vehicles.

A collapse of one sector affects all other sectors and the economyGreen 10 (Harlan Russell, June 27 2010, “Economic Interdependence Is Good,” http://populareconomicsweekly.blogspot.com/2010/06/economic-interdependence-is-good.html, ADL) How interdependent we have become! The lessons of this recession and the ongoing recovery, is that going it alone won’t work—whether when drilling oil wells, or evading financial regulations. We even have to thank our dependence on foreign trade with Asia, and our government-aided auto industry, for what is leading this recovery—the manufacturing sector. Economic interdependence is becoming the norm in this decade—private industry (via

innovation) and governments (via regulation) are becoming more interdependent. One can no longer exist without the other. And what affects one sector now affects the overall economy. The bursting housing bubble almost caused the worldwide collapse of the financial system because financial markets are now interconnected. The BP Gulf oil disaster is an example of nature’s interconnectedness. A toxic spill has become toxic to all states in the Gulf region. Overall industrial production in May surged 1.2 percent, following a 0.7 percent boost the month

before. The latest number was stronger than the consensus forecast for 1.0 percent. Manufacturing has been robust over the last three months with this component gaining 0.9 percent in the two latest months and jumping 1.2 percent in March.

Economic systems and industries are dependent on each other – one collapse creates a domino effectHaimes Santos et al (Yacov Haimes, Joost Santos, Kenneth Crowther, Matthew Henry, Chenyang Lian, Zhenyu Yan, No Date, "Risk analysis in interdependent infrastructures," www.docin.com/p-367199136.html, ADL)Human activities are defined and influenced by interdependent engineered and socioeconomic systems. In particular, the global economy is increasingly dependent on an interconnected web of infrastructures that permit hitherto unfathomable rates of information exchange, commodity flow and personal mobility. The interconnectedness and interdependencies exhibited by these infrastructures enable them to provide the quality of life to which we have become accustomed and, at the same time, expose seemingly robust and secure systems to risk to which they would otherwise not be subjected. This paper examines several analytical methodologies for risk assessment and management of interdependent macroeconomic and infrastructure systems. They include models for estimating the economic impact of disruptive events, describing complex systems from multiple perspectives, combining sparse data to enhance estimation, and assessing the risk of cyber attack on process control systems. 1. Introduction Critical infrastructure and industry sectors in the United States and abroad are becoming more interdependent due largely to the increasing integration and application of information technology in business operations such as manufacturing marketing and throughout the supply chain. New sources of risk to critical infrastructures and national security emerge from the dynamics of large-scale, complex systems that are highly interconnected and interdependent.

2AC Food Prices

Nanotech is key to solving future food shortagesSarchet et al - Penny Sarchet, Alok Jha (science and environment correspondent), Kathy Groves (food microscopist of Leatherhead Food Research), Terry Jones (Director of communications of Food and Drink Federation), (Ian Illuminato of the Friends of the Earth) ("Nanotech's role in feeding the planet," www.theguardian.com/what-is-nano/nanotech-feeding-the-planet-nanotech-s-role-in-feeding-the-planet, ADL)The challenge is clear: globally, we will need to feed two billion extra people by 2050 . As

politicians, industry and scientists turn their attention to the problem of world food security, many believe we will need to use every available tool to tackle this impending crisis. One such tool could be nanotechnology, the applications of which could potentially help us to produce more food, using less water and fertiliser, and with less of an impact on the environment. A recent Guardian seminar, sponsored by the European Commission, met to debate how we will continue to feed the world, and the panelists – Terry Jones, Kathy Groves and Ian Illuminato, chaired by Alok Jha – considered how important nanotechnology is likely to be in this task. Their opinions were listened to by members of an invited public audience, who were also able to put questions to the panel. "The scale of the challenge is reasonably well known," suggested Jones, director of communications at trade association the Food and Drink Federation. "The more pressing number, I think, is the eight billion people on the planet by 2025. If we're going to feed them, then we need to produce more food, from fewer resources, with a smaller impact on the environment – and that's going to require us to think differently." Futuristic goals Nanotechnology is the engineering of the very small, at the scale of millionths of a millimetre. It can describe both the futuristic goals of building tiny molecular machines and the more contemporary practice of adding nanoparticle substances to consumer products to make them lighter, stronger or more hygienic. The current use of nanotechnology in the food industry is still in its early stages and generally builds upon longstanding processes and practices in food production. Jones, however, says it is clear that nanotechnology might provide solutions to a range of industry problems. "You could see nanotechnology used in the cultivation, production, processing or packaging of food," he said. "It could be used to develop new food products or, indeed, improve existing ones." As well as reducing water use and contamination in food processing, Jones believes nanotechnology could help make food healthier. "In the UK, we talk a lot about what we need to take out of food, but nanotech could help us to add or enable the release of positive foods as well," said Jones, who noted that 30% of food waste occurs in the home and suggested that nanotech-enhanced packaging might tackle this. He also posited that nanotech could be used to enhance our enjoyment of food by providing us with new textures, tastes and colours.

2AC Economy

Manufacturing is vital to the economy – erosion of manufacturing kills the economyMcConaghy and Swezey 11 - Ryan and Devon, respectively, of the "Third Way Fresh Thinking" and "Breakthrough" Instiutes of the Schwartz Initiative on American Economic Policy (October 2011, "Manufacturing Growth: Advanced Manufacturing and the Future of the American Economy," thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf, ADL)MANUFACTURING AND THE FUTURE U.S. ECONOMY Manufacturing Growth and Jobs Advanced manufacturing is vital to widespread job creation and economic growth. Manufacturing already has a major impact on American employment and prosperity. Manufacturing jobs are “good” jobs that pay higher-than-average wages. In March 2009, manufacturing companies paid $32 per hour in wages and benefits, while all employers paid an average of $29.39 per hour—a 9% wage premium.25

Beyond direct job creation, manufacturing generates high levels of output and employment throughout the economy. The sector has the largest “employment multiplier,” according to economist Josh Bivens, who finds that each job created in manufacturing leads to the creation of 2.91 additional jobs, compared to 1.54 jobs in business services

and 0.88 jobs in retail trade.26 The manufacturing “output multiplier” is also higher than any other sector of the economy. Every dollar in final sales of manufacturing products supports $1.40 in output from other economic sectors. Most industries,

including professional and business services have multipliers of less than $0.70, and no other industry has a multiplier above $1.10.27 As the demand for manufacturing grows, it therefore spurs investment, job creation, and innovation throughout the economy.28 Conversely, the erosion of U.S. manufacturing output and

employment has an outsized and often devastating impact on regional economies . The economic multiplier effects from manufacturing are even greater in high-tech, “advanced” manufacturing sectors. The Milken Institute finds that every job created in electronic computer

manufacturing generates 15 other jobs throughout the economy.29 Intel’s new $4 billion R&D and manufacturing facility near Portland, Oregon, for example, will create 6,000 to 8,000 construction jobs and nearly 1,000 permanent high-tech jobs in the area. The government will benefit from property and sales taxes, and additional jobs will be created in downstream industries like home

construction and services.30 In addition to creating jobs, manufacturing is a driver of widespread economic growth. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke notes, increasing productivity is “perhaps the single most important determinant of living standards” and prosperity. 31 And as one of the most intensive

users of capital equipment and technology in the economy, the manufacturing sector is one of the nation’s most productive sectors; from 1987-2008, labor productivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector grew by 103%, nearly double the rate of 56% for the private sector as a whole.32

2AC Hegemony

Semiconductors are key to hegemonyNDU 03 - The National Defense University ("Electronics Industry Study Report:Semiconductors and Defense Electronics," www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA524792, ADL)Overview. Semiconductors are found in many defense related electronics components such as computers, sensors, switches and amplifiers. Semiconductors are critical to the way the U.S. military fights and to the functioning of the global economy. Electronics content in military ordnance, fighter planes, bombers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and a range of other weapons systems is all increasing, according to analysts. 23 In an interesting paradox, electronics are becoming more important to the Defense Department, while the Defense Department is becoming increasingly unimportant to thesemiconductor industry. Estimates put electronics as 60% of the cost of new weaponssystems, yet defense represents only .3% of the semiconductor market

2AC Renewables

Semiconductors key to viable renewablesBacklund and Rahimo 10 - Bjorn Backlund and Munaf Rahimo of ABB Switzerland Ltd (Power Mag, Issue 4 2010, "Power Semiconductor Technologies for Renewable Energy Sources," www.power-mag.com/pdf/feature_pdf/1283337722_ABB_Feature_Layout_1.pdf, ADL)High power semiconductors are key components for controlling the generation and connection to the network of renewable energy sources such as wind-turbines and photovoltaic cells. For a highest efficiency of the energy source, it is therefore essential to select the right device for the given conditions. This article looks at the performance features for the available high power semiconductors of choice and also takes a look at future device technologies and their expected impact on efficiency. Björn Backlund and Munaf Rahimo, ABB Switzerland Ltd, Semiconductors, Lenzburg, Switzerland Renewable energy sources as windturbines and photovoltaic cells have reached power levels of several MWs which have resulted in the need for high power semiconductor devices for optimized generation and network connection. The state-of-the-art devices of choice for these power levels are the IGBTs and IGCTs. Due to the power quality requirements, the earlier used solutions with thyristors in the wind turbines are rarely seen today. During the last 15 years, high power semiconductors have gone through a remarkable development. Several new generations of IGBT-dies have lead to a reduction in VCEsat of almost 40 % since

the early 1990s, and still a potential for further improvement is available. The Bipolar devices have also seen large improvements where the introduction of the IGCT have had a large impact on the MV-Drive design and higher ratings for them have recently been introduced or are in development. The thyristors have also not been standing still but have moved from 6500 V, 2600 A to 8500 V, 4000 A devices based on 150mm silicon now in production. The power semiconductors are used for two main tasks in the chain of renewable energy sources such as conversion of the power in the plant, as in wind-turbines, and transmission of the power to the grid. The best solution to determine what semiconductors to use for these tasks is to move top-down by following the path system requirements defining equipment requirements which in turn are defining the power semiconductor requirements. Through this chain the requirements on the devices are determined regarding items as required voltage and current ratings, needed degree of controllability, and operating frequency.

***Solvency

1AC Plan Text – Loan Gurantees

Text: The United States federal government should offer loan guarantees for the mining of rare earth elements in the Outer Continental Shelf

The Federal Government is key – financing, loan-guarantees, knowledge infrastructure, interagency collaboration, and competitive grants for public and private entitiesSmith 10 – Mark A. Smith is the Chief Executive Officer of Molycorp Minerals, LLC. This is from a written testimony in front of the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight (March 16 2010, “Rare earth minerals and 21st century industry,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2010_hr/Smith_Testimony.pdf, ADL) These process improvements fundamentally reverse the conventional wisdom that superior environmental stewardship increases production costs. At the same time, we significantly distinguish ourselves from the Chinese rare earth industry that has been plagued by a history of significant

environmental degradation, one that it is just beginning to recognize and rectify need for Federal Leadership Over the

past year, I have spent a significant amount of time in Washington meeting with Members of Congress and their staffs as well as officials in a variety of federal agencies to direct greater attention to this issue. I’m pleased to report, just over one year since we began our efforts, that the federal government is beginning to take meaningful steps toward understanding and addressing our rare earth vulnerabilities. The question remains, however, if it will be able to make its assessments, determine the required actions, and execute them within a timeline that seems to

be accelerating daily. In each of these meetings, and as this Committee has also inquired, I am asked what role the federal government should play in tackling this pressing concern, and I believe that there are 4 areas where it can have the greatest near- and long-term impact: 1) federally based financing and/or loan guarantee support for highly capital intensive projects like ours; 2) assistance rebuilding America’s rare earth knowledge infrastructure (university-based rare earth research, development of academic curricula and fields of study, training and exposure to the

chemical and physical science related to rare earths, etc.); 3) increased interagency collaboration at the highest levels on the impact of rare earth accessibility on major national objectives; and 4) funding competitive grants for public and private sector rare earth research. I’ll explore each in greater depth below: Financing support: Given the size, scale, ambition, and necessity of Molycorp’s redevelopment efforts, we submitted an application for the Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Program (LGP). We believed that the program was well-suited for our project, particularly given that the project’s substantial implications closely match the program’s paramount objectives. Traditional bank financing in the current climate – with very short repayment periods and interest rates near double digits – is not economically feasible. The LGP offers longer term financing and lower interest rates and would allow Molycorp to accelerate development in the near-term while ensuring rare earth resource availability in the long term. However, the DOE summarily rejected our application in December, saying that the project did not qualify as a “New or Significantly Improved Technology.” We reviewed the relevant portion of the Rule, Section 609.2, and our project meets every one of the stated criteria. We requested further discussion with the DOE to understand how it came to its conclusion and how Molycorp might proceed. After almost two months, the DOE finally responded to our request. During the meeting, the DOE contended that this project goes “too far upstream” and that the program was not intended to cover mining projects. We have yet to find the legislative or regulatory language that provides such a limitation. However, it appears we may need to ask Congress for legislative direction or possibly new legislative language specifically authorizing the use of loan guarantees for strategically important projects like this. Our frustrations with the loan guarantee notwithstanding, I still believe that this kind of financing support is exactly what a project like ours needs. We will be in a very strong position to both raise our portion of the capital to execute the project and repay the loan well-within the required timeline. We will continue to pursue this financing support despite the DOE’s current position. Rebuilding the rare earth knowledge infrastructure: The United States used to be the world’s preeminent source of rare earth information and expertise, but it has ceded that advantage over the past decade, as its

position in the industry has become subordinate to China and other countries in East Asia. The federal government, and the House Science and Technology Committee in particular, can play a pivotal role in reestablishing that institutional knowledge and expertise and sharing it with a wider audience of researchers, scholars, and practitioners here in the U.S. and abroad. At Molycorp, we are fortunate to have a team of 17 rare earth researchers and technologists who are second to none in the world, but almost all of them had no previous expertise in rare earths prior to joining Molycorp. It will be difficult for the

U.S. to reestablish its preeminence without a concerted effort to attract the brightest scientists and researchers to the field of rare earths. Rebuilding the knowledge infrastructure and the research support will go a long way toward that goal. Dr. Gerschneidner, who I’m honored to testify with today, is regarded as the father of rare earths, and his work at Ames Laboratory and Iowa State University as well as the great work being done by Dr. Eggert and his colleagues at the Colorado School of Mines can serve as the foundation on which to expand America’s rare earth expertise. As a reminder of the rest of the world’s interests and actions in this regard, the Korea Times recently reported that Korea is developing rare earth metals for industrial use at a government-funded research center. Interagency Cooperation: Over the past several months, we have been very pleased to learn about efforts within many federal agencies to direct specific attention to rare earth issues. We have been in direct contact with the

Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State, and each is examining this issue within the unique context of their agencies’ work. It is also worth noting that the Commerce Department convened a group of stakeholders from both the government and the private sector in December, 2009, which included representatives from DoD, GAO, USTR, and OSTP. We have also had multiple discussions with the Office of Science and Technology Policy directly and have been very appreciative of their engagement on this issue. In fact, OSTP, along with Commerce, is facilitating interagency collaboration going forward. While we are encouraged by these recent efforts, it is our hope that the agencies and the White House recognize that the global supply-demand challenges are approaching at an increasingly rapid pace and that their efforts should reflect the requisite urgency. Funding support for rare earth research: Part of China’s success in growing and dominating the market for rare earths can be attributed to their efforts to find and commercialize

new applications for rare earth materials. Federal funding support for competitive grants specifically directed at rare earth research will help to expand the U.S.’s ability to do the same. This has the potential to broaden the economic impact of rare earths, and contribute to the goal mentioned above of reestablishing America’s superior expertise in rare earth research.

1AC Plan Text – Licensing

Text: The United States federal government should issue licenses for rare earth element mining on the Outer Continent Shelf

Minerals management service is who issues the leases RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.htmlMinerals Management Service : leases the federal outer continental shelf, as well as conducts

environmental review, permit processes , and ongoing monitoring for specific proposals to explore for, or produce oil and gas resources

2AC Licensing

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, part of the Department of Interior, is responsible for offshore leasing Virginia Places, 9 “Virginia and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),” http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/ocs.html Federal agencies issue permits for species harvest and mineral extraction, beyond state waters, to the limit of US claims. For example, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, a part of the Department of the Interior, is responsible for offshore leasing outside of state waters.

2AC Naitilus

Naitilus plan uses two cutters, collector, and a pump system Goodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now, VitzNautilus plans to unleash three remote-controlled devices on the sea floor: two cutters and a collector, adapted from technologies used in the oil and cable-trenching industries. An as-yet-undesigned pump system will lift the ore from the seafloor to the ship. "They've already spent about

$400 million, the boat will be a couple hundred million," Wiltshire says. " A complete operation for Nautilus will

easily be a billion."

2AC AT: No REEs in OCS

Rare earth metals exist in the US outer continental shelfU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE N.O.A.A. 75 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is a federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. It plays several distinct roles within the Department of Commerce: A Supplier of Environmental Information Products, A Provider of Environmental Stewardship Services and a Leader in Applied Scientific Research. (1975, "MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE DEEP OCEAN," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975/html/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975.htm, ADL)

The Bering Sea --- outer continental shelf has the most promising potential for mining hard minerals of all United States outer continental shelf waters. Placer deposits of this potential include gold, platinum, cassiterite (tiLn),

scheelite (tungsten), rare earths, ilmenite (titanium), and others. Lode deposits are likely to include barite and copper, lead and zinc (as sulf ides), and molybdenum, while deposits of chemical precipitates of uranium-bearing minerals are probable in some anoxic sites. Government, industry, and academic groups have been conducting hard mineral surveys in this area for more than ten years.

Rare earths are harvested from outer continental shelf depositsU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE N.O.A.A. 75 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is a federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. It plays several distinct roles within the Department of Commerce: A Supplier of Environmental Information Products, A Provider of Environmental Stewardship Services and a Leader in Applied Scientific Research. (1975, "MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE DEEP OCEAN," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975/html/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975.htm, ADL)On the continental shelf, the Panel believes that initial mining operations in the production of sand and gravel will continue

to be conducted with rather conventional equipment (Table 1). On a smaller scale, and with similar conventional equipment, other resources, such as rare earth sands, barite, coal, tin, and phosphate rock have already been produced from shelf deposits in various parts of the world. Such activities are expected to increase as technological

capability and economic rewards increase. Unlike the area underlying the deep ocean, the question of ownership of much of the continental margins of the world is well-defined under existing

international law.

2AC AT: R&D

R and D solves the aff and avoids backlashHumphries 10 (Marc Humphries is a , September 30th, 2010, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain”, Congressional Report Service)The bill would establish an R&D program within the DOE to assure long-term supply of rare earth materials. The R&D program would, among other things, seek to identify and test potential substitutes, improve extraction, processing, recovery, and recycling technology of rare earth materials. The Secretary of Energy would establish an R&D Information Center and collaborate with members of the European

Commission to coordinate activities of mutual interest. The proposed R&D Information Center would be a repository for scientific and technical data, assist scientists and engineers in using the Center, provide advice to the Secretary on the R&D program and promote information sharing among the interested parties. The Secretary of Energy would present a plan to Congress that describes R&D activities and their anticipated contribution to providing rare earth materials to the U.S. economy, explain the requirements of the DOE loan guarantee program and the status of the programs receiving loan guarantee support. After four years the program would be assessed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The program would be authorized for $70 million over a five-year period (2011-2015). H.R. 6160 would establish a Rare Earth Materials Loan Guarantee program for commercial application of new and improved technologies for the separation, and recovery of rare earths, the preparation of rare earths (i.e., oxides, metal, and alloys) and the application of rare earths in the production of magnets, batteries, optical systems, and electronics, among other things. The Secretary would be required to cooperate with the private sector to assure complete rare earth materials production capacity five years after H.R. 6160 would be enacted into law. The authority to enter into loan guarantees would expire in 2018. The bill would also amend sections 3, 4, and 5 of the National Materials and Minerals Policy Research and Development Act of 1980.

2AC AT: BOEM

The US has these resources and can initiate drilling. BOEM 12 (BOEM Ocean Science, Winter 2012, No author, “The Marine Minerals Program: Meeting the Needs of Our Nation’s Coastline”, http://www.boem.gov/uploadedfiles/boem/newsroom/publications_library/ocean_science/os_12_oct_nov_dec.pdf)Offshore extraction of marine minerals that are critical to the U.S. economy and national security may become an important resource managed by BOEM under the Marine Minerals Program in the future, but the concept is not new. In fact, BOEM (then MMS) looked into leases for offshore mining of these resources on the Hawaii, California, and Oregon OCS during the mid- to late 1980s. The marine minerals of interest were cobalt-rich manganese crusts in Hawaii and massive sulfide deposits offshore Oregon and California. During that period, two task forces were established with the States, one with Hawaii and the other with Oregon and California, to assess the economic, engineering, and environmental aspects of ocean mining A three-year program to assess the mineral and biological resource potential of the Gorda Ridge was completed in 1986. The program discovered large polymetallic sulfide deposits on the Gorda Ridge, located approximately 150 miles offshore northern California and southern Oregon in water depths between 10,000 and 11,000 feet. Task Force sponsored surveys also resulted in the discovery of cobalt-rich manganese crusts on seamounts in the Hawaiian OCS, and US territories and possession. In both cases, MMS opted not to offer the areas for lease due to the adequacy of existing onshore mineral supply sources, market conditions, and consultations with mining companies that expressed the opinion it was premature to consider leasing the areas due to the technological mining constraints. Some 30 years later, demand has increased for products with components that contain copper, lead, zinc, manganese, cobalt and platinum, and rare earth elements (REEs) which are used in color television and flat panel displays (cell phones, portable DVDs, and laptops), rechargeable batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles, important defense applications, such as night vision equipment, and space-based satellites and communication systems. REEs often occur with other elements (e.g., copper, gold, uranium). Higher prices for those metals in recent years may be another reason for the increased interest in offshore mining. Most REE mining is likely to occur far from our mainland shores. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that global reserves of 110 million tons are found mainly in China, although Japanese researchers say they have discovered vast deposits at 78 locations on the Pacific Ocean floor at depths of 11,500 to 20,000 feet below the ocean surface in international waters east and west of Hawaii and east of Tahiti. Mining offshore REE deposits would likely be costly, but it doesn’t appear that consumption of products containing REEs will decline any time soon. Global demand for REEs may reach 210,000 tons per year by 2015, according to one estimate (see Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain). Only time will tell whether mining the sea floor can be commercially viable off our Nation’s coasts in the Pacific Region and elsewhere. If so, BOEM’s Marine Minerals Program will ensure it is carried out without damaging the diverse life forms found in these delicate offshore ocean environments.

BOEM is our agent, also US is keyBOEM 14 (Bureau of Ocean Management is a section of the department of the interior responsible for all ocean based drilling and mining projects, January 2014, Marine Minerals Program Fact Sheet, http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/MMP-Fact-Sheet.pdf)BOEM is the agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior which manages the responsible exploration and development of offshore energy and marine mineral resources on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The bureau promotes energy independence, environmental protection and

economic development through responsible management of these resources based on the best available science. Although the largest component within BOEM is the exploration and development of oil and gas

resources, the Marine Minerals Program (MMP) is responsible for managing non-energy minerals (primarily sand and gravel) on the ocean floor. As stewards of these resources, BOEM must ensure that the removal of any mineral resource is conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner , and that any potentially adverse impacts on the marine , coastal, or human environments are avoided or minimized For over 20 years, BOEM has provided OCS sand resources to complete 42 projects and convey more than 77 million cubic yards of material to coastal communities. That amount of sand, in cubic feet, would circle Earth’s equator 15.85 times. What are the primary uses of marine minerals? Marine minerals are used primarily in coastal

restoration projects, including beach nourishment and wetlands restoration. Beach nourishment is the replenishment of beach sand by natural or artificial means.

2AC AT: LOST/I-Law

International law allows deep sea mining and the US hasn’t ratified lost, so nbdTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello This lack of progress occurs in a context where the sustainability of consensus on international waters is not yet established. The U.N.C.L.O.S. conception of the seabed as the “common heritage of mankind” is not universal .

Indeed it is important to keep in mind that the United States has not ratified U.N.C.L.O.S.33 and rather consider that “Deep seabed mining is a “high seas freedom ” that all nations may engage in regardless of their membership or non- membership in U.N.C.L.O.S. or any other treaty. Like

other high seas freedoms, the right to engage in deep seabed mining is inherent to all sovereign nations under customary international law. Rather, it is the convention that attempts to restrict access to the deep seabed and infringe on the intrinsic rights of the United States and other nations that have chosen to remain non- parties.”34However, in the past the United States has secured its rights to mine the deep seabed through bilateral agreements with other deep seabed mining nations.

2AC AT: No Tech

Tech is based off of existing undersea tech and it is in the public domain Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”***DSM = Deep Sea Mining In order to develop DSM technology, Nautilus put together an Alliance of eight key players from the offshore equipment, services and engineering industries. These players are still developing deep-sea mining technology. Current designs have drawn upon existing technology from both the offshore petroleum and transoceanic communications cable industries. The basic methods and designs for exploration and extraction are in the public domain . Specific designs and methods developed

by industry first movers are considered patentable or trade secrets. As such, for the purposes of this section, we will only review currently proposed DSM technology and operations designs within the public domain and then offer some potential solutions to identified problems.

Tech now, research has been doneDuarte 13 (Carlos Duarte is a professor at the University of Western Australia, co-written by Sophie Arnaud-Haond, SBS, “Deep Sea Mining: Coming soon to an ocean near you”, http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/09/25/deep-sea-mining-coming-soon-ocean-near-you_These facts suggest that we may soon face and underwater gold rush, but in most citizen’s minds deep-sea mining is still something for sci-fic movies. Much to the contrary, the technology for deep-sea mining is not something of the future but it is largely existing . A deep-sea mining operation consists of a mining support platform or vessel; a launch and recovery system; a crawler with a mining head, centrifugal pump and vertical transport system; and electrical, control, instrumentation and visualization systems. Companies such as Lockheed Martin, Soil Machine Dynamics, IHC Mining and Bauer

or Nautilus Minerals are developing vehicles for deep-sea mining, pledging they are in the position to readily develop techniques to operate down to 5,000 metre depth. Indeed, the submarine vehicles required are already in existence and their operations are described in compelling animations.

We have the locating tech nowBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”Exploratory technology for deep-sea mining is currently in use and is similar to petroleum

exploratory technology . Active vents can be located from the plume, which can be detected

up to 10 km away , and tracked it to its source. Continental margin fault lines can be followed using side scan sonar. Vent fields generally occur along continental margins where geologic instability is common. Inactive vents and active vents can generally be found in close proximity (Baulch, 2005b).¶ Active vent plumes can be located by detecting compounds or elements such as methane and manganese, which

occur in the water around the source vent. (Herzig and Petersen, 2000). Locating inactive vents is more difficult; exploration teams use side-scan sonar, seismic surveyors, and deep-tow video systems to find the telltale features of an SMS mound (Herzig and Petersen, 2000).

2AC AT: Can’t Mine

Mining the resources is 5 years awayGoldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat Mining the ocean floor of the central Pacific on a commercial scale is five years away , but the

beginnings of an underwater gold rush are under way The number of companies seeking to mine

beneath international waters has tripled in the last three or four years . "We have already got a gold rush, in a way," said Michael Lodge, deputy secretary general of the International Seabed Authority, which regulates the use of the

sea floor in international waters. " The amount of activity has expanded exponentially."

2AC AT: Can’t Extract

We have the extraction tech nowBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New GuineaAfter the size and ore grade of the deposit have been assessed, trial mining may begin. Specific designs for SMS extraction are still in development and have not been disclosed, but concepts have been publicly discussed. These are a mixture of previous designs for crust and nodule mining, including modified technology from terrestrial coal and ocean diamond mining methods. SMS deposits present several challenges for extraction technology. First, the ore body is comprised of a combination of loose material such as fallen chimneys, and solid fused minerals such as re-crystallized sulfides and deposition layers (Herzig, 1999). Second, the seafloor terrain may be rugged due to tectonic activity. Extracting the ore body, while minimizing environmental impacts,

will require a¶ 25 ¶ combination of technologies working in stages. An SMS extraction device can be divided by three components: 1) drive body, 2) ore crusher and 3) ore lifter.

2AC AT: Can’t Process

We have the processing technology Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New GuineaOre processing technology has typically had the most widespread , concentrated, and lasting environmental

impacts in the mining industry. The use of cyanide leaching techniques in gold processing and the resultant cyanide settling ponds have been the source of some of the worst environmental mining catastrophes (i.e., Summitville Mine in Colorado, Marcopper Mine in the Philippines, or Omai Gold Mine in Guyana).¶ Processing methods of massive sulfide deposits typically recover only 40% of the gold (INEEL, 2005). Much of the losses are because the gold particles in the sulfide ore are too fine (<10 microns) whereas the average particle size used in ore processing slurries is 70 microns (Newmont). This leaves much of the gold on the inside of the ore particle, unavailable to the cyanide molecules during leaching. The gold left in the particle ends up in the tailings, considered too uneconomical to recover. The polymetallic nature of the SMS deposits may further complicate processing, though “dore” bullion (gold bullion with other metallic impurities such as Zn, Cu, or Ag) can be separated further during smelting.¶ A potential solution to cyanide tainted sulfide tailings disposal may be the ocean. The basic design involves a pipe from the processing plant out to a slope on the seafloor that falls to a kilometer depth. The technique relies upon anoxic conditions at the bottom to be sufficient to inhibit the formation of sulfuric acid and heavy metal dissolution and transport associated with terrestrial

acid mine drainage problems. There are 26 such tailings disposal operations in the world and the majority are found in the Asia-Pacific region (Pearce, 2000).

2AC AT: No REEs

Lots of REEsGoodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-nowSo it's no surprise that the Japanese study, which appears in the journal Nature Geoscience, sparked excitement. The researchers took core samples at 78 sites around Hawaii , Tahiti and other locations in the eastern South Pacific and central North Pacific, finding rare-earth concentrations of about 0.2 percent. At that

concentration, they reported, just 1 square kilometer of sea-floor mud could provide one-fifth of the

world's annual rare-earth consumption, making it a "highly promising huge resource for

these elements ."

***AT: Topicality

2AC AT: Exploration

Exploration means the process of searching for minerals---the aff meets thatOuter Continental Shelf Land Act, 53, Bureau of Ocean Management, “1 of 59¶ TITLE 43¶

CHAPTER 29¶ > SUBCHAPTER III¶ SUBCHAPTER III—OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,” http://www.boem.gov/Outer-Continental-Shelf-Lands-Act/ The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals , including¶ (1)¶

geophysical surveys where magnet¶ ic, gravity, seismic, or other systems are used to detect

or¶ imply the presence of ¶ such minerals , and¶ (2)¶ any drilling , whether on or off known geological structures,

including the drilling of a well in which¶ a discovery of oil or natural gas in paying quanti¶ ties is made and the dr¶ illing

of any additional¶ delineation well after such discovery which is needed to delineate any reservoir and to enable the¶ lessee to determine whether to proceed ¶ with development and production;

2AC AT: Development

Development means the discovery of minerals---the aff meets thatOuter Continental Shelf Land Act, 53, Bureau of Ocean Management, “1 of 59¶ TITLE 43¶

CHAPTER 29¶ > SUBCHAPTER III¶ SUBCHAPTER III—OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,” http://www.boem.gov/Outer-Continental-Shelf-Lands-Act/ The term “development” means those¶ activities which take place following discovery of

minerals in paying¶ quantities, including geophysical activity, drilling , platform construction , and

operation of all onshore support¶ facilities, and which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals discovered

***AT: Disads

AT: Obama Good

Domestic military applications and previous legislation prove popular. Humphries 10 (Marc Humphries is a , September 30th, 2010, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain”, Congressional Report Service)World demand for rare earth elements is estimated at 134,000 tons per year, with global production around 124,000 tons annually. The difference is covered by previously mined aboveground stocks.

World demand is projected to rise to 180,000 tons annually by 2012, while it is unlikely that new mine output will close the gap i n the short term. New mining projects could easily take 10 years to reach production. In the long

run, however, the USGS expects that global reserves and undiscovered resources are large enough to meet demand. Legislative proposals H.R. 4866 (Coffman ) and S. 3521( Murkowski ) have been introduced to support domestic production of REEs, because of congressional concerns over access to rare earth raw materials and downstream products used in many national security applications and clean energy technologies.

Plan popular—military supplyGrasso 13 (Valerie Bailey Grasso is a specialist in defense acquisition, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress”, CRS, December 23rd, 2013, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41744.pdf)Some Members of Congress have expressed concern with the nearly total U.S. dependence on foreign sources for rare earth elements. Some have raised questions about China’s near dominance of the rare earth industry

and the implications for U.S. national security. Yet the “crisis” for many policymakers is not the fact that China has cut its rare earth exports and appears to be restricting the world’s access to rare earths, but the fact that the United States has lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials, and that the manufacturing supply chain for rare earths has largely migrated to outside the United States. Still others are concerned about the impact of a potential supply chain vulnerability of materials critical for defense systems. Additionally, some Members of Congress have questioned the lack of knowledge of what specific materials are needed for defense purposes, which materials are strategic and critical to national security, and what steps might be taken to increase the domestic capability to produce these materials. In January 2011, three Members of Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates outlining their concerns over what they perceived as a lack of action on DOD’s part to ensure that adequate supplies of rare earths were available. They pressed for DOD to take immediate action, as described in excerpts below

Plan popular—renewables and offsets chinaGCC 14 (Green Car Congress is a website specializing in bills related to renewable technology, 2/8/14, “Senators introduce bill to encourage US production of thorium and rare earth minerals”, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2014/02/20140208-blount.html)

US Senators Roy Blunt (Mo.) and Joe Manchin (W. Va.) introduced the “National Rare Earth

Cooperative Act of 2014” this week, bipartisan legislation to encourage US production of rare earth metals (and thorium), relieving US dependence on China’s rare earth minerals. Noting that thorium is a mildly radioactive element commonly associated with the lanthanide elements in the most heavy rare earth deposits that are located in the United States and elsewhere, and that current regulations regulations regarding thorium represent a barrier to the development of a heavy rare earth industry that is based in the United States, the act grants private rare earth suppliers and end-users with an opportunity to set up a thorium-bearing rare earth refining cooperative in America. The bill proposes that: It is the policy of the United States to advance domestic refining of heavy rare earth materials and the safe storage of thorium in anticipation of the potential future industrial uses of thorium, including energy, as— (1) thorium has a mineralogical association with valuable heavy rare earth elements; 2) there is a great need to develop domestic refining capacity to process domestic heavy rare earth deposits; and (3) the economy of the United States would benefit from the rapid development and control of intellectual property relating to the commercial development of technology utilizing thorium. The bill proposes that as soon as practicable after enactment, the Cooperative Board, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, establish the Thorium Storage, Energy, and

Industrial Products Corporation to develop uses and markets for thorium, including energy. Thorium, among other uses, is of interest in advanced nuclear fuel cycles. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), rare earth elements are located in the Pea Ridge iron-ore mine in Washington County, Mo. Missouri also has a long mining history in various minerals, including some of the largest sources of lead deposits in the country. Blunt is also a co-sponsor of Senators Ron Wyden (Ore.) and Lisa Murkowski’s (Alaska) Critical Minerals Bill, which directs the USGS to establish a list of minerals critical to the US economy and national security such as Rare Earth Elements.

Plan popular—Republicans support breaking dependence on ChinaTopf 13 (Andrew Topf is a exclusive writer for Rare Earth Investing News, 9/23/14, “House Passes Critical Minerals Act”, Rare Earth investing News, http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/16395-house-passes-critical-minerals-act.html)

Known as the National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act, the bill was passed 246 to 178, with just 15 Democrats in favor. In the last Congress, 22 Democrats supported a similar bill. The act would give federal agencies a maximum 30 months to decide on whether to approve or reject permits for exploration and mining, and it limits the ability of opponents to use courts to stop mining. Get the latest Rare Earth Investing News articles delivered to your email inbox. Learn more Email Sign up Republican supporters of the bill say the legislation is needed to speed up mining approvals, to ensure that the US has adequate sources of strategic minerals such as rare earths. Locally sourced strategic minerals would break US dependence on other countries, such as China, on importing the materials, used for defense and other applications. “Burdensome red tape, duplicative reviews, frivolous lawsuits and onerous regulations can hold up new mining projects here in the U.S. for more than 10 years,” The Hill reported House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.), as saying. “These unnecessary delays cost American jobs as we become more and more dependent on foreign countries for these raw ingredients. “As China continues to

tighten global supplies of rare earth elements, we should respond with an American mineral mining

renaissance that will bring mining and manufacturing jobs back to America.”

AT: Midterms (Plan Popular)

2NC Card- Blue Economy Warrant from Bugel Evidence

The blue economy nature of Ocean Mining is popular and is seen as revitalization of American technological dominance Moorcroft 13 (Sheila, April 17th, “Ocean mining a race to the bottom”, http://www.innovationmanagement.se/2013/04/17/ocean-mining-a-race-to-the-bottom/)

The blue economy, the term ascribed to a wide range of activities such as fishing, shipping, coastal tourism, energy, cable laying and mining, presents huge opportunities. Estimates of the current value vary from $6-$21trillion; a recent study put the value added arising from the EU opportunity alone at €500 billion, rising to €600 billion by 2020. Investment is growing, but also environmental concern. Deep sea mining is at present a small but increasingly significant element of that economy. What is changing? The oceans cover an area of about 360 million km2, at an average depth of about 3800 metres, and contain the world’s most active volcanoes, highest mountains and deepest valleys. At present, only about 5% of the ocean bed is accurately mapped, but the advent of new deep sea robotic submersibles as well as ever more sophisticated survey ships and even satellites is beginning to address the challenge. But it will be a long, slow process – the area that each ship or submersible can cover is small. Deep sea mining is attracting significant investment. It was first attempted when the mineral-rich, deep sea vents surrounding underwater volcanoes were first

discovered in the late 1970s: the cost and technical challenges of exploration prevented progress – till now. The sophistication of new technologies and the growing demand for and price of many mineral resources are changing the equations. Copper, zinc, manganese and gold – among many others – are all to be found in deep sea deposits, many of which are said to produce far higher levels of purity than their land based equivalents. Global metal and mineral mining output was valued at $644 billion in 2010; but even land based mining is facing challenges as resource extraction moves to remoter and more inhospitable locations. Deep sea mining today provides almost none of that global supply, but by 2020 it could be providing 5%, 10% by 2030, valuing it at $65 billion in 2010 prices. However, to put the scale of deep sea deposits in perspective, the estimated value of deep sea gold deposits alone has been put at $150 trillion at today’s prices. But it is very early days. To date, 12 exploratory permits have been issued and one area of active mining is underway off the coast of Papua New Guinea. However, controversy is not far away. The Papua New Guinea government is challenging the terms of the deal and environmentalists are challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact assessment. Exploration continues. Why is this important? The potential rewards are enormous. In coming years we may witness a new ‘gold rush’ as nations and companies try to establish technological leadership to capture as much of the market not just for the minerals, but for the

technologies needed to locate and extract them. Aerospace and oil industry companies, electronics and robotics suppliers, marine and mining specialists all stand to gain as they transfer their various areas of expertise to this new frontier. Governments too are investing heavily including many emerging nation economies. Depending on whether the scale of the deposits lives up to expectations and our ability to extract them proves technically and economically as well as environmentally viable, deep sea mining could change the mineral supply base. For example, deep sea mining may break the relative stranglehold China has on supplies of rare earths, essential for mobile phones and clean technologies. Demand for gold has been increasing – to offset fears of inflation and financial uncertainty, but also in consumer markets such as India; a significant increase in supply could destabilize price structures.

2AC AT: REE DA

Deep sea mining inevitableTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello Initiated by the Japanese after Chinas’ economic sanctions over¶ Senkaku¶ territorial dispute, the revival of Deep Sea mining projects has¶ expanded ¶ worldwide . China ¶ 15¶ and India ¶ 16¶ have both launched important programs. Despite¶ impressive challenges, Deep Sea mining projects are ongoing and¶ their spreading ¶ seems inevitable

2AC AT: China Monopoly Good DA

China only cares about producing for domestic industries – they can still meet their own demand post planAlec Gimurtu, interviewing Jack Lifton, an independent consultant and commentator, He specializes in nonferrous strategic metals and studies those businesses; He has more than 50 years of experience in the global OEM automotive, heavy equipment, electrical and electronic, mining, smelting and refining industries, Streetwise Reports, A Radical Solution for the Rare Earth Supply Crunch: Jack Lifton, 7-9-2013, http://www.theaureport.com/pub/na/a-radical-solution-for-the-rare-earth-supply-crunch-jack-lifton//BDS)TMR: In August, you are presenting your case for a new international REE toll refinery to the Chinese Society of Rare Earths. What reaction are you expecting? JL: My thinking about this has evolved. I think that the Chinese want this to happen. The Chinese are now restructuring their REE production industry and downsizing it to match their internal demand. They will grow the industry in the future, but only to meet their domestic demand . I do not believe that the Chinese are interested in the REE export business. In the last year the Chinese have cut legal, reported production by more than 30%. Originally, Chinese domestic users consumed 60% of their own production. It's up to more than 80% today. When I proposed an international toll

refinery, I was surprised at the positive reaction I got from this in China. I was told by a high-ranking Chinese official in the REE industry that this is an excellent topic. The Chinese really do want to hear outsider views on this. It appears that the Chinese would like the rest of the world to develop enough REE production and refining so that the domestic Chinese REE industry can be left alone. That's my analysis at this point in time. TMR: How would new international toll refining change REE pricing? Would there still be a Chinese domestic price and a different international price? JL: Yes. At the moment the export prices are set by tax. Domestically, Chinese REEs are much cheaper than internationally posted prices because of the large export tax. There's a cap on volume as well as a large tax. The prices we see for cerium or lanthanum in North America, for example, are Chinese domestic prices plus export duties and transport. The problem for a new REE producer is—which price is it that you're going after? For example, say I can buy lanthanum in Chicago for the Chinese export price of $20/kg. Suppose I can produce lanthanum in New Jersey for $10/kg. That looks like a solid profit. The problem is "where is your market?" Yes, $10/kg is great if you're going to sell this into a North American market and the Chinese maintain their export duties. That is fine, except that there's no real market for these materials in North America. There's no total supply chain outside of China. China is the main place where the raw materials get turned into finished product. China is the only location of an existing "mine to magnet" total supply chain. Better than even, "mine to magnet," China has "mine to vacuum cleaner," "mine to car," and "mine to washing machine." They've got everything. As a North American producer of lanthanum, I'm going to have to sell into China at the domestic price, and pay the import duty and cover transport costs. These are all issues that junior miners do not think about. But these issues matter if you are trying to finance a $1B refinery. Is there a market at the price you're going to produce? It's not just about your costs per kilogram. When there is an accidental or intentional monopoly player like China, there are substantial additional factors to consider. And we haven't even mentioned the possibility of import quotas. And then there is the uncertainty. . .everything could change tomorrow. The Chinese REE market is evolving rapidly. They have dramatic overcapacity in everything: mining, refining, fabrication, you name it. There is a desire to cut back to profitable unit production. As they move in that direction, prices will rise in China.

The Chinese goal is to have prices that can sustain the industry. External competition in the commodity markets is not their concern. The model of Rhodia as a toll refinery does not concern China. Solvay is

not in the mining business. They don't make metals. They don't make magnets. They are a solvent exchange separation and high-purity refining company. Their output goes directly to the chemical, automotive and high-tech industries. Rhodia has a large competitive advantage because of its extant investment and China is not trying to take it away. However, REE permanent magnets are a different business because the refined elements from a company like Rhodia have to go to metal maker, an alloy maker and then a magnet maker. While they have these industries in Europe, there is not enough capacity to satisfy all European industrial demand. The Chinese dominate the HREEs because there are no sources outside China. There are still no mines outside of China that are producing significant quantities of HREEs. The Chinese still supply 100% of the world production. The locations of the REE survivors will determine where the toll refining business opportunities will happen. Ucore is in Alaska, Rare Element Resources in Wyoming. The American political climate is such that exporting natural resources to China, especially ones that have been as hyped as REEs, is not very likely to get the support of the government. Therefore, I think there is a strong possibility of a REE toll refinery being built in North America. Tasman is located

in Sweden and does not have to deal with the U.S. political climate. In this case, there is a strong possibility that HREE concentrates will be sold to China, for processing inside China. Other than Rhodia and perhaps two other small facilities in Japan, there's no HREE processing capability outside of China. While Tasman could ship ore or concentrates to China for the dysprosium content, the company wouldn't make any money doing it. Tasman is under review by several European companies as a source for potential feedstock into their vertical supply chain. That would be one path to the creation of a central European REE toll separation and refining plant. The entire HREE industry of the world, which today is 100% in China,

produces total of 15,000 tpa of HREEs. Of that, 60% is the element yttrium. Two new toll refining plants outside of China could double the world's production of the HREEs. In order to do that, we'd have to obtain HREEs ores from outside of China. The surviving juniors will be the companies that supply the midrange and HREEs to these types of refineries.

And Turn China can meet domestic Light REE demand indefinitely but can’t maintain a Heavy REE export monopoly, other production is required to avoid industry collapseJack Lifton, a Founding Principal of Technology Metals Research, LLC. He is also a consultant, author, and lecturer on the market fundamentals of the technology metals, Investor Intel, Lifton ‘Unchained’ (Part 2): The Driver for Global Rare Earth Demand, 10-1-2013, http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/part-2///BDS)The overall driver for global rare earth demand now and for the foreseeable future is a function of the evolution, nationally (i.e. domestically in China), regionally (i.e. in southeast Asia), and

globally, of the Chinese Rare Earth Industry. It is the same for global rare earth supply. Thus rare earth pricing and its impact on Future Supply and Demand also is dominated by the Chinese rare earth industry growth and the Chinese industry’s deployment of short term tactics based on its long term strategy. Based on what I know today, I think that: 1. There is sufficient developed light rare earth (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium) total supply chain capacity domestically in China to completely satisfy China’s domestic demand for the

indefinite future . Thus the only markets available to non-Chinese light rare earth producers are those outside of China and these account today for at most 20% of global demand, 2. The same is most likely true also for China’s domestic total supply chain and demand for the SEG (samarium,

europium, and gadolinium) rare earths, 3. The total global demand for primary HREEs is today essentially China’s domestic manufacturing market, However, from my own background knowledge and

experience, and my personal research in China, I believe that China does not have sufficient economically practical (profitable) or environmentally safe to mine supplies of new HREEs (I define these as terbium,

dysprosium, and yttrium) to satisfy even its near-term domestic (and currently the global) demand. It’s not

that the Chinese ion-adsorption clays are played out; it’s that their continued legal production is likely to be dramatically reduced by environmental and regulatory restrictions in the new era in China of the nation’s switch from export and savings driven GDP growth to that of domestic consumption as the principal driver. 4. It is my further opinion that if it were not for the fact that the Chinese rare earth processing industry is already massively recycling HREE bearing waste streams from

industrial processing and end of life industrial components there would already be a shortage within China of the HREEs. As it is, and as I stated above, I believe that new production of terbium, dysprosium, and yttrium from the Chinese adsorption clay deposits are diminishing due to the crackdown on illegal mining and on the issue of environmental pollution. Thus the rare earth market is truly segmented. On the one hand the two large non-Chinese producing primary rare earth mines, Mountain Pass and Mt Weld, overwhelmingly contain and produce just the light rare earths. Those deposits that are relatively rich in the HREEs, and are today in operation to produce HREEs, are the very low grade “adsorption clays” in southern China. The HREE separation and refining market within China has or seems to have vast overcapacity. This would seem to be an ideal situation for non-Chinese producers of mixed rare earth concentrates that have significant percentages of HREEs. But the issue is the rare earth total value chain not just the supply c hain. Those without knowledge of either chain have been for the last several years simply assuming the they could ascribe the

market value or a high proportion of it to their models of the values for the mixed rare earth process leach solutions derived from their mechanically beneficiated ore concentrates. The primary error in this reasoning is the assumption that the discount from “market pricing” would be “only” 40%. In fact the principle and majority OPEXs are incurred downstream of this point which involves processing the PLS all the way to the fabricated metallic forms or specified chemical blends required by the actual consuming industries. Among other glossed over expenditures are: The costs added for removing and disposing of radioactive components from the PLS are not just CAPEX and OPEX chemical but must also include future regulatory costs, which are today purely speculative, at best, The costs of separating the “desired” rare earths from each other involve substantial initial CAPEX and OPEX but most of the juniors have even so vastly overestimated such costs while simultaneously trivializing the costs discussed in factor 1 above, The cost of obtaining the latest, most efficient and competitive, supply chain component technology, such as those for separation, purification, metal making, and alloy making, The cost in time and manpower (person-power) to bring a total supply chain or enough of its components into operation to make a rare earth venture profitable from the start, and The cost of finding the people for and setting up a marketing organization to convince end users that they should risk adding a vendor to their procurement profile. Note well that this process normally takes up to three years!

China is shifting to supplying domestic demand and ei they can meet global demand now the CCP is purging the country of excess productionJack Lifton, a Founding Principal of Technology Metals Research, LLC. He is also a consultant, author, and lecturer on the market fundamentals of the technology metals, Investor Intel, Lifton ‘Unchained’ (Part 4): China is officially shifting focus to domestic consumer demand, 10-3-2013 http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/part4///BDS)The late and unlamented Soviet Union created this planning model, but could not make it work, and so the Soviet Union became a hypocritical dead end benefiting only privileged elites that in the end simply went bankrupt. Even though it had produced immense stockpiles of natural resources. It had not managed to create an economy that could consume them. China, over the last 25 years, just one generation, has created the largest export led economy in the world. It has accumulated US$3

trillion of reserves in doing so. China is now officially shifting gears. It has announced that it will shift its focus to domestic consumer demand so as to be able to maintain the vast productive capacity it has built as a low labor cost exporter. The Chinese mining industry and its downstream value chain are part and parcel of this shift in emphasis. Let’s see how exactly this is affecting the rare earth supply chain in China and how this will affect any forecast of future global demand for the rare earths collectively and individually. First of all please note that China today, notwithstanding the entry of both Molycorp and Lynas into the light rare earth supply market, remains the overwhelmingly largest supplier of light rare earths in the world. I estimate that during the last 12 months China has produced and sold 90% of the world’s legally traded light rare earths. I say “sold” to emphasize that Molycorp has stated that it has built a large inventory of material and it is not clear to me how much has been actually sold into the market. Lynas, hopefully due to start up issues, has so far produced almost nothing in finished goods (at its entry point into the market). Three weeks ago when I was in China at the ICRE in Ganzhou a speaker from Baotou dramatically emphasized that his company is the world’s largest vertically integrated producer of light rare earths all the way through to metals, and that, by itself, Baotou could easily supply the world’s demand for such products indefinitely. Keep in mind that of the 200 or so people in that audience only a dozen, at most, were not Chinese.

Ganzhou is the heavy rare earth processing center of the world. There are, as I mentioned above, some 38 rare earth separation plants with more than 60,000 tons per year of capacity in the three-province local region of southern China. The Baotou speaker wasn’t trying to impress us, few, non-Chinese, he was very pointedly telling the other Chinese to stick to mining and refining heavy rare earths. Why?

Because he is worried about competition in refining not from Molycorp or Lynas but from other increasingly stressed Chinese rare earth refiners who are being told by the central government that unless they are legal, environmentally in order, and profitable they can be ignored by the new consolidators of the rare earth industry appointed by the central government who, the consolidators, are the only ones who can give out production and end-use allocations and licenses. Interestingly enough there was a list shown of the individual capacities of the 38 rare earth separation plants in the region. The largest was of 5000 tons per annum capacity, the smallest was 1000 tons, and the average was 2000 tons. There are a small, relative to the total, number of much larger light rare earth separation plants in China. Notably in Baotou’s home, the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. I was told that China Minmetals, now appointed as a rare earth consolidator, for example, is building a new 10,000+ ton per year capacity SX plant. The statement was made in the conference that

90% of China’s rare earth refining is done by the largest 6 SX plants and that 97% is done by the top 20 SX plants. There is clearly a vast excess rare earth separation and refining capacity in China and there is clearly a bloodbath underway among them to see which will survive. These “communists’ are doing a very good job

of using market capitalism to sort out a problem. When this type of behavior occurs in a free market economy it normally results in temporary low prices during the oversupply period followed by price stability as inefficient companies fail and then price rises by the winners to compensate for their losses in the battle for survival . I think this is exactly what we’re seeing today in the, still dominated by China, rare earth markets

China has control over the REM industry but overheating, structural failures, and overproduction has left China’s industry weak Morrison and Tang 12 (Wanye and Rachel, April 30th, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States”, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85418/m1/1/high_res_d/R42510_2012Apr30.pdf

Overheated rare earth production in China during the 1990s and the early 2000s generated a fragmented industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining and illicit production. In order to maximize profits, these small companies often ignored safety and environmental regulations and fiercely competed with each other for export deals. In addition to

environmental degradation in China, this overcrowded rare earth sector and often intense competition sharply drove down rare earths prices and. therefore, further pressed producers to cut corners in order to secure their already thinning profit margins. Local governments, which often had vested interests, often

tolerated these practices.34 In addition to illicit rare earth production, smuggling also became widespread, which exacerbated resource depletion and kept prices low. According to

China Business News, about 20.000 tons of rare earths were smuggled from China in 2008. Which was estimated to have accounted for one- third of the total volume of rare earths leaving China that year. This smuggling is often the main reason behind the discrepancies between the

official statistics and the actual data of rare earth production and exports in China. Chinese policymakers and industry experts have voiced concerns over the perceived rapid depletion of their exhaustible rare earth resources. They contend that the rare earth deposits in China account for less than half

of total global reserves; however, the country mines and provides over 95% of the global supply Rare earth production in China has far outpaced the sustainable level which makes Chinese officials concerned that

such a disproportionately high level of output could soon deplete their resources. The Chinese government is also concerned that overproduction and illegal mining often came at the cost of environmental degradation - safety or environmental protection is often ignored in pursuit of revenue

potential.36 The Chinese media have repeatedly exposed incidents of water system and farmland contamination in rare earth mining areas, from Inner Mongolia to southern provinces such as Guangdong and Jiangxi.37 hi the southern provinces, rare earths can be found in high concentration in clays and soil a few

feet underground. As a result, the 1990s saw an explosion of the number of poorly constructed and maintained local mines that were both polluting and wasteful, leaving behind contaminated soil and water. In November of 2011, during a product quality inspection, China's General Administration of Quality Supervision found that 19 of 85 tea products contained excessive levels of toxic rare earths, including a batch of Lipton tea produced and sold in China by Unilever. Unilever later stated that the rare earth metals had

come from the soil where the tea was grown and had nothing to do with its production process.38 China currently argues that it is now moving to consolidate production and put supplies of a critical and exhaustible resource on a more sustainable footing. China maintains that rare earth export

prices have been too low to reflect its virtual monopoly position. Moreover, such dominance, in view of the

Chinese industry experts and policymakers, should assist China to move up the supply chain and engage in rare earth application and end products, not just being the world's supplier of raw materials.39 hi recent years, China has put in place a series of industry and trade policies, aiming to capitalize on its dominance of rare earth supply

Clean Tech Leadership isn’t zero-sum ,empirics provesEconomy 10 (Elizabeth C, "The game changer: coping with China's foreign policy revolution." Foreign Affairs, Academic OneFile. Web, http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?action =interpret&id=GALE%7CA246715580&v=2.1&u= northwestern&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1)

If the United States wants to be the global leader in clean-energy technology by 2050, for

example, it should now be developing the intellectual, financial, and political infrastructure to get there. And when Chinese clean-energy investment interests come knocking, as they are doing, the

United States will be well positioned to determine what types of investment should be welcomed. When done right, such deals have the potential to result in equitable partnerships and successful cooperation. In August 2010, for example, the United Steelworkers union struck a deal with the Chinese companies A-Power Energy Generation Systems and Shenyang Power Group to develop a $1.5 billion wind-farm venture in Texas that will create 1,000 jobs for U.S. workers--up from 330 U.S. jobs when the project was first proposed--and use about 50,000 tons of U.S.-made steel. Similarly, China's efforts to move the international financial system away from the dollar as the world's reserve currency, although potentially costly if done abruptly, might nonetheless be advantageous for Washington over the long run. If the United States were no longer able to borrow money at a better rate than other countries or run greater trade deficits with the benefit of a much-delayed economic impact, for example, it would impose a potentially helpful fiscal discipline on the U.S. economy.

Not zero-sum basis for cooperation in squo means that technology and development get shared Wan 2013 (Zheng, Brian Craig, Utilities Policy 27, “Reflections on China-US energy cooperation: Overcoming differences to advance collaboration”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178713000581

(2008). These intergovernmental agreements/protocols promote cooperation and interaction among institutions and personnel on a wider scale. The US is an important force in the development of energy technology, with obvious advantages in research, development, and

industrialization. Meanwhile, China is home to the fastest-growing energy markets with enormous potential for domination in the world market. China adopts a "market for technology" strategy (Mu and Lee, 2005) to introduce direct investment projects from the US and guide technology transfer. In this manner, China has enhanced its energy

efficiency schemes and developed its strengths in research and development During the Obama administration, China and the US accomplished additional breakthroughs in energy cooperation. In November

2009, the two governments established the US—China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), which promotes cooperative research and development through collaboration in production, learning, and research on clean coal, clean energy vehicles, and building energy conservation. The cooperation between the two is not limited to related technology developments and

government investments in scientific research; it also brings in more investments from enterprises and business agencies, with marketing as an important consideration. In early 2011, the energy sectors of China and the US signed the energy cooperation agreement (which covers product procurement), which amounts to more than US$13 billion (The Economic Times, 2011). The Sino-US Relations Research Croup of China Energy Fund predicts that if the US lifts its restrictions on exports, China can import American energy and

environmental protection technology worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Such large-scale bilateral energy

cooperation will enable China to acquire technology for new energy sources, as well as resolve

urgent energy and environmental issues. Meanwhile, business opportunities will reduce the huge trade deficit of the US and alleviate bilateral trade imbalance.

Clean Tech Markets aren’t Zero-Sum Eisen 2010 (Joel B, “China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917549)

It is exceedingly tempting to descend into stereotyping about a monolithic "Red Menace" aiming to dominate the world's economy. Of course, some do see China's growth in renewables as a threat. Many Western commentators focus on the growth of China's greentech manufacturing sector and its

potential impact on trade. n23 Protectionism in China's domestic greentech industries is a continuing concern, and, as I discuss below, it has led to claims, as most prominently made in a recent investigation commenced by the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), that multinational companies face obstacles to cracking the

Chinese market. n24 Some Western observers also see Chinese firms as competition at [*5] home, focusing on potential imports of Chinese technology into the United States at the expense of domestic companies and the economy. n25 This important subject is worth a full treatment in its own right, as it is inextricably bound up in a much broader

discussion about multilateral trade relations. I will touch upon it briefly in this article. For now, it is worth noting that growth in China's renewable power sector need not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Precisely the opposite may well be true. Chinese and Western companies have begun to and China are much more

complex than they are often made out to be. Similarly, I contend in this article that continued expansion of renewable energy in China is complex because it faces substantial technical and legal challenges similar in some respects to those faced in the United States. I will embark on an in-depth analysis of those challenges, set against the legal, political, and financial environment for renewable energy deployment in China. Beginning with China's governmental structure, I note that its unique characteristics pose special challenges for increasing the deployment of renewable energy.

The race is all rhetoric because it’s actually zero sum and the US would win anywaysChristina Larson, journalist focusing on international environmental issues, based in Beijing and Washington, D.C. contributing editor at foreign policy, America’s Unfounded Fears of A Green-Tech Race with China, Yale Environment 360, 8-2-2010, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/americas_unfounded_fears_of_a_green-tech_race_with_china/2238///BDS)At a factory in Wuxi, China, workers lift solar panels onto conveyor belts, while others in white lab coats move between machines as they check on a process for etching and engraving silicon wafers to form solar cells. This scene in itself isn’t remarkable. But there is a new sort of excitement about the work. China’s production of solar panels has grown quickly in the past two years; it is it now the world’s leading exporter. When Matt Lewis, a representative of the California-based nonprofit ClimateWorks, visited the factory in October, he said it reminded him of his native Silicon Valley: The workers, even ordinary line workers, had a sense that they were part of building the future, the hot new industry. This comparison makes some in the United States, and especially in Washington, nervous. Thomas Friedman has used the bully pulpit of his China Production Line influential New York Times column to warn that the United States is engaged in a global green-tech competition with China, whose potential dominance represents a “new Sputnik.” (“How do you say ‘clean your clock’ in Chinese?” he wrote.) This notion, conjuring residual memories of the days in which U.S. rivalry with Soviet Union was crystallized in the space race — when the word “Sputnik,” the name of the Soviet space program, inspired quivers of anxiety about America’s political and economic prowess and its existential place in the world — has today struck a resonant chord in Washington, drawing upon existing fears and mistrust of China. While some U.S. politicians and commentators still paint China as the global pollution villain, especially after the disappointing outcome at Copenhagen, others are beginning to take green China seriously — as a threat. Last fall, for instance, when Senator Charles Schumer got wind of a planned wind farm in west Texas, announced by a partnership of American and Chinese companies, that would use some wind equipment made in China and potentially create new jobs across the Pacific, he recommended blocking stimulus money from the project, rather than help boost green China. The stimulus money “is supposed to create jobs in America,” he wrote in a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu. (The new wind farm would also have created 300 jobs in Texas, but Schumer was worried that a greater number could be created in China.) Last month, a front-page Sunday piece by Keith Bradsher of the New York Times took the competition metaphor a step further and declared that China was in fact already winning the green-tech race. The article, “China Leading Race to Make Clean Energy,” made the rounds in Washington with its assertion that China had passed the U.S. and several western European countries to become the word’s top manufacturer of both solar panels and wind turbines; it quoted the CEO of a private equity firm in Beijing saying, ominously, “Most of the energy equipment [of the future] will carry a brass plate, ‘Made in China.’” The Times article also raised another spine-tingling geopolitical comparison — this time not likening Beijing to the latter-day USSR, but to the modern-day Middle East. “[China’s] efforts to dominate renewable China will gain thousands of jobs, but not necessarily at America’s expense. energy

technologies,” Bradsher wrote, “raise the prospect that the West may someday trade its dependence on oil from the Mideast for a reliance on solar panels, wind turbines and other gear manufactured in China.” In other words, China might become the Saudi Arabia of alternative energy; the implication seems to be that not only might green China pose an economic threat, but the sheiks of Beijing might soon wield undue political influence

over a “dependent” United States. Few business stories have ever been imbued with so much gravitas, so many fears, so many metaphors, so much geopolitical speculation, as the recent articles and coverage of China’s growing green-tech manufacturing sector. Behind these fears, there is something worth probing — and some myths worth dispelling. Just what are Americans afraid of? To distill the cloud of anxiety, there seem to be three chief fears. The first is very tangible — jobs. The second is about America’s place in the world — will the U.S. remain a global leader in innovation? And the third is about leverage — will the U.S. control its future, or be beholden to a foreign energy gatekeeper, one that exerts undue pull on its economic or foreign policy? “Even when you are looking at these big

numbers that are coming out of China today, I think it really pays to give a close look at what is actually happening on the ground,” says Elizabeth Economy, director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The River Runs Black. “Then

you begin to get a different, more nuanced picture than what is blasted on the business section of the New York Times.” The first essential fact to be aware of is that most news stories about China’s greentech gains are about manufacturing. China is becoming the wind-turbine factory to the world for much the same reasons it has long been the TV and t-shirt factory to the world: lower

wages, lower land prices, fewer regulatory and other requirements, etc. This isn’t particularly surprising, and it shouldn’t be seen as a reversal of the status quo. What’s changed most dramatically in the last five years has been growing global demand. With significant government investment, Chinese factories have planned for and stepped up production accordingly. Yes, this is bad news for U.S. cities like Detroit, where planners have recently been retrofitting old hot-rod factories into wind-turbine factories, such as an old Ford

Thunderbird plant in Michigan that’s being converted into a green-tech manufacturing center in a bid to boost the local economy. China’s research labs are politically constrained, limiting their ability to attract top talent. Manufacturing in China, especially low and medium-tech manufacturing, has certain clear economic advantages. But it’s also worth considering a few other facts.

