Problem univerzalija realizam vs nominalizamRealizam (filozofija) , Realizam(termin potie iz latinskog jezikares stvar,realis stvaran, predmetan) je vieznaan pojam koji se javlja uumetnosti,knjievnostiislikarstvu,filozofiji.[] 1Problem univerzalija 1.1Platonistiki realizam 1.2Nominalistiki izazov 1.3Realistiki odgovor 1.4Sinteza konceptualizam 1.5Stanje danas 2Druga znaenja pojma "realizam" u filozofiji 3LiteraturaProblem univerzalija[]Ufilozofijise pojamrealizampojavljuje u ranom srednjem vijeku u raspravi ouniverzalijama, koja se vodila u teologiji i filozofiji, uglavnom na podruju zapadnog (latinskog) hrianstva. (Slina se rasprava u isto vrijeme vodila i uislamskoj filozofiji). Rije je o problemuontolokogstatusa optihpojmova(ideja), odnosno vrsta i rodova: da li opti pojmovi, kao "konj", "trougao", "dobro" i sl. postoje realno (da li posjedujusupstancijalnost), sami po sebi, izvan pojedinanih stvari? Ako postoje, da li su tjelesni ili netjelesni?Problem se pojavio pri tumaenjuAristotelovogspisaKategorije, jednog od rijetkih Aristotelovih spisa koji je bio poznat hrianskome svijetu (i na zapadu i na istoku) nakon pada Rimskog carstva. NeoplatoniarPorfirijeukazao je na taj problem u svojemUvodu u Aristotelove kategorije, ali nije dao odgovor.Boetijeje taj spis preveo na latinski i tako je on postao poznat i na zapadu.Platonistiki realizam[]Nadovezujui se naPlatonaiplatonizam, realisti smatraju da je odgovor pozitivan. Platon je smatrao da ideja ne samo da samostalno postoji, nego da je svijet ideja najvia stvarnost i uzrok one stvarnosti, koju opaamo ulima: uopte ne bi moglo postojati nita dobro da mu ontoloki ne prethodi ideja "dobrote", ne bi mogao postojati pojedinani konj da ne postoji opta ideja "konja" itd. Ovakvo shvatanje u filozofiji se nazivaobjektivni idealizam, a srednjovjekovni realizam jedan je od njegovih oblika.Platonu se suprotstavio njegov savremenik, drugiSokratovuenik, kinikAntisten, koji je rekao da vidi konja, ali ne moe vidjeti "konjstvo". Antisten je tako formulisao gledite koje e u srednjem vijeku biti nazvanonominalizam, naime uenje, da samo pojedinane stvari postoje realno (imaju supstanciju), dok su pojmovi samo imena (nomen) za niz slinih predmeta. Platonov je odgovor naravno glasio da se radi o "gledanju" umom, do kojeg se pojedinac moe dovinuti samo kroz naporno obrazovanje u filozofiji.Aurelije Avgustin, koji se prije prihvatanja hrianstva dobro upoznao sa neoplatonskom filozofijom, prihvatio je realistiki stav, tumaei ga meutim u okviru hrianske teologije: ideje ne tvore samostalno podruje, kako je mislio Platon, nego opstoje u Bojem umu. Ideje su misli koje Bog misli, ali za ovjeka one su objektivna stvarnost, koja se shvata umom, uz posredovanje vjere. Prouavanje pojedinanih stvari, pristupanih ulima, ne moe dovesti ni do kakve vrijedne spoznaje.Realisti, nastavljajui se na Avgustina, gledaju u optim pojmovima (dakle, Bojim mislima) uzroke pojedinanih stvari, u okviru opte "Rijei",Logosa, kojom Bog stvara svijet. Logos je, odbacivanjemarijanskoguenja definisan kao bogu istobitan i izjednaen sa Hristom, kao jedna od osoba bojegtrojstva.Tokom slijedeih pet stoljea nije bilo znaajnih diskusija na tu temu.Jovan Skot Eriugena(810-880) dovodi hrianski novoplatonski realizam do ekstremnog oblika: ono to je optije, to je i realnije, a najrealnije je ono najoptije: Bog, koji sve stvara a nije stvoren, koji sve obuhvata i koji se ne moe pojmiti.Nominalistiki izazov[]Tek u 11. stoljeu, kada na zapadu dolazi do rasta uenosti (sa sreditem u Parizu), obnavlja senominalistikouenje u djeluRoscelina, (1050-1123), koji je bio proglaenjeretikomi njegovi spisi uniteni, pa o njegovom uenju znamo samo iz spisa njegovih protivnika. On je zastupao ekstremni nominalizam: svaki pojam, sve ono opte, to nema podlogu u onome to se ulima moe zapaziti, samo je prazan zvuk (latinski:flatus vocis), kojim ovjek daje skupno ime nekoj grupi stvari; ta skupna imena korisna su za komunikaciju meu ljudima, no ona nemaju supstancu, koja pripada samo pojedinanim stvarima. Svoje je uenje on primijenio i na hriansku