Sobre la entrada de inmigrante irregulares en España

8/7/2019 Sobre la entrada de inmigrante irregulares en Espaa

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Documentos CIDOB

Migraciones;17Immigration flows and the management of the EU's southern maritime

borders.

Dirk Godenau, Vicente Manuel Zapata HerndezPaolo Cuttitta

Anna Triandafyllidou, Thanos Maroukis

Gemma Pinyol (ed.)


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ImmIgratIon flows and the management ofthe eU's soUthern marItIme Borders

dik gu*

Vic mu Zp hz**

P Cui***

a tiyiu****t muki*****

g Piy (.)******

December de 2008

*Senior Lecturer of Applied Economics at La Laguna University (Tenerife)and Scientific Coordinator of the Tenerife Immigration Observatory (OBITEN)

** Senior Lecturer of Human Geography at La Laguna University (Tenerife)

and Academic Director of OBITEN

*** Researcher at the Dipartimento studi su Politica,

Diritto e Societ, University of Palermo

**** Senior Researcher Fellow at Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign

Policy (ELIAMEP)

***** Research Fellow at Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy(ELIAMEP)

****** Migrations Programme Coordinator, CIDOB Foundation


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Conens

Introduction

Protecting Borders? Managing Irregular Migration on the EUs

Southern Flank

Gemma Pinyol ............................................................................................. 7

The Case of the Canary Islands (Spain)

A Region of Transit Between Africa and Europe

Dirk Godenau and Vicente Manuel Zapata Hernndez ............................. 13

The Case of the Italian Southern Sea Borders:

Cooperation across the Mediterranean?Paolo Cuttitta ............................................................................................. 45

The Case of the Greek Islands:

The Challenge of Migration at the EUs Southeastern Sea Borders

Anna Triandayllidou and Thanos Maroukis .............................................. 63


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7

Introduction

Protecting borders? Managing Irregular Migrationon the EUs Southern Flank

ge Pinyol

In recent years, irregular migration has become a major political con-cern both at national level and in the European Union scenario. In theEuropean Union countries, politicians have identiied irregular migra-

tion as a problem and have given priority to preventing this phenom-enon in national migration policies and in the development o commonimmigration policy.

The increasing pressure o irregular migration lows on the CanaryIslands, Lampedusa, Malta and the Eastern Greek islands have under-lined the EU countries concerns or the protection o their (and theEUs) external borders. The main purpose o this issue o DocumentosCIDOB Migraciones is to explore how migration lows are managed

along the Southern maritime borders o the European Union and howdebates on human rights and security are dealt with in these scenarios.The dierent contributions do not ocus exclusively on the prevention

(control) o irregular migration, but also on the development o new instru-ments and policies on managing migration lows in these areas. In thissense, dialogue and cooperation with third countries have become impor-tant instruments, and progressively, bilateral agreements with third countries(on readmission and labour lows) have been signed. Furthermore, beyond

them and the management o labour migration, European countries, andespecially the Southern ones, are seeking innovative instruments to linkmigration and development policies and to incorporate into these policiestechnical cooperation with third countries.

In the autumn o 2005, international attention was drawn to Ceutaand Melilla, when organised groups o people, mainly rom Sub-Saharancountries, tried to climb over the ortiied ences o the two Spanish


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Gemma Pinyol

8 Documentos CIDOB, Migraciones

enclaves in North Arica. These events became even more dramatic when

a man was shot by the Moroccan gendarmerie and Morocco started todeport some o the Sub-Saharan nationals to the Morocco-Algeria desertborder. As the route through Morocco became more diicult, irregularmigration lows rom Sub-Saharan Arica started reaching the CanaryIslands by the Cayucos route (boats bigger than pateras that cantravel over longer distances), though it was a longer and more dangerousjourney or those desperately seeking to enter Europe.

The events in Ceuta and Melilla and the 2006 Cayucos crises were

episodes that, similarly, have occurred in the Aegean islands or in the Straito Sicily. Because o the dramatic images and the media attention given tothese events, signiicant segments o EU public opinion believe that irregularmigration in the EU is mainly arriving through the Mediterranean shores.Terms such as invasion; inundated by waves o or massive lows hide theact that irregular migration in the EU area mainly arrives through land bor-ders and airports. To respond to their citizens concerns, EU countries havestrengthened the control o their external borders to prevent and combat

irregular migration. As Maroukis and Triandayllidou note in their contribu-tion, this issue was o top priority prior to the 2004 EU enlargement, butless attention has been paid to the management o the (Southern) maritimeborders. In that sense, 2005-2006 could be viewed as a turning point: therelative increase o irregular lows rom Sub-Saharan Arica and Asia to thesouthern European countries brought the topic to the head o the EUsagenda, and the rest o the European countries became aware that southernborders were also European borders1.

1. It could be said that the year 2005 represented the discovery by the European Union o sub-

Saharan immigration and its impact on their Mediterranean member countries and their

Mediterranean neighbours. Zapata-Barrero, R. and De Witte, N. (2007): The Spanish Go-

vernance o EU borders: Normative Questions. Mediterranean Politics, 12:1, p. 85-90.


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Protecting borders? Managing Irregular Migration on the EUs Southern Flank

9Nmero 17, 2008

But distinctly than beore, the management o the maritime borders

and the prevention o irregular migration have been conceived beyondthe security and control dimension; and in a more cooperative perspec-tive2. In the guidelines already proposed by the European Commissionin its Communication 491 A Strategy on the External Dimension othe Area o Freedom, Security and Justice (October 2005), countrieslike Greece, Italy and Spain are attempting to connect migration issueswith broader areas o cooperation; trying to link migration and oreignpolicies and improving relations with third countries on migration

issues. As Cuttita quotes in his text, over the last decade, Italy has beenoering incentives to North Arican countries in exchange or coopera-tion in the management o irregular migration.

