SCHOOL SEGREGATION

DESEGREGATION AND

RE-SEGREGATIONTHE SOUTH IS NOT ALONE!!!!

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SCHOOL SEGREGATIONS, DESEGREGATION AND

RESEGREGATION

Historical Dictionary of School Segregation and Desegregation:

The American Experienceby

JEFFREY A. RAFFEL

Some Thoughts on the U. S. Court System The courts do not work in a political vacuum—

they can be effected by public opinion and community mores

The interpretation of the laws and especially the Constitution is under continuous evolution

Generally it takes a long time for the Supreme Court to reverse a previous court decision

An unusual case occurred in the late 20th century

Title one reversal.pptx

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CHRONOLOGY 1849 November: Massachusetts Supreme Court decides Roberts

v. City of Boston.—Mass. S. C. ruled segregated schools were legal in Mass.

1865 March 3: U.S. War Department establishes the

Freedmen’s Bureau--The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands was established in March 3, 1865 after two years of bitter debate. The Freedmen Bureau, as it was commonly called, was to address all matters concerning refugees and freedmen within the states that were under reconstruction. The Bureau was not appropriated a budget of its own, but was instead commissioned as a subsidiary of the War Department and depended upon it for funds.

POST CIVIL WAR QUESTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES!!!

What do we do with the leaders of the Confederacy?

How do we bring the seceded states back into the union?

What do we do with the confederate army?

WHAT DO WE DO WITH 3.5 MILLION SUDDENLY FREE FORMER SLAVES?

IN 1860 THE U. S. POPULATION WAS 27,300,000. 3.9 MILLION SLAVES, 3.5 MILLION IN THE SECEDED STATES2015 6

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1873 April 14: U.S. Supreme Court decides

Slaughterhouse Cases 83 U.S. 36 (1873). A Louisiana law of 1869 created a state corporation for the

slaughtering of livestock. The corporation was given exclusive power to slaughter livestock, and all other private slaughterhouses were required to close. Independent butchers could use the corporations facilities for a charge, but could not conduct independent operations.

Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion: No. The involuntary servitude claim did not forbid limits on the right to use one's property. The equal protection claim was misplaced since it was established to void laws discriminating against blacks. The due process claim simply imposes the identical requirements on the states as the fifth amendment imposes on the national government

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1875 March 1: President Grant signs the Civil Rights Act of

1875. 1883-October 15: U.S. Supreme Court decides the Civil Rights

Cases 109 U.S. 3 (1893), judging the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional. (8-1 vote)

The Act guaranteed that everyone, regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, was entitled to the same treatment in "public accommodations" (i.e. inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement). It established fines for violations of the act. Opposed in both the North and South.

1883 Court Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite

Associate Justices  Samuel F. Miller Stephen J. FieldJoseph P. BradleyJohn M. HarlanWilliam B. WoodsStanley MatthewsHorace Gray Samuel Blatchford

1896 Court Chief Justice  Melville W. Fuller

Associate Justices  Stephen J. FieldJohn M. HarlanHorace Gray David J. BrewerHenry B. BrownGeorge Shiras, Jr. Edward D. WhiteRufus Peckham

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Plessy v. FergusonThe Supreme Court of the United Sates, 1896163 U.S. 537 Facts:

Louisiana law required rail transportation providers to provide “separate but equal” railway cars for white and colored traveling within the state.

Plessy was one-eighth negro (thus he was a negro by Louisiana Law)—in accordance with Louisiana statutes he was told to move to a railway car for “colored” when entering Louisiana. He refused and was removed, arrested, and jailed in New Orleans.

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Points Of Law Questioned In This Case

State statute requiring separate accommodations for white and colored persons in coaches on railroads

13th and 14th Constitutional Amendments interstate commerce police power denying compensation

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Headnotes: 1. The 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution,

abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, is not violated by a state statute requiring separate accommodations for white and colored persons on railroads.2. A state statute providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races by railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in the state, and the assignment of passengers to the coaches according to their race by conductors does not deprive a colored person of any rights under the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.3. No question of interference with interstate commerce arises under such statute, in a case where the railway company enforcing it is a purely local line, with both its termini within the state.4. A law which requires the separation of the white and colored races in public conveyances is a reasonable exercise of the police power of a state.5. Whether the 2d section of such statute, denying to the passenger compensation in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which he properly belongs, is a valid exercise of the legislative power, this court does not decide.

