REZUMATE

1. Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making : Toward a Constructivist Approach The logical connections to both the realist and liberal paradigms were always strained. The insights of the original FPA scholars were undoubtedly intended originally as a corrective to some of the assumptions of the realist paradigm, most notably the rational actor assumption, whose economistic assumptions sit ill at ease with the more empirically driven, psychologically derived insights of FPA. One can treat the classic work of Robert Jervis and Graham Allison as amendments to real- ismFanomalies eating away at the realist paradigmFbut if so, the anomalies have evidently mounted to the point where the original edifice is imploding; FPA ar- guably runs against the whole thrust of realism, both in its classical and structural versions. Morgenthau’s notion of an unchanging human nature, derived from conservative political philosophyFthe animus dominandiFsits very oddly with the more nuanced appreciation of human beings that cognitive and social psychology bring to the study of FPA. Moreover, the systemic-level focus of neorealism self- consciously rejects what Kenneth Waltz calls the kind of ‘‘unit level’’ analysis which the stock in trade of FPA.

While the similarities between CFPA and constructivism are strong and real, there are at least two potential barriers to such a dialogue. The fourth and final section will examine these two obstaclesFone epistemological, the other onto- logicalFsuggesting ways in which these might be overcome.

As already noted, constructivism is a diverse collection of approaches whose mem- bersFwhile differing markedly over some substantive and epistemological is- suesFshare certain core propositions in common. Various authors have ably summarized the basic assumptions that underlie constructivism in its various forms, although these are so interrelated that we can have a hard time separating them from one another.

This definition is probably unduly restrictive, for it suggests that a theory must necessarily be ‘‘incorrect’’ or make claims that are patently false at the outset; a theory may be logically neither correct nor incorrect a priori, however, and yet self-fulfilling in the sense that the actors believe in it and so render it ‘‘true.’’ But Merton’s def- inition still captures the essential nature of the self-fulfilling prophecy; perceptions can be self-creating, and even misperceptions can be proven

‘‘correct.’’10 One in- teresting example applied to the field of IR theory is suggested by the work of Thomas Risse-Kappen, whose argument about the democratic peace illustrates the ways in which academic ideas seep into the policy community and become widely accepted to the point where they effectively shape reality rather than explain it:

If actors of democratic states view each other as predisposed toward peacefulness, the significance of the security dilemma in their interactions is substantially reduced and, therefore, a major obstacle toward stable security cooperation removed. Actors who trust each other start behaving accordingly. They thereby create a peaceful and cooperative order through their interaction processes which reinforces the percep- tion of one’s peaceful intentions. In other words, the presumption that the other is predisposed toward peacefulness leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy if both sides act on this assumption. The ‘‘democratic peace’’ is socially constructed

A clear awareness of what we now call the structure/agency problem is also present, although again it is couched in rather different language as one might expect. ‘‘We are still confronted by the empirical puzzle of the extent to which an individual policy-maker . . . influences policy outcomes and the extent to which impersonal forces (such as historical movements, ideologies, and governmental systems) also determine actions,’’ Snyder noted back in 1962. ‘‘One suspects that it is not one or the other but both’’

As for the cultural dimension of foreign policy and the importance of social identity, Snyder and his colleagues were among the first in modern IR to argue for the necessity of studying these phenomena, although in truth this recognition goes as far back as Harold Lasswell’s World Politics and Personal Insecurity, first published in 1935, and to Max Weber’s arguments in the Methodenstreit (methodological con- troversy) of the late nineteenth century

There is, as a number of observers have already noted, a risk that constructivism is in the process of becoming mere fad or what Chris Brown calls a ‘‘bumper sticker,’’ morphing into a big tent approach of such size and diversity that it loses its distinc- tiveness. Can everything and anything fit under the description of ‘‘constructivism’’? Clearly not. According to some critics, many supposedly ‘‘constructivist’’ arguments are merely old or existing theories dressed up in the superficial trappings of the approach. Stefano Guzzini, for instance, suggests that much scholarship calling itself ‘‘constructivist’’ is ‘‘often either eclectic or redundant. Eclecticism shows up when constructivism has become a general category out of which many researchers pick and choose their particular version without necessarily looking at the theoretical coherence of the final product.

