I Sentences, Distinction 3, Question 1Concerning Man's Knowledge of God

ARTICULUS PRIMUSUtrum Deus possit cognosci abintellectu creato.

First ArticleWhether God can be known by a created intellect.

Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videturquod Deus non sit cognoscibilis acreato intellectu. Dicit enim Dionysius,cap. I De div. nom., quod Deum necdicere nec intelligere possumus: quodsic probat. Cognitio est tantumexistentium. Sed Deus est supraomnia existentia. Ergo est supracognitionem.

We proceed thus to the first issue. 1. It seems that God isnot knowable by a created intellect. For Dionysius says,in Chapter 1 of On the Divine Names, that we canneither speak about nor understand God, which heproves in this manner. Knowledge pertains only toexisting things. But God is above all existing things. Heis, therefore, above knowledge.

2. Item, Deus plus distat a quolibetexistentium intelligibilium notorumnobis, quam distet intelligibile asensibili. Sed sensus non potestintelligibile cognoscere. Ergo necDeus potest a nostro intellectucognosci.

2. Moreover, God is more distant from any existingintelligible things known by us than an intelligible thingis from a sensible thing. But the senses cannot know anintelligible thing. Therefore, neither can God be knownby our intellect.

3. Item, omnis cognitio est per speciemaliquam, per cujus informationem fitassimilatio cognoscentis ad remcognitam. Sed a Deo non potestabstrahi aliqua species, cum sitsimplicissimus. Ergo non estcognoscibilis.

3. Again, all knowledge arises by means of somespecies through the formation of which an assimilationof the knower to the thing known is produced. But somespecies cannot be abstracted from God, since he is mostsimple. He is, therefore, not knowable.

4. Item, ut dicit Philosophus, III Physic.,omne infinitum est ignotum; cujus ratioest, quia de ratione infiniti est, ut sitextra accipientem secundum aliquidsui, et tale est ignotum. Sed Deus estinfinitus. Ergo est ignotus.

4. Besides, as the Philosopher says in Book 3 of thePhysics, every infinite thing is unknown. The reason forthis is that it belongs to the notion of an infinite thing that,according to something of itself, it is beyond the onereceiving it, and such a thing is unknown. But God isinfinite. He is, therefore, unknown.

5. Item, Philosophus dicit, III De anima,quod ita se habent phantasmata adintellectum, sicut colores ad visum.Sed visus corporalis nihil videt sinecolore. Ergo intellectus noster nihilintelligit sine phantasmate. Cum igiturde Deo non possit formari aliquodphantasma, ut dicitur Isa. XL, 18:Quam imaginem ponetis ei? videturquod non sit cognoscibilis a nostro

5. Furthermore, the Philosopher says, in Book 3 of Onthe Soul, that phantasms are related to an understoodthing just as colors are related to a seen thing. Butbodily vision sees nothing without color. Our intellect,therefore, understands nothing without a phantasm.Since, therefore, some phantasm of God cannot beformed - and thus it is said in Isaiah 40, 18: What imagewill you set up for him? - it seems that he is notknowable by our intellect.

intellectu.Contra, Jerem., IX, 24, dicitur: In hocglorietur qui gloriatur, scire et nosseme. Sed ista non est vana gloria adquam Deus hortatur. Ergo videtur quodpossibile sit Deum cognoscere.

On the contrary, in Jeremiah 9, 24, it is said: Let him whoglories, glory in this, that he knows and has becomeacquainted with me. But that to which God exhorts is notvainglory. It seems, therefore, that it is possible to knowGod.

Item, ut supra dictum est, etiamsecundum Philosophum, X Ethicor.,cap. X, ultimus finis humanae vitae estcontemplatio Dei. Si igitur ad hochomo non posset pertingere, in vanumesset constitutus; quia vanum est,secundum Philosophum, II Phys., quodad aliquem finem est, quem nonincludit; et hoc est inconveniens, utdicitur in psalm. LXXXVIII, 48:Numquid enim vane constituisti eum.

