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ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP JOHN J. STOIA, JR. (141757) RACHEL L. JENSEN (211456) THOMAS R. MERRICK (177987) PHONG L. TRAN (204961) 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP SANDRA W. CUNEO (110388) 1901 Avenue of the Stars, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310/461-1620 310/461-1621 (fax) [email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
[Additional counsel appear on signature page.]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LINDA LOW, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, LLC, d/b/a SIGNON SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
No. 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC
CLASS ACTION
NOTICE OF MOTION AND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND CLASS COUNSEL
Judge: Hon. John A. Houston Courtroom: 11
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38 Filed 10/12/12 Page 1 of 5
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Plaintiff Linda Low on behalf of herself and on behalf of each of the Settlement Class
Members hereby moves for an order:
1. Granting conditional certification of the Settlement Class, comprised of all Persons in
the state of California who purchased or acquired a “Daily Deal” Voucher between April 1, 2010 and
May 1, 2012, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. Appointing Plaintiff to serve as the Class Representative of the Settlement Class; and
3. Appointing the firms of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert &
LaDuca, LLP, and Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP to serve as Class Counsel, pursuant to
Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This motion is brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is
based on this motion; the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Unopposed Motion
for Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class and Appointment of Class Representative and
Class Counsel, submitted herewith; the Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Exhibits thereto
(“Settlement Agreement”); the Notice of Motion and Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement, filed concurrently herewith; the complete file and record in this Action; the
argument of counsel; and such other and further evidence and argument as the Court may choose to
entertain.
DATED: October 12, 2012 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP JOHN J. STOIA, JR. RACHEL L. JENSEN THOMAS R. MERRICK PHONG L. TRAN
s/ John J. Stoia, Jr. JOHN J. STOIA, JR.
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax)
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38 Filed 10/12/12 Page 2 of 5
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CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP SANDRA W. CUNEO 1901 Avenue of the Stars, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310/461-1620 310/461-1621 (fax)
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP CHARLES H. LADUCA WILLIAM H. ANDERSON 507 C Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: 202/789-3960 202/789-1813 (fax)
AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP MICHAEL A. McSHANE 221 Main Street, Suite 1460 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: 415/568-2555 415/568-2556 (fax)
LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN CHARLES E. SCHAFFER 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Telephone: 215/592-1500 215/592-4663 (fax)
BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP SHAWN J. WANTA 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2955 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: 612/252-3570 612/252-3571 (fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38 Filed 10/12/12 Page 3 of 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 12, 2012, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to
the e-mail addresses denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I hereby certify that I
caused to be mailed the foregoing document or paper via the United States Postal Service to the non-
CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 12, 2012.
s/ John J. Stoia, Jr. JOHN J. STOIA, JR.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101-3301 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) E-mail:[email protected]
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38 Filed 10/12/12 Page 4 of 5
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ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP JOHN J. STOIA, JR. (141757) RACHEL L. JENSEN (211456) THOMAS R. MERRICK (177987) PHONG L. TRAN (204961) 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP SANDRA W. CUNEO (110388) 1901 Avenue of the Stars, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310/461-1620 310/461-1621 (fax) [email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
[Additional counsel appear on signature page.]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LINDA LOW, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, LLC, d/b/a SIGNON SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
No. 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC
CLASS ACTION
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND CLASS COUNSEL
Judge: Hon. John A. Houston Courtroom: 11
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38-1 Filed 10/12/12 Page 1 of 13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
II. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIED...............1
A. The Requirements of Rule 23(a) Are Met ...............................................................2
1. Numerosity...................................................................................................2
2. Commonality................................................................................................2
3. Typicality .....................................................................................................3
4. Adequacy .....................................................................................................3
B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) Are Met ..........................................................4
1. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate .....................................4
2. A Class Action Is Superior to Individual Actions .......................................5
III. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE APPOINTED AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND HER COUNSEL SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS CLASS COUNSEL ...........................................................................................................................5
IV. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................6
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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CASES
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)...............................................................................................................1, 4
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) .....................................................................................................3
Collins v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. 274 F.R.D. 294 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ...............................................................................................3
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................2, 3
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................2
Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ...........................................................................................4, 5
In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 150 (N.D. Cal. 1991)...............................................................................................2
In re Emulex Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 717 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ...........................................................................................2, 3
In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Cal. 2005)...............................................................................................6
Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................3
Local Joint Exec. Bd. Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152,163 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................5
McPhail v. First Command Fin. Planning, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 598 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ...............................................................................................3
Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................3
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................5
Wright v. Linkus Enterps., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Cal. 2009) ...........................................................................................1, 5
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Zhu v. Fujitsu Group 401(K) Plan, No. C-03-1148RMW, 2004 WL 3252573 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2004) ........................................2
RULES
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 ...............................................................................................................................1, 2, 4 Rule 23(a)...........................................................................................................................1, 2, 4 Rule 23(a)(1) ..............................................................................................................................2 Rule 23(a)(2) ..............................................................................................................................2 Rule 23(a)(4) ..........................................................................................................................3, 6 Rule 23(b) ..................................................................................................................................1 Rule 23(b)(3)......................................................................................................................1, 4, 5 Rule 23(b)(3)(A) ........................................................................................................................5 Rule 23(b)(3)(B) ........................................................................................................................5 Rule 23(g) ..................................................................................................................................1 Rule 23(g)(1)..............................................................................................................................6
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I. INTRODUCTION
In conjunction with the parties’ Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement (“Joint
Motion”), filed concurrently herewith, Plaintiff Linda Low respectfully requests the conditional
certification of the Settlement Class, comprised of all persons in the State of California who
purchased or acquired a “Daily Deal” Voucher between April 1, 2010 and May 1, 2012 (“Settlement
Class”).1 See Stipulation of Class Action Settlement (“Settlement Agreement”), submitted as
Exhibit A to the Declaration of Christopher Young in Support of Joint Motion, §A.35.2 As set forth
below, the Settlement Class satisfies all the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is uncontested, as Defendant does not oppose the conditional
certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes. See Settlement Agreement, §C.3.