The contributions in this Documentos CIDOB Migracionesanalyse themanagement o Southern Europe maritime borders through three case-studies. Greece, Italy and Spain share some distinct characteristics thatexplain this selection: among others, these three countries have a markedlyborderline geographical position and share a large maritime border with

third countries. On the other hand, comparing the GDP between neigh-bouring countries reveals a notable economic dierence on the two shoreso the Mediterranean Sea. Inequality and an economic dierential couldbe noted in the Morocco-Spain and Tunisia-Italy cases, which explains thepush/pull actors o these migration routes. Finally, the irregular economyhas an important weight in these European countries: it could be deined

2. During its Presidency o the Council in 2002, the Spanish government demonstrated its

intention to bring immigration issues to the top o the EUs agenda and to link migration

management with development aid. The Spanish government proposed to apply sanctions

against countries which reuse to cooperate with the EU in ghting illegal immigration: al-

though the initiative did not prosper, it could be understood as an important step in which

relationships with third countries on migration issues acquired a prominent signicance.


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Gemma Pinyol


as an attraction actor or irregular migrants and could also explain the

importance o smuggling networks crossing their borders. Furthermore,irregular migration lows impact mainly on the insular border regionso these countries, and as Godenau and Zapata point out, these regionsoer certain peculiarities not only regarding their entry but also theirdeparture- in relation to their continental counterparts.

In the Spanish contribution, Godenau and Zapata Hernndez analysethe case o the Canary Islands, paying special attention to the renewedrole o this archipelago as a transit area o Arican migration towards

Europe. The short distance that separates the Canary Islands rom theSub-Saharan region, one o the most impoverished areas in the world,and the archipelagos condition both as Spanish and European border areconsidered in this article, in which authors also analyse the recent inluxo undocumented immigrants who travel by sea and the implications omanaging these human lows.

Paolo Cuttita gives an overview o border management along Italysmaritime borders, and pays special attention to the countrys coopera-

tion with North Arican Mediterranean countries. According to Cuttita,the release o many irregular migrants arriving at Italian coasts have ledto an increasing participation o non-government actors in border man-agement, building up a human rights regime which oers migrants aninstrument to open the gates o Fortress Europe.

In the Greek case, Maroukis and Triandayllidou describe the irregu-lar migration lows towards Greece and the more common (maritime)pathways o these lows, and analyse the dierent instruments designed

to combat the routes o irregular migration, not only in Greece but alsoin the EU scenario. Patrolling the sea borders 24 hoursaday/365 days-a-year using substantial human and technical resources, as well as increas-ing eorts to cooperate with origin/transit countries and externalizingborder control to those countries are some o the approaches discussedin this contribution.


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Protecting borders? Managing Irregular Migration on the EUs Southern Flank

11Nmero 17, 2008

As a Mediterranean odyssey, this Documento CIDOB Migracionesbegins

at the Atlantic Canary archipelago and, through Lampedusa and Sicily,ends at the Aegean islands. To summarise some o the common conclu-sions that arise rom the dierent contributions, it could be said thatmigrations are becoming an important issue that aect internationalrelations mainly, but not only, because o security concerns. In sum,migrations are acquiring major importance or international relationsbecause they are a widespread phenomenon that aects both countrieso origin and destination3. In that sense, the Southern European coun-

tries are privileged actors that could play a key role in promoting a betterand more coordinated management o the EUs sea borders and, at thesame time, in encouraging actions and instruments to promote develop-ment in the countries o origin and transit, within the ramework o auture and comprehensive European immigration policy.

3. As Weiner and Mnz quoted: Our principal argument -perhaps to state the obvious- is

that international migration and reugee movements are oreign policy, not simply do-mestic, issues. Nevertheless, citizens and policymakers are all too oten unaware that i

they want to secure their borders against unwanted population fows, this cannot be done

simply by unilateral decisions to regulate entry (Munz, R. and Weiner, M.: Migrants, Reu-

gees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies Toward Countries o Origin. Berghahn

Books, 1997: p.49).


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13

The Case of the Canary Islands (Spain):

A Region of Transit between Africa and Europe

dirk goenu n Vicene mnuel Zp hernnez

The first day I arrived here on the island of Lanzarote. I came on asmall boat, Im not going to say that Ive suffered much at sea or in theSahara Or something. Two hours. I arrived through Aaiun. There are

people there, as they say, mafia. Pay them and I came with 350 euroslike this Almost 400 euros []. There is no confidence in coming. Ifthey take the money you can get stuck there in the Sahara with no food,no money, nothing. To go back to your country you cant. And there isnobody that can help you for example, I say please I want to go backto my village they dont help you, there is no one, only the Sahrawis,because the Sahrawis are against the Moroccans. I had The one whowas smartest during the journey was me. I didnt pay for the voyage till

I was in the boat. The boat is big: 6 metres and 50. Like that, and 2metres for Well, we got here OK We called it a deadly voyage. Forexample, its not like coming in a ship or a plane, its not something ahundred percent safe. Well I came only to change my future, a futurecause what we have there isnt a future or nothing. There is no work,and to live everyday and think The people think just of leaving.There is no work, if youre going to do something the country doesntlet you. With the mafia we have there as a government The boat left

This article is based on the authors work titled The Canary Islands:Immigration in a Border Region of the Southern European Union, pub-

lished inRevista Poltica y Sociedad (Godenau and Zapata, 2008).


