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  • ROMNIA EUROPEAN

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    Adrian Nstase

    RROOMMNNIIAA

    EEUURROOPPEEAANN

    UN PROIECT POLITIC SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT

    Prefa de Christoph Zpel

    Editura MondoMedia Institutul Social Democrat Ovidiu incai

    2007

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    Institutul Social Democrat Ovidiu incai

    Bucureti, str. Atena nr. 11, sector 1 Tel. 230.24.34, 230.24.74, fax: 231.55.23, site: www.fisd.ro, e-mail: [email protected]

    Coperta: Octavian Penda

    Tehnoredactor: Oana Mocanu

    Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei

    NSTASE, ADRIAN Romnia european: un proiect politic social-democrat / Adrian Nstase. - Bucureti: MondoMedia, 2007 Prefa: Christoph Zpel Bibliogr. Index ISBN 978-973-99977-9-9 32.01(498:4)

    Servicii editoriale:

    Editura URANUS, Bucureti

    Reproducerea acestei lucrri, chiar i parial, prin orice procedeu

    fotocopiere, microfilmare, band magnetic etc. este strict interzis i intr sub incidena Legii nr. 8 / 1996 privind drepturile de autor i drepturile conexe.

    ISBN 978-973-99977-9-9

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    Nu mi propun s inventez noi probleme. ncerc s gsesc soluii la problemele existente.

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    CUPRINS

    Prefa la un proiect de anvergur .............................................19 CUVNT NAINTE .....................................................................59 I. DE UNDE AM PLECAT ..........................................................67 I.1. Proiectul Istoric al Romniei ......................................................... 67

    Lecia lui Nicolae Titulescu .............................................................. 67 Dinamica modernizrii, de la Blcescu la Ceauescu. ...................... 71 "La Roma!" ....................................................................................... 74 Dou tipuri de societi ..................................................................... 77 O oportunitate istoric ....................................................................... 79 ansa Romniei de a intra n lumea dezvoltat................................. 82 Helsinki sau trecerea de partea bun a istoriei .................................. 83 Digresiune despre o ilegalitate .......................................................... 85 Modernizarea Romniei, ca proiect naional..................................... 86 Declanarea procesului de modernizare, cu toate mijloacele posibile .............................................................................................. 90

    I.2. Relaiile Romniei cu Piaa Comun i Uniunea European ..... 94

    Legturile cu Comunitatea European pn la cderea comunismului .................................................................................... 94 Relaiile Romniei cu Piaa Comun/Uniunea European dup Revoluie ........................................................................................... 95 Ce s-a ntmplat dup alternana la putere din 1996? ..................... 102

    I.3. Guvernarea pentru integrare (20012004)................................. 108

    Premisele guvernrii PSD ............................................................... 108 Ctre o ar guvernabil. Macrostabilizarea economiei .................. 112 "Populismul" asumat al guvernrii PSD: combaterea srciei........ 115 Prioritate politic absolut: integrarea euroatlantic ....................... 120 O digresiune aparent: conceptele privatizrii ................................ 123

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    O nou politic a privatizrii ........................................................... 128 Curajul de a ne asuma realizarea capitalismului romnesc............. 132 Munca sau profitul?......................................................................... 135 Cotitura creterii economice............................................................ 137 Trei procese economice ncurajatoare............................................. 139

    I.4. Opinia public n timpul guvernrii PSD (20012004) ............. 142 II. UNIUNEA EUROPEAN LA CARE AM ADERAT........149 II.1. Impactul aderrii ....................................................................... 149

    Tratatul de Aderare a Romniei la Uniunea European document juridic esenial ................................................................................. 156 Suveranitate, subsidiaritate i reform constituional.................... 161 Un proiect deschis: europenizarea administraiei............................ 165 Alegerile pentru Parlamentul European .......................................... 169 Pledoarie pentru o strategie romneasc post-aderare .................... 174

    II.2. Ce poate face Romnia pentru viitorul Europei? .................... 182

    Necesitatea unei contribuii romneti ............................................ 182 Apreciere de ansamblu .................................................................... 183 Politicile Comune............................................................................ 186

    Uniunea Economic i Monetar (UEM).................................. 186 Politica agricol comun (PAC)................................................ 188 Fonduri structurale i de coeziune............................................. 189 Politica comercial comun ...................................................... 190 Politica extern i de securitate comun ................................... 190

    Justiie i afaceri interne.................................................................. 192 Aspecte instituionale ...................................................................... 192

    Consiliul .................................................................................... 193 Consiliul European.................................................................... 194 Comisia European ................................................................... 194 Parlamentul European ............................................................... 195 Parlamentele naionale .............................................................. 196

    Constituia european ...................................................................... 196 Alte aspecte ..................................................................................... 197

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    III. DE LA ADERARE LA INTEGRARE: PENTRU O ROMNIE EUROPEAN ........................................................199 III.1. Repere posibile pentru o nou revizuire a constituiei i mbuntirea sistemului electoral .................................................... 199 III.2. Zece prioriti economice.......................................................... 227

    1. Restructurarea instituional..................................................... 228 2. Dezvoltarea infrastructurii transporturilor ............................... 229 3. Dezvoltarea produciei de energie electric ............................. 231 4. Dezvoltarea serviciilor turistice ............................................... 237 5. Modernizarea agriculturii i dezvoltarea rural ....................... 247 6. Mediu ....................................................................................... 251 7. Valorificarea resurselor umane ............................................... 258 8. Creterea productivitii i mbuntirea eficienei muncii .... 260 9. Sigurana contribuabilului i a proprietii............................... 261 10. Competitivitatea produciei .................................................... 262

    Provocri europene i oportuniti pentru economia romneasc... 264 III.3. Zece principii pentru o Romnie social ................................. 270

    1. Drepturi i responsabiliti pentru toi cetenii ....................... 270 2. Ocuparea deplin baza viitorului........................................... 271 3. Investiii n ceteni .................................................................. 272 4. O societate solidar i incluziv ............................................... 273 5. Un serviciu public pentru ngrijirea i educarea copiilor

    de vrst mic .......................................................................... 274 6. Egalitate n drepturi pentru femei i brbai............................. 275 7. Dialogul social, un element indispensabil................................ 279 8. Diversitatea n integrare o for a Romniei ......................... 280 9. O societate durabil, capabil s fac fa schimbrilor

    climatice................................................................................... 280 10. Romnia activ n Europa i n lume pentru proprii

    ceteni..................................................................................... 281 Biserica Ortodox Romn, partener social al statului ................... 280

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    III.4. Satisfacerea nevoilor fundamentale ale romnilor i respectarea demnitilor..................................................................... 286

    Demnitatea individual i naional ................................................ 290 Desfiinarea sistemelor de privilegii ......................................... 291 Demnitatea ceteanului n faa autoritii publice.................... 294 Demnitatea ceteanului n faa autoritii private .................... 296 Demnitatea naional................................................................. 297

    Construirea bunstrii ..................................................................... 299 Polarizarea social..................................................................... 300 Reparaiile morale i materiale.................................................. 303 ranii ....................................................................................... 303 Pensionarii ................................................................................. 305 Salariaii .................................................................................... 306

    Rectigarea valorilor muncii i solidaritii................................... 311 Satisfacerea nevoii de informaie: spre o pres cu adevrat european ........................................................................................ 317

    III.5. O provocare istoric: modernizarea mediului rural .............. 323

    Cele "dou Romnii": ruralul tradiional i urbanul capitalist ........ 323 Urbanizarea ruralului................................................................. 325 Serviciile comunitare de tip urban i subvenionarea consumului n rural.................................................................... 329

    Modernizarea agriculturii ................................................................ 335 III.6. O nou abordare a politicii fiscale .......................................... 339

    Necesitatea unei strategii fiscale pe termen mediu ......................... 339 Politica economic "corect"..................................................... 340 Impozitul pe profit .................................................................... 340 Impozitul pe venit...................................................................... 340 Contribuiile sociale CAS....................................................... 341

    Politic fiscal azi............................................................................ 342 Concluzii asupra impactului cotei unice ................................... 353 Provocrile noului Cod Fiscal ................................................... 355

    Propuneri pentru o nou politic fiscal.......................................... 362

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    III.7. Creterea productivitii muncii n condiiile dezvoltrii durabile ................................................................................................ 370

    Responsabilitatea social a corporaiilor......................................... 372 III.8. Reforma sistemului de sntate................................................ 378

    Stoparea tendinelor negative i crearea condiiilor pentru mbuntirea strii de sntate a populaiei obiectiv general al politicii n domeniul sntii .......................................................... 380 Sntatea public............................................................................. 382 Dezvoltarea serviciilor medicale acordate persoanelor vrstnice ... 384 mbuntirea asistenei medicale din mediul rural......................... 385 mbuntirea strii de sntate a mamei i copilului ..................... 386 Limitarea corupiei din sistemul sanitar .......................................... 387

    III.9. Educaia, tiina i inovarea...................................................... 389

    Dezvoltarea capitalului uman.......................................................... 389 Educaia prioritate absolut .......................................................... 392 Standarde europene privind efortul financiar.................................. 394 Efortul de cercetare-dezvoltare ....................................................... 397 Cercetarea din nvmntul superior.............................................. 398 Efortul de inovare............................................................................ 401 Organizarea managementului tiinei i al inovrii la nivel naional ............................................................................................ 403 Consideraii finale ........................................................................... 407