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“A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races -- a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color -- has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection.”(543)

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“Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.”(544)

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Justice Brown cited Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, where the Massachusetts Supreme Court said Boston could have separate schools by race and that the constitution only required equality before the law.

“It was held that the powers of the committee extended to the establishment  [*545]  of separate schools for children of different ages, sexes and colors, and that they might also establish special schools for poor and neglected children, who have become too old to attend the primary school, and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning, to enable them to enter the ordinary schools. Similar laws have been enacted by Congress under its general power of legislation over the District of Columbia,…”(544-5)

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“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.” (551)

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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting, quoted from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). "The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -- exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race." (556)

In Strauder v West Virginia the Supreme Court struck down a law which bared Negroes from jury service.

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“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in the matter of accommodation for travellers. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. ” (557)

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Plessy set a precedent for de jure segregation in public school and other aspects of public life.

These laws, predominately in the south, were known as Jim Crow Laws.

The Jim Crow era generally dates from the 1890’s when the southern states began to codify racial segregation.

While the remainder of the country was quite segregated, it was generally based upon housing patterns and know as De Facto segregation.

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1899-December 18: U.S. Supreme Court decides Cumming v.

Richmond County Board of Education 175 U.S. 528 (1899) The U. S. Supreme Court upheld the right of

Richmond County Georgia to run high schools only for white students. This upheld the Georgia Supreme Court which had overturned a Georgia District court.

Within two years New Orleans and other southern school systems closed their “colored secondary schools”.

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1908-November 9: U.S. Supreme Court decides Berea College

v. Commonwealth of Kentucky 211 U.S. 45 (1908). U. S. Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law

which prohibited anyone from educating white and colored in the same school, unless done in separate classes, at least 25 miles apart.

The result was to allow states to prohibit integration in private schools as well as public.

The Kentucky statute remained on the books until 1950 when it was amended to allow voluntary integration.

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1915-June 21: NAACP wins its first case before U.S.

Supreme Court; Guinn v. United States 238 U S 347 (1915) decision makes the ‘‘grandfather clause’’ illegal. A grandfather clause said that a person could

be allowed to vote if his grandfather was eligible to vote with out paying “poll taxes” or passing a “literacy test”.

In the Guinn Case the court decided that the grandfather clauses of Maryland and Oklahoma violated the 15th Amendment.

This was the first major federal court victory of the NAACP.

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Gong Lum v Rice 275 U S 78 (1927) A Chinese student was not allowed to go to the

white public school in Bolivar County Mississippi.

The district court ruled the child has a right to go to the school.

The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the ruling.

The U. S. Supreme Court upheld the Mississippi ruling, saying the she should attend a school for ‘colored children’ since there was at least one in every county.

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Missouri ex rel Gaines v Canada 305 U S 337 (1938) The U. S. Supreme Court ruled that if a state

provided professional training for one sector of the population it must do so, within the state, for all to satisfy the “equal protection clause” of the 14th Amendment.

Missouri has allowed provided tuition to out of state schools for “colored law students”.

Sweatt v Painter 339 U S 639 (1950) The U S Supreme Court declared a newly form

Texas law school to be unsatisfactory because it was qualitatively deficient.

This still leaves the “Separate by Equal” concept intact!!!!

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At the time Brown reached the Supreme Court, South Carolina was one of 17 states that required school segregation. South Carolina law required complete segregation.

http://en.wakened.org/wiki/Briggs_v._Elliott

Supreme Ct. 1953Chief Justice  Fred M. VinsonAssociate Justices  Hugo L. Black Stanley Reed Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas Robert H. Jackson Harold Burton Tom C. Clark Sherman MintonReason Disbanded  Fred M. Vinson Died

Supreme Ct. 1954Chief Justice  Earl WarrenAssociate Justices  Hugo L. Black Stanley Reed Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas Robert H. Jackson Harold Burton Tom C. Clark Sherman MintonReason Formed:  Earl Warren Joined 10/4/532015 26

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Brown v. Board of Education of TopekaThe Supreme Court of the United States, 1954347 U. S. 483 (Brown I) Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al.,

on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

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Facts: In each of the four cases involved the plaintiffs,

Negro children, were denied admission to state public schools attended by white children under state laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race.

There were findings below that the Negro and white schools involved had been equalized, or were being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other tangible factors.