dogmu, dokazujui da je koncepcijatrojstvau sebi proturjena, to je i dovelo do osude za jeres.Realistiki odgovor[]Najznaajniji predstavnik realizma, u polemici sa Roscelinom, bio jeAnselmo od Canterburyja, (1033-1109). Anselmo istie prvenstvo vjere nad razumom: prvo se mora vjerovati, da bi se uopte smjelo raspravljati o Svetom Pismu, inae primjenadijalektikedovodi dojeresi, kao to se desilo Roscelinu. Nadovezujui se na Eriugenu, Anselmo je skovaoontoloki dokaz postojanja Boga.Drugi znaajni realist bio jeVilim iz Champeauxa, (1070-1121). On smatra da sutina (bit, bitnost) postoji samo u optem (rodu), a pojedinane se stvari razlikuju samo uakcidencijama. Iako je sam Vilim kasnije, pod utjecajem Abelardove kritike, odustao od radikalne formulacije, a drugi realisti traili umjerenije formulacije, realizmu je teko izbjeipanteistikukonsekvencu, da u svim pojavama svijeta treba vidjeti samo jednu boansku supstanciju. Takvo je uenje, istiu kritiari, sumnjivo sa gledita hrianske pravovjernosti. Crkva je meutim generalno prihvatala realizam, koji daje filozofsku pozadinu za nauk o trojstvu i o nasljednom grijehu.Sinteza konceptualizam[]Najznaajniji mislilac u ovom sporu bio jeAbelar(1079-1142), koji je bioivo, svestrano djelujue sredite borbe oko univerzalija( Windelband , str. 343). Njegovi su uitelji bili nominalist Roscelin i realist Vilim. U polemici protiv obojice, on je razvio svoje "srednje" uenje, koje je ipak blie nominalizmu, nazvanokonceptualizamilisermonizam. Realno postoje samo pojedinane stvari, ali pojmovi imaju znaaj u intelektu i nisu samo "prazan zvuk"; bez njih, nikakva ljudska spoznaja ne bi bila mogua. Njegova koncepcija ima bitan znaaj za dalji razvoj filozofije, jer naglaava aktivnu ulogu ljudskoga uma u stvaranju optih pojmova.Time je Abelard ukazao na put iz upljeg skolastikog formalizma koje ne brine o odnosu svojih spekulacija prema ulnoj stvarnosti, iako je sam faktiki jo unutar tog formalizma ostao. Stoljee i pol kasnije,Toma Akvinskiponovo prihvaa Aristotelovu koncepciju odnosa opteg i posebnog, koja je sadrajnija i daje via poticaja za dalja istraivanja. (To je bilo omogueno injenicom da su tek u 13. st. glavni Aristotelovi spisi postali ponovno poznati u hrianskim zemljama, zahvaljujui hebrejskim i arapskim prevodima.)Stanje danas[]Ove rasprave mogu u 21. stoljeu izgledati posve daleke i apstraktne. One su naravno bile uklopljene u teoloke diskusije koje su tada, a i danas, bile posve nerazumljive velikoj veini hrianskih vjernika (ali se zbog njih moglo i na lomai zavriti), a kamoli drugima.Meutim, oprena shvatanja o statusu optih pojmova i danas postoje, kako u filozofiji, tako i van nje, u politikim i drugim raspravama o pojedinim pitanjima, gdje se pojavljuju "realistika" i "nominalistika" shvatanja o pojedinim problematinim pojmovima.Npr. da linacija(i drugi slini pojmovi) postoji realno, van predstave koju o tome imaju pojedinci? U diskusijama o pojmovima "hrvatstvo", "srpstvo", "jugoslovenstvo", "Evropa", "Balkan" i tsl. lako moemo uoiti "realistiki" i "nominalistiki" stav, ili barem nain govora (a takve diskusije naravno vode i svi drugi narodi u svijetu).Drugi primjer su diskusije o pojmu pola i roda, koje je podstakaofeminizam. Postoje naravno bioloke razlike izmeu mukaraca i ena, ali do koje mjere moemo govoriti o postojanju "mukosti" i "enskosti" kao posebnih entiteta? Postoji radikalno nominalistiki stav koji sve razlike u osjeajima, ponaanju i dr. pripisuje samo odgoju, i tvrdokorno tradicionalistiki koji smatra da su razlike uroene i nepremostive; a postoje naravno i umjereni stavovi izmeu ta dva ekstrema, esto u smislu "naunog realizma" (vidi slijedei odjeljak).Druga znaenja pojma "realizam" u filozofiji[]Van spomenutog konteksta rasprave o univerzalijama, pojam "realizam" u filozofiji se koristi u razliitim znaenjima. Tako se ponekad "realistima" nazivaju svi oni filozofi koji idejama pripisuju objektivno postojanje, odnosno, svi "objektivni idealisti". Kantovose uenje naziva paktranscendentalni realizam, a uenje nekih njegovih nastavljaakritiki realizam, koji se pak po smislu pribliava "naunom realizmu" (vidi dolje). Potpuno drugaije je znaenje kada se "realizam" suprotstavljasubjektivnom idealizmu, kao uenje da vanjski svijet postoji nezavisno o svijesti, odnosno nezavisno o subjektu, koji ga spoznaje. U tom sluaju pojam "realizam" moe se koristiti kao sinonim zamaterijalizamili kao iri pojam, koji ukljuuje i neke tzv.idealistikekoncepcije. Savremeninauni realizam, kao "prirodna filozofija" koju naunici obino u svojem radu slijede, kompromisni je (eklektiki) stav po kojem neke osobine predmeta pripadaju njima samima, ali druge zavise o odnosu prema spoznajnom subjektu; koje su prvog, a koje drugog tipa treba u svakom pojedinom sluaju istraivanjima utvrditi. Dokle pak ta relativnost spoznaje see i koji su joj sve oblici, odnosno koliko nauka moe pretendirati na univerzalnost svojih spoznaja, predmet je znaajnih diskusija ufilozofiji naukeisociologiji spoznaje20. stoljea. Takoe se u filozofskim djelima, osobito u savremenojanalitikoj filozofijimoe nai pojamrealizamu njegovom svakodnevnom smislu.Zbog te viestrukosti, ako se termin "realizam" koristi, treba biti tano naznaeno na koje se znaenje misli. Ako je mogue, treba ga zamijeniti nekim preciznijim terminom. Treba biti vrlo oprezan u tome da se raznolike koncepcije svode pod neki opti pojam, da se "etiketiraju" (da se dakle postupa u smislu "realizma", svodei vrlo razliita razmatranja i uenja filozofa na neku optu "sutinu").

RoscelinIzvor: WikipediaJean Roscelin iz Compiegnea (Johannis Roscellinus Compediensis, oko 1050. - oko 1122/24) je bio francuski redovnik, teolog, filozof, pripada medu prve vane predstavnike zrele skolastike.

No, njegov nauk poznajemo tek iz jednoga pisma njegovu uceniku Abelardu, to ga prenosi J. - P. Mign (Patrologi Cursus Completus. To pismo, nastalo oko 1120, dio je Roscelinove polemike s Abelardom, a uz minuciozne teoloke argumente donosi i, za poboni Srednji Vijek, zacudnu kolicinu osobnih napadaja, sve do nesmiljenog izrugivanja Abelardovoj kastraciji, to je ovoga snala zbog njegove ljubavi spram Heloize. Inace nam je Roscelinovo naucavanje dostupno istom neizravno, iz spisa njegovih protivnika, realista: samoga Abelarda (umjerenog realista -konceptualista), Anselma od Canterburuyja (koji Roscelina napada kao jednoga medu "dijalekticarima naega doba"), te Johna od Salisburuyja, kao i jednog anonimnog epigrama.

Roscelin ulazi u povijest miljenja svojim radikalnim nominalizmom, kojim nastoji rijeiti veliki srednjovjekovni mudroslovni problem, problem univerzalija: one, dri Roscelin, ne postoje ni u Bojem umu (niti na nekom inteligibilnom nebu poput svijeta Platonovih ideja), niti u stvarima, ali nisu ni opci pojmovi (kako je tvrdio Abelard), premda postoji evidencija da Roscelin nije nijekao njihovu mogucnost. Ono opce naprosto nije drugo doli puka rijec, djeljiva na slogove, suglasnike i samoglasnike; pace, dah rijeci, daak glasa, kako on veli (flatus vocis). To je sententia vocum, njegov nauk o rijecima (glasovima): zbiljski opstoji samo ono pojedinacno, konkretni obojeni predmet, naprimjer konj, docim vec "boja" nema vlastite stvarnosti, kao niti, recimo, mudrost, izvan due koja je mudra. Svaka je substancija, dakle, individualna.

Roscelina je njegov dosljedni nominalizam doveo i osjetljivim teolokim konzekvencama. Tvrdeci, naime, kako Boje Trojstvo (kao opcost) nema realnosti, nego su realne samo tri Boje osobe, tri samostalna boanstva (Otac, Sin i Duh Sveti), jednaka tek voljom i mocju (una sit voluntas et potestas - prema Anselmovu prikazu Roscelina), ali ne jedinstvena, nego odvojena, poput tri andela ili tri due - inace bi se i Otac i Duh utjelovili, a ne samo Sin - Roscelin je zapao u krivovjerje triteizma, troboja, koje je osudeno na crkvenom saboru u Soissonsu 1092. Roscelin je tu opozvao svoja, u ocima Crkve kriva naucavanja, te izbjegao u Englesku, da ga ne snade kazna kamenovanja. Iz Engleske je, kao protivnik canterburyjskoga nadbiskupa Anselma, morao prebjeci u Rim, a poslije se vratio u Francusku. Kada je nestalo pogibli ekskomunikacije, navodno se ponovno priklonio svojemu izvornom uvjerenju.