    III.10. Fondurile europene nerambursabile n perioada 2007 2013........................................................................................... 409

    Dimensiunea financiar a politicii de coeziune economic i social n Uniunea European pentru perioada 2007 2013 .......... 410 Suportul financiar al Uniunii Europene pentru Romnia................ 415 Situaia fondurilor externe nerambursabile, a cofinanrii acestora i a contribuiei Romniei la bugetul Uniunii Europene n perioada 2007 2010 .................................................................. 423 Fluxurile financiare dintre Romnia i Uniunea European ........... 426

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    III.11. Un imperativ: justiia n slujba ceteanului ........................ 432 Justiia minim garantat .................................................................. 432

    III.12. Relaia armat-societate: miz major a profesionalizrii forelor armate........................................................ 452 III.13. Serviciile de informaii n Romnia European ................... 459

    Locul i rolul serviciilor de informaii n statul de drept................. 466 III.14. Racordarea Romniei la politica extern i de securitate comun i la relaiile externe ale Uniunii Europene ........................ 474

    Extinderea Uniunii Europene .......................................................... 480 Migraia ..................................................................................... 482 Balcanii Occidentali .................................................................. 483 Politica european de vecintate ............................................... 484 Procesul de la Barcelona ........................................................... 486 Orientul Mijlociu....................................................................... 487 Irak ............................................................................................ 488 Iran ............................................................................................ 489

    Relaiile cu partenerii strategici i cu zonele geografice importante........................................................................................ 490

    Relaiile transatlantice ............................................................... 490 Rusia.......................................................................................... 491 Asia............................................................................................ 492

    Politica de dezvoltare ...................................................................... 494 III.15. Minoritile naionale, parte integrant a societii romneti, la bine i la greu................................................................ 496 NCHEIERE........................................................................................ 501

    Un stat modern ca instrument al transformrii................................ 501 Soluiile autocratice nu sunt o opiune ............................................ 502 Efectele aderrii la Uniunea European asupra reformelor ............ 503 O nou strategie pentru piaa muncii............................................... 504 ndemn la concentrarea poziiilor i aciunilor................................ 505

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    Anexa I: Proiect de lege privind sistemul public de pensii pentru agricultori............................................................................................. 507

    Expunere de motive......................................................................... 507 LEGE privind sistemul public de pensii pentru agricultori............. 513 Coexistena celor dou sisteme de pensii pentru agricultori ........... 548 Evoluia tipurilor de pensionari....................................................... 549 Efort bugetar conform cu cele 2 legi ............................................... 550 Efort bugetar global cu pensiile agricultorilor ................................ 551 Tabel comparativ proiect de lege/lege sistem public de pensii ....... 552

    BIBLIOGRAFIE SELECTIV ......................................................... 553

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    SUMMARY

    Foreword to a Long-span project................................................19 PREAMBLE..................................................................................59 I. WHERE DID WE START FROM..........................................67

    I. 1. ROMANIAS HISTORICAL PROJECT .................................. 67 I. 2. ROMANIAS RELATIONS WITH THE COMMON

    MARKET AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ....................... 94 I. 3. A GOVERNMENT FOR INTEGRATION (2001-2004)........ 108 I. 4. THE PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE PSD

    GOVERNMENT (2001-2004)............................................ 142 II. THE EUROPEAN UNION TO WHICH WE ACCEDED ..................................................................................149

    II. 1. THE IMPACT OF THE ACCESSION .................................. 149 II. 2. WHAT CAN ROMANIA DO FOR THE FUTURE OF

    EUROPE?............................................................................ 182 III. FROM ACCESSION TO INTEGRATION: FOR A EUROPEAN ROMANIA ...........................................................199

    III. 1. POSSIBLE GUIDELINES FOR A NEW REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM...................................... 199

    III. 2. TEN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES .......................................... 227 III. 3. TEN PRINCIPLES FOR A SOCIAL ROMANIA .............. 270 III. 4. SATISFYING BASIC NEEDS OF ROMANIANS AND

    RESPECTING THEIR DIGNITY ...................................... 286 III. 5. A HISTORICAL CHALLENGE: MODERNIZATION OF

    THE RURAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................ 323 III. 6. A NEW APPROACH OF TO FISCAL POLICY................. 339

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    III. 7. INCREASING LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ..... 370

    III. 8. HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM............................................. 378 III. 9. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION ................ 389 III. 10. NON-REIMBURSABLE FUNDS IN THE PERIOD

    2007-2013 ........................................................................... 409 III. 11. AN IMPERATIVE: JUSTICE IN THE SERVICE

    OF THE CITIZEN .............................................................. 432 III. 12. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE

    SOCIETY: THE MAJOR STAKE OF PROFESSIONALIZING THE ARMED FORCES ............ 452

    III. 13. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN ROMANIA ......................................................................... 459

    III. 14. CONNECTING ROMANIA TO THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION....... 474

    III. 15. NATIONAL MINORITIES, PART AND PARCEL OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIETY, FOR BETTER OR WORSE............................................................................... 496

    CONCLUSION ...........................................................................501 Appendix I: Draft Law Project Concerning the Public Pensions System for Farmers ............................................................................... 507 SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................553

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    Lista de abrevieri

    A.M.R - Asociaia Magistrailor din Romnia A.S.E.A.N. - Asociaia Statelor Asiei de Sud-Est A.U.E. - Actul Unic European B.C.R. - Banca Comercial Romn B.E.I. - Banca European de Investiii B.N.R. - Banca Naional a Romniei B.M. - Banca Mondial C.A.E.R. - Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc C.A.E.N. - Clasificarea Activitilor din Economia Naional C.E. - Comunitatea European C.E.C. - Casa de Economii i Consemnaiuni C.E.C.O. - Comunitatea European a Crbunelui i Oelului C.E.E.A. (sau EURATOM) - Comunitatea European a Energiei Atomice C.D.R. - Convenia Democrat din Romnia (alian politic) C.E.D.O. - Curtea European a Drepturilor Omului C.E.E. - Comunitatea Economic European C.F.M. - Consiliul Funciei Militare C.F.S.N. - Consiliul Frontului Salvrii Naionale C.N.R. - Consiliului Naional al Cercettorilor, Italia C.N.R.S. - Centrului Naional de Cercetri tiinifice, Frana C.O.R.E.P.E.R. - Comitetul Reprezentanilor Permaneni C.S.A.. - Consiliul Suprem de Aprare a rii C.S.F.M. - Consiliul Superior al Funciei Militare C.S.I. - Comunitatea Statelor Independente C.S.I.C. - Consiliul Superior de Cercetri tiinifice, Spania C.S.M. - Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii D.A.E. - Departamentul pentru Afaceri Europene E.C.O.F.I.N. - Consiliul minitrilor de finane din statele membre UE F.C. - Fondul de Coeziune F.D.S.N. - Frontul Democrat al Salvrii Naionale F.E.D.R. - Fondul European de Dezvoltare Regional F.E.I. - Fondul European de Investiii F.M.I. - Fondul Monetar Internaional

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    F.N.I. - Fondul Naional de Investiii F.P.P. - Fondul de Investiii Private F.N.R.S. - Fondul Naional pentru Cercetare tiinific, Belgia F.S.E. - Fondul Social European F.S.N. - Frontul Salvrii Naionale I.S.P.A. - Instrumentul de Politici Structurale de Pre-Aderare .C.C.J. - nalta Curte de Casaie i Justiie J.A.I. - pilonul Justiie i Afaceri Interne M.A.E. - Ministerul Afacerilor Externe M.E.B.O. - Program de privatizare n mas M.E.R.C.O.S.U.R. - Piaa Comun a Americii de Sud N.A.T.O. - Organizaia Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord N.A.F.T.A. - Acordul Nord-American de Liber Schimb N.W.O. - Consiliul Cercetrii, Olanda O.C.D.E. - Organizaia de Cooperare i Dezvoltare n Europa O.M.C. - Organizaia Mondial a Comerului O.N.U. - Organizaia Naiunilor Unite O.S.C.E. - Organizaia pentru Securitate i Cooperare n Europa P.A.C. - Politica agricol comun P.E.S. - Partidul Socialitilor Europeni P.E.S.A. - Politica de Securitate i Aprare P.E.S.C. Politica Extern i de Securitate Comun P.D. Partidul Democrat P.H.A.R.E. - Programul de Ajutor pentru Restructurarea Economic

    (iniial Polonia i Ungaria) P.I.B. - Produsul Intern Brut P.N.L. - Partidul Naional Liberal P.N..C.D - Partidul Naional rnesc Cretin Democrat PNUD - Programul Naiunilor Unite pentru Dezvoltare P.P.E. - Partidul Popular European P.R.M. - Partidul Romnia Mare P.S.D. - Partidul Social Democrat P.S.D.R. - Partidul Social Democrat din Romnia R.I.C.O.P. - Programul de Restructurare Industrial i Reconversie

    Profesional

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    S.A.P.A.R.D. - Programul de sprijinire a agriculturii i de dezvoltare rural n rile candidate la UE, din Europa Central i de Est

    S.U.A. - Statele Unite ale Americii T.U.- Tratatul de la Maastricht (1992) T.V.A. - Taxa pe Valoare Adugat U.D.M.R. - Uniunea Democrat a Maghiarilor din Romnia U.E. - Uniunea European U.E.M. - Uniunea Economic i Monetar