Most of the green manufacturing jobs that the U.S. stands to “lose” haven’t in fact been created yet; China will gain thousands of new jobs, but not necessarily at America’s expense. Moreover, the United States will still gain many new green-collar jobs, in installation and maintenance, which can only be

locally based, as well as sales teams, conference planners, and other positions already arising to support the

growing green-tech field. Besides green-tech hardware, there’s also the question of the technology that enables it. Who will be responsible for the innovation that drives the low-carbon future? At present, America still has significant advantages — including the world’s leading university system and the entrepreneurial culture and venture-capital spigots of technology hubs, particularly Silicon Valley. “Intellectual property rights have done a lot to hamper China’s development of green technology,” says Linden Ellis, U.S. director of

nonprofit China Dialogue. “People would rather come to Silicon Valley and develop a technology where they know it will be protected by the law, right down to every line, than go to China and try to develop a technology there where maybe the components

will be cheaper and there is a lot of interest, but people do not trust that their findings will be protected.” Similar concerns have, for the

past two decades, grounded Beijing’s attempts to build a domestic airline industry, considered the pinnacle of

high-tech manufacturing. Foreign companies and top-notch engineers have simply been unwilling to share technology with China (Boeing has even avoided building factories in China, for fear of commercial espionage). The result: Planes that fly from Beijing to Shanghai today are still built by Boeing and Airbus. Of course, most green-energy equipment won’t match the complexity of assembling

something like Boeing’s new Dreamliner, but the airplane situation sheds light on two points: that cheap labor is hardly the only factor driving business decisions, and that, despite substantial government support, China’s domestic aerospace engineers have not yet produced research to rival that of Western competitors. (China’s university system and research labs are famously politically constrained, limiting their ability to attract top global talent.) Of course, China would like to change this. Beijing is doing its best to both allay the fears of international partners and to nurture its own homegrown innovators. A program known as the “State High-Tech Development Plan,” launched by Beijing in March 1986 and nicknamed the “863 Program,”

‘The clean-tech war is overblown from the start,’ says one American entrepreneur. aims to develop top scientists in China and to incubate cutting-edge technology projects in energy and other sectors. So far, its results have been modest over two

decades: birthing a family of computer processors known as Loongson, and some technology used in the Shenzhou spacecraft. While the 863 Program’s track record should certainly dispel Western assumptions that no good research can come from China, it also disproves the notion that money alone can clone a Steve Jobs or Bill Gates or Sergey Brin. This should allay some anxiety in Washington about America having fallen behind, but it is not a reason to become complacent. America has neither relinquished, nor is forever assured, her innovation crown. Meanwhile, folks in the green-tech and environmental frontlines — as opposed to politicians and

commentators — don’t see a “race” at all. “I do not see such a pattern exists,” says Wen Bo, a Beijing environmentalist. “The clean-tech war is overblown from the start,” says Richard Brubaker, an American

environmental entrepreneur in Shanghai. To them, the green-tech “race” is not one that one side wins and the other loses, but a scenario where partnerships are sought out and the final equation

doesn’t have to be a zero-sum game. “For now at least, there is a great symbiotic relationship with California and the east coast of China on green technology,” says Linden Ellis. “Where California has the know-how, the technology, the universities and programs dedicated to developing technology,

people who are interested in piloting it on a very expansive scale, or trying new combinations, often seek out research partners in China.” Similar partnerships can exist even when the focus shifts from research to commercial activity. Kevin Czinger, the CEO of a Santa Monica-

based electric car company that partners with a Chinese battery company, noted in a New Yorker article that if the U.S. would stop feeling threatened by China’s progress on clean technology, it might begin to recognize its own strengths in this field.

China and US achieve best results through cooperating on cleantech[this ev is probably more prescriptive than descriptive]Jonathan Woetzel, director in McKinsey’s Shanghai office, China and the US: The potential of a clean-tech partnership, McKinsey & Company, 8-2009, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/energy_resources_materials/china_and_the_us_the_potential_of_a_clean-tech_partnership//BDS)China and the United States, the world’s dominant producers of carbon emissions, have adopted aggressive

programs to reduce oil imports, create new clean-energy industries and jobs, and generally improve the environment.

But the environment that will be most critical to making or breaking the two countries’ efforts to curb the

dangers of global warming could well be the market that they jointly create in pursuit of their aims. Unless the two work together to provide the scale, standards, and technology transfer necessary to make a handful of promising but expensive new clean-energy technologies successful, momentum to curb global warming could stall and neither country will maximize its gains in terms of green jobs, new companies, and energy security. The risk is real. Electrified vehicles, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and

concentrated solar power, among other emerging “green tech” sectors, will need massive investment,

infrastructure, and research to get off the ground. While the Chinese and US governments, along with

private investors, are pursuing all of these technologies, they cannot achieve separately what they could jointly. Whether collaborating formally or informally, China and the United States

working as a group of two (or G-2) dedicated to climate change would boost these technologies and deliver benefits that would accrue to all nations. Clean-energy solutions are critical for reducing the amount of harmful greenhouse gases produced not only by the two highest-emitting nations but also by countries worldwide. For instance, if the majority of vehicles on the world’s roads by 2030 were hybrids and battery-powered vehicles, they would generate 42 percent fewer emissions than if all cars continued to run on today’s gas and diesel engines.1 But such reductions won’t occur—won’t even come close to happening—unless China and the United States lay the groundwork to make it so. A global electric-car sector must start in China and the United States, and it must begin with the two countries jointly creating an environment for automotive investors to scale their bets across both nations. Private companies in China and the United States will most certainly compete to make the products, including electric-drive (or hybrid) vehicles, batteries, charging stations, and so on. But the two governments can no doubt create the conditions for both of them to succeed—for example, by setting coordinated product and safety standards across the two markets, funding the rollout of infrastructure, sponsoring joint R&D initiatives in select areas (such as new materials for car parts), ensuring that trade policies support rather than hinder the development of a global supply chain for the sector, and providing consumers with financial incentives to buy the new models. More immediately, the two governments could pick matching cities in China and the United

States for electrified-vehicle pilots that could be used to collect standardized data on real electrified-vehicle consumer adoption, infrastructure costs, and driving conditions that could then be shared with companies in both nations. This new sector will require scale to succeed—more scale than could be found any time soon in either country alone.

Electrified vehicles may one day become a viable market within both nations, but that day will arrive much more quickly if the two countries collaborate to create a market that is bigger and more attractive. In building this market, China and the United States would also ensure that the companies and jobs associated with it would be created in both countries sooner. Oil consumption will fall more quickly as well: today, about 50 percent of China’s oil imports—and 80 percent of America’s—are used to fuel vehicles. In other words, one plus one would equal three. Such momentum would also likely spark Europe into competing in a global electrified-vehicle industry faster. CCS is another technology whose success needs the scale that only China and the United States can create together. Adapting CCS technology to coal-fired plants to capture the emitted greenhouse gases is expensive. CCS technology also uses a lot of energy to capture the emissions, thereby making plants less efficient. And fundamental questions about how the captured emissions are to be stored still need addressing. Neither nation is pursuing this expensive, uncertain emissions reduction technology quickly, but they would improve their chances and their options if they pooled costs and knowledge. Together, the two governments could fund demonstration plants in China and the United States, jointly evaluate technologies available from vendors, set standards, and drive down costs. By using the pilot plants as research labs to learn more about the challenges CCS faces and how to overcome them, the governments could share the information with companies entering the CCS business, advancing learning in this industry at a quicker pace. Assuming engineers find solutions to the technical and storage hurdles, we estimate that by 2030 this technology could “clean” 17 percent of coal power in the United States and 30 percent of China’s coal power, reducing total combined emissions by as much as 7 percent—a significant benefit to both nations and to the world. Concentrated solar power

(CSP) might not even have a future without joint action by China and the United States. As an emerging technology, CSP requires both technical progress and massive investments that only the largest economies can support. CSP technology uses sunlight to create and store steam power to drive turbines that transmit electricity on a larger scale more easily than they could using photovoltaic technology (which uses flat-screen receptors that turn sunlight into power). If clean concentrated solar power is scaled to generate 22 percent of total power in China and the United States by 2030, it could create over half a million jobs in each country. Setting common standards, coinvesting in pilot projects and R&D, and undertaking other joint initiatives are the way to get this started. There are other benefits to joint action on clean energy besides reducing oil imports, cleaning up the air, and creating jobs. Cooperation on tangible actions that result in positive improvements for each country could help to foster trust between governments that have real differences on other political and economic issues. In addition, meaningful reductions in oil consumption by the world’s two largest importers of oil could ease pressure on future global supply and demand imbalances of the fossil fuel. It won’t be easy for countries and companies to work in common to make these technologies real. The challenges to cooperation are numerous. Companies in both nations will be wary about what information they share with partners and competitors. Real cooperation between the two countries on technology initiatives is limited, so both sides will have to work hard to build relationships. In addition, they will need to create institutional frameworks for implementing and managing projects, as well as cofinancing mechanisms, partnership rules, and governance models. US companies will be concerned about protecting the intellectual property (IP) technologies that they use in pilot projects in China. The two governments will need to cleanly separate bilateral initiatives on clean-energy development from broader, multilateral agreements on emissions reductions. The list goes on. But none of these challenges are showstoppers. Negotiations between the two

countries could address nearly all these issues comprehensively. Even the thorniest—IP protection—is manageable. Because companies from many nations would contribute to making these three big technologies a success, IP agreements should be international. On that front, China will need to improve its ability to enforce global IP rules. Most critical, however, is the leadership that will be needed to surmount these obstacles. A commitment at the top levels of both governments to set a joint course for making these technologies real would be the signal of a real beginning. From there the impulse for collaboration may well filter down through the public and private sectors in the two countries to make research, investment, and policy a cooperative agenda.

2AC AT: China Monopoly Good (China Econ Impact)

Chinese economy resilient – urbanization, investment, and stimulus proveReuters 11(Kevin Yao, June 23, “Analysis: China economy resilient, for now”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/23/us-china-economy-growth-idUSTRE75M1AO20110623) RABEIJING (Reuters) – China's growth is slowing under the weight of Beijing's anti-inflation campaign and weaker global demand, but any investors betting on a hard landing would be underestimating the resilience of the world's second-largest economy . China's relentless urbanization continue to drive expansion even as Beijing seeks to check unfettered investment by growth-obsessed local authorities, while stronger domestic consumption is providing a firmer cushion against external shocks. China bears may have been emboldened on Thursday by a purchasing managers' survey showing growth in the factory sector nearly stalled in June as new export orders fell. But skeptics who are expecting an abrupt economic slowdown may have miscalculated Beijing's resolve to act quickly if needed to revive growth , especially if inflation eases later

this year as expected, reducing the need for fresh monetary tightening measures, analysts say. "The economy is set up for growth. You've still got urbanization and industrialization to come and all the incentives at local government levels are still to do with encouraging growth ," said Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered Bank in Hong Kong. "People always over-worry about a China hard landing. Clearly there are a lot of problems with the economy but people may underestimate the government's ability to muddle through." Green expects some policy relaxation later this year as price pressures start to moderate. NO HARD LANDING? Global investors are unnerved by any sign of a slowdown in China, a key global growth engine, even as the U.S. economic recovery loses momentum and Europe struggles with a sovereign debt crisis. An abrupt slowdown in China could hammer international financial markets and stifle demand for commodities from iron ore to soybeans. The economy has expanded at an average annual pace of 10 percent in the past three decades. Fears of a hard landing have gained traction as a recent stream of data showed the turbo-charged economy is cooling, but for now China shows no signs of following the West with growth levels falling well below long-term trends. Indeed, most market watchers typically define a hard landing in the Chinese context as a sudden dip in quarterly GDP growth below 8 percent, a level advanced economies can only dream about. The 8 percent threshold is, more importantly, a political line in the sand

for Beijing, which it deems to be the minimum level needed to create enough jobs to ensure social stability. The last time the economy showed signs of a sudden slump, during the depths of the global financial crisis in late 2008, Beijing announced a 4 trillion yuan ($ 600 billion) stimulus plan , quickly returning to double- digit growth . While few argue with the success of that scheme, many economists say the spending binge also sowed the seeds of inflation and created excesses such as unrestrained lending and property bubbles which are aggravating imbalances in the economy, leaving it more vulnerable if the current "soft patch" in Western demand turns out to be a prolonged downturn. MORE STIMULUS? Policymakers will certainly have more room to consider fresh pump-priming if inflation peaks in June or July near 6 percent, as widely expected, and then moderates steadily in the second-half of the year. Dong Tao, an economist at Credit Suisse, believes the central bank will not rush to relax policy for fear of fueling further property price rises, but said the government will unleash its spending power to prevent growth from slowing too much. "Should the threat of a hard landing emerge, we would expect fiscal stimulus to come to the rescue , instead of monetary easing. Providing funding to policy housing and speeding up infrastructure projects would be the easy options," he said. China has already announced an ambitious plan to start building and upgrading 36 million affordable homes between 2011-2015, with 10 million to be completed this year, to quell growing public discontent over rapidly rising house prices. Many economists, while trimming their growth forecasts for China, don't believe the current slowdown will amount to a slump akin to that during the global financial crisis . Most still expect GDP growth of more than 9 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier compared with 9.7 percent in the first quarter, with full-year growth seen at about 9 percent. "I'm not worried about the risk of a hard landing in China. It's a low- probability event this year and next year ," said Gao Shanwen, chief economist at China Essence Securities in Beijing. After all, a gentle easing in growth is exactly what Beijing wants and is in line with its policy to priorities' efforts to cool inflation. "The slowdown is essentially part of the deal. you need to a slowdown to reduce excesses and control inflation," said Kevin Lai, economist at Daiwa Global Markets in Hong Kong.

Chinese economy is self-correcting – threats of crisis are overblown and not supportedUlrich 10 - Managing Director and Chairman of China Equities at J.P. Morgan (Jing, March 3, J.P. Morgan’s Hands-On China Series, Google, “Debunking the myth of a China collapse”) RAThere have always been cynics regarding China’s economic growth and without joining the ranks of the doomsayers, it is easy to veer towards pessimistic conjecture simply by observing the changing landscape in China’s rapidly developing cities. Any casual visitor will marvel at the sprawling complexes of newly-built apartments and office towers – admittedly many units at these developments are typically owned by speculative investors holding out for capital appreciation. The worst-case fears concerning China’s property market are based upon a layer of truth and we ourselves have highlighted the untenable nature of price increases in some big Chinese cities, as well as the possibility that last year’s property boom was partly fuelled by misdirected bank loans. However, there are crucial differences between China’s real estate markets and those of the U.S . (and indeed Dubai), which require that we view the apparent building bubble through the lens of China’s unique circumstances. Unlike the dramatic increase in household leverage that precipitated the U.S. sub-prime crisis, Chinese household debt amounts to approximately 17% of GDP, compared to roughly 96% in the US and 62% in the Euro area. While the level of Chinese household leverage has increased in recent years, it has done so from a very low base. HANDS-ON CHINA REPORT – MAR 3, 2010 With respect to residential property, homebuyers in China are required to make minimum downpayments of 30% before receiving a mortgage, and at least 40% for a second home purchase. Even at the height of the government’s stimulus efforts, the minimum down-payment requirement for first homes was only lowered to 20%. The Chinese cultural tendency of shunning debt explains the many anecdotal accounts we hear about homebuyers putting down amounts that substantially exceed these minimum requirements. This is made possible by the massive amount of savings that Chinese households have accumulated, while in comparison, the U.S. savings rate stood below 1% in the years preceding the housing crisis. Although price increases in the Chinese residential market appear rapid (over 20% in 2009), such headline figures cannot be viewed in isolation of the broader trend in income growth. Over the past 5 years, urban household incomes grew at a 13.2% compound annual rate, compared to an 11.9% CAGR in home prices. This is not to say that pockets of overheating cannot be found in some regional markets. In Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, for instance, prices did in fact outpace income growth by a margin of more than 5 percentage points over the same period. But again, we see this as a symptom of new urban wealth being put to speculative use, rather than the profligate use of leverage. The combination of excessive leverage and mortgage securitization were at the epicenter of the U.S. sub-prime crisis – both of these factors are absent in the Chinese context. The commercial segment of real estate has inspired just as much concern, with prices rising 16% in 2009, despite low rental yields and prime office vacancy rates as high as 21% and 14% in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. However occupancy and rental rates have started to pick up for prime properties – many of the current vacancies are at the lower end. While returns for new projects may end up lower than expected, China’s urbanization process is far from over and vacant space will be absorbed over time . The crux of the problem with the Chinese real estate sector is that property is seen by the country’s investing class as a store of value, within an economy that offers its citizens persistently low deposit rates and limited investment options. The absence of a recurring property holding tax allows speculative homebuyers to disregard rental yields in hopes of reaping capital appreciation in the nottoo-distant future. We share many of the concerns about flawed incentives and overheating in the Chinese property market – but even if property prices were to undergo a correction, this would not trigger the type of economic and financial devastation that might arise in an over-leveraged economy. Although stability in the property market is critical to sustaining the Chinese economy’s recovery, policymakers are clearly concerned about the risk of asset bubbles and the threat that excessive speculation could drive prices beyond affordability for average homebuyers. The government is also well aware of the need to increase the holding costs for property investment and is weighing the potential value of introducing a national property tax. This measure might be introduced in the medium-term and should serve to deflate prices in some overheating markets. In the meantime, authorities have re-imposed a business tax on homeowners who resell their properties within a period of two years and could hike this further to deter speculation. The perennial ups and downs of China’s property sector arise from the fact that the country’s closed capital account and underdeveloped capital markets leave its citizens with few investment options. Investment interest in residential property has fuelled a mismatch between the stock of higher-ed apartment buildings and practical needs for affordable housing. This imbalance must be resolved over time by spurring the development of affordable housing, which is currently one of the government’s HANDS-ON CHINA REPORT – MAR 3, 2010 main policy initiatives. In the long run, financial reform, including capital account liberalization, will provide Chinese investors with broader investment options, reducing the role of real estate as a form of capital preservation. Worries about public sector debt A more recent warning issued by some China bears is that of hidden debt risk among Chinese local government investment companies – which according to state media reports, received approximately 40% of last year’s RMB9.6 trillion in new loans. Official estimates of the total outstanding loan balance for such investment entities exceed RMB6 trillion – or roughly 20% of Chinese GDP – a figure that has been criticized by some as being too low. According to a Bloomberg report quoting Victor Shih of Northwestern University, the worst case scenario arising from hidden borrowing by China’s local investment intermediaries is a large-scale financial crisis around 2012. Since many shovel-ready local infrastructure projects were brought forward as part of the stimulus plan, near-term returns on

investment are likely to be subdued. However, as J.P. Morgan analysts Samuel Chen and Sunil Garg have pointed out, Chinese bank loans for public sector investment projects carry implicit or explicit sovereign guarantees, and are thus almost akin to a bond issuance for a public works project. Moreover, the majority of projects at local government levels carry land collateral and explicit fiscal revenue guarantees. Over the past year, the Chinese government has also stepped up efforts to enforce tax collection across the corporate sector. This effort, when combined with improving business conditions, brought last years’ fiscal deficit to a narrower-thanbudgeted 2.2% of GDP. Chinese economic planners are already aiming to achieve a slowdown in infrastructure investment, shifting focus toward completing existing projects rather than funding new construction. Growth in infrastructure investment slowed to 42.5% in FY09, from 50.7% in the first half. On a year-over-year basis, the slowdown has been more pronounced, with infrastructure investment growth peaking at 55.5% in May, vs. 31.9% in December. Meanwhile, China’s banking regulator has ordered banks to closely follow lending guidelines to ensure that all lending to local government investment companies are backed by actual projects and that project risks are properly accounted for. Looking ahead, while certain local administrations might struggle to service debt, the magnitude of public sector debt risks do not appear as severe as some have suggested. According to IMF forecasts, China’s government debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach 22% in 2010, compared to 94% in the U.S. and 227% in Japan. Even if the more alarming estimates of local government debt were included, the ratio would only grow to approximately 51% of estimated 2010 GDP. As a pillar of demand for a number of economies and for the commodities complex, China's ability to regulate its economy has far reaching implication s for global markets. One must not underestimate the scale of future demand in a country that is urbanizing at a rate of 15 million people a year. Today, many observers are concerned that China’s economy has grown too rapidly, and are all too-ready to point to pockets of overcapacity as proof of an imminent system-wide collapse. While we agree that certain vulnerable areas of the economy deserve closer monitoring, we find little support for the sceptics' views of an imminent crisis.

2AC AT: Enviro DA

Robotics don’t link to the environment DA---it doesn’t tear up the ocean floorCurrie, 13 Adam, Rare Earth Investing News, “The Pacific Dream: An Underwater Rare Earth Behemoth,” http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/9349-underwater-rare-earth-deep-sea-china-japan-ocean-floor-geophysics-discovery.htmlEnvironmentally sound¶ Over half of the metal in this underwater deposit is on the heavier end of the spectrum, “twice the level of China’s key mines and without the radioactive by-product thorium that makes the metals so hard to mine,” according to researchers cited by The

Telegraph.¶ Commenting on the environmental implications of mining REEs from the seabed , Kowalczyk noted

that there will likely not be any major implications and that if issues arise, they will most likely be associated with the

amount of material that needs to be moved to access the ore-bearing horizons, which are subhorizontal and exist over large areas.¶ Describing the kind of extraction process that would be used to retrieve REEs from the seabed, Kowalczyk stated it will undoubtedly be robotic.¶ “It is very unlikely it will be an open-cut type of extraction sequence as this would impact considerable amounts of material . Possible candidates are in situ leaching,

robotic mining machines that are analogues of tunnel boring machines and perhaps subhorizontal

drilling similar to that used in the extractions of tight gas from shale formations on land.Ӧ He

continued, “it may be that a process similar to that used for roll-front uranium deposits on land may be adaptable to this environment also. If the new high-grade nodule type deposits are confirmed to be extensive and not buried deeply, this will simplify the mining process .”

The plan is net better than status quo mining and could to lead to environmental protectionUNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”, http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)2.2 Environmental Opportunities It may at first glance appear that deep-sea mining offers very few environmental 'opportunities' but advocates of deep-sea mining have argued that focusing mineral exploration on the deep sea is significantly better for the environment than the continued exploitation of minerals on land {Branan, 2007 and Schrope, 2007). The reasons put forward include less waste, smaller mine footprint, reusable infrastructure, lower greenhouse gas generation and easier site remediation. The trend of terrestrial mining to exploit ores of increasingly lower grades results in larger

and larger amounts of waste material being generated. The comparatively high grade of deep-sea ores and the

general absence of overburden means that, in comparison toon-land mining, there is likely to be a much smaller mine footprint and much less waste generation {Scott, 2001). Historically mining waste has often caused serious pollution -

contamination of waterways, increased sedimentation and acid mine drainage - but due to the minimal amount of waste theorized to be generated at deep-sea mine sites, toxic waste is considered to pose less of a problem with marine mining. Deep-sea mining is not likely to displace most land-based mining, however, unless

policy actions are implemented to limit or at least charge for environmental impacts associated with mining (see text box). Deep-sea mining activity may provide environmental spin-offs, which include increased knowledge of deep-sea biological communities. For example, private company funded research in the Manus Basin, Papua New Guinea, has already produced a significant body of literature on vent communities and the physio-chemical conditions surrounding hydrothermal systems. The value of these scientific discoveries is difficult to quantify, but it is clear that the costs of conducting such research in the absence of commercial exploration would be high and therefore may not occur. Increased knowledge assists with the management and conservation of deep-sea environments. Deep-sea mining activity and the habitat-mapping data it

could generate can be used to define meaningful marine protected areas in regions of the deep sea where there is currently very sparse information.

Don’t have to drill---can scoop it upGoldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat Lodge expects the pace to continue, with rising demand for metals for emerging economies, and for technologies such as hybrid cars

and smart phones. Extracting the metals will not require drilling. The ore deposits are in nodules strewn across the rolling plains of sediment that carpet the ocean floor. Oceanographers say they resemble knobbly black potatoes, ranging in size from a couple of centimetres to 30cm. Mining companies say it may be possible to scoop them up with giant tongs and then siphon them up to vessels waiting on the surface. No risk—their studies are all hype. Begley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”, http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)To the surprise of many scientists, however, the risk mining poses to the vent communities may be smaller than originally feared. For one thing, seafloor deposits are much more concentrated than those on land: at a site 3,000 feet down off Papua New Guinea called Solwara 1, where Nautilus expects to begin mining in 2012, deposits contain 6.7 percent copper. That compares with 0.46 percent for typical deposits on land. Pound for pound, seafloor ore also has more gold, zinc, and silver than land deposits do. That’s why seafloor mining should make economic sense in the first place.

It’s also why, to extract a given quantity of metal, less material needs to be processed, which is the most

environmentally destructive part of mining . (Processing requires toxic compounds and leaves vast piles of waste.) Seafloor mining might therefore be less destructive than mining on land, which brings such not-exactly-benign consequences as mountaintop removal, mercury pollution, and destruction of watersheds. In addition, the “cutter suction” technology pioneered by Nautilus—some version of which China presumably would adopt—

minimizes how much sediment is stirred up , says Samantha Smith, Nautilus’s environmental manager.

Remote-controlled machines smash the sulfide deposits, which are then hoovered up through a riser pipe to a vessel on the surface. Although the process destroys the chimneys that encase the sulfide-rich

plumes, the vents themselves survive. The challenge, says Duke’s Van Dover, “is to ensure that cumulative effects of mining activities do not exceed the rate of recovery of the organisms that rely on these habitats for survival.”

The vents are resilientBegley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”, http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)Another reason for optimism is that the vents can withstand disasters such as undersea volcanoes. A huge one near the East Pacific Rise erupted in 1991, releasing molten lava that basically paved the seafloor and choked off the geyser,

obliterating the vent creatures. Yet microorganisms and larger animals recolonized the vent

within two years, as larvae from neighboring vents arrived and set up housekeepin g. (Of course, if

larvae from a species different from the one wiped out arrive first, the new colony will differ from the original, with unknown

consequences for deep-sea biodiversity.) That suggests a resilience that bodes well for recolonization after

the mining operation moves on , too, though only for vents on tectonically active sites such as that where the eruption occurred. Vents such as those on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, for example, are not likely to be frequently overrun by lava and are relatively far apart, suggesting they may be less resilient. Still, “vent organisms seem to be adapted to withstand relatively frequent natural and severe disasters,” says Van Dover. “Seafloor mining

might be no worse than what nature delivers, though the effects of mining come on top of what nature does.”

Aff would mine in safe ways. Begley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”, http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)

The surest way to spare the vent creatures would be to mine only inactive vents, where the

geysers have stopped and the ecosystem has died . Nautilus has not agreed to that, but says it will take

steps to preserve vents. “We’ve put in place a number of measures to ensure that ecosystems

and biodiversity are maintained, ” says Smith. It plans to use undersea robots to move some vent

animals away from the area being mined, establish refuges from which vent creatures can seed

ecosystems recovering from mining, and allow one vent community to recover from mining before the company

tackles adjacent sites.

AT: Midterms

No one cares about rare earthsDobranksy 13 (Steve Dobransky is an Adjunct Professor at Cleveland State University. He is completing his Ph.D. studies at Kent State University, majoring in International Relations and Justice Studies. He has an M.A. from Ohio University and a B.A. from Cleveland State University, October, 2013, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, “Rare Earth Elements and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Rare Earth Elements and U.S. Foreign Policy)

The political dimension of REEs has not been developed or debated fully by Americans ,or by the rest of the world. Many politicians and corporate executives have transnational interests and cannot argue for more

aggressive policies without risking possible severe consequences. Most of the Wes tern public are not aware of

REE s and, thus have not demanded redress of the issue. Political scientists and other

scholars in general have not been attuned to the REE issue and, therefore, have not made any significant attempt to examine the issue, let alone make recommendations. A number of journalists and think tank members have been lighting

the torch and waving it to get others’ attention but so far few people have taken notice. With such relatively little interest by

the general public or intense demands by a fervent and powerful few, the REE issue is riding below the

political radar screen to the grave disadvantage of all. This issue has the potential to bring down America and greatly undermine its well-being and security, as well as the rest of the world. American prosperity and stability, and the world’s strategic balance, may well hang in the balance on the REE issue. If China consolidates its position and maintains a long-term monopoly of REEs, then it will ensure that most high-end and valuable products with REEs will be manufactured eventually in China and, thus, much of the world’s wealth will shift to China and be utilized there. China, then, will attain the level of the new—and, possibly, sole—superpower in the world in the coming decades.27

***AT: CPs

2AC FG Key (Generic)

Federal Gov Key to Mining OperationsUNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”, http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)

There are several reasons why comprehensive and well-implemented legislative and regulatory frameworks are essential to the governance of mining activity. As a first step, investors require a minimum of rules before making a positive investment decision , because of 1} the

long-term nature of the investment ; 2) the extremely high capital intensity of the industry,

especially in mining; and 3) the immobility of assets once built . In devising legal and contractual

frameworks, it is important to entrench internationally accepted standards and practices concerning natural resource sector administration and management. This includes making appropriate provisions mining in legislation which reflect best internal practices for transparency in decision-making, together with measures which are designed to uphold accepted standards of

corporate responsibility for companies, as well as enhancing the developmental benefits for local communities.

2AC FG Key (Protectionism)

Government is key to obtain the knowledge infrastructure to protect US interests --- the CP causes protectionism Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf To protect the U.S. government’s ability to manage critical minerals appropriately, Congress¶

should protect the government’s role in analyzing critical mineral vulnerabilities and¶

producing its own data . ¶ As congressional leaders¶ in both political parties strive to reduce spend¶ -¶ ing and seek

efficiencies, they should maintain¶ a strong U.S. government capacity for research ¶ and analysis – a public good that is both necessary to protect U.S. interests and undersupplied ¶ by the

private sector . Without vigilance, the¶ United States risks being blindsided by regular ¶ trade

disputes and supply disruptions , and by¶ countries exerting political leverage. ¶ Improving¶ how the

U.S. government handles mineral issues¶ should not require major increases in manpower¶ or spending. But the administration and Congress¶ must maintain the existing capacities and preserve the knowledge infrastructure that the¶ government has redeveloped in the past few years ¶ (See Key U.S. Government Offices box).

2AC FG Key (Regulations)

Outer Continent Shelf Lands Act confirms federal jurisidiction RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.htmlOuter Continental Shelf (seaward of 3 nautical miles from shore): the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. 1331 et seq.), passed in coordination with the Submerged Lands Act, confirmed federal jurisdiction over the resources beyond three nautical miles from shore and created a legal process for developing those resources (such as oil and gas).

The FG has the jurisdiction for the 197 miles RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.htmlExclusive Economic Zone (3 nautical miles to 200 miles offshore): pursuant to a 1983 proclamation by President Reagan (Proclamation No. 5030), the United States now asserts jurisdiction over the living and non-living resources within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While coastal states have primary jurisdiction and

control over the first three miles of the EEZ and the federal government has primary jurisdiction over and controls the remaining 197 miles , the Coastal Zone Management Act provides coastal states with substantial authority

to influence federal actions beyond three nautical miles. The assertion of jurisdiction under the EEZ provides a

basis for U.S. economic exploration and exploitation , scientific research, and protection of the environment.

Federal government, rather than states, have control over the coastal watersRSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.htmlDebate over who controls and manages the waters and resources found offshore the United States

began in the late 1700's and continues to this day. Issues in this debate include key federal and State relationships which must be better understood for effective management of California's ocean resources.¶ Soon after the founding of the United States, the newly formed federal government asserted sovereignty over a territorial sea extending three miles from the coast. Moreover, the coastal states asserted the ability to develop ocean resources out to three miles. Over the past 45 years, however, a number of events have occurred which drastically modified management of the offshore area. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court

upset what had appeared to be settled law and determined that the United States , rather than

coastal states, had paramount rights over the nation's coastal waters and resources [United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)]. This decision was surprising to coastal states, and set the stage for a debate resulting in the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (granting coastal states ownership of the lands and resources out to three nautical

miles from shore). Also enacted was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, establishing federal

jurisdiction over the resources beyond three nautical miles from shore and creating a legal

process for developing those resources.¶ In the early 1970's, Congress recognized that activities beyond states'

control and jurisdiction could significantly affect coastal states. Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; 16

U.S.C. 1451 et seq.) in 1972, providing a crucial link between coastal states and federal activities, or federally permitted activities, which occur just beyond state waters. As an incentive for states to develop management plans for their coastal resources, the Congress granted states the ability to review, and in some circumstances stop, federally permitted activities which "affect" the resources of the coastal zone, if those activities are not consistent with the federally approved state coastal program. However, the CZMA allows the U.S. Department of Commerce to override a state's objection to a federal

permit activity if the Secretary for Commerce finds that the objection is not supported by the

approved coastal management program, or the activity is otherwise required in the interests of national security.

Federal government has control over the outer continental shelfVirginia Places, 9 “Virginia and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),” http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/ocs.html In 1953 Congress also passed the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Land Act, endorsing the national government's claim to the ocean resources issued originally by President Harry Truman. International claims of rights to control navigation, fishing,

and economic development of mineral resources led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.¶ The Department of the Interior determines the boundary of Federal/state jurisdiction , when defining parcel boundaries for leasing OCS resources such as sand, heavy minerals, and especially hydrocarbons (oil and gas). The Department has adopted the mean lower low water (MLLW) line, as drawn on National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administation (NOAA) - National Ocean Service nautical charts, as the coast line. (NOAA uses the average of the lower low water height of each tidal day to draw the the mean lower low water or MLLW line.) Because the boundary changes as storms, currents, or even construction projects

reshape the shoreline, the Federal government is partnering with the states to adopt a fixed set of geographic coordinates to "immobilize" the boundary, eliminating future changes and minimizing confusion regarding jurisdiction.8¶ More legal wrangling was required after 1953 to clarify the relative power of

the states/Federal government over the Outer Continental Shelf, beyond the 3 nautical mile limit. In United States v. Maine, Virginia claimed that its colonial charters granted the state exclusive jurisdiction of Atlantic Ocean resources for 100 miles beyond the coastline.9 The US Supreme Court rejected that claim in 1975, affirming state control over the "inner" Continental Shelf but ensuring Federal authority over the Outer Continental Shelf. ¶ International standards for ocean boundaries are established in an

international treaty. President Clinton signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty in 1994, after it was modified to resolve President Reagan's concerns regarding international controls on deep sea mining of polymetallic (iron/manganese) nodules. However, Senate approval is required to finalize the US commitment to the treaty. Congress has never ratified it, declining once again in 2012 due in part to concerns that the International Seabed Authority could limit US sovereignty. (The International Seabed Authority is headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, and is not part of the United Nations.) 10¶ Consistent with the treaty (even though Congress has not ratified it), the United States claims a Territorial Sea for 12 nautical miles offshore. The starting point for defining offshore vs. inland waters is the "baseline," defined by the US as the line of mean low low water (MLLW) as mapped on the most-detailed (large scale) NOAA nautical charts.11¶ The US exercises sovereignty over its Territorial Sea, the air space above it, and the seabed and subsoil beneath it, but foreign-flag ships enjoy the right of innocent passage. The Federal government also claims a Contiguous Zone out to 24 miles (12 miles further than the Territorial Sea), allowing enforcement of federal customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws (but otherwise the US does not exercise sovereignty in the Contiguous Zone). Finally, the US claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending from 12-200 nautical miles offshore, with exclusive rights to develop and manage marine resources - including energy and mineral resources on the seabed, such as

oil/natural gas and iron/manganese nodules.¶ While the Federal government claims full ownership of lands

outside the state claims , in 1986 Congress created the Revenue Sharing Boundary in section 8(g) of the OCS Lands Act amendments so

the Federal government will share a "fair and equitable" portion of offshore revenues. The 8(g) Zone extends 3 miles beyond the state waters, and the Federal government gives coastal states 27% of revenues from oil/gas and renewable energy leases (i.e., offshore wind turbines) located in the 8(g) Zone.12

Federal government controls the landCarlson and Mayer, 13 Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law and the co¶ -¶ Faculty¶ Di¶ rector of the Emmett Center on Climate Change and the Environment. Andrew Mayer is a 2012¶ graduate of the UCLA School of Law and is currently an associate at a law fi¶ rm. We thank Rich¶ Ambrose,¶ William Boyd, Megan Herzog, Jon Michaels, Jon Varat, Jonathan Z¶ asloff, participants in¶ workshops at the University of Colorado¶ -¶ Duke

Environmental Roundtable and the UCLA School of¶ Law School, and research assistant Will Marshall, “Reverse Pre-Emption,” http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/Carlson_Mayer_Reverse_Preemption.pdfCoastal states own the land in their “territorial sea,” which includes “all¶ lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters¶ .¶ .¶ . seaward to a line¶ three geographical miles distant from the coast¶ line of each such state.”¶ 104¶ The¶ lands beyond the states’ territorial seas¶ — ¶ the outer continental shelf, or ¶ “OCS” ¶ —¶ are owned by

the federal government .¶ 105¶ The Outer Continental Shelf¶ Lands Act of 1953 granted the Secretary of the Interior the authority to lease¶ the OCS for oil and gas exploration and drilling.¶ 106¶

Absent the CZMA, states¶ would not be able to affect federal management of OCS lands .¶ 107¶ Given that¶ the CZMA was inspired in part by the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969, it is¶ unsurprising that most of the ma¶ jor disputes over the consistency requirement¶ have involved the federal leasing of tracts on the OCS¶ —¶ and thus outside a¶ state’s coastal zone¶ —¶ for oil and gas exploration or extraction

2AC AT: China CP

With increasing demand the magnitude and ease of access of deep sea REE’s makes them more viable than the most efficient land source [in context of china but can be read on land CP]Tom Green, Editor in chief of the Robotics Business Review, Deep Sea Dive for Rare Earth Elements, Robotics business review, 5-12-2014, http://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/article/deep_sea_dive_for_rare_earth_elements//BDS)Rare metals with names rarely heard After a year of falling prices and depleting customer inventories, buyers of Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are coming back into this $10B market, but now supplies are getting scarce and prices are beginning to soar. With populations consuming metals and minerals on the rise, especially new middle-class consumers in China and India, demand is set to skyrocket. Future supply chains and national economies will witness major disruptions, according to

a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study: Minerals and metals scarcity in manufacturing: The ticking time bomb. Three deep-ocean mining companies, Nautilus Minerals; UK Seabed Resources (the British division of Lockheed Martin); and DeepGreen Resources, plan to mine the sea floor under the Pacific Ocean (most notably in the Bismarck Sea off Papua New Guinea) using a combination of remotely operated or autonomous underwater vehicles, pumps, suction and riser pipes to extract the minerals. papua mines These REEs, with odd monikers like lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, promethium, neodymium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium, are not household names, but what they do makes every household—and the people in those households—live better lives. For example, most of our fancy electronic gadgets—like our Smartphones and laptops—depend on REEs to operate. Better yet for this Pacific sea hunt, the REEs aren’t alone on the sea floor: “staggering” levels of magnesium, gold, silver, cobalt, nickel and copper are there for the taking as well; much of which are easy pickings as mineral-rich nodules scattered over the sea bottom. Frontrunner: Nautilus Minerals Of the three contenders, the Canadian company, Nautilus Minerals (TSX:NUS), is the more ready to mine. “Nautilus plans to deploy three machines, operated by remote control. Operators sitting on a ship stationed above the deposit will control mine-bots on the seafloor: an initial cutter for clearance; a bulk cutter to do most of the work; and a machine to collect and transport the material to a pumping station. slurry ship “The material will then be pumped up in slurry form to the ship, where it will be de-watered and set to shore for processing. For nodules, robots will roam the seabed.” Critical to high-tech everything REEs are metals with unique physical, chemical and light-emitting properties vital to hybrid vehicles, rechargeable batteries, wind turbines (renewable energy) mobile (cell) phones, compact fluorescent light bulbs, laptop computers, disk drives, catalytic converters, and LED, Plasma, and LCD display panels. Neodymium, for example, is responsible for ensuring that the likes of Smartphones, hard drives, earphones, even MRI scanners, do the job they are designed to do. Far from abundant on land With over 30 percent of the world’s known REE deposits and by far the cheapest extraction process, China supplies 95 percent of the world’s REEs. However, China, with a rising middle class and booming domestic market, is steadily reducing export quotas. The Word Trade Organization (WTO), of which China is a member, ruled in March of 2014 that China was hoarding and taking unfair advantage of the market. That decision was two years in coming, and now China will appeal the current WTO judgment, which might take another two years. Byron Capital analyst, John Hykawy said “I’ve heard from so many critical materials buyers at large corporations that they want security of supply. And security of supply to them

means avoiding Chinese supply at all costs because they got fooled once. They don’t want to get fooled again.” 2-

to 3-miles down: REEs not alone on the seabed In the meantime, REEs are again getting to be in short supply, and with demand forecast to progressively increase, the world drastically needs new suppliers of REEs. The London Metal Exchange lists neodymium at $800 Kg; terbium metal at 1,900 Kg; and scandium metal 15,500.00 per Kg. Relatively inexpensive is lanthanum at $13 Kg. However, the battery in a Toyota Prius hybrid requires more than 10kg of lanthanum. Now multiply $130 times millions of Toyota’s and the need for lots of lanthanum comes into focus. Stephen Ball, chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin UK, owner of UK Seabed Resources, told the BBC “It’s another source of minerals – there’s a shortage and there’s difficulty getting access, so there’s strategic value for the UK government in getting an opportunity to get these minerals.” UK Seabed Resources

says surveys have revealed huge numbers of nodules – small lumps of rock rich in valuable metals

– lying on the ocean floor south of Hawaii and west of Mexico. The exact value of these resources is

impossible to calculate reliably, but a leading UN official described the scale of mineral deposits in the world’s oceans as “staggering” with “several hundred years’ worth of cobalt and nickel.” “These

tennis-ball sized nodules, found approximately four kilometers (2.5 miles) beneath the ocean’s surface, can provide millions of tons of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, as well as rare earth minerals, that are used in the construction, aerospace, alternative energy, and communications industries, among others,”

reports Lockheed Martin. The Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology and the University of Tokyo confirmed the discovery of a “huge new deposit” on the Pacific seabed, claiming the “deposit can be mined at very low cost and will be able to produce materials that are 20 to 30 times more concentrated than those currently being mined in China.” Robot submersibles hold the key Located approximately 5,700 meters or 3.5 miles down, the Japanese scientists “claim the deposits to be approximately 6.8 million metric tons of rare earths, equivalent to 230 years of local demand.” subsea mining Although subsea mining at depths of 500 feet or less has been carried out for some time, deep sea projects have had to await technology, which is now coming on line, funded by companies like Nautilus Minerals, with subsea robot mining tools built by technology partners like Soil Machine Dynamics. Then too, there are plenty of environmental issues about the potential impact on an ecosystem 3-miles deep—the flora and fauna of that lightless place we know little to nothing about. An adverse report was published in 2012: Out of our Depth: Mining the Ocean Floor in Papua New Guinea. Also, according to Mining Magazine, The UN’s International Seabed Authority (ISA) is involved, reporting that these new sea floor mining areas “provide the habitat for a variety of animal life previously unknown to science, and that over 500 new species have been discovered…and are of great interest to science.” Yet the ISA didn’t say no to the Bismarck Sea (Solwara I) operation. The ISA basically said “be careful”: “The uniqueness and fragility of this geographically fragmented ecosystem, and the value it holds for fundamental biological studies of metabolism, evolution and adaptation, will have to be taken into account in planning for mineral exploration and exploitation.” Below is a Nautilus-produced video that explains the Solwara I mining venture in depth. . About Nautilus Minerals: A Canadian registered company, Nautilus is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange TSX:NUS. Its corporate office is in Brisbane, Australia. Its major shareholders include MB Holding Company LLC, an Oman based group with interests in mining, oil & gas, which holds a 28.00% interest, Metalloinvest, the largest iron ore producer in Europe and the CIS, which has a 20.75% holding and global mining group Anglo American, which holds a 5.95% interest.

Lax environmental restrictions means the cost of producing REEs in china is externalized onto the environment Jonathan Kaiman, Beijing Guardian writer, The Guardian, Rare earth mining in China: the bleak social and environmental costs, 3-20-2014, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/rare-earth-mining-china-social-environmental-costs//BDS)Although Wang Jianguo knows little about rare earths mining, he is an accidental expert on its consequences. A short walk from the 43-year-old former farmer's dilapidated brick home in Xinguang Number One Village, is the world's largest rare earths mine tailings pond – an endless expanse of viscous grey sludge built in the 1950s under Mao Zedong. The pond, owned by the Inner

Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Company, or Baotou Steel, lacks a proper lining and for the past 20 years its toxic contents have been seeping into groundwater, according to villagers and state media reports.

It is trickling towards the nearby Yellow River, a major drinking water source for much of northern China, at a rate of 20 to 30 metres a year, a local expert told the influential Chinese magazine Caixin. "In the beginning, there was no tap water here, so we all drank from wells," Wang said. "The water looked fine, but it smelled really bad." In the 1990s, when China's rare earths production kicked into full gear, his sheep died and his cabbage crops withered. Most of his neighbours have moved away. Seven have died of cancer. His teeth have grown yellow and crooked; they jut out at strange angles from blackened gums. Rare earths are a group of 17 elements: "iron grey to silvery lustrous metals" that are "typically soft, malleable, and ductile; and usually reactive", according to the US Geological Survey. They're crucial in manufacturing a broad array of high-tech products, such as smartphones, wind turbines, camera lenses, magnets and missile defence systems. China produces more than 85% of the world's supply, about half of which comes from Baotou, a city of 2.5 million in China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 650km northwest of Beijing. Processing rare earths is a dirty business. Their ore is often

laced with radioactive materials such as thorium, and separating the wheat from the chaff requires huge amounts of carcinogenic toxins – sulphates, ammonia and hydrochloric acid. Processing one ton of rare earths produces 2,000 tons of toxic waste; Baotou's rare earths enterprises produce 10m tons of wastewater per year. They're pumped into tailings dams, like the one by

Wang's village, 12km west of the city centre. China began mining the minerals on a mass scale in the mid 1980s, and after nearly two decades of lax environmental regulation has only recently begun to address their noxious legacy. Seven years ago, China began restricting and taxing its rare earths exports, ostensibly to improve its environmental record. In 2010, the US, European Union and Japan – long accustomed to China's inexpensive supply – lodged a

complaint with the World Trade Organisation. China, they argued, was simply encouraging domestic consumers to pick up the slack. In late October, the organisation ruled that China's export restrictions violated its regulations. China is expected to appeal. In 2009, Baotou Steel began relocating farmers from villages around the tailings pond to resettlement sites on the city's outskirts; it has set up a waste managing warehouse staffed by 400 employees. Yet the pond is still a reminder of how far China's cleanup effort has to go. Surrounding villages are decimated. Stray dogs amble through dessicated corn and wheat fields, the rusted frames of

dismantled greenhouses arching above tangles of discarded plastic bags. "In China, the cost of environmental violations and damage is still way too low," said Ma Jun, director of the Beijing-based Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs. "Rare earths is such a classic case of this – we basically export the resources at a rather cheap price, and much of the environmental cost is externalised to local communities." Most of the rare earths processed by Baotou are extracted in Bayan Obo, a mining district in the Gobi desert 120km north of the city. Its largest open-pit mine is 1,000 metres deep and spans 48 sq km; in satellite images by Nasa released in 2012, it appears as one of many massive black craters dwarfing a sprawl of apartment blocks directly to their south. In 2009, the Beijing Science and Technology News reported that the area is struggling with its own pollution problems. A villager near its eastern mine told the newspaper that while visiting a nearby sheep market the year prior, he found that many of the animals had two rows of teeth, some so long that they couldn't close their mouths. Other countries have become less dependent on China's rare earths supply since 2010, when export quotas caused global prices to spike. The US and Australia are developing their own, more environmentally friendly mines. Rare earths-dependent industries are learning to recycle. A hard hat-wearing mechanic outside a tightly-guarded refinery near Baotou's tailings pond said the declining demand has hurt his job prospects. The man, surnamed Li, said a few hundred of his colleagues had been laid off over the past few months. When asked about the plant's environmental impact, he shrugged his shoulders. "We don't understand these things," he said. "We're just here to make a living."

2AC AT: Int’l CP (Protectionism DA)

The US is hypocritical when it tells China to stop putting REEs Tamny 12 (John, “China's "Rare Earths", and the Hypocrisy of the Obama Administration,” Forbes, 3-25, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2012/03/25/chinas-rare-earths-and-the-hyprocrisy-of-the-obama-administration/)As is well known now, the Obama administration recently joined the EU and Japan in a lawsuit filed at the World Trade Organization over China’s alleged restrictions on the export of rare earth elements. For those who’ve properly ignored what until now should have been a non-story, “rare earths” are metals essential for the production of everything from smart phones, to hybrid cars, to military equipment. At present,

China produces roughly 95% of rare earths, and it’s of course assumed that the high price of these obscure

metals has resulted from export restrictions. Obama et al really ought to look in the mirror on this

one , and once they do, leave China alone. To see why, let’s think for a moment about what this is all about. The U.S. and others

are telling China – the country – that it must sell more of what is endemic to China. The hypocrisy here is impressive , particularly considering the myriad restrictions our own government puts on the exploration for and mining of, nearly everything . What the Obama administration is doing here is the equivalent of China going to the WTO with a lawsuit demanding that we open up more of Alaska and other oil rich locales controlled by the U.S., not to mention reduce the various

regulations controlling the mining of other commodities that the U.S. is rich in. If the Chinese were to do so,

there’s no telling what the negative reaction would be from the U.S. political class, not to mention its citizenry. We’d be rightfully offended for another country nosing in on what should be a U.S. matter. It’s arguable that what makes the U.S. great is our collective lack of self-awareness that often reveals itself through some of the most disruptive entrepreneurial innovations known to mankind, but goodness, aren’t we crossing the line when we meddle in the affairs of other countries; essentially saying to them “Mine what we tell you to, and then sell to us”? A little humility is surely in order, for one.

The US must be the leader in stopping protectionism Perry, 4/14 Bill, Perry was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"), and Office of Chief Counsel and Office of Antidumping Investigations, U.S. Department of Commerce., “US CHINA TRADE WAR DEVELOPMENTS–TRADE, IP, ANTITRUST AND SECURITIES,” http://uschinatradewar.com/us-china-trade-war-developments-trade-ip-antitrust-and-securities/Fourth, some nations simply don’t share America’s commitment to labor and the environment, so when the U.S. doesn’t lead the way with strong standards and enforcement, trade agreements fall

short. Commitments on these issues have to be core parts of trade agreements , rather than something like a side deal that’s just coasting along for the ride. This is one area where the U.S. has made

progress. . . .¶ Finally, agreements must be ambitious, opening foreign markets and helping U.S. workers, farmers, manufacturers and service providers increase exports. . . .

2AC AT: Land CP

Sea mining will substantially decrease the environmental strain of land mining[also a one line cap answer- and perhaps a space warrant above it]Winston Tarere, referencing an environmental expert Samantha Smith, Deep sea mining to drive green growth and economy, Vanuatu daily post, 9-20-2012, http://www.dailypost.vu/content/deep-sea-mining-drive-green-growth-and-economy//BDS)

Dr Samantha Smith, environmental expert employed by the Canadian firm Nautilus Minerals is promoting deep sea mining at the world conservation congress organized by the International Union of Conservation Network (IUCN) in Jeju,

South Korea, as the solution to the ecological destruction of ecosystems by mining operations on land. “The world demand for minerals is on the rise and with the land resources stretched and the

grades of minerals declining, deep sea mineral production offer sound environmental

advantages.” She said the green growth can only be sustained by deep sea mining . Nautilus argues

that deep sea mining is needed now more than ever to drive the growth towards developing clean technologies such as solar and wind energy. “To build just one wind turbine requires 500kg of nickel plus 1000kg of copper. This means that a single turbine requires 12 times more copper to create 1 kilowatt of power than fossil fuels,” Dr Smith said. To put things into perspective, land only represents 30% of the earth’s surface while 70% is submerged underwater. Today 100% of mining is done terrestrially on 30% of the earth’s surface while 70% remains untouched on the seabed. Because most of these metals especially nickel are found

in the equatorial regions, it is argued that the further we delay mining the seabed, more virgin forests have to be destroyed to make way for mining, destroying biodiversity and tropical ecosystem as well as the earth’s capacity to absorb carbon emissions. With declining quality in the average ore grade to 0.61% grade on ore extracted on land compared to a 7.2 % grade from samples obtained on the seabed in the Bismarck Sea in PNG, these large sulphide deposits on the seabed will become the world’s major source of gold, copper, zinc and silver. Nautilus Minerals argue that building

electric and hybrid cars with low carbon emissions and costs will require more minerals such as copper that terrestrial mining cannot offer without further destruction to the environment, loss of biodiversity and livelihoods from climate change. The average car built in the US today has around 50-55 pounds or 22 to 24kg of copper. In a hybrid electric vehicle, this amount will double to 44 to 48kg of copper and triple to 66 to 72kg of copper in a pure electric vehicle. The vehicle’s inverter system alone which delivers power to the motors is connected to them by cables containing 8-18 kg of copper. The trade off in using more copper in vehicles in the US is 93% less smog-forming volatile and organic compounds and 31% less nitrogen oxide, compared to a car on fossil fuels. The Copper Development Association Inc translates this into a one-third reduction in use of oil if three-fourths of American vehicles were electric. Operating costs of plug-in cars are likely to be significantly lower than those on fossil fuel-powered cars because electricity costs three to five cents per mile with average electric rates, of the equivalent of 75 cents to $1.25 per gallon of gasoline. The rationale used is that the green economy will be driven by the use of renewable energy sources that has seen developed countries investing in new technology that seeks to make them become less dependent on fossil fuels for their energy supplies, building electricity based infrastructure for transportation. In-order to convert wind and solar energy directly into electric energy requires large amounts of metals whose terrestrial extraction have been cause of much destruction of nature’s biodiversity. According to a technical report prepared by SRK consulting (Australasia) Pty Ltd released May this year for Nautilus Minerals Inc, it has made applications for prospecting licenses and mining leases in PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga and New Zealand. Applications were made through Nautilus Minerals Offshore, a company registered in Vanuatu and fully owned by Nautilus Minerals Inc. Nautilus has 41 granted Prospecting Licenses in Vanuatu covering an area of 3630km2 on the eastern side of the main islands while there are 14 further Prospecting License applications covering 1247km2 Safe and environmentally friendly Deep Sea Mining has been hailed as the new frontier and the ‘Solwora 1’ site at the bottom of the Bismarck Sea is the experimental site and the new Wild West that needs to be conquered and subdued. Dr. Smith said the deep sea mining is environmentally friendly because they will be using technology that will scrape the top of the ocean floor getting metals like a

lawnmower cutting grass and transporting it in closed tubes back up to the to avoid spills and pollution to the surrounding environment. In her presentation she said the mineral deposit under the seabed at the ‘Solwora 1’ site in the Bismarck Sea goes down to a depth of 30 to 50 meters, however, there was enough deposits on the surface to sustainably produce enough without having to dig. When pressed about the drilling below the seabed to meet global demands she responded: “Even if we have to drill, 50 meters is not deep enough into the earth’s crust to trigger off a volcanic eruption, an earthquake or tsunami.” The Solwara 1 deposit is a stratabound seafloor massive sulphide that occurs on the flank and crest of a sub-sea volcanic mound which extends about 150m to 200m above the surrounding seafloor. Despite the safety assurances, opposing groups argue that there is too much that is unknown about seafloor mining to guarantee a full proof protection against any form of destruction of the marine biodiversity and ecosystems. The irony of deep sea mining as a green solution to terrestrial mining is that after we have extracted all minerals, leveled mountains and dig deep holes towards the earth’s crust to milk every last bit of rock, we now want to shift into the sea which truly remains as the last frontier. Perhaps after we have depleted all mineral resources at the bottom of the ocean, the new frontier will become the moon and Mars. Capitalism, modern consumerism and our desire and wants to have more, bigger, better, faster, smaller and efficient has a funny way of justifying greed for profit in a green growth and green economy framework.

Land mining is substantially more destructive to the environment and people than sea miningMeghan Miner, a freelance science and travel writer based in Washington, DC, master’s in science journalism, editorial researcher for National Geographic’s Traveler Magazine, science news writer for COSMOS Magazine in Sydney, Australia, and for the NPR program Living on Earth., Will Deep-sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?, National Geographic, 2-1-2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-precious-metals-oceans-environment///BDS)But a fledgling deep-sea mining industry faces a host of challenges before it can claim the precious

minerals, from the need for new mining technology and serious capital to the concerns of conservationists, fishers, and coastal residents. The roadblocks are coming into view in the coastal waters of Papua New Guinea, where the seafloor contains copper, zinc, and gold deposits worth hundreds of millions of dollars and where one company, Nautilus Minerals, hopes to launch the world's first deep-sea mining operation. Last year, the Papua New Guinean government granted the Canadian firm a 20-year license to mine a site 19 miles (30 kilometers) off their coast, in the Bismarck Sea in the southwestern Pacific Ocean. The company plans to mine the site, known as Solwara 1, by marrying existing technologies from the offshore oil and gas industry with new underwater robotic technologies to extract an estimated 1.3 million tons of minerals per year. Samantha Smith, Nautilus's vice president for corporate social responsibility, says that ocean floor mining is safer, cleaner, and more environmentally friendly than its terrestrial counterpart. "There are no mountains that need to be removed to get to the ore body," she says. "There's a potential to have a lot less waste ... No people need to be displaced. Shouldn't we as a society consider such an option?" But mining a mile below the sea's surface, where pressure is 160 times greater than on land and where temperatures swing from below freezing to hundreds of degrees above boiling, is trickier and more expensive than mining on terra firma.

CP has quantifiably one tenth the solvencyMeghan Miner, a freelance science and travel writer based in Washington, DC, master’s in science journalism, editorial researcher for National Geographic’s Traveler Magazine, science news writer for COSMOS Magazine in Sydney, Australia, and for the NPR program Living on Earth., Will Deep-sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?, National Geographic, 2-1-2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-precious-metals-oceans-environment///BDS)A mile beneath the ocean's waves waits a buried cache beyond any treasure hunter's wildest dreams: gold, copper, zinc, and other valuable minerals. Scientists have known about the bounty for decades, but only recently has rising demand for such commodities sparked interest in actually surfacing it. The treasure doesn't lie in the holds of sunken ships, but in natural mineral

deposits that a handful of companies are poised to begin mining sometime in the next one to five years. The deposits aren't too hard to find—they're in seams spread along the seafloor, where natural hydrothermal vents eject rich concentrations of metals and minerals. These underwater geysers spit out fluids with temperatures exceeding 600ºC. And when those fluids hit the icy seawater, minerals precipitate out, falling to the ocean floor. The deposits can yield as much as ten times the desirable minerals as a seam that's mined on land. While different vent systems contain varying concentrations of precious minerals, the deep sea contains enough mineable gold that there's nine pounds (four kilograms) of it for every person on Earth, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Ocean Service. At today's gold prices, that's a volume worth more than $150 trillion.

Plan or perm solves net better, land mines have more regulations, less resources, and a larger environmental impact Simon Rees, Deep-sea mining firms up standards as Nautilus ‘turns corner’, Mining Weekly, 8-8-2013, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/deep-sea-mining-firms-up-standards-as-nautilus-turns-corner-2013-08-08//BDS“This fits in with the notion that all mankind should share in the wealth accrued by exploiting minerals from the ocean floor in international waters. But how they set up an equitable mechanism for payment to all countries will be an immense challenge,” he added. When considering the benefits to mankind, proponents of deep-sea mining argue it also affords a partial solution to offsetting the interruption and impact caused by surface operations. Questions about how, where and to what extent traditional mining should take place will undoubtedly intensify as the global population continues to climb. “It’s getting harder to develop mines on land and there are fewer places left on the planet where you can establish a mine without affecting people,” Johnston said. Nonetheless, it is critical that marine ecosystems are afforded equal respect to those on land. In this regard, binding frameworks for deep-sea mining, environmental best practice and monitoring should be formally codified sooner rather than later. By striking the right balance now, future mineral rewards from the deep will be both great and good

Solvency deficit: deep sea mining can produce comparatively more minerals Robert Thomason, CIA Cover Story Gives Birth to Deep Ocean Mining, DC BUREAU, 3-10-14, http://www.dcbureau.org/201403109664/natural-resources-news-service/cia-cover-story-gives-birth-deep-ocean-mining.html//BDS )Resting deep on the seabed of the Pacific are two symbols of oceanic politics, one decaying as time ticks by; the other slowly growing at a pace measured in millions of years. The first symbol is the salvage site of Soviet submarine K-129. Once it prowled the seas with three nuclear missiles, but suddenly she and her crew were lost to the depths. After sinking mysteriously in 1968, the diesel-powered submarine became the object of an expensive and elaborate operation of the Cold War. The Central Intelligence Agency and Howard Hughes devised a cover story about deep-sea mining to recover it secretly. The operation, run by former CIA Director William Colby, was trying to determine the state of Soviet nuclear weapons prowess. After a string of near mishaps, the mission recovered only part of the sub. The other symbol is a widespread deposit of potato-sized rocks rich in manganese and other minerals. Called polymetallic nodules, these rocks were the original fictitious prey of the CIA’s cover story. But today those nodules are the prizes of a very real, but hardly less complicated, search of the ocean floors. The stories of the sunken Soviet sub and the polymetallic nodules are intertwined in history, technology and politics. Deep-sea mining is on track to become a reality soon despite serious questions about its environmental consequences. The linkage began soon after the United States found the lost Soviet submarine. A CIA plan codenamed “Project Azorian” oversaw the design and construction of the Hughes Glomar Explorer, a ship of unprecedented design and cost. The ship’s goal was to lift a 1,750-ton submarine, armed with nuclear missiles and torpedoes, off the seabed and into the belly of a huge ocean-going vessel. The CIA buried the operation in code names

like AZORIAN, DESKTOP and JENNIFER. Only a few years later, the very same ship that had pretended to look for deep sea minerals was in fact employed by Lockheed Martin to developed modern technology for pulling nodules off the seabed. Now, after four decades of international treaty negotiations, scientific studies, technological progress and roller coaster-like business cycles of metal prices, the polymetallic nodules still sit silently on the seafloor. Interested parties around the globe are debating both economic and environmental concerns. But the interest in deep sea mining of these mineral resources is intensifying, and by 2016 remote controlled vehicles could be crawling the ocean floor environment, cutting into or scooping from the seabed, and

pulling up ore that is richer in bounty than many mining resources that remain on dry

land. The polymetallic nodules are not the only treasure deep sea miners will be pursuing. Seamounts formed by underwater volcanoes and cobalt-rich crusts are also being studied intensively for commercial exploitation.