Roscelin se "spotaknuo" na pitanju Trojstva, shvativi ga odvec racionalno, formalno-logicki. Drugi su skolastici oprezno priznavali da taj problem nije dostupan razumu (koji se tu mora zaplesti u aporije odnoaja opceg i pojedinacnog), pa su njegovo rjeavanje preputali cistoj vjeri i Objavi.

Radikalni Roscelinov nominalizam preuzeo je Vilim Okamski, no on ivi i u nadolazecim stoljecima filozofije, ako toga filozofi i nisu uvijek svjesni. Nominalisticki se nauk provlaci kroz teoriju spoznaje, antropologiju, etiku, filozofiju politike. Prepoznajemo ga u raznim oblicima pozitivizma i uopce antimetafizike, te empirizma - senzualizma, u individualistickom egoizmu jednoga Maxa Stirnera, u filozofiji egzistencije Srena Kierkegaarda ili Jeana - Paula Sartrea, u anarhizmu i liberalizmu (pa, nacelno, i u komunizmu), koji uime pojedinca manje ili vie nijecu dravu kao zajednicu opcosti; napokon, u otporu protiv univerzalistickih ideologija to ga prua filozofsko-politicka teorija Nove Desnice (Neue Rechte, Nouvelle Droite) na celu s Arminom Mohlerom i Alainom de Benoistom.

Od Roscelinovih izravnih sljedbenika valja navesti Raimberta iz Lillea te redovnika Herimana. .()

() (.Pierre Abelard,.Petrus Abelardus) (10791142), , . , , . Theologia christiana( )., . , , . , . . , (Sic et Non). , , 158 . , . , , ( ) . , , - . . , . , , . (). , ( ) . .[1] . : , (). : , . , . , . , . () , . , .Problem of universalsFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaInmetaphysics, theproblem of universalsrefers to the question of whether properties exist, and if so, what they are.[1]Propertiesare qualities or relations that two or more entities have in common. The various kinds of properties, such as qualities andrelationsare referred to asuniversals. For instance, one can imagine three cup holders on a table that have in common the quality ofbeing circularorexemplifying circularity,[2]or two daughters that have in commonbeing the daughter of Frank.There are many such properties, such as being human, red, male or female, liquid, big or small, taller than, father of, etc.[3]While philosophers agree that human beings talk and think about properties, they disagree on whether these universals exist in reality or merely in thought and speech.Contents[hide] 1Positions 1.1Realism 1.2Nominalism 1.3Idealism 2Ancient thought 2.1Plato 2.2Aristotle 3Medieval thought 3.1Boethius 3.2Duns Scotus 3.3Ockham 3.4Medieval realism 3.5Medieval nominalism 4Modern and contemporary views 4.1Berkeley 4.2Kant 4.3Mill 4.4Peirce 4.5James 4.6Armstrong 5See also 6Notes 7References and further reading 8External linksPositions[edit]The main positions on the issue are generally considered to be:realism,nominalism, andidealism(sometimes simply called "anti-realism" with regard to universals).[4]Realism[edit]Main article:Philosophical realismThe realist school claims that universals are real they exist and are distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are various forms of realism. Two major forms arePlatonic realism(universalia ante res) andAristotelian realism(universalia in rebus).[5]Platonic realismis the view that universals are real entities and they exist independent of particulars.Aristotelian realism, on the other hand, is the view that universals are real entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them.Realists tend to argue that universals must be posited as distinct entities in order to account for various phenomena. For example, a common realist argument, arguably found in Plato, is that universals are required for certain general words to have meaning and for the sentences in which they occur to be true or false. Take the sentence "Djivan Gasparyanis a musician". The realist may claim that this sentence is only meaningful and expresses a truth because there is an individual, Djivan Gasparyan, who possesses a certain quality, musicianship. Thus it is assumed that the property is a universal which is distinct from the particular individual who has the property.[6]Nominalism[edit]Main article:NominalismNominalists assert that only individuals or particulars exist and deny that universals are real (i.e. that they exist as entities or beings). The term "nominalism" comes from the Latinnomen("name"), since the nominalist philosopher agrees that we predicate the same property of multiple entities but argues that the entities only share a name, not a real quality, in common. There are various forms of nominalism (which is sometimes also referred to as "terminism"), three major forms areresemblance nominalism,conceptualism, andtrope nominalism. Nominalism has been endorsed or defended by many, includingWilliam of Ockham,Peter Abelard,D. C. Williams(1953),David Lewis(1983), and arguablyH. H. Price(1953) andW. V. O. Quine(1961).Nominalists often argue for their view by claiming that nominalism can account for all the relevant phenomena, and thereforebyOckham's razoror some sort of principle of simplicitynominalism is preferable, since it posits fewer entities. Whether nominalism can truly account for all of the relevant phenomena is debated.Idealism[edit]Main article:IdealismSee also:German Idealism,Immanuel Kant,Johann Gottlieb Fichte,Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling,Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HegelandBritish IdealismIdealists, such as Kant and Hegel, posit that universals are not real, but are ideas in the mind of rational beings. Idealists do not reject universals as arbitrary names; rather, they treat universals as fundamental categories of pure reason (or as secondary concepts derived from those fundamental categories). Universals, in idealism, are intrinsically tied to the rationality of the subject making the judgment.For instance, when someone judges that two cup holders are both circular they are not noticing a mind-independent thing ("circularity") that is in both objects, nor are they simply applying a name ("circular") to both. Rather, they partially constitute the very concept of cup holder by supplying it with the concept of circularity, which already exists as an idea in their rational mind.Thus, for idealists, the problem of universals is only tangentially a metaphysical problem; it is more of a problem ofpsychologyandepistemology.Ancient thought[edit]Plato[edit]Platobelieved there to be a sharp distinction between the world of perceivable objects and the world of universals orforms: one can only have mere opinions about the former, but one can haveknowledgeabout the latter. For Plato it was not possible to have knowledge of anything that could change or was particular, since knowledge had to be forever unfailing and general.