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    II.. PPrreeffaa llaa uunn pprrooiieecctt ddee aannvveerrgguurr

    n decembrie 2001, l-am ntlnit pe Adrian Nstase pentru ntia oar, la cteva zile dup victoria PSD n alegerile parlamentare. Pe vremea aceea eram ministru de stat n Ministerul german al Afacerilor Externe. Am discutat despre procesul integrrii europene a Romniei i despre ridicarea regimului vizelor pentru Romnia. n anii ce au urmat, Adrian Nstase, n calitate de prim-ministru a pus n aplicare ceea ce anunase c va face. Acesta este fundamentul unei relaii fructuoase i de prietenie ntre Adrian Nstase i mine, bazat pe mprtirea valorilor stngii democratice, a credinei n progresul uman i n puterea sa de a-i ajuta concetenii s-i construiasc o via mai bun, ntr-o lume mai echitabil. L-am cunoscut pe Adrian Nstase att n calitate de om de stat, pe vremea cnd era prim ministru, i n cea de preedinte al Partidului Social Democrat. Cnd era preedintele PSD, am lucrat mpreun la procesul de integrare a social-democrailor romni n Internaionala Socialist. Am colaborat cu Adrian Nstase i cnd a coordonat negocierile de aderare a Romniei la Uniunea European. A fost o experien politic i de via important i interesant, care a transformat o amiciie politic, precum attea altele, ntr-o strns relaie politic i personal. i, ca n orice astfel de relaie, au fost momente n care nu am fost de acord asupra unor subiecte, ca de pild, eu nu am

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    mprtit decizia Romniei de a trimite trupe n Irak, ne-am spus unul altuia sincer prerile, ne-am ascultat argumentele i am cutat s nelegem interesele puse n joc. Cu toate acestea, sau poate tocmai de aceea, relaia noastr de prietenie nu a fost alterat, nu a ncetat dup 2004, ea continund s fie aceeai chiar dup ce Adrian Nstase a intrat n Opoziie. Acum, Adrian Nstase a scris o carte important. Nu doar pentru sine, ci ndrznesc s spun, i pentru Romnia. Scriu aceast prefa, din convingerea autentic a rolului pe care volumul lui Adrian Nstase l poate avea n transformarea unei ri importante pentru i din Europa, Romnia, fa de care m simt atras sufletete, chiar dac nu pot fi de acord cu tot ce se ntmpl n ultima perioad n aceast ar, mai ales n viaa ei politic.

    Romnia european reprezint rezultatul muncii unuia dintre oamenii de stat de succes ai Europei contemporane. Cartea lui Adrian Nstase este o sintez impozant a unui om de tiin social care aduce cunoaterea tehnic a problemelor europene i romneti, mbinate n mod fericit cu instinctul omului politic de a identifica i selecta prioritile societii, filtrate ns magistral prin percepia filosofic a unui gnditor al stngii de avangard. De aceea, cred c titlul complet al acestei cri ar putea fi Romnia european filosofia unui program de guvernare. Dei Adrian Nstase refuz explicit acest lucru, substana crii ar putea s constituie, n multe privine, suportul ideatic al unui ciclu de guvernare prelungit, n urma cruia Romnia, aflat n interiorul Uniunii Europene, va fi capabil s realizeze marele salt de la condiia unui stat aflat la una din zonele de frontier ale Europei, la aceea a unei societi democrate i integrate social a secolului 21. Aceasta este miza esenial a volumului Romnia european.

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    Subiectul central al crii are o dubl dimensiune: mai nti, cum s fie transformat societatea romneasc, astfel nct ea s dobndeasc trsturile depline ale unei comuniti europene prospere, n msur s genereze progres, iar, n al doilea rnd, cum ar trebui reformat ansamblul instituional european n aa fel nct acesta s fie apt s ajute Uniunea European s fac fa cu succes globalizrii politice, economice, culturale i ecologice. Pentru nceput, merit de reinut faptul c Adrian Nstase stabilete o relaie de intercondiionare ntre europenizarea Romniei i adncirea integrrii ei n Uniunea European. Aceasta este perspectiva corect, deoarece nu poate fi conceput progresul unei societi n cadrul Uniunii Europene, dac societatea european, respectiv instituiile comunitare, nu sunt n deplin stare de funcionare. Reeta politicii europene viabile pornete de la nivel local, prin naional spre comunitar i invers, dinspre comunitar, prin stat spre local i, n felul acesta, la fiecare cetean. n acest fel poate fi sintetizat paradigma n care este conceput cartea Romnia European.

    Cercetarea realizat de Adrian Nstase este provocatoare att pentru omul politic, ct i pentru specialistul n relaii internaionale, sociolog, istoric sau jurnalist. Sensul provocrii vine att din interpretarea dintr-o perspectiv personal a istoriei moderne a Romniei, mai ales a aceleia la care a participat sau a determinat-o, ct i din curajul de a propune un proiect pentru viitorul Romniei, ntr-o epoc n care prea puini oameni politici i asum vizionarismul, complcndu-se ntr-un prezenteism steril, generat i motivat de un aa-zis pragmatism electoralist.

    Pentru a-i atinge obiectivul, Adrian Nstase etaleaz n Romnia european o multitudine de metode i concepte, care necesit din partea lectorului o atenie special pentru nelegerea

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    demonstraiei. Cu toate c este o carte complex n structur i masiv n coninut, claritatea exprimrii i precizia conceptual sunt principalele atribute ale stilului autorului. Din punct de vedere al metodelor folosite, n Romnia european poate fi identificat metoda istoric-diacronic, pentru a pune n lumin etapele eseniale ale crerii statului romn modern. Naraia cu caracter memorialistic pigmenteaz textul, mai ales n segmentele din carte dedicate analizei istoriei recente a Romniei. Formaia de specialist n drept i relaii internaionale este evideniat n numeroase pri ale volumului, precizia juristului fiind mpletit n mod armonios cu tiina diplomatului cu o adnc experien n problemele internaionale. Dei Adrian Nstase recunoate c nu are o formaie de economist, n Romnia european numeroase subcapitole evideniaz o cunoatere subtil a macroeconomiei. Prin multitudinea de metode i concepte utilizate de ctre autor, aceast carte poate fi cu uurin ncadrat n rndul operelor care stau sub semnul cercetrii interdisciplinare.

    Cartea lui Adrian Nstase ridic trei chestiuni: 1) evaluarea motenirii tranziiei post-comuniste n Europa Central i de Sud-Est; 2) proiectul Europei politice i al Europei sociale; 3) identitatea Stngii n epoca globalizrii. I. O necesar evaluare a tranziiei post-comuniste

    n statele aflate sub dictatura comunist pn n anul 1989, procesul de tranziie a avut trei scopuri: introducerea drepturilor i libertilor ceteneti; dezvoltarea unei economii de pia, care s asigure un sistem economic eficient; independena fa de Rusia (fosta Uniune Sovietic).

    Societile post-comuniste din Europa Central i de Sud-Est au actuala fizionomie din cauza unei multitudini de factori: a)

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    tranziia a generat sau a adncit inegalitile sociale, srcia i diferenele regionale ntre diferite ri dar i n interiorul acestora; mecanismele tradiionale de integrare politic n societile i respectiv, statele europene, prezint delimitri culturale naionaliste fa de alte state sau strategii de securitate social n interiorul rilor. n timp ce Dreapta din statele ex-comuniste s-a folosit de primul mecanism, Stnga nu are nc o baz programatic foarte clar definit pentru a realiza integrarea socio-politic, care s fie orientat ctre securitatea social. Programul Stngii necesit unele modificri. Doar prin realizarea acestora, stabilitatea democratic va fi permanent asigurat n cadrul statelor membre UE; b) trecerea la economia de pia a fost resimit doar parial ca o eliberare i ca un succes pe de alt parte ns i ca o individualizare forat, necompensat pentru o mare majoritate nici mcar prin avantaje materiale; c) una din caracteristicile sociologice ale capitalismului postcomunist este lipsa unei clase a capitalitilor. Elitele economice ex-socialiste funcioneaz ca comprador intelligentsia, deci ca ageni locali ai capitalului internaional i ca reprezentani ai societii locale fa de capitalul internaional. Aceast afirmaie se cere nuanat, n statele n care elitele politice au recurs la auto-privatizare (este i cazul Romniei), unde s-a creat o clas de capitaliti autohtoni; d) este caracteristic externalizarea unor funcii ale statului ctre actori privai, ceea ce nu a dus ns la creterea eficienei i la scderea costurilor, ci la o cretere exploziv a personalului alimentat indirect de ctre stat, la o cretere a costurilor i la declinul calitii serviciilor publice; fragilitatea societii civile i orientarea ei spre Dreapta (spre deosebire de ceea ce se ntmpl n lumea occidental unde societatea civil este relativ bine dezvoltat i, n acelai timp, orientat spre Stnga); e) lipsa unei clase de mijloc puternice, ceea

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    ce, pe fondul libertii rectigate dup 1989, a dat posibilitatea unui surogat de clas mijlocie format din potentai locali, s ctige influen asupra guvernelor i s-i promoveze interesele private/de grup pe seama avutului public; f) partidele politice sunt legate, prin relaii netransparente, de mediul economic, de unde impresia corupiei generalizate, percepie care afecteaz ncrederea n soluiile politice democratice i n stat; g) mass-media are tendina de cartelizare, ca structur de proprietate, cultivnd ns politica-show, mesajul preponderent conflictual i adesea manipulator; h) justiia este nc sub influena factorilor politici i a celor economici, proasta ei funcionare crend puternice sentimente de frustrare social i manifestri politice radicale.