Moreover, as was said above, the contemplation of Godis the ultimate end of human life, according to thePhilosopher in Book 10, Chapter 10 of theNicomachean Ethics. If, therefore, man were not able toattain this, he would have been made in vain. For,according to the Philosopher in Book 2 of the Physics, avain thing is that which exists for the sake of some endthat it does not include. And this is unreasonable, as issaid in Psalm 88, 48: Did you, in fact, make him in vain?

Item, ut dicit Philosophus, III De anima,in hoc differt intelligibile a sensibili,quia sensibile excellens destruitsensum; intelligibile autem maximumnon destruit, sed confortat intellectum.Cum igitur Deus sit maximeintelligibilis quantum in se est; quia estprimum intelligibile, videtur quod anostro intellectu possit intelligi: nonenim impediretur nisi propter suamexcellentiam.

Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in Book 3 of Onthe Soul, an intelligible thing differs from a sensiblething in that an exceedingly strong sensible thingdestroys a sense organ; the greatest intelligible thing,however, does not destroy but strengthens the intellect.Therefore, since God, as he is in himself, is the mostintelligible thing because he is the first intelligible, itseems that he can be understood by our intellect; itwould be hampered, in fact, only on account of hisexcellence.

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum,quod non est hic quaestio, utrum Deusin essentia sua immediate videripossit, hoc enim alterius intentionisest; sed utrum quocumque modocognosci possit. Et ideo dicimus quodDeus cognoscibilis est; non autem itaest cognoscibilis, ut essentia suacomprehendatur. Quia omnecognoscens habet cognitionem de recognita, non per modum rei cognitae,sed per modum cognoscentis. Modusautem nullius creaturae attingit adaltitudinem divinae majestatis. Undeoportet quod a nullo perfectecognoscatur, sicut ipse seipsumcognoscit.

Solution: I respond that it should be said that thequestion here is not whether God can be seenimmediately in his essence - this is, indeed, a differentissue - but whether he can be known in any waywhatsoever. And therefore, we say that God isknowable, however not that he is knowable so that hisessence may be comprehended. For every knower hasknowledge of the thing known, not according to themode of the thing known, but according to the mode ofthe knower. The mode of no creature, however, reachesthe height of the divine majesty. Hence, it is necessarythat God is known perfectly, as he knows himself, by noone.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicutDeus non est hoc modo existens sicut

To the first, therefore, it should be said that as God is notexisting in the same way as existing things, but in him

ista existentia, sed in eo est naturaentitatis eminenter; unde non estomnino expers entitatis; ita etiam nonomnino est expers cognitionis, quincognoscatur; sed non cognoscitur permodum aliorum existentium, quaeintellectu creato comprehendi possunt.

the nature of being is present eminently, it follows thathe is not altogether devoid of the character of being. Heis thus also not altogether immune from knowledge butmay be known. But he is not known according to themanner of other existing things, which can becomprehended by a created intellect.

Ad secundum dicendum, quodquamvis plus distet Deus a quolibetintelligibili, secundum naturaeproprietatem, quam intelligibile asensibili, tamen plus convenit inratione cognoscibilitatis. Omne enimquod est separatum a materia, habetrationem ut cognoscatur sicutintelligibile: quod autem materiale estcognoscitur ut sensibile.

To the second, it should be said that, although God ismore distant from any intelligible thing, according to thequality of nature, than an intelligible thing is from asensible thing, he nonetheless agrees more in theconcept of being able to be known. For every thing thatis separate from matter has a concept so that it may beknown as an intelligible thing; every thing that ismaterial, however, is known as a sensible thing.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod species,per quam fit cognitio, est in potentiacognoscente secundum modum ipsiuscognoscentis: unde eorum quae suntmagis materialia quam intellectus,species est in intellectu simpliciorquam in rebus; et ideo hujusmodidicuntur cognosci per modumabstractionis. Deus autem et angelisunt simpliciores nostro intellectu; etideo species quae in nostro intellectuefficitur, per quam cognoscuntur, estminus simplex. Unde non dicimurcognoscere ea per abstractionem, sedper impressionem ipsorum inintelligentias nostras.

