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The question of the relationship of Godto change has taken on a special signifi-cance in the latter part of the twentiethcentury. The old Greek question of the oneand the many has been given an addedimpetus in our day. One reason is simplythat change, at least in terms of culturalchange, has become commonplace in ourthinking. Whole books are devoted to thesubject of change, such as Alvin Toffler’sFuture Shock and John Naisbitt’sMegatrends. The change is the result ofmany factors. The accelerating capabilityof technology has meant that technologi-cal changes are more radical, morefrequent, and farther-reaching. Theknowledge explosion, together with radi-cally improved means of communication,results in changes being spread over wideareas rapidly. Modern physics increas-ingly is coming to view reality not as staticand fixed, but as dynamic and growing.Coupled with this is the rise and spreadof process philosophy, with its emphasisupon the basic unit of reality as being notthe fixed substance, but event, somethingmuch more evanescent.

Interestingly, much of conservative the-ology has not really risen to the challengeto the traditional doctrine of divine im-mutability. Although there has been a realoutpouring of new systematic theologytexts from conservative theologians in thepast fifteen years, most of them really donot give much attention to this subject.Among the exceptions are WayneGrudem’s Systematic Theology1 and CarlF. H. Henry’s God, Revelation and Author-

ity.2 Both volumes give major attentionwith respect to change and permanence

in God’s nature to the challenge of pro-cess theology.

At least upon the surface, orthodox the-ology has much at stake in this issue, for ithas traditionally maintained the doctrineof divine immutability. By this it meant thatalthough everything else in the universeappears to undergo change, God does not.He is the unchanging eternal one. In lightof the recent developments mentionedabove, however, this topic needs fresh scru-tiny and contemporary restatement.

Basis of the Doctrine of ImmutabilityA. Biblical

One source from which the doctrine ofimmutability has drawn inspiration is theScriptures. Several passages seem to beartestimony to the fact that God is the un-changing one. Three passages in particu-lar have come in for attention bytheologians. The first is in Psalm 102,where the context is the discussion ofGod’s creation of all that is, and the con-trast between him in his unchanging char-acter, and everything else, which is sosubject to alteration and decay.

In the beginning you laid the foun-dations of the earth, and the heav-ens are the work of your hands. Theywill perish, but you remain; they willall wear out like a garment. Likeclothing you will change them andthey will be discarded. But you re-main the same, and your years willnever end (vs. 25-27).

Here the psalmist seems concerned todemonstrate to his readers that they neednot be concerned as they see all that sur-rounds them deteriorating and changing.

God and ChangeMillard Erickson

Millard Erickson is Research Pro-

fessor of Theology at Truett Theological

Seminary in Waco, Texas. Among his nu-

merous writings are Christian Theology,

Introducing Christian Doctrine, and God

in Three Persons: A Contemporary In-

terpretation of the Trinity. This article will

appear as a chapter in Erickson’s for th-

coming God the Father Almighty: A Con-

temporary Exploration of the Divine

Attributes (Baker).

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God is not like this. He remains the same,and he is endless and ageless.

A second passage frequently cited isMalachi 3:6. The context there is God’s dis-pleasure with his people, Israel. They havefailed to live up to their part of the cov-enant that he made with them. He re-minds them, however, that he is faithfulto his covenant, both in terms of blessingas he has done in the past, when that iswhat they deserve, and of judging, whenthat is the proper response to their actions.As he has been in the past, he also is inthe present: “I the LORD do not change.So you, O descendants of Jacob, are notdestroyed.” The emphasis is upon God’sunchanging action in the same situations,but underlying this is the fact that God isconstant in his dealings. While there is notan explicit statement about metaphysicalchange and immutability, there is someimplication that this is the basis of the be-havioral consistency.

The final passage for our considerationis from the New Testament book of James:“Every good and perfect gift is fromabove, coming down from the Father ofthe heavenly lights, who does not changelike shifting shadows” (1:17). James is at-tempting to encourage his readers bypointing out that all good things comeoriginally from God. These good gifts canbe expected to continue to come and tobe good, because the Father’s characterdoes not change at all. Of the three pas-sages, this one seems to be the most di-rectly addressing the issue of theconstancy of God’s being, in terms of notundergoing alteration.

B. Philosophical

The other source from which the doc-trine of God’s immutability derives isphilosophy. As we noted, the earliest re-

corded philosophical treatises which wehave are from Greek philosophy, wherethere was early debate over whether real-ity was fundamentally fixed and perma-nent or changing and temporary. Theeventual solution was to divide realityinto two parts, one of which was chang-ing, and the other unchanging. This un-changing component frequently played arole in the Greek philosopher ’smetaphysic comparable to that of God ina theistic view.

The two major types of Greek philoso-phy, at least during the period of influ-ence upon Christian theology, werePlatonic and Aristotelian. Each had itsown version of immutability of the su-preme principle. The Platonic variety wasfirst, both in terms of the development ofthe philosophy and the period of influenceexerted upon Christian theology.