While one can have some sympathy with these critiques, they often betray a ‘‘more constructivist than thou’’ mentality and a desire to close down debate, reserving the term ‘‘constructivism’’ exclusively for what the critic happens to do. Why should constructivism have a single epistemology, methodology, or ontology? Guzzini is surely correct that one is hardly a constructivist simply because one studies ideas, as we noted earlier, and it is difficult indeed to make constructivism compatible with rationalism, as some have sought to do.

Considering a case most of us know intimatelyFthe Cuban missile crisis of 1962Fmakes it plain how important both forms of constructivism are, as well as the

manner in which the choice of one or the other depends on the thing we are trying to explain. If we are interested in why Kennedy and his advisers gave little or no consideration to the option of doing nothing in response to the discovery of missiles in Cuba, for example, beliefs about Cold War Communism and appropri- ate presidential behavior in response to security threats shared by practically all Americans (social constructivism’s forte) seem so critical that it is difficult to under- stand how any useful explanation could conceivably leave them out. On the other hand, if we are interested in why Kennedy chose the naval blockade over the ‘‘surgical’’ air strike, society-wide beliefs tell us relatively little and individual con- structions a great deal.

2. WHAT NEXT FOR THE POLISH-ROMANIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?

As key players in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and Romania have an interest in functional membership, supported by transparent consultation within the EU, in which they can contribute effectively to the decision making processes which affect them. As the two manage EU and NATO external borders, they bring a particular vision, aimed at maintaining the attractiveness of the European project in their neighbours’ eyes, and address constructively the transition processes in their proximity.

Among the political and economic issues at the top of the common agenda, both countries are interested in keeping the European Council as the main forum for decision-making in the Union, including decisions regarding economic and monetary issues. At European level, there is increasing consensus that the austerity policies so far adopted need to be complemented by growth-inducing

initiatives. Romania has supported and efficiently implemented budgetary discipline as an objective, but further policy proposals aimed at stimulating growth are needed, in cooperation with Poland. At the same time, it is important that Romania coordinates with Poland in shaping the political debate on the future of the Eurozone, and that it turns its economic stability into political capital at EU level.

There is also major role also for the Polish and Romanian civil societies and non-governmental organisations, in jointly promoting respect for Copenhagen criteria. Polls conducted ahead of the 2014 European Parliamentary elections do not bode well for European democracies, particularly for centre parties, as more Europeans tend to slide towards extremist groups. Particularly worrying is the continued rise of xenophobic and anti-European attitudes in many EU Member States, including older ones, which gives a sense of overall deterioration of democratisation processes across the Union.

When it comes to energy policy, Poland and Romania—in common with other countries in the region— share the same concerns of security of supply, energy efficiency and the tensions between the severe environmental and market liberalisation expectations of the EU and national economic interests. Even without a common geographical border, such convergences serve as a solid foundation for cooperation. This can be on a bilateral level, just as on multi-lateral platforms—be that the EU or the V4 Plus format.

Since both Romania and Poland are among the countries paying the highest prices for Russian gas imports Europe-wide (in 2012 Poland paid an average price of $525 and Romania $440 per thousand cubic metres), their efforts should be joined to speed up the integration of the regional market and with this pave the way for a liberalised single European energy market. To this end, Romania has already joined the regional electric power market coupling, started by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.

There are multiple economic links, as well as political and security interests, which bind the four countries. In the EU, Poland and Romania are among the most important trade partners of Ukraine and Moldova respectively. Economic exchanges are poised to deepen once Ukraine and Moldova sign Association Agreements (AA) with the EU, envisioning the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the European market will open new avenues for Polish and Romanian investments. In addition to enhanced commerce, Poland and Romania represent main entry points connecting Ukraine and Moldova with the EU’s critical infrastructure, including highways, pipelines, railways and power grids. As limitrophe states, Poland and Romania strive to push the EU’s frontier further to the east, extending the perimeter of security and prosperity.

As Ukraine and Moldova could soon sign AAs, Poland and Romania could share

expertise on setting up domestic inter-ministerial mechanisms aimed at streamlining government actions towards implementation of association agenda. Finally, Romania and Poland cannot avoid horse trading concerning the next EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. Warsaw and Bucharest must work together to secure nominations from like-minded EU Member States, as the decisions of the outgoing commissioner were almost in line with the foreign policy of his country of origin.