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Dirk Godenau & Vicente Manuel Zapata Hernndez

14 Documentos CIDOB, Migraciones14

me I didnt pay without getting on because I know the mafia, they

take the money from the people and leave them stranded. They haveno heart. These 400 euros, my mother and father dont know what tosell to give me this money, My father sell 4 sheep, goats to give methe money. Were a poor family. He said OK. Im saying this, but yourenever going to change. Youre going to take me for real or youre going totake me on a tour of Morocco, and then come back here. And he said forreal, this boat takes the people 7 times, and nothing ever happens, comeon up. Give me the money and come up. Lie down in the boat. Twelve

hours of water. Well, the island of Lanzarote is near, like from here toLa Gomera, which you can see We were left sleeping in the boat fromtwo oclock in the afternoon till three in the night. At three in the nightwe came in, calmly and peacefully, each one jumps slowly, the peoplechange to good clothes. And everyone walks. I went and looked for atelephone booth and I call someone who gives me his address, listen Imhere on the island, in Lanzarote. And I discovered a danger even greaterthan the sea, that I dont speak the language, or anything, and I speak

two languages, my original language Arabic and French. Because westudy French as a second language.

Account obtained rom a Moroccan immigrant who arrived in theCanary Islands by boat. Extracted rom the interviews o illegal immi-grants conducted as part o a research project titled La inmigracin irregularen Tenerife (Illegal Immigration in Tenerie), sponsored by the TenerieImmigration Observatory between 2004 and 2007.


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The Case o the Canary Islands (Spain)

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Introduction

The establishment o borders between territories has not stopped themobility o persons between them, but it has conerred a renewed signi-icance on them in the contemporary context, in which intense currentsare trying to undermine the multiple obstacles put in place to hampersaid mobility. These clandestine journeys, which involve individuals whohave reed themselves o all documentation so as not to be identiied,and thus taken back to their lands o origin, maniest themselves in vari-

ous border areas across the planet. Some take place in spaces separatedby sea, as is the case o Arica and Europe, where the Mediterranean anda part o the Atlantic set the stage in which a variety o actors move,both to advance and to contain. Hence the renewed interest in the studyo migrations in these singular geographical settings, in which dierentstrategies or managing human lows, especially o an illegal nature,unold.

The Canary Islands are situated in this type o border territory, which

has led to a signiicant change in their migratory model. Movementso arrival as opposed to departure predominate in this new scheme othings, and in this sense, the arrival o undocumented persons hailingrom the Arican continent is acquiring a growing importance. Althoughits repercussions on the overall migratory phenomenon are not yet ogreat consequence, comparatively speaking, its social impact is. This isdue in large part to the way this type o mobility is maniested and to itssigniicance, since it emphasizes the relationship between the archipel-

ago and impoverished regions o the planet. A short distance separatesthis region rom one which has recently experimented extraordinaryeconomic growth, bringing about a high level o prosperity, stemmingrom its comparatively recent incorporation into the European Union.This proximity to one o the planets migratory routes creates a generaleeling o uncertainty.


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This article relects on this renewed role o the Canary Islands in the

migratory relationship between Arica and Europe, ocusing on the bor-der condition o the islands, and their now evident role as transit area.We stress the aspect o the recent inlux o undocumented immigrantswho travel by sea, including these peoples speciic characteristics, andconclude with an analysis o the management o these human lows andtheir implications, emphasizing some unsolved problems in this respect,such as the status o oreign unaccompanied minors.

The analysis is conducted rom the perspective o an insular region

separated rom the rest o the State and without any authority in thearea o border control and management o migratory lows, whichlimits its responsibility to avouring integration processes and provid-ing the newcomers with basic services. This circumstance oten cre-ates conlicts o interest between dierent levels o the administration,both in terms o jurisdiction and competition in the management omigratory lows and their eects. The comparison with other insularregions o Europe is o special interest i we are to better understand

the repercussions illegal immigration has on the current conigurationo its various structures.

Borders and Insular Regions

Borders are social constructs whose objective is the regulation, bothmulti-directional (o capital, goods and people) and bi-directional (oarrivals and departures) o the permeability that connects a system with

the exterior. Migratory policies are a part o this coniguration o bor-ders that deine States. When dealing with migration, national bounda-ries appear as part o a series o intermediate obstacles to the mobilitybetween origin and destination. Their permeability to the movement oindividuals is not always homogenous, since dierent sets o admissionrules usually apply, depending on the migrants characteristics: origin,motivation, training, inancial resources, etc.


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17Nmero 17, 2008

Borders are just one type o barrier and usually tend to be combined

with other means o separation. As such, quite oten political boundariescoincide with physical ones such as seas, rivers or mountain ranges1. As aconsequence, apart rom their purely social permeability -conditioned bythe control exercised on them, transportation inrastructure, the availabilityo crossing points, among other elements- they also oer varying degrees onatural resistance as determined by the possibilities o physically crossingthem. In this sense, a maritime boundary is dierent rom an overland one,even though their administrative unctions might be the same2. I one adds

the possibility o air transport, the concept o a physical boundary becomesthree-dimensional, since people can access points inside territories by air,thus placing the border at every international airport.

The concept o a border regionreers to the proximity o a certain ter-ritory to the outer boundary o a particular geographical entity, be it astate or a group o states sharing political boundaries. This is the case, orinstance, o the Schengen Zone3. The Canary Islands is a border regionstemming rom its position at the southern limit o Spain and, hence,

o the European Union, with a marked proximity to the western coast

1. At the same time, it is these same geographical rictions which have usually infuenced the

evolution and conguration o social spheres by reducing the degree o interchange between

the parts.