The major discussion of this specific topicis found in the second book of Plato’s Re-

public, in a dialogue between Socrates andAdeimantus. Socrates notes that all changeof a thing is effected either by that thing it-self, or by something external to it, and thatthe best of things are least liable to bechanged by external influences. This is trueof the influence upon persons of meats anddrinks, upon plants by winds or sun, andupon such manufactured things as furni-ture, houses and garments. Everythingwhich is good is least likely to suffer changefrom without. Since God is in every wayperfect, he cannot be altered by the influ-ence of external things. Might he not, how-ever, asks Socrates, will to change himself?The possibility, however, is more apparentthan real. Since God is perfect, not deficientin any quality, he cannot possibly changefor the better, being already the ultimategood. If he is to undergo change, it must befor the worse. Why, however, would God

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or even a human ever will to change for theworse? Socrates’ conclusion, with whichAdeimantus agrees, is: “Then it is impos-sible that God should ever be willing tochange; being, as is supposed, the fairest andbest that is conceivable, every god remainsabsolutely and forever in his own form.”3

There is a broader feature of Plato’sunderstanding of reality which underliesthis conception of immutability. For us,influenced by modern empirical science,the visible or tangible, the perceptible, ismost real, and the intangible things areless real. Plato understood reality in theexact opposite way. He expounds this inseveral places in his writings, but perhapsnowhere more clearly than in this sameRepublic. He develops the scheme in hisanalogy of the divided line. The lower halfof the line is the visible, and the other half(although the parts are of unequal length)is the intelligible. The lower part is in turndivided into a part composed of images,including shadows, reflections, and thelike, and another part which consists ofthings which we see, and everythinggrowing and made. The upper part of theoverall line consists of invisible but intel-ligible matters. The lower part consists ofideals or forms, such as the absolute tri-angle and square which geometriciansuse. The higher part of this upper part ofthe line is the realm of idea of the good,where, unlike the hypotheses dealt within geometry, one rises above hypotheses.4

The point is that the objects in the lowerrealm, subject to change, are less real thanare the ideas or forms in the upper half ofreality, which are absolute or pure and sodo not change. While there has been muchspeculation among students of Plato as tothe exact relationship in his thought ofGod and of the idea of the Good, it is ap-parent that permanence and fixity are

positively correlated with reality, in hisunderstanding. This analogy of the di-vided line is followed immediately by themyth of the cave. Here, persons are seated,bound from their childhood by chainswhich prevent them from turning andlooking behind them. They can only seethe wall in front of them. Behind them,unseen by them, are persons, movingabout, and behind these, a fire which castsits light upon these figures so that shad-ows of them and their movements are caston the wall in front of the prisoners. See-ing only the shadows and never thatwhich casts the shadows, they believe thatthe shadows are the reality. Actually, how-ever, the shadows are inadequate repre-sentations of the real characters behindthem. Again, the visible and the chang-ing are less real than that of which theyare images, and especially than the firewhose illumination makes it possible tosee the shadows.5

Aristotle’s approach to the matter is asdifferent from that of Plato as is his gen-eral metaphysic from Plato’s. Aristotleworked with a scheme in which potenti-ality and actuality were of great impor-tance to understanding change. Changeis from potentiality to actuality, whensomething becomes actually that which itis only potentially. He established,through his argument from motion, thatfor any motion to take place, there mustbe some unmoved mover. Change of thetype that we term motion is understoodin terms of potentiality and actuality, forsomething can only move when it is ca-pable of being elsewhere than where itpreviously was. God is immovable be-cause he is not potentially somewhereother than where he is. This is also true ofother types of change besides motion.God, being fully actual, cannot change,

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because he has no potentiality not alreadyfully realized.6

The philosophical arguments regard-ing the changelessness of God have alsobeen developed more recently. Three ofthese are quite closely related. Each pre-supposes the basic doctrines of the cre-ation and providence worked by God. Theargument advanced then becomes almosta practical one: such a view of God can-not be maintained unless he is changeless.In other words, the argument is that cer-tain activities of God, such as creation andprovidence, are inconsistent with the ideaof change in him.

P. T. Geach has raised the question ofthe changelessness of God as it bears uponthe question of origins, both of himself andof other things. He contends that the ques-tion “Who made God?” does not apply toa changeless God. Such would presumablyhave always been as he is now. If, however,God changes, then he is one among themany beings in the world. Even if it werepossible to think of such a God as causingeverything else, which he does not believeit is possible to think consistently, he wouldstill, like all other changing things, have tobe caused. He says, “So I dismiss any ‘re-thinking’ of God’s changelessness; it canlead only to an alien and incoherent viewof the Divine.”7

A somewhat similar argument has beenadvanced by Keith Ward. He contendsthat divine changelessness is essential todivine providence, considered especiallyas preservation. If God is subject tochange, then he might cease to be, or tobe the sustaining ground of the world.Thus we have a guarantee of the stability,regularity and ordered continuity of tem-poral change only if there is a changelessGod. The problem arises both on a theo-retical and a practical basis. If God is

changing, then he is not the God of pres-ervation and providence. And if there isno such guarantor of the change in theworld, we cannot really relate to the worldon the basis of such expectations.8

A final philosophical argument for im-mutability has been advanced by Geach.He contends that the confidence in Godand his promises that Christians have canonly be experienced and justified on thebasis of the immutability of God. Thisguarantees that God can and will fulfillhis promises. If this is not the case, thenChristianity as it has ordinarily been un-derstood is destroyed.9

To summarize the several philosophi-cal arguments:

1) Because God is perfect, he cannotchange, because all change is either in-crease or decrease, improvement or de-cline, and perfection can neither beimproved upon nor lost.