Energy security is a critical issue for both Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine is in the middle of implementing a gas sources diversification strategy. Poland already pumps gas in reverse mode from Germany to Ukraine. A similar option is under discussion with Romania. Although the volume of gas which can transit Romania to Ukraine are not significant at this stage, signing a gas transit agreement would be a trust-building measure between Kiev and Bucharest that could contribute to a further thaw in bilateral relations. Given Russia’s obstruction of similar deal between Slovakia (which has the greatest transit capacities among neighbours) and Ukraine, Poland might consider expanding its gas transit network with Ukraine. As regards Romania, the tempo of building the gas pipeline Iasi–Ungheni and interconnecting electricity networks must

speed up. Romania must prepare the second stage of the project—a compressor station—in order to be able use the gas interconnector with Moldova to its full capacity (1.5 bcm).

A DCFTA as part of an Association Agreement is the most powerful transformation tool the EaP provides. Poland and Romania must assist Ukraine and Moldova in the DCFTA implementation phase. Ultimately, economic de-monopolisation, enhanced transparency, and fair competition are in the interests of Polish and Romanian investors. Both states already implement projects to strengthen institutional capacity in Ukraine and Moldova. In the coming years, Poland could share with Ukraine and Moldova its experience in reforming the agricultural sector, helping to boost exports to the EU market. Romania could extend positive anti-corruption experience, transferring this not only to Moldova but also to Ukraine, when authorities in Kiev are ready to accept such assistance. Islands of reform in Ukraine and Moldova deserve special support. For instance, the Ministry of Education in Moldova pushed a law on the National Agency for Quality Assurance in High Education through parliament. A similar agency in Romania could be a valuable partner in setting up the institution in Moldova. The Interior Ministry in Moldova is implementing the most profound structural reform in decades. Poland and Romania could make this reform sustainable in the long term, by helping with expertise and technical assistance to create the Police College which will prepare the next generation of well-trained policemen.

Poland and Romania have, through concerted action, the potential to contribute to rendering the European project more flexible, to open it up towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, and to improve European security. The Strategic Partnership offers

a particular setting to reinforce coordination between the two countries in forging common positions on the major political and economic debates at the European level. These include navigating the European post-crisis agenda from austerity towards support for growth and employment, consolidating the Economic and Monetary Union (and within this, accommodating the positions of non-Eurozone members such as Poland and Romania), maintenance of a European budget favourable for the net beneficiaries, and safeguarding the principle and practice of the free movement of labour. Given the commonalities in the energy security of the countries, they should utilise both bilateral and multi-lateral platforms to push forward the regional integration of the energy market and to claim a voice in the debate on the future of shale gas in Europe. In the case of most European issues, the V4 Plus format can serve as a useful channel for Poland in involving Romania in shaping a regional view and communicating common interests.

Finally, given the similar approach to the main security challenges for Europe and to the issue of the future of NATO and the EU’s security dimension, the next step towards turning the Strategic Partnership premises into tangible results should see Poland and Romania coordinating and presenting common initiatives. The coming months could create opportunities for displaying such unified positions. At EU level, Romania and Poland should contribute to advancing the debate at the December 2013 European Defence Council meeting, on the factors which have so far hindered the Union’s ability to define a geopolitical vision of its own, particularly in relation to its neighbourhood. Joint efforts should also aim to reach a common assessment of the CSDP in terms of capabilities, EDA’s role and industry development, and striking a balance with engagement in NATO. At NATO, the 2014 Summit is to take place in the United Kingdom. Both Poland and Romania can contribute their joint assessment of the agenda for a post-ISAF Alliance, including renewed emphasis on exercises, a joint approach to acquiring key capabilities, and a realistic agenda with Russia.

3. ABORDARI PSIHO-COGNITIVE IN ANALIZA POLITICA EXTERNA – SORIN STEFAN DENCA

Rădăcinile conceptuale ale studiului politicii externă se regăsesc în Europa secolului al XVII-lea, în perioada apariţiei statelor naţionale moderne. Consacrarea analizei de politică externă ca domeniu academic s-a produs în Statele Unite ale Americii, în

special după cel de-al doilea război mondial1. Atât concepţiile idealiste, cu origini în gândirea idealistă, Kantiană, cât şi cele realiste, bazate pe concepţia Hobbesiană, pesimistă asupra naturii umane, inerent agresive, au stat la baza dezvoltării studiului academic al relaţiilor internaţionale şi politicii externe în Statele Unite.