DSM is cheaper and less environment impact --- private companies say nowBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”***DSM = Deep Sea Mining As we enter the 21st century, and assuming mining companies are finding deposits of sufficient size and grade, there are three possible economic drivers required for DSM to become a viable industry: 1) deep-sea mining may actually be cheaper than land mining , as suggested by Nautilus Minerals’ Worley Parson Engineering study (Heydon, 2005)¶ 1¶ which indicates that DSM for copper could cost about half the price of developing a land- based mine , 2) though unproven,

the concept of “surgical mining” of relatively small areas of SMS deposits may have less

impact on the environment than terrestrial mining (Heydon, 2005), and 3) India and China will both need large

amounts of copper to build power-grid infrastructure, driving the metals market to deep-sea mining (Yamazaki, 2005b).

2AC AT: LOST

no net benefit - LOST fails to regulate mining due to lack of coordination and proactive authorityBrooke Jarvis, independent journalist based in Seattle. Her work has appeared in Rolling Stone, The Washington Post, Sierra Magazine, Aeon Magazine, and The American Prospect, among others., Deep-Sea Mining—Bonanza or Boondoggle?, NOVA Next, 6-25-2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/earth/deep-sea-mining///BDS)Policing the Deep Sea It was the prospect of deep sea mining that prompted the Law of the Sea Convention, an effort to regulate marine resources it calls “the common heritage of all mankind.” Concluded in 1982 and ratified in 1994, the Convention set up the ISA to issue mining leases and regulate how minerals and other resources outside of national economic zones can be harvested. (Mining within territorial or archipelagic waters or Economic Exclusive Zones, which extend for 200 miles off of coastlines, is within national jurisdiction. Island nations are already scrambling to figure out how to oversee and profit from mining projects. For signatories to the Law of the Sea, the ISA’s regime will be a guidepost.) “Right now, we’re flying in the dark.” But the current system has a number of unresolved issues, Ardron says. The ISA doesn’t coordinate with the international bodies that oversee other ocean industries, such as fishing and shipping. Without communication, it will be hard to know when areas are being overtaxed. Likewise, the ISA’s current method for protecting what it calls “Areas of Particular Environmental Interest” is not proactive: first mining leases are assigned, then certain areas outside those leases are protected. “Right now, we’re flying in the dark,” Ardron says. “We don’t know if these leases are in ecologically important places or not—and it’s too late by the time they’re handed out.” There are also concerns about the transparency of the approval process—“generally we don’t know what leases are up for discussion until they’ve already been approved,” Ardron points out—as well as about how future infractions will be dealt with. Because no projects have gone into production yet, he argues it’s not too late to push for stronger reporting, transparency, and compliance guarantees: “The door hasn’t closed yet.” But with the rush for mining leases on, it is beginning to close. And at stake is a strange world we have only barely begun to understand.

UNCLOS would negatively effect the FG’s capability to sea-bed mineParthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf The Senate should ratify the U.N. Convention¶ on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¶ While today¶ the United States recognizes UNCLOS as custom¶ -¶ ary international law, ratifying this treaty would¶ increase the ability of U.S. policymakers to promote¶ the rule of law and freedom of navigation around¶ the world and also to participate in important dis¶ -¶ cussions about critical minerals. Today, the United¶ States cannot play a full role in the Arctic Council ¶ because it has not ratified UNCLOS, and its position¶ of promoting the rules enshrined in this treaty rings¶ hollow to international audiences. Since

American¶ concerns over seabed mining informed the initial ¶ refusal to ratify this treaty, these

issues are likely to¶ resurface in any debates about UNCLOS . To date,¶ efforts toward UNCLOS

ratification have stalled ¶ out of a misguided notion that the treaty would Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of

U.S. Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 26¶ |¶ negatively affect U.S. sovereignty, as it recognizes¶ exclusive economic zones for countries around the¶ world.

LOST is not required for resource extraction – in fact it cuts profits in half killing business confidence

Tennant 12 - not the Doctor (Michael, 27 June 2012, "Will Our Freedoms Be LOST at Sea?," www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/11824-will-our-freedoms-be-lost-at-sea, ADL)U.S. accession to LOST, then, will have a significant number of negative consequences. But what about the treaty’s alleged benefits? LOST backers claim the treaty will secure certain navigational rights for U.S. military and commercial shipping. However, the United States already enjoys such rights as a matter of customary international law. Moreover, America has for decades been a party to the International Maritime Organization, which establishes international laws with regard to shipping. Thus, to the extent LOST codifies navigational rights,

it is redundant. The treaty’s fans also argue that it will secure U.S. rights to extract natural resources from its continental shelf. As with navigational rights, the United States already exercises sovereignty over its continental shelf to a distance of 200 miles from shore; and other countries, after initially contesting the U.S. claim,

adopted the policy themselves. America could similarly claim rights over its continental shelf beyond 200 miles and work out its differences with the individual nations affected by such a claim. By

ratifying LOST , however, it cedes such authority to the ISA and, in addition, is forced to surrender half the

royalties earned from mining and drilling in the extended continental shelf . Although LOST supporters say U.S. accession to the treaty is necessary for American companies and their investors to feel confident that their claims to deep seabed mining sites will be recognized internationally, Rabkin observed, “It remains a fair question whether a complex U.N. regulatory bureaucracy — especially one that counts international wealth redistribution as one of its functions — is a reassuring presence for investors.” Knowing that the seemingly profitable site in which they

are considering investing stands a good chance of being stolen by the Enterprise and that any profits generated from the site the

company is allowed to mine — not to mention any new technologies employed — may be similarly confiscated, why would investors take such a risk?

Ratification limits Navy jurisdiction-Can’t solve HegZenko 3/24/14-Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations (“How to Avoid a Naval War with China”, Foreignpolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/24/how_to_avoid_a_naval_war_with_china) patelMost countries, including the United States, agree that territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from a nation's coastline, while EEZs extend much further -- usually up to 200 nautical miles. There is also consensus that while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established EEZs as a feature of international law and gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities within them, it does not provide coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. However, China and some other countries like North Korea interpret UNCLOS as giving coastal states the right to regulate all economic and foreign military activities within their EEZs.

The treaty hurts the US-Sovereignty-Environmentalists-Naval Rights-IntelligenceSchaeffer et al 7 – Brett D., Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs (9/1/7, Heritage, “The Top Five Reasons Why Conservatives Should Oppose the U.N.Convention on the Law of the Sea,”

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/09/the-top-five-reasons-why-conservatives-should-oppose-the-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea) patelThe Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold hearings this week on whether the United States should ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Twenty-five years ago, President Ronald Reagan rejected the treaty-and rightly so. Today, the convention remains a threat to American interests. Reason #1: The Treaty Will Undermine U.S. Sovereignty. President Reagan rejected the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 and cited several major deficiencies, none of which have been remedied. Reagan was concerned that the U.S., though a major naval power, would have little influence at the International Seabed Authority that the convention created. Although the Authority is supposed to make decisions by consensus, nothing prevents the rest of the "international community" from consistently voting against the United States, as regularly occurs in similar U.N. bodies, such as the General Assembly. In addition, President Reagan was troubled by the fact that the International Seabed Authority has the power to amend the convention without U.S. consent. That concern has also not been remedied in the intervening years. Another issue is that the convention requires states to transfer information and perhaps technology to mandatory dispute resolution tribunals. Under the convention, parties to a dispute are required to provide a resolution tribunal with "all relevant documents, facilities and information." This amounts to a blanket invitation for unscrupulous foreign competitors to bring the U.S. and American companies before a tribunal for the sole purpose of obtaining sensitive data and technologies that would otherwise be unavailable to them. The safeguards against such practices that President Reagan demanded have never come to pass. Reason #2: The Treaty Will Become a Back Door for Environmental Activists. The Executive Director of Greenpeace International, Thilo Bode, has explained how the environmentalist movement plans to leverage the treaty to advance its agenda, which often runs counter to U.S. interests: "Global warming is likely to have a big impact at sea…. Solving the environmental problems facing the oceans…is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind…. No single action or region can do this alone: It will require comprehensive international cooperation as required by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." President Clinton-a major supporter of the treaty-did not mince his words when he stated that the convention was "the greatest environmental treaty of all time." Indeed, the treaty states that convention participants must "take…all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from any source," (Article 194). This provision goes on to require that such measures address "all sources of pollution of the marine environment…including those from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere, or by dumping…." Signatories are also required to "adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere…" (Article 212). The convention's provisions and mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms will create new opportunities for environmental activists and like-minded governments to bring action against the U.S. for violating the Kyoto Protocol, even though America is not a party to that accord. American opponents of the Kyoto Protocol should be under no illusion: U.S. accession to this convention risks embroiling the U.S. in a plethora of legal actions, even if the Senate does not ratify Kyoto. Reason #3: America Should Not Participate in Yet Another U.N. Bureaucracy. International institutions created by multilateral treaties spawn unaccountable international bureaucracies, which in turn inevitably infringe upon U.S. sovereignty. The convention creates a bureaucracy known as the International Seabed Authority Secretariat. Like all international bureaucracies, the Secretariat has a strong incentive to enhance its own authority at the expense of state sovereignty. When international bureaucracies are unaccountable, they-like all unaccountable institutions-seek to insulate

themselves from scrutiny and thus become prone to corruption. The International Seabed Authority is vulnerable to the same corrupt practices that have riddled the U.N. for years. The United Nations Oil-for-Food scandal, in which the Iraqi government benefited from a system of bribes and kickbacks involving billions of dollars and 2,000 companies in nearly 70 countries, is a prime example. Despite ample evidence of the U.N.'s systemic weaknesses and vulnerability to corruption, the U.N. General Assembly has resisted efforts to adopt serious transparency and accountability reforms. Reason #4: American Participation Will Undermine U.S. Military and Intelligence Operations. Under the convention, the United States assumes a number of obligations at odds with its military practices and national security interests, including a commitment not to collect intelligence. The U.S. would sign away its ability to collect intelligence vital for American security within the "territorial waters" of any other country (Article 19). Furthermore, U.S. submarines would be required to travel on the surface and show their flags while sailing within territorial waters (Article 20). This would apply, for example, to U.S. submarines maneuvering in Iranian or North Korean territorial waters; they would be required to sail on the surface with their flags waving. Reason #5: The U.S. Does Not Need the Convention to Guarantee Navigation Rights. The U.S. enjoys navigation rights by customary international practice. The fact that the U.S. is not a convention member does not mean that other states will begin to demand notification by U.S. ships entering their waters or airspace. Indeed, the U.S. is not a signatory to the convention today and yet has freedom of the seas because current participants are required to grant the U.S. navigation rights afforded by customary international practice. In addition, these states have reciprocal interests in navigation rights that will discourage them from making such demands on American ships in the future.

UNCLOS does not deter South China Sea conflict Haidfer 14 – Ziad, Attorney at White & Case LLP (4/10/14, Foreign Policy, “Nine-Dash-Mine,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/10/beijing_should_let_law_reign_south_china_sea) patelTensions continue to roil Asia's waters, but they are now also finding their way into international arbitration. The perilous churn in the South China Sea, dubbed "Asia's Cauldron" by one leading strategic analyst, stems from the overlapping claims of six states -- Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- over a body of water vital to global trade, which contains energy resources and abundant fish stock in its vast depths. Negotiations over a maritime Code of Conduct to stabilize interactions in the South China Sea have been outpaced by the jockeying of ships between China and the Philippines. In the wake of a dangerous and asymmetric two-month standoff over the disputed Scarborough Shoal beginning in April 2012, Manila has rightly sought recourse in international law to manage the dispute through arbitration. For the sake of regional stability and its own interests, Beijing should follow suit. The legal wrangling started in January 2013, when the Philippines notified China of its intent to bring a challenge under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international treaty governing the rights and responsibilities of states in their use of the oceans and seas. (Both China and the Philippines are parties to UNCLOS, while the United States has yet to ratify it.) The Philippines argued then that China's so-called "nine-dash line," which encompasses virtually the entire South China Sea, was unlawful and contrary to UNCLOS. China's response was to reject the Philippines' notification letter altogether, noting Beijing had opted out of UNCLOS procedures for settling disputes that involve sovereignty claims or maritime boundaries. Beijing must now take a clear and hard look at the merits of abstaining any further. Beijing must now take a clear and hard look at the merits of abstaining any further. While it may

have a legal basis to abstain, acting on it could be strategically shortsighted. Given Beijing's assertions that its nine-dash line is grounded in international law, a greater show of confidence would be to defend its position before a neutral tribunal. Beijing will have the chance, if it chooses. Despite China's protestations, a five-member Arbitral Tribunal was assembled to hear the Philippines' claims; on March 30, the Philippines announced that it had filed its brief, here called a Memorial, elaborating its challenge. (Intriguingly, Beijing may have asked Manila to delay filing its Memorial in exchange for a mutual withdrawal of ships from the contested Scarborough Shoal.) China's willingness to abide by international norms would not only telegraph confidence, but could help offset the growing anxiety generated by its military modernization and maneuverings among neighbors who fear the Beijing doctrine may be veering toward realpolitik. For its part, the United States has expressed its support for the Philippines' submission. President Barack Obama's visit to the Philippines in late April will provide an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of such a rules-based approach to managing the dispute. Yet that largely depends on how Beijing responds. To be sure, nationalist public sentiment stoked by Beijing may have painted China into a corner. Hours after the Philippine Foreign Secretary announced the Memorial's submission on March 30, the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded that it did not accept the Philippines' submission of the dispute for arbitration and called on the Philippines to return to bilateral talks. With its Foreign Minister stating that China will never accede to "unreasonable demands from smaller countries" in the South China Sea, its Defense Minister stating that China will make "no compromise, no concessions," and official media outlets wading in with criticism of the Philippines' "unilateral" actions in filing its Memorial, it will be that much harder to backtrack. Yet submitting to an international tribunal is by no means beyond the pale for Beijing. China regularly engages in the WTO dispute settlement system and has a relatively strong compliance record in the face of adverse rulings, largely due to the reputational costs of non-compliance. Arbitrating the South China Sea dispute is assuredly more fraught than commercial disputes, grating as it does on China's rawest nerve: territorial sovereignty. That is why it must be complemented by all claimant states exploring the equivalent of an amicable settlement: shelving questions of who owns what and focusing on joint development of resources for which compelling precedent exists. For now, however, Manila's lawyers have staked out important legal ground in the South China Sea. Beijing should consider meeting them there.

Ratification undermines US proliferation efforts and Navy data intelligenceRabkin 6 – Jeremy, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, attended Harvard University, Cornell University (6/1/6, CEI, “The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America,” http://cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf)patel The United Nations did not invent the law of the sea. There has been a law of the sea in effect for many centuries. When Spanish and Portuguese explorers fi rst charted new sea routes to the Americas and Asia, their governments imagined that they could lay claim to all the ocean vastness in between. Successful challenges by new maritime powers, especially Britain and Holland, soon established the principle that the high seas should be open to all. In the early 17th century, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published an extremely learned treatise which summed up the new approach in a catchy phrase: “freedom of the seas.” To secure freedom on the seas, there had to be rules applicable to most situations that also acknowledged—and thereby constrained—necessary exceptions. These rules were developed over centuries in a process of mutual accommodation—and occasional challenge by war at sea—among major maritime powers. Nearly all of this law was “customary law,” meaning that it refl ected actual practice

among maritime states—including particular agreements among particular states—without being set down in any formal document. The conventions of 1958 had somewhat more ambitious goals. They sought to secure general agreement on precisely defi ned rights of “innocent passage” through coastal waters, specifying a 12-mile limit on territorial claims at sea (where the national laws could be enforced by coastal states). They laid down rules for charting the seaward boundaries of coastal waters when the actual coastline has an irregular or interrupted pattern. Almost all nations ratified these conventions within a few years, though not all observed their terms. The treaties did not address some matters on which there remained important disagreements, such as the status of fishing and mining rights outside territorial waters. These issues might have been addressed in a third convention fashioned along similar lines as its predecessors. But instead, UNCLOS III set out on a very different premise—that what belongs to no one must belong to everyone. Yet serious statesmen have never embraced this idea of a world authority on boundaries, empowered to make definite decisions on all disputed borders. This is partly because too many affected nations would not accept the decisions of such a world authority and other nations are not prepared to provide troops on an open- ended basis to back up such decisions—especially considering the conflicts that arise over border disputes. Yet this is the idea at the core of the new law of the sea treaty. It sets out relatively precise rules about who can claim what as national waters, then establishes an international "Authority" to regulate the unclaimed areas under the high seas—and a new tribunal to resolve any and all disputes about these rules. Most risks posed by the "Authority" are somewhat hypothetical at present, because mining on the floor of the deep seas has not yet been attempted. But the tribunal presents immediate problems for the United States because the U.S. Navy is, right now, very much present on the high seas. The United States is already committed, by its own policies, to abide by UNCLOS rules on transit rights and wants other nations to do so as well. The difficulties concern exceptions or the handling of exceptional circumstances. The question is. Who decides on the exceptional cases? The answer provided in UNCLOS III is a new international tribunal, most of whose judges—elected by the usual U.N. formulas to assure geographical and political "balance" —cannot be expected to have much sympathy for American concerns. The law of the sea’s most pertinent rule is that no nation can interfere with the ships of other nations on the high seas. The UNCLOS treaty acknowledges exceptions, such as when a ship is suspected of involvement in “piracy” or in the “slave trade” or falsely flying the flag of the intervening state.2 But UNCLOS’ acknowledgement of these exceptions is superfl uous in these cases because interventions on these grounds were already well established in the early 19th century, when these evils were of major concern to naval powers. Meanwhile, UNCLOS makes no provision for contemporary concerns. In particular, it makes no provision for intervention against ships operated by terrorists or ships transporting weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. Terrorists have obvious reasons to take their operations out to sea. An attack on an oil tanker, for example, could do vast environmental damage and have a sizable impact on international oil markets. Seaborne shipping may be used to transport missiles and other weapons components not easily sneaked through airports. Currently, the United States does not claim the right to stop any and all ships on the high seas, merely on general suspicion. Since 2004, the United States has encouraged other nations, under the American-led Security Proliferation Initiative (SPI), to sign agreements authorizing American naval patrols to inspect merchant ships fl ying their fl ags when there is reason to fear the ships are engaged in illicit activities. While more than half the ships engaged in international commerce are covered by these agreements, many are not. American policy implicitly acknowledges that stopping other ships on the high seas would usually be improper. But special circumstances might justify exceptional measures. UNCLOS III

provides that, if a ship or its crew are seized on the high seas, the fl ag state can appeal to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany, for a prompt decision on the legality of the seizure.3 The treaty allows states to opt for other forms of arbitration on other disputes, but other forms of arbitration require all nations involved to agree on a specifi c panel of arbitrators. The only important category of dispute where one party can force another to answer before ITLOS is when a ship has been detained on the high seas and the complaining party seeks its immediate release. Seizing a ship on the high seas without the consent of its home government would inevitably trigger a diplomatic confrontation. But in the right circumstances, the United States or its allies might feel obliged to act first and try to handle the diplomatic protests later. If intelligence gives reasonably firm indications of an imminent terror attack to be launched from a particular ship, the U.S. could insist on intervening, claiming a right of self-defense that supersedes the general “rules of the road” at sea. Alternatively, the United States might claim that a ship operated by terrorists was so closely analogous to a pirate ship that intervention could be justifi ed under the UNCLOS exemption for piracy. In still another variant, the United States might interpret a bilateral agreement with the fl ag state as covering a particular intervention, while the fl ag state insisted on a different interpretation. In any of these cases, the fl ag state would likely sit on the sidelines while the ship’s operators pursued a claim on their own initiative, “on behalf of the fl ag State,” as UNCLOS allows.4 It is easy to imagine situations in which U.S. intervention might trigger a complaint to ITLOS. It is hard to imagine situations in which ITLOS would be other than a complicating factor in ensuing U.S. diplomacy toward the fl ag state. Nor is there much consolation in the prospect of appealing to ITLOS against the seizure of an American ship, since the most vulnerable American ships would be small craft, gathering intelligence near the coasts of unfriendly states. UNCLOS couples transit rights with provisions for national regulatory measures in coastal waters, including the right of the coastal state to prohibit intelligence gathering in these waters. Suppose an American ship were seized outside the territorial waters of a hostile state, on the claim that it had earlier traversed these waters for illicit purposes and then been pursued into “contiguous” waters—as UNCLOS allows, for a belt of water extending twelve nautical miles beyond the twelve mile reach of “territorial waters.”5 The United States being required to document for ITLOS exactly what its ship was doing in exactly which waters could very well compromise sensitive U.S. intelligence gathering operations. It is not even clear that the United States would benefi t from having the option to pursue its own claims. In a direct confrontation over a seizure, the United States has considerable resources—naval, diplomatic, and economic—to unilaterally pursue its demands for immediate release. But having subscribed to UNCLOS, the United States would have much more difficulty wielding such pressures, if the state which effected the seizure insisted that the matter should be taken to ITLOS for resolution. UNCLOS seems to provide protection against these concerns by stipulating that states may opt out of its compulsory arbitration requirements when disputes concern “military activities...by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service.”6 At its narrowest reading, this provision might mean only that ITLOS will avoid intervening in full-scale confrontations between opposing battle fleets—a situation that would create problems far beyond those of dispute resolution. At its broadest, this exemption might mean that any seizure could be excluded from ITLOS review, since seizures are never effectuated by unarmed commercial vessels, which would entirely negate the provision bestowing mandatory jurisdiction on ITLOS for seizures at sea. So which is it? The only thing certain is that it will be up to ITLOS to decide how far it wants to intrude into U.S. naval strategy. The State Department has proposed ratification with an “understanding” that the military exemption will be read broadly. (Sec. 2, Par. 2 of ‘Text of Resolution of Advice and

Consent to Ratification,” printed with Treaty Doc. 103-39 in Hearings on the Un Convention on the Law of the Sea, Ot. 21, 2003, along with “Statement of William H.Taft, Legal Adviser to the Department of Stat) But UNCLOS itself stipulates that states may not attach “reservations” to their ratifi cation.7 Again, it will be up to ITLOS to decide what signifi cance, if any, should be accorded such unilateral U.S. “understandings.” And the court’s composition is not encouraging. As of September 2005, a clear majority of the court’s 21 judges were from states that cannot be supposed to be friendly to American naval action—including Russia, China, Brazil, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Lebanon, Grenada, and Trinidad. The earlier round of UNCLOS negotiations in the 1950s proposed, in addition to specifi cations of transit rights and delimitations of coastal waters, a separate treaty obliging signatories to refer disputes about these matters to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the Netherlands. The United States welcomed clarifi cation of the basic rules but successfully resisted the proposal that all disputes be referred to the ICJ. In the mid-1980s, infuriated by the ICJ’s handling of a case launched by the Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the U.S. withdrew its previous commitment to respond to claims before the ICJ by any state which agreed to open itself to all such claims in turn. And, of course, the United States has resisted urgings to submit its military personnel or any other U.S. citizens to judgments of the International Criminal Court. UNCLOS has packaged improved rules for the seas with the requirement that major disputes about these rules will go to a permanent international court, thus deemphasizing “freedom of the seas” in favor of claims of collective ownership. As a result, states with little involvement in maritime commerce will help to determine how these rules will be interpreted and applied to nations with a lot at stake in international commerce.

UNCLOS requires payments and mitigates any benefitsRabkin 6 – Jeremy, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, attended Harvard University, Cornell University (6/1/6, CEI, “The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America,” http://cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf)patel The best provisions in UNCLOS are those setting down rules for economic development in areas extending up to 200 nautical miles beyond the shorelines of coastal states. In addition to their territorial waters of up to 12 miles, coastal states can also claim control over fi shing and drilling in this exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The United States claimed such rights in 1945 for the continental shelf adjacent to its shores. This action provoked a variety of conflicting claims by other states, since the continental shelf—where waters are relatively shallow—does not extend nearly as far beyond coastlines elsewhere. The UNCLOS formula of a 200-mile limit for all coastal states was a compromise quite acceptable to the United States. Therefore the United States has asserted that this portion of UNCLOS should now be regarded as settled customary law, binding on all states whether they ratify this particular treaty or not. In fact, most coastal states have already claimed an exclusive economic zone in accord with UNCLOS provisions. However, the actual treaty insists that in return for the acknowledgement of such claims, coastal states must provide compensation to the rest of the world. The most blatant application of this concept concerns mineral extraction on the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. UNCLOS allows claims to the limit of the continental shelf or up to 350 miles from the shoreline, whichever is less.8 However, to claim such additional drilling rights the state must fi rst accept delineation of its continental shelf by a special Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, established by UNCLOS with a requirement that the Commission’s membership show for “equitable geographical representation” in its membership.9 If it chooses to exercise drilling or mining rights in this area beyond its EEZ, a state must provide a portion of revenue derived from such activity—increasing at 1 percent a

year up to a rate of 7 percent per year—to the Deep Seabed Authority, an agency established by UNCLOS for general supervision of deep sea development.10 The United States government already provides sizable contributions—often over extended periods—to international aid organizations for programs—such as vaccination, schooling, and road building—which it considers likely to improve conditions in developing countries. UNCLOS does nothing to advance this. Instead, it requires states that are able to extract mineral wealth from the seas to compensate those that are not—while the non-extracting state contributes nothing to the equation. Moreover, money extracted from drilling efforts on the continental shelf goes to an entity that is not equipped to administer development assistance to developing countries. The Seabed Authority is not even charged with doing that. UNCLOS instead makes all mining operations in the deep seas—beyond the continental shelf or the 350 mile limit of coastal states—subject to approval by this agency. The Authority is not only authorized by UNCLOS to regulate mining operations to guard against environmental and safety concerns, it is also authorized to enforce the treaty’s assertions that “resources [of the deep seabed] are the common heritage of mankind”11 and that “all rights in [these] resources are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf [the Authority] shall act.”12 The original treaty, negotiated during the heyday of socialist enthusiasm, contemplated that the Authority would serve “mankind” by reserving a considerable share of mining operations to an internationalized public production entity, to be known as “the Entity.” By the late 1970s, many Third World governments had “nationalized”—i.e. forcibly seized—mines and oil wells developed by foreign companies and were eager to form OPEC-style international cartels to boost the prices they could obtain for raw material exports by limiting their supply in world markets. While nothing came of this effort, UNCLOS enshrines one aspect of it. UNCLOS provides for an Economic Planning Commission to monitor “factors affecting supply, demand and prices of minerals.”13 Relying on Planning Commission reports, the Authority is then directed to adjust its permits for deep seabed mining to assure “just and stable prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers.”14 The idea is to assure that mining from the deep seabed does not provide too much competition to mines on land. The Reagan Administration emphasized objections to the regulatory role of the Authority when it rejected U.S. participation in UNCLOS in 1982. Most European countries also withheld their approval at the time. A decade later, with communism in collapse and the benefi ts of the free market widely acknowledged, the Clinton Administration joined with Europeans in negotiating revisions to UNCLOS. A supplementary agreement, completed in 1994, does go far in correcting the treaty’s most egregious provisions on deep seabed mining. The agreement directs that mining in the area controlled by the Authority should be pursued “in accordance with sound commercial principles” and neither subsidized nor protected by special tariffs. One revision eliminates enforced contributions to the Entity and stipulates that its activities be regulated on the same terms as private fi rms. The treaty also signals a repudiation of cartel planning by folding the Economic Planning Commission into a separate Legal Commission. All of this is to the good. It might also be seen as bowing to reality. Mineral extraction from the deep seas has turned out to be much more expensive and diffi cult than Third World diplomats imagined in the 1970s—in fact, no fi rms have expressed serious interest in such projects. Since its establishment in 1995, the Authority has authorized a handful of exploration efforts but has received no bids for actual mining projects. It remains a fair question whether a complex U.N. regulatory bureaucracy—especially one that counts international wealth redistribution as one of its functions—is a reassuring presence for investors. The 1994 Agreement does not actually abolish the Planning Commission, but simply suspends its operations until the regulatory council of the Authority “decides otherwise.”15 The Seabed Authority still proclaims, on its offi cial website, that it will oversee “action to protect

land-based mineral producers in the third world from adverse economic effects of seabed production.” The 1994 Agreement seems to give at least tacit support to this notion in empowering the Authority to provide “economic assistance” to “developing countries which suffer serious adverse effects on their export earnings” from deep seabed mining.16 The Authority can still direct proceeds from mining or drilling approved for the continental shelf to compensate “affected developing land-based producer States.” If the world wants to encourage mining in the deep seabed, this is no way to do it. Further, this approach carries an immediate risk to U.S. national security. Allegedly to ensure that the benefi ts of deep sea mining are properly shared, UNCLOS requires all states to “cooperate in promoting the transfer of technology and scientifi c knowledge” relevant to exploration and recovery activities in the deep seas.17 The 1994 supplementary agreement endorses these provisions, qualifying them only with vague assurances that technology transfer should be conducted on “fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, consistent with the effective protection of intellectual property rights.”18 It remains to be seen whether the Authority will assert claims to impose technology transfers in this fi eld. It could do so by making such transfers a condition for approving permits for exploration or recovery by Western fi rms, since all such activity requires approval of the Authority.19 Yet even without direct demands from the Authority, the Chinese government, by invoking these provisions, managed to obtain microbathymetry equipment and advanced sonar technology from American companies in the late 1990s. China claimed to be interested in prospecting for minerals beneath the deep seas. Pentagon offi cials warned against sharing this technology with China, given its potential application to anti-submarine warfare. But other offi cials in the Clinton Administration insisted that the United States, having signed UNCLOS—even if not yet having ratifi ed it—must honor UNCLOS obligations on technology sharing. Future administrations may be more vigilant, but the Authority may, in the future, be more insistent. That is the logic of a treaty that makes mining by fi rms in one country contingent on the approval of the governments in other countries.

LOST undermines the US Naval power and risks war with ChinaBolton and Blumenthal 11 – John and Dan (9/29/11, “Time to Kill the Law of the Sea Treaty—Again,” WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904836104576560934029786322)patel The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)—signed by the U.S. in 1994 but never ratified by the Senate—is showing some signs of life on Capitol Hill, even as new circumstances make it less attractive than ever. With China emerging as a major POWER , ratifying the treaty now would encourage Sino-American strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and do nothing to resolve China's expansive maritime territorial claims. At issue is China's intensified effort to keep America's military out of its "Exclusive Economic Zone," a LOST invention that affords coastal states control over economic activity in areas beyond their sovereign, 12-mile territorial seas out to 200 miles. Properly read, LOST recognizes exclusive economic zones as INTERNATIONAL waters, but China is exploiting the treaty's ambiguities to declare "no go" zones in regions where centuries of state practice clearly permit unrestricted maritime activity. Take the issues of INTELLIGENCE , surveillance and reconnaissance, both by air and sea. LOST is silent on these subjects in the exclusive zones, so China claims it can regulate (meaning effectively prohibit) all such activity. Beijing also brazenly claims—exploiting Western green sensibilities—that U.S. naval vessels pollute China's exclusive zone, pollution being an activity the treaty permits coastal states to regulate out to 24 miles. China wants to deny American access to its nearby waters so it can have its way with its neighbors. Beijing is building a NETWORK of "anti-

access" and "area denial" weapons such as integrated air defenses, submarines, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber and anti-satellite systems designed to make it exceedingly hazardous for American ships and aircraft to traverse China's exclusive zone or peripheral seas. If the Senate ratifies the treaty, we would become subject to its dispute-resolution mechanisms and ambiguities. Right now, since we are the world's major naval power, our conduct dominates state practice and hence customary INTERNATIONAL law—to our decided advantage. This dispute is not really about law. China simply does not want the U.S. military to gather INTELLIGENCE near its shores. And other nations quietly support China's position, including Russia, Iran, Brazil and India. Given China's incessant incursions into the exclusive zones of other Asian nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, these states may seek to restrict international maritime activities in their exclusive zones as well, further complicating U.S. efforts. All Washington wants is to continue doing what it has been doing since it became a maritime POWER : use its Navy to enhance international peace and security, deter conflict, reassure allies, and collect intelligence. LOST undercuts these strategic imperatives, and that is why it has always been a bad idea for the U.S.—a formula for endless legal maneuvering and the submission of conflicting claims to the treaty's international tribunal, where our prospects are uncertain at best. One hopes India and Japan will stop reflexively supporting LOST. They have significant alternatives to check China's growing power, including closer cooperation with the United States. The treaty is not an answer—it is only a beguiling, flawed escape hatch from the hard work America and others must do to meet China's challenge. That hard work must include properly funding and equipping the Navy and exercising it in China's exclusive zones, including especially on intelligence missions, based on long-established state practice. Together with diplomacy to PREVENT nascent conflicts from escalating, these steps will reassure allies of full U.S. support in resolving disputes with China

Resource extraction will only fund terrorist groupsRumsfeld 6/12/12 – Donald (“Why the U.N. Shouldn't Own the Seas,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303768104577460890850883780) patelThirty years ago, President Ronald Reagan asked me to meet with world leaders to represent the United States in opposition to the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty. Our efforts soon found a persuasive supporter in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Today, as the U.S. Senate again considers approving this flawed agreement, the Reagan-Thatcher reasons for opposition remain every bit as persuasive. When I met with Mrs. Thatcher in 1982, her conclusion on the treaty was unforgettable: "What this treaty proposes is nothing less than the INTERNATIONAL nationalization of roughly two-thirds of the Earth's surface." Then, referring to her battles dismantling Britain's state-owned mining and utility companies, she added, "And you know how I feel about nationalization. Tell Ronnie I'm with him." Reagan had entered office the year before with the treaty presented to him as a done deal requiring only his signature and Senate ratification. Then as now, most of the world's nations had already approved it. The Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations had all gone along. American diplomats generally supported the treaty and were shocked when Reagan changed America's POLICY. Puzzled by their reaction, the president was said to have responded, "But isn't that what the election was all about?" Yet, as the Gipper might have said, here we go again: An impressive coalition—including every living former secretary of State—has endorsed the Obama administration's goal of ratifying the treaty. The U.S. Navy wants to "lock in" existing and widely accepted rules of high-seas navigation. BUSINESS groups say the treaty could help them by creating somewhat more certainty. Can so many people, organizations and countries be

mistaken? Yes. Various proponents have valid considerations, but none has made a compelling case that the treaty would, on balance, benefit America as a whole. Though a 1994 agreement (signed by some but not all parties to the treaty) fixed some of its original flaws, the treaty remains a sweeping power grab that could prove to be the largest mechanism for the world-wide redistribution of wealth in human HISTORY. The treaty proposes to create a new global governance institution that would regulate American citizens and businesses without being accountable politically to the American people. Some treaty proponents pay little attention to constitutional concerns about democratic legislative processes and principles of self-government, but I believe the American people take seriously such threats to the foundations of our nation. The treaty creates a United Nations-style body called the "International Seabed Authority." "The Authority," as U.N. bureaucrats call it in Orwellian shorthand, would be involved in all COMMERCIAL activity in international waters, such as mining and oil and gas production . Pursuant to the treaty's Article 82, the U.S. would be required to transfer to this entity a significant share of all royalties generated by U.S. companies—royalties that would otherwise go to the U.S. Treasury. Over time, hundreds of billions of dollars could flow through the Authority with little oversight. The U.S. would not control how those revenues are spent: The treaty empowers the Authority to redistribute these so-called INTERNATIONAL royalties to developing and landlocked nations with no role in exploring or extracting those resources. This would constitute massive global welfare, courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer. It would be as if fishermen who exerted themselves to catch fish on the high seas were required, on the principle that those fish belonged to all people everywhere, to give a share of their take to countries that had nothing to do with their costly, dangerous and arduous efforts. Worse still, these sizable "royalties" could go to corrupt dictatorships and state sponsors of terrorism. For example, as a treaty signatory and a member of the Authority's EXECUTIVE council, the government of Sudan—which has harbored terrorists and conducted a mass extermination campaign against its own people—would have as much say as the U.S. on issues to be decided by the Authority. Disagreements among treaty signatories are to be decided through mandatory dispute-resolution processes of uncertain integrity. Americans should be uncomfortable with unelected and unaccountable tribunals appointed by the secretary-general of the United Nations serving as the final arbiter of such disagreements. Even if one were to agree with the principle of global wealth redistribution from the U.S. to other nations, other U.N. bodies have proven notably unskilled at financial MANAGEMENT. The U.N. Oil for Food program in Iraq, for instance, resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in corruption and graft that directly benefited Saddam Hussein and his allies. The Law of the Sea Treaty is an opportunity for scandal on an even larger scale. The most persuasive argument for the treaty is the U.S. Navy's desire to shore up INTERNATIONAL navigation rights. It is true that the treaty might produce some benefits, clarifying some principles and perhaps making it easier to resolve certain disputes. But our Navy has done quite well without this treaty for the past 200 years, relying often on centuries-old, well-established customary international law to assert navigational rights. Ultimately, it is our naval power that protects international freedom of navigation. This treaty would not make a large enough additional contribution to counterbalance the problems it would create. In his farewell address to the nation in 1988, Reagan advised the country: "Don't be afraid to see what you see." If the members of the U.S. Senate fulfill their responsibilities, read the Law of the Sea Treaty and consider it carefully, I believe they will come to the conclusion that its costs to our security and sovereignty would far exceed any benefits.

Ratification means CP cannot solve for the affirmative- the theory is flawedBandow 4 – Doug, Senior Fellow at Cato, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, writes for many journals and papers, focuses on civil liberties and political science (3/15/4, “Sink the Law of the Sea Treaty,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/sink-law-sea-treaty) patel President Bush has demonstrated his willingness to stand alone internationally. Yet for little better reason than go-along, get-along multilateralism, the administration is now pushing the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, which was just unanimously voted out of Richard Lugar’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At a committee meeting in February, Lugar noted a wide range of support from American interests “for U.S. accession to be COMPLETED swiftly.” However, the treaty is a flawed document, and there would be serious costs from accepting it. The Law of the Sea Treaty originated in the 1970s as part of the United Nations’ redistributionist agenda known as the “New International Economic Order.” The convention covers such issues as fishing and navigation, but the controversy arose mainly over seabed mining. In essence, the Law of the Sea Treaty was designed to transfer wealth and technology from the industrialized states to the Third World. Two decades ago, President Ronald Reagan ignored criticism of American unilateralism and refused to sign the treaty. U.S. leadership caused the Europeans and even the Soviet Union to stay out. Many Third World states eventually acknowledged the treaty’s many flaws. But treaties attract diplomats as lights attract moths. The first Bush and Clinton administrations worked to “fix” the treaty, leading to a revised agreement in 1994. Washington signed, leading to a cascade of ratifications from other countries. GOP gains in Congress, however, dissuaded the Clinton administration from pushing for ratification. Now George W. Bush has stepped in where Bill Clinton feared to tread. Unfortunately, the revised treaty retains many of its original flaws. There is still a complicated multinational bureaucracy that sounds like an excerpt from George Orwell’s “1984”: At its center is the International Seabed Authority. The Authority (as it calls itself) supervises a mining subsidiary called the ENTERPRISE, ruled by an Assembly, Council, and various commissions and committees. Mining approval would be highly politicized and could discriminate against American operators. Companies that are allowed to mine would owe substantial fees to the Authority and be required to do surveys for the Enterprise, their government-subsidized competitor. A mandatory transfer of mining technologies to Third World companies has been watered down. However, “sponsoring states” — that is, governments of nations where mining companies are located-would have to facilitate such transfers if the Enterprise and Third World competitors are “unable to obtain” necessary equipment commercially. Depending on the whims of the Authority, ensuring the “cooperation” of private miners could look very much like mandatory transfers. The Authority, though so far of modest size, would suffer from the same perverse incentives that afflict the U.N., since the United States would be responsible for 25 percent of the budget but easily outmaneuvered. Proposals by industrialized signatories to limit their contributions have so far received an unfriendly reception. Still, when it signed the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Clinton administration said there was no reason to worry, because the treaty proclaims that “all organs and subsidiary bodies to be established under the Convention and this Agreement shall be cost-effective.” Right. Presumably just as cost-effective as the U.N. The treaty’s mining scheme is flawed in its very conception. Although many people once thought untold wealth would leap from the seabed, land-based sources have remained cheaper than expected, and scooping up manganese nodules and other resources from the ocean floor is logistically daunting. There is no guarantee that seabed mining will ever be commercially viable. Yet this has not dimmed the enthusiasm of the Authority. Like the U.N., it generates lots of reports and paper and

obsesses over trivia. Protecting “the emblem, the official seal and the name” of the International Seabed Authority has been a matter of some concern. Among the crises the Authority has confronted: In April 2002 the Jamaican government turned off its air conditioning, necessitating “urgent consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.” A year later Jamaica used the same tactic in an ongoing battle over Authority payments for its facility. Oh yes, half of the Authority members are behind on their dues. Were seabed mining ever to thrive, a transparent system for recognizing mine sites and resolving disputes would be helpful. But the Authority’s purpose isn’t to be helpful. It is to redistribute resources to irresponsible Third World governments with a sorry history of squandering abundant foreign aid. This redistributionist bent is reflected in the treaty’s call for financial transfers to developing states and even “peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status”-code for groups such as the PLO. Whatever changes the treaty has undergone, a constant has been Third World pressure for financial transfers. Three voluntary trust funds were established to aid developing countries. Alas, few donors have come forward to subsidize the participation of, say, sub-Saharan African states in the DEVELOPMENT of ocean mining. Thus, the Authority has had to dip into its own budget to pay into the funds. Why, given all this, was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee eager to sign on? The treaty is not without benefits. Provisions regarding the ENVIRONMENT, resource management, and rights of transit generally are positive, though many reflect what is now customary international law, even in the absence of U.S. ratification. Lugar notes that “law and practice with respect to regulation of activities off our shores is already generally compatible with the Convention.” This would seem to be an equally strong argument for not ratifying the treaty. Most influential, though, may be support from the U.S. NAVY, which is enamored of the treaty’s guarantee of navigational freedom. Not that such freedom is threatened now: The Russian navy is rusting in port, China has yet to develop a blue water capability, and no country is impeding U.S. transit, commercial or military. At the same time, some ambiguous provisions may impinge on freedoms U.S. shipping now enjoys. In Senate testimony last fall, State Department legal adviser William H. Taft IV noted the importance of conditioning acceptance “upon the understanding that each Party has the exclusive right to determine which of its activities are ‘military activities’ and that such determination is not subject to review.” Whether other members will respect that claim is not at all certain. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the vice chief of naval operations, acknowledges the possibility that a Law of the Sea tribunal could rule adversely and harm U.S. “operational planning and activities, and our security.” Moreover, at a time when Washington is combating lawless terrorism, it should be evident that the only sure guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power of the U.S. Navy, combined with friendly relations with the states, few in number, that sit astride important sea lanes. Coastal nations make policy based on perceived national interest, not abstract legal norms. Remember the luckless USS Pueblo in 1968? International law did not PREVENT North Korea from seizing the intelligence ship; approval of the Law of the Sea Treaty would have offered the Pueblo no additional protection. America was similarly unaided by international law in its 2001 confrontation with China over our downed EP-3 surveillance plane. Nor has signing the Law of the Sea Treaty prevented Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, and others from making ocean claims deemed excessive by others. INDEED, last October Adm. Mullen warned that the benefits he believed to derive from treaty ratification did not “suggest that countries’ attempts to restrict navigation will cease once the United States becomes a party to the Law of the Sea Convention.” Critics of the U.S. refusal to sign in 1982 predicted ocean chaos, but not once has an American ship been denied passage. No country has had either the incentive or the ability to interfere with U.S. shipping. And if they had, the treaty would have been of little help.

In 1998 Law of the Sea Treaty supporters agitated for immediate ratification because several special exemptions for the United States were set to expire; Washington did not ratify, and no one seems to have noticed. Now Lugar worries that Washington could “forfeit our seat at the table of institutions that will make decisions about the use of the oceans.” Yet last October Assistant Secretary of State John F. Turner told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America has “had considerable success” in asserting “its oceans interests as a nonparty to the Convention.” Law of the Sea Treaty proponents talk grandly of the need to “restore U.S. leadership,” but real leadership can mean saying no as well as yes. Ronald Reagan was right to torpedo the Law of the Sea Treaty two decades ago. Creating a new oceans bureaucracy is no MORE attractive today.

There is no framework for exploitation which means cp isn’t necessary and mining could occur in US watersNorton Rose Fulbright 13 (October 2013, “Current Issues in Seabed Mining,” http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/107981/current-issues-in-seabed-mining) patelWhen the International Regime for Seabed Mining was introduced at the United Nations in 1994, as an amendment to the Law of the Sea Treaty (the Treaty) the then Secretary General of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) Ambassador Satya Nandan described the proposed regime as providing for: "a stable environment for investors in deep - seabed minerals under a market - oriented regime; it guarantees access to the resources of the seabed to all qualified investors; it provides for the establishment of system of taxation which is fair to the seabed miner and from which the international community as a whole may benefit;" As of 2013 it is fair to ask what progress has been made towards these goals. The Regime described to the United Nations by Ambassador Nandan concerned the development of a Seabed Mining Regime in respect of the ocean floor beyond the territorial limits of coastal states (the Area). A mining regime within the limits of the jurisdiction of a country does not involve the ISA; consequently the development of the necessary relationships to pursue mining are between the miner and the government of the coastal state. However, many of the issues are relevant to both mining areas. Activity in coastal waters has been concentrated in the Southern Pacific. A number of Pacific Island countries have granted either exploration or exploitation leases and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community has identified seabed mineral potential in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, Samoa and Niue. In the Area, the ISA has granted seventeen contracts either directly to countries or to companies sponsored by a country (this is a requirement of the ISA). ISA contracts are for exploration; contracts granted in respect of mining in territorial waters may include rights to exploit the resource (this is the case with the lease granted by Papua New Guinea to Nautilus Minerals). The result of all of this is that both governments and private industry have interests in the development of seabed mining in territorial waters and beyond. All this interest in seabed mining arises from a number of sources, two of which are the world need for more metal (including rare earth metals) and the possibilities of financial benefits for the countries that possess the metals. Using copper as an example, the US Geological Survey has estimated that world consumption of copper over the next 25 years will exceed all of the copper metal ever mined to date. The average reserve grade of land based copper projects as of 2009 stood at .61 %. Nautilus has estimated that the grade available in its Papua New Guinea seabed project is 7.2 %. As a potential beneficiary the Cook Islands estimate that mining the minerals in their waters has the potential to increase their GDP a hundred fold. The UN estimates that the current per - capita income of the Cook Islands is $12,200. Seabed mining is

not unlike other new industries attempting to establish themselves. In order to prosper there must be a legal framework in place and industry must have a social license from the relevant stakeholders. With a new industry in uncharted waters the attainment of a social license involves the development of a consensus that the activity is safe and that it does not adversely affect the environment in which it is conducted. This is frequently a substantial hill to climb for industries in new areas. The seabed is one such area. Mining for shale gas faced much the same developmental issues and one expects that methane hydrate mining will encounter similar hurdles. The complete legal framework for seabed mining is not yet in place, what currently exists is a developing framework. There is no exploitation code for seabed mining in areas regulated by the ISA. Many ISA exploration licenses expire in 2016 and the current licensees will require guidance on an exploitation framework. The ISA has recently published a study describing what might be included in a regulatory framework for exploitation but currently it is just that, a study. In the South Pacific very few of the island nations have mining codes, although some are in progress, such as the Cook Islands. Part and parcel of the establishment of the regulatory framework is the development of a taxation/royalty regime to provide certainty for a developer assessing its risks. For activities in territorial waters this may be negotiated between the developer and the coastal state. The Finance Minister for the Cook Islands, Mark Brown, has recently stated that the Cook Islands would expect to receive stakes in mining companies for free as the price for granting rights to exploit the resources of the Cook Islands. In the case of ISA regulated leases one expects that a generic regime, including a royalty structure, will be developed to cover production in all ISA regulated areas. This will probably be a regime bereft of any individual negotiation between ISA and its individual licensees. It will be interesting to see whether the companies who have leases in ISA areas as a result of state sponsorship have the staying power to await an ISA articulated mining regime.

2AC AT: LOST (Enviro NB)

There is no guarantee of environmental protection absent an establishment of a network of marine protected areasTULLIO SCOVAZZ No date - United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Professor of International Law at University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan(“THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERSITY, INCLUDING GENETIC RESOURCES, IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,” http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/ICP12_Presentations/Scovazzi_Abstract.pdf) patel New challenges are facing States as regards the subject of conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. This report will focus on the legal aspects of the subject. It will elaborate on how the present regime, as embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), could evolve to address some of the new challenges, such as a regime for genetic resources and the establishment of a network of marine protected areas. The basic aspect of the high seas regime is freedom. Today the freedom of the high seas is not absolute, but subject to a number of conditions, as specified by the relevant rules of international law, including UNCLOS. Today it cannot be sustained that a State has the right to engage in specific marine activities simply because it enjoys freedom of the sea, without it being bound to consider the opposite positions, if any, of the other interested States. Also the concept of freedom of the sea is to be understood in the context of the present range of marine activities and in relation to the other potentially conflicting uses and to interests having a general character, such as the sustainable use of living resources and the protection of the environment. The most innovating aspect of UNCLOS is the concept of common heritage of mankind. It presupposes a regime completely different from both the traditional concepts of sovereignty, which applies in the territorial sea, and of freedom, which applies on the high seas. The basic elements of the regime of common heritage of mankind, applying to the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the Area), are the prohibition of national appropriation, the destination of the Area for peaceful purposes, the use of the Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind as a whole with particular consideration for the interests and needs of developing countries, as well as the establishment of an international organization entitled to act on behalf of mankind in the exercise of rights over the resources. However, the prospects in the field of mineral resources in the Area remain today uncertain. A number of factors, including the cost of seabed mining activities, have inhibited progress towards commercial exploitation of mineral deposits.

Exploitation is inevitable and LOST excludes any provisions on the environmentTULLIO SCOVAZZ No date - United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Professor of International Law at University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan(“THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERSITY, INCLUDING GENETIC RESOURCES, IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,” http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/ICP12_Presentations/Scovazzi_Abstract.pdf) patel The exploitation of commercially valuable genetic resources may in the near future become a promising activity taking place beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

But what is the international regime applying to genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction? Neither the UNCLOS nor the Convention on Biological Diversity provide any specific legal framework in this regard. Some States take the position that the UNCLOS principle of common heritage of mankind and the mandate of the International Seabed Authority should be extended to cover also genetic resources. Other States rely on the UNCLOS principle of freedom of the high seas, which would imply the freedom of access to, and the unrestricted exploitation of, genetic resources. In fact, both the divergent positions move from the same starting point, namely that the UNCLOS is the legal framework for all activities in the oceans and seas, including in respect of genetic resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the UNCLOS is a cornerstone in the field of codification of international law. Nevertheless, the UNCLOS, as any legal text, is linked to the period when it was negotiated and adopted (from 1973 to 1982). Being itself a product of time, the UNCLOS cannot stop the passing of time. While it provides a solid basis for the regulation of many subjects, it would be illusory to think that the UNCLOS is the end of legal regulation. International law of the sea is subject to a process of natural evolution and progressive development which is linked to new needs and involves also the UNCLOS. In particular, the UNCLOS cannot be supposed to regulate those activities that its drafters did not intend to regulate for the simple reason that they were not foreseeable in the period when this treaty was being negotiated. At this time, very little was known about the genetic qualities of deep seabed organisms. The words “genetic resources” or “bioprospecting” do not appear anywhere in the UNCLOS. When dealing with the special regime of the Area and its resources, the UNCLOS drafters had only mineral resources in mind. The UNCLOS defines the “resources” of the Area as limited to “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in-situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules”. This means that the UNCLOS regime of common heritage of mankind cannot be automatically extended to the non-mineral resources of the Area. But, for logical and chronological reasons, the regime of freedom of the high seas cannot apply to genetic resources either. While establishing specific regimes for living and mineral resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, the UNCLOS does not provide any third regime for the exploitation of marine genetic resources. A legal gap exists in this regard. Sooner or later it should be filled (better sooner than later) through a regime which, to be consistent, should encompass under the same legal framework the genetic resources of both the deep seabed and the superjacent waters. However, some general principles of the UNCLOS should be taken into consideration when envisaging a future regime for marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction. They include the paramount objective to “contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular the special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked” (UNCLOS preamble). Also in the field of genetic resources, the application of the principle of freedom of the sea under a “first-come-first-served” approach leads to inequitable and hardly acceptable consequences. New cooperative schemes, based on a regime for access and the benefit of all States, should be envisaged in a future agreement on genetic resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This is also in full conformity with the principle of fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources set forth by the Convention on Biological Diversity. The scope of the UNCLOS regime of the Area is already broader than it may be believed at first sight. The legal condition of the Area has an influence also on the regulation of matters and activities that, although different from minerals and mining activities, are also located in that space and are more or less directly related to mining

activities, such as marine scientific research, the preservation of the marine environment and the protection of underwater cultural heritage. As far as the first two matters are concerned, it is difficult to draw a clercut distinction between what takes place on the seabed and what in the superjacent waters. Bioprospecting, that is what is currently understood as the search for commercially valuable genetic resources of the deep seabed, can already be considered as falling under the UNCLOS regime of marine scientific research. Also bioprospecting is consequently covered by Art. 143, para. 1, of the UNCLOS, which sets forth the principle that “marine scientific research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the mankind as a whole”

2AC AT: LOST (Politics NB)

LOST is massively unpopular in both chambersTennant 12 - not the Doctor (Michael, 27 June 2012, "Will Our Freedoms Be LOST at Sea?," www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/11824-will-our-freedoms-be-lost-at-sea, ADL)Although the Obama administration is putting on the drive to get the Senate to ratify LOST, its success is by no means certain. The House of Representatives recently voted to deny the administration millions of dollars in funding for LOST organizations, which suggests that the anti-LOST movement is strong and well-organized . Kerry has said he will not bring the treaty up for a vote before the November election

because, according to The Hill, “some lawmakers ‘on and off the committee’ have candidly told him they’d ‘be more comfortable’ if they could avoid having to cast the controversial vote during the campaign season ” — another indication that the treaty is widely unpopular. Kerry will likely try to get LOST through the

Senate during the lame-duck session after the election. That may not be easy: At least 27 Senators have signed a letter circulated by Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) stating that they will not vote to ratify LOST, and it only takes 34 Senators in opposition to sink its ratification. If the vote is delayed until the next President is inaugurated, it could end up being opposed from the White House, which would likely prevent ratification. Obama’s presumptive Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, has signaled his unease with LOST; and while the Libertarian Party’s nominee, Gary Johnson, does not appear to have taken a stand on LOST, the party has in the past specifically praised U.S. refusal to join the accord. America, by rejecting LOST, cannot stop the UN from claiming control over the oceans. But, wrote Greenley, “U.S. ratification would provide that final stamp of legitimacy for the UN’s power grab over the oceans and seas and constitute a major step into world government.” The

globalist elites are pushing hard for U.S. accession to LOST. Those concerned about U.S. sovereignty and fearful of transferring more power to unaccountable international organizations will have to work just as hard to ensure that if and when the treaty finally does

come up for a vote, the Senate has the guts to tell the globalists to get lost.

2AC AT: LOST (Conflict NB)

LOST is too vague and not bindingTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello In this context, it’s feared that poor States owning offshore mineral resources are undemanding and agree an implementation of this new industry without precaution. Although scientists have uncertainty about their actual extent, it’s obvious that marine environmental hazards would be very significant. The

risk to see this activity starting and developing outside of any international regulation is unfortunately not negligible. This fear reflects the fact that the provisions of U.N.C.L.O.S. relating to the protection of the marine environment are too vague and not actually binding on States as illustrated by the offshore oil and gas industry development.

2AC AT: PIC out of Minerals

Mineral mining is an all or nothing thing --- you cant pick which ones you mine until they are processed on land --- that means either CP doesn’t solve the aff bc it mines NO minerals or it links to the net benefit Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf Though supply chains differ for every mineral, several steps are common across most of these supply¶

chains and can help analysts identify potential¶ points of vulnerability . Once potentially profitable¶ reserves are discovered, companies must obtain the¶ technology, permits and capital needed for min¶ -¶ eral extraction. Since most

minerals are not pure ¶ ores – extracted resources typically contain many ¶ different materials in

various concentrations – the¶ minerals must be processed and separated . Unless¶ the deposits are

processed on site, the minerals¶ may be shipped multiple times before they are¶ ready to use. Many minerals are sold in commodities markets, which requires additional physical¶ shipment or financial steps. Finally, the minerals¶ are purchased, shipped to the consumer and used.

2AC AT: Privatization (Capital)

No mining for a decade---start up costs too highGoodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-nowJohn Wiltshire, director of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory, also at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, puts it even more bluntly. "The truth of the matter is, nobody's going to mine in the deep sea

— even if somebody massively funds this — for a minimum of a decade ," he says. The startup

cost could run from $1 to $2 billion .

REE mining requires a lot of capital start up Anthony, 11 Sebastian, “Rare earth crisis: Innovate, or be crushed by China,” Lead editor at Ziff Davis, Inc. Owner at SA Holdings Past Columnist at Tecca Editor at Aol (Weblogs, Inc) Education University of Essex Extreme Tech, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/111029-rare-earth-crisis-innovate-or-be-crushed-by-china Rare earths — a block of seventeen elements in the middle of the Periodic Table (pictured below) — aren’t actually all that rare,

but they tend to be very hard to obtain commercially . Generally, rare earth elements are only found in minute quantities in mineral deposits of clay, sand, and rock (earths!), which must then be processed to extract the rare metals — an expensive process, and also costly for the

environment as billions of tons of ore must be mined and refined to yield just a few tons of usable rare earths.

Privates won’t distribute equallyNemeth et al 8 (Stephen C. Nemeth and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa,Elizabeth A. Nyman and Paul R. Hensel Department of Political Science, Florida State University, “Ruling the Sea: Institutionalization and Privatization of the Global Ocean Commons,” http://mailer.fsu.edu/~phensel/garnet-phensel/Research/UNCLOS08.pdf) patelWithin their EEZ, states have jurisdiction and are free to manage, develop, and exploit all resources within the sea, the floor, and subsoil from their continental shelf with a boundary at 200 nautical miles or to the edge of the continental margin.6 This idea gained widespread support amongst both developed and developing states. During the first substantive conference of UNCLOS in 1974, 100 out of 143 participating states supported the idea (Pratt and Schofield, 2000: 4). By the time a preliminary text was made ready in 1977, 29 states had made a formal EEZ claim; by the signing of UNCLOS in 1982, 59 states had done so (Pratt and Schofield, 2000: 4). While privatization is an attractive solution, its primary drawback is the potential for the creation and/or exacerbation of resource distributional inequities. It has been admitted that the formalization of EEZs as part of the UNCLOS agreement “has increased, rather than decreased, inequality among states, giving more to the already well-endowed richer states” (Borgese, 1995: 15). One of the most significant problems is that the subdivision of the commons is not homogenous. Merely allocating equivalent portions of the commons does not mean that all users will get an equal share. States may be tempted to seek larger shares of the commons

to put more resources under their private control; a lack of information about the resource will also complicate negotiations regarding the distribution of a resource since a state risks getting a worthless share (Wijkman, 1982). In addition, the migratory nature of fish stocks and the interconnectedness of the ocean’s ecosystem mean that resources cannot be managed solely within the EEZ, leading to problems with fishing fleets pursuing migratory fish stocks just outside of other states' EEZs (Borgese, 1995; Bailey, 1996).7 Since some resources can move between EEZs, each state has incentives to exploit the resource before another does the same.