    Principala concluzie care trebuie extras din studierea peisajului politic, economic i cultural din cele zece state ex-comuniste care au aderat la UE de la 1 mai 2004/1 ianuarie 2007 poate fi faptul c integrarea european nu poate nlocui integrarea politic i social din interiorul acestor ri. Ca atare, consider c Europa post-comunist are nevoie de un program de Stnga pentru integrarea social. Romnia european contribuie la un astfel de program, pentru unul din statele importante ale Uniunii Europene. II. Ce fel de Europ vor social-democraii?

    Aceasta este una dintre ntrebrile eseniale la care Adrian Nstase ncearc s dea un rspuns n aceast carte. Patru chestiuni cred c sunt prioritare pe agenda politic european: a) reforma instituional, avnd drept corolar adoptarea unui Tratat constituional; b) ntrirea democraiei i combaterea mirajului populist; c) reforma sistemelor sociale, pentru a le asigura

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    sustenabilitatea; d) problema energetic, aflat n strns corelare cu cea ecologic.

    a) O Constituie pentru Europa Respingerea Tratatului Constituional al Uniunii Europene

    de ctre Frana i Olanda, este n msur s blocheze att adncirea integrrii, ct i continuarea extinderii n Europa de Sud-Est. mprtesc mpreun cu Adrian Nstase preocuparea fa de necesara reformare a instituiilor comunitare, astfel nct Europa s poat deveni un actor major i mai responsabil n procesele de globalizare. Pentru mine, ca european din Germania, este vital ca Uniunea European s dobndeasc o Constituie, chiar dac unii au reticene n a o denumi astfel, deoarece n acest fel vom putea trece de la Europa pia la Europa politic, de la Europa naiunilor la Europa ca actor global responsabil. Apreciez, de aceea, cu att mai mult propunerea lui Adrian Nstase, pe care-l consider un european din Romnia, de a aduce o contribuie romneasc la construirea viitorului Europei, cu att mai mult cu ct Romnia trebuie s aspire la o Uniune European constituit ca o federaie de state, construit pe doi piloni (primul, comunitar, consolidat, iar al doilea, interguvernamental, restructurat), gndit ca o existen concomitent a dou Uniuni, una Economic i Monetar, alturi de una Politic.

    b) Mirajul populismului Optimismul de la nceputul anilor `90, generat de cderea

    comunismului n Europa a fost nlocuit, pas cu pas, de o stare de nemulumire fa de soluiile politice tradiionale. Radicalismul a reaprut n Europa. Mai nti, n mod aparent paradoxal, n

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    Occident: Partidul Libertii n Austria, Lista lui Pim Fortuyn n Olanda, pentru a nu mai vorbi de Frontul Naional n Frana.

    ncepnd cu anul 2004, evenimente neateptate au intervenit n viaa politic a statelor din Europa post-comunist. n acest an, 2004, guvernanii din ntreaga arie a Europei Centrale au pierdut alegerile pentru Parlamentul european. n anul 2005, alegerile parlamentare din Polonia au adus o nfrngere devastatoare pentru forele dezintegrate de centru-stnga i o victorie neateptat a partidelor naionaliste radicale, precum Autoaprarea RP i Liga Familiilor Poloneze. Ulterior, aceste partide au devenit membre ale noii coaliii de guvernmnt de centru dreapta, care nu a reuit s se consolideze i a trebuit s fac fa unui protest de mas ncepnd cu acea dat.

    n alegerile din 2006, n Slovacia, SMER, un partid democratic de stnga a ieit nvingtor, iar forele de centru-dreapta, dezintegrate, au pierdut alegerile. Numeroi social democrai s-au artat ngrijorai de formarea unei coaliii cu Partidul Naional Slovac (SNS), un partid radical naionalist. Pn n toamna lui 2006, nici Ungaria, nici Cehia nu au reuit s evite destabilizarea vieii politice, dei aceasta nu a urmat modelul polonez. Doar n istoria democrat a Ungariei, votanii au acordat un al doilea mandat coaliiei de guvernmnt de centru-stnga, n timp ce naionalitii radicalii de Dreapta, Partidul Ungar al Justiiei i Vieii (MIP-Jobbik) i Partidul Muncitorilor i-au pierdut susinerea, care era oricum limitat. Totui, imediat ce coaliia de centru-stnga i-a nceput mandatul a trebuit s fac fa unui masiv protest al Opoziiei, dublat de un violent conflict ntre grupurile radicale de Dreapta.

    Ca i n Ungaria, alegerile din Cehia, din 2006, au artat o slbire a unei fore radicale, Partidul Comunist din Boemia i

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    Moravia (KSCM). n alegeri, att Stnga ct i Dreapta democratic au obinut un numr egal de mandate, neputnd astfel forma o coaliie. Impasul politic a transformat ara ntr-un stat neguvernabil pentru o lung perioad de timp.

    La alegerile prezideniale din Bulgaria, din 2006, liderul partidului ultranaionalist ATAKA, Volen Siderov a ajuns n turul al doilea al alegerilor prezideniale. A pierdut n faa preedintelui Gheorghi Prvanov, care a candidat ca independent, nominalizat de un comitet de iniiativ, dar a fost lider al Partidului Socialist Bulgar. Discursul lui Volen Siderov a fost puternic anti-european i anti-minoriti, i a vizat voturile nemulumiilor de reformele adoptate n vederea intrrii n Uniunea European. Ceea ce s-a ntmplat n Bulgaria seamn cu scenariul francez din 2002, cnd socialitii l-au susinut pe candidatul de Dreapta Jacques Chirac n faa celui de extrema-dreapt antieuropean Jean-Marie Le Pen. Alegerile pentru Parlamentul European au subliniat pericolul creterii extremismului antieuropean.

    Vlaams Belang-ul flamand, Aliana Sloven, Liga Familiilor Poloneze, Liga Nordului sunt doar cteva dintre formaiunile politice naionaliste care joac un rol din ce n ce mai important pe scenele politice din statele central i est-europene. Susinerea lor electoral a fost limitat prin praguri electorale sau voturi nominale, care s le ndeprteze posibilitatea de a ajunge la putere. Totui, simpatia de care se bucur le transform n aliai de ocazie ai partidelor de Dreapta sau de Stnga la formarea coaliiilor.

    Trebuie s fac unele remarci privind ascensiunea populismului n ntreaga Europ n cursul ultimului deceniu. n societile vest-europene se simte o dorin sporit de securitate, legalitate i ordine. Mesajele naionalist-populiste ce rspund acestei dorine sunt astfel formate din: a) cei care se tem c

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    schimbrile aduse de globalizare le vor reduce nivelul actual de via; b) cei care se tem c nu vor fi n stare s foloseasc schimbrile aduse de globalizare spre a-i ridica nivelul de via i, din aceast cauz, vor rmne n urma celor care vor fi capabili s o fac; c) cei ce se tem c nu vor putea nici cunoate/nelege, nici controla i nici influena actele unei guvernri care, devenit global, va fi netransparent, neresponsabil i neprotecionist.

    O parte din aceste explicaii pentru rbufnirile radicalismului n Occident sunt valabile i pentru Europa post-comunist. ns, sfritul etapelor de aderare formal la instituiile euro-atlantice a adus cu sine crepusculul solidaritilor specifice epocii de tranziie. Dac de la mijlocul anilor `90 tendinele negative ale societilor post-comuniste au putut fi moderate prin ncercarea de consensualizare n jurul marilor proiecte de aderare la NATO i integrare european, odat atinse aceste obiective nemulumirile au rbufnit. i n Est, ca i n Occident, teama fa de schimbare, personificat n noile state intrate n UE de integrarea european, genereaz opiunea fa de liderii care promit s rezolve toate problemele din societate, i aceasta ntr-un timp foarte scurt. Specificitatea valului de destabilizare din lumea post-comunist este dat de faptul c s-a dezvoltat simultan n ntreaga regiune, i nu numai ntr-o ar sau alta aa cum s-a ntmplat anterior. Mai mult, a artat fragilitatea democraiilor, care erau considerate ca fiind democraii consolidate. i, n sfrit, pierderea echilibrului n zon a aprut imediat dup aderarea acestor state la Uniunea European, ceea ce a jucat, aa cum se susine adesea, un rol cheie n stabilitatea politic a regiunii.

    Una dintre diferenele dintre populismul din Est i cel din Vest faptul c n Europa celor 15 radicalismul s-a nscut n condiiile crizei partidelor Dreptei tradiionale, n timp ce n

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    societile post-comuniste extremismul de Dreapta a survenit i ca urmare a degringoladei prin care a trecut stnga democratic. Exemplul polonez, n care social-democraii au suferit grave nfrngeri electorale ca urmare a acuzaiilor de corupie i a certurilor fratricide, este elocvent n acest sens. Dar, Stnga din Europa Central i de Est este parazitat de populism i pentru c partidele social-democrate sau aflat n fruntea procesului de aderare la Uniunea European, iar visul prosperitii dobndite peste noapte nu s-a realizat. Altfel spus, stnga pltete acum costul transformrilor sociale pe care le-a realizat, dar care nu au generat numai prosperitate ci i excludere social, srcie, un sentiment de inadaptare la schimbrile percepute a fi prea rapide i prea radicale.