[7]For that reason, the world of the forms is the real world, likesunlight, the sensible world is only imperfectly or partially real, likeshadows. ThisPlatonic realism, however, in denying that theeternal Formsare mental artifacts, differs sharply with modern forms of idealism.One of the first nominalist critiques of Plato's realism was that ofDiogenes of Sinope, who said "I've seen Plato's cups and table, but not his cupness and tableness."[8]Aristotle[edit]Plato's studentAristotledisagreed with his tutor. Aristotle transformed Plato's forms into "formal causes", the blueprints oressencesof individual things. Whereas Plato idealizedgeometry, Aristotle emphasizednatureand related disciplines and therefore much of his thinking concerns living beings and their properties. The nature of universals in Aristotle's philosophy therefore hinges on his view ofnatural kinds.Consider for example a particularoaktree. This is a member of a species and it has much in common with other oak trees, past, present and future. Its universal, its oakness, is a part of it. A biologist can study oak trees and learn about oakness and more generally the intelligible order within the sensible world. Accordingly, Aristotle was more confident than Plato about coming to know the sensible world; he was a prototypicalempiricistand a founder ofinduction. Aristotle was a new,moderatesort of realist about universals.Medieval thought[edit]Boethius[edit]The problem was introduced to the medieval world byBoethius, by his translation ofPorphyry'sIsagoge. It begins:"I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and subsist about these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation".[9]Duns Scotus[edit]Duns Scotusargued strongly against both nominalism and conceptualism, arguing instead forScotist realism, a medieval response to the conceptualism of Abelard.Ockham[edit]William of Ockhamargued strongly that universals are a product of abstract human thought. According to Ockham, universals are just words/names that only exist in the mind and have no real place in the external world.Medieval realism[edit]Realism was argued for by bothThomas AquinasandJohn Duns Scotus. Aquinas argued that both the essence of a thing and its existence were clearly distinct,[10]in this regard he is close to the teaching of Aristotle.Scotist realismargues that in a thing there is no real distinction between the essence and the existence, instead there is only aFormal distinction.[11]Both these opinions were denied by Scotus' pupil William of Ockham.Medieval nominalism[edit]Nominalism was first formulated as a philosophical theory in the Middle Ages. The French philosopher andtheologianRoscellinus(c. 1050-c. 1125) was an early, prominent proponent of this view. It can be found in the work ofPeter Abelardand reached its flowering inWilliam of Ockham, who was the most influential and thorough nominalist. Abelard's and Ockham's version of nominalism is sometimes calledconceptualism, which presents itself as a middle way between nominalism and realism, asserting that thereissomething in common among like individuals, but that it is a concept in the mind, rather than a real entity existing independently of the mind. Ockham argued that only individuals existed and that universals were only mental ways of referring to sets of individuals. "I maintain", he wrote, "that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject... but that it has a being only as a thought-object in the mind [objectivum in anima]". As a general rule, Ockham argued against assuming any entities that were not necessary for explanations. Accordingly, he wrote, there is no reason to believe that there is an entity called "humanity" that resides inside, say, Socrates, and nothing further is explained by making this claim. This is in accord with the analytical method which has since come to be calledOckham's razor, the principle that the explanation of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible.Critics argue that conceptualist approaches only answer the psychological question of universals. If the same concept iscorrectlyand non-arbitrarily applied to two individuals, there must be some resemblance or shared property between the two individuals that justifies their falling under the same concept and that is just the metaphysical problem that universals were brought in to address, the starting-point of the whole problem (MacLeod & Rubenstein, 2006, 3d). If resemblances between individuals are asserted, conceptualism becomes moderate realism; if they are denied, it collapses into nominalism.[12]Modern and contemporary views[edit]Berkeley[edit]George Berkeley, best known for his empiricism, was also an advocate of an extreme nominalism. Indeed, he disbelieved even in the possibility of a general thought as a psychological fact. It is impossible to imagine a man, the argument goes, unless one has in mind a very specific picture of one who is either tall or short, European, African or Asian, blue-eyed or brown-eyed, et cetera. When one thinks of atriangle, likewise, it is always obtuse, right-angled or acute. There is no mental image of a triangle in general. Not only then do general terms fail to correspond to extra-mental realities, they don't correspond to thoughts either.Berkeleyan nominalism contributed to the same thinker's critique of the possibility of matter. In the climate of English thought in the period followingIsaac Newton's major contributions tophysics, there was much discussion of a distinction betweenprimary qualities and secondary qualities. The primary qualities were supposed to be true of material objects in themselves (size, position,momentum) whereas the secondary qualities were supposed to be more subjective (colorandsound). But on Berkeley's view, just as it is meaningless to speak of triangularity in general aside from specific figures, so it is meaningless to speak of mass in motion without knowing the color. If the color is in the eye of the beholder, so is the mass.