2. Carling (2007: 324) argues that controlling maritime boundaries is dierent rom controlling

overland ones, since the rst type requires the control o areas, while the second requiresonly the observance o lines.

3. The Schengen Zone was initially conceived in 1985 and acquired ocial status ten years la-

ter, with the purpose o abolishing border controls and harmonizing the external ones among

the countries party to the accord. The rst ones -Germany, France, Belgium, the Nether-

lands and Luxembourg- over time were joined by almost all Member States o the European

Union, including Spain in 1991.


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o Arica. Actually, in geographical terms, the archipelago belongs to the

Arican continent, and this act is becoming more and more obvious toinhabitants on both sides o the divide4.

The role o borders in the migratory dynamic also constitutes a theme ogrowing importance or relection among social scientists who deal with thegeographic mobility o populations. This process started in the Canaries withthe irst reerences by Domnguez (1992), and continues to this day as parto the study on illegal immigration (Godenau and Zapata, 2005 and 2007).The archipelago has recently become a hot spot as regards the displacements

o undocumented persons. This, in turn, has created a growing interest in theinternational and national press, especially as concerns the inlux o boat peo-ple, the most spectacular maniestation o outsiders arriving at the islands.

Insular border regions oer certain peculiarities in relation to theircontinental counterparts. The overland discontinuity between theinsular region and the outside conditions its accessibility, requiringthat any arrival be by air or sea. The risk proile o a maritime border,and the likelihood o crossing it, is dierent rom that o crossing an

overland border due to the dierent transportation and border controltechnologies necessary in each case. In general terms, a journey made byboat or plane requires greater collective coordination, given the higher costo individual transport. At the same time, group operations are easier todetect and require a suitable complementary inrastructure, like ports andairports, which makes them more visible and controllable.

Concerning migration trajectories, it is not just the entry to insular regionsthat is unique; similar arguments apply to the departure. Immigrants who

desire to access other parts o the European Union by way o the Canariesmust again use maritime or air transportation, and are thus subject to the

4. The minimum distance between the archipelago and continental Arica, about a hundred

kilometres or 53 nautical miles, lies between the eastern coast o the island o Fuerteventura

and the area o Taraya in southern Morocco.


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19Nmero 17, 2008

relevant controls ound in these means o transportation. In this sense, one

might think that the attractiveness o the Canaries as a place o transit is, inprincipal, relatively low, given that it does not oer the advantages o ter-ritorial continuity. This is accentuated even more in the case o some o theminor islands -where some o the undocumented migrants arrive- whichhave even less connectivity, either with the rest o the region or with otherparts o the European continent.

Even so, the last ew years have seen an increase in the number o undocu-mented immigrants arriving by sea rom various points on the Arican coast,

due to the interaction o various actors: a) the reduction o border perme-ability in other areas, like, or instance, the Straits o Gibraltar, motivated bya greater supervisory eort o the European Union and its Member States(Carling, 2007)5; b) the increased collaboration between the EU and Aricanemigration transit countries as concerns prior control o entries to EU ter-ritory (Lpez Sala, 2006: 80), which has contributed to shiting potentialdeparture points to more southerly points on the west coast o Arica; c)the limitations on repatriation causing transers rom the Canaries to the

European continent, which oers immigrants the possibility o being relo-cated to the Peninsula, thus allowing them to move on to their planneddestination once the obligatory detention period ends6; d) the inormationand possibilities o choice available to the immigrants when it comes toassessing and choosing alternative entry points. The services provided by the

5. In 2007, 18,057 undocumented immigrants arrived on Spanish coasts, 53.9% less than theprevious year, o which 30.9% (5,579 people) used the traditional Mediterranean route,

according to inormation provided by the Ministry o the Interior, the remaining 69.1% using

the Canaries.

6. A similar argument is applicable to the unaccompanied oreign minors increasingly present

on rats and shing boats, given the special protection status accorded them, which orders

that they be admitted to reception centres known as CAME.


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intermediaries o illegal migration end once immigrants are taken to their

destination; any diiculties with urther displacements are not their respon-sibility. In this sense, it is likely that oten the smugglersdo not oer reliableinormation to their clients.

The border under consideration here is one which relects one o thegreatest disparities in equality on the planet, a act that is one o the driv-ing orces behind this type o immigration. I we consider developmentindicators, the distance separating the Canaries rom any place o origin othe Arican immigrants who arrive by sea are abysmal, so much so that one

headline in the national press read: Aricas rich neighbour. This is thecase, or instance, o the Republic o Mali, one o the principal countries oorigin in the last ew years, which accounted or 15.8% o the total numbero arrivals by sea to the archipelago between 2004 and 2007. Its socioeco-nomic attributes place it among the poorest territories in the world, with ableak outlook or its approximately 12 million inhabitants.

In act, the Republic o Mali occupies the 173rd place in the 2007Human Development Index (0.380, one o the last countries in the

global list published by the United Nations Development Programme),with a per capita income o 1,033 dollars (26 times lower than Spain), alie expectancy slightly above 50, and a literacy rate o 1 in 4 inhabitants.This situation is not very dierent rom that listed or Mauritania (137thplace in the same list), Senegal (156), Gambia (155), Guinea Bissau(175), Guinea (160), and the Ivory Coast (166), among others, all beingmain countries o origin o the recent Arican immigration lows. Itseems then that the destination o many people rom these countries is

increasingly intertwined with the opportunities they dream o discover-ing in territories such as the Canaries, gateway to Europe, where theyhope to ind alternatives to their present-day predicament, even i thismeans undertaking an adventure with an uncertain outcome.