2) Because God is pure actuality, there canbe no change in him, for all change is actu-alization of potentialities which are present.

3) If God could change, he would notbe uncaused, and therefore could not bethe cause of anything else either.

4) If God could change, we could nothave confidence in his preserving allthings that are, since his ability to do somight decline or alter.

5) If God could change we could nothave confidence in him to keep his prom-ises, thus losing an essential componentof Christianity.

Definitions of ChangeThere are many different definitions of

change or varieties of change. It is helpfulto look briefly at these varieties.

1) There is change that might be calleddecline or deterioration. This is the loss, ei-ther partially or entirely, of positive quali-

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ties, or the acquisition of negative qualities.2) There is change that can be referred

to as growth or improvement. This is theopposite of change of type one above.

3) There is locational change, the move-ment from one place to another.

4) Relational change involves nochange in the thing itself, but in the rela-tionship to another object or person.

5) Temporal change is aging, not in thesense of the deterioration that we usuallyassociate with growing old, but merely asthe accumulation of a great number ofyears in existence.

6) Alteration is qualitative change,modifying the attributes or characteristicsof that which changes. This could, how-ever, be alteration which supplements,rather than contradicts, the qualities al-ready possessed.

7) Reversal is alteration of such a radi-cal nature as to involve actual contradic-tion of qualities previously possessed.

8) Change of mind involves coming tohold different beliefs or attitudes, or mak-ing different decisions than previously.

9) Change of action is a matter of be-having differently, or taking different ac-tion than previously, again either radicallydifferent and contradictory or supplemen-tary and harmonious.

10) Change of knowledge is the acqui-sition of information or truth which onedid not previously possess. It could in-volve displacement either of ignorance orof error.

Which, if any, of these types of changecan be appropriately attributed to God,and which are inconsistent with the con-cept of God or the biblical teaching regard-ing him? And which of these are underdispute in the current discussions?

1) Since God presumably is not spatial

or spatially located, the sense of changeas movement from one place to anotherdoes not apply.

2) Some cases of relational change arereally not changes at all in the subject. Theother, the object to which this subject isrelated, may have changed, thus chang-ing the relationship. So, for example, if Iam taller than my teenage friend and Iremain the same height but he grows tobe taller than I, I am now shorter than he,but this is not really a change in me. To besure, the relationship can change throughmy becoming shorter than before and thusshorter than my friend. It would seem thatchange of the former type can be attrib-uted to God without there really being anychange in him.

3) Change as decline would certainlybe genuine change in God, but this typeof change is scarcely being argued for byany theologians today.

4) Change as increase or growth wouldalso seem to be genuine change. Processtheologians claim that God is changing inthis sense.

5) Temporal change, or aging, is not apossibility if one holds that God is time-lessly eternal. While those who think ofGod as of infinite duration within timemight seem to be able to reconcile this kindof change with their concept of God, thatmay be questionable, since a God who isalready and always has been infinitely oldcould scarcely somehow become older.

6) Alteration, in terms of either the strongor the weak sense, clearly conflicts with themore traditional view of God. It is underdispute at the present time, however.

7) Change of action seems to be clearlytaught by Scripture. For example, Goddelivered the people of Israel fromPharoah at one point in history, and senthis son to the cross at another. Whether

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such actions represent real change or areonly consistent outworkings of one un-changed and unchanging divine nature isdebatable, however. To some extent, theanswer here depends on the conclusionto the next variety below.

8) Change of mind is the issue currentlybeing considerably debated, with not onlyprocess theologians but also free will the-ists claiming that God changes his mindand plan, often in response to the actionsof human beings.

9) Change of knowledge, coming toknow something he did not know beforewould seem to be change in God, enlargingwhat he possessed within himself previ-ously. This is also currently under dispute.

Arguments Against ImmutabilityOne argument being advanced most

vigorously is the contention that the bib-lical description of God is of a being whochanges, in his attitudes, his decisions,and his actions.

A. Repentance passages. The first of theseis Exodus 32:12. There Moses implores Godto change his mind and his actions, not al-lowing his people to perish at the hands ofthe Egyptians. He says to Jehovah, “Whyshould the Egyptians say, ‘It was with evilintent that he brought them out, to kill themin the mountains and to wipe them off theface of the earth’? Turn from your fierceanger; relent and do not bring disaster onyour people.” Moses certainly seemed tothink God capable of changing his commit-ment to a course of action which presum-ably he had decided upon.