Cu începere din anii 1950, ştiinţa politică americană, implicit studiul relaţiilor internaţionale şi al politicii externe, a început să fie dominată de abordările behavioraliste. În plan practic, acest fapt a însemnat înlocuirea abordărilor normative cu un program de cercetare cantitativ. În cazul analizei de politică externă, perspectiva behavioralistă a îmbrăcat forma unui program de cercetare cunoscut sub numele de „studiul comparativ al politicii externe“. Scopul acestuia a fost crearea şi acumularea unui corpus de informaţii privind comportamentul politic, care să poată fi generalizate empiric. Analiza de politică externă a fost semnificativ marcată de predominanţa studiilor comparative în această perioadă, dar au existat încercări de explicare a deciziilor de politică externă din perspectiva rolului jucat de factorii psihologici şi cognitivi (Carlsnaes, 2003: 333), cu atât mai mult cu cât importanţa acestora a fost acceptată de multă vreme. Totuşi, conturarea unei agende de cercetare specifice nu s-a produs decât cu dificultate. Transferul de metode şi tehnici de cercetare din portofoliul psihologiei în cel al analizei de politică externă a fost privită cu neîncredere de o serie de specialişti, principalul argument invocat fiind faptul că metodele de laborator şi experimentele nu pot fi aplicate în domeniul studiului comportamentului politic.

Cea de-a treia categorie, a contextului în care politica externă este elaborată, se

referă la mediul psiho-social. Cinci teme majore au caracterizat studiile de acest tip

în ultima jumătate de secol: 1. caracterul şi natura actorilor politici individuali; 2.

rolul percepţiilor; 3. rolul societăţii i culturii în sens larg; 4. specificul comunităţiis

politice; 5. caracteristicile sistemului internaţional (Hudson & Vore, 1995: 226).

Abordările psiho-cognitive se încadrează în special în primele două arii tematice şi

într-o anumită măsura în cea de-a treia.

Într-o primă fază, abordările psiho-cognitive au urmărit studierea atitudinilor actorilor politici şi schimbarea atitudinală, şi mai ales problema consistenţei şi disonanţei cognitive. Cu începere din anii ’70 însă, studiile psiho-cognitive au schimbat complet unghiul de abordare.

În 1953, într-un studiu dedicat bol evismului, Nathan Laites a introdus pentru sprima dată conceptul de „coduri operaţionale” cu referire la preceptele şi maximele caracterizând viziunea bol evismului clasic asupra politicii, regulilor de conduită şi snormelor de comportament cărora „bunul” bolşevic trebuie să li se conformeze (George, 1969: 193-4). Studiul nu a produs un impact deosebit la momentul publicării, în schimb a fost preluat critic şi reintrodus în studiile comportamentului

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politic de către Alexander George2 în 1969. Cadrul elaborat de George a fost ulterior utilizat şi adaptat de alţi politologi la propriile programe de cercetare.

Ca şi cartografia cognitivă, teoria atribuirii este legată de domeniul psihologiei şi de

lucrările lui Fritz Heider, care au stimulat interesul cercetătorilor din domeniul

relaţiilor internaţionale i analizei de politică externă (Bonham, 1993: 256). Îns

esenţă, teoria atribuiri consideră că indivizii umani atribuie comportamentul uman

fie factorilor personali (dispoziţionali), fie celor exteriori individului (situaţionali).

Această idee a fost preluată de cercetătorii din domeniul relaţiilor internaţionale şi

analizei de politică externă şi aplicată modului în care liderii politici, acţionând ca

„oameni de ştiinţă naivi” sau conform bunului simţ, percep şi explică propriul lor

comportament şi pe cel al altor lideri (Heradstveit şi Bonham, 1986: 344). Aplicaţii

ulterioare ale teoriei atribuirii sunt studiile lui Heradstveit şi Bonham din 1986 cu

privire la modul în care oficiali americani şi norvegieni au perceput intrarea

repetată a navelor sovietice în apele teritoriale norvegiene, sau cel publicat în 1996

cu privire la imaginea în lumea arabă a războiului din Irak din 1991, precum şi

analiza lui Stephen Walker publicată în 1999 cu privire la stilurile de atribuire ale lui

George Buch Sr. şi Bill Clinton.

Conceptul de „imagine” aplicat analizei relaţiilor internaţionale a fost iniţial utilizat

de Kenneth Boulding, reputat economist cu contribuţii majore în domeniul ştiinţelor

sociale în general. Argumentul său a fost că realitatea umană este structurată de

diferite paliere imagistice, începând cu imaginea modului de funcţionare a lumii.