Plaintiff also requests that the Court appoint her to serve as the Class Representative of the
Settlement Class and her counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca,
LLP, and Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP, to serve as Class Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23(g).
II. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIED
When presented with a proposed class action settlement, the court must determine whether
the proposed settlement class satisfies the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a) and at
least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Importantly, in assessing the class certification
requirements under Rule 23, the court need not consider the manageability of the class action, as
settlement will eliminate any need for trial. Wright v. Linkus Enterps., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468, 474
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Confronted
with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the
1 Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendant, Participating Merchants, their parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which SOSD has a controlling interest, SOSD employees, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members of all the preceding referenced individuals. Id. 2 All capitalized terms herein shall have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement.
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case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no
trial.”)).
Here, the conditional certification of the Settlement Class is appropriate for purposes of
settlement because all the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.
A. The Requirements of Rule 23(a) Are Met
As a threshold matter, the Settlement Class satisfies the prerequisites of numerosity,
commonality, typicality and adequacy under Rule 23(a).
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be sufficiently numerous such “that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). See also Zhu v. Fujitsu Group 401(K) Plan,
No. C-03-1148RMW, 2004 WL 3252573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2004) (class of approximately
139 members sufficient to meet numerosity requirement); In re Emulex Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D.
717, 719 (C.D. Cal. 2002); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 150, 153 n.4 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (numerosity requirement clearly satisfied by allegation that hundreds if not thousands of class
members traded Adobe securities during class period). Sign On San Diego concedes that the
Settlement Class satisfies the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). See Declaration of
Christopher M. Young, submitted in support of Joint Motion, ¶12.
2. Commonality
Commonality is met if “there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality has “‘been construed permissively’” and does not require all
questions of fact and law to be common. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Commonality is present here because Plaintiff’s claims are based on a common course of
conduct by Defendant to market and sell Daily Deal Vouchers with expiration dates, allegedly in
violation of federal and California gift certificate laws. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the federal
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (“CARD Act”) is applicable to all
Groupon Vouchers sold during the Class Period and that the Card Act prohibits the sale of gift
certificates with expiration periods of less than five years. See Settlement Agreement at 2. Plaintiff
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also alleges that the expiration dates on Daily Deal Vouchers violate a number of California
consumer protection laws. See id. The imposition of illegal expiration terms on Daily Deal
Vouchers is uniform across the Class and serves as the factual and legal bases for the underlying
class claims. Commonality is therefore satisfied. See, e.g., McPhail v. First Command Fin.
Planning, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 598, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (commonality satisfied where defendants
engaged in a “‘common course of conduct’”) (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903-04 (9th
Cir. 1975)); see Collins v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. 274 F.R.D. 294, 300-01 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(common questions of law or fact shared by prospective class members are sufficient to satisfy
commonality requirement).
3. Typicality
Typicality is readily met because the claims of Plaintiff Low and the members of the
proposed Settlement Class are based on the same core facts and underlying legal theory: Defendant’s
marketing and sale of Daily Deal Vouchers with allegedly illegal expiration terms. See id. at 301
(citing Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (typicality is satisfied if the
plaintiffs’ claims arise from same course of conduct as the class claims and are based on same legal
theory)).
4. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In the Ninth Circuit, Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied
where: (i) counsel for the class is qualified and competent to vigorously prosecute the action; and
(ii) the interests of the proposed class representatives are not antagonistic to the interests of the
Class. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003).
The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are plainly satisfied in this case. First, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, and Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP,
are eminently qualified and experienced in class action litigation and have performed extensive work
to date in identifying and investigating potential claims in this action, preparing a detailed class
action complaint, and successfully negotiating the proposed Settlement. See Emulex Corp., 210
F.R.D. at 720 (court evaluating adequacy of counsel’s representation may examine “the attorneys’
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professional qualifications, skill, experience, and resources. . . . [and] the attorneys’ demonstrated
performance in the suit itself”). The firms have vigorously prosecuted this action to achieve a very
fair and reasonable settlement and will continue to represent the best interests of the Settlement Class
in implementing and overseeing the settlement.