2AC AT: Privatization (Enviro DA)

Private companies have no regulations---causes haphazard regulations that only the federal government harmonizing solves Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello The greatest fear would be this new industry expanding without being subject to any form of international supervision control or regulation. The dreadful precedent of the offshore oil exploitation evidences that it would be irresponsible to relinquish the regulation of Deep Sea

mining industry under the sole responsibility of the private companies and the States involved. This

regulation obviously involves stakes that exceed the framework of national policies. ¶ The first part of this work deals with the inadequacy of the current international legal framework regarding Deep Sea activities and particularly Deep Sea mining. Changing this situation and introducing international regulation involves reconsidering the current conception of the law of the sea, which has remained focused on the sovereignty of coastal States.¶ The second part is related to the foreseeable issues of Deep Sea mining. Even though environmental protection is a vital challenge, the increasing strategic dimension of raw materials, especially some rare metals, might counter it. Geopolitical stake of the seabed control could all the more speed the rush to the abyss.¶ I. INADEQUACY OF DEEP SEA MINING LEGAL FRAMEWORK¶ The E.E.Z. is usually considered as an extension of the State’s territory. Such a view tends to impede international regulation. The uncontrolled development of offshore oil and gas industry reflects this almost total lack of international regulation. It stresses the need to establish an international regulation based on the precautionary principle in order to avoid a haphazard development of the seabed exploitation.¶ 17. Nautilus would be the first company worldwide to commercially explore thigh grade massive sulphide deposits on the sea floor. In January 2011 Nautilus was granted a 20 years mining lease by the Government of Papua New Guinea for the development of the Solwara 1 deposit which lies in the Eastern Manus Bassin on the Bismark Sea at approximately 1600 metres depth. Nautilus planned to produce copper and gold in 2010. However, the company has been embroiled in a dispute with the P.N.G. Government under a shared funding agreement (http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2012-11-14/nautilus-project-halted-over-dispute- in-png/1045884).¶ 4¶ A. E.E.Z. Regime Impedes International Regulation¶ Since its recognition by the Geneva Convention of March 29th, 1958, prominence of the coastal State over the natural resources of the continental shelf – which is considered as an extent of its territory – has never been challenged. This prominence has even been strengthening through the creation of the 200 miles E.E.Z. under U.N.C.L.O.S. adoption in Montego Bay in December 10th, 1982. Coastal States have the “exclusive rights” to exploit, manage and preserve resources of seawater, and ocean floor beyond their territorial waters, up to 200 nautical miles from their coastline. Furthermore, E.E.Z. can be expanded under certain conditions (see hereinafter III C.).¶ Following Article 56 (1) (a) U.N.C.L.O.S., the term refers to an area where the coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed subsoil, and with regard to the other activities for the economic exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, current and winds”.¶ In this area, the coastal State shall conserve and manage natural resources. This requirement echoes the duty to ensure the protection and preservation of the marine environment referred to in Articles 192 to 237 U.N.C.L.O.S. Among these provisions Article 194-3 asserts that coastal States should limit the “pollution from installations and devices used of the exploitation or exploration of the natural resources of the seabed and the subsoil”.¶ According to Article 56 (2) U.N.C.L.O.S.:« In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention ».Indeed “sovereign rights” appear not to be absolute but circumscribed by the rules of international law of the sea. Thus, the coastal State does not have a plenary jurisdiction as may suggest use of the term "sovereignty".¶ For instance, coastal States must take into account the rights and freedoms of other States (Art. 72 § 2 U.N.C.L.O.S.) and do not affect other uses of the sea with respect to the waters and the airspace above them (Art. 78 § 1 U.N.C.L.O.S.). For example, the establishment of offshore platforms is normally prohibited in areas where there is intense fishing activity (Art. 147 § 2 (b) U.N.C.L.O.S.).Generally, the Convention seeks to find a balance between the rights granted to coastal States and traditional uses of the sea.¶ Despite the tensions caused by the increasing use of marine resources only a few international initiatives have been taken18. Ocean governance remains limited. Thus, these last years witnessed the spectacular development of offshore oil industry in a legal lacuna. Despite the high importance of the subject, the¶ 18. See, Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Uses of the Oceans, in Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf, Davor Vidas, ed., Martinus Nijhoff (2010).¶ 5¶ pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the seabed continues to spark little interest.¶ 

This kind of pollution is expressly referred to in Article 208 U.N.C.L.O.S. which requires coastal

states to adopt laws and regulations in order: "to prevent , reduce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting directly or indirectly from the seabed." It means any activity or operation within

the area under the jurisdiction of a State, that is to say the internal waters, territorial sea, E.E.Z. and the continental shelf.¶ The coastal State shall regulate in particular the E.E.Z. under its jurisdiction. In addition, § 4 and 5 of Article 208 U.N.C.L.O.S. require efforts to harmonize national regulations through international organizations, in order to avoid differences , which could be reflected by some States introducing more permissive standards than othe¶ Thus, States wishing to authorize mining activities underwater must first establish an appropriate legal framework .

Then normally coastal State incurs responsibility in case of damage caused to the marine environment (Art. 304 U.N.C.L.O.S). However, even if the State is theoretically responsible for its E.E.Z.’s use, there is no binding provision to regulate its action in this regard. In fact, Article

208-5 U.N.C.L.O.S. invites only Parties to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent , reduce and control pollution of the marine environment.

Only federal government and national legislation can provide the guide and regulation for private companies---solves the environemntBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”The importance of law and policies addressing deep-sea mining cannot be understated because establishing such regulations allows all deep-sea mining stakeholders a better

command of their interests . This includes how effective the management of marine mineral extraction will be and how well the ocean environment is protected. Therefore, a careful assessment of current and past laws and regulations of deep-sea mining are addressed such as;

international legislation, national legislation and environmental regulations in PNG, local and state government legislation

in PNG, and the Madang Guidelines and code for environmental management of marine mining.

Privatizing risks more environmental destruction-this answers your studyChris Fred 12/21/13-Associate Editor of the Journal of Applied Ecology (2004-) Former Editor of ICES Journal of Marine Science (2001-2005) Governor and member of Council, Marine Biological Association UK (2003-) (Harry Blustein,” Privatizing the oceans is a bad idea,” http://harryblutstein.com/environment/privatizing-the-oceans/) patelThe oceans cover almost three-quarters of the planet’s surface, and for many people they represent the last great wilderness. But in fact the seas support many human activities, and have done for millennia – for how much longer, though, is debatable. And that has raised many suggestions of how to save them. Marine ecosystems underpin an estimated two-thirds of global GDP, and seafood makes up around 6% of the world’s total protein consumption. As the world’s population approaches nine billion by the middle of this century, the demands on the sea to provide nutrition will continue to rise. Yet the UN has already acknowledged the failure to ensure sustainable use of the seas – efforts to ensure stocks are fished sustainably have been underway for more than 100 years in Europe, yet most stocks are over-exploited with population numbers below safe biological limits. As well as over-fishing, human activities impact upon the whole marine ecosystem. The food chain is affected as predator or prey species are removed in great numbers, causing population shifts and imbalances. The seas are used as a dumping ground, from household rubbish to toxic waste. The oceans have also absorbed around half of all the carbon dioxide emitted since the industrial revolution, which has raised the oceans’ acidity levels. This build up of toxins, warming and acidification all impose great stresses on sea life. So it’s clear that existing management schemes are failing to protect the oceans. This has prompted some to call for a partial privatization of the oceans, with coastal communities “owning” areas of the sea. A recent proponent is the World Bank. Its 21-person panel of experts concludes that the threats to the ocean are so diverse and difficult for traditional measures to regulate that large-scale public-private partnerships are the best hope of delivering sustainable use. The idea that someone who has ownership of a resource will protect it seems intuitive and proposals to “privatize” fisheries have a long history. Private rights do not themselves deliver sustainability or environmental protection – look at the impact industrialization of agriculture has had on the countryside, for example. It is legislation that protects woods, hedgerows and field margins, not the fact that someone owns them. From an economic point of view, creating a market – attributing value to, buying and selling areas of the sea – would contribute to economic indicators such GDP as these “services” currently rendered gratis would now be captured in the trading accounts of companies. But

ultimately it would take something that is the common property of all and sell it (one assumes governments would sell rather than give) to corporations and consortia. These would then trade the sea floor like any other property. From an ecological point of view the proposal is flawed. The seawater that carries fish larvae, plankton and other foods, and pollutants too, will wash in and out of these regions without any regard for boundary lines drawn on maps and charts. Similarly, fish will swim in and out of the areas without checking in at border control. These cross-boundary movements would render many of the possible protective measures ineffective. When we own land we generally erect a fence or wall to keep our livestock in and to prevent others from gaining access to or damaging or our property. The land ownership analogy is simply not appropriate in the context of the oceanic world. The UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) follows the principle that the high seas are international and owned by no nation, and are the common heritage of mankind (Article 136). A policy of privatisation of the seas therefore involves setting aside this principle. Human pressures on the ocean continue to increase and effective action is certainly needed, and urgently. The idea of ceding parts of the ocean to local communities, perhaps in partnership with multinational corporations, is seen as providing a mechanism that would allow the communities that have a stake in the health of their local ecosystems to play a part in managing them, using their local knowledge. Anthropologists are keen to promote examples where indigenous people develop their own environmental and resource management practice using traditional ecological knowledge. There are many examples of such successes in the marine environment – particularly in dynamic, productive ecosystems – but where fish are highly mobile such approaches fail. If your fish move in and out of your patch it will always pay to catch them now, rather than let them go to be caught by someone else, or risk them moving to another area and not returning. The “noble savage” living in balance with nature is simply a romantic Victorian construct. Archaeological evidence shows clear over exploitation of fisheries resources by Stone Age peoples. The world’s fish catch peaked in the 1980s; even from the 1960s on it was clear many stocks were severely over exploited. In the 50 years since then we have seen proposal after proposal to save the seas – reduce pollution, introduce Marine Protected Areas, extend Exclusive Economic Zones to 200 miles, and others. None has really delivered. Speaking as an ecologist, the answer is simple – we need to reduce fishing. We need to do this urgently, make a significant change, and in one or two decades we might have healthier stocks which can then sustain catch rates similar to now. But talk of privatizing the sea is just another example of how politicians are unwilling to face the challenge head on.

2AC AT: Privatization (Defense DA)

In the context of defense related minerals, the private sector wont invest in them and there isn’t a reliable supply --- that collapses defense industries Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf In developing new policies related to minerals,¶ policymakers must remember that substantial¶ government intervention already exists , includ¶ -¶ ing permitting exploitation on government lands¶ and regulating environmental

impacts. However,¶ policymakers must navigate a market that is not¶ always easy to predict and in which the need¶ for federal government intervention (or nonin¶ -¶ tervention) is not always obvious. In the

recent¶ rare earths case, the private sector responded by¶ providing some capital for a domestic mining ¶

operation to resume. This does not always solve ¶ the foreign policy and geopolitical challenges

the¶ U.S. government experiences. In particular, for¶ minerals that private companies will not reliably ¶ produce or more defense-specific applications,¶ U.S. government interests may be at stake while¶ private

interests are not¶ To manage circumstances where the federal¶ government must act to protect

U.S. interests¶ against the threat of supply disruptions , various¶ federal agencies have existing mechanisms that¶ must be preserved and

utilized. The Departments¶ of Defense and Energy already have mechanisms¶ for offering low-interest loan guarantees for busi¶ -¶ nesses in a broad range of strategically important¶ fields, from semi-conductors to military assets to¶ energy infrastructure. Similarly, these agencies¶ can use loan guarantees to facilitate production¶ or advance research and development related to¶ minerals, including lending

funds to support¶ research on the more efficient use of rare earths,¶ rhenium or lithium in defense or energy appli¶ -¶ cations. Only a willingness to use these

tools is¶ required

Government is key to obtain the knowledge infrastructure to protect US interests --- private companies withhold information to understand the global supply chain --- that causes protectionism Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf To protect the U.S. government’s ability to manage critical minerals appropriately, Congress¶

should protect the government’s role in analyzing critical mineral vulnerabilities and¶

producing its own data . ¶ As congressional leaders¶ in both political parties strive to reduce spend¶ -¶ ing and seek efficiencies, they should maintain¶ a strong U.S. government capacity for research ¶ and analysis – a public good that is both necessary to protect U.S. interests and undersupplied ¶ by the private sector .

Without vigilance, the¶ United States risks being blindsided by regular ¶ trade disputes and supply

disruptions , and by¶ countries exerting political leverage. ¶ Improving¶ how the U.S. government handles mineral

issues¶ should not require major increases in manpower¶ or spending. But the administration and Congress¶ must maintain the existing capacities and preserve the knowledge infrastructure that the¶

government has redeveloped in the past few years¶ (See Key U.S. Government Offices box).¶ In addition to

continuing to produce good data,¶ the U.S. government can do more to leverage its ¶

relationships with contractors. The private sector¶ will continue to withhold important

information in order to keep information proprietary or¶ because it could be harmful to the bottom line if¶ shared with the government. But when DOD, for¶ example, has billion-dollar contracts with suppliers¶ for critical military assets, it should be able to have ¶ contractual

requirements that these companies¶ share information about major supply chain

vulnerabilities that can provide other countries with¶ leverage over the United States or

potentially cause¶ major disruptions . The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall¶ Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is an¶ important

model for requiring due diligence in¶ understanding and reporting supply chain infor¶ -¶ mation among manufacturers that source minerals¶ from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2AC AT: Recycle CP

Can’t sustain our industries --- has little impactParamaguru, 13 Kharunya, “Rethinking Our Risky Reliance on Rare Earth Metals,” http://science.time.com/2013/12/20/rare-earths-are-too-rare/Recycling metal has been advocated by some as a possible way of managing these precious resources—the European Parliament adopted a law curbing dumping of electric waste in 2012, meaning member states will

need to collect 45 tons of e-waste for every 100 tons of electronic goods sold in the previous three years by 2016. But Gradael says that for rare earths, recycling will have little impact until our use of these materials first

plateaus, as there will not be enough in the recycling stream to keep up with future demand .

Instead, Gradael hopes that product designers, material scientists and engineers will fully take into account the risks and limitations of relying on such resources in the future and design new products accordingly. Until that innovation comes, we’ll continue to be exposed to the environmental damage, geopolitical scares and price shocks that come with being reliant on rare earths.

Most rare earth’s cannot be recycledParthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf The ability to recover and recycle minerals economically can expand sources of supply . Minerals¶ can be removed from manufactured items that¶ are headed for the landfill, extracted and then¶ recycled. Lithium, for example, has good recy¶ -¶ cling potential, and economical recycling and¶ reuse is being researched extensively. Gallium can¶ be

recovered and reprocessed in some cases, as¶ can rhenium, niobium and tantalum. However,¶ for most rare earths ,

very little material can be¶ recycled or recovered economically given current ¶ technologies

and methods

Links to environment DAMarshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/)

Not Curbside Recycling rare earth elements isn’t as easy as recycling glass or plastic — there are

challenges at nearly every level . For one thing, the elements are present in small amounts in things like cell phones. As parts get smaller, so do the amounts of material used. In a touch screen, for example, the

elements are distributed throughout the material at the molecular scale . “It’s actually getting much harder to

recycle electronics,” says Alex King of the Ames Lab in Ames, Iowa, and director of the Critical Materials Institute — a U.S. Department of Energy–funded “Innovation Hub” focused on strategies for ensuring the supply of five rare earth metals identified by the government as critical. “We used to have cell phones where you could snap out the battery, which is probably the biggest single target for recycling. With smartphones, those things are

built so you can’t get the battery out, at least not easily.” Cell phones are typically recycled by smashing, shredding and grinding them into powder. The powder can then be separated into component materials for disposal or recycling. But new cell phones incorporate more elements than ever — some around 65 in total. (For comparison, all of industry uses only about 85 different elements.) This makes the powder a more complicated

mixture to separate than it was with older phones. “It’s easier to separate rare earth elements from rocks than

from cell phones ,” King says. To separate these materials often means “very aggressive solvents

or very high temperature molten metal processing. It’s not simple,” says Yale University industrial ecologist

Thomas Graedel. Because of the nasty materials or large amounts of energy needed, in some cases recycling could create greater environmental harm than mining for the metals in the first place. “A case by case analysis is needed to decide whether a given product is a good recycling candidate,” Graedel says. The researchers, led by Benjamin Sprecher at

the Materials Innovation Institute in Delft, Netherlands, also found that shredding hard drives for recycling resulted in a 90 percent loss of neodymium. “The large losses of material incurred while shredding the

material puts serious doubts on the usefulness of this type of recycling as a solution for

scarcity ,” the researchers wrote. They propose a method in which hard drives are taken apart by hand as a way to address this issue.

Elements can’t be separated and regs stop. Marshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/)When small amounts of rare earths are part of complex mixtures, separation can be too expensive to justify for these elements alone, leading some to suggest that the even more valuable elements within electronics, such as gold, palladium and iridium, may make recycling economically worthwhile. “It might be that the rare earths will pay for the price of doing the processing and the gold, platinum and palladium will be the cash flow,” says Eric Peterson of Idaho National Laboratory, who leads the rare earth reuse and recycling research program for the Critical Materials Institute. To address both environmental and economic problems with recycling, the Critical Materials Institute and other research groups, including a European consortium, are testing supercritical carbon dioxide, ionic liquids, electrochemical methods and more as strategies for improving the prospects of rare earth recycling. Getting the Goods While the technical challenges of recycling rare earths are substantial, Graedel says, they are not the main problem. “I think it’s fair to say that the biggest challenge we have

with recycling the rare earths and many other things is the challenge of collection ,” he says. “It’s more of a social and perhaps regulatory challenge than a technological challenge.” The existing recycling infrastructure for fluorescent bulbs makes them good candidates for rare earth recycling, many experts say.With price

pressures off, at least for now, and few laws requiring recycling, there is little incentive to try to get the

materials back . As of 2011, less than 1 percent of rare earths were recycled. People tend to hoard or toss their old phones.

Cars , which may have more than two dozen rare-earth-containing motors in them driving everything from windshield wipers to

the rear view mirror adjustment, are not recovered formally. Many electronics end up in developing countries where they may ultimately be dismantled in unsafe or inefficient ways. And even fluorescent light bulbs, which are

supposed to be recycled by law because of the mercury in the tubes, are only recycled at a rate of around 30 to 35 percent. The existing recycling infrastructure for fluorescent bulbs makes them good candidates for rare earth recycling, many experts say. Fluorescent light bulbs make use of rare earth elements to fill out the color spectrum: the red and green phosphors in the powder that lines the inside of the lights are the rare earth elements europium and terbium. Recyclers collect the mercury, the

glass and the metal parts of the bulbs, but they have traditionally dumped the rare-earth-containing

white powder that lines the tubes. Some companies are now recovering these. While LED lights may be taking off in popularity, there will be plenty of fluorescent and compact fluorescent bulbs in use for decades to come, Peterson says, so they remain good targets for recycling. LEDs use rare earths, too, but in much smaller amounts than fluorescent bulbs and in ways that

make them more difficult to recycle. “I am not convinced that it will be possible to extract rare earths

from LEDs in an economical manner, ” King notes.

No devices to recycleMarshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/)Supply and Demand Of course this all assumes a big enough supply of ready-for-recycling electronics — which may not be a safe assumption right now. Wind turbines, for example, have a 20- to 30-year lifetime,

meaning almost none is yet ready for recycling . In one recent study, Jelle Rademaker of the Green Academy in

the Netherlands and colleagues calculated the potential for rare earth recycling from magnets in computer hard drives, hybrid cars and wind turbines, assuming 100 percent recovery in each case. They found that the amount available for recycling could be at most 10 to 15 percent of the demand between now and 2015.

The percentage dips even further toward 2020 , as demand takes off but only computer hard drives are available

for recycling.

2AC AT: States

States cannot access the rare earth metals we needAlex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patelSeabed mining exploration has focused on four main resources: polymetallic (predominantly manganese) nodules, seafloor massive sulphides (SMS), cobalt-rich crusts and phosphates. Most of these minerals occur in the deep-sea regions beyond the continental shelf.

Polymetallic (manganese) nodules occur on the seafloor in abyssal plains, which generally range from 3 000 m – 6 000 m in depth.2 SMS occur along the mid-oceanic ridges and volcanic arcs that form at the boundaries of the earth’s tectonic plates, typically at water depths ofaround 2 000 m.3 Cobalt-rich crusts form on seamounts (essentially underwater mountains) at depths of 400 m – 7 000 m. Phosphates, conversely, are found in relatively shallow waters, generally less than 600 m deep.4 Phosphate is an important input in the production of fertilizer and has become central to modern agricultural production

2AC AT: Substitutes CP

Some rare earth minerals don’t have substitutes --- this collapses heg and is vulnerable to price spikes and vulnerabilities which links to our protectionism/ trade advantageParthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf For many minerals and raw materi¶ -¶ als, consumers have options to substitute different¶ minerals with similar properties if something is¶ unavailable or too costly.¶ Others possess properties for which scientists and manufacturers have¶ yet to find substitutes . Rare earth minerals fall into¶ this category.

In many defense applications , for¶ example, certain rare earths retain magnetism at¶ extreme

temperatures to a degree not readily found ¶ in other minerals . Niobium and tantalum can be¶ replaced in

some applications but with reduced¶ effectiveness. For rhenium and lithium, however,¶ there are a variety of substitutes in use today, with¶ additional substitutes currently being tested and¶ developed. Gallium

can be replaced for many of its¶ uses, although some substitutes are also vulnerable¶ to disruptions and

price spikes

No reliable source substitute for REEs --- we are still reliant --- in particular, doesn’t solve renewables Paramaguru, 13 Kharunya, “Rethinking Our Risky Reliance on Rare Earth Metals,” http://science.time.com/2013/12/20/rare-earths-are-too-rare/From our smartphones to our latest weaponry, the technology that underpins modern life would be impossible without rare earth metals. The importance of rare earths has only grown as emerging markets increase their demand for technologies made with it, as does the renewable energy industry . Now a new study from researchers at Yale has found that many of the materials used in high-tech products, including rare earth metals, have no satisfactory substitutes, underscoring not only

our vulnerable reliance on them, but also the need to better manage these crucial resources.

***Neg

***Privatization CP

1NC CP

Text: The United States federal government should reform the cooperate tax system and repeal laws that drive up company costs

Picking winners and losers fails and turns the aff – only reforming policies and regulations solveU.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL)What is good for the manufacturing industry is good for all businesses in the U.S.. Our trading partners are not gaining ground on U.S. manufacturing because our manufacturing sector is declining; they are gaining ground because our current economic policies are failing U.S. manufacturers and businesses in the U.S. We cannot use targeted and excessive regulations and policies that actively engage in picking winners and losers in the economy in order to compete globally. If we wish to continue to attract and retain innovative and successful companies, we need to reform many of the federal policies that are hampering U.S. companies.

1NC Picking Winners

The Aff picks winners and losers – that kills competitiveness and private investmentLoris 12 - Nicolas Loris, an economist, focuses on energy, environmental and regulatory issues as the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation (12/13/12, "Blowing More Taxpayer Money for Offshore Wind," dailysignal.com/2012/12/13/blowing-more-taxpayer-money-for-offshore-wind/, ADL)Higher costs for a technology should not be a signal for the government to step in and try to lower those costs to make the politically preferred technology competitive. By attempting to force government-developed technologies into the market, the government diminishes the role of the entrepreneur and crowds out private-sector investment. This practice of the government picking winners and losers denies energy technologies the opportunity to compete in the marketplace, which is the only proven way to develop market-viable products. When the government attempts to drive technological commercialization, it circumvents this critical process. Thus, almost without exception, it fails in some way. This is true with renewable technology, fossil fuel technology, or technologies pushed forward by the DOE to make businesses and homes more energy efficient. The same reasoning holds true for why Congress should not extend the wind production tax credit. An extension would perpetuate America’s addiction to energy subsidies and create technological stagnation that adversely affects the long-term competitiveness of the wind industry. Providing another year of tax credits would be a $12 billion taxpayer-funded mistake that would further distort the electricity markets and, on net, cause economic harm by shifting labor and capital toward windmill production and away from more economically valuable investments. If the windmills add value to the economy, they won’t need the subsidy. All of these subsidy programs continually ignore the fact that we are always going to have a demand for electricity—and

we have ample supply from a variety of sources to meet that demand. The resources and

technologies that can most efficiently meet that demand will all almost certainly have one thing in common: They won’t need a government program to be successful.

Picking winners and losers entrenches policy in protectionismU.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL)President Carter's Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultz observed: One does

not have to be a cynic to forecast that the surest way to multiply unwarranted subsidies and protectionist measures is to legitimize their existence under the rubric of industrial policy. The likely outcome of an industrial policy that encompassed some elements of both ``protecting the losers'' and ``picking the winners'' is that the losers would back the subsidies for the winners in return for the latter's support on issues of trade protection.

2NC Say Yes

Investors are willing to invest in rare earth elementsFoote 14 (Bill, 1/7/14, "How China Is Creating Rare Earth Investment Opportunities in the U.S.," www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/07/how-china-is-creating-rare-earth-us-investment-opp.aspx, ADL)Rebooting U.S. production Molycorp owns a mine in Mountain Pass, CA, that was shut down over 10 years ago due to soaring extraction and production costs in direct competition with Chinese mining companies. Molycorp reopened the mine in 2012 and expects to be at its full capacity of 19,000 tons in 2014. Molycorp also operates a separation plant and sells rare earth concentrates and refined products from newly mined and previously mined above-ground stocks. With China restricting rare earth materials for more domestic consumption, and with a U.S. domestic demand of about 6,000 tons annually, Molycorp will be able to export most of its production. If non-Chinese sourced rare earth supplies are tight, then over the next five years prices should rise, fueling Molycorp's revenue growth, payback for mine investments, and profit to plow back into more mine development. Molycorp is not alone, though. Ucore is breaking ground in its Alaskan Bokan Mountain mine. This mine will not only extract uranium ore, but also the heavy rare earths needed in defense, industrial, and consumer goods technology. Within 3-5 years Ucore could be able to produce 10,000 tons annually. World supply net of Chinese production may still be short enough to buoy prices for further mine and processing expansion. Perhaps there is now enough incentive to encourage other U.S. companies to join the rare earth business. Until then, Molycorp and Ucore can enjoy the profits of being the only companies capable of meeting technology demand in U.S. domestic and export markets.

Investors are looking at rare earth elements – too many projects to ‘pick winners’Hampton 09 (Michael, 11/30/09, "Rare Earths: Is the present hype justified? Can we pick winners?," www.financialsensearchive.com/fsu/editorials/2009/1130.html, ADL)What a difference a year makes. There has been a dramatic transformation for the Rare Earth companies from no hope to big hopes as the Rare Earths became the latest "hot" sector to capture investors' imagination. We all know that mining investors are prone to flights of fancy, and the staying power of dreams will be tested on a long hard road from discovery to production. Metal Events Ltd's“5th International Rare Earths Conference" held in Hong Kong last week, was a great place for a reality check on the current state of the Rare Earths sector. Despite its history, and an ability to attract the top companies in this growing industry, the conference was concerned about their numbers. A room had been booked for 70 people, but in March it seemed that the interest level was too small to attract the usual number of participants. The organizers decided to go ahead with the same size room anyway, with whatever numbers they could get. When the doors opened on November 18th for the two day conference, there were 170 delegates, a new record - and the room was groaning with people. The changes in market capitalization of companies involved in the conference revealed the extent of the turnaround. Picking ten public companies in the audience with Rare Earth mining projects at various stages of development, the aggregate market capitalization as of mid-November was $1.59 Billion. Using the same number of shares outstanding, and the end-2008 stock prices, the market cap would have been $518 Million. That's a rise of 206% in 10 1/2 months, far above the general stock indices. One cannot help but ask, is the present hype justified? Dudley Kingsnorth of Industrial Minerals Company of Australia Ltd put it well in his presentation. Money is available, he said, but is not infinite. "Perhaps $2 Billion will be available to the Rare Earths sector," said Kingsnorth. "If it is spread evenly over the 57 existing projects, it will be squandered." The industry will need to advance the right projects, and advance them quickly; it is to prevent a destructive price squeeze in a few years time. The crunch may arrive as early as 2014 or 2015. Both China and the US have seized on green technologies as a way out of the present global slump. But we are unlikely to get to a brighter greener future without the special qualities of rare earth metals. They are an essential part of magnets, batteries, glass, and other components, making them smaller, lighter, and more heat resistant. An alphabet soup of obscure elements on the periodic table, with odd names like Lanthanum, Europium, and Dysprosium, the 17 rare earth elements (REE) are used in critical applications. For instance, Rare Earths permit the manufacture of small permanent magnets, capable of operating at a wide range of temperatures. Few, if any, substitutes are available. Where there are substitutes, it is commonly one REE replacing another. Consider the applications and you get an idea of the potential for future growth in the market. Each typical disk drive has two magnets utilizing an alloy of Neodymium (Nd), a rare earth. According to Takehisa Minowa, of Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd, a conference presenter, 500 million drives are sold each year. That's 1 billion magnets, for a single high tech product. Rare earths are also needed in air conditioners, wind turbine generators, and hybrid cars. The motor for the Prius hybrid car uses 1 kilogram of Nd, and the battery uses 10-15 kg's of Lanthanum (Ln), another rare earth. Multiply that by a car market which may potentially reach 5 to 6 million hybrid cars by 2018, an optimistic figure in a presentation by Olivier Touret, Rhodia Electronics, and you have a very big demand number. On top of that, new applications are being discovered every year, as technological innovation constantly requires smaller and lighter components. Overall annual growth rates in consumption have mostly fallen in the range of 9% to 22% per annum, according to Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths (BRIRE.) In a paper prepared by Ms. Song Honghang, Director; and presented by her colleague Wang Yan, a review of 60 years of history showed China's remarkable role in taking production from just 1,000 tons 1978, to 2,500 in 1980, and then 20,000 in 1989. After that rapid pace, and a slowdown in 1990 from the Asian Crisis, growth resumed. From 1991 to 1995, growth was again back over 20% per annum. Over the past decade, growth has been much closer to 10% annually, which is still rapid on

this bigger base. Total demand for Rare Earth Oxides was near 130,000 tones in 2008. While 2009 is a clear down year, thanks mainly to a big destocking in Japan, the potential for high growth over the rest of this decade is excellent. Our green dreams cannot be realized without ongoing growth in production of these unique metals. The political reality (which I discussed in an article last year*) is that the world is highly dependent on China for Rare Earths. Something like 90% of annual production comes from that country, and that the Chinese are using more domestically and tightening their export quotes. BRIRE's figures show that Rare Earth Oxide ("REO") exports peaked at 55,000 tons in 2005, and have been falling as quotas are tightened. (REO figures are slightly deceptive, since the oxide is about 5-10% heavier than its REE content.) Some industry sources estimate that as much as 10,000 tons of "gray" material leaves the country outside the quotas. But this is conjecture, and the Chinese government is aiming to restrain this. This nervousness over supply sources has brought about a race for new sources of production. Manufacturers in Japan, Europe, and the

US all want to see diverse sources for these critical elements, as they launch new products with REE content. Prices are down year-on-year, but a mania for the Rare Earth miners was ignited by story coming out of one of the Chinese ministries in the Spring of 2009 that China was considering a complete ban on the export of certain rare earths in their raw form, preferring export value-added products and keep growing the jobs in China. This report was

later "clarified" in the summer, but it was followed by recommendations from various stock brokers and analysts that Rare Earth related mining stocks were a good way to play the emerging green energy boom, since new mines were needed to counter a possible stranglehold by the Chinese. In fact, with a 2008 demand for 130,000 tons of REO, a resumption of 10% plus growth could add 15,000 - 20,000 tons annually to demand.

That would essential require perhaps one new world class Rare Earths mine being added each year for the foreseeable future. Fortunately, there are two giants waiting in the wings, and they are both outside China. Lynas Corp's (LYC.au) Mount Weld deposit in Western Australia is a high grade carbonatite deposit. According to the presentation from the company's Vice President, Matthew James, the project is progressing well again. The key step was raising A$450 Million to fund remaining construction costs. In late April, China Non-Ferrous Metals agreed to invest A$252 Million for a majority stake. But the terms were not approved by the Australian government. So the company turned to the equity markets, and completed a financing at A$0.45 in October. This will allow them to complete the mine and related infrastructure, and build a large processing facility in Malaysia, where they will have access to cheaper power. Mr. James expects production to commence in the first half of 2011, initially at an annual rate of 11,000 tons. Later, they will ramp up to 20-22,000 tons, which would give them perhaps

14% of the global market in REO. The second major project in the pipeline is a mine reopening for Molycorp Minerals. Eight private equity investors backed the company, including Goldman Sachs, Traxis Partners, and Resource Capital amongst others, allowing Molycorp to buy the large Mountain Pass project in California from Chevron in September 2008. The mine was a historic producer and holds a 30 year mining permit, and a completed environment impact statement, needing only minor revisions. But prior to full reopening, a new state-of-the-art processing plant is being built at a cost of $250 million or more. The plant will permit far higher recoveries, with less waste, and 99% purity. Once in full operation in 2012, they will have 1,000 employees and production of 20,000 tons of REO per annum, which is almost fully covered by long term sales contracts. The higher efficiencies and better recoveries may allow production to be ramped up to 40,000 tons without a new mining permit. Geoff Bedford of Neo Material Technologies (NEM.v) spoke about the "rollercoaster ride" of 2009, and how some market participants may have over-reacted to some misinformation about falling Chinese export quotas. He does not expect a full ban on any REO exports, but rather that the Chinese will accomodate changes in demand. He also spoke of his company's involvement in the Pitinga project in Brazil, where his company is assisting a mining company, Taboca, in investigating whether their existing producing tin mine will undergo some changes in its extraction and separation methods to allow production of heavy rare earths.

Several other projects are competing with each other to meet demand growth needs beyond 2012. Avalon Rare Earths has a promising project at Thor Lake which has reached about halfway "on a 5 to 10 year journey to production." The company finished a scoping study in 2007, and undertook extensive delineation drilling in 2008. They have a deposit of 64 million tonnes, with 20% Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE), at over a 2% grade, with a 1.6% cutoff. This appears to be commercial, but there are still tests underway to see if transport and processing methods are workable. After a capital investment of $300 - 400 million, it could be in production by

2012 - 2013. Donald Ranta of Rare Element Resources (RES.v) has the Bear Lodge carbonatite deposit in Wyoming, which will be the subject of a scoping study in 2010. Also at an advancing stage is Arafura's (ARU.au) Nolan’s project, which Chairman Nick Muir spoke about. They have an approximate 30 million ton deposit, right in the "center of Australia." They have a pilot plant funded by the government, and are facing a capital expenditure of perhaps A$400 million to put a mine into production. They will be replacing their CEO, who has recently resigned, and seeking possible strategic partners. Ian Chalmers of Alkane Resources (ALK.au) described his company's Dubbo project in New South Wales, which is a Zirconium and HREE project, which was the subject of a feasibility study in 2002, and has also received a government grant to build a pilot plant, which went into operation in 2008. Prospective buyers are presently evaluating output products. The economics of starting up an enlarged mine will be improved if zirconium, niobium, and yttrium prices line up, and allow them to sign long term offtake agreements at prices which will permit construction of an expanded mine. Brief presentations were also given by: privately-owned Frontier Minerals which has the high grade Zandkopsdrift arbonatite deposit, in the Northern Cape province of South Africa, Greenland Minerals (GGG.au) with its Kvanefjeld deposit in the country with the same name, privately-owned Mongol Gazar with a deposit in Mongolia, and Trevor Blench spoke about his company's "small but very

high grade" project at Steenkampskraal in South Africa which needs a renewal of a mining license to be restarted. Beyond these, but not

presenting are dozens of companies, with Rare Earth projects. Industry expert, Dudley Kingsnorth mentioned that there were 57 Rare Earth projects on the go, but another conference delegate told me that is figure was over 120 projects, including some newly added ones, which are based upon only "a handful of grab samples." If history is any guide, and the market stays

keen, a number of the new companies will raise enough capital to progress their projects. But

how can anyone, especially an investor new to this sector be expected to pick the winners , in

what is becoming a crowded field at the early stage end? The old formula: go for size and grade may not work, because the development of RE deposits is a highly complex matter. Evaluating the potential for a gold deposit with straightfoward metallurgy is relatively easy. A poly-metallic deposit which

complex metallurgy is more difficult, but picking winners in the Rare Earths sector may be the most difficult games of all. That is because there are so many different elements involved each with their own supply, demand and pricing dynamics. And then there are the problems which begin as you mine the deposit. The rare earths must be extracted and separated from each other. But then there is the "dirty secret" of rare earths, virtually every deposit is radioactive with a significant concentration of thorium or uranium bound up with the Rare Earths. This makes the separation and handling of the materials even more complex and critical and is why the price tags for capital expenditures are so very high. The other problem is the timeline. It can take 5 to 10 years to bring one of these deposits into production. Dudley Kingsnorth provided a list of 10 steps to production, showing that it is longer and more expensive than most think. Compared with other mining projects, there are some added steps, like: defining the extraction and separation process, and running a pilot plant. And because of the radioactivity, the environmental approvals can be difficult to obtain. Kingsnorth estimates the cost of a pilot plant and preparing a banking feasibility study could be in the region of $40 to 60 Million. And that is for a project that will only have "proven" itself on a benchtest, and so there is a risk that the money may be wasted. A typical process might involve as many as 1,000 steps. And even when the pilot plant is operating well, prospective buyers will want to evaluate the output products from the plant, and see how well they can be incorporated into their own manufacturing process. Running a pilot plant can take years ("5 - 6 years" is the figure I have in my notes), until buyers are found that are willing to sign the long term offtake agreements that banks may require to provide financing for capital expenditures. With such long time frames, Kingnorth's

notion that the limited capital must be allocated selectively takes on special urgency. There is no doubt that the Rare Earths mining sector has a bright future. The usual gold rush that we saw after the nickel discovery at Voisey's Bay and the uranium price

boom of 2007 may come to Rare Earths at well. But if too many early stage companies are floated, a large number of investors in these new companies are going to be disappointed.

2NC Solvency

Private interest in Mining exists now, only a question of funding and regulationsVic Kolenc, Reporter referencing an interview, $8 billion worth of rare earth minerals in Sierra Blanca area mountain, company says, El Paso Times, 1-26-2014, http://www.elpasotimes.com/business/ci_24993344/8-billion-worth-rare-earth-minerals-sierra-blanca//BDSA fledgling Sierra Blanca company is trying to raise $20 million to continue developing plans for its proposed open-pit mine on a mountain near the West Texas town to produce billions of dollars of rare earth minerals that federal agencies have deemed critical to make clean-energy products and weapons. "We're going to put Hudspeth County on the map," said Anthony Marchese, 50, a New Jersey investment banker and board chairman for Texas Rare Earth Resources Corp., which trades on the Over-the-Counter, or penny, stock market under the TRER symbol. "This could be a very large opportunity for the area, including El Paso." China supplies more than 90 percent of the world's rare earth minerals. Besides, energy and defense applications, the minerals also are used in electronic devices, lasers, in oil and gas drilling, water treatment, and other uses. Texas Rare Earth Resources holds two state leases to explore and develop a 950-acre rare-earth minerals deposit in the almost mile-high Round Top Mountain, located eight miles northwest of Sierra Blanca and about 85 miles southeast of El Paso. The company this month released an updated economic assessment, which estimated Round Top could produce about $8 billion worth of rare earth minerals over a 20-year mine life. It would cost almost $293 million to build the mining facility and go into production, the assessment concluded. The company has spent more than four years and about $20 million so far in developing its plans, Marchese reported. It's now trying to raise about $20 million, which could be done by attracting a partner, Marchese said. It needs about $13 million to do a year-long feasibility study. The goal is to have the mine operating in three years, Marchese said. Nick Pingitore, 69, a geologist at the University of Texas at El Paso, said the mountain's resources have been known for about 30 years, but they didn't become important until recent years. "The demand for rare earth materials was very small in the past and now they are incredibly important in the modern world in various applications," he said. Pingitore and Phil Goodell, another UTEP geology professor, are Texas Rare Earth shareholders and members of the company's board of directors. The minerals are called rare, not because they are hard to find, but because they are found in small concentrations that are difficult and often costly to extract from the ground. There are 17 rare earth elements divided into two groups — light, and heavy. The heavy group of elements are in shorter supply and thus considered more valuable, Marchese said. Round Top has 10 heavy and five light rare earth minerals, he reported. The Sierra Blanca company isn't the only one trying to cash in on the rare earth market. Molycorp Inc., a Denver-based mining company, has spent more than $1 billion in recent years to reopen, modernize and expand its rare earth mining facility at Mountain Pass, Calif., Molycorp financial documents show. It also has rare earth mining facilities in China. The California mine has been producing light rare earth minerals, and in 2012 the company reported it began operating new facilities at Mountain Pass to produce heavy rare earth minerals. Marchese said he doesn't see Molycorp competing against Texas Rare Earth because, he said, Round Top has a larger heavy rare earth deposit than he's seen reported by Molycorp for its California mine. Molycorp's heavy rare earth minerals are coming from its China operations, he said. Australia also has mines producing rare earth minerals. Texas Rare Earth has identified five other rare earth mining

projects proposed by companies in the United States and Canada. But those projects are either not in good locations or are on federal property, which makes getting mining permits difficult, Marchese said. Hudspeth County Judge Mike Doyal said poor and sparsely populated Hudspeth County needs an economic boost, but, he said, he also wants to make sure the mine wouldn't hurt residents' health. "They're talking about some low-grade uranium there, which raises some concern about dust, and everything they pull out of there will use an acid wash to purify it," Doyal said. "I can't say one way or the other about the operation. I don't know enough about it." That's why he invited the company to make a presentation at Hudspeth County Commissioners Court on Tuesday. UTEP's Pingitore said Round Top has a small amount of uranium, which is found in "virtually any rare earth deposit." "The uranium is a sellable material if we can separate it" from the rock, he said. Laura Lynch, 55, a Texas Rare Earth executive, board member, and shareholder, whose family has operated a ranch in Hudspeth County for more than 70 years, said she has yet to find opposition to the mine. Almost 90 people attended an open house at its Sierra Blanca offices this month, she reported. Jim Suydam, a spokesman for the Texas General Land Office in Austin, which in 2011 granted Texas Rare Earth two, 19-year leases for Round Top, said the company's proposed mine has great potential. But the agency doesn't study a lease holder's plans except to make sure it follows applicable state and federal laws, he said. Marchese said the state would get about $490 million over 20 years if the mine operates as proposed. Money from state mineral leases goes into the state's education fund. Texas Rare Earth raised $17.5 million from a stock offering several years ago when the stock was at $2.50 per share, Marchese said. But the stock has dived to around 40 cents per share today. The drop is largely due to New York investment fund Libra Advisors, which held almost 10 percent of the company's stock, selling most of its shares last year as part of its plan to liquidate the fund, he said. The fund now holds about 2 percent of the company's shares. The company has about 700 shareholders, Marchese said. Almost 40 percent of its stock is owned by eight board members and three executive officers, two of whom are also board members. The company recently hired KLR Group, a New York investment bank, to help identify financing for the project. Texas Rare Earth CEO Daniel Gorski, with more than 40 years experience in the mining industry, said in a recent conference call with investors that all financial options are being considered. Those include joint ventures, and the "outright sale of the company," he said. UTEP's Pingitore said he bought shares in the company about three years ago but got heavily involved with the company after he became unhappy with its very expensive plan for extracting the rare earth minerals from rocks. He is involved with research at UTEP on the much less-expensive heap leach process the company now plans to use to extract the microscopic rare earth minerals from rocks. UTEP's findings are double checked by the company with independent labs, he noted. The plan is to crush rocks from the mountain, lay them out in big piles on a football-size field, and use a sprinkler system to dribble acid onto them to get the rare earth minerals out, Pingitore said. A ground liner system would protect the ground. "It's not like a vein of gold. You can't just follow a vein," he said. "You have to process the whole rock somehow." The rare earth mineral ends up in a powder form, he said.

Private sector is on the cusp of thorium mine development only funding is needed

Boyle 11 (Rebecca, March 10th, “The electronic future is buried under the ground in Missouri”, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-03/rare-earth-mine)

Mountain Pass now produces about 3 percent of the world's rare earth supply, and Molycorp hopes to increase that to 25 percent, producing 40,000 metric tons a year by 2013. Mountain Pass will be the country's leading rare earth mine, but it won't be able to produce many of the so-called heavy rare earths, like

dysprosium, which is used to make computer memory and lasers. One analyst suggested this week that Molycorp should diversify by buying up companies with claims on heavy rare earth deposits. Pea Ridge has them in abundance, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Despite their name — a holdover from the 1800s and early 1900s — rare earths aren't particularly rare; they're much more common than gold, and some are nearly as common as lead. They're found in relatively low concentrations, however, requiring the processing of lots of rock. Ten states are known to have significant rare-earth deposits, according to a 2010 study by the USGS. Most are in the western U.S., but the Pea Ridge deposit has the highest grade of any site in the country, averaging 12 percent rare earth oxide concentration. Mountain Pass has much more tonnage, but at an average of only 8 percent concentration (and the vast majority is "light" rare earths). Given its resources and existing infrastructure, why isn't Pea Ridge already producing rare earths? There's a catch. Along with iron, the heavy rare earths at Pea Ridge are found intermingled with thorium, a radioactive element that requires special processing and cleanup. Hoping to turn this into a positive, Kennedy is drumming up support for thorium as an alternative energy source, namely powering molten salt reactors that could be scattered throughout cities. "When you mine for rare earths, you get the thorium for free," he said. Kennedy, a former Army Special Forces soldier and investment banker, has become an outspoken evangelist for rare earths and thorium, speaking to members of Congress, mining groups and engineers — he just gave a presentation at Oak Ridge National Laboratory — about the problem of Chinese dominance and the potential for American resurgence. He is pressing lawmakers in Missouri and Washington to establish a public-private cooperative to come up with $1 billion to build a rare earth refinery in Missouri, and he is hoping to spur a new thorium energy industry. For now, his plans center on iron production. He wants to build a pipeline to ship iron ore to the Mississippi River 44 miles to the east, where he already has a permit for a processing facility and barge port. Pea Ridge will be the only domestic producer of merchant pig iron, which is used to make steel. Currently, American mills import pig iron from countries like Brazil and Sweden. Just like in its past, iron will be the mine's main motivation, Kennedy said. But the almost-forgotten rare earths could be the icing on the cake.

2NC Solves Picking Winners

Reforming policy is the best way to solve competitiveness and private investmentU.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL) As we listen to testimony today from distinguished lawmakers, economists, and business leaders, my thought is that, instead of a Washington-centric industrial manufacturing policy, Congress should instead adopt progrowth economic policies that raise the competitiveness and opportunity for all economic boats

in our country: 1 ) To ensure businesses do not bear higher tax costs, Congress should adopt a

comprehensive plan to reduce federal spending relative to the size of our economy, reform our entitlement programs to make

them sustainably solvent, and gradually bring the federal budget back into balance. 2) To increase

competitiveness around the globe, Congress should reform our corporate tax system . The United States has the second highest corporate income tax rate in the world. Congress should reduce the after-tax cost of new investment by expensing most equipment and shortening the depreciation schedules for buildings. Congress should move to a territorial tax system. Until then, Congress should act now to allow U.S. corporations to repatriate stranded American profits to invest in new jobs, research, investment, and financial stability here at home. 3) To find new customers for American manufacturers, farmers, and service companies, Congress should immediately approve the three outstanding free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea and seek more opportunities to open growing markets to American

workers. 4) To reduce unit costs and keep American companies located in America, Congress

should repeal laws that drive up costs --such as the new national health care law and unnecessary federal regulations. To help erase the estimated 18 percent disadvantage in costs for U.S. manufacturers compared to their global competitors, Congress should act now to modernize our patent system and reform our tort system to reduce the excessive costs of frivolous lawsuits. I believe adopting these economic policy changes would benefit U.S. manufacturers, their customers, their suppliers, and their workers far more than any national manufacturing strategy.

2NC AT: Links to Politics

Reforming tax law is bipartisanRATE - A lobby in Washington (Reforming America's Taxes Equitably, "Democratic and Republican Platforms Agree: Corporate Tax Rate is Too High, Needs Reform," ratecoalition.com/pressreleases/democratic-and-republican-platforms-agree-corporate-tax-rate-is-too-high-needs-reform/, ADL)WASHINGTON, D.C. – The recently released Democratic and Republican platforms both include language calling for corporate tax reform with the aim of increasing job creation, economic growth and competitiveness through a lower corporate tax rate and broader tax base. RATE Co-

chairs Elaine Kamarck and James P. Pinkerton released the following statements regarding the common goal of the two parties: “At a time of hyper partisanship and few policy agreements, the agreement in the Democratic and Republican platforms on corporate tax reform shows much promise that something will be done to reform our corporate tax rate, which is far too high,” said James P. Pinkerton, Co-Chair of the RATE Coalition and former White House domestic policy adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. “Having the highest corporate tax rate in the world hurts economic growth and increases job losses at a time when both parties are looking boost the economy and job creation. Such agreement bodes well for policymakers aiming to reform our corporate tax code.” “Democratic and Republican lawmakers agree that corporate tax reform that lowers the rate and broadens the base is key to economic growth and drastically lowering the unemployment rate,” said Elaine Kamarck, Co-Chair of the RATE Coalition and former White House adviser to President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. “In 1986 Democratic and Republican leaders worked together to enact tax reform that led to more than a decade of strong economic growth. Policymakers have another such opportunity today to create jobs and once again make the United States the top nation in which to grow a business.” The corporate tax reform sections of the Democratic and Republican platforms can be found below. Democratic Platform: We are also committed to reforming the corporate tax code to lower tax rates for companies in the United States, with additional relief for those locating manufacturing and research and development on our shores, while closing loopholes and reducing incentives for corporations to shift jobs overseas. … There is more to do. We Democrats support lowering the corporate tax rate while closing unnecessary loopholes, and lowering rates even further for manufacturers who create good jobs at home. Republican Platform: American businesses now face the world’s highest corporate tax rate. It reduces their worldwide competitiveness, encourages corporations to move overseas, lessens investment, cripples job creation, lowers U.S. wages, and fosters the avoidance of tax liability-without actually increasing tax revenues. To level the international playing field, and to spur job creation here at home, we call for a reduction of the corporate rate to keep U.S. corporations competitive internationally, with a permanent research and development tax credit, and a repeal of the corporate alternative minimum tax. We also support the recommendation of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, as well as the current President’s Export Council, to switch to a territorial system of corporate taxation, so that profits earned and taxed abroad may be repatriated for job-creating investment here at home without additional penalty.

Lobbies shield the link to politicsCTJ 13 - citizens for tax justice (August 21 2013, "Corporate-Backed Tax Lobby Groups Proliferating," ctj.org/ctjreports/2013/08/corporate-backed_tax_lobby_groups_proliferating.php#.U78JBvldU6w, ADL)In recent years, the corporate tax reform debate in the nation's capital has been invaded by an army of acronyms such as T.I.E., A.C.T. and R.A.T.E., representing different businesses and corporate

interest groups. These groups seek to rebrand and build momentum for a corporate tax reform that benefits corporate rather than public interests. In this report we identify the nine lobby groups most actively and publicly advocating for business interests in the corporate tax debate: the Alliance for Competitive Taxation (ACT), Businesses United for Interest and Loan Deductibility

(BUILD), Campaign for a Home Court Advantage (a campaign by the Business Roundtable), Coalition for Fair

Effective Tax Rates, Fix the Debt, Let's Invest for Tomorrow (LIFT) America, Reforming America's Taxes Equitably (RATE), Tax Innovation Equality, and the WIN America Campaign. We also identify the ten U.S. corporations most aggressively pursuing tax reform through these groups based on each of the company’s participation in four or more such coalitions. Though the specific goals of these groups vary, there are common threads between them. For example, five of the nine groups explicitly support moving to a territorial tax system, which would exacerbate corporate tax avoidance overseas and promote the offshoring of jobs. Four of the groups explicitly support revenue-neutral tax reform. And, the WIN America Campaign, BUILD, and TIE each support either protecting or implementing very specific tax breaks that would benefit their corporate backers. For a full inventory of the groups' policy positions see Table 1. Based just on the lists of corporate members released by these groups (many remain private), they represent at least 359 different corporations and 186 different trade associations. Further, 87 of the corporations are actually supporters of two or more of these corporate tax lobbying efforts, with 31 supporting as many as 3 or more of these groups. See Table 2 for breakdown of the most active corporations and which groups they belong to.

***States CP

2NC Follow-On

States can successfully shape federal lawCarlson and Mayer, 13 Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law and the co¶ -¶ Faculty¶ Di¶ rector of the Emmett Center on Climate Change and the Environment. Andrew Mayer is a 2012¶ graduate of the UCLA School of Law and is currently an associate at a law fi¶ rm. We thank Rich¶ Ambrose,¶ William Boyd, Megan Herzog, Jon Michaels, Jon Varat, Jonathan Z¶ asloff, participants in¶ workshops at the University of Colorado¶ -¶ Duke Environmental Roundtable and the UCLA School of¶ Law School, and research assistant Will Marshall, “Reverse Pre-Emption,” http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/Carlson_Mayer_Reverse_Preemption.pdfMany states appear to use their reverse preemption power under the¶ CZMA robustly and

successfully to challenge federal actions as inconsistent ¶ with their coastal plans . Although

states find that proposed projects are¶ consistent with the applicable CZMP about¶ 95 ¶ percent of the time, findings of¶ inconsistency have been used to block a significant number of large

energy¶ infrastru¶ cture projects . Even when a consistency finding is appealed as¶ described above,¶ 131¶ many appeals are

settled before final determination. Given¶ the lengthy appeals process, these settlements are likely to be on terms¶

favorable to the state. Thus, for large pro¶ jects with significant effects on the¶ coastal zone, the consistency requirement can be an effective tool for states to¶ bargain for mitigation, or even to block the project altogether

2NC AT: Licenses

States have the capacity to issue licenses for federal land CGOPLR, 2 Governor's Office of Planning and Research, State of California, “INDUSTRIAL USES,” http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/preemption/Part2c.htmlStates are permitted to impose environmental controls on mining activities on federally owned land, according to a 1987 U.S. Supreme Court ruling. In this case, the high court held that the California Coastal Commission could require a company to obtain a permit for its limestone mining operations in the Big Sur region of the fede rally owned Los Padres National Forest. The decision

represented a victory for states , particularly western states with substantial acreage owned by the federal

government. It allows states to impose environmental regulations upon private mining operations conducted on federal lands. The decision may have a far broader reach, for the Court has distinguished "land-use decisions" from "environmental regulation," noting that states may impose "environmental regulations" even where they have no authority to make "land-use decisions" (California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company, (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1419; Curtin, p. 66)

***LOST CP

1NC Solvency

LOST is a prerequisite to gaining access to resources and space especially in the articLanger 12 (Andrew Langer is the president of the Institute for Liberty, “The Case for Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, November 28, 2012, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/11/28/the_case_for_ratification_of_the_law_of_the_sea_treaty_116272-2.html) patelRussia and China, two of America’s most powerful strategic foes, are actively exploring the Arctic and Pacific for oil, gas and seabed mineral riches. The U.S. is not. Why? Because, Russia and China have ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty and the U.S. hasn’t. Without ratifying LOTS, the U.S. has no standing to apply for mining and drilling permits under international law. Bottom line: there is a new Cold War taking place, and America is not winning. The seabed holds trillions of dollars of mineral resources. According to RT, a Russian/English news channel, Russian Foreign Ministry official Alexander Gorban last month stated his hope that “there will never be a “war for resources” – or an even “hotter” conflict – in the Arctic Region.” In the next breath, he then went on to reiterate that Russia is indeed "…trying to fight for the Arctic shelf…” Gorban is a close Putin ally and his acknowledgement that Arctic conflict is possible demonstrates the global stakes in play. Russia is not alone in recognizing the value of the LOTS in the fight for global resource dominance. Five countries border the Arctic: Russia, the U.S. (via Alaska), Canada, Norway and Denmark (via Greenland). However, only one country is ineligible to mine or drill those resources -- the U.S. That’s because the U.S. is not a member of the international body that grants title, or property rights, to countries to engage in the exploration of seabed resources. That body is called the International Seabed Authority (ISA). Admittance into that body is accomplished via ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty. China is also utilizing LOTS and the ISA to aggressively pursue the wealth of the Arctic. According to a report by Elisabeth Rosenthal in the New York Times last month, “The Arctic has risen rapidly on China’s foreign policy agenda in the past two years,” said Linda Jakobson, East Asia program director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. So, she said, the Chinese are exploring “how they could get involved.” China is already playing the role of the Russia of the Pacific. Right now, China is exploring U.S.-based mineral claims in the Pacific and there is nothing the U.S. can do about it. China is acting within the framework of international law and the U.S., because we have not ratified LOTS, has no standing in the International Seabed Authority to challenge China’s abuses. Another concern about Russia and China centers on rare earth minerals which are found in abundance in the seabed. The U.S. requires an incredible number of military products for which rare earth minerals are essential. Those products have historically been manufactured here in the U.S., and ought to be. The U.S. also faces a serious munitions problem: today, a tremendous number of our bullets are manufactured in China…meaning that if we find ourselves cross-wise with the Chinese, they can cut off our supply of bullets. When it comes to high-end military hardware, it is essential that America be self-reliant, not reliant on China and Russia for the minerals needed for our own defense products and national security. Over 160 nations have ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty during the past 20 years. The U.S. now stands alone with Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and sad smattering of third world and disreputable nations in turning our backs on the greatest opportunity for wealth creation available on the globe today. In doing so, the U.S. is not losing jobs and economic opportunity to BRIC nations and the rest of the world, we are surrendering them. The Senate

still has time to act to ratify LOTS and to set things right. This is the most important economic agenda item the Congress can take up – and they can still do it before the end of the year. With one vote, the United States Senate has the power to unleash staggering economic growth and jobs creation.

2NC Solvency

The CP provides the legal certainity necessary for companiesClinton 12 –Hilary (5/23, “Clinton's Testimony on the Law of the Sea Convention, May 2012,” http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/clintons-testimony-law-sea-convention-may-2012/p28340) patelU.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing, and able to explore this area. But they have made it clear to us that they need the maximum level of international legal certainty before they will or could make the substantial investments, and, we believe, create many jobs in doing so needed to extract these far-offshore resources. If we were a party to the convention, we would gain international recognition of our sovereign rights, including by using the convention's procedures, and therefore be able to give our oil and gas companies this legal certainty. Staying outside the convention, we simply cannot. The second development concerns deep seabed mining, which takes place in that part of the ocean floor that is beyond any country's jurisdiction. Now for years, technological challenges meant that deep seabed mining was only theoretical; today's advances make it very real. But it's also very expensive, and before any company will explore a mine site, it will naturally insist on having a secure title to the site and the minerals that it will recover. The convention offers the only effective mechanism for gaining this title. But only a party to the convention can use this mechanism on behalf of its companies. So as long as the United States is outside the convention, our companies are left with two bad choices – either take their deep sea mining business to another country or give up on the idea. Meanwhile, as you heard from Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, China, Russia, and many other countries are already securing their licenses under the convention to begin mining for valuable metals and rare earth elements. And as you know, rare earth elements are essential for manufacturing high-tech products like cell phones and flat screen televisions. They are currently in tight supply and produced almost exclusively by China. So while we are challenging China's export restrictions on these critical materials, we also need American companies to develop other sources. But as it stands today, they will only do that if they have the secure rights that can only be provided under this convention. If we expect to be able to manage our own energy future and our need for rare earth minerals, we must be a party to the Law of the Sea Convention. The third development that is now urgent is the emerging opportunities in the Arctic. As the area gets warmer, it is opening up to new activities such as fishing, oil and gas exploration, shipping, and tourism. This convention provides the international framework to deal with these new opportunities. We are the only Arctic nation outside the convention. Russia and the other Arctic states are advancing their continental shelf claims in the Arctic while we are on the outside looking in. As a party to the convention, we would have a much stronger basis to assert our interests throughout the entire Arctic region. The fourth development is that the convention's bodies are now up and running. The body that makes recommendations regarding countries' continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles is actively considering submissions from over 40 countries without the participation of a U.S. commissioner. The body addressing deep seabed mining is now drawing up the rules to govern the extraction of minerals of great interest to the United States and American industry. It simply should not be acceptable to us that the United States will be absent from either of those discussions. Our negotiators obtained a permanent U.S. seat on the key decision-making body for deep seabed mining. I know of no other international body that accords one country and one country alone – us – a permanent seat on its decision making body. But until we join, that reserved seat remains empty. So those are the stakes for our economy. And you will hear from Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey

that our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. We have much more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. U.S. Armed Forces rely on the navigational rights and freedoms reflected in the convention for worldwide access to get to combat areas, sustain our forces during conflict, and return home safely all without permission from other countries. Now as a non-party to the convention, we rely – we have to rely – on what is called customary international law as a legal basis for invoking and enforcing these norms. But in no other situation at which – in which our security interests are at stake do we consider customary international law good enough to protect rights that are vital to the operation of the United States military. So far we've been fortunate, but our navigational rights and our ability to challenge other countries' behavior should stand on the firmest and most persuasive legal footing available, including in critical areas such as the South China Sea. I'm sure you have followed the claims countries are making in the South China Sea. Although we do not have territory there, we have vital interests, particularly freedom of navigation. And I can report from the diplomatic trenches that as a party to the convention, we would have greater credibility in invoking the convention's rules and a greater ability to enforce them. Now, I know a number of you have heard arguments opposing the convention. And let me just address those head-on. Critics claim we would surrender U.S. sovereignty under this treaty. But in fact, it's exactly the opposite. We would secure sovereign rights over vast new areas and resources, including our 200-mile exclusive economic zone and vast continental shelf areas extending off our coasts and at least 600 miles off Alaska. I know that some are concerned that the treaty's provisions for binding dispute settlement would impinge on our sovereignty. We are no stranger to similar provisions, including in the World Trade Organization which has allowed us to bring trade cases; many of them currently pending against abusers around the world. As with the WTO, the U.S. has much more to gain than lose from this proposition by being able to hold others accountable under clear and transparent rules. Some critics invoke the concern we would be submitting to mandatory technology transfer and cite President Reagan's other initial objections to the treaty. Those concerns might have been relevant decades ago, but today they are not. In 1994, negotiators made modifications specifically to address each of President Reagan's objections, including mandatory technology transfer, which is why President Reagan's own Secretary of State, George Shultz, has since written we should join the convention in light of those modifications having been made. Now some continue to assert we do not need to join the convention for U.S. companies to drill beyond 200 miles or to engage in deep seabed mining. That's not what the companies say. So I find it quite ironic, in fact somewhat bewildering that a group, an organization, an individual would make a claim that is refuted by every major company in every major sector of the economy who stands to benefit from this treaty. Under current circumstances, they are very clear. They will not take on the cost and risk these activities under uncertain legal frameworks. They need the indisputable, internationally recognized rights available under the treaty. So please, listen to these companies, not to those who have other reasons or claims that are not based on the facts. These companies are refuting the critics who say, "Go ahead, you'll be fine." But they're not the ones – the critics – being asked to invest tens of millions of dollars without the legal certainty that comes with joining the convention.

LOST provides jurisdiction for U.S. companies to drillBellinger 12-John, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law (CFR, June 14,2012, “Should the United States ratify the UN Law of the Sea?,” http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-agreements/should-united-states-ratify-un-law-sea/p31828) patel

The Convention would also codify U.S. legal rights to exploit vast oil and gas resources on our extended continental shelf off the coast of Alaska (an area the size of two Californias), to mine valuable minerals on the deep seabed, and to lay and service submarine telecommunications cables. U.S. companies are not willing to invest the billions of dollars necessary to exploit Arctic resources unless they have the clear legal rights guaranteed by the Convention. As a result, the treaty is also strongly supported by the U.S. business community, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, major oil companies, the shipping and fishing industry, and telecommunications companies. Unfortunately, some Republican Senators have blocked Senate approval of the Law of the Sea Convention based on myths and misperceptions about the treaty, including concerns that president Reagan opposed the treaty when it was originally drafted in 1982, and that it might now infringe on U.S. sovereignty. But the flaws identified by president Reagan were fixed by amendments to the treaty in 1994 (which led all other major industrial countries to join the treaty). And far from infringing on U.S. sovereignty, joining the Law of the Sea Convention would codify U.S. sovereignty over vast new oil and gas resources in the Arctic. Other countries have benefited greatly by joining the Convention, and the United States is losing out by remaining on the sidelines.