Comportamentul uman depinde de imaginile mentale iar semnificaţia unei

informaţii este legată de schimbarea pe care o produce acestor imagini. Cunoaşterea

umană, argumentează Boulding, este conectată organic de imaginile mentale fiind

rezultat al experienţelor anterioare şi susceptibilă schimbării pe măsura apariţiei de

noi informaţii.

Teoriile învăţării au fost aplicate domeniului relaţiilor internaţionale începând din

anii '70, studii de pionierat fiind publicate de Ernest R. May în 1973 şi Robert Jervis

în 1976. În primul caz, May a examinat analogiile cu situaţii din trecut pe care liderii

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americani le-au făcut în scopul justificării războiului din Vietnam şi a rolului pe care

aceste analogii l-a jucat în formularea politicii externe americane (Warner, 1975:

462). Deja menţionata lucrare a lui Jervis privind percepţiile în politica

internaţională a alocat un capitol consistent problemei modului în care liderii

politici învaţă lecţiile istoriei. Aceste două studii au fost urmate, în special de la

jumătatea anilor '80, de numeroase analize privind problema procesului de învăţare,

stimulate şi de acceptarea tot mai largă a faptului că teoriile structurale nu sunt

echipate suficient de bine din punct de vedere teoretic pentru a explica sfârşitul

Războiului Rece sau alte situaţii de schimbare în politica internationala.

Herrmann a identificat o serie de critici care au fost aduse abordărilor psiho-

cognitive în studiul politicii externe. Prima se referă la caracterul teoretic şi

descriptiv al acestora studii, limitate la descrierea ideografică a percepţiilor pe care

liderii politici le au cu privire la existenţă. În al doilea rând, pe lângă faptul că sunt

excesiv de teoretice, aceste studii reuşesc să fie suficient de abstracte încât, conform

lui Herrmann, să explice totul şi nimic. În plus, rolul elementelor emoţionale şi

afective nu a fost suficient explorat, în ciuda importanţei pe care o prezintă.

Analiza de politică externă, deşi considerat sub-domeniu al relaţiilor internaţionale,

se bazează pe o premisă diferită, şi anume faptul că deciziile de politică externă sunt

rezultatul acţiunii umane, individuale sau de grup. Este aşadar plasată la intersecţia

diferitelor tipuri de ştiinţe sociale în măsura în care acestea sunt legate de domeniul

politicii internaţionale . Caracterul inter şi multi-disciplinar al analizei de politică

externă oferă deschideri promiţătoare pentru viitorul domeniului.

4. FOREIGN POLICY MAKERS AND THEIR NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS –

NAOMI BAILIN WISH

The correlational analysis showed strong correspondences between some of the

ational role conceptions of political leaders and the foreign policy behavior of their

nations. For example, nations whose leaders perceived dominand roles affecting

large domains were more likely to participate in the international arena.

The MDPREF analysis showed that the two most important factors underlying the

entire set of roles and behaviors could be interpreted as ‘’cooperative versus

competitive’’ and ‘’high status versus low status’’. The first of these factors is

associated with cooperative versus competitive motivations,diplomativ versus

ideological role issues,and friendly versus hostile behavior. The role and behavior

variables most highly associated with the second factor were perception of

dominance,size or level of influence domain,and extent of involvement or

participation in the international area.

These results demonstrate some of the distinct advantages in using perceptual data.

An analysis of national attributes might have been adequate for an international

system,but this no longer appears as effective when one considers the current

transnational system whichincludes both state and nonstate actors. By using

perceptual data one might be able to determine which multinational corporations

and terrorist groups perceive their roles as most competitive,how much system

change they seek,how influential they perceive themselves to be internationally,and

how these perceptions are related to their behavior.

These analyses could highlight important qualitative differences between the public

pronouncements of governamental leaders and those of corporate spokespersons

and other nonstate actors.

Role conceptions also are particularly useful in examining changes in the

international or transnational system over time. Analyzing role conceptions which

were professed in the 1970s and comparing them with those prosessed in the early

decades can give us clues to changing relationships in the international system.

5. STUDIUL FACTORILOR CULTURALI IN ANALIZA POLITICII EXTERNE –

LUCIANA ALEXANDRA GHICA.

La jumatatea secolului XX,cand stiintele sociale au capatat forma si agenda lor

clasica,au existat numeroase incercari de a define si ierarhiza subiecte de cercetre,in

special stiintele sociale. Unul dintre cele mai influente astfel de demersuri i-a

apartinut sociologului American Talcott Parsons,care insista asupra diviziunii stricte

intre discipline pe baza distinctiei intre obiectele de cercetare.