    Ca atare, combaterea populismului n Europa celor 27 nu va putea fi realizat printr-o simpl retoric pro-democratic, ci doar n urma unui proces de transformare al crui rezultat s fie rectigarea ncrederii n instituii, fie c ele sunt de la nivel statal sau comunitar, n eficiena asigurrii securitii personale i colective de ctre Uniunea European. De asemenea, partidele stngii democratice trebuie s devin mai credibile n renovarea mesajului democratic, s determine ntrirea ncrederii n valorile politice i n eficiena participrii civice.

    c) Modelul Social European Suntem parte a unei discuii general-europene n legtur cu

    adaptarea sistemului de securitate social, construit dup sfritul Primului Rzboi Mondial, la noile realiti impuse de trecerea la economia bazat pe cunoatere. mbtrnirea populaiei, managementul conservator al fondurilor de pensii, aversiunea fa de risc privind transferul fondurilor publice n fonduri private de pensii, concurena din partea unor ri cu salarii mici, dar cu capital

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    uman valoros, fuga locurilor de munc n alte ri mai prietenoase din punct de vedere fiscal, eterogenitatea crescnd a politicilor sociale ale statelor membre UE, numrul mare de omeri sunt tot attea ameninri care au adus n atenie nevoia de reform a modelului social european.

    n Germania, aceast tematic are o rezonan special, cunoscute fiind discuiile legate de adoptarea Agendei 2010. O protecie social efectiv n Europa necesit reguli adoptate la nivel comunitar. Aceasta este mai important pentru noile state membre post-comuniste dect pentru cele occidentale: nivelul securitii sociale, precum ocrotirea sntii i pensiile, este o problem de mare importan nu numai n Romnia. Precondiiile de baz sunt dou decizii politice asumate la nivel european: mai nti, toate statele membre ale UE trebuie s cad de acord c dezvoltarea economic i securitatea social sunt obiective la fel de importante. Teza potrivit creia trebuie mai nti s obinem cretere economic, apoi s asigurm securitatea social nu este deloc acceptabil, pentru c politicile sociale trebuie nelese ca un factor productiv al economiei europene; n al doilea rnd, principiul fundamental trebuie s fie acela al competiiei ntre companii, nu ntre companiile din diferite state, sprijinite de acestea. Consecina acestui principiu va fi egalizarea condiiilor de pornire n competiia economic i a rezultatelor politicilor economice de la nivel european.

    n lumina diferenelor de bogie dintre vechile i noile state membre ale Uniunii Europene, solidaritatea ntre acestea este absolut necesar. Fondurile structurale ale Uniunii sunt necesare pentru finanarea investiiilor n instituii i infrastructur, astfel nct s fie posibil creterea economic rapid. Elementul fundamental care distorsioneaz competiia n UE este taxarea

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    companiilor, iar standardizarea la nivel european a taxelor este necesar. Realizarea unui nivel de taxare a companiilor n jurul procentului de 30% poate fi un reper pentru toate statele membre ale Uniunii. ns, trebuie s acceptm faptul c finanarea insuficient n statele nou intrate sau n cele mai srace nu ar putea fi compensat doar prin transferuri dinspre cele mai bogate prin intermediul fondurilor structurale. Creterea economic a fiecrei companii poate asigura un succes de durat.

    Dumpingul salarial este nociv pentru ntreaga Europ. Salariile care sunt prea mici sunt nocive pentru salariai n statele srace, deoarece nu le asigur dect puin din necesiti, dar este nociv i n statele bogate, deoarece genereaz un nivel al omajului mai mare dect este necesar pentru competitivitate. Marea provocare a politicii sociale i a strategiilor sindicatelor n UE este egalizarea salariilor la un nivel ct mai nalt posibil. Condiia prealabil pentru ndeplinirea acestui obiectiv este crearea unui sistem de salarii minime n toate statele membre ale Uniunii, urmnd ca acestea s fie ajustate prin creterea punct cu punct. Principiul de baz ar trebui s fie acela al unor salarii comparabile pentru competene comparabile.

    n opinia mea, conceptul pieei-libere unidimensionale, a societii de pia este total greit. Doar securitatea social ca o precondiie a libertii personale, oferit de Stnga democratic, poate supravieui n viitor.

    d) Producie i consum sustenabile Energie - Mediu n Romnia european autorul acord o importan aparte

    dezvoltrii sustenabile. Simt nevoia s mi exprim i eu poziia fa de aceast chestiune, viziune consonant cu cea a lui Adrian Nstase.

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    Ca parte constitutiv important a Strategiei de la Lisabona, viziunea dezvoltrii durabile i perspectivele sale de mediu, economice i sociale sunt fundamentale pentru o societate bazat pe solidaritate i justiie o societate n care cetenii cred n viitor i particip activ la dezvoltare.

    n paralel i ncorporat n strategiile economice i de ocupare a forei de munc este necesar s accelerm lupta mpotriva degradrii mediului prin aciune concertat pentru modele sustenabile de producie i consum. Nu doar Europa va beneficia de pe urma progresului acesta va uura povara global asupra planetei noastre i va genera noi tehnologii ecologice care s poat fi apoi rspndite n ntreaga lume.

    Scopul este ruperea legturii dintre creterea economic i presiunea exercitat asupra resurselor naturale. Inovaiile, noile tehnologii i investiiile sunt fundamentale pentru reuita strategiei. Tehnologia este o sabie cu dou tiuri. Este att o cauz a multor probleme de mediu, ct i o soluie a lor. Este de domeniul evidenei c tehnologiile trecutului nc dominante n transport, energie, industrie i agricultur submineaz sistemele noastre elementare de meninere a vieii, apa i aerul curate i solul fertil.

    n toate aceste sectoare sunt disponibile sau pe cale s apar noi tehnologii. Ele nu vor reduce doar impactul asupra mediului, ci, dac sunt folosite pe scar larg, pot rezolva probleme de mediu.

    Avem de ales ntre schimbarea tehnologic ntr-un ritm fr precedent sau o modificare n compoziia atmosferei care s nu aib echivalent n trecut, nc din zorii umanitii. mbuntirea n tehnologiile mediului prin intermediul unor investiii mai mari ar putea s creasc rata mbuntirii n ceea ce privete eco-eficiena. O astfel de evoluie ar mbunti relaia dintre creterea economic

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    i presiunile asupra mediului, permind evoluii mai favorabile n ambele.

    Nu exist o contradicie inerent ntre creterea economic i meninerea unui nivel acceptabil al calitii mediului. Creterea economic permite de obicei societii s furnizeze oamenilor un mediu mai curat i mai sntos. Astfel, problema nu trebuie vzut ca una de cretere economic versus mediu, ci de cum poate fi nsoit creterea standardelor de via de protejarea i mbuntirea calitii mediului. ntrirea integrrii ar trebui s fie benefic att pentru mediu, ct i pentru eliminarea subsidiilor pentru activiti nocive mediului i politicii economice. Ecologizarea politicii fiscale, de exemplu prin eliminarea subsidiilor pentru activiti nocive pentru mediu ar trebui s creasc eficiena economic.

    Practic, sustenabilitatea este o chestiune de eliminare a tehnologiilor vechi i promovarea unor tehnologii mai eficiente i productive. Ar trebui s cutm noi tehnologii, eficiente, noi, curate. Ele vor produce mai mult n termeni de valoare pentru consumatori, dar vor utiliza mai puin energie i alte resurse.

    nlocuirea vechilor tehnologii cu altele noi, orientate spre sustenabilitate impulsioneaz o puternic cretere economic de pe urma investiiilor fcute. O rat mai mare de investiii va face loc unui ritm mai rapid de nlocuire a vechilor tehnologii. O strategie de dezvoltare durabil care s includ o politic hotrt de a rectifica preurile va face introducerea de noi tehnologii mai profitabil i va ajuta investiiile i creterea economic. Astfel, strategia UE de dezvoltare durabil poate contribui la o astfel de strategie de investiii.

    Aceast abordare a problemei tehnologiilor sustenabile are, de asemenea, un aspect care privete dezvoltarea. Statele membre

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    ale UE i alte state dezvoltate au elaborat, implementat i exportat n trecut tehnologiile care stau la baza modelelor noastre non-sustenabile de producie. Aceste state vor avea principala responsabilitate pentru introducerea noilor tehnologii i pentru punerea lor la dispoziia rilor n curs de dezvoltare. Viziunea pe termen lung trebuie combinat cu un program ndrzne de aciune pentru investiii, cretere economic i presiunea asupra resurselor naturale. Pentru a face acest program realizabil, ar trebui s se bazeze pe principiul performanei optime adic pe noi tehnologii, sisteme i principii care au demonstrat c funcioneaz bine.

    Strategie european privind energia (Energy for a Changing World), recent adoptat, i asum obiective ndrznee: reducerea emisiilor de gaze poluante de ctre statele dezvoltate cu 30% pn n 2020; creterea eficienei energetice cu 20% pn n 2020; creterea ponderii energiei regenerabile cu 20% pn n 2020; creterea nivelului utilizrii biocombustibililor n transport cu 10% pn n 2020. Toate aceste obiective asumate la nivel comunitar, problema dependenei Uniunii Europene de resursele energetice ale Rusiei i implicaiile politice pe care acest lucru l are deja, necesit o atitudine realist i curajoas din partea politicienilor europeni. III. Stnga democratic european n epoca globalizrii

    Dezvoltrile politice din rile europene, precum i impactul pe care l are globalizarea asupra realitilor social-politice, economice i culturale, impun o revedere i o modernizare a programului partidelor social-democrate europene, precum i a gndirii politice social-democrate n general.