Another significant instance is found inJeremiah 26, where the possibility of Godchanging his mind is mentioned. So Jeho-vah says to Jeremiah, “This is what theLORD says: ‘Stand in the courtyard of the

LORD’s house and speak to all the peopleof the towns of Judah who come to wor-ship in the house of the LORD. Tell themeverything I command you; do not omit aword. Perhaps they will listen and each willturn from his evil way. Then I will relentand not bring on them the disaster I wasplanning because of the evil they havedone’” (vv. 2, 3). This sounds like a cleardeclaration that God intends to bring judg-ment, but that he will change his mind, orliterally repent, of that action. WhenJeremiah goes to preach to the people, herepeats the message, and says the samething about God that he has said of him-self: “Then Jeremiah said to all the officialsand all the people: ‘The LORD sent me toprophesy against this house and this cityall the things you have heard. Now reformyour ways and your actions and obey theLORD your God. Then the LORD will re-lent and not bring the disaster he has pro-nounced against you’” (vv. 12, 13).

A final example of God’s repenting ofjudgment that he plans to bring is the caseof Nineveh. The message which Jehovahgave Jonah to preach in Nineveh andwhich he finally did preach was a categori-cal statement of judgment: “On the firstday, Jonah started into the city. He pro-claimed: ‘Forty more days and Ninevehwill be overturned’ (Jon. 3:4). When theking heard the message, he commandedeveryone to turn from their wicked ways,and to show their repentance through theuse of sackcloth and ashes, for he reasoned:‘Who knows? God may yet relent and withcompassion turn from his fierce anger sothat we will not perish”’ (v. 9). This indeedproved to be the case: “When God sawwhat they did and how they turned fromtheir evil ways, he had compassion and didnot bring upon them the destruction he hadthreatened” (v. 10).

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Nor is God’s change of mind restrictedto repenting of evil that he has purposedto do. The opposite change also takesplace. In Genesis 6, God comes to regrethaving created humans, and resolves tonegate his creative action by wiping outwicked persons. The Scripture writer re-ports, “The LORD saw how great man’swickedness on the earth had become, andthat every inclination of the thoughts ofhis heart was only evil all the time. TheLORD was grieved that he had made manon the earth, and his heart was filled withpain. So the LORD said, ‘I will wipe man-kind, whom I have created, from the faceof the earth—men and animals, and crea-tures that move along the ground, andbirds of the air— for I am grieved that Ihave made them’” (Gen. 6:5-7). This ap-pears to be a clear indication of God re-versing his plan and doing what negates,at least with respect to some persons, hisearlier life-giving endeavor.

Upon their surface, these passagesseem clearly to indicate a change of mindon God’s part. Certainly, such a God mustbe subject to change, at least in terms ofattitude, will, and intention, resulting inchange of action from what he has alreadydone and indicated he was about to do.Thus, for example, Richard Rice takesthese passages quite literally.

The biblical descriptions of divinerepentance combine elements ofemotion and decision to provide astriking picture of the divine reality.They indicate that God is intimatelyinvolved in human affairs and thatthe course of human events has pro-found effects on him. . .God workstoward his objectives in history indynamic interaction with humanbeings. Their experiences and deci-sions affect his experiences and de-cisions. So important is the notionof divine repentance in biblicalthought that it deserves to be re-

garded as one of the central themesof Scripture. It represents ‘an impor-tant interpretive vehicle for under-standing the divine activitythroughout the canon.’10

Rice does not think this a problem inlight of the sovereign nature of God, or acontradiction of his nature. Rather thanbeing isolated incidents, the accounts ofdivine repentance are actually character-istic of God. He repents, not despite thefact that he is God, but because he is God.It is his very nature to repent, or to relentof action he had planned to take, in lightof human action and reaction. Rice findsrepentance, or a willingness to turn fromhis determinations and actions, a defin-ing characteristic of God, as found in listsof such qualities in Exodus 34:6-7; Jonah4:2; and Joel 2:13.11

We cannot conclude our considerationof the question of divine repentance orchange of mind at this point, however. Foranother set of texts seems to indicate thatGod does not, and indeed, cannot, repent,or change his mind. One of these is Num-bers 23:18-20: “Then he uttered his oracle:‘Arise, Balak, and listen; hear me, son ofZippor. God is not a man, that he shouldlie, nor a son of man, that he shouldchange his mind. Does he speak and thennot act? Does he promise and not fulfill? Ihave received a command to bless; he hasblessed, and I cannot change it.’” A sec-ond is quite similar, in 1 Samuel 15:28-29:“Samuel said to him, ‘The LORD has tornthe kingdom of Israel from you today andhas given it to one of your neighbors—toone better than you. He who is the Gloryof Israel does not lie or change his mind;for he is not a man, that he should changehis mind.’”

Rice recognizes the difficulty of thesetwo passages, but maintains that they do

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not ultimately teach the traditional doc-trine of divine immutability, or mean thatGod does not and cannot change his mind.He negates such an interpretation of thesepassages on four considerations:

1) Repent is used here as a synonymfor “lie.” Thus, the passages are not de-nying that God changes his mind, butrather, that he never deliberately says hewill do something while fully intendingto do something different.