The tech is ready- companies are waiting for ratificationPincus 12 – Walter, reports on intelligence, defense and foreign policy for The Washingon Post covered numerous subjects, including nuclear weapons and arms control, politics and congressional investigations, awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, other honors were the 1977 George Polk Award for articles exposing the neutron warhead, a 1981 Emmy from writing a CBS documentary on strategic nuclear weapons, and most recently the 2010 Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy for columns on foreign policy (5/28/12, The Washington Post, “Fine Print: Treaty on the seas is in rough Senate waters,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fine-print-treaty-on-the-seas-is-in-rough-senate-waters/2012/05/28/gJQAzCyFxU_story.html) patelSupporting the latter argument, she said, previously U.S. energy companies weren’t technologically prepared to take advantage of the provisions that allow a country to claim economic sovereignty to 600 nautical miles from its coasts. That’s far beyond the current 200 nautical miles. “U.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing and able to explore this area,” she said, but they need “international legal certainty” from the treaty “before they will or could make the substantial investments . . . needed to extract these far offshore resources.” Clinton described arguments against the treaty as being “based on ideology and mythology, not in facts, evidence or the consequences of continuing failure to accede to the treaty.” For example, Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) raised the prospect that “under this treaty, any country could sue the United States in the International Tribunal Law of the Sea, not in the U.S. courts, or take the U.S. before binding arbitration,” under provisions designed to “reduce and control pollution of the maritime environment.” Inhofe went on to cite an article by William C.G. Burns which, he said, named the United States as “the most logical state to bring action against.” Burns, however, in his 2006 article, adds that the convention “does not impose an absolute prohibition against pollution” and that it would be difficult to succeed with such legal action. Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) raised another concern, repeating an argument that the treaty’s language about abating air pollution would enforce the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States has not ratified. “A lot of people believe . . . the administration wants to use this treaty as a way to get America into a regime relating to carbon, since it’s been unsuccessful doing so

domestically,” Corker said. Clinton responded, “It is our legal assessment that there is nothing in the convention that commits the U.S. to implement any commitments on greenhouse gases under any other regime. . . . It doesn’t require adherence to any specific emission policies. Sen. James E. Risch (R-Idaho) raised one of the critics’ major arguments: money paid to the International Seabed Authority as royalties for extraction of resources from the deep sea are to be distributed by the authority. “Why do we as Americans, give up our taxing authority, handing money over to the United Nations to develop some kind of formula that we have no idea what it’s going to?” Risch said. Clinton noted that it’s not a tax but a royalty arrangement, similar to those that exist on land and sea. The royalty doesn’t start for five years, she added, then rises at 1 percent each year until it caps at 7 percent. One of the 1994 modifications to the convention gives the United States a permanent seat on the Council of 36 signatories that sets the policies for royalties as well as approves their distribution. Those decisions must be made by consensus, meaning unanimous approval. “We would have a permanent veto power over how the funds are distributed, and we could prevent them from going anywhere we did not want them to go,” Clinton said. She later added that consensus is necessary to deal with “any decision that would impose an obligation on the United States” or any country. Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) repeated several criticisms then added that the signatories “also help get to define the rules of engagement for the U.S. Navy all over the world.” Dempsey diplomatically responded, “Where in the treaty do you see our rules of engagement or our activities limited, because they’re not limited in any way.” One main selling point, emphasized by Clinton, is that “the largest single portion of the U.S. extended continental shelf is in the Arctic,” where Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, through its ownership of Greenland, are already establishing their claims. As Palin wrote in her 2007 letter, “If the U.S. does not ratify the convention, the opportunity to pursue our own claims to offshore areas in the Arctic Ocean might well be lost. As a consequence, our rightful claims to hydrocarbons, minerals, and other natural resources could be ignored.” Perhaps it’s time for conservative Republicans to listen to Palin on something she knows about firsthand.

American companies and the Navy want certainty before proceedingAbrahams 12 – Joseph (3/12/9, “LOST and Found: Senate Moves Toward Ratification of U.N.'s 'Law of the Sea Treaty,’” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/12/lost-senate-moves-ratification-uns-law-sea-treaty/) patelThe U.N. began working on LOST in 1973, and 157 nations have signed on to the treaty since it was concluded in 1982. Yet it has been stuck in dry dock for nearly 30 years in the U.S. and never even been brought to a full vote before the Senate. But swelling approval in the Senate and the combined support of the White House, State Department and U.S. Navy mean LOST may be ready to unfurl its sails again. Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said during a January confirmation hearing that he intends to push for ratification. "We are now laying the groundwork for and expect to try to take up the Law of the Sea Treaty. So that will be one of the priorities of the committee, and the key here is just timing -- how we proceed." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, saying the treaty is vital for American businesses and the Navy, told Kerry that his committee "will have a very receptive audience in our State Department and in our administration." LOST apportions "Exclusive Economic Zones" that stretch 200 miles from a country's coast and establishes the International Seabed Authority to administer the communal territory farther out. The treaty's proponents say it clears up a murky legal area that has prevented companies from taking advantage of the deep seas' wealth. "American firms and businesses want legal certainty so they can compete with foreign companies for marine resources," said Spencer Boyer, director of international law and

diplomacy at the Center for American Progress. Without the clearly defined authority established by the treaty, "there's confusion -- a lot of businesses don't want to take that risk." The American military is looking for another kind of certainty from LOST -- a guarantee of safe passage through all seaways, a right China sought to deny an unarmed Navy vessel Monday in its own Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. "The Convention codifies navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our armed forces," the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in a June 2007 letter to Senate leadership. LOST has even managed to unify environmental groups and deep-sea miners, who both see something to gain in the treaty. "We gain sovereignty, we gain territory, we gain access to places that we have not had access to as easily," said Don Kraus, president of Citizens for Global Solutions, a group that advocates strengthening international institutions. "We don't stand to lose anything."

The CP provides legal certainty for mining and drillingAdams 12 – Shar, EPOCH staff writer (5/23/12, “Ratifying Law of the Sea Urgent, Says Clinton,” http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/ratifying-law-of-the-sea-urgent-says-clinton-241708.html) patelWASHINGTON—The need for the United States to sign onto a maritime treaty is a matter of “utmost security and economic urgency,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate hearing Wednesday. The U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) has become the leading accord in dealing with international maritime disputes, offering guidelines on a range of issues—including free passage through world’s seaways, jurisdiction of ocean beds, and passage for underwater telecommunication cables. Whether to join the international body has been a point of discussion in the U.S. Senate for over 20 years—but to date, the United States remains one of the few major countries that has not signed up. Currently, 160 nations, including Russia and China, are members. Clinton said, “Twenty years ago, ten years ago, maybe even five years ago, joining the convention was important, but not urgent. That is no longer the case.” The race for resources is a big contributor to the urgency. The convention allows nations to claim economic sovereignty over their continental shelf to a distance of around 200 nautical miles from shore. That would extend U.S. territory by at least one-and-a-half times the size of Texas, maybe more, Clinton said. Before, oil and gas companies did not have the technology to drill in such areas. Yet, now that they do, without the treaty they do not have the legal certainty of jurisdiction. Similarly, mining companies now have the technology to mine deep waters, beyond the continental jurisdiction, but without the mechanism the Treaty provides to ensure secure title, companies are hesitant to make expensive investments. “As long as the United States is outside the convention, our companies are left with two bad choices: either take their deep-sea mining business to another country or give up on the idea,” Clinton said.

Even if the treaty hurts the US companies are ok with itBower and Poling 12 – Ernest, Gregory (5/25/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Advancing the National Interests of the United States: Ratification of the Law of the Sea,” http://csis.org/publication/advancing-national-interests-united-states-ratification-law-sea)patelThe Law of the Sea has been ratified by 162 countries, including every other member of the UN Security Council and every other industrialized nation on the planet. It undergirds the modern international order in the maritime domain, an order built by the United States and its allies. It is the only comprehensive treaty recognized worldwide that lays out the rules for vessels on the high seas. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, recognizing its value, operate under its guidelines even in the absence of ratification. So why has it repeatedly failed to receive Senate

approval? Opponents have presented four general arguments: The Law of the Seas restrictions would interfere with U.S. military interests. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), which determines rights to seabed mining, would block U.S. economic interests. The Law of the Sea’s taxation scheme for exploitation of resources within a nation’s exclusive economic zone would redistribute revenues unfairly. The treaty would limit U.S. sovereignty. Fortunately for the law’s proponents, each of these ideological battles has been fought and won, especially following the treaty’s renegotiation. The first objection has largely been dropped in the face of more than two decades of overwhelming support from every branch of the U.S. military. The second is clearly not a concern to the U.S. industries actively pushing U.S. ratification. The ISA’s 39 staff and narrow jurisdiction have little chance of bullying the United States or anyone else. U.S. mining interests meanwhile are sitting on the sidelines while the ocean’s resources are claimed by others, and U.S. telecom companies lack the protections and dispute resolution mechanisms for undersea cables that all their international competitors enjoy. Regarding the third concern, the taxation on resource extraction in exclusive economic zones amounts to just over 2 percent on average, a price that mining and hydrocarbon companies have signaled they are willing to pay as the world’s energy markets hunger for new resources and prices of commodities climb. As for revenue redistribution, opponents too often overlook the fact that following renegotiation of the Law of the Sea, the United States is guaranteed the only permanent veto on how funds are distributed. It is also exempt from any future amendments to the treaty without Senate approval. In other words, the United States would enjoy a position of unequaled privilege, not unfair treatment, within UNCLOS. The final, and currently most prominent, argument against ratification surrounds sovereignty. Opponents say that, by limiting itself to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and whatever extended continental shelf it can claim, the United States is restricting its jurisdictional sovereignty. What this argument misses, however, is that the United States’ continental shelf is the largest of any—up to 600 miles offshore in the Arctic alone. John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia School of Law has argued that ratification would “massively increase [U.S.] sovereign jurisdiction” by more than the size of the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska combined. The arguments against ratification have been steadily weakened in the last three decades and were overwhelmingly addressed in 1994. The most important reason, however, for U.S. accession has remained unchanged for 30 years: a rules-based international order is in the United States’ interests. The current global order and the U.S. preeminence within it are built upon legal norms and rules. Those rules do not unfairly constrain the United States. They constrain those that would overturn the system, and they prevent a return to an earlier era of great-power competition and might-makes-right diplomacy. General Dempsey said May 9 at a forum on the Law of the Sea, “Force of arms should not be our only national security instrument. [A] stable legal framework has never been more important to the United States.”

All your arguments are hype- the CP solves and EVERYONE is on boardHurst 13 – Isaak, an attorney with the International Maritime Group, PLLC—a boutique law firm that provides legal services to Alaska’s maritime, oil and gas, mining, and international business communities (11/1/13, “The Law of the Sea and Its Effects On Offshore Mining,” http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-Business-Monthly/November-2013/The-Law-of-the-Sea-and-Its-Effects-On-Offshore-Mining/) patelThe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—the US military backs it, the oil industry loves it, and Senators Murkowski and Begich support it. Hell, even the environmentalists are behind this piece of legislation. So why won’t Congress ratify this treaty and put this issue to bed? Despite the majority of world’s nations adopting this treaty (84 percent), the United States

still believes accession to this treaty is not in its best interest. The argument: the treaty contravenes the nation’s economic ideology and it erodes US sovereignty. These arguments are misguided, and non-ratification has begun to stem offshore mining projects by US companies due to the uncertainty over “clear legal title” to the resources extracted. This article will examine the Law of the Sea Convention and the fierce political debate surrounding ratification. The Law of the Sea—the Early Years Introduced in the late 1960s by UN member states to prevent conflicts over maritime rights between nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (also known as “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”) is a treaty designed to govern the navigation, fishing, and exploitation of resources in the world’s oceans. The Convention’s primary value is it provides legal clarity to the world’s maritime boundaries and clarifies the rights nations have to the exploitation and development of resources within those boundaries. Of the world’s 196 nations, 166 have ratified UNCLOS. One country, however, has been noticeably absent from adopting the Convention—the United States. The United States had its first opportunity to adopt UNCLOS in 1982 under the Reagan Administration. Reagan, however, had serious reservations about UNCLOS. First, Reagan believed the language in UNCLOS conflicted with America’s economic ideology and its free market principals. Under UNCLOS, deep-sea resources are classified as the “common heritage of mankind”; may only be mined for “the benefit of mankind as a whole”; and a percentage of the royalties generated from these projects must be “shared” with the world’s developing and landlocked nations. Naturally, the Reagan Administration balked at this language, calling it “fundamentally flawed.” Reagan’s secondary concern was that accession would erode US sovereignty. Under UNCLOS, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is tasked to manage and control certain aspects of deep-sea mining, including the permitting of these projects. Reagan saw the ISA as an unelected, unaccountable international bureaucracy that had no business controlling the affairs of the United States or its offshore mining companies. Reagan’s reservations were enough to convince congress not to ratify the Convention, and his disapproval now forms the political backbone against UNCLOS ratification. The Law of the Sea—Modern Debate In June of 2012, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held an array of hearings on UNCLOS to drum up congressional support for the Convention’s ratification. Senator John Kerry lead the charge and invited key players from the oil and gas, telecommunications, offshore mining, manufacturing, shipping, environmental, and tourism industries. Their argument was straightforward: without a universally recognized legal regime governing the exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep-sea beyond the zones of national jurisdictions, US companies would not assume the investment rights associated with such projects until it was clear who had “clear legal title” to the resources extracted. Uniformly, these industry leaders testified that accession to UNCLOS would provide such clarity, which would subsequently create jobs, protect the environment, and ultimately lead to a stronger US economy. To drive the point home, Kerry also invited senior members from every branch of the US armed forces to testify that accession would increase national security. The US military supports the Convention because it ensures unimpeded access to travel through and over the world’s oceans. Even former Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta support ratification—declaring accession will increase the United States’ sovereign right to the outer continental shelf, which, in Alaska, extends six hundred miles offshore, instead of the current two hundred-mile limit. Yet, despite the overwhelming support and expert testimony of our nation’s military, industrial, and political leaders, the Senate pushed back. Senator Jim DeMint, a conservative Republican from South Carolina and prominent figure of the Tea Party movement, led the opposition. DeMint, armed with Reagan’s reservations about UNCLOS, resurrected congressional fears that accession will erode US sovereignty by subjecting it to the

authority of the ISA. DeMint also propagated Reagan’s ideological concerns over the deep seabed mining provisions, which DeMint’s supporters tagged as “socialist.” DeMint and his fellow conservatives even promoted the slogan, “What would Reagan do?” By playing the Reagan card, DeMint secured the signatures of thirty-four other Senators, which scuttled Kerry’s attempt to ratify the Convention. Why UNCLOS Matters Now DeMint’s concerns are noble, but they are misguided—accession to UNCLOS will not erode US sovereignty, but solidify it. First, under UNCLOS, the United States is entitled to permanent seat on ISA’s Council, which provides the United States with veto power over any decisions or policies it finds objectionable. This “seat at the table” is a seat the United States does not have but desperately needs. Countries like China and Russia are now aggressively pursuing offshore mining leases within the parameters of the Convention. As of September of 2013, China is now the only nation authorized by the ISA to explore the deep seabed for as many as three major types of minerals. Would the United States have allowed such a sweeping grab of minerals rights if it were a member of the ISA Council? Likely not, but without UNCLOS membership, the United States has no voice. Second, there is no universally recognized legal regime governing the navigational rights of nations beyond the zones of their respective jurisdictions. This issue is of particular concern as China continues to exploit this international law loophole by engaging in naval operations and fishing expeditions in the territorial waters of other nations (Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Vietnam). Under UNCLOS, such activities are explicitly prohibited. Indeed, to curtail China’s lackadaisical stance on maritime borders and resources of other countries, the United States needs to ratify this treaty. Moving Forward The United States is one of the last remaining countries that has not ratified UNCLOS—along with Iran, Libya, North Korea, Ethiopia, and Burundi. Embarrassing political associations aside, non-ratification is curtailing offshore development as US companies are afraid of the legal risks associated with such projects due to the lack of clear legal title to deep-sea resources. To combat this issue, Congress should look past the political hyperbole and understand that accession will expand US sovereignty by solidifying the world’s maritime borders and provide US entities with the legal confidence necessary to engage in deep-sea mining projects.

Companies are waiting for ratification- Only the counterplan accesses solvency of the affLobe 12 – Jim, American journalist and the Washington Bureau Chief of the international news agency Inter Press Service (“U.S.: Law of the Sea Treaty Ratification Faces Unsettled Waters,” http://www.globalissues.org/news/2012/06/05/13919)patelSuccessive administrations — both Democratic and Republican — led negotiations for the treaty from the late 1960s onward. But when completed in 1982, then-President Ronald Reagan, under pressure from big U.S. mining and ENERGY COMPANIES, rejected it, citing its provisions for deep-sea mining, particularly its requirement that mining claims be regulated by a Jamaica-based International Seabed Authority (ISA). Nonetheless, Reagan ordered the government to abide by all other sections of the treaty, which amounted essentially to a codification of existing international customary and maritime international law. In 1994, the seabed provisions of the treaty were amended to satisfy Reagan's objections. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush - the latter, however, only in his second term - subsequently supported its ratification. In 2007, it was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a lopsided 17-4 vote but was never sent to the floor for final action. After Obama took office in 2009, his administration listed LOST as one of a half-dozen treaties, including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (which has been ratified by 185 countries), as priorities for ratification. None, however, have yet made any headway on Capitol

Hill due to opposition by Republicans, a growing number of whom have argued that international treaties unduly constrain Washington's freedom of action in the world and threaten its sovereignty. All branches of the U.S. armed services, particularly the Navy, have long supported the treaty because of its recognition of navigation rights for vessels engaged in military activities. In addition, the same U.S. mining and energy interests that had previously opposed the treaty because of its possible interference with deep-sea drilling or mining have also now lined up in favour. It was Pentagon chief Leon Panetta who launched the new ratification campaign at a Law of the Sea symposium May 9 and who later appeared with the chiefs of all four armed services, as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to testify in favour of the treaty before Kerry's committee two weeks later. '(T)his treaty is absolutely critical to U.S. national security …the longer we delay, the MORE we undermine our own national security interests,' said Panetta, who this week urged Washington's Asian allies worried about China's territorial claims in the South China Sea at the Shangri-La Defence Dialogue in Singapore to speak out in support of ratification. Similarly, U.S. oil, gas, and mining industries that have developed new technology to exploit the deep seabed, as well as TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES that rely on undersea cables, have come out strongly for ratification, insisting that U.S. adherence to the treaty would not only offer them greater security in undertaking such expensive investments, but also give Washington a voice in managing the ISA

The CP solves the entirety of the case and gives further jurisdiction-heg-manufacturing-economy-access to mineralsGrady et al 12- Jim, CEO of LighTec Inc. in Merrimack, Republican state Sen. Gary Lambert of Nashua is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Larry A. Mayer is director of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the University of New Hampshire (“Sea treaty a must for U.S.,” http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/4218363-95/kellyayotte-jeanneshaheen-lawoftheseetreaty)Commissioned by President John Adams in 1800, the Portsmouth Navy Yard has built the ships that delivered more than a century of U.S. maritime dominance. New Hampshire was also at the forefront of America's industrial revolution, and the Granite State remains home to a vibrant high-tech and manufacturing ECONOMY. U.S. Sens. Jeanne Shaheen and Kelly Ayotte have an unprecedented opportunity to advance New Hampshire's industry and help maintain U.S. sea power by supporting ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Currently under consideration in the U.S. Senate, this U.S.-initiated treaty would help drive investment, economic growth and job creation in New Hampshire and across America. By ratifying the treaty, America would gain exclusive sovereign commercial rights to the full U.S. outer continental shelf, which, in some areas, extends up to 600 miles beyond the coast - three times the current 200-mile limit. The University of New Hampshire's own Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping has been deeply involved in mapping unexplored regions of the Arctic seafloor in support of potential U.S. claims under the Law of the Sea Treaty. UNH is home to some of the world's leading experts in hydrographic and seafloor mapping, and they've spent months at sea in support of expanded U.S. claims that can only be realized if the country becomes a party to the treaty. Former U.S. senator Judd Gregg was instrumental in ensuring UNH researchers had the resources they needed to pursue their exploration. With ratification, U.S. companies would gain exclusive access to vast oil, gas and mineral resources in the deep seabed off America's shores -

including rare earth minerals that New Hampshire's high-tech manufacturing businesses depend on. These minerals are used in a wide spectrum of high-tech products that will be increasingly important to the Granite State's ECONOMY. On the national security front, perhaps no one stated the benefits of the treaty better than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May how Law of the Sea would affirm critical navigational freedoms and reinforce the sovereign immunity of U.S. warships as they conduct naval operations around the world. The Law of the Sea would guarantee international legal recognition of the right of America's armed forces to move unencumbered throughout the world's oceans. Moreover, ratifying the treaty would give the United States access to an internationally recognized system for resolving commercial disputes in foreign waters while protecting America's exclusive right to address military disputes directly and on its own terms. Opponents of the treaty argue that it would somehow weaken U.S. military strength and that U.S. companies could reap the benefits of the deep seabed without it. Those arguments don't hold water - and the people who would know - our military and business leaders - have made that clear. The treaty strengthens our military posture and offers additional protections to our armed forces overseas. That is why all living former U.S. presidents and secretaries of state, as well as current and former Army, Marine and Air Force generals and Navy and Coast Guard admirals, have endorsed ratification. No American company will make an investment in deep seabed mineral recovery without international legal recognition of its right to do so. Thomas Donohue, president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June said, 'Accession benefits the U.S. economically by providing American companies the legal certainty and stability to do what they do best: putting people to work by creating new and innovative goods and services.' Jay Timmons, president and CEO of the National Association of Manufacturers, testifying before the same committee said, 'Other nations are actively seeking to knock us from our mantle of economic leadership, yet, too often, we remain on the sidelines. Manufacturers can't afford for the U.S. to sit on the sidelines when it comes to the Law of the Sea.' American companies have President Ronald Reagan to thank for the treaty's extremely favorable deep seabed mining provisions. Reagan's efforts to secure a better deal for America led to changes that granted the United States a permanent seat - with veto authority - on the council that governs seabed mining. Reagan held out for amendments that eliminated mandates that would have required the United States to share technology and revenue from deep seabed mining. But the U.S. Senate must act to secure all of these important economic and national security benefits for America. Without treaty ratification, America stands to lose out to claims from nations that are parties to the treaty and want to encroach upon the vast seabed mineral wealth off U.S. shores. By endorsing the Law of the Sea Treaty, Shaheen and Ayotte can help support the Granite State's high-tech and manufacturing industries - and create jobs for New Hampshire workers - while strengthening American sovereignty and providing important legal recognition for the navigation rights of America's armed forces

Ratification allows for licensing and the GOP House is on boardGupta 14 – Sajata (1/24/14, Professional Mariner, “Critics: U.S. missing the boat in failing to endorse Law of the Sea,” http://www.professionalmariner.com/February-2014/Law-of-the-Sea/) patelThousands of meters below the ocean’s surface lie nodules and hydrothermal vents — essentially underwater volcanoes — rich in precious metals, such as silver, gold, manganese, copper, cobalt and zinc. As new technologies have made exploration and extraction of these metals feasible, companies from various countries have been queuing up for access to the

spoils. To date, the International Seabed Authority, which was established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has issued almost 20 licenses for prospecting of these mineral deposits and is considering several more. Mining could begin as soon as 2016. When UNCLOS went into effect in 1994, it essentially codified maritime law, covering issues such as safety at sea and pollution. To date, MORE than 160 countries have ratified the treaty. Despite playing a central role in its creation, the United States has not followed suit. Oddly, the treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support with both Republican and Democratic presidential administrations pushing for its ratification in the Senate, which is all that is needed for the U.S. to take its seat at the table. Yet some conservative senators have said the treaty will threaten U.S. sovereignty on the high seas and have repeatedly blocked the measure. The ramifications of this opt-out are far-reaching. Angling its way into the deep-sea “gold” rush, said Larry Mayer, director of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the University of New Hampshire, would require the U.S. to break the law. In a document titled “Why the United States Needs to Join the Law of the Sea Convention Now,” Lockheed Martin Corp. wrote: “Timing is critically important if U.S. industry is to undertake exploitation of the deep seabed for valuable rare earth and other mineral resources. Other countries are already moving quickly and aggressively to secure internationally recognized rights to these resources. ... U.S. companies cannot use this country’s technological leadership to pursue, with the sponsorship of the United States government, a leadership position in this strategically important EMERGING MARKET.” Besides limiting deep-sea mining, failure to ratify the treaty could stymie America’s ability to drill for oil in the Arctic. There, receding ice caps are providing access to oil-rich seabeds, which are thought to hold up to a quarter of the world’s undiscovered reserves. UNCLOS establishes that a country has full jurisdiction over resources within 200 nm of its seashore, an area referred to as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Countries can petition to extend their reach by showing that their continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ. By joining the treaty, the U.S. could extend its EEZ off the coast of Alaska by 400 nm. Russia has already submitted a claim for half of the Arctic, and Canada intends to put forth a large claim that could encroach upon the U.S.’s EEZ. “We believe that it is now time for action on the Law of the Sea (Convention). The U.S. can no longer afford to wait to secure access to the vital resources that lie within” its extended continental shelf, Jack N. Gerard, president and chief executive of the American Petroleum Institute, wrote in a letter to Sen. Lisa Murkowski, then the Republican senator from Alaska, in 2011. Until recently, seafarers followed a general set of ethical guidelines on the open ocean, said Caitlyn Antrim, executive director of the Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans in Washington, D.C. It was generally accepted, she said, that ships could sail anywhere without interference from neighboring countries. That system worked well for hundreds of years, but President Harry Truman muddied the waters in 1945 when he laid claim to America’s entire continental shelf for oil and gas exploration. Hundreds of other countries soon followed suit, both to gobble up underwater oil reserves and to protect their fisheries. The first Law of the Sea conference was held in 1958, but delegates couldn’t figure out how to best carve up the ocean, so they let the question hang. By the mid-1960s, a more comprehensive solution was clearly needed. After almost a decade of negotiations lasting from 1973 to 1982, delegates drafted a comprehensive document laying out how member countries should use the world’s oceans and established the framework for the EEZ. Article 87 codified key freedoms on the high seas, including a country’s right to navigate and fly over the world’s oceans, lay cables and pipelines, fish and conduct scientific research. Articles 192 through 237 spelled out extensive rules on pollution prevention and protection of the marine environment. UNCLOS established an international tribunal to moderate disputes between countries. “UNCLOS was simply intended to be the suitcase, if you will, that you could put a lot

of (maritime) topics in,” said Clay Maitland, chairman of the North American Marine Environment Protection Association and former delegate to the Law of the Sea Convention. When UNCLOS first came up for Senate ratification in the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan laid out six areas of concern. He was particularly worried that the treaty did not adequately protect U.S. mining interests in the deep sea. As it stood, any country could hire a company to scope out areas in the high seas thought to be rich in precious metals. That meant that one country could pay for all the prospecting only to have another country come in and start mining right next to them. By the 1990s, policymakers had addressed all of Reagan’s concerns. Notably, the U.S. was guaranteed a permanent seat — with veto power — on the International Seabed Authority, the agency responsible for governing actions, including mineral extraction, in the deep sea. By then, after garnering the necessary 60 votes, the treaty was already in effect globally. But the Senate has never been able to muster the 67 votes (two-thirds majority) necessary for ratification. In 2007, Antrim and others went to scores of senators’ offices pushing the case for ratification. Backers of ratification included industry reps from mining and oil and gas companies, various environmental groups, and the U.S. COAST GUARD. But conservative senators blocked the vote. Right-to-life groups partnered with the anti-internationalist groups, Antrim said, and proponents faced a “broad coalition of ‘no.’” UNCLOS came up for consideration again in 2012. That year, in a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, COAST GUARD Commandant Adm. Robert Papp Jr. said that ratifying UNCLOS would help sustain America’s leadership as a maritime first responder, protect American prosperity and ensure America’s Arctic future. “For decades, we have largely acted in accordance with a treaty that we have no ability to SHAPE and without the additional benefits that come from being a party,” Papp wrote. “We need to lock in the favorable navigational rights that our military and shipping interests depend on. We need to be a party as the best way to secure international recognition of our sovereign rights over our extended continental shelf. We need to be a party to influence and lead the further development of the international rules governing the oceans.” Without the U.S. at the table, said Mayer, companies will remain unwilling to explore and extract on our behalf. “The reason why all the industry wants this — why all the oil companies want this — is because of certainty. They hate uncertainty. They’re not going to invest a billion dollars in an oil rig if they’re not certain who has the rights to it.” That shared distaste for uncertainty has created strange bedfellows. Besides oil and gas and mining companies, several environmental agencies, including Oceana, World Wildlife Fund and Ocean Conservancy, are pushing for ratification. Clear guidelines ensure that all countries are following established environmental protocols, Mayer said. “I’ve never in my life sat on a panel that will have Greenpeace, THE MILITARY and the oil companies all agreeing,” he said. With the U.S. forfeiting its role as a leader in international maritime issues, UNCLOS has started to show its age. Most of its provisions were set forth in the 1970s, Maitland said. They did not cover issues related to piracy or environmental advocacy on the high seas. In a recent high profile case, Russia, which is party to UNCLOS, seized a Greenpeace ship carrying two journalists and 28 individuals protesting the development of the country’s first offshore oil platform in the Arctic. Russia has refused to participate in a case being heard at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. “What do we do with all these situations that are cropping up now, and the Greenpeace situation is one of them … that are not covered in UNCLOS at all?” Maitland asked. “Congress shows little to no interest in any international maritime matters.” Treaties automatically come up for reconsideration every two years. The Senate may vote on UNCLOS during the lame-duck session in 2014 or in 2015. However, unless Senate opponents of the treaty fail to get re-elected, ratification remains unlikely.

The US is behind- ratification is the only guarantee of extractionDr. Maurin 13 - Legal Consultant at the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division (SOPAC) of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Suva Sub-Regional Office, Fiji (4/22/13, Islands business, “Pacific region faces seabed mining challenge,” http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/environment/950/pacific-region-faces-seabed-mining-challenge/) patelMinerals, such as rare earth metals, are increasingly becoming an important commodity in a resource-constrained world economy. As a result new frontiers both onshore and offshore, to the depths of the ocean, are emerging around the world. The Pacific region stands at the forefront of this pioneering venture. Yet concerns abound about the environmental impacts of future offshore mining projects on deep sea ecosystems. With limited experience in managing extractive resources and embryonic capacities to oversee offshore activities, Pacific Island governments must remain cautious in making decisions about whether to engage with seabed mining activities, and consider how to do so in the best and long-term interest of their nations. Conscious of the opportunities but also the risks, states in the Pacific Islands region have recently embarked on a regional initiative. This initiative is the development of policy and legislative regimes to manage seabed mining activities, with the assistance of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the European Union. Seabed minerals: a new frontier The recent discovery of rare earth elements in the deep seabed by Japanese interests, and the granting by Papua New Guinea of a pioneering offshore mining license for seabed mineral deposits 1500m below sea-level, has drawn renewed international attention to the Pacific region. Resource competition continues to intensify for rare earth metals critical to the new high-tech and ''green'' economies, whereas China still maintains a near monopoly on current world supplies. Global demand for various other metals found within deep seabed mineral resource samples - copper, gold, manganese, cobalt, nickel and other strategic metals - is on an upward trend, sustained by the industrialization of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other emerging economies. Since the discovery of polymetallic nodules in the abyssal plains of ocean basins in 1873, the deep seabed has been viewed as a potential new mining frontier. Marine mineral exploration in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted two additional seabed mineral types: cobalt-rich crusts found on the flanks of submerged volcanic islands and seamounts throughout the world's oceans (at depths of 400 - 4,000 meters), and seafloor massive sulfides (SMS) (or 'black smokers') that form along seabed ridges in water depths ranging from 450 to 5,000 meters. A 21-year seabed mineral prospecting program run by the government of Japan in collaboration with the South Pacific Applied Geoscience and Technology Commission (SOPAC) investigated the seabed minerals potential in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 12 countries in the Pacific region. A number of Pacific Island countries (PICs) have since issued exploration licenses within their EEZs to exploration companies. In a pioneering move, in January 2011, the government of Papua New Guinea granted Canada's Nautilus Minerals Inc the rights to extract SMS deposits containing gold, copper, silver and zinc from the Bismarck Sea under its ''Solwara 1'' tenement: a world-second deep sea mining license to be issued. The copper grades of SMS are found to be several times the grades currently mined onshore. From the early 2000s, increase in metal prices on global markets have reignited commercial interest in deep sea mineral potential, and have encouraged advances in subsea mining technology, building on methods used for offshore gas and oil, relatively shallow marine diamond mining, and sand and gravel dredging. Pioneer state-owned entities from Japan, Korea, China and France now share the ground with private entities enticed by the estimated commercial value of seabed recoveries. Significant new investments in exploration activities presage prospects for a long term source of revenues for

PICs. The economic development potential of this new offshore mining industry, enormously attractive for developing nations like the PICs, remains however to be balanced against the risks to the marine environment (that could impact on other essential industries), and existing capacities to monitor such developments and mitigate adverse impacts. Initiated by PICs governments, with the support of the Metal Mining Association of Japan, the Pacific Islands Forum and SOPAC, a Workshop on Offshore Minerals Policy was convened in February 1999 in Papua New Guinea, which led to the adoption of some principles for the development of national offshore mineral policies (Madang Guidelines, December 1999). Building on this initiative a decade later, PICs requested technical support from SOPAC to assist with the development of policy and legislative regimes to manage their deep sea mining potential. With funding from the European Union, SOPAC, now a Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), launched in 2011, the ''Deep Sea Minerals Project'' to provide relevant assistance to 15 Pacific ACP states. A dual regime for DSM activities The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides the ocean space into maritime zones and prescribes rights and responsibilities within those zones, including conferring sovereign rights to coastal states over the seabed minerals within their EEZs and an overriding shared responsibility by all states for the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Beyond the limit of national jurisdiction the seabed is known as ''the Area''. State parties to UNCLOS recognize the seabed resources of the Area to be the ''common heritage of mankind.'' UNCLOS established a body - the International Seabed Authority (ISA) - to organize and control seabed minerals activities in the Area. States, through their own agency or through sponsorship of private contractors, can carry out activities in the Area under the control of the ISA and in accordance with its regulations. A special regime applies to developing countries, who are given preferential access to 'reserved areas'. The ISA's regulations currently cover exploration only. Regulations for exploitation are aimed to be completed by 2016. Developing such a regime while so many scientific ''unknowns'' remain is challenging, and there is concern whether the ISA organs will have sufficient teeth to monitor contractors' performance and enforce compliance with the regime.Whether state party consensus on the exploitation regulations can be achieved remains also to be seen. The ISA has already approved 17 contracts for exploration in the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Lying between the Line Island Group of Kiribati and Mexico in the international waters of the Pacific Ocean, the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone, known for its elevated abundance of polymetallic nodules, is currently subject to 13 exploration licenses, including three sponsored by developing small island states, all from within the Pacific region: Nauru, Tonga and Kiribati. Potential for development in PICs With some of the world's largest EEZs and known seabed mineral potential, Pacific Island countries stand at the forefront of this new industry. But concerns are voiced regarding national regulatory capacities, particularly given the lack of scientific consensus on the risks to marine ecosystems and biodiversity associated with deep sea minerals. To secure national development from resource extraction, a range of factors are at play including effective macroeconomic management and high quality governance institutions characterized by transparency and the rule of law. Comprehensive and well implemented legal and regulatory frameworks for deep seabed mining are a requirement of UNCLOS, and equally important to attract responsible foreign investors into a state jurisdiction. For projects that entail such high risks, consistency of regulation and security of tenure would be a prime expectation for any creditable operators in this pioneering field. How states (and the ISA) formulate fiscal regimes for seabed mining taxes and royalties will also be key. Facilitating a viable industry must be balanced against securing appropriate return to the states (or for ''mankind'' in general) whose resources are being exploited. As the SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project assists PICs with the development of legal and regulatory frameworks to

govern deep sea minerals activities, prospects are taking shape for a new economic opportunity for the Pacific region. But lessons must be learnt from history: from decades of negative social and environmental impacts from ill-managed onshore mining operations, and from failure to maximize returns to the state from the exploitation of other natural resources - on-land mining, logging and fisheries. Pacific states now have the opportunity of a new start, developing well-thought-out, precautionary, proactive policies and dedicated seabed minerals legislation before any mining activities commence. The Cook Islands and the Kingdom of Tonga have taken the lead amongst PICs to establish national legislative regimes to complement the ISA's efforts at the international level - designed to uphold international law standards, minimize adverse social or environmental impacts, and the realization of economic benefits. All parties recognize, however, that the implementation of such regimes will be a challenging ''ask'' of small island governments. Looking ahead, and building on the work of the regional SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project, there is conceivable benefit to PICs adopting a collaborative approach at the regional level. Strengthening regional capacity to oversee and assist with legal and technical matters, and the setting of minimum standards on a regional basis, for the management and monitoring of DSM activities is recommended. A coordinated negotiating bloc of PICs, using pooled capacity for regulatory mechanisms, could support equitable and sustainable development across the region, rather than mere exploitation of those non-renewable resources. A different kind of ''race to the bottom'' could be avoided if PICs coordinate, rather than compete, to attract investors.

US needs LOST to contribute to decisions Stratfor 7 (3/29/7, “The Law of the Sea: Climate Change in the Arctic and Washington,” http://www.stratfor.com/law_sea_climate_change_arctic_and_washington#axzz370UYwyUR) PatelLeon Panetta, the chairman of the U.S. government's Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, told a Washington audience March 29 that Senate ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a national imperative. Panetta, a former congressman and chief of staff to former President Bill Clinton, pointed to a number of concerns raised by the United States' nonparticipation in the treaty. By speaking out, Panetta adds his voice to a growing chorus of politicians and interest groups that have decided that UNCLOS ratification should be a national priority. Ratification of the treaty has enjoyed general support among policymakers since the treaty was re-crafted in 1994 to meet U.S. concerns about sovereignty, but staunch opposition from conservative and libertarian senators has stifled ratification. The metaphorical tide is turning, however, as more and more conservative interest groups come to see UNCLOS as, at worst, a necessary evil. Climate change and its impact on the Arctic is the most significant factor pushing UNCLOS ratification toward a tipping point. As the polar ice melts, a number of heretofore unimaginable situations have developed. These include the possible emergence of the Northwest Passage as a major shipping route and the fear that the newly accessible resources of the Arctic will spur significant battles over seafloor boundaries. The debate over U.S. UNCLOS ratification is a familiar one. It focuses on whether it is better for the United States to be inside a flawed, sometimes troublesome international system where Washington can exert power to minimize the damage the organization can do, or to remain outside such an organization, unfettered by the agreements others are making. Since the Reagan administration, the United States has generally followed the latter approach, one favored by politically conservative factions. The emerging Arctic-related issues challenge this prevailing approach, however. Being outside UNCLOS has reduced U.S. ability to influence debates that are increasingly relevant to the country's primary interests. In response, a powerful coalition of

industries, environmentalists and hawkish foreign policy groups and the Bush administration have aligned in support of the treaty -- though not yet in a coordinated manner. Traditionally conservative political groups are coming to view the price of nonparticipation as growing in relation to the sacrifices of signing on. As a result, entrenched interests aligned against the treaty are shrinking, and the question increasingly appears to be one of when UNCLOS will be ratified, not whether. Treaty participation always has been a double-edged sword. By definition, treaties demand the abdication of some sovereignty. In return, countries get a seat at the table where the treaty's language is interpreted and refined. Because the reward is one of having power within an organization, smaller and less-powerful countries that otherwise have no voice in international affairs are strong boosters of international treaties. Powerful counties, conversely, lose power by joining treaty organizations. The reward for the larger players is the ability to tailor discussions and limit the range of options considered by the treaty parties. The use of power within a treaty is now most visible in Europe's new strategy on climate change, where the Continent is using its hegemony over the climate regime to adjust the treaty to suit its own long-term geopolitical needs. Despite all the talk about climate change, the discussion has largely been about a theoretical problem: the effects of climate change. The actual warming of the planet until recently largely has been ignored. This is changing, however, particularly in light of the unexpectedly swift retreat of the ice cap near the North Pole. The visible changes in the Arctic brought by global warming will have numerous implications. Most important, the Arctic will come to stand as a symbol of climate change, as visible evidence that the Earth is warming. Scientists and interest groups will battle strenuously over the question of how much of the warming is caused by human activities and about whether the warming is necessarily a bad thing. In all likelihood, most will come to see the Arctic as a symbol of the effect of human activities. Those who view the melting polar ice as a symbol will doubtless see irony in the fact that the shrinking cap could make it cheaper to get to hydrocarbon deposits that were previously uneconomical to produce. A much-quoted study released in 2000 by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the unexplored Arctic contains as much as one-quarter of the world's remaining hydrocarbon reserves. In November 2006, however, the consulting firms Wood Mackenzie and Fugro released a report that argues the recoverable reserves are closer to 3 percent. Either way, the Arctic has lots of oil to exploit. The Wood Mackenzie study asserts that three fields in the Arctic contain more than 10 billion barrels of oil -- Russia's South Kara Yamal Basin, East Barents Sea and the Kronprins Christian Basin off Greenland's northeastern coast. Alaska's North Slope has an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil equivalent in undiscovered reserves. The rules defining which country has economic control over access to mineral reserves fall under UNCLOS. The treaty gives countries exclusive rights to resources within 200 nautical miles (nm) of their shorelines. In addition, if the continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nm limit, countries have exclusive rights to minerals either as far as the shelf extends or until the furthest of two absolute limits it met: 350 nm or 100 nm from the 2,500-meter depth line. The Arctic Ocean is very shallow, and the region's continental shelves extend far beyond 350 nm before an average sounding of 2,500 meters is met. Though not a party to the treaty, the United States respects these definitions of mineral rights. By not being a party, however, Washington lacks significant influence on an important aspect of drawing the boundaries. Under the treaty, countries must submit claims of the extent of their continental shelves to the New York-based Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a group that approves the science behind countries' continental shelf claims. Countries that ratified UNCLOS in 1994 or before have until 2009 to submit their claims. Unsurprisingly, countries' claims overlap throughout the Arctic. From the U.S. perspective, the crucial issue is not merely the minerals that it can claim, but the potential for a major shift in the relative

mineral wealth of Russia vis-a-vis its neighbors. A growing dispute between Russia and Norway is perhaps the most important of these. In 2001, Russia submitted its definition of its continental-shelf borders. Russia's claim is widely considered a significant overreach, since it claimed a shelf extending almost to the North Pole and it made territorial claims that impinged on oil- and natural gas-rich Norwegian claims (claims that have long been widely, if informally, acknowledged as belonging to Norway) in the Barents Sea. Though Norway's claim, released in late 2006, is in some ways more realistic, it appears to have been drafted to meet Russia's aggressive claim in kind. With Russia increasingly aggressive in its use of oil and natural gas as a lever against Europe, it will fall in part to UNCLOS (and possibly the CLCS) to make decisions that will affect the reserves and production potential of Norway and Russia. As it stands now, the CLCS is highly unlikely to support one side over the other, and it will throw the decision over the extent of continental shelf ownership to the two countries to negotiate, a resolution that bodes ill for Norway. Treaty advocates say this would not necessarily be the case if the United States were involved in the organization. National security-focused advocates in the United States say the country's nonparticipation in UNCLOS shuts out Washington from being able to meaningfully influence how UNCLOS resolves the disputed claims. Industry, from oil and natural gas producers to their major customers in the chemical and transportation industries, also wants the United States to have a seat at the table.

1NC Enviro NB

LOST provides environmentally friendly standards Alex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patelThe UN Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS) provides the central framework for determining rights and responsibilities in terms of the exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals. UNCLOS grants states the right to undertake exploration and exploitation activities for marine minerals on their continental shelves, a zone which generally extends up to 200 nautical miles from the state’s coastline.7 The seabed beyond areas of national jurisdiction is defined by UNCLOS as ‘the Area’, and this zone and its resources are declared to be ‘the common heritage of mankind’, in which exploration and exploitation of marine minerals are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.8 The International Seabed Authority (ISA) was established through UNCLOS in order to develop and oversee regulations governing the prospecting, exploration and extraction of deep-sea minerals in areas beyond national jurisdiction.9 All rules, regulations and procedures established by the ISA to govern seabed mining are collectively referred to as the ISA Mining Code. To date the ISA has only issued contracts for exploration activities,10 but it has recently indicated that contracts for the exploitation of polymetallic nodules may be issued as soon as 2016.11 The ISA Mining Code establishes a number of central principles on environmental safeguards for seabed mining, including requirements to: • prevent, reduce and control pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, applying a precautionary approach and best environmental practices; • gather environmental baseline data against which to assess the likely effects on the marine environment; • establish comprehensive programmes for monitoring and evaluating environmental impact; • include proposals for ‘impact reference zones’ (areas that are sufficiently representative to be used for assessment of impact on the marine environment); and • include proposals for ‘preservation reference zones’ (areas in which no mining shall occur to ensure representative and stable biota of the seabed in order to assess any changes in marine biodiversity). 12 While the ISA Mining Code is aimed primarily at governing seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction, a number of UNCLOS provisions are also of relevance to national jurisdictions. Article 192 of UNCLOS creates a general obligation for states to protect and preserve the entire marine environment, both within and outside areas of national jurisdiction.13 Perhaps the central legal obligation for states with regard to seabed mining is the determination by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that state laws and regulations governing seabed mining must be ‘no less effective than international rules, regulations and procedures’ – such as the ISA Mining Code.14 Moreover, the Seabed Disputes Chamber notes that states have a direct obligation under international law to ensure that seabed mining activities are governed in accordance with the precautionary approach, employing best environmental practice and conducting prior environmental impact assessment.15 However, an effective state response to these obligations ultimately requires an appropriate national legislative framework.

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Ratification supports a multipolar worldScott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patel

In many ways, the arguments surrounding the treaty are emblem- atic of the broader debate about the role of U.S. diplomacy in the post- 9/11 world. Skeptics of the convention believe it is not needed, given the hegemonic strength of the U.S. Navy. And, they ask, why does the United States need to join this international agreement if it has gotten along fine so far without it? They also worry that the United States will undermine its sovereignty by incurring additional treaty obligations to international bodies established within the United Nations' svstem. In a fast-changing world, with new threats confronting the United States all the time, this camp holds that the United States needs to be able to respond as nimbly as possible, unencumbered by lengthy legal conven- tions that might restrict its freedom of action. Supporters of the convention counter that the principles embodied in the treaty are the cornerstone of U.S. naval strategy and create the rule of law for prosecuting pirates and the growing number of other threatening nonstate actors. They argue that the convention is impor- tant for economic reasons as well, as it creates legal certainty for all kinds of commercial ocean uses, from offshore oil and gas to undersea cables to deep-seabed mining, that favor U.S. interests. They also argue, from an ecological perspective, that the convention helps the United States assume a leadership position for dealing with collapsing fishing stocks, pollution from land-based sources and ships, and the growing danger of ocean waste. Convention advocates highlight how oceans are, by their very nature, international and thus require a regime of international law and collaborative approaches to their management. They point to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as a prime example of how a carefully constructed international accord negotiated within the framework of the convention can provide for a legally binding conservation regime. Recognizing the utility of this specific fisheries management tool, the United States rapidly ratified this additional instrument as soon as it was possible to do so in 1996. Lastly, supporters ask that if the United States is not willing to accede to a convention that it requested, funda- mentally shaped, and subsequently caused to be modified in order to address its own concerns, then why in a multipolar world should other countries follow its diplomatic leadership? In such a context, how will expressions of U.S. commitments to the rule of law abroad be heard?

Multilat is key to hegemonyDavid A Lake, 10– Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego ( “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf) patelThe safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and certainly deeper than in the 1990s—more like NATO than the ad hoc coalitions of the new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by competition with the Soviet Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands

will have to be even stronger than those in NATO. 47 The great paradox of contemporary international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United States requires even more binding constraints on its policy is fit to preserve the authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the globe. ¶ The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda . Since it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore, 48 Americans need not be overly concerned about “runaway” organizations or global mission creep. At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. ¶ Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits— security, free trade, economic prosperity—have developed a taken-for-granted quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they receive from the country’s position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see multilateral institutions constraining the country’s freedom of action. Precisely because unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and for some attractive, any constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear. 49¶ But if the United States is to remain the leader of the free world and possibly beyond, it must make its authority safe for others. To sustain US authority over the long term, it must be embedded in new, more constraining multilateral institutions. Americans trust their government only because of its internal checks and balances. Although there may be disagreements on exactly where the appropriate scope of government authority ends, nearly all Americans agree that limited government is the best form of government. This same principle extends abroad. If the United States is to exercise authority over other states, and enjoy its fruits, that authority must be checked and balanced as well. The height of hubris is not that the United States might govern the world, at least in part. This is a fact of international politics. Rather, hubris arises in the belief that the virtue of its people and leaders will restrain the United States sufficiently such that other peoples will voluntarily cede a measure of their sovereignty to it. 50 Politicians and peoples may occasionally be saintly, but it would be folly to rely on this quality at home or abroad. Recognizing the universal need to restrain authority, the United States should, in its own self-interest, lead the way to a new world order.¶

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UNCLOS shows commitment to multilateralismScott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patelOpponents or the convention argue that there is no need to join the treaty because, with the world's hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the convention it likes as customary international law, following the convention's guidelines when it suits American inter- ests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not. They also argue that the convention is an unforgivable forfeiture of U.S. sovereignty to states that mean American interests harm. Supporters counter by saying that the convention expands the rule of law over the vast expanse of the world's oceans and contains provisions that could actually extend U.S. sovereignty. They also believe that shunning the convention is a tone-deaf response to the spirit of multilateralism and that, beyond undermining specific ocean policy issues and freezing the United States out of the convention's decision-making bodies, it tar- nishes America's diplomatic reputation at a critical moment in interna- tional relations.

UNCLOS sustains multilat and US leadership in order to fulfill our role in the international communityScott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patelThe 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea may seem an obscure agreement to nonexperts. That is not the case. The convention is a care- fully negotiated international agreement numbering several hundred pages that covers a host of measurable national security, economic, and environmental issues of vital strategic importance to the United States. By remaining a nonparty to the convention, the United States not only forfeits these concrete interests but also undermines something more intangible: the legitimacy of U.S. leadership and its international repu- tation. For example, American pleas for other nations to follow pollu- tion and fishing agreements ring empty when the United States visibly rejects the Law of the Sea Convention. Remaining outside the con- vention also hurts its diplomatic hand in other international forums, as well as the perceptions of other states about U.S. commitments to multilateral solutions. As former Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted, "The decision not to sign on to legal frameworks the rest of the world supports is central to the decline of American influ- ence around the world."2 Given the unprecedented challenges, threats, and opportunities the United States currently faces, it is as important as ever at this critical juncture to strengthen American influence and diplomatic leadership. Historically, one of the underlying foundations of U.S. global leadership has been a perceived commitment to the international rule of law and willingness to build international institutions that create a predictable international order from which all peace-loving countries can benefit. Acceding to the Law

of the Sea Convention will help undergird contin- ued U.S. leadership, by sending a tangible signal that the United Statesremains committed to its historic role as an architect and defender of world order. From this perspective, acceding to the convention is low-hanging fruit to advance a much broader U.S. foreign policy agenda. It has the broadest bipartisan domestic support; supplies the most direct national security, economic, and environmental benefits for the United States; and has genuine global reach. A committed political effort to join the convention during 2009 will provide a highly visible demonstration to a world audience that U.S. leadership has the resolve to match words with actions, especially when domestic follow-through means expending political capital. Breaking the fifteen-year stalemate in the Senate on the convention will be a strong signal that the United States is committed to multilateral agreements, especially those whose development both Republican and Democrat presidents and a strong bipartisan caucus in Congress cham- pion. Therefore: 1. The central and strongest recommendation of this report is that the Senate should exercise its constitutional authority by offering its consent for the United States to formally join the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.In doing so, the Senate should consider the carefully worded and painstakingly crafted text resolution of advice and consent sub- mitted as part of the SFRC Executive Report in December 2007 (Appendix III). This draft resolution chooses arbitration for dis- pute settlement and makes other important declarations, under- standings, and interpretations that safeguard U.S. interests. These details are not insignificant, specifying U.S. exemption from man- datory dispute settlement in certain cases; requiring legislation for implementation in U.S. waters and to guide interpretation in U.S. courts; and preserving Senate oversight over any future amend- ments to the convention. If the Senate takes the convention up again this year, it would also have another opportunity to revisit this text of advice and consent and could make additional decla- rations, interpretations, and understandings needed to safeguard U.S. sovereignty. For the reasons listed in this report, the president should consider making U.S. accession to the convention a leading foreign policy ini- tiative in 2009.

2NC AT: Perm do both

The regime must come before we divide up the ocean, otherwise it becomes a geopolitical concern and causes fightsTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianielloIn order to prevent the offshore mining industry from suffering the same fate, it would be necessary to introduce international requirements into E.E.Z.’s legal regime upstream before

Deep Sea mining takes off . This would be a crucial step in Ocean governance’s strengthening.

However, growing strategic issues related to the control of raw materials constitute a major obstacle. It is feared that the control of the bottom of the oceans shall become a growing geopolitical concern in the

coming years.

Unilateralism means the plan doesn’t claim territorial rightsPanchyson 13- Dorian (12/19/13,”UNCLOS-er than ever; why the U.S. should learn to stop worrying and love the law of the sea http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/unclos-er-than-ever-why-the-u-s-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-law-of-the-sea/) patelPreliminary studies indicate the U.S. extended continental shelf totals close to one million square kilometers – an area approximately double the size of California, with a large portion in the Arctic Sea north of Alaska. As knowledge of these areas expands through ambitious mapping projects such as Ballard’s and other joint-government projects, the U.S. is likely to encounter increasingly tense negotiations over disputed areas. Without the adjudication mechanism offered by UNCLOS, the U.S. may be forced to settle disputes through diplomacy, or alternatively, assert the claims unilaterally. Given that all other Arctic Council member countries have ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. should make UNCLOS ratification a key security priority moving forward. Presidential Proclamation granted the U.S. sovereignty over its marine holdings rather than international law. In 1983, President Reagan signed Proclamation 5030, declaring sovereignty over the 200 nautical miles extending from the continental U.S., as well as its overseas territories and protectorates. This came a year after the U.S. declared it would not ratify UNCLOS, as Part XI was seen to be unfavorable to free-markets and counter to U.S. security interests. Despite support from both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, ratification was unreachable as a result of Congressional resistance. However, a recent support has been driven by recognition that UNCLOS could be in the national interest in a variety of areas. Supporters cite the need to establish additional mechanisms to counter China’s increased unilateralism in the South China Sea, while securing rights for U.S. commercial and naval ships, amongst others. Perhaps most importantly, ratifying UNCLOS would provide a legitimate mechanism for adjudicating national claims to extended EEZs, especially in contested areas such as the Arctic. Sea. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently released the Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy, which prioritizes the ability to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats, allowing the U.S. to exercise “sovereignty in and around Alaska.” However, any claims that extend beyond the 200-mile nautical limit would be negotiated without the legitimacy of the diplomatic channels offered through UNCLOS. Although the U.S. has partnered with Canada in mapping the continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea, bilateral negotiations may become increasingly difficult if U.S. is forced to engage non-allied countries in resource

disputes. Critics maintain that UNCLOS would commit the U.S. to a dispute-resolution mechanism that has traditionally been unfavorable to its interests. Further, UNCLOS has been recognized as customary international law, thereby encouraging adherence to its provisions, regardless of ratification. Others suggest the U.S. should continue to pursue unilateral options, engaging partners through traditional diplomatic channels only when necessary. With the largest continental shelf in the world, a lot is at stake for U.S. interests moving forward. By some estimates, there are more than 100,000 underwater mountains containing a variety of strategic and valuable minerals within the borders of the U.S. EEZ. However, these areas – and those just beyond the 200 nautical mile limit – remain unexplored. As the areas are mapped, UNCLOS provides the legal framework for the U.S. to make claims on maritime territory within the extended continental shelf area. This would allow U.S. companies to apply for exploration licenses in the deep seabed where no country has sovereign rights. Ratifying UNCLOS is not without its costs. Much like any international treaty, countries are forced to adopt provisions that may be counter to national policies, while relinquishing a degree of sovereignty in exchange for a body of law with no enforcement mechanism. However, with such a vast, unexplored continental shelf, the U.S. could leverage UNCLOS to extend maritime claims beyond the 200-mile nautical limit. Asserting these claims under the auspices of international law would allow for easier dispute resolution with partner countries, while providing access to valuable extractive resources. Without UNCLOS, the U.S. may be forced to adopt an increasingly aggressive unilateral stance – a decision that is likely to prove counter to long-term national security interests.

The perception of the CP sends a multilateral signal that avoids the unilateral signal of the planBorgerson May 2009 – Scott G former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patelOpponents for the convention argue that there is no need to join the treaty because, with the world's hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the convention it likes as customary international law, following the convention's guidelines when it suits American inter- ests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not. They also argue that the convention is an unforgivable forfeiture of U.S. sovereignty to states that mean American interests harm. Supporters counter by saying that the convention expands the rule of law over the vast expanse of the world's oceans and contains provisions that could actually extend U.S. sovereignty. They also believe that shunning the convention is a tone-deaf response to the spirit of multilateralism and that, beyond undermining specific ocean policy issues and freezing the United States out of the convention's decision-making bodies, it tar- nishes America's diplomatic reputation at a critical moment in interna- tional relations. Debating the wisdom of whether to enter into international agree- ments is as old as the nation itself. Stung by the controversy over the 1794 Jay Treaty and the emergence of bitter partisanship between anglophile Federalists and francophile Democratic-Republicans (who felt the United States betrayed its French midwife when negotiating with the British in light of the 1778 treaties of Amity and Commerce), George Washington warned in his 1796 farewell address against "per- manent alliances." In the centuries that followed, two distinct camps emerged in the American foreign policy tradition: one was isolation- ist, seeking to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine and remain aloof from corrupt, European deal-making; the other was more internationalist,

seeking a more active United States in world affairs.1'' Debates for and against the convention roughly fit within these two categories. Proponents of the convention, who can be assumed to include almost all Democrats and moderate Republicans (by most accounts, a large enough bloc to achieve a two-thirds majority, as required by the Constitution for the United States to join the convention), have been frustrated to date by a passionate minority that strongly believes it is not in U.S. interests to join the convention. Opponents of the treaty argue that the convention unnecessarily commits the United States to follow rules designed by states hoping to constrain American free- dom of action. Their specific objections to the convention are crystal- lized in the minority views submitted for the record the last time the convention was favorably voted out of the SFRC in December 2007: "[CJertain provisions of the [convention], particularly those dealing with navigation, have merit," but overall and especially in regard to the dispute resolution, "[i]t is puzzling why we would want to submit to a judicial authority selected by the United Nations, given the organiza- tion's corruption scandals, and the fact that of the 152 countries Party to the treaty, the median voting coincidence with the United States in the General Assembly was less than 20 percent. This treaty subjects the United States to a governing body that is hostile to American inter- ests." 16 Other provisions found objectionable included "taxes" assessed to outer continental shelf activities; fear of judicial activism by the Law of the Sea Tribunal, especially with regard to articles relating to land- based sources of pollution that are called a "backdoor Kyoto Protocol"; and a belief the convention will severely curtail U.S. intelligence-gath- ering activities.On an item-by-item assessment, however, these arguments are found to be lacking (Appendix I in far greater detail addresses the convention's opponents' critical concerns). With regard to dispute settlement, the United States has indicated that it would choose arbitration as stated in the draft resolution of advice and consent; it cannot be forced into any other dispute settlement mechanism. Specifically, Article 287 of the con- vention reads: "[I]f the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree." Under no circumstances can the United States be subjected to any dispute resolution procedures without its consent. Also, the con- vention does not assess a "tax" but, rather, includes modest revenue- sharing provisions from exploitation of oil and gas from the seabed beyond the EEZ that have been supported by every president since Richard Nixon, including Ronald Reagan. These resources were far outside any earlier claim made by the United States, and the agreement to the modest payments was part of a package deal that included will- ingness to recognize extension of U.S. control over the resources on the continental margin beyond two hundred nautical miles, which may encompass well over a million square kilometers of potentially exploit- able minerals. That the payments are, indeed, modest is attested to by the support of the U.S. oil and gas industry for these convention provi- sions. With regard to a "backdoor Kyoto Protocol," Bush administration officials testified before the SFRC that the convention does not apply the Kyoto Protocol to the United States, either directly or indirectly. The convention's provisions include no cause for legal action regard- ing land-based sources of pollution; they only represent agreement that states are responsible for addressing pollution under their own laws and enforcement. Lastly, the heads of the U.S. Navy and intelligence agencies have testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the convention does not impede intelligence-gathering activities; on the contrary, the rights afforded to the United States by the convention significantly empower U.S. intelligence-gathering abilities.On balance, the arguments in favor of the convention far outweigh those opposed, which is the reason the convention has attracted such a diverse and bipartisan constituency. As presidents Clinton and George W. Bush forcefully argued in their written communications with the Senate (Appendix II), objections to the 1982 convention were

substan- tively addressed in the 1994 agreement on implementation. Continu- ing to treat most parts of the convention as customary international law, as the United States does now, literally leaves it without a seat at the table in important decision-making bodies established by the con- vention, such as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS); weakens the hand the United States can play in negotia- tions over critical maritime issues, such as rights in the opening of the Arctic Ocean; and directly undercuts U.S. ability to respond to emerg- ing challenges, such as increasing piracy in the Indian Ocean. Joining or not joining the convention is more than an academic debate. There are tangible costs that grow by the day if the United States remains out- side the convention. The majority view of the SFRC and the opinion of every major ocean constituency group is that joining the convention is in America's foreign policy interests. Debating the merits of internationalism versus unilateralism is a great U.S. tradition, but the irony is that the conventionactually allows for an expansion of U.S. sovereignty: freedom of move- ment for a powerful navy; a legal tool for U.S. forces to combat scourges at sea, such as piracy, drug trafficking, and human smuggling; and a pro- cess for extending U.S. jurisdiction over a vast amount of ocean space equal to half the size of the Louisiana Purchase.As the next section of this report details, acceding to the conven- tion would advance a long list of national security, economic, and envi- ronmental issues of strategic importance to the United States. Beyond establishing the rules for territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, the convention establishes regimes for managing shipping fleets, fish, and pollutants that do not abide by national boundaries. The Law of the Sea Convention includes specific provisions guaranteeing free- dom of navigation for merchant fleets and navies, and sets firm limits on jurisdiction to prevent "creeping sovereignty" by a few aggressive coastal states eager to unilaterally extend their authority seaward. The convention is used to prosecute pirates and is the basis for the Prolif- eration Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD). In addition to these traditional geostrategic issues, the conven- tion is also germane to a host of other ocean uses, some traditional and others new. It governs commercial activities on, in, and under the world's oceans. With one-third of the world's oil and gas alreadv pro- duced offshore, this is especiallv important, as the future of hydrocar- bon extraction is in ever-deeper waters. The convention establishes the jurisdictional framework for rules governing this industry operating on the extended continental shelf. Deep-seabed mining is also an emerging industry, and the convention establishes, together with the 1994 agree- ment on implementation, the legal regime for extracting resources from the ocean floor. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), cre- ated by the convention, introduces chambered voting, a permanent seat for the United States in the executive decision-making bodies, and the power to block adoption of rules and budgets that are counter to U.S. interests. The convention is also crucial for helping to manage commer- cial uses yet to be envisioned. Innovation and new technologies have played an essential role in sustaining U.S. prosperity and preeminence, and American entrepreneurs will undoubtedly discover future oppor- tunities in the oceans.