Contributions to philosophy[edit]Main article:Subjective idealismAccording to Berkeley there are only two kinds of things: spirits and ideas. Spirits are simple, active beings which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and perceived.[12]The use of the concepts of "spirit" and "idea" is central in Berkeley's philosophy. As used by him, these concepts are difficult to translate into modern terminology. His concept of "spirit" is close to the concept of "conscious subject" or of "mind", and the concept of "idea" is close to the concept of "sensation" or "state of mind" or "conscious experience".Thus Berkeley denied the existence of matter as ametaphysicalsubstance, but did not deny the existence of physical objects such as apples or mountains. ("I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.",Principles#35) This basic claim of Berkeley's thought, his "idealism", is sometimes and somewhat derisively called "immaterialism" or, occasionally,subjective idealism. InPrinciples #3,he wrote, using a combination of Latin and English,esse is percipi,(to be is to be perceived), most often if slightly inaccurately attributed to Berkeley as the pure Latin phraseesse est percipi.[13]The phrase appears associated with him in authoritative philosophical sources, e.g. "Berkeley holds that there are no such mind-independent things, that, in the famous phrase, esse est percipi (aut percipere) to be is to be perceived (or to perceive)."[14]Hence, human knowledge is reduced to two elements: that of spirits and of ideas (Principles#86). In contrast to ideas, a spirit cannot be perceived. A person's spirit, which perceives ideas, is to be comprehended intuitively by inward feeling or reflection (Principles#89). For Berkeley, we have no direct 'idea' of spirits, albeit we have good reason to believe in the existence of other spirits, for their existence explains the purposeful regularities we find in experience.[15]("It is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us", Dialogues #145). This is the solution that Berkeley offers to theproblem of other minds. Finally, the order and purposefulness of the whole of our experience of the world and especially of nature overwhelms us into believing in the existence of an extremely powerful and intelligent spirit that causes that order. According to Berkeley, reflection on the attributes of that external spirit leads us to identify it with God. Thus a material thing such as an apple consists of a collection of ideas (shape, color, taste, physical properties, etc.) which are caused in the spirits of humans by the spirit of God.Theology[edit]A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediatecauseof all our experiences.He did not evade the question of the external source of the diversity of thesense dataat the disposal of the human individual. He strove simply to show that the causes of sensations could not be things, because what we called things, and considered without grounds to be something different from our sensations, were built up wholly from sensations. There must consequently be some other external source of the inexhaustible diversity of sensations. The source of our sensations, Berkeley concluded, could only be God; He gave them to man, who had to see in them signs and symbols that carried God's word.[16]Here is Berkeley's proof of the existence of God:Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on mywill. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. (Berkeley.Principles#29)As T.I. Oizerman explained:Berkeley'smystic idealism(asKantaptly christened it) claimed that nothing separated man and God (exceptmaterialistmisconceptions, of course), since nature or matter did not exist as a reality independent of consciousness. The revelation of God was directly accessible to man, according to this doctrine; it was the sense-perceived world, the world of man's sensations, which came to him from on high for him to decipher and so grasp the divine purpose.[16]Berkeley believed that God is not the distant engineer ofNewtonianmachinery that in the fullness of time led to the growth of a tree in the university quadrangle. Rather, the perception of the tree is an idea that God's mind has produced in the mind, and the tree continues to exist in the quadrangle when "nobody" is there, simply because God is an infinitemindthat perceives all.The philosophy ofDavid Humeconcerning causality and objectivity is an elaboration of another aspect of Berkeley's philosophy.A.A. Luce, the most eminent Berkeley scholar of the 20th century, constantly stressed the continuity of Berkeley's philosophy. The fact that Berkeley returned to his major works throughout his life, issuing revised editions with only minor changes, also counts against any theory that attributes to him a significantvolte-face.[citation needed]Relativity arguments[edit]See also:Three Dialogues between Hylas and PhilonousJohn Locke (Berkeley's predecessor) states that we define an object by itsprimary and secondary qualities. He takes heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a bucket of cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water, then put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water, one of your hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other that the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects (both your hands) perceive the water to be hotandcold, then the heat is not a quality of the water.While Locke used this argument to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley extends it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says that size is not a quality of an object because the size of the object depends on the distance between the observer and the object, or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to different observers, then size is not a quality of the object. Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument and then asks: if neither primary qualities nor secondary qualities are of the object, then how can we say that there is anything more than the qualities we observe?