2) These statements pertain to specificpromises of what God intends to do. Theydo not declare general principles.

3) The assurance that God does not re-pent in these specific circumstances presup-poses the general possibility that he does orcan repent. It is not that God will not repentin such cases because he cannot, but becausehe does not choose to do so.

4) One of the very chapters (l Sam. 15)that affirm that God does not repent actu-ally says twice that he does repent (v. l 1,35). “So,” says Rice, “the scope of this de-nial obviously is very limited. It is not astatement of general principle.”12

Is this rebuttal of contradictory passagessuccessful, however? Although Rice makesa point of asserting that there are only twosuch passages, compared with more thanforty that say that God does repent, he hasnot taken into consideration all of the perti-nent passages. While counting every con-ceivable passage that asserts that Godrepents, he has disregarded several otherpassages on the other side. Two of these re-fer to God’s resolve with respect toMelchizedek: “The LORD has sworn andwill not change his mind: ‘You are a priestforever, in the order of Melchizedek’” (Ps110:4); “Others became priests without anyoath, but he became a priest with an oathwhen God said to him: ‘The Lord has swornand will not change his mind: ‘You are a

priest forever’” (He 7:20b-21). Another pas-sage affirming the unchanging purpose andcommitment of God is found in Jeremiah4:27, 28: “This is what the LORD says: ‘Thewhole land will be ruined, though I will notdestroy it completely. Therefore the earthwill mourn and the heavens above growdark, because I have spoken and will notrelent, I have decided and will not turnback.’” Finally, Ezekiel delivers a similarmessage to Israel: “‘I the LORD have spo-ken. The time has come for me to act. I willnot hold back; I will not have pity, nor will Irelent. You will be judged according to yourconduct and your actions,’ declares the Sov-ereign LORD” (24: 14).

Interestingly, these passages seem moresusceptible to the interpretation Riceplaces upon the other two, namely, thatthey could refer to God’s particular pur-pose and action in these specific cases.That is less the case with the passages thathe does treat, however. There the fact thatGod will not repent is tied to the fact thathe is God, not a human. What he does ordoes not do is a result of who and whathe is. The statements contradict Rice’s in-terpretation. One of the principles for de-termining whether a particular orsituational statement is to be understoodas universal or as only applying to thatsituation is whether the statement is madedependent upon or is supported by a uni-versal or doctrinal statement. Here, thatis indeed the case. God’s action derivesfrom who and what he is.

Rice’s first point also deserves somescrutiny. He does not support his conten-tion with any discussion of the Hebrewwords involved. Interestingly, the linguis-tic data do not support his contention ofsynonymity. In each of the cases (Nu 23:19and two occurrences in 1 Sa 15:29), theword for repent is the common one, naham.

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This basically means “to be sorry, to con-sole oneself,” and is an onomatopoeticword used to mean “to breathe pantingly,of a horse.” In the hithpael, as here, it means,“rue, repent of.”13 In the former case, theword translated “lie” is kazov, which meansbasically, “to lie, to tell a lie, to disappointor fail.”14 In the Samuel passage, the wordtranslated “lie” is shakar, which means, “todo or deal falsely.” Linguistically, naham

scarcely can be considered a synonym ofeither of these words. It may be that Rice isclaiming that there is Hebrew parallelismin Numbers 23:19, so that the two state-ments are equivalent, but he does not saythat, and this does not really seem to bepoetry. Of further interest in 1 Samuel 15:29is the word natzach which can mean either“pre-eminent” or “enduring.” Many trans-lators and commentators, basing their in-terpretation upon a cognate meaning of“illustrious” or “pre-eminent” in Aramaicrather than that of “pure” or “reliable” or“innocent” in Arabic and Ethiopic, trans-late this as “the glory of Israel.” Brown,Driver, Briggs also indicate that the wordmeans “enduring, everlastingness, perpe-tuity,”15 and Keil and Delitzsch believe thatin the context, the idea of “permanence”and “unchangeableness” make the bestsense. They say the word

signifies constancy, endurance, thenconfidence, trust, because a man cantrust in what is constant. This mean-ing is to be retained here, where theword is used as a name for God, andnot the meaning gloria, which is takenin 1 Chron. xxix.11 from the Aramaeanusage of speech, and would bealtogether unsuitable here, wherethe context suggests the idea ofunchangeableness. For a man’s repen-tance or regret arises from his change-ableness, from the fluctuations in hisdesires and actions. This is never thecase with God; consequently He is theunchangeable One, in whom Israel can

trust, since He does not lie or deceive, orrepent of His purposes.16

On the basis of all these considerations,we must judge Rice’s second point inad-equate. Rice’s third point is also question-able. He affirms that the statement thatGod will not repent assumes the generalpoint that God does or can repent. Thatdoes not seem to follow, however. Theassumption or hidden premise is that, “IfGod promises that he will not repent in agiven case, that means that he can or doesat times.” What is the evidence for thiscontention? It would seem equally pos-sible that God is simply affirming that hehas not changed, and just as he does notrepent or alter his behavior, he has not andwill not here. This is given as a practicalencouragement, not a technical theologi-cal statement. Finally, what of Rice’s con-tention that 1 Samuel 15, which containsthe statement in verse 29 that God doesnot repent, actually includes two state-ments (vs. 11, 35) that God did repent? In-terestingly, Rice does not wrestle with theapparent contradiction. Logically, at leastthree possible interpretations of this phe-nomenon could be offered:

1) The statements in verses 11, 35 andthat in verse 29 simply are in contradic-tion and must be understood as such.