To the third, it should be said that a species by whichknowledge arises exists in potency in the knoweraccording to the mode of the knower himself. Hence, aspecies of the things that are more material than theintellect exists in the intellect in a more simple way thanin things, and for this reason, things of this sort are saidto be known by way of abstraction. God and angels,however, are simpler than our intellect, and for thisreason, a species that is formed in our intellect by whichthey are known is less simple. Hence, we are not said toknow them by abstraction but by an impression of themin our understandings.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod infinitumdicitur dupliciter, scilicet privative etnegative. Infinitum privative est quodsecundum suum genus est natumhabere finem, non habens; et tale, cumsit imperfectum, ex sui imperfectioneperfecte non cognoscitur, sedsecundum quid. Infinitum negativedicitur quod nullo modo finitum est; ethoc est quiddam quod se ad omniaextendit, perfectissimum, non valensab intellectu creato comprehendi, sedtantum attingi.

To the fourth, it should be said that a thing is calledinfinite in two ways, namely, privatively and negatively.In the privative sense, a thing is infinite that, according toits genus, was begotten to have a limit but does notpossess one, and such a thing, since it is imperfect, isnot known perfectly on account of its own imperfectionbut is known in a certain respect. In the negative sense,a thing is called infinite that is limited in no way, and thisis a certain thing that extends itself to all things, the mostperfect thing that cannot be comprehended, but onlytouched, by a created intellect.

Ad quintum dicendum, quodPhilosophus, III De anima, loquitur de

To the fifth, it should be said that, in Book 3 of On theSoul, the Philosopher speaks about the intellect's

cognitione intellectus connaturali nobissecundum statum viae; et hoc modoDeus non cognoscitur a nobis nisi perphantasma, non sui ipsius, sed causatisui per quod in ipsum devenimus. Sedper hoc non removetur quin cognitioaliqua possit esse intellectus, non perviam naturalem nobis, sed altiorem,scilicet per influentiam divini luminisad quam phantasma non estnecessarium.

knowledge that is connatural to us according to thecondition of this life. And in this way, God is known byus only through a phantasm, not a phantasm of himselfbut of an effect of his by which we reach him. But, as aresult of this, the fact that there can be some knowledgeof God in the intellect is not withdrawn - knowledge notby the way natural to us but by a higher way, namely, bythe influence of the divine light for which a phantasm isnot necessary.

Alia concedimus. Tamen ad ultimum,quia concludit, quod Deus etiam nuncmaxime cognoscatur a nobis,respondendum est, quodquodammodo est simile in intellectu etsensu, et quodammodo dissimile. Inhoc enim simile est quod sicut sensusnon potest in id quod non estproportionatum sibi, ita nec intellectus,cum omnis cognitio sit per modumcognoscentis, secundum Boetium, Decons., lib. V, prosa VI, in hoc autemdissimile est quod intelligibileexcellens non corrumpit, sicutexcellens sensibile; unde intellectusnon deficit a cognitione excellentisintelligibilis, quia corrumpatur, sedquia non attingit. Et ideo non perfecteDeum videre potest intellectus creatus.

We concede the other arguments. Nonetheless, to thelast one because it concludes that God may also now beknown by us in the greatest way, it should be stated inreply that there is, in a way, a similarity and, in a way, adissimilarity between the intellect and the senses. Forthere is a similarity in the fact that, just as the sensescannot attain knowledge in relation to that which is notproportionate to them, neither can the intellect, since allknowledge exists through the mode of the knower,according to Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy,Book 5, Prose 6. There is a dissimilarity, however, in thefact that an exceedingly strong intelligible thing does notcorrupt the intellect, as an exceedingly strong sensiblething corrupts the senses. Hence, the intellect does notfail to attain knowledge of an exceedingly strongintelligible thing because it is corrupted, but because itdoes not reach it. And for this reason, a created intellectcannot see God perfectly.

John Laumakis(jlamakis@hilltop.ic.edu)

The Aquinas Translation Project(http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)

I Sentences, Distinction 3, Question 1 Concerning Man's Knowledge of God