Berkeley's great contribution (picked up on later by Kant) was to suggest the preposterousness of referencing absolute knowledge, given that all knowledge is gained through contingent sensory experience. In fact, the very notion of finding coherence and permanence within sensory experience was so preposterous to him, that he had to postulate the notion of a God who holds all reality in HIS mind, in order to explain why the world doesn't just vanish when we stop perceiving it. He was forced, by his extreme empiricism, to posit the existence of God in order to explain our experience of coherence, even though on an empirical understanding of raw sense data, such a conclusion did not follow. In this, he demonstrates the importance and brilliance of Kant's "Copernican revolution" in epistemology that was to follow. For without Kant, Berkeley was not able to give an account of the coherence of our experience that squared with his empiricism. David Hume tried to give such an account when he proposed that concepts are merely the faded memories of sensory experiences had over and over again, like writing on a page which eventually sinks through to the underlying pages. But this account seemed to threaten the very possibility of science as an objective endeavor and made Kant, himself a scientist, very uneasy. It forced Kant to come up with his theory of noumenal objects as unverifiable but understandable extensions of our immediate sensory experience constructed according to the inherent schemae of our understanding. Thus, in place of God's role as guarantor of the coherence of the world, Kant posits a faculty of reason structured by the forms of our intuition (our sense of time and space) and the categories of our understanding (like the notion of cause and effect).Kant[edit]Idealism is a broad category that includes several diverse themes, fromKant's radical doubt about what can truly be perceived externally toHegel's Absolute Ideal as the verification of the sum of potential manifestations of matter and concepts. This position argues that the nature of reality is based only in our minds or ideas, and represents one of several divergent interpretations of Kants legacy. On Hegels view, the external world is inseparable from the mind, consciousness or perceptions. Universals are real and exist independently of that on which they might be predicated.But to conflate Kant's and Hegel's versions of idealism is to seriously miss the point of Kants radical doubt, which was stimulated in turn by David Hume's. Kant claimed it was Humes skepticism about the nature of inductive reasoning and the conclusions of rationalist metaphysicians (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) that "roused him from his dogmatic (i.e. rationalist) slumbers" and spurred him on to one of the most far reaching re-evaluations of human reason since Aristotle. Following Aristotles lead, Kant considered that knowledge can only be had through experience of particulars. Given that premise, the notion of absolute knowledge (as described by Plato and the rationalists) is seen as mere illusion, and this is what he set out to demonstrate in the first part of his magnum opus "The Critique of Pure Reason" (1781). He claims to demonstrate that because knowledge can only be had through contingent (imperfect) experience, the notion of absolute, uncontingent knowledge must not actually be obtainable, but must function merely as a regulative principle or heuristic device for problem solving. Thus we can conceive of a noumenal world (noumenal meaning "object of thought") which exists only as a heuristic for our cognitive capacities and not as something directly accessible to experience. The noumenal world for Kant is the way things in themselves might appear to a being of uncontingent reason (i.e. God).The phenomenal world, on the other hand is the world of experience, in which we live and in which objects are given to reason in experience. Our understanding of the phenomenal world is inevitably colored by the imperfections, or restrictions, of the knowing apparatus, and this is what he set out to describe in the first part of the 1st Critique. Following Aristotles lead, he describes categories of the understanding, such as the notion of cause and effect, which inevitably mediate our experience of the world and give us the objects of our experience. The objects in themselves as they might appear in their universal or absolute nature are forever hidden from us, and thus Kant effectively rules out the type of access to the world of the forms that had been formulated by Plato. The notion of the noumenal can only function as a heuristic of reason, not as an actual something to be experienced by contingent beings. Thus Kant effects his Copernican revolution of knowledge by changing our perspective on knowledge from a question of what can truly be known (i.e. how can we actually come to know universals), to a question of how does the knowing mind operate. As with Copernicus, the data remains the same but the model used to encounter the data shifts tremendously.After Kant, the problem of universals becomes a problem of human psychology and questions about conceptual models we use to understand universals, rather than the same old metaphysical arguments about what universals really are. The second part of the 1st Critique is Kants examination of the rationalist claims to absolute knowledge, taking on the most famous of these, theontological proofof Gods existence, and showing that he can, through pure, non-experiential logic, both prove the affirmative and the negative of a proposition about a noumenal object (i.e. an object like God which can never be an object of direct experience for a contingent being). Given that both A and not-A are seen to be true, Kant concludes that its not that God doesnt exist but that there is something wrong with how we are asking questions about God and how we have been using our rational faculties to talk about universals ever since Plato got us started on this track! He goes on, in subsequent