2) The statement in verse 29 must beinterpreted in light of those in verses 11and 35.

3) The statements in verses 11 and 35are to be interpreted in light of verse 28.

It would seem, in light of the consider-ation offered earlier, that the narrativestatements (about what God did) shouldprobably be interpreted in light of thedoctrinal statement about what and whoGod is. In any event, Rice’s sliding pastthe issue is disturbing. It should be noted

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that the major sources cited in support ofhis view are not persons usually identi-fied as evangelicals (Fretheim andKnight). Non-evangelicals do not neces-sarily feel a responsibility to reconcile bib-lical statements. Perhaps non-evangelicalassumptions about the nature of biblicalauthority have crept in, or perhaps Riceis not conscious of or forthright about hisbiblical presuppositions.

What needs to be asked, however, iswhether this rather literal approach to thediscussion of the divine willing and act-ing is carried through consistently, or whatwould be the results were we to do so.There are certain statements made inScripture about God which, if taken liter-ally, would produce some interesting re-sults for the doctrine of God. For example,there is the statement by Jehovah inDeuteronomy 5:9, 10, “for I, the LORDyour God, am a jealous God, punishingthe children for the sin of the fathers tothe third and fourth generation of thosewho hate me, but showing love to a thou-sand generations of those who love meand keep my commandments.” Or takeMalachi’s statement, attributed to God:“Yet I have loved Jacob, but Esau I havehated, and I have turned his mountainsinto a wasteland and left his inheritanceto the desert jackals” (1:2b-3), and re-peated by Paul: “Just as it is written: ‘JacobI loved, but Esau I hated’” (Ro 9:13). Whatwould be the effect upon the doctrine ofGod of interpreting these passages withthe same literalistic hermeneutic em-ployed on the repentance passages? Inter-estingly, Rice does not mention such data.

Is there a better way of understandingthese statements about God’s repentance?What if we look upon those promises andwarnings as being conditional in nature,so that the comprehensive form of state-

ment would be: “I will reward obedienceand righteousness, and condemn or pun-ish disobedience and unrighteousness.”Then, when God moves from promise topunishment, it is not because he has in anyway deviated from his original intention,but that the recipients of those pronounce-ments have changed. This means that thechanges to be found in God in these casesare actually relational changes. God is re-lated differently to these persons than hehad been, but not because he has changed,rather, it is they who have changed. Rela-tional change, however, is considered bymost philosophers not to be real changein the subject concerned.

To be sure, there are difficulties for theposition we have outlined. One wouldwish, on this view, that there were not thedirect statements that picture God aschanging and repenting. One must, how-ever, attempt to account for all of the rel-evant data, not simply those which fitone’s theory. This view is able to take intoaccount more of the data, with less dis-tortion and greater consistency, than is thealternative view.

B. Knowledge passages. Several passagesseem to indicate that God has discoveredsomething that he did not know. For ex-ample, after testing Abraham in connec-tion with the command to offer his sonIsaac as a sacrifice, God says to him, “‘Donot lay a hand on the boy,’ he said. ‘Donot do anything to him. Now I know thatyou fear God, because you have not with-held from me your son, your only son’”(Gen. 22:12). The clear impression onewould get if coming to this passage with-out any other antecedent conception ofGod is that God needed this test to deter-mine what Abraham would do, since hedid not already have that information.

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Much of this consideration will be ex-amined in our discussion of omniscience,especially as it concerns foreknowledge.Here we must ask ourselves whetheromniscience really is compatible withimmutability. Norman Kretzmann hasargued that these two are mutually con-tradictory. For if God is omniscient, heknows all things. In a changing world,therefore, God’s knowledge changes. Andto know the changing, to have one’sknowledge change, is to change oneself.17

To be sure, God knows something dif-ferent today than he did yesterday,namely, what is happening currently. Totake a variation on a motif employed byvarious philosophers, God does not si-multaneously know, “Richard Nixon ispresident of the United States,” and “Ri-chard Nixon is not president of the UnitedStates.” Since God knows truth and makesno errors in his knowledge, he knows thefirst statement from noon on Monday,January 20, 1969 to noon on Friday, Au-gust 9, 1974. Before and after those timeshe knows the second statement. Does thismean then that he has changed?