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Summary: In an opinion by Warren, Ch. J., the Supreme

Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs, by reason of the segregation complained of, were deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The "separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 41 L Ed 256, 16 S Ct 1138, involving equality in transportation facilities, under which equality of treatment is accorded by providing Negroes and whites substantially equal, though separate, facilities, was held to have no place in the field of public education.

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“In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors.[Footnote 9] Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.” (493)

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“We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.” (493)

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“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. (Emphasis added) Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[Footnote 12]” (495)

Inherently--Existing as an essential constituent or characteristic; intrinsic. (Dictionary.com)

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A QUESTION TO CONSIDER! In all of the cases combined that we know

as “Brown v Board of Education” except the Delaware case, the Federal Circuit Courts upheld segregations!

Why do you think this happened?????

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Brown v. Board of Education of TopekaThe Supreme Court of the United States(1955)349 U.S. 294(Brown II)

In this case the Court ruled on how de jure segregation should be halted.

The judgments below (except that in the Delaware case) are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. (301).(emphasis added)

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The Court has be oft criticized for the use of the phrase “with all deliberate speed” in Brown II.

Many feel that it gave districts a grounds for “dragging their feet” in pursuing desegregation efforts.

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Cooper v Aaron 359 U S 1 (1958) The court ruled that the states were bound by

the court’s decisions and could not ignore them.

Alexander v Holmes County Board of Education 396 U S 19 (1969) The court reversed a Fifth Circuit Court ruling

allowing a delay in abolishing the dual school system in Holmes County Mississippi

It decaled the “with all deliberate speed” doctrine of Brown II to be no longer acceptable.

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Note that the court did not address de facto segregation, only de jure segregation!!!!

Since Brown many attempts have been made to address de facto segregation in education, mostly by actions such as busing.

In the rural south compliance with Brown lead to closing the “traditionally colored schools”. In many cases the administrators of those schools lost jobs or were demoted to teaching positions.

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Some local systems attempted to comply with Brown and were thwarted by state legislatures.

Some schools systems accompanied the desegregation process by segregating schools by gender.

Virginia repealed the compulsory education laws and made it a local option.

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In a classic case, Prince Edward County Virginia closed it schools and the state and county give aid to a system of all white private schools – In GRIFFIN ET AL. v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY ET AL. (1964) 377 U.S. 218, the Supreme court gave the District court jurisdiction to force the reopening of public schools and to stop the issuance of vouchers and taxes to private schools.

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While the Jim Crow Laws were eroded by the cases already discusses, it was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was the “death knell” of Jim Crow.

Historically, while the civil rights movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s was leading to this act, the precipitating event for the passage of this legislation was the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963. This type of legislation had been a center point of his vision of the U. S., however, he had been unable to move it through Congress!!

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SWANN ET AL. v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 402 U.S. 1 1971 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, which

includes the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, had more than 84,000 students in 107 schools in the 1968-1969 school year. Approximately 29% (24,000) of the pupils were Negro, about 14,000 of whom attended 21 schools that were at least 99% Negro. This resulted from a desegregation plan approved by the District Court in 1965, at the commencement of this litigation.

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Burger, Ch. J., expressing the unanimous views of the court, it was held that

(1) in default by school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, the District Court had broad power to fashion a remedy which would assure a unitary school system, and such power was not restricted by public education provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC 2000c(b), 2000c-6);

(2) the District Court's order reassigning teachers in order to achieve faculty desegregation was proper;

(3) although the constitutional command to desegregate schools did not mean that the number of students in every school in every community always had to reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole, the use of racial ratios as a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy was within the District Court's equitable discretion;

(4) in order to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments of students, the District Court could properly take affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones, including pairing or grouping of schools and use of non-compact or noncontiguous zones; and

(5) under the circumstances of the instant case, the District Court's orders requiring additional busing of elementary and secondary school students as a means of school desegregation were within the court's power to provide equitable relief.

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Keyes v Denver School District No. 1 413 U S 189 (1973)

This is the first case where segregation was identified in a district outside of the south.

It was also implied that the district could be subject to relief as in the case of Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) The court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of

1964 required all schools to provide appropriate education, including language appropriate education for those with limited English proficiency.

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Milliken v Bradley I. 418 U S 717 (1974) In Detroit case the Court ruled that busing

across district lines was acceptable only if it could be shown that multiple districted practice racial segregation. (this would, of course have been referring to de facto segregation)

Washington v Davis 426 U S 226 (1976) In a public hiring case the Court ruled that a

test or procedure which led to a disproportionate racial impact is not inherently racially discriminatory. It must be shown that a discriminatory motive was present. This case was based upon hiring for the Washington, D. C. police department.