Critiques and other works, to demonstrate his model for the proper use of concepts like God the Good, and the beautiful, effecting the most radical re-evaluation of these ideas since Plato, and changing forever the course of western philosophy. It is perhaps no small exaggeration to claim that most western philosophers since Kant, even if they disagree with him, have had to find some way to respond to his revolutionary ideas.Mill[edit]John Stuart Milldiscussed the problem of universals in the course of a book that eviscerated the philosophy of SirWilliam Hamilton. Mill wrote, "The formation of a concept does not consist in separating the attributes which are said to compose it from all other attributes of the same object and enabling us to conceive those attributes, disjoined from any others. We neither conceive them, nor think them, nor cognize them in any way, as a thing apart, but solely as forming, in combination with numerous other attributes, the idea of an individual object".However, he then proceeds to state that Berkeley's position is factually wrong by stating the following:But, though meaning them only as part of a larger agglomeration, we have the power of fixing our attention on them, to the neglect of the other attributes with which we think them combined. While the concentration of attention lasts, if it is sufficiently intense, we may be temporarily unconscious of any of the other attributes and may really, for a brief interval, have nothing present to our mind but the attributes constituent of the concept.[citation needed]In other words, we may be "temporarily unconscious" of whether an image is white, black or yellow and concentrate our attention on the fact that it is a man and on just those attributes necessary to identify it as a man (but not as any particular one). It may then have the significance of a universal of manhood.Peirce[edit]The 19th-century American logicianCharles Sanders Peirce, known as the father ofpragmatism, developed his own views on the problem of universals in the course of a review of an edition of the writings of George Berkeley. Peirce begins with the observation that "Berkeley'smetaphysicaltheories have at first sight an air of paradox and levity very unbecoming to a bishop".[13]He includes among these paradoxical doctrines Berkeley's denial of "the possibility of forming the simplest general conception". He wrote that if there is some mental fact that worksin practicethe way that a universal would, that fact is a universal. "If I have learned a formula in gibberish which in any way jogs my memory so as to enable me in each single case to act as though I had a general idea, what possible utility is there in distinguishing between such a gibberish... and an idea?" Peirce also held as a matter ofontologythat what he called "thirdness", the more general facts about the world, are extra-mental realities.James[edit]William Jameslearned pragmatism, this way of understanding an idea by its practical effects, from his friend Peirce, but he gave it new significance. (Which was not to Peirce's taste - he came to complain that James had "kidnapped" the term and eventually to call himself a "pragmaticist" instead). Although James certainly agreed with Peirce and against Berkeley that general ideas exist as a psychological fact, he was a nominalist in his ontology:From every point of view, the overwhelming and portentous character ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why, from Plato and Aristotle, philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular and in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars. The only value of universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning, to know newtruthsabout individual things. William James,The Principles of PsychologyThere are at least three ways in which a realist might try to answer James' challenge of explaining the reason why universal conceptions are more lofty than those of particulars - there is the moral/political answer, the mathematical/scientific answer and the anti-paradoxical answer. Each has contemporary or near contemporary advocates.The moral or political response is given by the conservative philosopherRichard M. WeaverinIdeas Have Consequences, where he describes how the acceptance of "the fateful doctrine of nominalism" was "the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence".[14][15]Roger Penrosecontends that thefoundations of mathematicscan't be understood absent the Platonic view that "mathematical truth is absolute, external and eternal, and not based on man-made criteria ... mathematical objects have a timeless existence of their own..."Nino Cocchiarella(1975), professor emeritus of philosophy atIndiana University, has maintained that conceptual realism is the best response to certain logical paradoxes to which nominalism leads. It is noted that in a sense Cocchiarella has adopted Platonism for anti-Platonic reasons. Plato, as seen in the dialogueParmenides, was willing to accept a certain amount of paradox with his forms. Cocchiarella adopts the forms to avoid paradox.Armstrong[edit]The Australian philosopherDavid Malet Armstronghas been one of the leading realists in the twentieth century, and has used a concept of universals to build a naturalistic and scientifically realist ontology upon. In bothUniversals and Scientific RealismandUniversals: An Opinionated Introduction, Armstrong describes the relative merits of a number of nominalist theories which appeal either to "natural classes" (a view he ascribes toAnthony Quinton), concepts, resemblance relations or predicates, and also discusses non-realist "trope" accounts (which he describes in theUniversals and Scientific Realismvolumes as "particularism"). He gives a number of reasons to reject all of these, but also dismisses a number of realist accounts.See also[edit]Philosophy portal

Abstract object Bundle theory Conceptualism Nominalism Object (philosophy) Philosophy of mathematics Platonic form Qualia[16] Realism (philosophy) Universal (metaphysics) Universality (philosophy)