Perm can’t solve-the CP eliminates the unilateral signal and only ISA can grant mining rights to companiesBates 6 – Candace L. (UNC law review, “U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests ,” https://www.law.unc.edu/components/handlers/document.ashx?category=24&subcategory=52&cid=669) patelThe revised Agreement limits the full application of the deep seabed regime to the point of economic viability.127 U.S. companies were not certified as having the ability to participate as

pioneer investors in the Agreement entering into force because the United States has not signed UNCLOS. 128 Pioneer investors are those states that are signatories to UNCLOS III and have the opportunity to explore the deep seabed.129 The new agreement allows U.S. companies to have the same rights as pioneer investors if they meet certain technical requirements.130 In this instance, the United States was put in the same position as potential deep seabed-mining states.131 The United States is also guaranteed a position on the Council should it sign UNCLOS. There are many misconceptions as to what the signing of UNCLOS would mean for the United States and deep seabed mining. It is argued that by ratifying UNCLOS, including the Agreement, states will inevitably have to discontinue their unilateral attempts at deep seabed mining.133 However, this is unfounded as the law of the deep seabed was intentionally not settled in order to produce solid negotiations of the sort that resulted in UNCLOS.134 Most, if not all, of the potential deep seabed mining nations are dedicated to the adoption of UNCLOS and the Agreement.135 The potential deep seabed mining countries understand that there is a lack of economic viability in the present deep seabed mining industry, and “it is inconceivable that the necessary financial markets would support unilateral mining if it is contrary to the principles” of UNCLOS.136 The other issue that could present slight problems in the deep seabed mining framework is the dual regimes developed under UNCLOS and the Agreement.137 Some states adopted the original Part XI, whereas others, such as the United States, negotiated and adopted the 1994 Agreement.138 However, the dual system is unlikely because most nations supported the 1994 Agreement and no state voted against it.139 The only possibility of a dual regime will arise if the United States fails to ratify the Agreement and then unilaterally attempts to subsidize its own industry.140 The question then arose as to the accessibility of the nodules of the deep seabed—particularly the unlimited access of private entities not signatories on UNCLOS.141 The fear was that such unlimited access would create a shift in the market, eroding the stability of the seabed market.142 Developing nations were opposed to the limited access provisions because they would drive a technological and economic gap between the developed and developing nations.143 In this instance, those nations already producing land-based minerals would most likely choose to protect themselves from the unlimited supply of deep seabed minerals by lowering the prices of the land-based minerals.144 Most of the G-77 considered political control of economic activity to be the solution to the instability of the seabed market; many nations consequently requested production controls.145 However, those countries already involved in mining supported a free market system because of the uncertainty in the deep seabed potential market.146 The rift in the negotiations occurred when the potential miner nations feared great political constraints to limit the possibility of failure would create a less friendly market.147 However, other nations feared that ocean mining would be overburdened and force mineral prices to fluctuate.148 Because of this fear, these nations required a limited market in which the political entity would rule on the matter as circumstances arose, leaving the political entity rather than the demand for the minerals as the driving force in the market.149 Part XI of the Convention pertains directly to individual seabed mining companies.150 If a company is sponsored by a member state, state sponsorship presupposes some general supervisory duties, allowing a company to apply for exclusive or exploitation rights to mine along the international seabed.151 The private property rights of those companies depend on the authority of international law to grant these exclusive and/or exploitation rights.152 Granting of these rights was in response to the position that exclusive mining rights over a particular length of time and area are a necessary precondition to private investment in the development of nonliving resources found in the seabed.153 The grant of private access to international organizations for the attainment of mining rights induces more provisions for

property and economic rights of the private entities.154 In order to explore the continental shelf, mining companies must acquire exclusive mining rights of a specific area through a contract.15

***NEPA CP

2NC Squo = Circumvent

Current processing and refining methods of REE’s causes massive environmental pollution only the CP allows for a reassessment of those practices Weng et al 13 (S. M. Jowitt, G. M. Mudd and N. Haque, June 1st, “Assessing rare earth element mineral deposit types and links to environmental impacts”, http://web.a.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=f35e17a-eedd-436a-8a4b-82d011441848%40sessionmgr4001&vid=2&hid=4206)The mining, processing and refining of the REEs has the potential to cause major environmental problems that arc closely linked to the deposit type, processing methods used and there extent of pollution control adopted to mitigate environmental impacts. There are, however, very few published detailed studies on the actual impacts of RHE processing. This lack of comprehensive studies limits the understanding of potential and actual risks, especially when considering the various REE deposit types and project configurations. In general, common concerns (as outlined by Chen et aiy 2005; Mudd,

2008; Qifan et aL, 2010; Pillai et a!.9 2010; Wen et al., 2013; IAEA, 2011) include: (i) significant use of chemicals (e.g. acids, alkalis, solvents) (ii) the presence of significant Th concentrations in REE ores and concentrates, and to much a lesser extent U, and the radioactive nature of some refinery wastes (especially gypsum wastes) (iii) corrosive fluorine-bearing gases (iv) occupational and public health risks from potential chemical and radiation exposures (both perceived and actual)These issues are exacerbated by the high-tech end-uses of the majority of the REEs; their uses mean that the majority of REE demand is for high-purity single REEs. Hence, the processing of REE ores does not simply involve the concentration of ore minerals such as sulphides or native metals (as is the case for many base and precious metals), but instead required the selective separation of each individual REE from the hosting minerals and subsequent production of a single clement concentrate or product. The highly variably nature of REE minerals (e.g. Table 2), again sharply contrasts with both base and precious metal resources where commodities of interest are hosted by one or two relatively easily processable minerals in any given deposit. The variety of REE minerals means that the REE extraction and processing is problematic and can be time-consuming. This, combined with the fact that the REE are chemically similar (i.e. have similar properties and behaviors)

means that REE mineral processing techniques are both energy and chemically intensive. The difficulties and

expenses in REE extraction and processing also means that these processes can have significant environmental impacts. The relatively small and somewhat poorly documented (compared to, for

example, Cu processing by smelting or Au processing using cyanide, both of which are harmful but with more well-

known and more easily remediated impacts) nature of global REE production means that little research to date has focused on the life cycle environmental impacts of REE production , including the impacts of

REE mine site, processing, production, manufacturing and recycling (or lack thcrcoi) processes on the environment. In addition, REE mineralization is often associated with enrichments in the radioactive elements U, Th and K, as well as a wide variety of other harmful (and biologically active) elements; all these elements can potentially cause significant environmental and public health problems during processing and waste disposal. The difficulties inherent in processing these ores are evidenced by a report in the China Daily (Jiabao and Ji, 2009). This report indicates that the production of a single tonne of refined REE oxide from Bayan Obo, the world's most important REE deposit, also produced 63 000 m3 of harmful S- and F-bcaring gases, 200 m3 of acidic water, and 1 -4 t of radioactive waste (especially Th-related wastes). The safe disposal of these wastes, especially the radioactive wastes that are often produced during REE production, is a significant problem that needs to be overcome during REE mine planning and remediation. Rare earth element mining and processing also involves a wide range of occupational hazards such as pneumoconiosis as well as potential occupational poisoning from Pb, Hg, benzene, and phosphorous. In addition, the costs and likelihood of successful rehabilitation of affected mining and processing sites need to be considered during mineral exploration and within feasibility studies; to date, these have not been significant factors given the low number of REE mines globally, although the increased demand for the REE means that these impacts need to be considered in detail in the very near future. At present, there is a dearth of literature linking REE deposit mineralogy, processing routes and waste management methods to environmental risks through formal methodologies such as life cycle impact assessment (LCA). By first developing a more comprehensive understanding of the key mineralogical and geological differences in REE deposits, this study should facilitate more thorough life cycle impact

assessments in the future. This facilitates better understanding of the real and perceived environmental risks from the whole REE production chain, and all of these factors should be quantified in an

urgently needed comprehensive LCA for REE mining and processing. Currently, LCA is the primary methodology used to quantify environmental impacts of material extraction, refinery, and processing for most base metals mining activities, such as Au, Al, Cu and Fc (e.g. Norgate and Haquc, 2010; Norgate and Jahanshahi, 2010; Northcy et a/., 2013). As outlined above, REE deposits arc geologically and mineralogically diverse. This means that evaluation of the impacts of REE extraction and processing requires specifically focused LCAs. The distribution of the REEs in both value and in terms of allocation of mass of HREEs and LREEs within an individual deposit is also crucial to determine the effectiveness of inputs and outputs within an LCA. For example, LREE-dominant deposits require different processing and refinery routes than HREE-dominant deposits, and the added complexity of the production of multiple co-products such as U. Nb, Ta, Zr and Fe (e.g. Dubbo-Toongi, Bayan Obo) also needs to be taken into account during LCA analysis. Here, we compare the

2NC Solvency

CP is a pre-requisite to deep sea mining and causes a spur of technological innovation critical to Aff solvency Halfara and Fujita 02 (Jochen and Rodney, “Marine Policy”, Volume 26 Issue 2 pg. 103-106, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0308597X01000410) It is well known that terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems can be disrupted, damaged, or destroyed by terrestrial mining operations. Relative to terrestrial and aquatic

systems, deep-sea ecosystems are much less understood and more difficult to monitor. Until and unless a better understanding of these ecosystems has been reached, the threats posed by deep-sea mining will be uncertain but potentially serious. The current consumption rate and the projected increase of

consumption of minerals may increase incentives to proceed with deep-sea mining. Because the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining are uncertain but potentially serious, a prudent policy approach would consist of: (1) conserving mineral resources, (2) increasing the recycling of minerals, and (3) exploiting land based

mineral resources with much greater efficiency and more stringent environmental regulation. Mining on land has caused environmental devastation, certainly, but environmental risks of terrestrial mining are better known and perhaps could be more easily contained than those of deep-sea mining. Environmental impacts associated with terrestrial mining should be reduced before

deep-sea mining is allowed to proceed. Once these concerns are addressed, comprehensive risk assessment for commercial deep-sea mining can be conducted. A precautionary approach can create incentives for reducing uncertainty and minimizing ecological impacts associated with deep-sea mining. A presumption that deep-sea mining will have adverse ecological impacts until compelling evidence shows that it will not creates a strong incentive to conduct credible research on impacts. We therefore recommend the establishment of marine protected areas around hydrothermal vents to facilitate monitoring and regulation of all activities in these zones. Conditions on the expansion of a mining operation from pilot phase to commercial phase and a mechanism to

halt mining if adverse impacts are detected create incentives for minimizing ecological impacts. Since less developed nations may lack adequate environmental regulations or sufficient funds for environmental studies, mining within the EEZs of the above countries could cause serious marine environmental degradation. Incentives and financial resources to study and reduce environmental impacts related to the mining activities will likely be needed. New discoveries of rich and massive mineral deposits could spur a great deal of investment in deep-sea mining. Historically, environmental regulations have followed the development of new technologies

and industries, rather than anticipating and guiding them. Massive investment in economic activities tends to result in resistance to environmental regulation. Performance standards and other types of regulations that anticipate potential environmental impacts have the potential for guiding technological innovation and industry operations toward the goal of minimizing such impacts. Lack of regulation within EEZs could result in harm to deep-sea ecosystems rich in species. Presently, a window of opportunity exists for the international community to implement scientific, technological, and legal measures to minimize negative environmental impacts before a sudden rush to commercialization (and attendant opposition to regulation) develops.

2NC AT: Perm do Both

We should have environmental review---this needs to happen before we deploy the deep sea mining otherwise it causes our environment disturbances impactBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”***DSM = Deep Sea Mining Many uncertainties surround deep-sea mining and one of the most significant is the potential impacts to the surrounding environment . To better understand and identify the potential impacts, a brief review of nodule DSM experiments was completed. Information gathered from

these studies and other research studies focused on SMS mining led to the identification of potential impacts from exploration and extraction of SMS deposits. These impacts were categorized as follows: direct physical disturbances , sediment plumes , acoustic impacts , waste water disposal , and

machinery leaks or malfunctions .¶ In order for the industry to determine the extent of

impacts environmental assessments will need to be conducted. It is suggested that a Before

After Control Impact Paired Series field assessment be conducted. This will allow for a comprehensive and targeted environmental monitoring program in the dynamic deep sea environment. Placer

Dome may be the first company to conduct a full scale deep-sea mining operation; it is essential that they use a sampling method that will identify impacts and quantify the magnitude of¶ vi¶ these impacts. The assessment method they choose will need to be rigorous so that it stands up to outside review and critique by scientists and stakeholders.

2NC AT: Normal Means

1. NEPA EIS isn’t normal means in the context of mining operations Kasperowicz 12 (Pete, 7/12, “House votes to streamline federal mining permit process”, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/237551-house-votes-to-streamline-federal-mining-permit-process)

The House approved legislation Thursday that would require federal agencies to take no longer than 30 months to make decisions related to mining permits, and limit the ability of groups to mount legal challenges against these permits. Members voted 256-160 in favor of H.R. 4402, the National Strategic

and Critical Minerals Production Act. Twenty-two Democrats voted with Republicans in favor of the bill,

after several Democrats argued during debate that the bill would unacceptably ease environmental rules. Under the bill, federal agencies would have to make an effort to minimize delays in the mining permitting process. This includes making a finding that proposed projects should not be subject to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) standards, if it can be determined that agency guidelines and/or state guidelines are enough to "ensure that environmental factors are taken into account." It would also require civil suits against granted permits to be filed within 60 days after they are granted. Republicans said these changes are needed to help the United States keep pace with the rest of the world in producing minerals seen as key to manufacturing and national security.

***Misc CPs

Substitutes CP

Text: The USFG should provide incentives to develop substitute and recycling technology for REMs

CP solves the price disruptions by reducing demandParthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of Security,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf The U.S. government should create incentives¶ to reduce consumption when its interests are¶

on the line.¶ This report focuses primarily on the ¶ nature of current and potential supply challenges,¶ but solutions must also include reducing demand ¶ for minerals that see major

disruptions or erratic ¶ prices . Policymakers can maximize the potential¶ of substitution and recycling by clearly identifying¶ the minerals for which U.S. government interests are affected most directly, and then offering¶ incentives to develop substitutes for these minerals . Developing efficient solutions, however, will¶ require addressing the daunting information chal¶ -¶ lenges discussed earlier

Recycling CP

The United States Federal Government should expand its e-recycling programs for rare earth collection.

E-recycling solves short term market problems and avoids the link to the DACho 12 (Renee Cho is an environmental writer for the Earth Institute, “Rare Earth Metals: Will We Have Enough?”, 9/19/12, http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/09/19/rare-earth-metals-will-we-have-enough/)“I would like to see more exploration and research to make sure we know what’s there and what the challenges are of going after it,” said Graedel. “I don’t think we know if we’ll have the resources to meet future demand.” He also wants material scientists to aim their product design and lab investigations at the most common elements, rather than the scarcer ones. Some companies, including GE, Toyota and Ford, are trying to use less rare earth metals in their products, limit waste and/or develop substitute metals. E-waste recycling in Ann Arbor, MI. Photo: George Hotelling Though recycling e-waste cannot satisfy the rapidly growing demand for rare earth metals, it is one way to help alleviate the shortage . Recycling and reusing materials also saves

the energy used in mining and processing, conserves resources, and reduces pollution and

greenhouse gas emissions . The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports that in 2009, 2.37 million tons of

electronics were discarded, but only 25 percent was recycled. The European Union recently enacted new e-waste recycling rules requiring member states to recycle 45 percent of all electronic equipment sold starting in 2016, rising to 65 percent by 2019. (Find out where you can recycle your e-waste.)

to rare earth elements are the only viable option Worthington 11 (David Worthington, Feb 18 2011, “Experts: U.S. cannot mine enough rare earth minerals,” http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/experts-us-cannot-mine-enough-rare-earth-minerals/, ADL)The U.S. government must fund new research into alternatives to rare earth minerals if it is to forestall supply shortages, experts say. The U.S. can’t dig its way out of its rare earth minerals shortage. Instead, increased government investments are necessary to foster the development of alternatives, experts groups concluded in a joint study. The American Physical Society (APS) and Materials Research Society were unanimous in calling for broader research into new materials and increased electronics recycling. The study was released to lawmakers today. Ask as they may, the U.S. House of Representatives seems unlikely to oblige. The House majority's FY 2011 discretionary budget proposal dramatically reduces government spending for the sciences by 33 percent, the APS reports. House Republicans have committed to cut US$100 billion in government spending, with the possibility of further cuts to come. Washington's nascent austerity politics puts the experts at loggerheads with policy makers: the study saw no away around greater government involvement. The Associated Press quoted Robert Jaffe, co-chair of the joint study group and professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as saying, "We do not recommend economic stockpiling, which we believe is a disincentive to innovation and has backfired in the past." Jaffe continued, "After all, many of these elements are not even found in significant deposits in the United States so mining independence doesn't even make sense.” The Obama administration called on Congress take action to diversify sources of supply for the U.S. and its allies. There has been a slight uptick in domestic supply in response. In December, a rare earth mine reopened in California. Rare earth minerals belong to a family of elements that are used to manufacture many staples of the modern world - ranging from electronics, hybrid cars, solar panels and wind turbines to guided missiles. China is the world’s leading source of rare earth metals, the rest of the world lags far behind its production capacity. China has used export bans to put the squeeze on Japan and the United States in political disputes. However, China is also reliant upon on imports for sourcing its solar technology, the study's authors noted.

***China DA

1NC China DA

Current Chinese monopoly over the REM industry is critical to maintain stable control of Clean Tech Leadership Labrutoa 13 (Leslie Hayes, Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx, Mark Workman, Nilay Shahd, “Contrasting perspectives on China’s rare earths policies: Refraining the debate through a stakeholder lens”, http://ac.els-cdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/S0301421513007805/1-s2.0-S0301421513007805-main.pdf?_tid=a1077004-0782-11e4-940d 00000aab0f01&acdnat=1404922015_d6c9c9f884a2ea2cf247a1220417ee0b)

This sparked significant investments in China's knowledge and technology base (Hannon et aL, 2011; Haxel et aL, 2002; Hurst, 2010; Seaman. 2010), which has led to what is sometimes called "China's rare-

earth stranglehold" as shown in Fig. 1 (Plumer. 2011). China has thus become the de facto producer, user, and exporter of REEs (Kingsnorth. 2011), with the USA. Japan. Germany and France as the key importers (see Fig. 2) (BGS. 2011; UN Comtrade, 2009) . The problematic nature of this import-dependency is accentuated by China's questionable control of corruption, regulatory quality political stability, voice and accountability as measured by the worldwide governance indicators, where China ranks between the 25th and 50th

percentile, with an average of 29.7/100 (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Based on such information, nations have started to stress the importance of diversified rare earth metal portfolios for domestic imports.

Secondly, REEs have no known alternatives or substitutes (Hoenderdal, 2011; Holliday et al., 2012),

which in combination with high lead times for mine development (Kidela Capital Group, 2010) and the lack of production and refining capability outside of China, reinforces the power-dependence relationship between China and the ROW (Humphries, 2012). The appeal of REEs

lies in their unparalleled electrical, optical, magnetic, and catalytic applications that significantly improve energy efficiency and aid in miniaturization thereby decreasing environmental impacts, which is why they are used in many high-tech, cleantech and precision applications as shown in Tables 1 and 2 (Angerer etal.,

2009; BGS, 2011; US Department of Energy, 2011; USGS, 2011; Wouters and Bol, 2009). Thirdly, there is considerable uncertainty about the quantity and location of rare earth reserves . The following figure compares the data on anticipated REE reserves as produced by the Chinese Society of Rare Earths and UK-based Roskill (Zhanheng, 2011) with data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) on proven reserves (Long et al., 2010). While the definition of proven and anticipated reserves differs, the various sources seem to distribute responsibility in different ways through the use of different reserves definitions. Following Zhanheng (2011) China holds less than 23% of global reserves and Brazil holds almost 32.5%. Long et al. (2010) argue that China holds about 36% of global REE reserves and attribute only 0.05% to Brazil. Korinek and Kim (2010) discuss the reserve base for rare earths as well as state that 57.71% is to be found in China, 13.62% in FSU and 9.1% in the USA. This suggests a varying distribution of responsibility from the actors involved. China's data suggest that Brazil's anticipated reserve quantities have the potential to be exploited, thus reducing the

current reliance on China. The USGS data, on the other hand, suggests that China's proven reserve dominance warrants their role as global provider of rare earths (Long et al., 2010;

see Fig. 3). Despite these differences, it is unanimously agreed that China produces 95-97 percent of REEs used in downstream end-user products. It is also generally accepted that the deposits in China

are plentiful in heavy rare earths, and estimated to contain 80 per cent of the world's heavy rare earth elements (BGS, 2011; Long et al.. 2010; USGS, 2011). With the relatively recent boom in the use of REEs, especially driven by rapid development of clean technologies and high-tech applications, REE usage is likely to increase in the future (Alonso et al., 2012; Ayres and Talens-Peiro, forthcoming;

Buchert, 2011; Hoenderdal, 2011). This estimated demand increase for resources with unique, hard-to-

imitate-and-substitute properties can create a sustainable competitive advantage for the resource owner (Barney, 1991), while countries and organizations that need such

resources end up in a position of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This power-dependence relationship (Emerson, 1962) is fundamental to understanding

China currently is outpacing American green technology but an increase in their domestic competiveness trades off with China’s industry Eisen 2011 (Joel B. “The new energy geopolitics? China, Renewable Energy, and the “Greentech Race”, http://www.heinonline.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu /HOL/Page?page=9&handle=hein.journals %2Fchknt86&collection=journals#14)

The prevailing concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate the global greentech market if current growth rates continue. However, it is by no means clear that they will. Some signs in the past year point to over- building and overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment and consolidation of existing firms. In mid-2010, concern about the failure of nations to agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain business climate for wind energy companies.72 One China-based research analyst wrote, "it's a tough situation to be a wind turbine manufacturer anywhere in the world right now, including in China."7' On the other hand, there were reports

that the top three IPOs in 2010 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.74 Other firms moved forward with their offerings,75 but a planned initial public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid- 2010 due to

unfavorable market conditions.76 There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet competitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities in China have chosen Western wind turbines over products from domestic firms due to superior control

systems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine sizes.77 The quality of some Chinese greentech is often not yet as strong as that of foreign products.78 As recently as 2009,

Chinese wind turbines were less capable than their foreign counterparts ,79 as measured by lower capacity factors (the percentage of time that the turbines operate to generate electricity).80 One article on the wind

industry observes, "Western producers lead in the high performance segments, while the Chinese lead in lower- performance, price-driven segments."81 Chinese firms have grown quickly in manufacturing high-volume products but often do not hold key technology patents that would enable them to

develop more sophisticated equip- ment.82 Chinese firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower cost of labor.83 As a result, they have quickly ascended into a leadership position in "downstream" areas of the PV production chain, including cell production and module assembling, but lag behind in "upstream" areas requiring more technological skill,

such as silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.83 Chinese companies have a rapidly increasing number of patents, but to date, the companies are "relatively weak" in terms of the patents they hold on more sophisticated technology.85 A Chinese observer notes that "[i]n quantity, China has become a great solar energy patent country but power does not mean technical power."86 In

2009, American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in solar technology.87 Government research and development support is aimed at closing this technology gap.88 However, funding from the central government may be inefficient because it focuses too little on basic research.89 Still, many who are

familiar with China believe that it is only a matter of time before Chinese greentech improves through the well-known Chinese propensity to grow domestic companies by innovating, based at first on importing foreign technology and assimilating it. As energy policy analyst Julian Wong observes: One of the historical features of China's technology innovation is the role of foreign technology in the

innovation chain. To achieve its goals of indigenous innovation, China's government has adopted a model of "import-absorb-digest-re-innovate." Thus, the early stages of all technology development include heavy reliance on foreign technologies.90 Over time, much as Japanese and Korean automakers have evolved over the past few

decades, Chinese greentech firms may eventually close the gap and sell more sophisticated products. Even if Chinese solar and wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry in the United States is hardly standing still. Unlike a moribund Rust Belt industry ripe for

trampling by foreign companies, it is growing and providing more products to the domestic and global markets.91 The cost advantages of Chinese firms may eventually fade,92 or the gap may close. Chinese workers increasingly are demanding higher wages and better working conditions.93 Foreign firms are increasingly taking another strategy to cut costs: building their own manufacturing plants in China 94 Some greentech, like the larger components of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.*5 In the American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from China might outweigh higher domestic labor

costs. And American greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as preferential tax policies.96 On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible juggernauts displacing their foreign counterparts. To assert that as a fact is simply erroneous. Further, while predictions of dominance may or may not be accurate, the real question may be whether it matters. Americans may perceive, rightly or wrongly, that Chinese firms are about to dominate this sector. There is obvious concern at the highest levels of the United States government, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions and trade missions involving the American and Chinese government’s suggest.97 Some retort that fear of Chinese firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that mighty Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene 98 Who is correct? The picture is muddled and leaves room for arguments based on fear of what the Chinese firms might do. Setting up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential

drawback: it could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two nations. If American companies' biggest fear is being shut out of the Chinese green- tech market, portraying Chinese companies as participants in a competition can easily lead to an arms race where each

nation erects protectionist barriers to the other's firms. In this zero sum game, there may be one winner. or none at all. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be best to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race."

Chinese clean tech leadership is key to their economy, internal stability, and solves extinction Delinger, 10 Paul consultant specializing in the China market who is based in Hong Kong, 7/20/10, “Why China Has To Dominate Green Tech,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/20/why-china-has-to-dominate-green-tech/On the policy level, the Chinese government has to perform a delicate balancing act , it has to balance the desire of many Chinese to live a Western lifestyle, together with its high energy consumption and waste, with the need to preserve

the environment, since China, and the world , would suffer enormous damage if 1.3 billion people

got all their energy needs from coal and oil, the two most widely used fossil fuels. China’s political and

social stability depends on finding the right balance, since the party has an implicit mandate: it will deliver

economic growth to the Chinese people. This is why the Chinese government has chosen to invest in

developing new green energy technology . The country is very fortunate in that most of the discovered deposits of rare earths used in the development of new technologies are found in China. While these deposits are very valuable, up until recently, the industry has not been regulated much by the Chinese central government. But now that Beijing is aware of their importance and value, it has come under much closer scrutiny. For one, Beijing wants to consolidate the industry and lower energy waste and environmental damage. (Ironically, the rare earth mining business is one of the most energy-wasteful and highly polluting industries around. Think Chinese coal mining with acid.) At the same time, Beijing wants to cut back rare earth exports to the rest of the world, instead encouraging domestic production into wind and solar products for export around the world. With patents on the new technology used in manufacturing, China would control the intellectual property and licensing on the products that would be used all over the world. If Beijing is able to do this, it would control the next generation of energy products used by the world for the next century. That is the plan. It would be like if the oil-producing nations in the 1920s and 1930s said that they didn’t need Western oil exploration firms and refineries to distribute oil products; they would do all the processing themselves, and the Western countries would just order the finished oil products from them. This is how China obviously plans to keep most of the value-added profits within China’s borders. Before any Western readers snap into “evil Chinese conspiracy to take over the world” mode, it’s worth pointing out that Chinese rare earth experts and government officials have repeatedly warned Western visitors that this policy change would be introduced. Unfortunately, these warnings have gone largely unheeded and ignored by the Western media and politicians who, it seems, have been largely preoccupied by multiple financial crises and what to do about the West’s debt load. The debt crisis in the West means that it is very hard for Western green energy companies to find financing for their technologies, then to market them as finished products. New energy technologies are highly risky, and initial investments are by no means guaranteed. Because they are considered high-risk and require high capital expenditure (unlike Internet technologies which are very cheap and practically commoditized), banks are reluctant to finance them unless they are able to find government-secured financing.

Because most U.S. banks are recapitalizing their businesses after the debt bubble burst, there are very few, if any western banks who will finance new green energy technologies. This has opened a window of

opportunity for the Chinese government to finance, and for Chinese technology companies

to develop, then manufacture these new green products. But just making these technologies is

not enough; they need to be competitive against traditional fossil fuels. When it comes to the amount of energy released when coal or oil is burned, the new green technologies are still way behind. This means that, at least in the early stages of adoption, Chinese businesses will still be reliant on coal and oil to bridge that energy chasm before the new energy technologies become economically competitive. Much depends on how much the Chinese government is willing to spend to promote and incentivize these new technologies, first in China, then overseas. Because of China’s growing energy demands,

we are in a race for survival . The 21st century will be remembered as the resurgent coal and

oil century, or as the century humanity transitioned to green technologies for energy consumption.

While China is investing heavily now in green tech, it is still consuming ever larger amounts of coal and oil to drive its economic growth. Right now, we all depend on China’s success to make the

transition to green energy this century. For all practical purposes, we’re all in the same boat .

China’s economic rise is good --- they’re on the brink of collapse --- causes CCP instability and lashout --- also tubes the global economy, US primacy, and Sino relationsMead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9, http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn . The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net . The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest --and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness . Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.

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China’s leading the globe in clean tech competitiveness Yu 12 Hongyuan, professor and deputy director of the Institute for Comparative Politics and Public Policy, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 12/28/12, “A revolution is here, and clean energy is the spark,” http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-12/28/content_16065380.htmTechnological innovation is critical in the energy structure and, furthermore, next-generation energy will

determine not only the future of the international economic system but shifts in political power.¶ Since the modern international system was set up, the energy chain has undergone two important changes. The first was during the Industrial Revolution in the 1860s, ushered in by Britain, which was marked by a transition from the era of fuel-wood, or the bio-fuel era, to the era of coal. The second change was the second industrial revolution, in the United States in the 1920s, which saw a transition from the era of coal to the era of oil. Today we are in the midst of a third

revolution, a transition to an era of clean and low-carbon energy.¶ Under the long-cycle theory, the ownership and use of new energy is closely related to national technological and institutional advances. Countries with a dominant position in new energy must have an institutional and technical advantage stemming from their possession and use of new energy. They have to break through constraints imposed by previous economic structures, which leads to big

changes in the global industrial chain, allocation of resources and national competitiveness.¶ There is every reason to believe that those new-energy powerhouses will ultimately change the global distribution of power through international competition. As history shows, every significant structural change in the international system has been due to a revolution in energy. The country or non-state entity that seized a new energy chain or part of it was challenging the status quo.¶ As the world debates collective action against climate change, most countries have found that economies based on new and clean energy and on low-carbon and clean energy hold the keys to the future.¶ The European Union's carbon aviation tax aimed at boosting the bloc's competitiveness and promoting climate negotiations could also boost its creativity and competitive edge. The Low Carbon Economy Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs says that the EU promoted climate negotiations not just because it was a pioneer in low-carbon economics, but because it also wanted to predominate in global

governance and lay the foundations for the future economy.¶ Considering China's huge economy and the rapid growth in its emissions, it clearly matters when it comes to energy and climate change . China is developing many energy resources, and putting in place a system that supplies stable, economic and clean energy. It is working hard to develop a recycling economy so it can garner the highest possible economic and social benefits using the least energy

possible. Since the late 1990s China has been promoting clean, renewable energy to try to balance growth and environmental concerns and ultimately to reduce its reliance on coal .¶ In 2010 it set the goal of meeting 15 percent of its primary energy consumption through non-fossil fuels by 2020. It is targeting the development of non-fossil energy including wind power, solar power, biomass energy, solar energy, and thermal and nuclear power equivalent to 480 million metric tons of standard coal by the end of 2015, according to the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the renewable energy industry issued recently by the National Energy Administration.¶ Hydropower is the leading source of renewable energy. It provides more than 97 percent of all electricity generated by renewable sources. The dams and hydropower plants also play an important role in water resource planning, in preventing flooding, making rivers navigable, solving irrigation problems and creating recreation areas. During the 12th Five-Year Plan China will begin building more than 60 key hydropower projects, and the aim is to have 430 GW of total hydropower installed capacity in the country by 2020. However, debate about the negative impacts of dams and hydropower plants is

heated, most of it focused on environmental problems.¶ By the end of 2015 the country's wind power capacity is expected to reach 100 million kW , with annual electricity output of 190 billion kW/h, the plan says. China's wind power will reach

100 million kilowatts by 2015 and annual wind power generation will be 190 billion kilowatt hours. Of that, offshore wind power will account for 5 million kilowatts ; solar power will be 15 million kilowatts and annual solar power generation will hit 20 billion kilowatt hours.¶ China enjoys many advantages in developing solar energy. It has become a world leader in photovoltaic cell production. The demand in the country for new solar modules could be as high as 232 mW each year from now until 2012. The government has announced plans to expand the installed capacity to 1,800 mW by 2020. If Chinese companies manage to develop low-cost, reliable solar modules, then the sky is the limit for a country

that is desperate to reduce its dependence on coal and oil imports as well as the pressure on its environment by using renewable energy.¶ China has overtaken the US to become the largest producer of zero-carbon energy. The US is the hegemony and

China is the rising power, but clean energy will create a new paradigm for relations between the US and China in energy. Cooperation between the two on clean energy is noteworthy , and both countries are leading the world in investing in renewable energy and should seek to resolve trade disputes and eliminate protectionist trade policies. The US should closely look at sales of Chinese renewable energy products in the US market and seek to reduce trade barriers.¶ The difficulty lies not in new ideas, but in escaping from old ones. Whatever the outcomes and motivations, in order to deal with the energy-water-food nexus, China should understand it is in its economic and national interest to move ahead with clean and zero-carbon energy development. Together with recently announced plans,

China's clean energy development marks a sea change in the reform of the international system .

China has control over the REM industry but overheating, structural failures, and overproduction has left China’s industry weak Morrison and Tang 12 (Wanye and Rachel, April 30th, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States”, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85418/m1/1/high_res_d/R42510_2012Apr30.pdf

Overheated rare earth production in China during the 1990s and the early 2000s generated a fragmented industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining and illicit production. In order to maximize profits, these small companies often ignored safety and environmental regulations and fiercely competed with each other for export deals. In addition to

environmental degradation in China, this overcrowded rare earth sector and often intense competition sharply drove down rare earths prices and. therefore, further pressed producers to cut corners in order to secure their already thinning profit margins. Local governments, which often had vested interests, often

tolerated these practices.34 In addition to illicit rare earth production, smuggling also became widespread, which exacerbated resource depletion and kept prices low. According to

China Business News, about 20.000 tons of rare earths were smuggled from China in 2008. Which was estimated to have accounted for one- third of the total volume of rare earths leaving China that year. This smuggling is often the main reason behind the discrepancies between the

official statistics and the actual data of rare earth production and exports in China. Chinese policymakers and industry experts have voiced concerns over the perceived rapid depletion of their exhaustible rare earth resources. They contend that the rare earth deposits in China account for less than half

of total global reserves; however, the country mines and provides over 95% of the global supply Rare earth production in China has far outpaced the sustainable level which makes Chinese officials concerned that

such a disproportionately high level of output could soon deplete their resources. The Chinese government is also concerned that overproduction and illegal mining often came at the cost of environmental degradation - safety or environmental protection is often ignored in pursuit of revenue

potential.36 The Chinese media have repeatedly exposed incidents of water system and farmland contamination in rare earth mining areas, from Inner Mongolia to southern provinces such as Guangdong and Jiangxi.37 hi the southern provinces, rare earths can be found in high concentration in clays and soil a few

feet underground. As a result, the 1990s saw an explosion of the number of poorly constructed and maintained local mines that were both polluting and wasteful, leaving behind contaminated soil and water. In November of 2011, during a product quality inspection, China's General Administration of Quality Supervision found that 19 of 85 tea products contained excessive levels of toxic rare earths, including a batch of Lipton tea produced and sold in China by Unilever. Unilever later stated that the rare earth metals had

come from the soil where the tea was grown and had nothing to do with its production process.38 China currently argues that it is now moving to consolidate production and put supplies of a critical and exhaustible resource on a more sustainable footing. China maintains that rare earth export

prices have been too low to reflect its virtual monopoly position. Moreover, such dominance, in view of the Chinese industry experts and policymakers, should assist China to move up the supply chain and engage in rare earth application and end products, not just being the world's supplier of raw materials.39 hi recent years, China has put in place a series of industry and trade policies, aiming to capitalize on its dominance of rare earth supply

China Rare Earth dominance is critical to sustaining Clean Tech LeadershipEichner 12 (Andrew W, Tech & Poly 257, “More Precious than Gold: Limited Access to Rare Elements and Implications for Clean Energy in the United States”, http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals /jltp2012&div=14&id=&page=)

China is the world's leading producer of rare earths, making the country one of the most important suppliers of materials in the global clean energy movement .54 When

compared with the rest of the global supply, Chinese ownership of rare earth deposits far overshadows any other country, with China controlling 36% of the world's total rare earth reserves. 5 By comparison, the next greatest supply, held by the Commonwealth of Independent States, is

only 19% of the global reserve total.56 The United States remains a distant third, controlling only 13% of reserves.57 Furthermore, not only does China hold the greatest concentration of the world's rare earth reserves, the country is also the world's biggest producer of rare earth materials, providing between 95% and 97% of the global supply .58 The

combination of these factors makes China the most dominant country in today's rare earths market. A similar, though less extreme, situation exists with the global lithium supply. Chile holds approximately 76% of the world's currently accessible lithium reserves,59 dwarfing Argentina and Australia, which hold a combined total of 14% of the world's reserves.60 Additionally, recent findings in Bolivia suggest that there may be a massive supply of lithium located underneath the country, causing some "Bolivians ... to speak of their country becoming 'the Saudi Arabia of lithium.'"

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China monopoly on REE key to maintain tech companies which is key to their economyTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello After the low cost of labor has allowed the relocation of traditional industries in China , rare

earths are used as a lever to encourage the relocation in China of research and technology

industries. This transition from an economy¶ mainly based on the industry is at the heart of

the economic development plan of China . Rare earths monopoly is used as a lever to achieve

this goal . High-tech companies wishing to ensure a steady supply of rare metals are thus

encouraged to relocate their production there , or to grant technology transfer. "With this program

planned asphyxia, China is in a position to turn into a great power on the high-value segment

of high-tech industries ." 46

Chinese monopoly key artificially raising global prices and forcing companies to move to China for productionPerry, 4/14 Bill, Perry was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"), and Office of Chief Counsel and Office of Antidumping Investigations, U.S. Department of Commerce., “US CHINA TRADE WAR DEVELOPMENTS–TRADE, IP, ANTITRUST AND SECURITIES,” http://uschinatradewar.com/us-china-trade-war-developments-trade-ip-antitrust-and-securities/The Chinese export restraints challenged in this dispute include export duties and export quotas, as well as related export

quota administration requirements. These types of export restraints can skew the playing field against the United States and other countries in the production and export of downstream products. They can

artificially increase world prices for these raw material inputs while artificially lowering prices for

Chinese producers. This enables China’s domestic downstream producers to produce lower-

priced products from the raw materials and thereby creates significant advantages for

China’s producers when competing against U.S. and other producers both in China’s market

and other countries’ markets. The export restraints can also create substantial pressure on

foreign downstream producers to move their operations, jobs and technologies to China .

Chinese monopoly of REEs is key to clean tech development Reuters, 10 – (Reuters, “Analysis: Rare earth monopoly a boon to Chinese clean tech firms,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/12/us-china-rareearth-idUSTRE67B0BT20100812)

(Reuters) - In the race to build hybrid cars and wind turbines to feed growing demand for green technology, China has one clear advantage , it holds the world's largest reserves of rare earth metals and dominates global production.¶ Wind turbines, made by No.2 wind turbine maker Xinjiang

Goldwind Science & Technology, and hybrid cars, being developed by Warren Buffet-backed Chinese automaker BYD are among the biggest guzzlers of rare earth minerals, which analysts say are facing a global supply crunch as demand swells . ¶ This little-known class of 17 related elements is also used for a vast array of electronic devices ranging from Apple's iPhone to flat screen TVs, all of which are competing for the 120,000 tons of annual global supply.¶ China controls 97 percent of rare earth production.¶ "Rare earth for China is like oil to the Middle East," said Yuanta Securities analyst Min Li.¶ Worldwide demand for rare earth is expected to exceed supply by some 30,000 to 50,000 tons by 2012 unless major new production sources are developed, say officials at Australian

rare earth mining company Arafura Resources.¶ China has curbed exports of the mineral since 2005 through quotas and

duties, saying it needs additional supplies to develop its domestic clean energy and high-tech sectors. On Wednesday, it said it would cut export quotas in 2010 by 40 percent.¶ "Export restrictions may provide an advantage to Chinese turbine makers, again because of the cost advantage," said CIMB analyst Keith Li.¶ He said Chinese green companies would have priority in securing supply of the metals over international peers and their proximity to sources of the minerals ensures quicker and cheaper long-term supply.¶ China's domestic consumption of the metals poses the biggest threat to global supply. The country, which holds a third of the world's reserves, eats up to 60 percent of global rare earth supply for a wide range of applications from consumer gadgets and medical equipment to defense weapons.¶ For related factbox click:¶ China's trading partners have grown increasingly vocal about its move to cut its export quotas, but Beijing is determined to control the rare earth market.¶ "Foreign companies could be facing some material supply risks, unless they decide to move production to China," warned Yuanta's Min Li.¶ NO GUARANTEES¶ But while China may ensure its first-tier green companies are given access to the rare elements, analysts agree this alone is unlikely to guarantee success for the Chinese clean tech firms.¶ New technologies free of rare earth elements could emerge that may undermine China's advantage, while further cuts in rare earth quotas could trigger a political backlash which could force the nation to keep supply open for its trading partners.¶ "Chinese technology needs to develop quickly enough to make full use of that advantage," said CIMB's Li.¶ "That window closes if its existing technologies fail to evolve."¶ Still China will have the upper hand in the global rare earth market for a while yet.¶ There are currently many new mine projects outside of China in the pipeline but few will be able to compete with it on price unless governments offer production subsidies.¶ Low prices for rare earth metals from China have undermined production and led to closure of several mines overseas. Lax environmental rules and cheap labor also allow China to sell rare earth metals at low prices.¶ Also, the development of new rare earth mines could take as many as 10 years.¶ China's leading rare earth company, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Co., is building 200,000 tonnes in rare earth oxide reserves, and state media reported that the company is joining forces with Jiangxi Copper Corp to set unified prices for rare earth metals.¶ If supply becomes extremely tight as experts suggest, Chinese green companies may take upon themselves to secure the mineral by getting involved in the actual process of making rare earth products, analysts said.¶ BYD is scouting for new sources of lithium, an important ingredient for its high-performance batteries.

Chinese monopoly is necessary to maintain low costMorrison and Tang, 12 – (**Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, AND **Rachael Analyst in Asian Affairs, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export¶ Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for¶ the United States,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf)

In recent years, China has been restructuring its domestic rare earth industry while putting more¶

restrictions on rare earth exports, which has greatly affected the price and quantity of rare earths ¶

available in the global market. This has caused concern among businesses and foreign¶ governments about potential business risks and geopolitical implications. Such concerns became¶ more acute when China reportedly suspended shipments of rare earths to Japan, due to a months-¶ long diplomatic crisis with Japan in September of 2010

Its independently key to chinese economy and tech transfer for green industries --- low costs are keyMorrison and Tang, 12 – (**Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, AND **Rachael Analyst in Asian Affairs, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export¶ Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for¶ the United States,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf)

To many observers, China’s rare earth policies are part of a complex web of Chinese government¶

industrial policies that seek to promote the development of domestic industries deemed

essential ¶ to economic modernization . In the late 1980s, the United States was the global leader in rare earth¶

production. However, preferential policies by the Chinese government and lax environmental¶ standards there quickly enabled China to become a dominant, low-cost producer of rare earths by¶ the late

1990s. Many analysts contend that China’s recent actions to consolidate its rare earth¶ production and restrict exports are intended to promote the development of domestic downstream ¶

industrie s , especially those engaged in high technology and green technology industries , by¶

ensuring their access to adequate and low-cost supplies of rare earths . It is further argued that¶

China’s rare earth export policies are intended to induce foreign rare earth users to move their¶ operations to China, and subsequently , to transfer technology to Chinese firms. China

denies that¶ its rare earth policies are political, discriminatory, or protectionist, but rather, are intended to¶ address environmental concerns in China and to better manage and conserve limited resources.

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China Clean Tech Leadership zero-sum- companies are shoring up markets and dominance is key to securing them Caperton et al, 11 (Richard W., Kate Gordon, Bracken Hendricks, Daniel J. Weiss, “Helping America Win the Clean Energy Race,” Center for American Progress, February 7, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/ces_brief.pdf, )This is no way to build a modern industry. Already we have seen cutting-edge solar power manufacturing companies begin to close their doors, either permanently or to move to other countries with strong and dedicated clean energy markets. Evergreen Solar Inc., for example, recently announced plans to close its Massachusetts plant to put more funds into solar panel manufacturing in China. Hie company followed on the heels of SpectraWatt Inc. in New York and Solyndra Inc. in California closing some of their facilities. As General Electric Co.s chairman

and chief executive, Tefflmmelt, said at last year's ARPA-E summit, those countries with strong demand for renewable energy products will naturally pull these companies into their borders because "innovation and supply chain strength gets developed where the demand is the greatest." Similarly, wind manufacturers in Iowa, once a state leader in this industry, are laying off workers as new orders fail

to materialize. Leading global financier Deutsche Bank decided to move billions of investment dollars out of the U.S. clean energy market, and into China and Europe as soon

as it was clear there would be no comprehensive climate and energy legislation coming out of the 111th Congress. China and our other economic competitors in Asia, Europe, and emerging markets are not waiting for America to regroup. These stories share a common theme: investment dollars leaving the United States to be deployed among our global competitors who have fully embraced the economic and environmental imperative to

enter a new era of cleaner, more sustainable and domestic energy. China is the most striking example. In 2009, even as the United States was installing more wind turbines, China driven by stable long-term demand for its products, became the world’s largest manufacturer of wind power systems. It was already the world’s largest solar manufacturer and developer of efficient nuclear and coal technologies. But China isn’t alone. Not by a long shot. Germany is not far behind in linking strong clean energy policies to market growth and manufacturing leadership, as the leading global manufacturer of solar inverters—a key part of solar power systems—and has made huge strides in energy storage solutions that will further accelerate the widespread adoption of renewable power. Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom are also global clean energy leaders with thriving

domestic markets. All these countries have comprehensive programs in place to spur robust and stable demand for low-carbon energy, which then creates a market for businesses to manufacture and install the technologies to meet that demand . Last June,

China announced its plan to meet a renewable energy standard of 20 percent by 2020, matching the European Union’s target. Germany has set a target of 60 percent by 2050. The country already gets 16 percent of all its power from renewables, well on its way to meeting this ambitious goal, and some think it may reach 100 percent by 2050. Denmark has gone a step further, actually announcing its intention to become 100 percent independent of fossil fuels by 2050, something that at least one of its islands has already achieved. This occurred in a country that in 1970 was almost completely dependent on foreign fossil fuels. These countries prove that strong clean energy standards build growing economies. But even more than that, strong clean energy standards are now imperative if we are to compete on the same playing field as China and Europe. America over the course of the 20th century took command of the Industrial Revolution and the communications revolution, and then led the world into the Information Age. It is time for us to lead the clean-tech revolution, too. Today, others are beating us to the punch, not because we lack the technology and innovation to lead this new revolution, but because we are not providing the market signals needed for our private-sector entrepreneurs need to invest over the long haul. This clean energy investment gap is rapidly becoming the greatest threat to America’s technology leadership.

U.S. competition would stonewall Chinese foreign markets and cripple innovation which kills aff solvency Economy et al. 10 (Elizabeth, Micheal Levi, Shannon O’Neil, Adam Segal, “Globalizing the energy revolution: how to really win the clean-energy race”, http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library. northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CA246715577&v=2.1&u=northwestern&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1)

The world faces a daunting array of energy challenges. Oil remains indispensable to the global economy, but it is increasingly produced in places that present big commercial, environmental, and geopolitical risks; greenhouse gases continue to accumulate in the atmosphere; and the odds that the world will face catastrophic climate change are increasing. These problems will only worsen as global demand for energy rises. Environmental advocates and security hawks have been demanding for decades that governments solve these problems by mandating or incentivizing much greater use of the many alternative energy sources that already exist. The political reality, however, is that none of this will happen at the necessary scale and pace unless deploying clean energy becomes less financially risky and less expensive than it currently is. This is particularly true in the developing world. yyyyyyyyyyyyyA massive drive to develop cheaper clean-energy solutions is

necessary. Indeed, many claim that it has already begun--just not in the United States. They warn that the United States is losing a generation-defining clean-energy race to China and the other big emerging economies. They

are right that the United States is dangerously neglecting clean-energy innovation. But an energy

agenda built on fears of a clean-energy race could quickly backfire. Technology advances most rapidly when researchers, firms, and governments build on one another's successes. When clean-energy investment is seen as a zero-sum game aimed primarily at boosting national competitiveness, however, states often erect barriers. They pursue trade and industrial policies that deter foreigners from participating in the clean-energy sectors of their economies,

rather than adopting approaches that accelerate cross-border cooperation. This slows down the very innovation that they are trying to promote at home and simultaneously stifles innovation abroad . To be sure, clean-energy innovation alone will not deliver the energy transformation the world needs. It can drive down the cost of clean energy and narrow the price gap between clean and dirty sources, but it is unlikely to make clean energy consistently cheaper than fossil fuels anytime soon. Government policies will still need to tip the balance, through regulations and incentives that promote the adoption of alternatives to fossil fuels.

Possible alternatives for Rare Earth Metals make China’s Clean Tech leadership uniquely vulnerable to U.S. competition Yale Global 10 (11/15, YaleGlobal Online Magizine, “China’s Chokehold On Rare-Earth Minerals Raises Concerns”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-rare-earth-minerals)

However, Beijing may have overplayed its hand. China’s moves have sent major consuming countries scurrying to secure sources of supply outside China: building stockpiles, providing incentives for domestic firms to mine and process rare earths, and finding alternative ways of make high-tech products that reduce reliance on rare earths. The US Geological Survey says that

substitutes are available for many applications, but generally are less effective. Still, Japan announced earlier this month that it had developed the first high-performance motor, free of rare earths, for petrol-electric hybrid vehicles. The House of Representatives in Washington recently approved legislation to support revival of the

once leading-edge rare-earths industry in the US, while the Energy Department says it will release a plan this autumn for developing more rare-earth metal supplies, in part by encouraging US trading partners to hasten expansion of production. Yet China could keep its dominant grip on the rare-earths industry for some years. It holds 35 percent of global reserves, but supplies over 95 percent of demand for rare-earth oxides, of which 60 percent

is domestic, according to Industrial Minerals Company of Australia, a consultancy. Just as important, Chinese companies, many of them state-controlled, have advanced in their quest to make China the world leader in processing rare-earth metals into finished materials. Success in this quest could give China a decisive advantage not just in civilian industry, including clean energy, but also in military production if Chinese manufacturers were given preferential treatment over foreign competitors. Cerium is the most abundant of the 17 rare earths, all of which have similar chemical properties. A cerium based coating is non-corrosive and has significant military applications. The Pentagon is due to finish a report soon on the risks of US military dependence on rare earths from China. Their use is widespread in the defense systems of the US, its allies, and other countries that buy its weapons and equipment. In a report to the US Congress in April, the Government Accountability Office said that it had been told by officials

and defense industry executives that where rare-earth alloys and other materials were used in military systems, they were “responsible for the functionality of the component and would be difficult to replace without losing performance.” For example, fin actuators in precision-guided bombs are specifically designed around the capabilities of neodymium iron boron rare-earth magnets. The main US battle tank, the M1A2 Abrams, has a reference and navigation system that relies on samarium cobalt magnets from China. An official report last year on the US national defense stockpile said that shortages of four rare earths – lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium – had already caused delays in producing some weapons. It

recommended further study to determine the severity of the delays. The surge in Chinese rare-earth output initially flooded the market, cutting prices and stimulating new applications. Now with China

seeking to capitalize on its advantage, the US and other advanced economies are trying to rush alternative rare-earth mines into production to reduce reliance on China and improve security of supply. While demand is forecast to increase by around two thirds over the next five years, the US Geological Survey says that undiscovered resources are thought to be very large relative to expected demand. However, bringing new

mines into production will take several years. And although the GAO report said that rare-earth deposits in the US, Canada, Australia and South Africa could be mined by 2014, rebuilding the US rare-earth supply chain might take up to 15 years. Meanwhile, China will hold sway and serve a cautionary note on global interdependence and reliance of high technology.

2NC Brink

China has devoted their energy capacity to renewable technology, restrictions to clean coal development have left their energy sector vulnerable to U.S. Hjalte 8 (Krister-Lund University School of Economics, “The Clean Tech Development Mechanism in China”, http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1335711&fileOId=1646654)

China has promoted renewable energy as center of the focus. Yet insufficient attention has been paid onto other sectors that would have greatly contributed to China's sustainable development benefits otherwise.

Chinese government has barred lending to steel and cement companies. This is to

postpone the unrestrained expansion of heavy industry. This is considered crude generalized industrial policy. Yet its efficiency in blocking clean energy finance is considerable. Bankers are not supporting energy efficiency projects as they expect too high transaction costs to work-

around such investment control. Furthermore higher efficiency in industrial energy would stem from shutting down old factories that are often characterized by poor management and outmoded technology, and replacing them with new, modem and efficient ones. However, the idea is difficult to put into action. This is because of high political barrier to closing them; most of them are owned and operated by local government (Chandler &Gwin

2008: 9). The investments in coal energy sources have also been impeded. Due to the restructuring of the State Power Corporation environmental goals have been set aside and foreign investors are being redirected only when local partners tail to keep up with the agreements within the power sector. Unclear definition of baseline, methodology and justification of additionally has been a major barrier as well (Zeng 2006: 83; Ojner 2007: 46). Similarly, the growing sector as transportation raises pressing emission problem. China is expecting more than 140 million cars on its roads by 2020, seven

times higher than now (Vennemo et al 2006: 255). However, the sector is less financially attractive, mainly due to high monitoring costs (Bueninterview). The wider coverage of strong market

mechanism support to lower transaction costs, as provided for renewable sectors, may result in greater sustainable development to China.

International Competition means that China needs Clean Tech Leadership to maintain stabilityPernick 7 (Ron, June, “The Clean Tech Revolution”, http://web.mit.edu/cron/project/urban-sustainability/Old%20 files%20from%20summer%202009/Ingrid/Urban%20Sustainability%20Initiative.Data/Clean%20Tech%20Revolution.pdf)

And it isn't just China that is embracing clean tech. Across the globe developing nations in Asia, Africa, and South America view clean-energy sources such as wind, solar, and biofuels not as niche novelties environmentalist-motivated "alternatives" but as a critical, urgent, a growing piece of a diversified energy mix needed to fuel their rapid developing economies and middle classes. With the hypercharged economies of China and India both growing 5% to 9% annually, there's a palpable feeling of wanting to deploy and use any energy source they can % their hands on. There's less of a perceived conflict between establish'

energy sources and newer, cleaner options. Wind, solar, small hydroelectric, biogas, biofuels—we need all of those, these nations seem to say as much as possible, as soon as possible, and above all, as cheaply as possible. This adds up to unprecedented opportunity for clean-tech manufacturers and investors in

meeting the power and water needs of billions people. The profit opportunity to serve the emerging

markets in China and countless other nations is expanding for both large corporations are emerging start-ups. That's why today the world’s leading wind, solar, and other clean-tech providers are already moving into the Chinese mark via joint ventures with local companies and other avenues. Tapping these markets won't be easy, but the growing, energy-hungry middle classes of developing nations require massive new water energy infrastructure projects, be they wind farms off the Indian corn ethanol plants in China, or desalination facilities in Algeria. And nr communities, which still represent nearly 50% of the global population, are in desperate need of finding creative ways to meet the resource needs of their residents. In India, some 56% of the population's 700 million rural residents lack reliable access to electric power. The nation wants deliver electricity to all of them by 2020—5O% of it from renewal sources including wind, solar, and biofuels.

2NC ImpactChinese growth fueled by clean tech is key to global sustainability Wu, 12 Changhua Greater China Director, The Climate Group, July 2012, “CONSENSUS AND COOPERATION FOR A CLEAN REVOLUTION,” http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/TCG_ChinaCC_web.pdfThis transformation, together with growth of other emerging economies, is reshaping the world. Along with

the likes of India and Brazil, China’s growing economic power has a direct impact on a range of global

sustainability issues , from climate change and resource use, to international trade and responsible business investment. With the world’s second largest economy and the largest population, China’s actions now have global repercussions – for good or bad.¶ Policy and decision makers in China understand this. This is

why, after three decades of rapid economic growth, China has started to restructure its economy and transform

the way it grows. This means working to decouple energy and resource use from economic growth and

reduce greenhouse gas emissions . But this is not being done simply for altruistic reasons. The biggest driver for

change is energy and resource security , along with the recognition that global climate change, if left unchecked, has

the potential to undermine much of what China has achieved.¶ Over the next five to ten years, China intends to make

green development the engine room of its economy . By doing so, China’s aim is not only to address its energy

and resource concerns, but also to develop and lead the clean industries that will be at the heart of low carbon 21st century economies. And as policies and measures laid out in last year’s 12th Five Year Plan

demonstrate, China’s plans are more than just rhetoric.¶ But success is by no means guaranteed. In the absence of a proven road map or uniform template for green economic growth, a learning-by-doing approach is necessary.

Because this means mistakes may be made, China is seeking greater consensus and cooperation in finding systemic solutions to the sustainability problems it shares with the rest of the world. These solutions will require that issues of equity and inclusiveness are addressed. They will also depend on the willingness of all parties to move away from fixed positions, as well as display greater reciprocity.

China’s renewable dominance is key to combating climate change, reducing pollution, increasing food and water security, and eliminating oil dependency Lo 13 (Kevin, June 3rd, “A critical review of China’s rapidly developing renewable energy and energy efficiency policies, http://ac.els-cdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/S1364032113006655/1-s2.0-S1364032113006655 -main.pdf?_tid=61bc6f90-0619-11e4-91d1-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1404766861_72a7dae949cc9b2e2c6a0d9bf789d119)

Renewable energy and energy efficiency (REEE) policies relate to five significant issues in China. First among these is energy security, defined as "unimpeded access or no planned interruptions to sources of energy" China's sustained economic development over the past three decades has accompanied a

rapid rise in energy demand, which, at times, has contributed to widespread electricity shortages [2]. China's increasing dependence on oil imports is also a concern. China has changed from an oil exporting country in the early 1990s to one of the largest oil importing countries in the world, with an oil import dependency rate of

more than 50% [3j. Oil imports are perceived as susceptible to interruption because most oil imported to China must pass through the Malacca Strait, a chokepoint wedged

between Indonesia and Malaysia that is vulnerable to maritime blockage |4|. Climate change is the second issue affecting China's commitment to REEE policies. Despite its status as a

developing country and its historically low emissions, China faces international pressure to control its carbon emissions, which has intensified since China surpassed the United States as the world's largest carbon polluter [5]. Domestic concerns about the impact of climate change also contribute

to the urgency of climate mitigation [6]. Third, REEE policies affect economic competitiveness. The manufacturing of renewable energy products (e.g., wind turbines and photovoltaic cells) has been designated as a pillar

industry by the government which hopes that China will become a global leader and exporter of green technologies |7,8j. Therefore, REEE policies can be understood as both economic and environmental policies.

Pollution is the fourth issue. The burning of fossil fuels is associated with air, water, and soil pollution, which have serious implications for health, water security, and food security. Finally, human livelihood is the fifth issue affecting China's adoption of REEE policies. Despite rapid development, many Chinese rural households still depend heavily on traditional biomass energy for heating and cooking [9).

Renewable energy, such as photovoltaic and solar water heating, can significantly improve the

livelihood of people from underdeveloped areas in China. Due to the salience of these issues, the Chinese government has expended considerable effort to develop and implement REEE policies, manifested in an array of major policy initiatives since 2005. However, as this critical review demonstrates,

China's REEE policies are still far from comprehensive, and significant room for improvement exists. Chinese REEE policies are differ from those of the United States, where the federal government has been slow to act and instead relies on state-level policy experiments (10), and Europe,

where a supranational body (the European Union) plays a significant role in REEE policy- making [ 111. In China, the central government is the key policymaking body [12], and central-level policies are therefore the

focus of this study. REEE policies span a wide spectrum and are very diverse. For example, policies designed to improve industrial energy efficiency differ significantly from policies aiming at improving energy efficiency in buildings or promoting the deployment of renewable energy. To ensure comprehensive coverage, this critical review is organized into five parts: electricity, industry, transport buildings, and local government.