Suppose, however, that God has al-ways known, and perhaps has always in-tended, that Richard Nixon would bepresident during this period of time. If thisis the case, then he has always known,“Richard Nixon will be president of theUnited States from January, 1969 (reck-oned on the Gregorian calendar) to Au-gust, 1974.” He also, presumably knowswhat time it is on earth, i.e., what is cur-rently occurring there. Thus, at a giventime, he knows, “it is now exactly 12:34:56EST, July 22, 1937;” “it is now exactly16:32:19, MST, November 4, 1962;” etc. Atthe moment of this writing, he knows “itis now exactly 15:14:31, CDT, July 16,1996.” He also knows that it is true that

“Erickson is typing at his computer key-board while looking out the window atthe lake.” But the content of his knowl-edge has not really changed. It appearsthat what has changed is something ex-ternal to God, and he is conscious of that.This is, in other words, not greatly differ-ent from relational change.18

This observation grows out of P. T.Geach’s discussion of what he has calledthe “Cambridge criterion,” because it fre-quently occurs in discussions by Cam-bridge philosophers. According to thiscriterion, something changes if some predi-cate applies to it at one time and not an-other. He notes, however, that somethingmay have a change of attributes withoutitself having really changed in the usualsense of the word.19 Thus, as Swinburneillustrates, Socrates may at one time bethought about by Smith and at anothertime not be thought about by Smith, butwithout Socrates really having changed.20

How does this analysis apply to thecurrent question, however? When Godknows something about someone and thatperson changes, is it not God whochanges, just as in the preceding referenceSmith changes, as the knower, butSocrates does not? Yet a little closer exami-nation may negate this supposition. Foralthough God now knows that Smith isso and so, he has always known that thiswould be the case. In a sense, the contentof God’s knowledge has not changed, onlythe tense of the verb.

What, however, of the question ofchanges in God’s action, so that he doessomething at one time different than whathe does at another? How are we to regardthis? Does this not indicate some changein God? For example, at one point Godlooks with apparent favor upon his chil-dren, the people of Israel, and delivers

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them from the injustice and oppression atthe hands of Egypt. Then, after theirlong-standing indifference, disobedience,and even rebellion, Jehovah allowed themto be taken captive and carried off into aforeign land. When, however, there hadbeen a sufficient period of this experience,God intervened to bring his people backfrom this captivity. Obviously, these weredifferent actions by the same God at dif-ferent times. Can we in some appropriatefashion argue that God has changed be-cause he is acting differently?

One who thinks so is Steven Davis. Henotes that the God revealed in Scripturedoes change in some ways. There are ob-vious cases in which he is at one pointangry with someone who has sinned, andthen at a later point forgives the person,who has repented. He maintains that thisshould be considered change, but that itis not significant to the doctrine of immu-tability, as biblically maintained. It is onlyincompatible with the strong notion ofimmutability, of God who does not changeat all. He believes that the classical doc-trine of immutability was designed to pro-tect belief in a God who was faithful inkeeping his promises, who did not act ar-bitrarily or capriciously. That faith can bemaintained while allowing the sort ofchange we have spoken of here.

One way of responding to this questionwould be to frame it in terms of the ques-tion posed by Plantinga, “Does God havea nature?” If he does, then one possible re-sponse would be to say that God’s actionschange, but that what he is, as contrastedwith what he does, does not change. Thereis another way of approaching the ques-tion, however. That is in terms of what itactually means to act. What if God has,from all eternity, chosen to take a certainaction? If, then, the working out of this

within time takes different forms at differ-ent points, can we say that there has beena change in God? Richard Swinburne con-siders this possibility and feels that such aconception would indeed solve this prob-lem, but at a high cost. He comments:

This difficulty could be avoided ifone said that all that God bringsabout he has chosen ‘from all eter-nity’ to bring about. The effects (e.g.the fall of Jerusalem, the fall ofBabylon) which God brings aboutoccur at particular times (587 B. C.and 538 B. C. respectively). Yet Godhas always meant them to occur atthose times—i.e. there was no timeat which God did not intend Jerusa-lem to fall in 587 B.C. When 587 B.C. arrived there was no change inGod—the arrival of the moment putinto effect the intention which Godalways had. This view would needto be made more sophisticated todeal with the suggestion that God’sbringing out one state of affairs, sayA, rather than another, say B, wasdue to his reaction to the behaviourof men (e.g. men may have behavedbadly and so God gave themdrought instead of rain). The viewin question would have to claim thatin such circumstances ‘from all eter-nity’ God had intended thatA-occur-if-men did so-and-so andB-occur-if-men did such-and-such.21

Swinburne does not consider this anattractive solution, however, for it createsmore problems than it solves. Such a Godwould be, he maintains, a very lifelessthing. He would not be a person who “re-acts to men with sympathy or anger, par-don or chastening because he chooses tothere and then.” Yet such a person, hefeels, is the kind of God found in the OldTestament, which is the foundation of Ju-daism, Islam, and Christianity.22

It would appear that performing dif-ferent actions at different times is not anindication of change in a person. Humanbeings do different things at different

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times and in different situations, but with-out being thought to have changed. It isonly if a person acts in a way inconsistentwith the earlier actions, or acts so differ-ently that the whole pattern or tenor ofthe person’s life appears changed, that wespeak of the person as having changed.