Following the increased rate o arrivals o undocumented immigrants bysea throughout 2006, which roughly equalled that registered in the years2002-2005, the eort put into augmenting border control in the Atlantic


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21Nmero 17, 2008

has been rising progressively, and with it the probability o early detection o

the vessels beore they arrive at the Canary coast. The growing collaborationbetween Spain and an increasing number o neighbouring Arican countriesto prevent these boats rom sailing has also been making the crossings morediicult7. Consequently, the cost o the West Arica-Canaries route is onthe rise, both or the immigrants and the smugglers, as well as or the Statesinvolved in the deployment o these control methods. It is possible that therecent reduction in the inlux o vessels into the Canaries, coupled with arenewed increase in the Mediterranean, is indicative o the eects o this new

cost-proit balance associated with the alternative entry points.

Dynamics and Characteristics of Mobility

The arrival o undocumented migrants to the Canary coast on boardrickety vessels started in the irst hal o the 1990s8. From January 1994 toDecember 2007, 85,775 people reached the Islands -or attempted to- illegally,using 2,674 vessels, according to inormation provided by the Government

7. The dierent phases o Operation Hera, being run by the European Border Agency

(Frontex) on the Arican Atlantic coast rom Morocco to Gambia, with the participation

o Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, Germany, the UK, Finland, Sweden and Luxembourg,

have accounted or the interception o almost a hundred vessels carrying 8,574 undo-

cumented migrants throughout 2007, according to inormation provided by the Spa-

nish Ministry o the Interior.8. This adventure has been magnicently refected in award-winning publications by journalists

Juan Manuel Pardellas Socas (Hroes de bano, 2004) and Jos Naranjo Noble (Cayucos,

2006). Also, in recent documentaries, such as Europa paraso o espejismo? (2005) and

Dijarama (Bienvenidos) (2008), sponsored by the Spanish NGO Nimba and directed by the

duo Chus Barrera-Alicia Fernndez, as well as Cayuco (2007), directed by Mara Mir and

unded by the European Centre or the Study o Migratory Flows.


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Delegation in the Canaries9. This number considers successul crossings,

since there is little data and much speculation about those expeditions thatare lost at sea, which serves to underscore the human drama involved in thiskind o odyssey10.

Graph 1. Undocumented immigrant arrivals in the Canaries by illegal

points of entry between 1994 and 2007

Source: Government Delegation in the Canaries. Compiled by the authors.

9. These gures are rough estimates since, until now, the progressive availability o inorma-

tion as to the arrival o undocumented immigrants notwithstanding, there does not exist a

centre yet that documents this mobility, resulting in the appearance o dierent numbers

that vary by source and date o inquiry. In preparing this article, the sources were mainly

based on data provided by the Government Delegation in the Canaries, with special thanks

to Marlene Meneses or compiling the required inormation.

10. According to the latest annual report by SOS Racism, during 2007 it was possible to do-cument the death or disappearance o 876 people while trying to reach the Spanish coast,

mostly around the coast o the archipelago (2008: 45). The same source indicates, a year

beore, the high estimate o the Canary government o around 6,000 missing in the stretch

o sea separating the Canaries rom the Arican coast. The Ministry o the Interior, based on

inormation provided by the Civil Guard which runs the Canaries Control Centre, estimates

the number o dead in 2006 at about 1,260.


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23Nmero 17, 2008

The last iteen years have seen a preliminary stage, which lasted until

1997, in which the irst boats arrived sporadically rom the nearestpoints on the Arican coast, and continuing with the sustained increaserom 1998 to 2002, and urther consolidated in the period 2002-2006,which in turn boosted the process o building a basis or more eec-tive border control through the signing o accords with Morocco andMauritania11. The process culminated with the inamous Cayuco Crisis,which took place during the spring and summer o 2006, and which hadits origins in the ormation o alternative southerly routes and the use o

larger vessels, a situation which abated progressively starting in Octobero that same year.

Throughout this period one can observe, or instance, the progressiveincrease in the number o passengersper vessel, a strategy used by theorganizers in order to maximize each voyage12. It is also likely to be theresult o the use o larger vessels constructed out o better material, ish-ing vessels (cayucos) as opposed to rats (pateras), both terms becominglargely generalized in the everyday lexicon o the Canaries. Also o note

is the improvement in the instruments that allow the Canary coast tobe reached with more guarantees and rom urther away: more powerulmotors, modern navigation systems such as GPS, mobile phones, etc.

The improvement in navigation systems relates both to the larger distancesthe expeditions have to cross as well as to dierent strategies or outmanoeu-vring the denser policing presence, structured in layers, which orces many othe boats to sail many nautical miles o the Arican coast, a act which oten

11. One has to take into account that during this period the immigration fow proceeding rom

Morocco decreased substantially, including via legal entry routes.

12. This tendency is in contrast to that detected by Jangle (2007: 305) or the illegal entries to

the European Union rom Eastern Europe, characterized by the progressive reduction in the

size o the groups.


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ends tragically or the immigrants. This sometimes leads to an increase in the

amount o time spent at sea, a act that negatively aects both the physicaland mental state o the immigrants.