    Chestiunea esenial este dac distincia tradiional dintre Stnga i Dreapta mai este relevant, chiar dac ele se vor

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    desprinde de mediul prozaic al politicii de partid tradiionale. n opinia mea, aceast semnificaie se va pstra, cel puin la un nivel general. n ansamblu, Dreapta va accepta mai degrab existena inegalitii i va prefera s i susin pe cei puternici dect pe cei fr putere.

    Aceast distincie trebuie s conduc n politica social a Stngii democratice la integrarea celor slabi i la eliminarea privilegiilor, la politica sa global de repudiere a unei singure superputeri i la susinerea unei ordini mondiale multipolare.

    Programul de baz al partidelor social-democrate continu s fie orientat ctre o strategie flexibil dreapta-stnga. Acest lucru este valabil n ciuda tuturor discuiilor despre a treia cale sau noul centru. Anthony Giddens, consilier al Partidului Laburist, afirm n cartea sa Dincolo de stnga i dreapta (1994): Distinciile dintre stnga i dreapta vor continua fr ndoial s existe n coerena practic a politicilor de partid.

    Simpla distincie realizat de Giddens i cele dou alternative politice fundamentale ce deriv din aceasta, ajut la depirea sentimentului de insecuritate ce rezult din eecul i fragmentarea stngii comuniste, care a discreditat ambele valori i noiuni ale Stngii. Noul centru a constituit astfel delimitarea fa de Stnga nedemocrat. Slbiciunea conceptual a alternativei centrului fa de Dreapta rezid n faptul c, totui, ea nu face distincia ntre Dreapta democrat i Dreapta nedemocrat.

    Centrul, privit din punct de vedere matematic, este punctul de pe o lung linie care separ Dreapta de Stnga. O politic de centru nseamn practic aducerea celor care sunt deschii ctre noi soluii, la partea opus din cele dou zone ale centrului. ntr-un sistem bipartid aceasta va constitui o sarcin strategic funcional a stngii, dar i a dreptei, dac dorete o majoritate la centru. Ct

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    privete programele fundamentale, nu trebuie s se renune la votanii tradiionali de Stnga, ci trebuie s fie atrai i ali votani poteniali.

    Valorile Stngii democratice trebuie s conin distinciile formulate de Anthony Giddens, care se reflect n valorile democraiei i justiiei sociale. Aceste valori au un corespondent n triada de valori rezultate din Revoluia francez Libertate, Egalitate, Fraternitate. Pentru social-democraia internaional s-au adoptat, prin documentul emis n 2003 la Congresul Internaionalei Socialiste Guvernarea ntr-o societate global o nou triad de principii: dezvoltarea durabil, drepturile omului, democraie. Fiecare dintre aceste principii are cte trei dimensiuni. Dezvoltarea durabil include un mediu sntos, progres economic i justiie social; drepturile omului includ dreptul la securitate individual, identitate cultural i integrare social; iar democraia include buna guvernare, transparena i participarea.

    Redefinirea social-democraiei este cerut i de faptul c valorile politice privind drepturile omului i naiunea, cultura sau integrarea social devin mai concrete pentru realitatea social dect circumstanele social-economice i ateptrile populaiei. Tendina de baz a ateptrilor sociale este orientarea ctre stadiul n care lucrurile vor deveni mai bune, iar situaia va nceta s se deterioreze. n acest context, compararea cu propriile poziii mai proaste din trecut este inutil, n timp ce comparaiile cu ceilali, care sunt dup cum pretind pe o poziie mai bun, vor fi mult mai relevante. Aceast atitudine de invidie este semnificativ att pentru strategiile de delimitare ale Dreptei, ct i pentru strategiile de integrare ale Stngii.

    Succesul acestui program depinde de pregtirea i abilitatea de a ndeplini obligaiile partidelor; aici se afl avantajul permanent

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    al partidelor de Stnga fa de partidele populiste, a cror incapacitate de a-i ndeplini promisiunile se va vedea foarte curnd.

    Sunt de acord cu Adrian Nstase c noi, social-democraii europeni, trebuie s fim n avangarda micrii pentru crearea unei naiuni civice europene, fundamentat pe conceptul de cetenie european, care va trebui s constituie unul din pilonii identitii cetenilor europeni. Societatea cosmopolit pe care o dorim creat n Europa nu poate fi bazat dect pe principii precum cele ale respectului diversitii, construciei valorilor comune, subsidiaritii i coeziunii spirituale. n acest sens, trebuie reafirmat faptul c politica social-democrat nelege coexistena dintre majoritate i minoritate ca o surs de bogie.

    Coeziunea social sau, mai bine spus, refacerea coeziunii sociale reprezint o alt sfidare major aflat pe agenda reformei ideologice social-democrate. Social-democraia promoveaz principiul egalitii anselor. Dar egalitatea anselor trebuie s fie echilibrat cu ansa egalitii, ca mijloc de includere pentru fiecare individ. Aceasta implic, la rndul su, realizarea unui alt echilibru i anume acela dintre integrarea n familia democrat i integrarea familiei n structura colectivitilor deschise. Asemenea colectiviti urmeaz, la rndul lor, a se agrega n societatea civic multicultural i n cea cosmopolit. Politica anselor de integrare i a egalitii ca integrare ar trebui definit ct mai concret cu putin, astfel nct s identifice calea ctre creterea libertii i securitii individuale prin creterea adaptabilitii, ca i prin realizarea unei juste corelri ntre libertatea de opinie i rspundere, ntre riscul asumat i ctigul obinut. Organizarea societii civile, explicarea rolului clasei mijlocii i trebuie s fie pri integrante ale actualei ideologii social-democrate.

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    *

    n final, doresc s-mi exprim nc odat aprecierea pentru

    rezultatul efortului tiinific i doctrinar al autorului, spernd c volumul Romnia european se va bucura de atenia pe care o merit pe deplin din partea publicului cititor, c aceast provocare la dialog i reflecie va fi acceptat, iar peste un deceniu Adrian Nstase va scrie o carte de istorie pe care ar putea-o denumi Memorii. Cum am realizat Romnia european! Sunt convins c Adrian Nstase va contribui la traducerea acestui proiect n realitate!

    Dr. Christoph Zpel

    Preedinte al Comitetului Economic, Coeziune Social i Dezvoltare al Internaionalei Socialiste

    Berlin, mai 2007

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    FFoorreewwoorrdd ttoo aa LLoonngg--ssppaann PPrroojjeecctt

    It was December 2001, when I met Adrian Nstase the first time,

    a few days after the success of PSD in the parliamentary elections. At

    this time I was Minister of State in the German Foreign Office. We

    discussed the process of Romanias European integration and the lifting

    of the visa-regime vis--vis Romania. We agreed in crucial issues. In the

    following years Adrian Nstase as Prime Minister implemented, what he

    had announced. This is the fundament of a fruitful and friendly relation

    between Adrian Nstase and me, grounded on joint sharing of the

    democratic Left values, of the faith in human progress and in the force of

    him to help his fellow citizens to build for themselves a better life in a

    more equitable world. I have known Adrian Nstase both as statesman,

    when he was Prime Minister, and as President of the Social Democratic

    Party. When he used to be the PSD leader, we worked together in the

    process of the integration of Romanian Social Democrats into the

    Socialist International. I have also cooperated with Adrian Nstase when

    he coordinated the negotiations for Romanias adherence to the European

    Union. It was an important and interesting political and life experience,

    which turned a political amity, like so many others, into a close political

    and personal relationship. And, as it happens in any such relationship,

    there were moments when we could not agree with one another on some

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    topics, as for instance, I did not agree to Romanias decision to send

    troops to Irak, but we sincerely spoke out our views, we listened to

    arguments and we tried to understand the interests at stake. Nevertheless,

    or maybe therefore, our relationship has not been altered, did not come to

    an end after 2004, and continued to be the same even after Adrian

    Nstase joined the Opposition.

    Now Adrian Nstase has written an important book not only for himself, but I dare say, for Romania as well. I am writing this preface because I am genuinely convinced of the role Adrian Nstases book can play in the transformation of a country important for and in Europe, Romania, to which I am spiritually attracted, even if I cannot agree with everything happening of late in this country, particularly in its political life.

    European Romania is the fruit of the work of a successful statesman of contemporary Europe. Adrian Nstases book is an imposing synthesis made by a social scientist who contributes his technical knowledge of European and Romanian topics, happily combined with the politicians instinct to identify and select societys priorities, filtered nevertheless through the philosophical perception of a thinker belonging to the vanguard Left. Thus, I think that the complete title of this book might be European Romania the Philosophy of a Governing Program. Although Adrian Nstase refuses explicitly this, the substance of the book might form, in many ways, the conceptual underpinning of a prolonged cycle of government, in the wake of which Romania, within the European Union, would be able to do the great leap forward from the condition of a state at the frontier lines of Europe,

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    to the condition of a democratic and socially integrated society of the 21 century.. This is the essential stake of European Romania. The central subject of the book is double-seized: first, how can Romanian society be transformed so as to get the full features of a prosperous European community, able to generate progress, and, secondly, how should the European institutions be reformed so as to be capable to help European Union successfully cope with political, economic, cultural and ecologic globalization. For the beginning, worth noting would be that Adrian Nstase establishes an inter-conditioning between Romanias Europenization and the deepening of its integration into the European Union. This is the correct prospect, as the progress of the societies in the EU-member states cannot be conceived within the European Union, if the European society, i.e. communitarian institutions, is not functioning at full capacity. A viable European policy recipe starts from a local level, via statal towards communitarian and, the other way round, from communitarian, via statal towards local, and in this way to each and every citizen. This is the way one may synthesize the paradigm on which European Romania has been conceived.