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MILO SHEFF ET AL. v. WILLIAM A. O'NEILL ET AL.SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT238 Conn. 1; 678 A.2d 1267; 1996

OPINION: PETERS, C. J. The public elementary and high school

students in Hartford suffer daily from the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty, have had on their education.

Federal constitutional law provides no remedy for their plight.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, under the unique provisions of our state constitution, the state, which already plays an active role in managing public schools, must take further measures to relieve the severe handicaps that burden these children's education.

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The issue is as controversial as the stakes are high.

We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford have waited long enough.

The constitutional imperatives contained in article eighth, § 1, n1 and article first, §§ 1 and 20, n2 of our state constitution entitle the plaintiffs to relief.

At the same time, the constitutional imperative of separation of powers persuades us to afford the legislature, with the assistance of the executive branch, the opportunity, in the first instance, to fashion the remedy that will most appropriately respond to the constitutional violations that we have identified.

The judgment of the trial court must, accordingly, be reversed

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Hartford public schools were racially, ethnically and economically isolated and that, as a result, Hartford public school students had not been provided a substantially equal educational opportunity under the state constitution, article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20.

The court clearly recognized that the state had not intentionally segregated racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system.

"Although intended to improve the quality of education and not racially or ethnically motivated, the districting statute that the legislature enacted in 1909, now codified at [General Statutes] § 10-240, is the single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. The districting statute and the resultant school district boundaries have remained virtually unchanged since 1909.

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The districting statute is of critical importance because it establishes town boundaries as the dividing line between all school districts in the state.“

The court further recognized that: "The General Assembly has enacted no legislation that was intended to cause either de jure or de facto segregation.

It enacted the districting statute, not to impose or to foster racial or ethnic isolation, but to improve educational quality for all Connecticut schoolchildren by increasing state involvement in all aspects of public elementary and secondary education.

Moreover, the districting scheme presently furthers the legitimate nonracial interests of permitting considerable local control and accountability in educational matters."

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MILO SHEFF ET AL. v. WILLIAM A O'NEILL ET AL.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD - NEW BRITAIN, AT NEW

BRITAIN

45 Conn. Supp. 630; 733 A.2d 925; 1999• On July 25, 1996, Governor John Rowland issued

Executive  [**927]  Order No. 10, creating the education improvement panel (the panel), which was charged to "explore, identify and report on a broad range of options for reducing racial isolation in our state's public schools, improving teaching and learning, enhancing a sense of community and encouraging parental involvement."

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• Within five months of receiving the final report of the panel, the Connecticut legislature had passed Public Acts 1997, No. 97-290, entitled "An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and Opportunities." This legislation was aimed at reducing racial, ethnic and economic isolation, as well as improving the quality of education throughout the state-with an emphasis on improving urban education.

• The first section of Public Act 97-290 amended General Statutes § 10-4a, the statute which defines the "educational interests of the state," to include the reduction of "racial, ethnic and economic isolation," and to impose a duty on each school district to "provide educational opportunities for its students to interact with students and teachers from other racial, ethnic and economic backgrounds . . . ." n2 The failure of local districts to carry out one or all of the "educational interests of the state," can, as discussed below, result in financial and other sanctions, including the loss of state educational funding. Moreover, the state department of education can initiate litigation to enforce the state's educational interests.

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Interdistrict cooperative programs are school sponsored programs in which students from different school districts participate together in a diverse array of

educational experiences. Interdistrict magnet schools are created by two or more

districts combining their ideas, skills and resources to create a new school centered around a unique or unusual theme, specifically designed to foster both excellence in academics and the reduction of racial, ethnic or economic isolation.

Like magnet schools, charter schools are conceived and implemented by local educators and parents. Charter schools arise from an entrepreneurial approach to providing education and use a unique, autonomous governance structure.

Section 2 of Public Act 97-290 also listed minority staff recruitment as one method whereby schools could attempt to alleviate racial, ethnic and economic isolation.

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Rhetorical Question:

What would happen if Louisiana was required to completely revamp the public education program because of the high failure rate of rural parishes such as Richland and St. Helena and the urban centers such as New Orleans?

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RESOURCES FOR FARTHER STUDY http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/

segregation2.html -- PBS cite on the “Rise and Fall of Jim Crow” – Page is time line in the history of Jim Crow.