Second, there is no conflict between Plaintiff’s interests and the interests of the Settlement
Class Members. Plaintiff and the members of the Settlement Class assert the same legal claims based
on Defendant’s imposition of expiration terms on Groupon Vouchers, and their alleged losses arise
out of the same course of conduct by Defendant during the Settlement Class Period. As such,
adequacy is satisfied.
B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) Are Met
Once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, the court may certify a class if it also
determines that: (1) questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members; and (2) a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
1. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate
The requirement of predominance tests whether the proposed Class is cohesive enough to
warrant representative adjudication. See Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 638 (S.D. Cal.
2011) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623). Predominance is met when the alleged fraudulent conduct
is perpetrated on multiples persons through similar representations, even though class members may
have suffered individualized damages. See Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 638 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
Advisory Committee Notes (1966)).
As the Supreme Court has observed, the predominance test is “readily met in certain cases
alleging consumer . . . fraud.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. Here, the same set of operative facts and
legal issues uniformly apply to the Settlement Class comprised of consumers across the country.
That is, each Class Member purchased a Daily Deal Voucher with expiration terms that Plaintiff
contends are illegal. Accordingly, the question of liability is the same for all Class Members, as the
Court must determine whether Defendant’s marketing and sale of Daily Deal Vouchers with
expiration terms is prohibited under federal and California gift certificate laws. Common questions
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of law and fact therefore predominate in this case. See Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 638-39
(predominance established where all class members were exposed to the same alleged
misrepresentations).
2. A Class Action Is Superior to Individual Actions
Superiority is demonstrated where “classwide litigation of common issues will reduce
litigation costs and promote greater efficiency.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227,
1234 (9th Cir. 1996). Given the relatively small size of each Class Member’s potential claim (based
on the face value of each Daily Deal Voucher purchased), and the common elements among the legal
claims of Class Members, this class action is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the
legality of Groupon’s Vouchers. See Wright, 259 F.R.D. 468 (citing Local Joint Exec. Bd.
Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152,163 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that class action is a plaintiff’s only realistic method for recovery if there are multiple
claims against the same defendant for relatively small sums)). Moreover, the factors cited in Rule
23(b)(3) as relevant to the requirement of superiority weigh in favor of certification. Individual
Class Members have little interest in prosecuting a multitude of separate, individual actions against
The San Diego Union Tribune for violations of the gift certificate laws. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(A). Indeed, individual actions would impose a greater burden on the judicial system and the
parties, reduce resources, and would not increase the prospect for recovery. Additionally, Plaintiff is
unaware of any separate individual actions concerning the marketing and sale of Daily Deal
Vouchers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). Accordingly, the proposed Settlement of the Action on a
class-wide basis is a fair and efficient method to resolve the claims of all putative Class Members
without burdening the judiciary system with a multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits.
III. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE APPOINTED AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND HER COUNSEL SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS CLASS COUNSEL
Plaintiff also requests that the Court designate her as Class Representative of the Settlement
Class. As discussed above, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement
Class. Defendant has agreed that the named Plaintiff should be appointed as Class Representative.
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See Settlement Agreement at §A.5. Thus, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court appoint her to
serve as Class Representative for the Settlement Class.
Additionally, Rule 23(g)(1) requires the Court to appoint counsel to represent the interests of
the Class. See In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346, 355 (N.D. Cal. 2005). For the
reasons stated above, in connection with the adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a)(4), and as has
been demonstrated thus far in this litigation, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert
& LaDuca, LLP, and Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP are experienced and well equipped to
vigorously, competently and efficiently represent the proposed Settlement Class. Notably,
Defendant has also agreed to Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP,
and Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP’s appointment as Class Counsel. See Settlement
Agreement at §A.4. The Court should accordingly appoint the firms as Class Counsel for the
Settlement Class.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to conditionally
certify the Settlement Class, appoint Plaintiff to serve as Class Representative of the Settlement
Class, and appoint Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, and
Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP to serve as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.
DATED: October 12, 2012 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP JOHN J. STOIA, JR. RACHEL L. JENSEN THOMAS R. MERRICK PHONG L. TRAN
s/ John J. Stoia, Jr. JOHN J. STOIA, JR.
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax)
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CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP SANDRA W. CUNEO 1901 Avenue of the Stars, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310/461-1620 310/461-1621 (fax)
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP CHARLES H. LADUCA WILLIAM H. ANDERSON 507 C Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: 202/789-3960 202/789-1813 (fax)
AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP MICHAEL A. McSHANE 221 Main Street, Suite 1460 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: 415/568-2555 415/568-2556 (fax)
LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN CHARLES E. SCHAFFER 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19106 Telephone: 215/592-1500 215/592-4663 (fax)
BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK &WANTA LLP SHAWN J. WANTA 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2955 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: 612/252-3570 612/252-3571 (fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
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777287_1 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 12, 2012, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to
the e-mail addresses denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I hereby certify that I
caused to be mailed the foregoing document or paper via the United States Postal Service to the non-
CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 12, 2012.
s/ John J. Stoia, Jr. JOHN J. STOIA, JR.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101-3301 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) E-mail:[email protected]
Case 3:11-cv-01090-JAH-WMC Document 38-1 Filed 10/12/12 Page 12 of 13