    The research made by Adrian Nstase is challenging both for the politician and for the expert in international relations, sociologist, historian or journalist. The meaning of the challenge is the result of interpreting from a personal vista Romanias modern history, particularly the history in which he participated or which he determined, as well as the result of his courage to propose a project for the future of Romania, at an epoch when an insufficient number of politicians assume a visionaires outlook, indulging in a sterile present-stickiness, generated and motivated by a so called electoral pragmatism.

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    To reach his aim, Adrian Nstase displays in European Romania a multiplicity of methods and notions, spurring the readers special attention so as to make him understand the authors demonstration. Although this book is complex in its structure and massive in content, the clear phrase and the conceptual precision are the main attributes of the authors style. As for the methods used, in European Romania one can identify the diachronic-historical method, so as to highlight the essential stages crossed in creation of the modern Romanian state. Narrative with memoirs flavors are coloring the text, particularly in the segments dedicated to the examination of Romanias recent history. His Law and International Relations professional background is evident in many parts of the volume, the jurists accuracy being harmoniously intertwined with the knowledge of a diplomat with thorough experience in international problems. Although Adrian Nstase admits he has not an economists training, in European Romania, there are a lot of subchapters that prove his knowledge of macroeconomics. Owing to the multitude of methods and notions used by the author, this book has a rightful place among the works written under the sign of interdisciplinary research.

    Three questions are raised by Adrian Nstases book: 1.) assessment of the post-communist transition legacy in Central and South-Eastern Europe; 2.) the project of political Europe and social Europe; 3.) identity of the Left in the globalization age.

    I. A necessary assessment of post-communist transition In the states under communist dictatorship until 1989, the

    transition process had three goals: introduction of civic rights and liberties; development of a market-oriented economy, able to

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    secure an efficient economic system; independence of Russia (former Soviet Union).

    The post-communist states in Central and South-Eastern Europe have the present physiognomy due to a multitude of factors, a) Transition has generated or deepened social inequalities, poverty and regional differences between countries but also within them; traditional mechanisms of political integration in societies and in European states, respectively, are nationalist cultural delimitations from other states or strategies of social security within the countries themselves. While the Right in the former communist countries has used the first mechanism, the Left has not got yet a very well defined programmatic basis to achieve the socio-political integration, to be oriented towards social insecurity. The Program of the Left needs alterations. Only after completing these alterations, the democratic stability will be permanently secured within EU member-states; b) Transition to the market-oriented economy has been only partially felt like a liberation and a success on the other hand yet, it has been felt like a forced individualization, for which not even the material advantages have been able to make up for a great majority; c) One of the sociologic characteristics of post-communist capitalism is the absence of a capitalists class. Ex-socialist economic elites are functioning like comprador intelligentsia, thus as local agents of the international capital and as representatives of local society of the international capital. This assertion needs a more nuanced specification, in the states in which political elites resorted to self-privatization - Romanias case, too - , where a class of autochthonous capitalists has been created; d) Characteristic is the externalization of some functions of the state by private actors, a fact which has not led to higher efficiency and lower costs, but to the explosive growth of

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    the personnel indirectly supported by the state, to higher costs and a lower quality of public services; a frangible civil society and its orientation towards the Right, in contradistinction to societies, where the civil society is comparatively well developed and, at the same time, oriented to the Left. e) Absence of a powerful middle class, which, against the background of a liberty re-conquered after 1989, offered the possibility to a substitute middle-class, formed of local potentates, to gain influence over the governments and promote their private/or group interests to the detriment of public property; f) Political parties are linked, by non-transparent relationships, to the economic environment, wherefrom the impression of a generalized corruption, a perception that is harmful to the confidence in democratic political solutions and in the state; g) Mass-media has a tendency to associate in cartels, as their property structure is concerned, though cultivating the so-called policy-show, the pre-eminently conflicting and quite often manipulating message. h) Justice is still under the influence of political and of economic factors, its poor functioning creating strong feelings of social frustration and radical political manifestations.

    The main conclusion to be drawn from the study of the political, economic and cultural landscape in the ten ex-communist states which adhered to EU since May 1, 2004/January 1, 2007 may be the fact the European integration cannot replace political and social integration within those countries. Therefore, I think that post-communist Europe needs a Leftist program for social integration. European Romania contributes to such a program, for one of the important states of the European Union.

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    II. What kind of a Europe do the social-democrats want? This is one of the essential questions to which Adrian Nstase tries to give an answer in the present book. I think that four items have priority on the European political agenda: a) institutional reform, having as natural consequence the adoption of a constitutional Treaty; b) strengthening of democracy and contesting the populist mirage; c) reform of social systems, to secure sustainment; d) the energy problem, closely correlated with the ecological one.

    a) A Constitution for Europe Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union by France and the Netherlands is able to block both the deepening of integration, and its further extension in South Eastern Europe. I share with Adrian Nstase the concern for the necessary reform of the community institutions, so that Europe may become a major and more responsible actor in the globalization processes. For me, as a European in Germany, it is vital that the European Union should get a Constitution, even if there are some people reticent enough to call it by that name, for in this way we would be able to progress from Market-oriented Europe to Political Europe, from the Europe of Nations to Europe as a Responsible Global Actor. Therefore I appreciate even more the proposal advanced by Adrian Nstase, whom I consider a European in Romania, to make a Romanian contribution to the build-up of Europes future, so much the more as Romania should aspire to a European Union constituted as a federation of states, built on two pillars, the first, communitary, reinforced, and the second, inter-governmental, restructured, thought out as a concomitant existence of two Unions, one Economic and Monetary, side by side with a Political One.

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    b) The mirage of Populism The optimistic effervescence of the early 1990s, generated by the fall of communism in Europe has been replaced, little by little, by a feeling of dissatisfaction with the traditional political solutions. Radicalism reappeared in Europe. First, apparently as a paradox, in the West: Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei sterreichs), Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Party) in the Netherlands, not to speak about the Front National (National Front) in France.

    Starting 2004, unexpected events occurred in the political life of the states in post-communist Europe. Then, in 2004, ruling parties all over Central Europe lost the elections for the European Parliament. In 2005, parliamentary elections in Poland brought about a devastating defeat of the centre-Leftist disintegrated forces and an unexpected victory of radical nationalist parties, like Samoobrona RP (Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland) and Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR (League of Polish Families). Later these parties became members of the new centre-Right government coalition, which did not succeed to consolidate itself and was obliged to cope with a mass protest starting that date. In 2006 elections, in Slovakia SMER, a democratic-left party had success, the centre-Right forces disintegrated, lost the elections. But many Social Democrats are concerned on a Coalition with Slovensk nrodn strana (Slovak National Party), a radically nationalistic party. Till the fall of 2006, neither Hungary, nor Czech Republic succeeded to avoid the destabilization of political life, although they did not follow the Polish model. Only in Hungarys democratic history, the voters granted a second mandate to the centre-Left coalition, while the Right radical nationalists, Magyar Igazsg s let Prtja (in short: MIP-Jobbik) (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) and Magyar Munksprt (Hungarian Workers

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    Party) lost their anyway limited support. Nevertheless, shortly after the centre-Left coalition had begun its mandate, it was obliged to cope with a massive protest of the Opposition, doubled by a violent conflict between the radical Right groups. Like in Hungary, the Czech elections, in 2006, proved a weakening of the a radical force, the Komunistick strana ech a Moravy KSM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia). In the elections, both the Democratic Left and the Democratic Right obtained an equal number of mandates, being thus unable to form a coalition. The political deadlock turned the country into a non governable state for a long period of time. At the presidential elections in Bulgaria, in 2006, the leader of the ultra nationalist party, ATAKA, Volen Siderov, reached the second round of the presidential elections. He lost to President Georgi Parvanov, an independent candidate, nominated by an initiative committee, but he was leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Volen Siderovs discourse was powerfully anti-European and anti-minorities, and was targeted on the votes of people dissatisfied with the reforms adopted with a view to joining the European Union. What happened in Bulgaria looks very much like the French scenario of 2002, when the Socialists supported the Right-wing Jacques Chirac against the extreme-Right Jean-Marie Le Pen. The elections to the European Parliament underlined the dangerous strength of the extreme anti European right. The Flemish Vlams Belang, the Slovene Alliance, the League of Polish Families, the are only some of political nationalist groupings playing a increasingly important part on the political stages in the Central and East European countries. Their electoral support was restricted by electoral lower limits or nominal votes, likely to remove their possibility to ascend to power. Nevertheless,