Graph 2. Median number of undocumented immigrants per vessel arriving in

the Canaries by illegal points of entry between 1994 and 2007


The low o people is continuous all year round, with a tendency towards agreater concentration o arrivals during the summer months, between Augustand September, when weather conditions are optimal or carrying out thevoyage. The monthly peaks have been changing in recent years, rom October

in 2003 and 2004, to December in 2005, August-September in 2006 andNovember in 2007, a act that demonstrates a search or the best period orthe crossing, and which is driven by the climate-related aspects mentionedabove and the coniguration o the control mechanism. The most intenseepisode was logged in the above mentioned interval o 2006, during whichsome 15,000 undocumented immigrants were caught trying to reach thearchipelago by sea, mainly to the island o Tenerie.


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25Nmero 17, 2008

Graph 3. Monthly average 2004-2007 of the number of undocumented

immigrants arriving in the Canaries by illegal points of entry


Tenerie and Gran Canaria are the main logistical points or handlingthis inlux, namely in the southern ports o Los Cristianos (Arona) andArguinegun (Mogn), to where almost all o the vessels caught in thehigh seas, especially ishing boats, are towed. It is also the destination

or those persons saved at sea by the coast guard. The arrival o boatsremains quite requent in the easterly part o the region, almost alwaysdirected towards Fuerteventura, the insular region with the longest tra-dition and highest igures or this kind o mobility. Some even manageto reach land without being previously detected by the External PatrolService (SIVE, in its Spanish acronym). For these arrivals, the composi-tion in terms o origin is characterized by a higher percentage o peoplerom the Maghreb, mostly Moroccans, while in the more westerly arriv-

als the percentage o those originating rom sub-Saharan Arica, espe-cially Senegal, Gambia and Mali, is greater13.

13. Not all arrivals correspond to the exact choice o island made by the passengers themsel-

ves, since a high percentage o these vessels are intercepted on the high seas and towed to

the nearest port with the proper acilities.


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Now and then there appear on the horizon o the islands what are known

as barcos negreros, or slave ships, shabby, rundown vessels that can transportin their old hulls several hundred immigrants, occasionally also o Asiandescent. They oten await their opportunity to sail north rom the gul oGuinea. In some cases they have been linked to the existence and activity oso-called mother ships, which supposedly approach the islands and disembarktheir passengers onto launches. The most notorious incident o this typeoccurred in 2002, when the reighter No docked in the port o Las Palmasoriginating rom Senegal with 250 sub-Saharan Aricans on board. Ashva, N.

T. Conakry, Fullbeck, M. V. Polarand Ile Dolonne, among others, are all parto the recent history o these voyages to the Canaries. Lately they are beingintercepted en route, and even detained while still at anchor and preparingthe start o their journey.

Increased controls in international waters surrounding the Canarieshave, over a short period o time, changed the impact o the inlux oimmigrants to the dierent islands o the archipelago, with Tenerie andGran Canaria accounting or around two thirds o all detained immi-

grants, as mentioned above. Signiicant measures have been put in placein the Capital islands or controlling the reception, health, documenta-tion, internment, repatriation or transer o the incomers, o particularimportance when handling the arrival o larger vessels, sometimes sev-eral in one day, which can carry well over a hundred people. In somecases they also arrive on the smaller western islands, where the lack oadequate inrastructure and suicient personnel make it more diicultto manage the situation and comply with established protocols.

Usually the majority o the immigrants is comprised o young males,and occasionally women. Speciic statistics, compiled since 2006, showthat women do not even make up 1% o these arrivals. Even so, sometimespregnant women, or mothers with young babies, also make this journey, aact which coners an even greater degree o drama to this migration. Thesame applies to those unaccompanied minors present on nearly every boatand who arrive in small groups in the area, where they have to be housed


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27Nmero 17, 2008

and cared or in keeping with applicable laws. The physical and mental situ-

ation o these people tends to be quite delicate when initial medical care isprovided, especially ollowing a long voyage and/or when the newcomershave had to ace adverse weather conditions. Thus, it is common or thesejourneys to have grave consequences, despite the immigrants being attendedto by increasingly specialized personnel14.

Table 1. Undocumented immigrants arriving in the Canaries by illegal points

of entry between 2004 and 2007

Islands 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % TOTAL %

Gran Canaria 535 6.3 1,399 29.7 5,464 17.2 2,965 25.2 10,363 18.2

Fuerteventura 7,532 88.4 2,239 47.5 2,269 7.1 694 5.9 12,734 22.4

Lanzarote 348 4.1 323 6.8 822 2.6 637 5.4 2,130 3.7

Tenerie 104 1.2 637 13.5 18,275 57.4 5,813 49.5 24,829 43.7

La Gomera 0 0.0 72 1.5 3,138 9.8 244 2.1 3,454 6.1

El Hierro 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,891 5.9 1,262 10.7 3,153 5.5

La Palma 0 0.0 48 1.0 0 0.0 131 1.1 179 0.3

CANARIES 8,519 100 4,718 100 31,859 100 11,746 100 56,842 100


There has been a noted surge in the nationalities o those Aricansmaking the crossing, although most are rom the arc that extendsrom Morocco to Ghana, including the landlocked country o Mali.

The boundary has been shiting south as a consequence o border

14. An increasing number o seminars and courses are being held in the archipelago on the

connection between this kind o immigration and the medical measures required to cope

with it.


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control eorts, resulting in turn rom greater international coopera-

tion and the growing tendency on Spains part to externaliseits bordercontrols15. The direct and shortroutes rom Taraaya (Morocco) and ElAaiun (Western Sahara), still operational but with reduced traic, havebeen partly replaced by the use o much longer and perilous itinerariesoriginating in Nouadibouh (Mauritania), Saint Louis (Senegal) and evenAbidjan (Ivory Coast). Although originally disputed, the impact thatthe FRONTEX orce deployed in the region has had is evident in thereduction o arrivals recorded throughout 2007, causing many people to

insist on the need or its continued existence and on the redoubling oits eorts with more material and human resources.