Rare Earth Metals and Clean Tech Leadership key to Stable Chinese Economy Seaman 10 (John, “Rare Earths and Clean Tech Analyzing China’s Upper Hand”, IFRI)

The rare earth industry is now a cornerstone in a wider restructuring of the Chinese economy bent on increasing domestic wealth and consumption. After all, China's emergence as the world's dominant rare earth producer did not happen by accident. Its leaders recognized early on that its wealth of mineable deposits constituted a strategic advantage. As production ramped up, Deng Xiaoping, China's leader and Communist Party Chairman famously made

the revealing correlation in 1992 that "there is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China." But Chinese leaders also recognized that the resource advantage could be translated into a boon for economic development and the competitiveness of Chinese industries. In 1999, Jiang Zemin,

Chinas President and Dengs successor, would explain the logic: Improve the development and application of rare earth and change the resource advantage into economic superiority."42 Today,

global REO production is worth an estimated $1.3 billion, but the industries that rely on these elements are reportedly worth over $4.8 trillion.43 Downstream industries hold the majority of the jobs and wealth. China is hoping to use its resource advantage and the growth in projected

demand of rare earth applications not simply to sell more raw materials, but to develop the country's

production capacity of the high tech applications themselves. Profits from this higher-earning production would then benefit Chinese companies and create more, higher earning jobs at home. At a time when upward pressure is being put on wages in China and masses of

young, unemployed graduates are scouring the job market in search of skilled work, growth spurred on by a well-planned management of rare earth resources could help to ease social tension . As Dudley Kingsnorth explained for the South China Morning Post, "China dominates the rare earth supply and only employs,

for argument's sake, hundreds of workers to get it out of the ground. To refine it further, they employ thousands more workers. But to get the real value added and produce the end products - the phones, cars and hard disks - then China can employ millions. And China will need to supply 300 million [extra] jobs by 2020."44 This also plays into a broader economic strategy designed to rebalance China's economy. For decades China has been dependent on export-driven growth. Western leaders have long decried trade imbalances and Chinese policies that favor exports at the expense of its internal consumption. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis,

the need to rectify global imbalances is all the more evident, and China is now determined to spur consumption at home.45 A key to generating this consumption is to increase domestic wealth, and one important element in creating this wealth is capturing value- added steps in the production ladder. This affects rare earths in two ways. First, curbing the export of REO promotes the development of higher value-added levels of rare earth-related production in China. Rather than simply being content with selling oxides and refined rare earth metals, restricting exports of these products supports the development of local manufacturers of rare earth applications and industries further downstream. After all, why be content with selling REO when you can eventually sell the electric cars and

wind turbines that depend on them? Secondly, mastering value-added production of rare earth-related technologies in China also requires foreign expertise and technology . As

mentioned above, restricting REO export quotas is meant in part to encourage foreign manufacturers of rare earth-dependant technologies to move to China, bringing with them highly specialized knowledge and innovation that could give Chinese companies an advantage over the purely foreign competition.

China rise is Good- Economic contraction causes global depression, Taiwanese invasion, and democratic backsliding Lewis 7 [Dan, 4-19, World Finance, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” http://www.worldfinance.com/news/137/ARTICLE/1144/2007-04-19.html] According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yen. Should that revaluation

happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of Euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a

decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and

unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t

end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become

successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very

worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has actually deferred political reform in the world’s oldest

nation. China today is now far further from democracy than at any time since the Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my fear is there is at least a chance he was just early.

2NC World Tech Impact

China accesses a better i/l to clean tech leadership their innovation methods and R&D are critical to global development Tan 2010 (Xiomci, Energy Policy 38, “Clean Technology R&D and innovation in emerging countries- Experience from China”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510000315)

The joint-ventures' failure to acquire wind energy technology has motivated the Chinese government to back domestic turbine producers' R&D and innovation. Through the 863

and 973 Programs (2005, 2008), the central government has provided a significant amount of research funding to domestic turbine manufacturers. China's top five wind turbine manufacturers all have a large R&D center. They play a key role in the acquisition, localization, diffusion and re-innovation of wind energy technology in China. For instance, Xinjiang Coldwind Science & Technology Company (Coldwind), the largest turbine manufacturer in China, started its R&D operation by undertaking the National Key Science and Technology Project in the 9th Five-Year Plan to develop 600 kW wind power generating sets in 1998. One year later, Coldwind successfully developed China's first 600 kW wind power generating set, with a localization rate of 90%. During the 10th Five-Year Plan period, Coldwind was granted three National Science and Technology Projects, one of which was to develop 1.2 MW direct-driven permanent magnet wind turbine. Four years later the first two 1.2 MW magnet turbines were erected. Their localization rate, again, reached 90%. So far Coldwind has acquired independent R&D capacity and proprietary IPR for 1.5 MW and is currently testing its 3 MW model. And the design and development of 5 MW wind turbine is in the conceptual design

stage. This paper has examined an array of complementary policy measures that China utilizes to spur domestic R&D and innovation in clean technology. These measures include designing a national level-S&T strategy prioritizing clean energy; establishing direct funding programs to support clean energy R&D; incentivizing the private sector to

undertake a leading role in R&D and innovation; and capitalizing on public-private synergies to bring

together multi-sector expertise. In addition to direct R&D funding assistance from the central government, Coldwind has also received much support from the government of Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The local government designated a high-tech development zone for Coldwind and also provided matching R&D funds to some of the 863 and 973 grants. In terms of favorable policy, Coldwind enjoys an up to 15% income tax deduction for the year 2001-2010. This benefit is supported by two regulations promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC): the Catalog for the Guidance of Industrial Structure Adjustment (2005) and the Circular on Preferential Tax Policy Issues for Developing the Western Region (2001). The paper did not seek to provide a critique of these measures. Rather, it

described the totality of China's clean technology development efforts as an example of the approaches that can be taken in crafting effective, country-specific clean technology policy and development. For developing countries, the bulk of technological progress comes from the adoption and adaptation of pre-existing but new- to-market technologies, and through the spread of technologies across firms, individuals, and the public sector within a country

(World Bank, 2008). In the decades ahead, most of the growth in global energy demand—90% by 2030

—will come from emerging countries. If greenhouse gas emissions are to be constrained, and a low carbon economy achieved, large-scale clean technology deployment is therefore especially vital for the developing world. Also critical is crafting an innovation model that caters to particular conditions and needs of developing countries. China's comprehensive efforts laying the groundwork both to achieve a domestic clean energy economy, and to assist other developing countries to do so, indicate its commitment to becoming a global leader in the clean technology revolution. The China experience also provides policy approaches and funding and partnership models from which other emerging and developing countries can learn.

China’s Clean Tech dominance is key to global stability and solve the aff through tech diffusionWu 12 (Changhua, The Climate Group, “Consensus and Cooperation For a Clean Revolution”, http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/TCG_ChinaCC_web.pdf)

This transformation, together with growth of other emerging economies, is reshaping the world. Along with the likes of India

and Brazil, China's growing economic power has a direct impact on a range of global sustainability issues, from climate change and resource use, to international trade and responsible business investment. With the world's second largest economy and the largest population, China's actions now have global repercussions-for good or bad. Policy and decision makers in China understand this. This is why, after three

decades of rapid economic growth, China has started to restructure its economy and transform the way it grows. This means working to decouple energy and resource use from economic growth and reduce

greenhouse gas emissions. But this is not being done simply for altruistic reasons. The biggest driver for change is energy and resource security, along with the recognition that global climate change, if left unchecked, has the

potential to undermine much of what China has achieved. Over the next five to ten years, China intends to make green development the engine room of its economy. By doing so, China's aim is not only to address its energy and resource concerns, but also to develop and lead the clean industries that will be at the heart of low carbon 21st century economies. And as policies and measures laid out in last year's 12th Five Year Plan demonstrate, China's plans are more than just rhetoric. But success is by no means guaranteed. In the absence of a proven road map or uniform template forgreen economic growth, a learning-by-doing approach is necessary.

Because this means mistakes may be made, China is seeking greater consensus and cooperation in finding systemic solutions to the sustainability problems it shares with the rest of the world. These solutions will require that issues of equity and inclusiveness are addressed . They will

also depend on the willingness of all parties to move away from fixed positions, as well as display greater reciprocity. China today is embarking on a new period of economic, social and environmental transformation. This change is likely to be as profound -and probably even more so- than the extraordinary two

decades it has just witnessed. This clean revolution will be a journey measured in decades, not years. It will

require China to constantly learn, experiment and explore. But like many of China's other endeavors, success in achieving a green development pathway will help reshape the world.

***Politics

1NC Politics

Plan unpopular—empiricsDoggett 10 (Tom Doggett is an economist of Reuters, 9/30/14, "U.S. aims to end China's rare earth metals monopoly”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-earth-metals-rare-idUSTRE68T68T20100930)Legislation has been introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives to increase

investment and production of the rare metals in the United States, including providing extraction companies with federal loan guarantees. However, the legislation is not expected to clear the Congress this

year.

2NC Politics

Environmentalists hate the planCox 13 (Ramsey Cox is a bill analyst for the Hill, July 3rd, 2013, “House bill aims to ‘streamline’ permits for mining rare earth elements”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/309177-house-bill-aims-to-streamline-permits-for-mining-rare-earth#ixzz375uEe916 Decade-long permitting delays are standing in the way of high-paying jobs and revenue for local communities,” Amodei said. “This bill would streamline the permitting process to leverage our nation's vast mineral resources, while paying due respect to economic and environmental concerns.” In May, the House Natural Resources Committee marked up the bill and voted to advance it on a 24-17 vote. Only one Democrat on the committee supported the bill

— Rep. Jim Costa (D-Calif.). Some Democrats have argued that streamlining mining permits could be

harmful to the environment and should be thoroughly reviewed before mining is allowed. The bill would require the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to work with state and local governments to expedite the permitting process in order to keep the United States competitive with other mining countries, such as China and India.

Plan is unpopularTopf 13 (Andrew Topf is a exclusive writer for Rare Earth Investing News, 9/23/14, “House Passes Critical Minerals Act”, Rare Earth investing News, http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/16395-house-passes-critical-minerals-act.html)

Opponents voted against the bill because they said it would erode environmental protections

and because it includes a broad definition of “strategic minerals,” The House reported. “The bill’s classification of critical minerals is so broad that even sand and gravel and other such things can fall under its definition,” said Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.). Attempts by House Democrats to narrow the definition of strategic minerals were unsuccessful. Not surprisingly, the bill was applauded by the US mining industry. “Without compromising our rigorous environmental standards, this bi-partisan legislation carefully addresses the inefficiencies of our underperforming system by incorporating best practices for improving coordination among state and federal agencies, clarifying responsibilities, avoiding duplication, setting timeframes and bringing more accountability to the process,” National Mining Association CEO Hal Quinn said in a statement. However, while the bill has the blessings of House Republicans and industry, it is unlikely to gain the support of a majority of

lawmakers in the Democrat-controlled Senate. A similar version of the legislation died in the the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in 2012, Mineweb reported.

***Environment DA

1NC Environment DA

Mining disrupts the ocean floor---that’s critical to food security and ocean biodiversityGoldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat The problem is much remains unknown – not just about what exists on the ocean floor but how ocean systems operate to keep the planet habitable. The ocean floor was once thought to be a

marine desert, but oceanographers say the sediment is rich in marine life , with thousands of species of

invertebrates at a single site.¶ "It's tampering with ecosystems we hardly understand that are really at the frontier of our knowledge base," said Greg Stone, vice-president for Conservation International.

"We are starting mining extracting operations in a place where we don't fully understand how it works yet. So that is our concern – disturbing the deep sea habitat ."¶ Most of the models rely on being able to produce 1 million tonnes of ore a year. Stone said the seabed authority was putting systems in place to protect the ocean floor , but other scientists said there still remained enormous risks to the

sediment and the creatures that live there.¶ " It is going to damage vast areas of the sea floor ,"

said Craig Smith, an oceanographer at the University of Hawaii who served as an adviser to the International Seabed Authority. "I just don't see any way [in] mining one of these claims that whole areas won't be heavily damaged." ¶ Earle expressed fears about how mining companies will deal with waste in the high seas. "Mining is possible," she said. "But the 20,000ft question is

what do you do with the tailings? All of the proposals involved dumping the tailings at sea with profound impacts on the water column and the sea floor below. The Seabed Authority initially proposed to set aside 1.6m sq km of the ocean floor as protected areas, or about 20% of its territory. But those reserves are under review. As economic pressures rise, there are fears that commercial operations would begin to erode those protected areas.¶ "I think it is certain that within a year or two there will be more claims covering these areas and there won't be enough room left to

develop these scientifically defensible protected areas," Smith said.¶ Some have argued that with all the unknowns there

should be no mining at all – and that the high seas should remain out of bounds for mineral extraction and for shipping.¶ José María Figueres, a former president of Costa Rica and co-chair with the former British foreign secretary, David Miliband, of the Global Ocean Commission, an independent entity charged with developing ideas for ocean reform, suggested leaving all of the high seas as a no-go area for commercial exploitation (apart from

shipping).¶ "Do we know enough about the seabed to go ahead and mine it?" said Figueres. "Do we understand enough about the interconnection between the seabed, the column of water, the 50% of the oxygen that the ocean produces for the world, the 25% of the carbon that it fixes in order to go in and disrupt the seabed in way that we would if we went in and started mining? I don't think so, not until we have scientific backing to

determine whether this is something good or bad for the planet."¶ World leaders are now mobilising to address

concerns, not just about seabed mining, but about how to safeguard ocean systems which are increasingly

recognised as critical to global food security and a healthy planet. ¶ US secretary of state John Kerry, in

a video address delivered to a high-level ocean summit hosted by the Economist and National Geographic last

week, invited leaders to a two-day summit in Washington that will seek ways of protecting fishing stocks from

overexploitation and protecting the ocean from industrial pollution , plastic debris and the

ravages of climate change.¶ The stakes have never been higher, scientists said. The oceans are becoming

increasingly important to global food security . Each year more than a million commercial fishing vessels extract more than 80m metric tonnes of fish and seafood from the ocean. Up to three billion people rely on the sea for a large share of their protein, especially in the developing world.¶ Those demands are only projected to grow. "If you look at where food security has to go between now and 2030 we have to start looking at the ocean . We have to start

looking at the proteins coming from the sea," said Valerie Hickey, an environmental scientist at the World Bank.¶ That makes it all the more crucial to crack down on illegal and unregulated fishing, which is sabotaging efforts to build sustainable seafood industries. Two-thirds of the fish taken on the high seas are from stocks that are already dangerous depleted – far more so than in those parts of the ocean that lie within 200 miles of the shore and are under direct national control.¶ Estimates of the unreported and illegal catch on the high seas range between $10bn and $24bn a year, overwhelming government efforts to track or apprehend the illegal fishing boats. The illegal fishing also hurts responsible fishing crews.

Food insecurity triggers wars Trudell 5 (Robert H., Fall, Food Security Emergencies And The Power Of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 277, Lexis)2. But, Is It Really an Emergency? In his study on environmental change and security, J.R. McNeill dismisses the scenario where environmental degradation destabilizes an area so much that "security problems and ... resource scarcity may lead to war." 101 McNeill finds such a proposition to be a weak one, largely because history has shown society is always able to stay ahead of widespread calamity due, in part, to the slow pace of any major environmental change. 102 This may be so. However, as the events in Rwanda illustrated, the environment can breakdown quite rapidly - almost before one's eyes - when food insecurity drives people to overextend their cropland and to use outmoded agricultural practices. 103 Furthermore, as Andre and Platteau documented in their study of Rwandan society, overpopulation and land scarcity can contribute to a breakdown of society itself. 104 Mr. McNeill's assertion closely resembles those of many critics of Malthus. 105 The general argument is: whatever issue we face (e.g., environmental change or overpopulation), it will be introduced at such a pace that we can face the problem long before any calamity sets in. 106 This wait-and-see view relies on many factors, not least of which are a functioning society and innovations in agricultural productivity. But, today, with up to 300,000 child soldiers fighting in conflicts or wars, and perpetrating terrorist acts, the very fabric of society is under increasing world-wide pressure. 107 Genocide, anarchy, dictatorships, and war are endemic throughout Africa; it is a troubled continent whose problems threaten global security and challenge all of humanity. 108 As [*292] Juan Somavia, secretary general of the World Social Summit, said: "We've replaced the threat of the nuclear bomb with the threat of a social bomb." 109 Food insecurity is part of the fuse burning to set that bomb off. It is an emergency and we must put that fuse out before it is too late.

Mining destroys the biod---that causes extinctionGoldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat But with rising demand from China and India for rare earth metals like copper, and deep-sea surveys having now found concentrations of minerals four to five times those on land, it has returned but this time in the ‘unregulated’ territorial waters of PNG, conveniently close to the Asian markets. ¶ Ecologists say the PNG government is allowing Nautilus to go ahead with the first ever commercial deep-sea mining project without properly considering the environmental impacts or local opposition. Nautilus investors include the mining giant Anglo-American which is ignoring indigenous opposition to a gold and copper mine in Alaska.¶ ‘Cradle of life on earth’¶ As well as being metal-rich, the volcanogenic hydrothermal deposits which Nautilus plans to mine are home to a unique ecosystem

that is still largely unknown to scientists since being discovered in the late 1970s. Initially, the deep sea was thought to be full of soft sediment and little else but the discovery of hydrothermal vents on the seabed, which produce the deposits, revealed a completely novel ecosystem , unreliant

on photosynthesis.¶ ‘It’s the cradle of life on earth ,’ explains Dr Rod Fujita from the Environmental Defense

Fund and author of studies looking into deep-sea mining, ‘and the only one that does not depend on sunlight. There are species there that are found nowhere else on earth . It’s not like any land habitats we are used to; in fact you

have to have your perspective altered to appreciate this deep-sea world,’ he says.¶ The mining process in PNG will take the top 20-30m off the seabed at a depth of 1,500m and lift it up to the surface before transferring it by barge

to processing sites on land. ‘ You will destroy fauna just by lifting the land,’ says deep-sea ecologist Professor Paul Tyler, from the National Oceanography Centre at Southampton University. ‘It is possible you might mine at a distance [from the hydrothermal vents] but by mining close by you will affect the flow and the vents might switch off and then all the animals die – you lose a huge biomass .’¶ 'Flimsy' environmental report ¶ Nautilus has

attempted to fend off these criticisms by publishing an environment assessment, co-produced by a respected deep-sea biologist Dr

Cindy Van Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and seafloor habitats will ‘inevitably be

severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘ many years’ to recover. ¶ However, other ecologists say the assessment is ‘flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential damage mining will cause.¶ Professor Richard Steiner, from the University of Alaska cites the incompleteness of classification of species found at the sites and an inadequate assessment of the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the effects of increased light and noise in the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering plume [the process of removing water

from the mined deposits] to deep-sea organisms, which will not be able to differentiate between food and junk sediment.¶

Of particular concern are the hundreds of thousands of tonnes of waste that will be produced by the

mining process, which Steiner compares to that of a ‘ giant underwater tractor’ and which will be

pumped onto deeper seabeds nearby. Dr Fujita said the physics of water as well as weather and currents made it difficult to predict or contain any spill and that deep-sea mining had the capacity to produce pollution that could travel across into international waters.¶ A smoking hydrothermal vent on the ocean seabed¶ Exploitation or financial gain?¶ ‘I don’t think the project would be allowed to proceed anywhere else in the world based on such a poor analysis of risks,’ says Steiner. The USA is known to have similar deposits off the coast of Washington as has Canada but mining is not thought to be imminent. Dr Fujita suggests Nautilus is just the latest overseas mining giant to take advantage of lax regulations in the country. ‘In PNG they have a poor record of mining on land resulting in lots of poor conditions and that bad record and lack of oversight is now moving from land to sea,’ he says.¶ Only this week the PNG government was accused by Greenpeace of allowing rampant logging and failing to respect the rights of indigenous groups who depend on the forests.¶ Nautilus has reportedly suggested the country would benefit by more than $200 million from the mining but Steiner says the benefits to local people or the economy of PNG were likely to be disproportionately low compared to the scale and risk of the project. ‘While the project could gross almost $1 billion USD in its 30-month lifetime, it expects to provide only $41 million in total taxes and royalties to the government, a $1.5 million development fund and a few dozen jobs at most to PNG nationals,’ he said.¶ Prof Steiner is also acting as a science advisor to Mas Kagin, a group formed in 2008 to give a voice to coastal indigenous people in PNG oppose any commercial mining. The group says it depends on the coastal waters for their ‘livelihood, culture and way of life’ and has a right to oppose the seabed mining. In a campaign video community groups from two provinces expressed their fears.¶ ‘When we first heard that Nautilus was going to mine the seabed using technology that had never been used anywhere else it felt as though we were becoming a science lab…and our very lives part of an experiment to test this new technology,’ it says.¶ Nautilus conducted workshops with local villages to explain its proposals but rejected calls to set up a permanent citizens advisory council. The company also declined to respond to concerns raised in this article but has previously said it took great pride in ‘leading

the mining industry into the deep ocean’. ¶ Opening the floodgates¶ It has estimated several billions tons of copper could be extracted from seafloor sites around the world. Dr Tyler acknowledges that the deep-sea has ‘not

even had its surface scratched with what it might contribute to the economy’ but fears PNG’s decision to approve Nautilus mining

plans will ‘ open the floodgates’ before proper assessments have been made of the impact. China is known to be seeking to mine similar deposits in the South-West Indian Ocean.¶ ‘Deep-sea fishing is a good example.

We can ring alarm bells but there is no regulation of it. If I had my way the whole area of deep-sea would become a protected area and people who want to exploit it would have to apply to a body who can ensure that they were doing a proper environmental analysis before

they were allowed to exploit it. At the moment there is no requirement at all and we end up looking at the damage done,’ he says.¶ Steiner agrees and says there is too much wrong with the PNG project: ‘the way this first deep-

sea mine proceeds will set the tone for all others, and this is a very, very bad start’ . He argues investment in

reusing copper and gold made more sense than continuing to pay mining companies to take bigger risks in an effort to dig up more.

1NC Midterms

Plan popular— boosts economy and suppliesKilzer 11 (Lou Kilzer, 1/30/2011, Trib Live, “U.S. control of 'rare earth' minerals slipping”, http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/nation-world/s_720470.html#axzz376Xqz8zU)’Those minerals, called "rare earths," shape a modern nation's defense and economy. Your

iPhone and hybrid car won't work without them, nor will your laptop computer. The Pentagon needs them for its precision-guided "smart" bombs. China has locked up the supply — stripping the United States of its dominance. U.S. lawmakers in both parties blame China's "mercantilist" policies — state interference in international trade. Yet, the United States and other nations also were caught napping, according to members of Congress, lobbyists and industry experts. Consider: • China produces 97 percent of the rare earths used in high-tech items such as fiber optics, flat-panel monitors and televisions, and electricity-generating wind turbines. • Through export policies and tariffs, China forces foreign companies to manufacture there in order to remain competitive. And where manufacturing goes, research and development often follow. • China dominates more than rare earths. It leads the United States (or even the rest of the world combined) in key elements such as germanium, indium, antimony, zinc, manganese, tungsten, magnesium, cadmium, pig iron, graphite and fluorspar. Those materials, used to make alloys, feed China's surging steel industry. A decade ago, China and the United States produced roughly equal amounts of steel; in 2010, the United States produced about 90 million metric tons — to China's 630 million. • China is acquiring even more foreign resources. While most of the world fell into recession in 2008, China went on a spending spree: It bought all or part of 184 foreign mining assets for $37.2 billion, according to the U.S. accounting firm Ernst & Young. Recently, Shanghai Securities News reported that China may create a strategic stockpile of rare earths, tungsten, antimony, molybdenum, tin, indium, germanium, gallium, tantalum and zirconium. In contrast, the United States began selling its reserves in the 1990s. China has positioned itself to surpass the United States in purchasing-power parity — a closely watched measure of an economy's real size — next year, according to the Conference Board, a nonprofit international business association. 'Free market isn't working' The situation leads some analysts to stark conclusions. "The free market isn't working right now," says Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., who intends to sponsor legislation to re-stockpile strategic materials. China, he says, "had the foresight to say, 'We want to be a manufacturing country. There are critical components to that in terms of raw materials, and we're going to make sure that we have unfettered access to those supplies.' "And now it's (their) goal as a country not to export those raw materials. It is to export finished products." John Pike, a defense expert and director of GlobalSecurity.org, a Virginia-based website analyzing military and intelligence matters, says "we cannot pretend there's a free market when there's not." Ronald Ashburn, executive director of the Association for Iron & Steel Technology, a Warrendale-based nonprofit promoting industrial research, says China controls "huge aspects of the world capacity for many materials." Congressional staffers, speaking on background, agree. "China is going to produce, whether they are making a profit or not," says a Democratic staffer who has studied the issue for years. Its mining companies "are willing to get hammered" financially in order to gain control over markets. A Senate Republican staffer says the federal government has backed American firms, but "people didn't like it. But they do like jobs — and mining jobs are good jobs." Three bills countering China's rare-earths policies were introduced in the last Congress by Coffman, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, and Rep. Kathleen Dahlkemper, D-Erie, who lost re-election in November. Each bill involved some degree of government intervention. None won approval. Dahlkemper's bill emerged at a sensitive moment — during China's brief rare-earths embargo on Japan in September. A spooked House passed it, 325-98, but the bill lost momentum as the midterm election neared and China relented. Like Coffman, Murkowski plans to try again. Many Republicans, however, caution against going too far, too fast. In a statement, 10 GOP congressmen on the committee that sent Dahlkemper's bill to a House vote said federal loans "should be restricted to those areas not undertaken by the private sector," to avoid "favoring certain companies ... and potentially crowding out further private-sector investment." Congressional Republicans generally favor trimming regulations to spur rare-earth mining.

2NC BioD Link

Seabed mining kills animals and their natural habitatsAllsopp et al 13 –Michelle, researcher at Greenpeace (“Review of the Current State of Development and the Potential for Environmental Impacts of Seabed Mining Operations,” Greenpeace Research Laboratory, http://www.greenpeace.to/greenpeace/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/seabed-mining-tech-review-2013.pdf) patelThere are many environmental concerns regarding these projects and other prospective deep sea mining activities – these are identified and discussed in this report. The habitats targeted and the probable impacts from mining may be summarised as follows: Hydrothermal vents host a unique community structures with many species of animals being exclusively native to these habitats. Mining would remove thousands of vent chimneys completely, flattening the seabed. Resident animals would be killed. As part of its developments in Papua New Guinea, Nautilus plans to try and transfer animals to other sites but this is scientificallyuntested and could also disturb other ecosystems. It is unknown whether habitats would recover or if animals would return if vent chimneys reformed. Seamounts studied to date show there is an abundance of life associated with these structures, including corals and sponges and huge aggregations of fish. Seamounts have been described as underwater oases and they appear to be important habitats for migrating species. Mining in the vicinity of these structures will destroy corals and sponges which grow on the seamounts and recent studies indicate that recovery times would be in decades to centuries. Manganese Nodules extraction would remove some of the only hard substrate on the abyssal deep sea floor resulting in habitat loss and mortality of resident animals. Manganese nodules themselves take millions of year to form so these habitats could be completely lost from large areas of seabed. There are concerns that noise from any deep sea mining operations would travel over large distances and could negatively impact on deep diving whales and deep sea fish which use sensitive acoustic changes for communication and navigation. There are also fears that exclusion zones around mining areas in coastal waters will reduce fishing areas impacting on local people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, the deep-sea has high intrinsic and potentially commercial value in the form of marine genetic resources, including perhaps the pharmaceutical basis for new treatments and therapies., There are concerns that mining may destroy genetic resources before they are even investigated. Mining is thus certain to cause some irreversible damage and negative impacts to unique deep sea habitats. To protect marine habitats Greenpeace is calling for the implementation of a global network of Marine Reserves which would protect at least 40% of the world’s oceans including particularly vulnerable areas such as seamounts, and hydrothermal vents.

It causes biodiversity loss and slow rates of recoveryEPA 12 ( “Interim Report: Seabed Mining in the Northern Territory,” http://www.ntepa.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/144039/Seabed-Mining-Report.pdf) patelBased on an extensive review of dredging and offshore mining studies, Penney et al. (2008) found benthic recovery to be most rapid (< 2 years) in the intertidal and shallow subtidal zone (around 5 m depth), where fine-grained sandy sediments are affected by high wave action and strong current effects that allow removed or disturbed sediments to be rapidly replaced, redistributed and restratified. Penney et al. (2008) noted recovery to be slower in coarse gravel-type sediments and slowest in deep-sea areas, where it takes approximately 40 years

for substantial recovery (Figure 5, Appendix 11). Penney et al. (2008) also found natural benthic recovery rates, following cessation of seabed mining in Namibia, to be substantially faster than recovery of vegetation communities following cessation of land-based mining (Figure 5, Appendix 11). They illustrated this point by comparison with the arid Namibian desert where natural recovery processes are extremely slow, potentially taking decades before vegetation communities show significant signs of recovery, with some impacts still obvious after a century or more. In contrast, the turbulent, high-energy nearshore marine environment, with its benthic components well-adapted and robust to high levels of natural disturbance, supports much faster recovery processes. In some cases, a markedly different benthic community may recolonise the disturbed seabed area following the cessation of mining or dredging, particularly if sediment characteristics have been altered. Sand extraction, for example, can result in reduced sediment depths or exposure of different seabed sediments that support a different benthic community structure (Penney et al. 2008). Consideration needs to be given to differing recovery rates between different biological components of the marine environment. For example, nearshore benthic recovery rates may be relatively rapid (Penney et al. 2008) but recovery times for seagrass beds may be relatively slow (D. Parry, pers. comm., 29 Oct 2012). Differing recovery rates will need to be factored into seabed mining impact mitigation and rehabilitation programs.

Deep seabed mining exploits the habitats of life and results in biodiversity lossCraw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,” http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport.PDF) patelThe deep sea is a place of myth and mystery, filled with weird and wonderful life forms, and vital to the survival of our planet. But now, this mostly unknown world is facing large-scale industrial exploitation – as mining of the deep seabed for minerals fast becomes reality. As land-based minerals become depleted and prices rise, the search for new sources of supply is turning to the sea floor. This emerging industry, facilitated by advances in technology, poses a major threat to our oceans, which are already suffering from a number of pressures including overfishing, pollution, and the effects of climate change.1 A growing number of companies and governments2 – including Canada, Japan, South Korea, China and the UK – are currently rushing to claim rights to explore and exploit minerals found in and on the seabed, such as copper, manganese, cobalt and rare earth metals. There are currently 17 exploration contracts3 for the seabed that lies beyond national jurisdiction in the deep seas of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans, compared with only 8 contracts in 2010. Contract holders will be able to apply for licences to carry out commercial mining in the high seas as soon as regulations for exploitation are developed – anticipated as early as 2016.4 There is also significant exploration interest within national waters, particularly in the Pacific Ocean, and one licence to mine the deep seabed has already been granted in Papua New Guinean waters. However, very little is known about deep-sea habitats, or the impact that mining operations will have on ecosystems and the wider functioning of our oceans. Once thought to be relatively lifeless, scientists now recognise that the deep sea is actually a species-rich environment5, with many species still to be discovered. Because deep-sea species live in rarely disturbed environments and tend to be slow growing and late maturing, with some unique to their particular habitat types (such as hydrothermal vents) or even specific locations, they are highly vulnerable to disturbance or even extinction.6 Deep seabed mining could have serious impacts on the ocean environment and the future livelihoods and wellbeing of coastal communities. Only 3% of the oceans are

protected and less than 1% of the high seas7, making them some of the least protected places on Earth. The emerging threat of seabed mining is an urgent wake-up call: the world’s governments must act now to protect the high seas, including by creating a global network of marine reserves8 that will be crucial sanctuaries at sea for marine life and the ecosystems which we all rely on for our survival. An international, multi-sector approach to management and protection is needed, if we are to ensure the health and sustainable use of our oceans. The remote deep and open oceans host a major part of the world’s biodiversity, and are vital for our survival on Earth.9 The deep sea plays an important role in regulating planetary processes, including regulation of temperature and greenhouse gases.10 It supports ocean life by cycling nutrients and providing habitat for a staggering array of species.

Animals who cannot escape will die and result in biodiversity loss-not knowing the impact makes it worseCraw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,” http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport.PDF) patelSeabed mining poses a major threat to our oceans. All types of seabed mining will kill whatever can’t escape the mineral extraction operations. Organisms that grow on the seabed will be smothered as a result of sediment disturbance and the discharge of waste. The current lack of scientific knowledge on the deep-sea environment, and the lack of knowledge of the technology employed, limits our ability to predict the environmental impacts of mining operations and to determine whether habitats can ever recover from the disturbance.15 We know that deep-sea species from many habitats, such as seamounts and abyssal plains, are particularly vulnerable due to their slow growth rates, their low resilience to changes in their environment, and slow recovery rates after disturbance.16 Some hydrothermal vent communities may be more resilient to impacts because of the high natural levels of turnover of these ecosystems, although this is dependent on the underlying geology and biogeography of the individual systems.17 Mining licences for hydrothermal vents have already been granted to Nautilus Minerals by the Papua New Guinean government to mine for sea floor massive sulphides in national waters 1,500 metres under the sea, despite significant environmental concerns and community opposition. A study at the mining site found 20 new species, with more species likely to be found in the future.18 The impacts on the actual mining site will be very high, but the resilience of this system is unknown, as are the effectiveness of the proposed efforts to assist natural recovery. The wider impacts of the mining operation on surrounding ecosystems are also unknown.19

Mining pollutes the waters and creates higher risk for deathCraw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,” http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport.PDF) patelThe release of sediment plumes20, clouds of potentially toxic particles that will smother species and habitats, and could expose seabed communities to heavy metals and acid, is a major concern.21 Even if they manage to survive the direct mining impact, filter-feeding organisms will have their feeding apparatus clogged by these sediments, causing starvation. Some plumes are likely to be nutrient rich, which could cause algal blooms and reduce oxygen concentrations.22 It will be hard to predict how these plumes may spread. It is likely to be

impossible to restrict impacts from tailings, or the release of metals to a local area, due to the very nature of ocean currents.23 Impacts that spread far away from the original site could potentially lead to international disputes. Pollution from dewatering, the removal of water from metals removed from the seabed, may contain heavy metals and other pollutants, which will be re-suspended if discharged into the water column.24 Potential contamination of the food chain? Metals and other contaminants mobilised during mining or processing operations, as well as some processing chemicals themselves, could accumulate in the tissues of marine organisms, including fish. It is not clear how significant any increases above background contamination might be in any one case, and concerns have been raised by scientists and fishing communities in areas targeted for prospecting and mining, regarding the potential for tainting of fish or even the introduction of harmful levels of contaminants into the food chain.25 Noise and light pollution Deep-sea communities live in relative silence, and in the dark. Studies have shown that deep-sea fish communicate at low sound frequencies26, and are sensitive to acoustic changes to sense food falls – the fall of organic matter that provides an important source of nutrients to the deep sea27. Whales rely on sound for communication and navigation, and when encountering increased noise, change their vocalisation patterns and behaviour, and move away to new areas.28 Studies show that baleen whales experience chronic stress when exposed to increased shipping noise.29 Low-frequency mining noise could travel far from the mining site, with one estimate suggesting that noise from the Nautilus operation near Papua New Guinea could travel up to 600km from the site.30 This could have negative impacts on deep diving whales in the area. Mining will also introduce bright light into an environment that, but for bioluminescence, is constantly dark, impacting species that are adapted to these conditions, such as deep-sea vent shrimp, which have been shown to be blinded by the lights used by researchers.31

Mining results in catastrophic destruction of the natural habitat and biodiversity lossCraw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,” http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport.PDF) patelThe impacts of seabed mining are expected to change species diversity and density in the mined area, resulting in changes to the food web, with potential impacts on ecosystems and fish populations of unknown duration. The extraction of minerals from the seabed will destroy seabed habitat, and depending on the location and the mining technique used, leave a flatter, compressed surface that could be unsuitable for recolonisation and habitat recovery, or smother habitat in mining tailings. On seamounts, mining will cause the destruction of centuries-old coral and sponge communities and change complex seabed topography into a flattened and rubble and sediment strewn sea floor. Seabed mining could cause fish mortality, due to habitat loss and a decline in food sources. For example, phosphate extraction proposed in shallow water near Namibia is expected to impact fish populations through habitat and food source removal, with mining operations set to take place within migratory routes and spawning grounds.39 Similarly, within the deep sea, mineral deposits often occur in habitats that support important and diverse fish populations. For example, cobalt-rich crusts are often located on the flanks and summits of seamounts, underwater mountains that host a great abundance of species. These include slow-growing fish species such as orange roughy, grenadiers and redfish, the status of which – in the cases where data exist – is generally considered already overexploited or depleted by deep-sea fishing.40 In cases where

seamounts have been severely destroyed by bottom trawling, there has been no sign of recovery of large bottom-dwelling fauna five years after trawling stopped, highlighting the vulnerability of these communities.41 Research suggests that it will take many decades or more for seamount communities to recover from such trawling.42 Greenpeace has been calling for a ban on deep-sea bottom trawling to stop the potentially irreversible impacts of this destructive fishing practice on sensitive deep-sea habitats and species. The impacts of mining in these areas would be even more devastating to the already threatened fragile ecosystems of the deep ocean.

Mining kills unique speciesTom Levitt 10/28/10 – journalist (Ecologist, How deep-sea mining could destroy the 'cradle of life on earth', http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/653840/how_deepsea_mining_could_destroy_the_cradle_of_life_on_earth.html) patelDeep-sea hydrothermal vents systems may be where life first evolved on earth It was perhaps only a matter of time before mining the deep seas took off. Following in the footsteps of deep-sea fishing and drilling for oil it has been lurking in the minds of exploration companies like Nautilus Minerals, which is behind a major project in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The idea of digging up the seabed one mile beneath the ocean surface to extract mineral-rich deposits such as copper and zinc first emerged in the 1960s. An initial flurry of interest in the 1970s was put off by low

metal prices and UN regulations that exist on exploiting resources in international waters. But with rising demand from China and India for rare earth metals like copper, and deep-sea surveys having now found concentrations of minerals four to five times those on land, it has returned but this time in the ‘unregulated’ territorial waters of PNG, conveniently close to the Asian markets. Ecologists say the PNG government is allowing Nautilus to go ahead with the first ever commercial deep-sea mining project without properly considering the environmental impacts or local opposition. Nautilus investors include the mining giant Anglo-American which is ignoring indigenous opposition to a gold and copper mine in Alaska. ‘Cradle

of life on earth’ As well as being metal-rich, the volcanogenic hydrothermal deposits which Nautilus plans to mine are home to a unique ecosystem that is still largely unknown to scientists since being discovered in the late 1970s. Initially, the deep sea was thought to be full of soft sediment and little else but the discovery of hydrothermal vents on the seabed, which produce the deposits, revealed a completely novel ecosystem, unreliant on photosynthesis. ‘It’s the cradle of life on earth,’ explains Dr Rod Fujita from the Environmental Defense Fund and author of studies looking intio deep-sea mining, ‘and the only one that does not depend on sunlight. There are species there that are found nowhere else on earth. It’s not like any land habitats we are used to; in fact you have to have your perspective altered to appreciate this deep-sea world,’ he says. The mining process in PNG will take the top 20-30m off the seabed at a depth of 1,500m and lift it up to the surface

before transferring it by barge to processing sites on land. ‘You will destroy fauna just by lifting the land,’ says deep-sea ecologist Professor Paul Tyler, from the National Oceanography Centre at Southampton University. ‘It is possible you might mine at a distance [from the hydrothermal vents] but by mining close by you will affect the flow and the vents might switch off and then all the animals die – you lose a huge biomass.’ 'Flimsy' environmental report Nautilus has attempted to fend off these criticisms by publishing an environment assessment, co-produced by a respected deep-sea biologist Dr Cindy Van Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and seafloor habitats will ‘inevitably be severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘many years’ to recover. However, other ecologists say the assessment is ‘flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential damage mining will cause. Professor Richard Steiner, from the University of Alaska cites the incompleteness of classification of species found at the sites and an inadequate assessment of the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the effects of increased light and noise in the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering plume [the process of removing water from the mined deposits] to deep-sea organisms, which will not be able to differentiate between food and junk sediment. Of particular concern are the hundreds of thousands of tonnes of waste that will be produced by the mining process, which Steiner compares to that of a ‘giant underwater tractor’ and which will be pumped onto deeper seabeds nearby. Dr Fujita said the physics of water as well as weather and currents made it difficult to predict or contain any spill and that deep-sea mining had the capacity to produce pollution that could travel across into international waters. A smoking hydrothermal vent on the ocean seabed Exploitation or financial gain? ‘I don’t think the project would be allowed to proceed anywhere else in the world based on such a poor analysis of risks,’ says Steiner. The USA is known to have similar deposits off the coast of Washington as has Canada but mining is not thought to be imminent. Dr Fujita suggests Nautilus is just the latest overseas mining giant to take advantage of lax regulations in the country. ‘In PNG they have a poor record of mining on land resulting in lots of poor conditions and that bad record and lack of

oversight is now moving from land to sea,’ he says. Only this week the PNG government was accused by Greenpeace of allowing rampant logging and failing to respect the rights of indigenous groups who depend on the forests. Nautilus has reportedly suggested the country would benefit by more than $200 million from the mining but Steiner says the benefits to local people or the economy of PNG were likely to be disproportionately low compared to the scale and risk of the project. ‘While the project could gross almost $1 billion USD in its 30-month lifetime, it expects to provide only $41 million in total taxes and royalties to the government, a $1.5 million development fund and a few dozen jobs at most to PNG nationals,’ he said. Prof Steiner is also acting as a science advisor to Mas Kagin, a group formed in 2008 to give a voice to coastal indigenous people in PNG oppose any commercial mining. The group says it depends on the coastal waters for their ‘livelihood, culture and way of life’ and has a right to oppose the seabed mining. In a campaign video community groups from two provinces expressed their fears. ‘When we first heard that Nautilus was going to mine the seabed using technology that had never been used anywhere else it felt as though we were becoming a science lab…and our very lives part of an experiment to test this new technology,’ it says. Nautilus conducted workshops with local villages to explain its proposals but rejected calls to set up a permanent citizens advisory council. The company also declined to respond to concerns raised in this article but has previously said it took great pride in ‘leading the mining industry into the deep ocean’. Opening the floodgates It has estimated several billions tons of copper could be extracted from seafloor sites around the world. Dr Tyler acknowledges that the deep-sea has ‘not even had its surface scratched with what it might contribute to the economy’ but fears PNG’s decision to approve Nautilus mining plans will

‘open the floodgates’ before proper assessments have been made of the impact. China is known to be seeking to mine similar deposits in the South-West Indian Ocean. ‘Deep-sea fishing is a good example. We can ring alarm bells but there is no regulation of it. If I had my way the whole area of deep-sea would become a protected area and people who want to exploit it would have to apply to a body who can ensure that they were doing a proper environmental analysis before they were allowed to exploit it. At the moment there is no requirement at all and we end up looking at the damage done,’ he says. Steiner agrees and says there is too much wrong with the PNG project: ‘the way this first deep-sea mine proceeds will set the tone for all others, and this is a very, very bad start’. He argues investment in reusing copper and gold made more sense than continuing to pay mining companies to take bigger risks in an

effort to dig up more. ‘The global economy simply does not need the gold or copper that would be recovered at these deep-sea hydrothermal vents. We know how to recycle and reuse much of the copper already up out of the ground, run through the economy, and discarded in waste dumps. It is a unidirectional waste of resources, energy and money. And we know better.’

2NC Link / AT: Oversight

Negative impact on aquatic life---regulation diminish farther out of seaMacDonald, 12 Alistar, Writers WSJ, “Next Frontier: Mining the Ocean Floor,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577434660065784388 Meanwhile, environmental groups have raised concerns about the possible effect of deep-sea mining on aquatic life. While nations have specific regulatory authority over the seabed

under their territorial water, that oversight diminishes farther out to sea . Miners counter the likely environmental impact is less than onshore mining, in part because it doesn't require building roads and is far from human habitation.

2NC AT: Regulation

Its not that drilling causes accidents but that the fundamental activity is problematicTroianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello However Deep Sea mining could make this situation change for several reasons. Firstly, because of

the increasing public awareness on environmental issues. Secondly, because compared to offshore oil or gas industry, environmental risks are fundamentally different in nature. While in offshore oil or gas

industry the environmental risk is mainly accidental, with Deep Sea mining it comes from the nature of the activity itself . In the first case, the risk is identified, whereas in the second case it is poorly understood and

difficult to assess. The difference is significant: Deep Sea mining risk is not contained and its extent is just

about unknown.

2NC AT: Van Dover Study

Van Dover’s study is wrong Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat Nautilus has attempted to fend off these criticisms by publishing an environment assessment, co-produced by a respected deep-sea biologist Dr Cindy Van Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and seafloor habitats will ‘inevitably be severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘many years’ to recover.¶ However, other

ecologists say the assessment is ‘ flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential damage mining will cause.¶ Professor Richard Steiner, from the University of Alaska cites the incompleteness of classification of species found at the sites and an inadequate assessment of the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the effects of increased light and noise in the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering plume [the process of removing water from the mined deposits] to deep-sea organisms, which will not be able to differentiate between food and junk sediment.

2NC Impact Calc

The effects on the environment are long lasting and unpredictable due to untested equipmentAlex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patelAs minerals targeted by seabed mining occur in different forms and geological settings, the potential environmental impact - including on fisheries - should be considered within the particular geological region and mining methodology proposed. Nevertheless, certain common effects of seabed mining may be distinguished, such as the removal of mined material, along with seabed sediments and associated benthic organisms (organisms living on or under the seabed); the perturbation of the seabed; and the introduction of new materials to the environment, such as processing waste or energy in the form of heat, light and seismic and acoustic waves.5 The recovery of benthic communities (seabed plants and organisms) depends on a range of natural processes, but is generally most rapid in the intertidal and shallow subtidal zone, slower in coarse gravel sediments and slowest in deep- sea areas, where substantial recovery takes about 40 years. In some cases the impact of marine seabed mining may be particularly long lasting, for example, where mining or dredging changes the characteristics of the seabed, leading to a change in habitat.6 Opponents to seabed mining emphasise that scientific knowledge of ecosystems in the deep sea and other marine environments is often poorly developed and seabed mining relies on untested technologies that may result in unforeseen impacts on marine ecosystems.

We should utilize the precautionary principle when evaluating these types of debates---the lack of knowledge about the effects of mining on the ocean sea bed means we shouldn’t take the risk---this is how legislation and international law is structured and should shape your decision calculus Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello Obviously this kind of risk falls within the scope of the precautionary principle , which has had a

global impact since the 1992 Rio Conference. It has become influential in many fields of

international environmental law and central in the debate on climate change . Beyond that, the precautionary approach inspires public policy management especially in the context of sustainable use of natural resources. The well-known example is the fish stocks management.While U.N.C.L.O.S. does not expressly refers to the precautionary principle26it appears more or less explicitly in other more

specialized conventions related to marine pollution. Moreover upon the formula of “ prudence and caution ” it is

implicitly assumed by the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (I.T.L.O.S.). For instance, it was invoked against Japan by Australia and New Zealand in the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna case. In the absence of scientific certainty on how to ensure the conservation of this fish, the Court

encouraged the parties to act with caution , without mentioning explicitly the principle and to take

measures to avoid irreparable damage to existing stocks: “Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, the parties

should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern Bluefin tuna.” 27

2NC Species IL

Deep sea mining causes disruptions to the benthic layer---causes water toxicity, water columns, zooplankton, food chain Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello As stated, the effects of underwater mining are largely unknown and require a precautionary approach. Specialists and conservationists are nevertheless convinced that the removal of parts of the seabed will cause disruptions in the benthic layer, increased toxicity of the water column and suspended

sediment residues. Removing parts of the seabed could cause permanent disturbances into the

habitat of benthic organisms, possibly depending on the type of mining and location. Among these disturbances fine particles resulting from the mining could have the greatest impact. They could cause asphyxiation of several organisms . Depending on particles size and water currents the plumes could spread

over more or less extensive zones, possibly having an impact on light penetration, zooplankton ,

which in turn could affect the food chain.

2NC Vent IL

Drilling hurts the vent ecosystems Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”Additionally, it has been suggested that drilling could impact the flow of vent fluid diverting

hydrothermal fluids away from the vent communities (Interridge, 2000). This could result in a wide

range of impacts on the vent ecosystem , including the possibility of activating a new area at the drilling location. This may be diverting vent fluid away from previously active locations resulting in significant short term effects on the ecosystem . However, the vent ecosystem is well adapted to a changing environment because of natural tectonic activity as discussed in the environment section so long term impacts may be less severe over the entire vent field.

The organisms in the bottom of the ocean form the basis for the food chainBirney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) “Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”The vent ecosystems are rich in carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, organic carbon compounds, methane, hydrogen, and ammonium. Mineral rich venting fluid forms the basis for the food web.

The bacteria found in the vent systems are chemoautotrophic and use hydrogen sulfide or methane as their energy source. The majority of bacteria obtain their energy source from sulfide. Bacteria are specialized for extreme conditions. Hyperthermophiles can be found in extreme temperatures over 80°C, barophiles survive at high pressure, and acidophiles survive in acidic conditions.¶ Bacteria can be found living in the subsurface of the vents, on

surfaces surrounding vent openings, on the surfaces of vent animals, and suspended within the effluent itself (Hessler, 1995). Bacteria and hydrothermal vent organisms form symbiotic relationships with various animals. The importance of the symbiotic relationships between these organisms is illustrated by the Giant Tubeworm, Riftia pachyptila, where the relationship¶ 17¶ with bacteria is obligatory (essential for both host and symbiont). This tubeworm is a large animal reaching 1-2 meters in length. The host, Riftia, provides the symbiont, bacteria, with a stable supply of nutrients from the external environment, and the symbiont supplies the host with a stable supply of organic carbon (Van Dover, 2000). Riftia pachyptila lacks a digestive system, and relies exclusively on the chemosynthetic bacteria for energy. The bacteria live inside the trophosome of the tubeworm, which is a specialized organ to house the sulfide-oxidizing bacteria. It is imperative that the higher organisms are able to incorporate the energy produced by the microorganisms so that they can survive at hydrothermal vents. Other symbiotic dependent organisms include the Giant White

Clams and the mussel Bathymodiolus. In both cases bacteria live in the gill filaments. Snails and clams are also known to host

symbiotic bacteria.¶ In addition to maintaining symbiotic relationships, the bacteria also form the basis of the food web as primary producers . Organisms such as the blind Atlantic vent shrimp, Rimacaris, feed on the sulfur bacteria directly. Similarly, other worms and polychaetes have been observed with bacteria in their gut, suggesting they feed directly on the mats of sulfur bacteria. Larger organisms, such as crabs and fishes are opportunistic feeders and feed on other vent organisms. Thus, a food web is established, consisting of primary producers (chemoautotrophic sulfur bacteria), the secondary

producers (tubeworms, mussels, clams, shrimp), and predators (fishes) or detritivores (crabs).

***Solvency

AT: Solvency

5 Reason Aff Fails in long term- stabilization; sterilization; savings; socio-economic growth; and safetyUNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”, http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)

The truth is that too often mining revenues have been used not for positive social transformation but for short-term or focused political agendas. Sound revenue management will ensure that the correct balance is narrowly struck between saving revenue for future generations, and spending current mining revenue on with long-term benefits.

In order to better guide governments in the most appropriate way to collect projects, manage and disburse natural-resources revenues, five issues are of particular importance and need to be taken into account

to ensure sound revenue management. These issues are stabilization; sterilization; savings; socio-economic growth; and safety. Stabilization refers to the need to protect against mineral-resource price fluctuations and require that incremental revenues be set aside in a Fund when the commodity prices are high

and taken out when the prices drop, so that governments have a stable revenue stream. Sterilization involves keeping a large part of the revenue collected out of the local economy to avoid Dutch disease and excessive

inflationary pressure. Saving for future generations: since the resources are limited and will eventually be exhausted, some of the revenues should be saved in view of intergenerational equity. Examples of savings funds include

Norway and more recently Timor-Leste Safeguarding revenue: protecting saved revenue is not always easy. It is necessary to have a separate funding vehicle for savings which is governed by non-discretionary rules, so that Governments are less tempted to spend these savings. Socio-economic development: although revenue should be set aside for future generations, long-term investments in infrastructure and socio-economic projects should be made while mining is going on . Making good

investments in health, education, roads, technology, etc. is also investing in future generations One of the main challenges for Governments receiving substantial additional revenues from mining activity is how to properly manage a significant increase in budget and to avoid waste . Public demands may put government under pressure to increase expenditure in various areas. Although some socio-economic projects may have long-term benefits, spending and investment decisions can become highly politicized. In this climate, short-term benefit projects, rather than long-lasting ones, can often become the norm.

AT: Tech

Technology is not viable MacDonald, 12 Alistar, Writers WSJ, “Next Frontier: Mining the Ocean Floor,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577434660065784388 But previous attempts at deep-sea mining haven't yet proven technologically possible or

economically viable , despite more than a century of experience. Efforts date back to the 1870s, when a

British research vessel trawled up manganese nodules from a depth of almost three miles as part of a wider scientific study of the world's oceans.¶ Commercial efforts to raise manganese from the ocean floor in the 1970s collapsed amid technical difficulties, among other problems. Despite recent gains in technology , some

mining analysts say the challenges ahead for economic production are still significant . ¶ Costs are

still far from clear, and the limits of today's advances in technology are still largely untested. Last week's announcement from Nautilus came as little surprise to analysts, who say delays are common in mining and particularly so in projects pursuing new avenues.

AT: Private Companies

No mining for a decade---start up costs too highGoodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-nowJohn Wiltshire, director of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory, also at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, puts it even more bluntly. "The truth of the matter is, nobody's going to mine in the deep sea

— even if somebody massively funds this — for a minimum of a decade ," he says. The startup

cost could run from $1 to $2 billion .

No one wants to mine and mining won’t replace China for a decade—can’t solve the advantagesGoodier 11 (Rob Goddier is a writer for Popular Mechanics’ environment and earth column, Popular Mechanics, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now”, 7/8/11, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now)Deep-sea rare-earth deposits aren't new, either. Wiltshire, Sansone and many other researchers have been studying mineral deposits—including rare-

earth mineral deposits—on the ocean floor since their careers began. "I published a paper on this 25 years ago. The first papers that indicated rare-earth minerals go back 30 or 35 years," Wiltshire says. "People have been talking about mining manganese nodules since the 1960s," Manganese nodules are conglomerates of metallic particles—rare-earth metals and others—stripped from the water over eons, and they were the hot undersea mining topic of decades past. Manganese nodule mining even provided cover for a bit of Cold War intrigue in 1974, when a $350 million deep-sea drilling ship built by one of Howard Hughes' companies supposedly went looking for a deposit to develop. In fact, the ship was being used by the CIA to look for a Soviet nuclear sub that had sunk

off Oahu in the 1960s. Today, though, as in the 1970s, cost and time remain enormous hurdles to mining these deposits. Wiltshire says a proposed deep-sea mine off the coast of Papua New Guinea illustrates the challenges that would face anyone looking to start a rare-earth operation in the Pacific Ocean. Nautilus Minerals plans to build a $157 million ship to support what could be the world's only deep-sea gold and copper mine. The ship, floating about three miles above the seafloor, will need to be gigantic: 680 feet long, with a deadweight capacity of more than 20,000 tons and bunks for up to 160 people. Nautilus plans to unleash three remote-controlled devices on the sea floor: two cutters and a collector, adapted from technologies used in the oil and cable-trenching

industries. An as-yet-undesigned pump system will lift the ore from the seafloor to the ship. "They've already spent about $400 million, the boat will be a couple hundred million," Wiltshire says. "A complete operation for Nautilus will easily be a billion." The question, then, for any company that would seek to lease these areas (from the Pacific nations which possess the rights) and mine

rare earths from the ocean bottom is: Is it worth all this trouble and expense? At 0.2 percent concentration of rare earths, the deep-sea deposits pale in comparison to ore deposits on land, which can have 5 to 10 percent concentrations. All things being equal, it's easier to collect minerals from mud than from ore. But things are not equal, because this mud is beneath three miles of water. Experts do not discount the notion that we may someday mine rare-earth metals in the deep sea; perhaps the buzzwords of the year 2040 will be "Autonomous Underwater Mining Vehicle." But if you're wondering where rare-earth components in computer chips and solar cells will come from for the next decade, the answer is clear—China.

AT: Leasing

Leasing mechanisms fail—companies hate it and very low concentrations of minerals. Goodier 11 (Rob Goddier is a writer for Popular Mechanics’ environment and earth column, Popular Mechanics, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now”, 7/8/11, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now)

The question, then, for any company that would seek to lease these areas (from the Pacific nations which possess the rights) and mine rare earths from the ocean bottom is: Is it worth all this trouble and expense? At 0.2 percent concentration of rare earths, the deep-sea deposits pale in comparison to ore deposits on land, which can have 5 to 10 percent concentrations. All things being equal, it's easier to collect minerals from mud than from ore. But things are not equal, because this mud is beneath three miles of water. Experts do not discount the notion that we may someday mine rare-earth metals in the deep sea; perhaps the buzzwords of the year 2040 will be "Autonomous Underwater Mining Vehicle." But if you're wondering where rare-earth components in computer chips and solar cells will come from for the next decade, the answer is clear—China.

***Chinese Monopoly Advantage

AT: Chinese Monopoly

Chinese monopoly is over - it will never be consistent and always fall apartWortsall 13 – Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute, writer at Forbes (12/18/13, Forbes, “Chinese Rare Earth Metals Surprise, Free Markets Actually Work,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/12/18/chinese-rare-earth-metals-surprise-free-markets-actually-work/) patelChina’s virtual monopoly on rare earth elements used in high-technology applications has been loosened, decreasing the risk that supplies to U.S. defense contractors could be disrupted, according to the Pentagon’s latest assessment of the nation’s industrial base. “Global market forces are leading to positive changes in rare earth supply chains, and a sufficient supply of most of these materials likely will be available to the defense industrial base,” said the Pentagon report by Elana Broitman, the Defense Department’s top official on the U.S. industrial base. “Prices for most rare earth oxides and metals have declined approximately 60 percent from their peaks in the summer of 2011.” Here’s the background: back 5 years ago 95% of the world’s rare earth production came from China. The rest was in India and Russia or ex-Soviet states (indeed, the one I deal with was almost exclusively coming from Russia). Then China decided that they would limit exports from that nation. The declared reason was environmental: it is indeed a messy business. The general assumption was that the reason was rather different. They limited exports of the raw materials but not of anything made from them. Neodymium for example, had an export limit (and serious export taxes) slapped on it, but FeNdB magnets, made from neodymium could be exported without limits or taxes. So we all assumed that the intention was to attract the manufacturing to China and thus increase the amount of value added in that country. So, what actually happened? Well, just what people like me, those with morethan a passing acquaintance with rare earths and free markets said would happen (indeed, I said it here in Foreign Policy). Mines outside China began to open up, exploration for new mines outside China surged (at one point there were more than 400 such projects going on) and manufacturers started to consider whether they really, really, needed to use rare earths or whether something else would do. Supply went up and demand went down in other words. Thus was the Chinese monopoly broken and prices fell back. All of which teaches us something useful about monopolies. Where a monopoly is contestable we don’t in fact have to worry about it very much. China was selling us all of the rare earths we wanted, at prices we were happy to pay, for decades. So, they had a monopoly? So what? As soon as they actually tried to take advantage of that monopoly then it all fell apart for them. They actually, by attempting to restrict supply, managed to call into being their own competition. This has applications in other ares of current concern of course. For example, the European Union claims that Google is misusing its dominance in search. But while Google certainly is dominant in search this is a contestable monopoly. As soon as Google starts to throw its weight around to the detriment of consumers then consumers will go off and use one of the myriad of alternatives. And new alternatives will arrive as well. Where monopolies are natural ones (perhaps because of network effects) or backed by government licence or regulation the situation is different, but a contestable monopoly can almost certainly be left alone. Precisely because as soon as anyone tries to profit from the monopoly that monopoly itself will be contested.

Domestic mine in alaska solvesSEACC, 11 – (12/27, “Rare Earth Elements in Alaska TRADE OUR SALMON FOR “CLEAN” ENERGY?,” seacc.org/mining/bokan-mountain-mine/RareEarthElementswebsitegarfsFINAL.pdf)

An all¶ -¶ but¶ -¶ forgotten uranium mine on Prince of Wales Island has is experiencing a

renaiss¶ ance of much ¶ of the hype and speculation for developing a domestic source for rare Earth Elements (REEs) is focused¶ on a small deposit on Prince of Wa¶ les Island near Bokan Mountain.¶

If you have missed the rhetoric, China controls 97% of the world’s supply¶ of REE’s and is restricting¶ exports

threatening the development of renewable energy and green technologies. Mining on POW is¶ considered neces ¶

sary to break China’s control.

US companies are investing --- solves 30 percent of the the global supply Schneider, 12 – (October 26, Howard, Washington Post, “China’s advantage erodes in a key area: rare earth minerals,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-26/business/35498936_1_rare-earth-earth-exports-europium)

Even as the United States was pursuing its WTO claim, Colorado-based Molycorp, along with firms in Australia and elsewhere, were reshaping the landscape . Molycorp reopened a rare earth mine in Mountain Pass, Calif., that had been shuttered a decade ago because the supply of the minerals coming from

China was so cheap.¶ Molycorp President Mark A. Smith said the company, which has scaled up employment at the mine

from 55 to 420 in recent years, aims to produce as much as 40,000 metric tons a year by 2013 ,

accounting for about 30 percent of projected world supply.

Molycorp will solve domestic rare earth shortagesProctor 13 (Cathy, Oct 2 2013, "Molycorp: The only US rare-earth mine is ready for prime time," www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2013/10/molycorps-only-rare-earth-mine-in-the.html?page=all, ADL)The last major elements of the $1.5 billion expansion and modernization of Molycorp Inc.’s rare earth mining and processing facility in Mountain Pass, Calif., are done, according to the company. Specifically, the mine’s chloralkali plant is “mechanically complete” and work to start up the plant has begun, the Greenwood Village-based mining company (NYSE: MCP) said Wednesday. Also, the last unit of the mine’s “multi-stage cracking plant” also is mechanically complete and startup procedures have begun, Molycorp said. “This means that the final construction work on the $1.5 billion rebuild of the Mountain Pass facility is complete,” Molycorp’s spokesman, Jim Sims, told me. “The units are now in commissioning and following that they’ll go into full-scale production,” he said. Molycorp mines rare-earth elements, which are processed into compounds vital for a number of industrial and military applications, including electronics, oil refining, bombs and special magnets used in wind turbines and electric cars. At Mountain Pass, Molycorp owns the biggest U.S. deposits of rare earths. The chloralkali plant takes wastewater from the process that separates mining ore and the rare earth elements and recycles it into feedstocks for the separation process, Sims said. “It greatly reduces the environmental footprint at Mountain Pass, and it also drives down our production costs,” Sims said. Molycorp hopes its process will be competitive with the lowest cost rare earth producers in the world, the company said. The mine’s multi-stage cracking plant is part of a chemical process that raises the amount of rare earth elements the facility can get from the ore, speed up the production process, and also lower costs, the company

said. “About 8 percent of the ore you pull out of the ground is rare earths,” Sims said. “We’re getting increasingly better rates of recovery, and this last unit of the multi-stage cracking unit will help us increase that even more. It’s all about efficiency,” he said.

China is taking efforts to stabilize prices now: stockpiling and taxesLowder 12 - Sally Lowder of The Critical Metals Report (9/11/12, "China's Stockpile Effort Could Stablize Rare Earth Metals Prices: Brandon Tirpak," www.theaureport.com/pub/na/chinas-stockpile-effort-could-stabilize-rare-earth-metals-prices-brandon-tirpak, ADL)Ultimately, falling prices for the metal commodities or for the rare earth oxides (REOs) directly affect money flowing into the industry. I think the Chinese government will take extra measures to stabilize prices or exert some upward price pressure, such as new taxes or the stockpiling efforts it recently announced.