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    the sympathy they are enjoying turns them from occasional allies of the Right or Left parties in forming coalitions. It is necessary to make some remarks concerning the ascent of populism all through Europe during the last decade. In West European societies there is an increasing desire of security, legality and order. Nationalist-populist messages responding to this desire are thus formed of: a) people fearing that changes brought about by globalization would lower their present living standards; b) people fearing that they would not be able to use the changes brought about by globalization in order to raise their living standards and, therefore, they would lag behind those proving capable to do it c) people fearing they would not be able to know/understand, control or influence the acts of a government which, turned global, will be non-transparent, irresponsible, non-protective . Some of these explanations for the outbursts of nationalistic populism in West Europe are also valid for post-communist Europe. But, the end of the formal adherence stages to EU and NATO brought in the twilight of the solidarities specific for the transition epoch. If in the mid-1990s the negative tendencies of the post-communist societies could be tempered by the attempt at reaching consensus about the great adherence to NATO and European integration projects, once these targets reached, dissatisfactions broke out. In the East and the West alike, the fear of change, personified by European integration in the new states adhered to EU, generates an option for leaders who are promising to solve all problems in a society in a very short time. The specific feature of the destabilization wave in the post-communist world is the result of its simultaneous development in the whole region, and not only in this or that country as it happened previously. Moreover, it proved the brittleness of democracies, considered as

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    being consolidated democracies. And, last but not least, the loss of balance in this zone appeared shortly after the adherence of these states to the European Union, a fact which played, as frequently sustained, a key part in the political stability of the region. One of the differences between eastern and western populism in Europe is the fact that in EU 15 area, radicalism was born when the crisis of the traditional Right-wing parties was prevailing, while in post-communist societies Right-wing extremism occurred in wake of the tumble suffered by the democratic Left. The Polish example, where Social Democrats had suffered serious electoral defeats as a consequence of the accusations of corruption and of the fratricide quarrels, is quite eloquent in this sense. But, the Left in Central and Eastern Europe is infected by populism also because the Social Democratic parties took the lead in the process of adherence to the European Union, and the dream of prosperity won overnight did not come true. In other words, the left is paying now the price of social changes achieved by it, social changes which have not generated prosperity alone, but also social exclusion, poverty, a feeling of non-adjustment to the changes seen as too swift and too radical. Thus, the combating of populism in EU 27 will not be achieved by a simple pro-democratic rhetoric, but only following a process of transformation whose result must be the regaining of confidence in institutions, be they at a state or at community level, in the efficiency of ensuring private or collective security by the European Union. The parties of democratic Left should also gain more credibility in their capacity to rejuvenate the democratic message, to determine a strengthened confidence in the political values and the efficiency of civic participation.

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    c) The European Social Pattern There is a general-European discussion about adapting the social security system, built-up since the end of World War I, to the new realities imposed by transition to an economy based on knowledge. The ageing of the population, the conservative management of pension funds aversion to risk concerning the transfer of public funds into private pension funds competition caused by low salary countries but with a valuable human capital, the flight for jobs in other more tax-friendly countries, the growing heterogeneity of social policies in the EU member-states, the great number of jobless people are all menaces that brought into focus the need of reforming the European social pattern. In Germany, this topic has a special echo, the discussions about the adoption of the 2010 Agenda being well-known. An effective social protection in Europe requires rules adopted at a community level. That is more important for the new post communist member states than for the western; the level of social security like health care and pensions is a reason of major concerns not only in Romania. Basic pre-requisites are two political decisions assumed at a European level: first, all the EU member-states should come to terms that economic development and social security are equally important goals. The thesis according to which we should first obtain an economic growth and only then ensure social security is altogether unacceptable, for social policies should be understood as a productive factor of European economy; secondly, the basic principle should be competition between companies, not between companies from different states backing them. The consequence of this principle will be the equalization of starting terms in the economic competition and of the results of economic policies at a European level.

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    As the differences of wealth between the old and new EU member-states are concerned, their solidarity is absolutely necessary. The structural funds of the Union are necessary for the financing of investments in institutions and infrastructure, so that a swift economic growth is made possible. The fundamental distorting element in the EU competition is the taxing of companies, while standardization at a European level of taxes proves necessary. The achievement of a 30% taxation level of the companies may be a guide mark for all the EU member-states. We should nevertheless accept the fact that the insufficient financing of the newcomer states or of the poorer ones cannot be compensated only by transfers from the richer countries through the intermediate of structural funds. The economic growth of each company can assure a durable success. Salary dumping is noxious for the whole of Europe. Too low salaries are noxious for employees in poor states as they cannot cover their bare necessities, but they are also noxious in richer countries, as they generate a higher level of unemployment than required by competitiveness. The great challenge of social policy and of trade-union strategies in EU is the equalization of salaries at an as high level as possible. The pre-requisite condition for reaching this objective is the creation of a minimum salary system in all the EU member-states, which would be later adjusted point by point. The basic principle should be that of comparable salaries for comparable competencies. In my opinion, the notion of a uni-dimensional free market, of a market-oriented society is altogether wrong. Social security alone as a pre-requisite of personal freedom, offered by the democratic Left, may survive in the future.

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    d) Sustainable production and consumption Energy Environment The author pays in his European Romania a particular importance to sustainable development. I feel like expressing my own opinion about this question, a viewpoint consonant with Adrian Nstases. As a constitutive part of the Lisbon Strategy, the vision of a durable development and its environmental, economic and social prospects are fundamental for a society based on solidarity and justice a society in which its citizens believe in the future and participate actively in development. Simultaneously and incorporated into the economic and labor occupation strategies we need to accelerate the struggle against the degradation of environment by a concerted action for sustainable production and consumption patterns. Europe will not be the sole beneficiary of progress, as progress would lighten the global burden on our Planet and would generate new ecologic technologies likely to be disseminated all over the world.

    The aim is the breaking of the link between economic growth and the pressure exerted on natural resources. Innovations, new technologies and investments are fundamental for a successful strategy. Technology is a double-edged sword. It is both a cause of and a solution for many environmental problems. It is a matter of evidence that past technologies still prevailing in transports, energy, industry and agriculture are undermining our elementary systems of maintaining the purity of life, water and air and keeping soil fertility.

    New technologies are or will be soon available in all these sectors. They will not reduce only the impact on environment but, if

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    used on a large scale, they will be able to solve environmental problems.

    We have to choose between technological change at an unprecedented pace and an alteration of the atmosphere composition with no equivalent in the past, as early as the dawn of humanity. Improvements in environmental technologies with the help of bigger investments might raise the improvements rate in eco-efficiency. Such an evolution would better the relationship between economic growth and pressure on environment, allowing for more favorable evolutions in both of them.

    There is no inherent contradiction between economic growth and the maintenance of an acceptable level of environmental quality. Economic growth usually allows society to offer people a cleaner and healthier environment. So, this problem should not be considered as an economic growth versus environment issue, but as a question of how higher living standards can be accompanied by improved environmental quality. The strengthening of integration should be beneficial both for the environment and for the elimination of subsidies for activities noxious to environment and to economic policy. The ecologic improvement of fiscal policy, by eliminating for instance subsidies for activities noxious to environment should raise economic efficiency.

    Practically speaking, sustainability is a matter of eliminating old technologies and promoting more efficient and more productive ones. We must look for new, efficient, clean technologies. They will produce more in terms of value for consumers, but will use less energy and other resources.

    The replacement of old technologies with fresh ones, oriented towards sustainability stimulates a strong economic growth in wake of investments. A higher rate of investments will allow for

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    a replacement of old technologies at an accelerated pace. A long-lasting development strategy including a firm policy of price readjustment will make more profitable the introduction of new technologies and will spur investments and economic growth. Thus, the EU lasting development strategy can contribute to such an investments strategy.

    This approach of the sustainable technologies problem has got an aspect concerning development. The EU member-states and other developed states have drawn up, implemented and exported in the past technologies that are at the basis of our non-sustainable production patterns. These states will bear the main responsibility for the introduction of new technologies and for putting them at the disposal of the developing countries. The long-term vision should be combined with a daring action program for investments, economic growth and pressure upon natural resources. For such a program to be feasible, it should be based on the principle of optimum performance that is on new technologies, systems and principles that have already demonstrated their good functioning.

    The recently adopted European strategy concerning energy - Energy for a Changing World - , assumes daring objectives: reducing greenhouse polluting gas emissions from developed countries by 30% by 2020; improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020; raising the share of renewable energy to 20% by 2020; Increasing the level of bio-fuels in transport fuel to 10% by 2020. All these objectives assumed at a community level, the problem of the dependence of the European Union upon the energy resources of Russia and the political implications this fact has already got need a realistic and courageous attitude of the European politicians.

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    III. The European democratic Left in the Globalization Age Political developments in European countries, and the impact of globalization on socio-political, economic and cultural realities, require a review of the European social democratic parties program, as well as of the social-democratic political thinking in general.

    The essential question is if the traditional distinction between the Left and the Right is still relevant even if they would detach themselves from the prosaic environment of the traditional party policy. In my opinion, such significance will be preserved, at least at a general level. On the whole, the Right will rather accept inequality and will prefer sustaining the powerful ones instead of the powerless.

    This distinction should lead in the societal policy of the democratic Left to an integration of the weak and the elimination of privileges, to its global policy of repudiating a single superpower and of sustaining a multi-polar world order.

    The fundamental program of social democratic parties continues to be oriented towards a flexible right-left strategy. This is valid in spite of all discussions about a third way or a new centre. Anthony Giddens, an adviser of the Labour Party, states in his book Beyond Left and Right (1994): Distinctions between Left and Right will further exist in the practical coherence of party policies.

    The simple distinction made by Giddens and the two fundamental political alternatives deriving from it, are helpful in surpassing the feeling of insecurity resulting from the failure and the fragmentation of the communist Left, which had discredited both values and notions of the Left. The new centre constituted

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    thus a delimitation from the non-democratic Left. The conceptual weakness of the centre alternative as compared to the Right resides in the fact that, it does not make any distinction between the dem