15. This practice is not exclusive to EU countries and is carried out mainly in Arica, both in

areas o the Maghreb and south o the Sahara, the origin and transit area o the majority

o current undocumented immigrants (Carling, 2007: 322), since the phenomenon is being

observed in other regions o the planet such as the US-Mexico border (Angina Tellez and

Tao Pena, 2007).


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29Nmero 17, 2008

Table 2. Undocumented immigrants by nationality arriving in the Canaries by

illegal points of entry between 2004 and 2007

Nationality 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2004-2007 %

Angola 13 0.3 11 0.0 9 0.1 33 0.1Algeria 37 0.5 4 0.0 3 0.0 44 0.1Benin 2 0.0 5 0.0 12 0.1 19 0.0Burkina Faso 125 1.5 5 0.1 64 0.2 286 2.5 480 0.9Burundi 1 0.0 1 0.0Cape Verde 4 0.1 5 0.0 8 0.1 17 0.0Cameroon 18 0.2 4 0.1 7 0.0 11 0.1 40 0.1Chad 1 0.0 2 0.0 26 0.2 29 0.1Congo (Zaire) 44 0.5 10 0.2 17 0.1 45 0.4 116 0.2Ivory Coast 308 3.7 264 5.7 1,696 5.6 706 6.2 2,974 5.5

Eritrea 1 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0Ethiopia 2 0.0 5 0.0 5 0.0 12 0.0Gabon 15 0.0 27 0.2 42 0.1Gambia 1,654 20.1 1,228 26.5 3,627 12.1 2,245 19.7 8,754 16.1Ghana 363 4.4 201 4.3 189 0.6 393 3.5 1,146 2.1Guinea Bissau 351 4.3 328 7.1 956 3.2 562 4.9 2,197 4.0Guinea 519 6.3 200 4.3 718 2.4 909 8.0 2,346 4.3Eq. Guinea 500 1.7 161 1.4 661 1.2Kenya 2 0.0 3 0.0 5 0.0Liberia 70 0.9 24 0.5 62 0.2 44 0.4 200 0.4Mali 2,830 34.4 1,299 28.0 3,418 11.4 1,042 9.2 8,589 15.8Morocco 902 11.0 784 16.9 1,225 4.1 869 7.6 3,780 7.0Mauritania 187 2.3 65 1.4 186 0.6 414 3.6 852 1.6

Mozambique 1 0.0 1 0.0Niger 100 1.2 6 0.1 71 0.2 131 1.2 308 0.6Nigeria 81 1.0 23 0.5 70 0.2 78 0.7 252 0.5Rwanda 2 0.0 4 0.0 3 0.0 9 0.0Sao Tome 1 0.0 1 0.0Senegal 21 0.3 117 2.5 16,215 53.9 2,683 23.6 19,036 35.1Sierra Leone 54 0.7 27 0.6 78 0.3 65 0.6 224 0.4Somalia 3 0.1 7 0.0 19 0.2 29 0.1South Arica 5 0.0 5 0.0Sudan 219 2.7 14 0.3 31 0.1 46 0.4 310 0.6Tanzania 1 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0Togo 6 0.1 10 0.0 22 0.2 38 0.1Uganda 2 0.0 2 0.0 4 0.0

Zimbabwe 1 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0Others 335 4.1 7 0.2 853 2.8 542 4.8 1,737 3.2TOTAL AFRICA 8,218 100 4,640 100 30,063 100 11,376 100 54,297 100

India 301 100 77 98.7 23 14.6 144 98.6 545 79.9Pakistan 123 78.3 2 1.4 125 18.3Palestine 1 1.3 1 0.1Sri Lanka 11 7.0 11 1.6TOTAL ASIA 301 100 78 100 157 100 146 100 682 100



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Although the intention was to centralize all the access points and to organize

the handling o this inlux o people into the archipelago by locating them inthe places best equipped with the proper acilities, it should be noted that allthe islands receive vessels, albeit in dierent proportions. It had already hap-pened with rat traic, which even reached El Hierro arriving rom the east,and now it is also occurring with the ishing boats, which skirt the Aricancontinent starting in the extreme south beore making a last ditch eort toreach the central and western islands as a result o the route they must ollowso as not to lose their way. This has resulted in Tenerie becoming the main

destination or this journey, judging by the numbers issued or the region bythe Government Delegation.

In summary, ourteen years o inlux o undocumented persons bysea, with various episodes o heightened intensity in the number oarrivals, (which all took place initially on the same beaches or in otheradjacent areas o the coast), have acutely conditioned the vision held bythe Canary society o immigration16. Notwithstanding the igures or the

16. In this respect, it is worth reviewing the document titled Reexiones sobre la actual inmi-

gracin Aricana en Cayucos, written and issued in October 2006 by a group o Canary

University proessors in the ramework o the so-called cayuco crisis (summer 2006), which

involved the arrival o a large number o undocumented immigrants via a new sea route,

more to the south than the traditional routes which linked the neighbouring Arican coast

with the eastern islands o the archipelago. The ten-point document aims to draw attention

to the shit in the public debate over immigration in the Canaries. The documents authors

rearm their stance that the collective perception o immigration tends to be interpreted

more as a threat than as an opportunity, thus causing the prolieration o controversies

and myths, which routinely, and without empirical proo, are associated with other problems

such as unemployment or the quality o basic services like health and education. Thus, citi-

zens and politicians are invited to refect on how the challenges posed by immigration can

be turned into opportunities. The text was published in the Op-ed section o El Pas under

the title Canarias, ante la inmigracin aricana, on Monday, November 13, 2006.