TCMR: Tell us more about China's stockpiling plans. BT: This past July, the Chinese government announced,

without elaboration, that it would create a stockpile of roughly 6 billion (B) renminbi-worth of REEs. That effort will

begin within the next several weeks. A lot of people expect to see some price stabilization as a result, and if you take note of figures published by Asian Metal, the rate at which prices are falling has slowed drastically over the last several months.

AT: Monopoly = War

It is empirically denied by the Japan disputes China will go to war when they stop exportsSternberg 14- Joseph, editor at the WSJ (1/8/14, Wall Street Journal, “How the Great Rare-Earth Metals Crisis Vanished,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579308252845415022) patelThere was a time, not so long ago, when the world feared China was going to use its dominance of the global rare-earth-element industry to crush Western economies and militaries in a strategic vise. Those were the days. Recent developments highlight how wrong those alarmist predictions were. Rare earths are the metals at the bottom of the periodic table that are exceptionally useful in many high-tech applications, from lasers to solar panels to electric car batteries to smartphones. China is the world's major extractor and only processor of rare-earth ores. Beijing aroused worries in late 2010 when it apparently limited exports of the minerals to Japan amid a territorial dispute. The episode stoked fears that China would use its sole-supplier status for nefarious ends. Except that it turns out Beijing doesn't have the wherewithal to execute such a dastardly plan. Consider the new plan Beijing unveiled last week to consolidate its rare-earth industry into six large extraction and processing companies. As a start, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Company (yes, that's its name) is buying nine of its smaller competitors in the north, with more mergers and acquisitions to come. This is at least the second time in roughly a decade that Beijing has attempted rare-earth rationalization. The first foundered when faced by opposition that included the local officials who so often sponsor projects away from Beijing's watchful gaze. The consolidation drive is a sign of weakness, not strength. The impetus is Beijing's need to resolve the problems its past interventions in the market have created. Export restrictions kicked in three years ago, officially justified by the need to reduce the pollution caused by mining and processing. Global prices rose dramatically, creating an incentive for new miners to start production, and an opportunity for them to profit from circumventing export blocks via endemic smuggling. Meanwhile, Beijing's economic stimulus policies lowered the cost of credit, making it easier to fund this investment. But once the global panic subsided and demand slackened, rare-earth prices fell by as much as 60% from their 2011 peaks. Oversupply is the new worry. On a related note, the export restrictions also have not helped Beijing mitigate the environmental damage caused by the rare-earth industry. Processing the ores is messy work, and Beijing seems to have hoped that whatever other mercantilist objective it might achieve, limiting export quantities would also lead to a cleanup of the industry at home. Not so, because the restrictions stimulated new mining by small, illegal operators with even worse environmental practices than the big companies. Now lower global prices and the resulting thinner profit margins make costly environmental compliance that much harder. Don't suppose for a minute that centrally arranged consolidation will solve any of this, since consolidation doesn't fix the underlying problem with China's approach to rare earths: Beijing still steadfastly refuses to allow the market to operate. Just ask yourself, when is the last time that politically allocated capital; administrative controls on price, production, export or other disposition of an output; and centrally determined corporate structures resulted in a rational industry, in China or anywhere else? For guidance on better options, Beijing could look abroad. The other big rare earths story of the moment highlights the extent to which Beijing's non-market machinations have triggered

helpful market responses elsewhere. A Pentagon report leaked last month noted that reliance on Chinese rare-earth metals, while still high, is declining. New supplies for most rare-earths are coming online, as uncertainty over China's reliability and a period of higher prices stimulated investment in new mining projects elsewhere. Greenland and Russia both have opened new tracts to rare-earths exploration in the past year. China's share of global production now is down to as low as 80% from 95% in 2010.

AT: Solvency

The US lacks domestic refining capability—still get sent to ChinaKennedy 1/29 (Jim Kennedy is an internationally recognized expert on rare earths and Thorium nuclear energy systems and has been actively involved in consulting, advisory and legislative issues for the mining and energy industry. He is a leading industry advocate for the development of a fully integrated rare earth value chain inside the U.S. and promoting the development of Thorium nuclear energy., Investor Intel, “China’s Rare Earth Monopoly and its formidable impact on U.S. National Defense”, http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/chinas-rare-earth-monopoly-formidable-impact-u-s-national-defense/#sthash.gA1R2Gc5.dpuf) Molycorp recently disclosed to shareholders that much of its cerium production cannot be sold, because of the latter material’s oversupply. Cerium and lanthanum oxides, which are typically used by the glass

polishing and petroleum cracking industries, are not critical to weapon systems or high technology applications. It is my understanding that Molycorp sells most of its lanthanum to W.R. Grace for use in the chemical catalyst

petroleum applications. The remaining 17%* of high value rare earths that Molycorp produces from Mountain Pass goes to China for refining and value adding, according to the acquisition agreement between Neo Material Technologies Inc. and Molycorp.

No domestic refining capability and China is preferred by US companies. Kennedy 1/29 (Jim Kennedy is an internationally recognized expert on rare earths and Thorium nuclear energy systems and has been actively involved in consulting, advisory and legislative issues for the mining and energy industry. He is a leading industry advocate for the development of a fully integrated rare earth value chain inside the U.S. and promoting the development of Thorium nuclear energy., Investor Intel, “China’s Rare Earth Monopoly and its formidable impact on U.S. National Defense”, http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/chinas-rare-earth-monopoly-formidable-impact-u-s-national-defense/#sthash.gA1R2Gc5.dpuf) 1. U.S. mining of rare earths is pointless if it isn’t able to refine these resources into value added DoD ready commodities: China maintains a global monopoly on all refining, metallurgical, alloy and component technologies as well as OEM and material science facilities. U.S., Japanese, Korean and European businesses are relocating to China to secure access to these materials, including those used by National Defense. For instance, in 2013, GM established a new Technology Science Laboratory in China. As an example, a Chinese corporation was granted approval to purchase the assets of A123 battery. A123 was the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s drive for electric vehicles. The fact that GE moved the last of its medical imaging divisions to China provides further proof. Over the last decade nearly every major multinational relying on REE’s has moved its manufacturing facilities, established subsidiaries and suppliers in China to gain access to these materials in what is a labor and technology drain that is undermining our economic future. The U.S. should establish in my opinion – a fully integrated REE refinery value chain in North America.

AT: China Bashing

Currency manipulation causes China bashingHsu, 4/21 Sara, Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York, “Are Claims of Currency Manipulation Just China Bashing?,” http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/are-claims-of-currency-manipulation-just-china-bashing/Opponents of the idea that China manipulates its currency assert that this allegation is a type of “ China bashing ,” carried out for political purposes and containing little economic merit. These analysts

contend that the currency manipulation argument becomes a larger issue only when it is politically convenient, as interest groups in favor of legislation against China gain ground. They also argue that China’s chosen type of “crawling peg” exchange rate is valid since experience has shown that other types of exchange rates, particularly a fully liberalized exchange rate, can be harmful if the currency suddenly changes value. Some scholars have also found the currency manipulation allegations to be counterproductive, as they result in a further depreciation of the currency.

AT: Protectionism IL

china tightening its grip on REE increase production of other REEs and increases innovation for conservation --- internal link turns the impact

OR

US will always be able to get REEs even with restrictions PLumer, 12 – (10/19, Brad, Washington Post, “China’s grip on the world’s rare earth market may be slipping,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/10/19/chinas-chokehold-over-rare-earth-metals-is-slipping/)

Then in 2010, China decided to restrict its export quota by 40 percent. That helped drive prices up and suddenly made it economical for other countries to start boosting their own production again again. Out in Mountain Pass, Calif., for instance, Molycorp is now reopening and expanding its massive rare earth metals mine.¶ Meanwhile, Japan has rushed to reduce its dependence on rare earths over the past few years—

especially since China has a habit of restricting exports every time the two nations get into a territorial spat. Panasonic has developed a technique to recycle neodymium from old electronic appliances. Honda is extracting rare earths from used car batteries. TDK Corp., which creates magnets for motors, now sprays dysprosium on its motors rather than mixing it in, in order to conserve. All told, reports the Asahi Shinbun,

Japan’s demand for rare earths dropped from 31,000 tons in 2010 to 23,000 tons in 2011.¶ So even though China is still the world’s largest rare earths supplier, its ability to control the global market has lessened

greatly . Within two years, the market adjusted . As a result, Barber notes, “China itself also is changing its tune and has

announced a higher export quota.”

2010 empirically denies the impact --- we don’t become protectionist nor crack down but just find new reservesParthemore, 1AC Author, 11 – (Christine Parthemore, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where she directs the Natural Security Program and the Natural Security Blog, prolific author, former journalist writing for The Washington Post, Roll Call, and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, MA from Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, June 2011, “ELEMENTS OF SEUCURITY: MITIGATING THE RISKS OF U.S. DEPENDENCE ON CRITICAL MINERALS,” Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf)

Minerals are a subject of much contention. On one hand, the United States remains less prepared for supply disruptions, price spikes and trade disagreements related to the global minerals trade than most experts realize. On the other hand, public concern over reliable access to the minerals required in key sectors of the U.S. economy, in particular those needed to produce military equipment, is growing. Too frequently, however, such concerns are based on inaccurate assumptions. A sober and informed analysis suggests there are real vulnerabilities, which place critical national security and foreign policy interests at risk. In worst-case scenarios, supplies of minerals that the United States does not produce domestically may be disrupted, creating price spikes and lags in delivery. Even short of major supply disruptions, supplier countries can exert leverage over the United States by threatening to cut off certain key mineral supplies. The United States may also lose ground strategically if it continues to lag in managing mineral issues, as countries that consider assured access to minerals as far more strategically important are increasingly setting the rules for trade in this area. China’s rising dominance is at the heart of this growing public debate. Its 2010 cutoff of rare earth elements2 – a unique set of minerals that are difficult to process yet critical to many hightech applications –

attracted particular attention. After Japan detained a Chinese trawler captain over a skirmish in the East China Sea, Japanese companies reported weeks of stalled shipments of rare earths from China amid rumors of an official embargo. This may

sound like a minor trade dispute, but China currently controls production of about 95 percent of the world’s rare earths, which are critical to building laser-guidance systems for weapons, refining petroleum and building wind turbines. Coinciding with possessing this incredible leverage over the rest of the world, China has also reduced its export quotas for these minerals. For its part, the Chinese government contended that it did not put any formal export embargo in place, and that its plans to reduce exports simply reflect the need to meet growing domestic demand for rare earths. Japan-China relations experienced further strain in their already tense relationship. In the United States, many reporters, policy analysts and decision makers did not foresee this challenge. Feeling blindsided, some in the United States characterized the situation in a manner that demonized China rather than using the opportunity to better understand the true nature of U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities. The 2010 rare earths case and others are increasing interest in critical minerals among U.S. policymakers. Congress held hearings on the strategic importance of minerals between 2007 and 2010, and the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to study and report on its dependence on rare earth elements for weapons, communications and other systems.3 During a 2009 hearing on minerals and military readiness, Republican Representative Randy Forbes of Virginia called minerals, “one of those things that no one really talks about or worries about until something goes wrong. It’s at that point – the point where we don’t have the steel we need to build MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] engine that the stockpile becomes critically important.”4 In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that it would be “in our interests commercially and strategically” to find additional sources of supply for rare earth minerals, and stated that China’s recent cuts to rare earth exports “served as a wakeup call that being so dependent on only one source, disruption could occur for natural disaster reasons or other kinds of events could intervene

Protectionism now over solar panels Cardwell, 6/3 Diane, NYT Writer, “U.S. Imposes Steep Tariffs on Importers of Chinese Solar Panels,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/energy-environment/us-imposing-duties-on-some-chinese-solar-panels.html?_r=0

The Commerce Department on Tuesday imposed steep duties on importers of Chinese solar panels made from certain components, asserting that the manufacturers had benefited from unfair subsidies.¶ The duties will range from 18.56 to 35.21 percent, the department said.¶ The decision, in a long-simmering trade dispute, addresses one of the main charges in a petition brought by the manufacturer SolarWorld Industries America. While it is preliminary, the ruling means that the United States will

begin collecting the tariffs in advance of the final decision, expected later this year.¶ “Today is a strong win for the U.S. solar industry,” said Mukesh Dulani, president of SolarWorld Industries America, based in Hillsboro, Ore. “We look forward to the end of illegal Chinese government intervention in the U.S. solar market, and we applaud Commerce for its work that supports

fair trade.Ӧ The decision comes against a backdrop of increasing trade conflict driven at least partly by a rapidly evolving industry whose center of manufacture and installation has shifted over the last decade from Europe to Asia. Although the European Union settled a similar dispute with China through negotiation, tensions have still bubbled. And the United States is seeking to challenge India over the local content requirements for its solar program through the World Trade Organization.

AT: Protectionism Impact

Trade wars won’t escalate to real conflict, let alone protectionismIkenson, 09 associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html

A Little Perspective, PleaseAlthough some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates.If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation.In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020.

While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

AT: China Impact

No China warRobert J. Art , Fall 20 10 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the

other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability

vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically . These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

***Clean Tech Advantage

AT: Clean Tech (High)

The US is winning the clean tech race and has structural advantages over China Bredenberg, 13 Al, writer, analyst, consultant, communicator, and specialist in the investigation and articulation of complex topics “More Questions Raised About Whether U.S. or China Dominates in Cleantech,” http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2013/03/25/more-questions-raised-about-whether-us-or-china-dominates-cleantech/ Conventional wisdom says that, when it comes to cleantech manufacturing, China is cleaning the United States’s clock. We published a piece here at IMT Green & Clean Journal a few weeks ago implying exactly that.¶

So you can imagine our surprise when the Pew Charitable Trust’s Environmental Initiatives group

came out with a report this month claiming that the U.S. actually has a trade surplus over

China in solar photovoltaic (PV), wind and smart energy technologies . The report makes the contrarian

statement: “Considering all aspects of the value chain, U.S. exports and trade to China actually exceeded Chinese exports to the United States by $1.63 billion in 2011,” 2011 being the latest year in which data were

available for the purposes of the report.¶ Overall, says Pew, the U.S. and China, the world’s leading economies, trade more than half a trillion dollars in goods and services back and forth. In that big picture, China exported $4.00 in 2011 for every $1.00 by the U.S., reflecting “the reality that China is a low-cost producer and the United States a high-volume consumer of finished products.”¶ But in the area of clean energy technologies, the U.S. has some

advantages that aren’t reflected in that larger picture . Pew finds that, because of the country’s

expertise in innovation and entrepreneurship , U.S. firms “excel in production and sale of complex, high-margin and performance-critical goods,” while “China’s strength is more narrowly based on assembly and high-volume manufacturing.”

US Clean tech high and increasing with no signs of slowing downDepartment of Energy 14 ("CLEAN TECH NOW," energy.gov/clean-tech-now, ADL)America’s energy landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation. According to a new Energy Department report, falling costs for four clean energy technologies -- land-based wind power, solar panels, electric cars and LED lighting -- have led to a surge in demand and deployment. The numbers tell an exciting story: America is experiencing a historic shift to a cleaner, more domestic and more secure energy future. That clean technology revolution is here today -- and it is gaining force. Read the report Revolution Now: The Future for Four Clean Energy Technologies Watch a video from Secretary Ernest Moniz and learn more about the report Read Secretary's Moniz blog post about the report and the Clean Tech Revolution

WIND ENERGY Wind energy is the fastest growing source of power in the United States, creating jobs opportunities for thousands of Americans and boosting economic growth. In 2012, U.S. wind capacity topped 60 GW, enough energy to power more than 15 million homes. America's Wind Industry Reaches Record Highs Wind Farm Growth

Through the Years Blades of Glory: Wind Technology Bringing Us Closer To a Clean Energy Future Energy 101: Wind Turbines RESIDENTIAL SOLAR The U.S. is on the verge of a major shift to solar energy, putting a clean, renewable energy source within reach of the average American family. In 2012, rooftop solar panels cost about 1 percent of what they did 30 years

ago, and deployment is skyrocketing. Top 6 Things You Didn't Know About Solar Energy Energy 101: Solar Photovoltaics Energy Department Support Brings Game-Changing Advancements in Solar Energy Finding Solutions to Solar's Soft Cost Dilemma Solar For Milwaukee, By

Milwaukee ELECTRIC VEHICLES Before 2010, there was effectively no demand for electric vehicles. In 2012, Americans bought more than 50,000 plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). And with battery costs falling more than 50 percent in the last four years, 2013 is set to be another banner year for PEVs. In the first half of 2013, Americans doubled the number of PEVs they purchased compared to the same period in 2012, and last month, PEV sales reached a new record high. More than 11,000 PEVs were sold in August 2013 -- that's a 29 percent improvement in sales over the previous monthly record. Top 10 Things You Didn’t Know About Electric Vehicles The eGallon: How Much Cheaper Is It to Drive on Electricity? Visualizing Electric Vehicle Sales Energy 101: Electric Vehicles LED LIGHTING Unlike traditional

incandescent bulbs, LED lighting generates more light than heat and lasts as much as 25 times longer.

Once an expensive niche product, LED bulbs are becoming an affordable choice for Americans looking to reduce their electric bills. In 2012, about 49 million LEDs were installed in the U.S. -- saving about $675 million in annual energy costs. Switching entirely to LED lights over the next two decades could save the U.S. $250 billion in energy costs and avoid 1,800 million metric tons of carbon pollution. Top 8 Things You Didn’t Know About LEDs LED Lighting Bright Lights and Even Brighter Ideas Energy 101: Lumens A Winning Light Bulb With the Potential to Save the Nation Billions

US clean tech is at historically record highsClean Edge 13 (June 2013, "2013 U.S. Clean Tech Leadership Index," http://cleanedge.com/sites/default/files/CTLI-2013-Report.pdf, ADL)Yet despite these negative factors, clean-tech deployment in the U.S. showed notable, and even historic, market momentum during the year. Wind power, spurred in part by the then-looming expiration of the federal production tax credit, grew by 28 percent with 13.1 gigawatts of new capacity installed in 2012,

bringing the U.S. past the 60 GW milestone in total wind power capacity for the first time . That

made wind energy the nation’s largest source of new generation capacity for the year, contributing 41 percent of the total – even more than the 33 percent share of new generation capacity from natural gas. Overall, renewable energy (wind,

solar, geothermal, biomass, and others) accounted for 49 percent of the nation’s added electricity capacity, its largest share ever. Solar PV in the U.S., spurred by continued price drops and ever-more-innovative financing options, had its second straight banner growth year. Installed PV capacity grew by 3,313 MW or 76 percent, with California becoming the first state to install more than 1,000 MW in a single year. The geothermal power industry bounced back from recent doldrums, adding more than three times as much new capacity in 2012 as the two previous years combined. This growth in clean

energy occurred with little significant new federal legislation or Congressional leadership. But clean-tech leadership at the state and metro

level tells a different, and much better, story. As we detail in the State Index, U.S. states – often politically conservative ones – are now rivaling the world’s leading clean- tech nations for preeminence in many areas. Take Iowa and South Dakota. With each state generating 24 percent of its utility-scale electricity from wind power in 2012, they trail only the country of Denmark (at 30 percent) for world leadership in this critical clean-tech metric. And Iowa wind farms actually generate more power than those in Denmark – 13,945 GWh in 2012, as compared to 11,637 GWh in Denmark (much less populous South Dakota generated 2,914 GWh from wind). An April 2013 report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, “Ramping Up Renewables: Energy You Can Count On”, presented this type of “if states were countries” analysis. North Dakota (with 15 percent of generation from wind) and Minnesota (14 percent) would also make this global top 10, just below Portugal’s 17 percent and Spain’s 16 percent. Global clean-tech powerhouse Germany generated 11 percent of its electricity from wind last year, but so did Kansas, Idaho, Colorado, and Oklahoma. Germany, with a much larger population than most U.S. states, has much larger total power from wind – 61,204 GWh in 2012. The leading U.S. state in total wind generation, Texas, reached 31,860 GWh. On peak wind days during the year, wind farms supplied 25 percent of the juice to the grid in the Midwest, 30 percent to the Southwest Power Pool (Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Texas Panhandle), and 32 percent in the rest of Texas. The nationwide generation percentage for the U.S., by contrast, was just three percent, although wind was the largest contributor of new capacity as noted

above. The emergence of states as key global markets for clean-tech products and services has not been lost on the industry, particularly with some states’ renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandates, net-metering laws, and other supportive policies under attack from fossil-fuel backed lobbyists and legislators. “The federal PTC is hugely important, but it is state policies that drive our markets,” says Susan Innis, senior manager of public affairs for leading wind turbine maker Vestas North America.

AT: Clean Tech (Low)

Clean tech industry failing --- companies can’t keep up Texier, 14 Maud, analyst on a power trading desk, she studied the market mechanisms that can develop new demand-response models. She has been scouting new technologies such as renewables, storage or energy efficiency for a large power utility in Silicon Valley before joining a solar start-up., “The State Of The Cleantech Industry,” http://cleantechnica.com/2014/02/11/state-cleantech-industry/However, overproduction of solar cells and panels, combined with rapidly falling prices for that and other reasons, led to the demise of numerous solar startups . Meanwhile, many European

countries, facing a financial crisis, stepped back and reduced its support for cleantech. The early growing pains that face all industries as they mature also showed up. That included some innovators

going bankrupt or struggling to make it to their teenage years . Iconic cleantech companies

such as Fisker, Better Place, and A123 went bankrupt; a lot of other startups had poor exits as

they were struggling raising new funds.

AT: China Race

The Aff is just rhetoric – the US and China are engaged in a cooperative frameworkWorld Resources Insitute 12 - An issue convened by The World Resources Institute in the ChinaFAQs (April 2012, "CLEAN TECH’S RISE, PART II: U.S.-China Collaboration in Public-Private Partnerships," www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_IssueBrief2_PPP.pdf, ADL)As two of the world’s largest economies, competition between the United States and China often obscures another reality: As the globe’s two biggest users of energy and producers of greenhouse gases, the two nations have also long collaborated on efforts to develop and scale-up cleaner energy technologies. U.S. business is widely engaged with Chinese businesses in private business relations1 and also in public-private partnerships. Indeed, their overlapping interests in clean energy have spawned a wide array of cooperative, public-private projects that are delivering tangible benefits to both nations and the world at-large, including new markets for U.S. companies, improvements in clean tech for both countries, lower global costs of controlling pollution and emissions, and new opportunities for economic growth and jobs.2 A key feature of public-private partnerships is that U.S. businesses recognize the benefits and are contributing funds to these initiatives. Government agencies and companies in the U.S. and China have been collaborating on energy and climate issues for a quarter-of-a-century, notes Mark D. Levine, a senior scientist at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National

Laboratory who has been involved in U.S.-China energy partnerships for decades.3 China, for instance,

has gained key technical assistance from the U.S. that has helped it develop energy saving

standards for buildings,4 household appliances5 and autos.6 At the same time, U.S. government officials,

business executives and academics have gained extensive insight into China’s complex energy system and its

approach to policy-making, and have built working relationships with key decision-makers.7 Both nations are gaining practical, hands-on experience developing and deploying new technologies – from carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) to advanced wind turbines – due to China’s rapid economic growth. The lessons learned, experts say, can help

build mutual trust and drive down the costs of these technologies worldwide.8 This cooperation comes at a critical time for the health of the global climate. “If the Chinese don’t dramatically reduce carbon emissions from coal, there’s no way we can make a dent in climate change globally in the time period that matters,” says Kelly Sims Gallagher, Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy at Tufts University and ChinaFAQs expert.9 “Because the United States and China are the world’s top two greenhouse gas emitters, together accounting for more than 40% of annual emissions, any solution requires both countries to transition to low-carbon economies,” writes Kenneth Lieberthal, a China expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. “U.S.-China cooperation on climate change would have not only bilateral but global benefits.” In recent years, the two nations have expanded opportunities for collaboration through a range of agreements and multilateral and bilateral organizations. In 2008, for instance,

building on a 30-year history of science and technology collaboration,11 the U.S. and China signed The Ten-Year Framework Agreement on Energy and Environment, which identifies five areas of cooperation, including clean and efficient electricity production and transmission, and clean transportation.12 In 2009, the two nations extended the Framework, launching a wide-ranging package of cooperative efforts between private businesses, various Chinese ministries and U.S. agencies, including the establishment of three U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Centers (focusing on electric vehicles, clean coal, and buildings), an Energy Cooperation Partnership (ECP) working to match U.S. clean energy businesses with Chinese markets, the U.S. China Renewable Energy Partnership, and others.13 Such efforts reflect the fact that “cooperation on clean energy and climate change is now seen in both Washington and Beijing as a major issue in U.S.-China relations,” notes Kenneth Lieberthal. “The world has awakened,” he adds, “to the potential for U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy and climate change.”

The clean tech race is just politicized rhetoric – more likely that US and China companies will cooperatePricewaterhouse Coppers 11 (January 2011, "The US-China cleantech connection: shaping a new commercial diplomacy," www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/assets/us-china-cleantech-connection.pdf, ADL)Competing “together” Behind the oft-politicized rhetoric of a so-called “cleantech race,” there also

exists a deepening, increasingly complex inter-dependence between US and Chinese cleantech firms and the strong likelihood that more US and Chinese companies are finding intersections of collaboration. “China and the US have become more dependent upon one another, as greentech becomes more global—with companies from China, the US and EU working more collaboratively,” said Ellen Pao, partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, a US venture capital firm which invests in cleantech start-ups in China. The rapid growth of cleantech industries comes as China shifts as the world’s factory to a maturing market keen on expanding its share of intellectual property assets and establishing global brands. Achieving these ambitions in many cases goes hand-in-hand with enlisting as partners US companies with the know-how, technology and brands, for example companies offering higher-quality turbine technology, smart grid infrastructures, and electric vehicle components and charging devices, to name a few. Such partnerships are motivated by joint ownerships and co-development of intellectual property assets, which could lead to two-way paths of reciprocal access to markets.

US and Chinese markets are partnering in clean techPricewaterhouse Coppers 11 (January 2011, "The US-China cleantech connection: shaping a new commercial diplomacy," www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/assets/us-china-cleantech-connection.pdf, ADL)The US and China have emerged as global leaders of cleantech, each placing big bets that aggressive backing of emerging industries can achieve multiple goals of environmental protection, resource conservation and economic growth. Cleantech’s quick rise among national priorities has effectively created new markets for clean energy and efficiency technologies. Some of these may well take years and even decades to mature. Meanwhile, the US and China are forging ahead with ambitious build-outs in areas such as mega wind and solar plants, smart electricity grids and green transportation infrastructures. Indeed, the potential scale and political urgency of these emerging

industries—along with ambitious national targets for roll-outs— bear a semblance of the Space Race of the 1960s. While cleantech companies in both countries are in many cases locked in head-to-head competition to become major players in these developments, there also exist intersections where US and Chinese companies are partnering in ways that play to each other’s strengths while closely aligning with national clean energy policies. Successful partnerships could potentially hold significant growth opportunities both within and beyond US and Chinese markets.

AT: Warming Impact

No warming and not anthropogenicFerrara, 2012 (Peter, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Senior Advisor for Entitlement Reform and Budget Policy at the National Tax Limitation Foundation, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, served in the White House Office of Policy Development, graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School , 5/31/2012, "Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling," http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/)Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global

warming. That is because natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling ,

global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years , and global

temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more. That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers,

talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy. The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-

interested political science you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the

conference speeches are online. What you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious, pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the climate alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are causing catastrophic global warming in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do have any response. The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its Climate Change Reconsidered volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). Those Climate Change Reconsidered volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their

response is to Climate Change Reconsidered. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently. Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming

(and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally

caused climate cycles . For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 19 40s to the

late 19 70s . The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due

around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late

1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal

Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don

Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University , knew the

answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010 . He made that prediction

because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full

explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree , and the gap was widening .

That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of

CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such

alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years , with similar data going back

15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing

a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity . That is associated in the earth’s history with

even lower , colder temperatures . The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle, compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age, which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and

premature death. Such impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun.

Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.

Tech and adaptive advances prevent all climate impacts Singer et al 2011 Dr. S. Fred Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Member of the International Academy of Astronautics; Robert M. Carter, Research Professor at James Cook University (Queensland) and the University of Adelaide (South Australia), palaeontologist, stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental scientist with more than thirty years professional experience; and Craig D. Idso, founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, and Association of American Geographers, et al, 2011, “Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf )

Decades-long empirical trends of climate -sensitive measures of human well-being , including the percent of developing world population suffering from chronic hunger, poverty rates, and deaths due to extreme

weather events, reveal dramatic improvement during the twentieth century, notwithstanding the

historic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The magnitude of the impacts of climate change on human well-being depends on society's adaptability (adaptive capacity), which is determined by, among other things, the wealth and human resources society can access in order to obtain, install,

operate, and maintain technologies necessary to cope with or take advantage of climate change

impacts. The IPCC systematically underestimates adaptive capacity by failing to take

into account the greater wealth and tech nological advances that will be present at the time for which impacts are to be estimated. Even accepting the IPCC's and Stern Review's

worst-case scenarios, and assuming a compounded annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of only 0.7 percent, reveals

that net GDP per capita in developing countries in 2100 would be double the 20 06

level of the U.S. and triple that level in 2200. Thus, even developing countries' future

ability to cope with climate change would be much better than that of the U.S. today .

The IPCC's embrace of biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was premature, as many researchers have found "even the best biofuels have the potential to damage the poor, the climate, and biodiversity" (Delucchi, 2010). Biofuel production consumes nearly as much energy as it generates, competes with food crops and wildlife for land, and is unlikely to

ever meet more than a small fraction of the world's demand for fuels. The notion that global warming might

cause war and social unrest is not only wrong, but even backwards - that is, global cooling has

led to wars and social unrest in the past, whereas global warming has coincided with periods

of peace, prosperity, and social stability .

***Hegemony Advantage

AT: Naval Power Impact

Naval budget cuts extirpate naval readiness and prove no threshold exists for their deterrence impactEaglen, 12 (Mackenzie, March 15th, “Obama’s Shift-to-Asia Budget is a Hollow Shell Game”http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/15/crafty-pentagon-budget-showcases-marquis-programs-while-masking/)Pentagon plans now retire seven cruisers and two dock landing ships at the same time as the Navy is revising downward its 30-year shipbuilding plan. Military leaders have been quick to point to the ten ships planned for construction over the next fiscal year. The problem is that this figure, as it appeared in the FY 2012 budget, was supposed to be thirteen, not 10. In fact, in the 2012 budget, the Navy requested 57 ships from 2013-2017. The new 2013 budget cuts this to 41 ships. It's hard to see how these dramatic cuts in fleet size fit into the

administration's pivot to Asia. Naval research and development do not fare much better. While the Navy is to be commended on a getting some research initiatives right -- such as breaking out a new account for Future Naval Capabilities focusing on advanced research and prototypes, increasing funding for the Littoral Combat Ship, and increasing

funding for the Marine Corps' Assault Vehicles -- many of the Navy's RDT&E decisions do not appropriately resource the rhetorical emphasis on the Pacific. The budget slices the Power Projection Applied Research account by nearly 15%, affecting programs like precision strike and directed energy weapons. Similarly, Force Protection Applied Research dropped by 27%, cutting innovation in anti-submarine warfare and hull assurance. A 28% cut in Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research affects initiatives such as electronic attack, surface-based anti-cruise and ballistic missile defenses, and the Surface Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP, which uses electronic warfare to disarm incoming missiles. Other R&D cuts impact separate initiatives on anti-submarine warfare, undersea weapons, cyber security, electronic warfare, sensing, SATCOM vulnerabilities, missile defense countermeasures, S and X-band radar integration, and radar defenses against electronic attack. These programs form important parts of the Navy's next-generation arsenal, especially when it comes to the

Pentagon's evolving AirSea Battle concept. They are exactly the type of programs the Pentagon should be protecting if it is serious about emphasizing the unique challenges of the Asia-Pacific. The fact that R&D money declined for these particular Navy programs is a disturbing sign for the overall coherence of the administration's budget. While the Navy received a $4 billion increase in O&M funding from 2012, it could not

come soon enough. The Navy has been stretched past the breaking point in terms of operational readiness, with nearly one quarter of its ships failing their annual inspection in 2011 and cracks in the aluminum superstructure of every cruiser in the Navy's inventory. The naval readiness crisis was so bad in 2011 that Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy told the

House Armed Services Committee that, "we're not good to go." Increased O&M funding for the Navy helps, but more needs to be done in order to fix the fleet. It certainly does not help that the Navy is forced to pay nearly $900 million

to retire ships early while the fleet size is already too small. Various defense officials and military chiefs have testified recently that the services are sacrificing size of the force for either readiness or quality. Given the rapidly rising levels of risk associated with the latest defense budget cuts, it is likely both readiness and quality will decline despite the Chiefs' best efforts.

Institutional alt causes outweigh Cropsey 10 - (Seth, “The US Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 34 No. 1, January 2010, pgs 35-45, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Cropsey_US_Navy_In_Distress.pdf)In February 2009, the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Port Royal ran aground about a half mile south of the Honolulu airport. The Navy’s investigation found that the ship’s navigational gear was broken and that the ship’s fathometer wasn’t functioning. In simple terms the bridge didn’t know where the ship was. The investigation

subsequently discovered that the commanding officer was exhausted, sleep-deprived, and that sailors who were nominally assigned to stand watch against such incidents were assigned elsewhere in the ship to cover manning shortages. Two months later the Navy’s iron-

willed Board of Inspection and Survey determined that problems with corrosion, steering, surface ships’ firefighting systems, and anchoring were widespread throughout the Navy .

Asked by Defense News to comment on these findings five former commanding officers agreed that smaller crews, reduced budgets, and fewer real-life training opportunities for over-worked crews were important causes for this catalogue of affliction. It’s hardly a surprise. The Navy reported last

year that 11,300 sailors were supporting ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reduced budgets, efforts to save money by cutting the size of crews, schemes to take up the slack with shore services, and all manner of ‘labor-saving’ devices parallel and reflect the Navy’s increasingly distressed fortunes since the end of the Cold War. The US Navy has not been as small as it is today since the administration of William Howard Taft when the Royal Navy filled the international role that America’s naval forces eventually inherited and currently possess. As suggested by the past two decades of declining navy procurement, the rising cost of ships, hints from the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Review now underway that previous goals for fleet size are open to question, and the public’s focus on

the nation’s land wars in the Middle East, chances are that US naval shrinkage will continue. The likelihood of a much diminished navy coincides in time with every current prediction of large global strategic change in the foreseeable future. Among National Intelligence Council estimates, Joint Operating Environment forecasts, the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment’s studies, the UK Defence Ministry’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre as well as similar predictive efforts undertaken by French and German national security

experts, there is a general consensus. Proliferation, resource scarcity, environmental change, the emergence of new international power centres including non-state actors, significant changes in relative US power, failed states, and demographic change point to an increasingly unstable future and challenging international strategic environment. The common denominator in managing these problems is maritime power: force that can be applied to the shore from the sea, used to protect against missile-borne as well as stealthier ocean-borne Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD), marshaled to alleviate the causes of massive immigration, and displayed to reassure allies and dissuade enemies. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked the oxygen out of any serious effort to understand the connection between the large changes that strategic planners see in the future, Americans’ expectations that they will retain their ability to wield global influence, the Navy’s role in maintaining such influence, and the US fleet’s slow evanescence. No attempt to connect fleet shape and size to the unfolding strategic environment exists as a referent for

public debate. Indeed, civilian and military leadership maintains in the face of growing demand for ships to defend against relatively low threats – like piracy – as well as very dangerous ones – like the possibility of smuggled WMD reaching our shores – that ‘capability’ rather than number of ships is key to

accurately measuring our naval power. With very few exceptions political leaders in both parties do not ask fundamental questions. What role does naval power have in preserving America’s position as the world’s great power in the middle of a fluid and troubling strategic environment? Even with Congress and administration support how can the nation’s current maritime strategy achieve its own goals, to say nothing of the global objectives that Theodore Roosevelt saw so clearly? The cooperative arrangements with foreign navies envisioned by the Navy’s current maritime strategy may perhaps moderate problems of failing states and terror. But is this enough to manage other challenges? Is the Navy’s current organization capable of addressing both conventional and asymmetric threats? Can today’s highly structured and inflexible system for designing and

building ships adapt quickly and cost-effectively to changes in the strategic environment? What, for example, do globalization, the growing dependence of the United States on sea-borne transit for strategic

resources and minerals, and the likelihood of more dislocations such as continue from Somali piracy mean for the future of US national security?

AT: Pharma Impact

Lack and R&D means pharmaceuticals fail to create innovative techKessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”, http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)

Is there any doubt that the leading drug companies are in desperate need of reinvention?

Blockbuster drugs are coming off patent or being taken off the market for safety reasons and there

are no replacement drugs on the horizon to make up the shortfall in profits. Furthermore, healthcare reform is likely to exacerbate the flaws in big pharma's traditional business model by imposing pay for performance, as is already the case in Europe. To state the obvious, over the past decade, the pharmaceutical industry has brought few drugs to market from its own development efforts. Commentators have stressed, and heads of big pharma have acknowledged, that the sector's R&D efforts need to be drastically changed. But alteration of the industry's culture and lumbering

decision-making process will be slow and challenging and will require bold leadership . Recognizing

that the R&D engine cannot be repaired rapidly to fuel growth, big pharma has taken several steps in dealing with its diminished R&D productivity. First, it has looked to expand its markets geographically into developing countries; second, it has increased its emphasis on generic drugs and biosimilars; and finally, it has sought to diversify by migrating into new product categories. Although the foregoing steps will lessen the projected shortfall in revenues associated with the expiration of patents in the coming years, the achievement of sustained growth in big pharma will of necessity depend to a large extent on another factor—its ability to increase the productivity of internal R&D efforts, while at the same time bolstering the pipeline with drugs acquired from the biotech sector. It is clear that from its internal productivity alone big pharma is unlikely to achieve the growth needed to fuel revenues. Successful implementation of this pipeline strategy will require the management at each company to optimize its current internal R&D efforts and its approach to acquiring drugs.

Loss of patents will cause pharmaceutical industry collapseKessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”, http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)

A major reason that big pharma must limit the number of compounds it introduces into its pipeline is that spending on R&D places great pressure on earnings . The public equity markets relentlessly focus on short-term performance and unduly punish companies that do not meet quarterly revenue

and earnings expectations. It has been reported that analyst expectations for the industry are so diminished that they are now hoping that the pharmaceutical industry as a whole will reach a compounded annual growth rate of 1% of revenues over the next five years. The loss of patents on blockbusters by big pharma is a major concern. In the next five years, of the top 10 best-selling drugs in the world, 9 will go off patent,

and of the top 20, 18 will lose patent protection. As a result, ~$100 billion of sales will be lost during this period. This number may be understated, given the recent safety issues associated with some blockbuster drugs, such as GlaxoSmithKline's (GSK; Brentford, UK) diabetes drug Avandia (rosiglitazone). To compensate for these losses, big pharma has resorted to buying revenues by means of acquisitions to replace declining sales. At the same time, sales of existing drugs are less likely to benefit from direct-to-consumer advertising. Indeed, direct-to-consumer advertising will continue to garner greater scrutiny from regulators and have less of a favorable impact on sales of new and existing products. The pressure asserted by generics is causing an ever-steeper decline in returns on marketing and sales on drugs coming off patent than was the case in the past. It has not gone unnoticed by big pharma that generics sales have outpaced sales of the pharmaceutical industry over the past ten years. This has been driven by an increase of demand, the expiration of patents and cost constraints imposed by governments and third-party payers. The expectation is that this trend will

continue into the future. With the patent cliff looming, generics will have many small-molecule blockbusters to target. Although

one of the anticipated benefits of healthcare reform for big pharma will be expanded coverage, pay for performance will be an increasing issue. This legislation will put added pressure on product pricing from government and third-party payers. GSK recently has reported a drop in profits, which it attributed to US healthcare reform and European government 'austerity' measures that have had an impact on the drug industry1.

Regulations and scandals are an alt cause to the industryKessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”, http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)

Technology will make regulators and third-party payers better equipped to measure what benefits patients are deriving from the drugs. The net effect is that governments and payers will continue to bear

down on prices, access, utilization and prescribing patterns. In addition, the pharmaceutical sector is going to be faced with a more stringent regulatory pathway for approval of new drugs , as well as closer government scrutiny of the continued marketing of existing drugs. There is little doubt that the regulators are going to focus increasingly on patient safety and benefits when bringing new drugs to market3. The recent restrictions placed on GSK's Avandia because of data indicating an association with heart toxicity points in this direction. The manner in which big pharma is perceived in political circles will also have an impact on its future prospects. The US Congress portrays the industry as insensitive to consumer safety. Indeed, the Obama Administration publicly vilified big pharma as part of its health reform initiative (while simultaneously courting its participation in providing funds to close the so-called donut hole, a coverage gap in the 2003 Medicare Part D health plan for prescription drugs). Regulatory halting of sales of therapeutics for safety reasons, poorly handled product recalls and the imposition of unprecedented criminal and civil fines (reaching $2.3 billion in

Pfizer's case), coupled with calls for CEOs to serve jail time for illegal drug promotion, settlements relating to bilking healthcare programs by inflating drug prices and investigations of paying bribes to boost sales and the development and marketing of drugs have also added to the public's wariness of the sector. The net effect of a plummeting reputation—down in some surveys as low as the tobacco

and oil industries—has been to hurt the industry across numerous constituencies that have a bearing on the prospects of its products, including governments, regulators and consumers . For these reasons, the importance of disassociation and delineation from big pharma has not been lost on the biotech industry.

AT: Competitiveness Impact

Even if we lose our competiveness American industry will still outpace competitors Qian, 2008—reporter of Yale Global [Jiang, February 29th, Is the Sun Setting on US Dominance? – Part II, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10435]

The proponents of such a "multipolar worldview" often confuse the immense potential of their favored giants with their actual influences. They often overlook the immense internal difficulties these rising giants must overcome to realize their potential. Most importantly, they do not take full account of the strategic interactions between these giants during their simultaneous rise and the strategic opportunities that such interactions present for the US. Among the rising powers, the European Union boasts by far the largest economy, with a strong currency and a comparatively large and prosperous population. However, after a long drive of expansion, Europe faces a serious cohesion problem. It still suffers from a weak security framework that's dependent on NATO and a legalistic rather than executive center in Brussels. Although the EU does chase strategic interests in its proximities such as the central Asia and North Africa, it does so, not for any overreaching vision to compete globally, but mostly for parochial economic reasons. Europe is not yet competing in any "Great Game," for the simple reason that Europe is not yet unified. Recent rejections of the EU constitution show that serious resistance remains towards further integration. After recent stabilization of its economy, a resurgent Russia is often mentioned as a future global power. However, Russia faces severe long-term internal challenges. Its population is declining and aging, its vast Siberia territories hollowing out after the end of Soviet subsidies. Extractive industries such as hydrocarbon, mining and timber account for 80 percent of Russia's exports and 30 percent of its government revenue, whereas its manufacturing industries are mostly outdated and uncompetitive. Russia therefore will have serious issues with its self-image as a major world power, finding it hard to forge an assessment of its global role commensurate with its long-term demographic and economic realities. Japan has a similar problem of updating its self-image as the most "advanced" nation in Asia for more than 100 years. Today Japan faces the harsh reality that, after its neighbors catch up, Japan will again find itself a geographically small, resource-poor island nation dependent on trade, living uneasily among large, populous continental neighbors. It has a largely pacifist, prosperous population in a neighborhood still rife with nationalism. Unlike Europe, East Asia has yet to extinguish historical grievances, border disputes and a taste for raw national powers. As Japan itself proved, economic rises, once initiated, can be rapid indeed, so its current economic strength does not guarantee its future influence. Furthermore, barring a rapid re-militarization, Japan's growth in national strengths is bound to be slower than that of its still maturing neighbors, therefore its relative strategic position in East Asia will only grow weaker. Either re-militarization or an erosion of its self-perceived leadership in the region is likely to require a profound reassessment of Japan's postwar consensus of national purposes. India sees itself as an up-and-coming power, proud to be a democracy yet simultaneously aspiring to more traditional "hard" powers. As a diverse and still poor country, it faces immense internal challenges. Its manufacturing base and infrastructure need major overhaul. Beyond these, India is limited by its geographical constraint in the South Asia and the thorn in its side that’s Pakistan. Sandwiched between Pakistan, Burma and the Himalayas, India’s ambition beyond the subcontinent could not blossom until its geographical perimeter is secured. China borders three of the ambitious giants – India, Russia and Japan. China's neighborhood is far tougher than that of either Europe or the US. Like India, China is a large, poor country rife with internal tensions. Unlike Europe or America, its current form of government does not enjoy wide ideological appeal. Compared with Russia’s or even Japan’s, its military is still modernizing. It has recently become fashionable in America and Europe to describe Chinese "expansions" in Africa and South America. But the evidence is mostly economic deals over raw materials. This is not expansionism, but mercantilism. China is indeed playing an active geopolitical game in its immediate environment: Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Korea Peninsula. But this only serves to show that China is still mired in local complexities.

AT: Disease Impact

Disease won’t cause extinctionPosner ‘5 (Richard, Judge 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (Richard, Skeptic, “Catastrophe”, 11:3, Proquest)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort , at least if the focus is on

extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues , such as the Black Death,

smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly

natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race . The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a first time.

AT: BioterrorNo risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - their evidence is hype

MATISHAK ‘10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,” 4-29, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php)

WASHINGTON -- The United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to

the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people

are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said

this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to

Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms

of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15).

Yet experts say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center.

The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to

deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in

place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience.

"There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the

same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

AT: Industrial Base

Lack of experience and structural problems to the industrial baseWatts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)

Design and manufacturing experience among companies has declined over the past few decades because of the decreasing frequency of new starts, cutbacks in existing programs, retirements from the work force, and reductions in company elaborate facilities. With declining manufacturing experience and truncate

productions runs, it has become more difficult for companies to estimate accurately the costs of producing major systems over the course of multi-year production run For example, one tendency has been to overestimate the savings during production as efficiency improves due to learning from one unit to the next. Learning-cm^ theory, originally based on aircraft production experience during the 1930s an late 1940s, holds that as the number of units produced doubles, the recurring co: per unit decreases at a fixed rate or constant percentage.123 Optimistic assumption about manufacturing learning curves present an obvious temptation to low-ba production costs.> Since at

least the 1960s, US companies have been inclined to over-promise and underbid on major defense programs in order to win competitions. The decline in new starts since the 1980s seems to have accentuated this problem,

giving rise to the term "dysfunctional competitions." As a Defense Science Board task force observed in 2000. the

''remaining defense-focused companies are competing for fewer new major programs, limiting their growth potential and making each new program a 'must win'."124 The result has been lower margins, greater risk, and more cost overruns in major defense programs. Here both the industry and government are at fault—the former for being unable to resist underbidding programs, and the latter for not exercising more control over major competitions.

Industry Fails Watts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)

While the overall performance of US military technologies and weapon systems has been excellent, the industry has failed, on more than one occasion, to provide systems with the promised capabilities, or only done so after following delays, increased costs, or both. Recent examples of major program failures stemming from cost overruns, schedule slippage, or performance include termination of the

National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO's) Future Imagery Architecture program,"6 termination of Army- Navy Aerial Common Sensor, and the scrapping of the Coast Guard's Deepwater program to produce the first new coastguard cutters in more than three decades."7 It is difficult to assess the full extent of these various program shortfalls because they can often be dealt with by government actions such as making available additional funding available, altering requirements to avoid acknowledging shortfalls, or stretching out programs until technical problems have been resolved. Moreover, program terminations—the most glaring manifestation of acquisition difficulties — can also be chosen by the government to release funds for other uses or because products are no longer needed. In the case of FIA, however, the government's assessment of the two proposals was surely questionable. Whereas Boeings proposal for producing a new generation of electro-optical and radar-imaging reconnaissance satellites was evidently superior to Lockheed Martin's, the government's judgment about Boeing s ability to match LM's four decades of experience and success in this area appears, in hindsight, to have been poor. As then-NRO director Keith Hall later said about the selection of Boeing, "I shouldn't have allowed it to go further.""8 The dominant criticism of the weapons and systems produced by the defense industry is that programs either cost too much to

start with, or their costs increase during development and production. Studies by the government and others have identified a number of causes, including overly optimistic bidding in proposals, errors in engineering and management, government changes in performance requirement, and the inherent complexity of advanced military capabilities that "stretch the boundaries" of proven technology For example: • As much as 40 percent of program cost overruns can be correlated to changes in annual buys imposed by top-level members of the DoD/Executive branch or Congress. These factors are generally beyond the

control of government or industry program managers.119 • Significant percentages of cost overruns result from discrepancies or shortfalls in the program's initial baseline requirements. The need for

such changes can be legitimate responses to evolving threats and enemy capabilities. They can also reflect bureaucratic difficulties such as the lack of coordination or foresight within the government or contractor team.

Industrial base not key to military dominanceWatts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)

Of course, this impression of the US defense industry's ability to support American military strategy is not without blemishes. The defense industry has exhibited short- falls in at least two areas. First, in certain

cases other nations—including the former Soviet Union—have produced weapon systems offering comparable, or even superior, tactical performance at substantially lower unit costs than their US counterparts. Most often mentioned in this regard are small arms, mortars, air defense guns and surface-to-air missiles. For instance, the 7.62-millimeter Kalashmkov AK-47 assault rifle, initially adopted by the Soviet army in 1949, was simple and inexpensive to man- ufacture yet provided legendary ruggedness and negligible failure rates. By compari- son, when the American 5.56-mm XM16E1 (renamed the M16 upon adoption by the US Army) entered service in Vietnam in 1966, reports of jamming and malfunctions in combat surfaced almost immediately, and modifications of the rifle were needed to overcome these deficiencies. Even today, assault rifles of the Kalaslmikov family are estimated to constitute one fifth of the worldwide supply of firearms and are found in "practically every theatre of insurgency or guerrilla combat."109 Similarly, the premier US fighter of the Vietnam era, the technologically more advanced McDonnell Douglas F-4, cost four times more than the Soviet MiG-21, but the smaller, lighter MiG was a superior dogfighter in horizontal-plane, turning fights, especially at higher altitudes.110 To defeat the MiG-21's superior turning ability, F-4 crews had to master the more difficult techniques of maneuvering in the vertical plane so that they could take advantage of the F-4's superior thrust-to-weight and raw power."1 In the early 1970s, comparisons such as these led some observers to wonder whether the United States might be pricing itself out of the competition with the Soviets by emphasizing technologically sophisticated but more expensive weaponry.112 While US combat experience during major operations in 1991, 2001-2002, and 2003 against Iraqi, Taliban, and al Qaeda forces suggest that the United States produces some of the world's best weaponry the unit-acquisition price of the F-22, which is over $300 mil- lion per jet, has limited the buy to 175 operational aircraft. Along these same lines, the US Navy's recent decision to limit the planned buy of seven DDG-1000 Zumwalt-classdestroyers to the first two ships due to unit prices over $3 billion only reinforces longstanding concerns about the ballooning unit costs of advanced US weapon systems."3 Second, the American defense industry has also been unable to develop technologies and systems to alleviate some of the most pressing challenges of ground combat, such as jungle warfare, urban combat, guerrilla or irregular warfare and peacekeeping. More than 80 percent of all US military personnel killed in combat during the last fifty years have been in the ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps."4 Of course, industry's inability to achieve much greater survivability for American soldiers and marines may stem more from the inherently complex, messy nature of ground combat than from a failure to exploit emerging technologies or design better equipment. Nevertheless, this vulnerability, which insurgents and suicide bombers have exploited in Iraq

and Afghanistan, has been a significant constraint on US foreign policy and flexibility since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; until technologies or weapons capable of eliminating Clausewitzian friction are discovered —which seems highly unlikely even in principle—inflicting casualties on US forces will continue to be a viable stratagem for America's enemies."5

AT: Manufacturing

Manufacturing doesn’t solve anything- the jobs are poor-performing and they are not capable of competing for innovation ***Read all highlightingYglesias 12 [Matthew Yglesias is Slate's business and economics correspondent. Before joining the magazine he worked for ThinkProgress, the Atlantic, TPM Media, and the American Prospect, Slate, “Forget the Factories”, April 2012]While Facebook was buying Instagram on Monday, a couple of my favorite wonky policy journalists were hailing the White House’s plans to revive American manufacturing. Specifically, Ed Luce from the Financial Times and Ezra Klein of the Washington Post were both very taken with National Economic Council director Gene Sperling’s recent speech (PDF) that attempted to put some analytic meat on the bones of President Obama’s manufacturing-heavy State of the Union address. I don’t share their enthusiasm. The extra effort that went into Sperling’s speech raises the troubling possibility that these ideas will actually guide policy in a second term rather than simply serve as props in a re-election campaign. It is sensible for public policy to pay attention to the creation of great firms, to strength in specific

sectors, and to the quality of the jobs generated by different economic models. But it should be obvious that the

path forward for America is to focus on our strengths in information technology and media,

and not compete with the Chinese for manufacturing supremacy . Klein’s gloss on Sperling’s argument is that there's “a market failure” regarding manufacturing in which an open marketplace “is failing to appropriately

price the benefits of manufacturing firms.” So America should push for more manufacturing jobs because such jobs are worth more than they appear to be worth. Such things can happen. An unregulated market leads to overproduction of air pollution, so you need to tax it, and underinvestment in children’s education, so you need to subsidize it. If an unregulated marketplace underproduces manufacturing firms or establishments, then we should subsidize factories just like

schools. Sperling’s case rests on two main legs—externalities associated with research and development and externalities associated with what’s known as “agglomeration.” The basic idea in

both cases is that spillovers from manufacturing benefit the rest of the economy. On the R and D front, it’s clear that companies that come up with great ideas can’t capture them all . New

inventions prompt imitators and new processes have a way of leaking out as workers switch

jobs . When flat panel high-definition televisions came onto the market, it wasn’t just one company that knew how to make them.

Suddenly everyone was making them. That’s R and D spillover . Agglomeration spillover helps explain why the two most successful TV makers are both in South Korea. It’s not just a weird coincidence, it’s something you see all the time. Sperling notes that researchers have found that “spillover benefits decline with distance, indeed by over half when they are more than 700 miles away” and tend not to cross national boundaries. That’s because spillovers are fundamentally made of people—gossip over dinner, workers and managers drifting from one firm to another, casual inspection of the other guy’s setup, etc.—and people don’t move around that much. Long story short, if the awesomest, most innovative widget-making factory in the world is in your country, that gives you a huge leg up on your odds of becoming home to a disproportionate share of the next 10 awesome widget factories. The problem is that none of this has much to do with manufacturing. If you want to subsidize R and D, then subsidize R and D—there’s no need for the backdoor of an across-the-board subsidy to factory owners regardless of how much R and D they actually do . On

agglomeration, the irrelevance of manufacturing per se is even clearer. It’s not a coincidence that Twitter, Apple, Google, and Facebook are all located on a narrow corridor between San Jose, Calif. and San Francisco, that all the movie studios are in Los Angeles, or that nonlocal journalism happens overwhelmingly in

New York and Washington, D.C. Industry clusters happen in all sectors. But if you look at America’s metropolitan areas, it’s clear that manufacturing-oriented places are relatively poor . The wealthy clusters in the United States are built around things like software, biotechnology and medical devices , higher education, finance, and business services. Places like California, Minneapolis, Seattle, and the Northeast corridor are far richer than the factory-oriented Rust Belt and Southeast. Sperling notes that “if an auto plant opens up, a Wal-Mart can be

expected to follow,” but that opening a Wal-Mart doesn’t bring an auto plant . But, again, this highlights the need for communities to have firms that are competitive in global markets, not manufacturers per se. A global firm—be it Ford or Amazon or Paramount—calls into being a local economy of shops and

barbers. But the road to a more prosperous America is to learn from the most prosperous parts of the country, not to imitate Chinese clusters that are even poorer than America’s industrial hubs . The potential of America’s most productive places is tragically limited by restrictive zoning policies that keep the cost of living high and population growth low. The number of American students getting degrees in computer science and other technical fields is actually falling even as the number of people going to college grows. Short-sighted politicians are underinvesting in the transportation infrastructure even as people need to access our most vibrant labor markets. These kinds of issues don’t do as good a job of addressing the anxieties of Midwestern swing state voters as visits to lock-making factories, but creating new billion-dollar software startups has a lot more to do with the future of American prosperity. The scary thing about the factory-driven view of the American future is that it’s not totally implausible . The “insourcing” trend where firms move production back to North America is real enough. The drivers are rising Chinese wages and falling “unit labor costs” in the United States . But that’s just a way of saying that America can regain factory parity with China by eliminating the prosperity

gap between our two countries—a very strange policy aspiration. Most likely there’s nothing we can

do to prevent some narrowing of the gap, which will have the consequence of bringing some jobs back. But we should measure our success by the extent to which this doesn’t happen, and we instead build and

expand new industries that push living standards up and keep factory owners searching

abroad for cheap labor.

AT: Food Shortages

New tech and advancements means that food production will continue to increase. Zubrin 11 (Dr. Robert Zubrin, president of Pioneer Astronautics, Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Policy “WHY IT’S WRONG TO AGREE WITH THE MALTHUSIANS ABOUT ETHANOL” May 13, 2011http://www.ilcorn.org/daily-update/182-why-it-rsquo-s-wrong-to-agree-with-the-malthusians-about-ethanol/)//

In an op-ed article printed in the Denver Post May 8, editorial columnist Vince Carroll endorsed the view of population control advocate Lester Brown that the U.S. corn ethanol program is threatening the world’s poor with starvation. This endorsement is especially remarkable in view of the fact that, as the otherwise generally astute Mr. Carroll has correctly noted many times in

the past, all of Lester Brown’s many previous limited-resources doomsday predictions have proven wildly incorrect. In fact, Lester Brown is wrong about the alleged famine-inducing potential of the ethanol program for exactly the same reason he has been repeatedly wrong about the alleged famine-inducing potential of

population growth. There is not a fixed amount of grain in the world. Farmers produce in response to demand. The more customers, the more grain. Not only that,

but the larger the potential market, the greater the motivation for investment in improved techniques. This is why, despite the fact that the world population has indeed doubled since Lester Brown, Paul Ehrlich, and the other population control zealots first published their manifestos during the 1960s, people worldwide are eating much better today than they were then. In the case of America’s corn growing industry, the beneficial effect of a growing market has been especially pronounced, with corn yields per acre in 2010 (165 bushels per acre) being 37 percent higher than they were in 2002 (120 bushels per acres) and more than four times

as great as they were in 1960 (40 bushels per acre.) Not only that, but in part because of the impetus of the expanded ethanol program, another doubling of yield is now in sight, as the best farms have pushed yields above 300 bushels per acre. As a result, in 2010, the state of Iowa alone produced more corn than the entire United States did in 1947. Of our entire corn crop, only 2 percent is actually eaten by Americans as corn, or 12 percent if one includes products like corn chips and corn syrup. These advances in productivity do not only benefit the United States. America’s farmers are the vanguard for their counterparts

worldwide. New seed strains and other techniques first demonstrated on our most advanced farms, subsequently spread to average farms, and then go global, thereby raising crop yields everywhere.

There is no plausible scenario for resource warsVictor, a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies the Woods Institute for the

Environment, 2007 (David. “What Resource Wars?” November 1. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7344601/What-resource-wars-From-Arabia.html)

THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents

cause conflict and war? There is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich

societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But resource-related conflicts are

multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict

and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns

that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity,

that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action

to stem the dangers is long overdue.In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons

to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But

none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that

contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a

growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and

responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE wars are actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical

Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency

as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the

leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long,

oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make

it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of

regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry--

which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.

iAdv

The auto industry needs more REE’s for HybridsDaily Tech 4/30/10 (Daily Tech, “China's Stranglehold on Rare Earth Metals Could Choke EV, Hybrids,” http://www.dailytech.com/Chinas+Stranglehold+on+Rare+Earth+Metals+Could+Choke+EV+Hybrids/article18274.htm) patelThe auto industry seems to be moving towards embracing hybrids and electric vehicles. One needs only look at examples like the 2011 Nissan LEAF and 2011 Chevy Volt, or the the new Chevy Volt MPV5 EV-crossover concept. However, there's growing concern that the industry is casting a rather blind eye to what exactly the impact of its leap might be. While about a third of U.S. oil comes from unstable regions like Nigeria and the Middle East, EVs present perhaps an equally challenging geopolitical resource problem. According to Robert Bryce, author of the book "Power Hungry: The Myths of ‘Green’ Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future", the current third-generation TOYOTA PRIUS uses 25 lbs. (11 kg) of expensive rare-earth metals -- approximately twice the amount found in a standard vehicle. That's a big problem as rare earth metals, known scientifically as lanthanides are almost exclusively controlled by China. Could this stranglehold slow progress of these NEW VEHICLES and hasten China's ascent to the world's most dominant economy? These are concerns that Bryce has been voicing. Bryce describes,"95% and 100% of the world’s supply of this entire row of the periodic table [is controlled by China]." The biggest uses of lanthanides are in the BATTERY PACK and electric motor of hybrids and EVs. Bryce believes that lanthanide demand will outpace supply as early as 2013, slowing the industry's growth and allowing China to raise its resource prices. He states, "There are no significant supplies (of lanthanides) that can come on stream in anything close to the time span the market need." Currently, 100,000 tons (90,718 t) per year of lanthanides are manufactured and utilized. That figure is expected to soon rise. Bryce says, "Estimates are that within two-three years the market demand will be 120,000-130,000 tons (108,862-117,932 t) per year." Worldwide there's 99 million tons (89.8 million t) of rare earth metals, but it's expensive and tricky to tap these reserves. It also takes time -- up to 15 years. The U.S. currently has no working lanthanide mines, though it does have lanthanide resources. The bottom line is that China outguessed the U.S. and the rest of the world, wisely recognizing the value of the resource in 1980s and early 90s and committing to the expensive up front investment to harvest them. Now 10 to 15 years later, it is reaping the REWARDS, while the U.S. is left wondering what to do. China is well aware of its position and plans to fully exploit it now. Former Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping remarked some time ago, "There is oil in the Middle East, there are rare-earths in China; we must take full advantage of this resource." Bryce warns that the rush to EVs and hybrids may put the U.S. in a bind. He states, "In this headlong rush to go ‘green,’ we are essentially trading one type of import reliance for another. We are going to be more dependent on a single market, where there’s no transparency and one dominant market player who happens to own most of our DEBT already.