Can this be said of Jehovah? Is it notrather the case that God’s actions through-out the span of redemptive history areconsistent with, and indeed are the un-folding of, the basic pattern he has re-vealed regarding himself from the verybeginning? Examine the giving of the law,for example, where God’s moral charac-ter and expectations of humans are spelledout in some detail. There is the threat ofjudgment upon those who fail to heedGod’s commands, and a promise of mercyand forgiveness for those who refuse.Some have seen a change in the God de-scribed in Scripture from the Old Testa-ment to the New, and Marcion evenposited that there were actually two dif-ferent Gods involved. Yet, there was al-ways provision for the forgiveness of sin,mediated through the sacrificial system.Nor was there a change from salvationbeing by works to salvation by gracethrough faith. Paul seems to make quiteclear in Galatians 3:6-9 that Abraham wasnot saved by his works but by his faith,and presumably this was true of the restof the Old Testament saints as well.

It appears that the strong objection toimmutability has been motivated by a re-action to the Greek philosophical concep-tions of static immobility. That kind ofGod, in the Aristotelian fashion, does notreally act, and because thinking aboutwhat changes would itself entail change,does not really think about anything ex-cept himself. It is this static conception thatis found objectionable. On these grounds,

virtually any action is deemed change,and consequently, action is basically elimi-nated. Both those who hold such a viewof God and those who reject it definechange in such a way that it virtually ex-cludes the idea of any significant activity.

Does immutability require such, how-ever? Is it inconsistent with any action, atall? It appears to me that what we are en-countering here is a confusion of stablewith static. The God we find in Scriptureis not a static being, as is Aristotle’s God.He is rather an active, dynamic being, atwork in the world. This dynamic activity,however, is stable, not unstable. His actionsare in keeping with his fundamental na-ture, with his values, plans, and decisions.A human who acts at one time in one wayand at another time in another way reallycan only be deemed to have changed if oneor the other of these actions is in conflictwith the fundamental values and moralbeliefs of the person. There is nothing tolead us to believe that God acts at any pointin conflict with his nature. Bear in mindthat God is a much more complex beingthan we are, with beliefs, values, and deci-sions which take into account infinite pos-sibilities. His plan will therefore be verycomplex, and may involve a great varietyof activity, as it unfolds.

The bigger issue seems to be the ques-tion of the constancy of God’s nature. IsGod actually changing in his essence,growing, altering what he is? Process the-ology, with its view of God as changing,has basically accepted the presuppositionsof modern dynamic philosophy, and inaddition holds to a rather radically imma-nent view of God. Thus, God participatesin the same change that characterizes therest of reality.

Process theology rather openly ac-knowledges its indebtedness to this mod-

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ern dynamic philosophy. Interestingly,although vehemently (and accurately)disavowing the theology of process theo-logians, the “openness of God” or “freewill theism” school of theologians alsoappear to have adopted the presupposi-tions of modern dynamic philosophicalviews of reality. Repeatedly, they criticizethe traditional view, or classic theism, foradopting the Greek philosophy of a Platoor an Aristotle, but do not ask what philo-sophical view underlies their own theol-ogy. It may well be that modern dynamicor process philosophy is preferable toGreek metaphysics. That, however, iswhat must be debated, rather than sim-ply criticizing the latter view, while giv-ing the impression that their view is notbased upon an alternative philosophy, butis simply the way things are.

ENDNOTES1 Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology

(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) 163-68.2 Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Au-

thority, vol. 5, God Who Stands and

Stays, part one (Waco, TX: Word, 1982)286-94.

3 Plato, The Republic, II: 381.4 Ibid., VI: 509-13.5 Ibid., VII: 514-18.6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII: 5-9 (1071a-

1075a).7 P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1972) 322.8 Keith Ward, The Concept of God (Glasgow:

William Collins, 1977) 153, 155.9 P. T. Geach, Providence and Evil (New York:

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977) 6.10 Richard Rice, “Biblical Support for a

New Perspective,” in Clark Pinnock,Richard Rice, John Sanders, WilliamHasker, and David Basinger, The Open-

ness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Tra-

ditional Understanding of God (DownersGrove, IL.: InterVarsity, 1994) 34. Theclosing quotation is from TerenceFretheim, “The Repentance of God: AKey to Evaluating Old Testament God-Talk,” Horizons in Old Testament Theology

10 (1988) 56.11 Ibid., 30-31.12 Ibid., 33.13 Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles

A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon

of the OT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955)636-37.

14 Ibid., 469.15 Ibid., 663-64.16 C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Biblical Com-

mentary of the Books of Samuel (; rpt. GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1950) 158.

17 Norman Kretzmann, “Omniscience andImmutability,” Philosophy of Religion, ed.William Rowe and William Wainwright(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,1973) 60-70.

18 Cf. P. T. Geach, Providence and Evil, 41.19 Geach, God and the Soul (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) 71f.20 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of

Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977)212-13.

21 Ibid., 214.22 Ibid.