Dintr-un astfel de punct de vedere,nu numai ca analiza politicii externe nu ar fi mai

mult decat o eventual minora subdisciplina a sociologiei,dare a nu ar fi trebuit sa

aiba prea multe in comun cu problematicile culturale.

Cultura,un concept problematic – acest termen a dezvoltat doar trei sensuri majore.

Acestea ar putea fi numite illuminist,romantic si respective classic,corespunzand

teoriilor franceza,germana si respective engleza ale culturii.

Pentru iluministii francezi,cultura era echivalentul civilizatiei,al ratiunii si al

progresului stiintific,definindu-se in mod particular prin opozitie cu

superstitiile,traditiile si aparenta gandire instinctuala specifica Vechiului Regim. In

acest sens,cultura nu putea de decat universal,o caracteristica potential a intregii

umanitati,manifestandu-se atat la nivel material,prin progress stiintific si

tehologic,cat si la nivel spiritual prin impunerea ratiunii drept principiu ultim de

cunoastere si actiune. In schimb in spatial german,partial sub influenta

protestantismului liderilor politici,cultura capata un sens total opus celui de

civilizatie.

Kultur se refera in primul rand la cultura nationala. In ciuda opozitiei dintre

ele,paradigm franceza si cea germana aveau cel putin un lucru in comun,si anume

faptul ca termenul manifesta o puternica incarcatura pozitiva : cultura era

dezirabila. La fel ca si in cazul francez,the culture se refera la vaori universal,eterne.

In mod similar conceptual de Kultur este de natura spirituala.

Indiferent de traditie,insa,conceptual de cultura sugereaza faptul ca ar exista o

dimensiune colectiva a interactiunii umane,manifestata in special la nivel symbolic

al ideilor.

Succesul de care a inceput sa se bucure perspectiva culturalista a depins insa si de

reconsiderarea unor fenomene si concept politice frecvent studiate in disciplina. In

primul rand,amenintarile contemporane de securitate nu mai sunt de ordin strict

military si au complexitate semnificativ mai ridicata decat in urma cu cateva decenii.

Acest lucru se poate observa,de pilda,prin faptul ca exista noi tipuri de conflicte si

crize international,majoritatea de intensitate scazuta si latente pentru perioade

indelungate,dar care implica in mod frecvent factori de natura socioculturala.

Cultura nu este omogena sau distribuita in mod egal intre membrii unui grup. In al

doilea rand un individ poate apartine simultan mai multor culturi.

6. CLAUDIA ARADAU – ALTERITATE SI POLITICA EXTERNA

In acest capitol este vorba de trei tehnologii de putere care functioneaza in sfera

international : suverana,disciplinara si biopolitica.Daca Foucault analizeaza acetse

tehnologii de putere in cadrul statului liberal,ele sunt tot mai multe aplicate sferei

international. Astfel, politica externa poate fi inteleasa ca o modalitate de guvernare

a alteritatii printr-o combinatie de tehnologii suverane,disciplinare si biopolitice.

Analiza discursive a reltiei cu alteritatea contesta imaginarul realist al sferei

international. Egalitatea suverana a statelor este un mit care se aplica unei

minoritate de subiecti. Sfera international este caracterizata de relatii

inegalitare,care exclude anumite state de la deplina participare in politica

internationala.

De la relatia intre lumea europeana si lumea colonial la cea intre state suverane si

state fragile sau esuate,sfera international exista prin crearea normalitatii. In acest

context,doua noi forme ale politicii externe prezinta un interes special : politica

externa ca interventie si terapie. Aceste forme de politica externa in ‘’Lumea noua’’ –

construiesc o relatie cu alteritatea in care aceasta e reprezentata ca

aberanta,devianta si anormala.

Daca pentru realism suveranitatea in sfera international e independent si

identitatea care este atribuita unui stat,precum si populatiei

acesteia,constructivismul pune in evidenta modalitatile prin care subiectii sunt

identificati in sfera international prin practice discursive care identifica si plaseaza

state si subiecti intr-un continuum de normalitate-anormalitate. Aceste forme de

discriminare si de constituire a unor relatii cu alteritatea,bazate pe tehnologii

suverane,disciplinare si biopolitice,depend de discursurile care naturalizeaza si

clasifica tipurile de subiecti ce populeaza sfera international.