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31Nmero 17, 2008

inal destination o the majority o these individuals, almost always out-

side the archipelago, the ater-eects o this migratory phenomenon arestill evident on a population which has been slowly discovering, throughthe dynamics and characteristics o this mobility, the wide range o di-iculties aced by the Arican continent and which impel these journeysin which the immigrants literally risk their lives.

Managing the Flows and its Implications

The implications o the migration in question are important or thearchipelago, since a complex structure to receive and assist the immi-grants has had to be created. During times o maximum inlux, theestablishments used to process the immigrants proved to be insuicient,as were the internment centres, requiring temporary housing to be pro-vided in old military bases. The debate generated stemming rom thehigh economic cost o this system, coupled with the prejudices arisingrom the extensive use o public services by the newcomers, is becoming

more and more intense in Canary politics, even though the central gov-ernment, under its jurisdiction, has devoted numerous resources to theissue. Such is the case o the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Immigrationbetween the State and the Autonomous Community of the Canaries, whichestablished a und o188.2 million or the period 2005-2007, owhich more than a hal was earmarked, on the one hand, or maritimeassistance and irst aid or immigrants intercepted in Canary waters oron the coast, and on the other, or the ight against clandestine immigra-

tion and to the orderly channelling o migrant lows.The increased inlux o undocumented persons and their access to theislands via a wider array o points has caused a marked increase in the numbero internment centres (CIES) designated to house the immigrants duringtheir stay in the region, according to current regulations which allow or aninternment o up to 40 days. This is currently under review or adoption bythe European Union and its member states. Along these lines, the Hoya Fra


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in Santa Cruz de Tenerie (321 beds) has been added to the irst installations

o Barranco Seco in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (168 beds) and El Matorralin Puerto del Rosario (Fuerteventura, 1,269 beds), which meet the needsresulting rom the inlux in the eastern Canaries. These were the existingresources until 2006, when Fuerteventura was the most aected by the arrivalo undocumented immigrants.

The capacity in place was outstripped in 2006 as a result o the temporaryincrease in the rate o arrivals, which led to the establishment o various cen-tres or the temporary internment o immigrants (CETI), provisional struc-

tures o an interim nature located next to the police station o Las Amricasbeach (Arona, Tenerie), La Isleta in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, La Camellain San Sebastin de La Gomera and Valverde in El Hierro17. The conditionsin all these centres, permanent or temporary, especially during their initialoperations, were questioned by various public and public agencies, their con-cerns about the violation o human rights reaching the international stage.The act that access to these sites is strictly limited or persons or agenciesthat have no connection with their operation has given rise to speculation

and heated debate concerning the conditions in which the immigrants arehoused in these centres.From these centres, and beore the legally stipulated period o deten-

tion is over, most o the immigrants are transerred to those countrieswith which Spain has signed repatriation agreements18, requently utiliz-

17. Currently, a new CETI is being prepared in the old barracks o Las Canteras in the Tenerie

town o San Cristbal de La Laguna, according to inormation rom the Ministry o theInterior, so as to cope with possible uture scenarios.

18. As o early 2008 Spain has repatriation agreements with the Arican countries rom where

the majority o clandestine immigrants arrive to the Canary coast: Senegal, Gambia, Mali,

Morocco, Guinea Bissau, Ghana and Mauritania, as well as with Equatorial Guinea, Algeria

and Cape Verde. Regarding the table listing the largest infux, only Ivory Coast and Guinea

are missing.


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33Nmero 17, 2008

ing charter lights that leave rom Canary airports. Inormation about

repatriation is highly sensitive and tends to be disorganized, since itmainly aects the governments o those countries whose citizens enteredthe country illegally. This was the case, or instance, with the 5,285 repa-triations to Senegal in 2006 during the cayuco crisis, which caused a greatcontroversy in said country between the authorities and the thousandso youngsters who were sent back ater completing the perilous outwardjourney (Ndoye, 2007: 23).

As expected, the number o repatriations has markedly increased in

recent years, being, moreover, one o the reasons that Ministry o theInterior oicials cite as a sign o the success o the control mecha-nisms put in place in an eort to paciy public opinion. Between2004 and 2007, Spain repatriated 370,027 individuals, includingreturns, readmissions and expulsions. O the 50,138 people whotried to enter Spain via illegal entry points in the same period, 92.3%were transerred to their countries o origin, many o them rom theCanaries.

The people who cannot be directly repatriated rom the Canariesare moved to other Autonomous Communities, especially when thenumber o immigrants in the Canaries increases considerably due torecurrent arrivals. Occasionally there is news o immigrants ound invarious parts o the country with a deportation order in hand, ater the40-day period o detention legally permitted had expired without theseimmigrants identiication being possible.

In relation to these movements, one o the questions still let unre-

solved is the arrival o minor undocumented immigrants who, underexisting laws, have to be cared or and housed by the Child ProtectionServices o the Autonomous Community (Asn Cabrera, 2007). This hasresulted in the number o these individuals in speciic housing centres(CAME and CAI) exceeding that originally planned or the Canaries,around 300 places generally distributed between the islands o Tenerieand Gran Canaria. The igure or 2006 was around 1,000 minors, with


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2007 exceeding this number, according to the Autonomous Government,

which had to provide emergency centres and resources (DEAMENAC)to cope with this extreme situation19.

Graph 4. Foreign unaccompanied minors under tutelage in the Canaries

in 2006

Source: Oicial Digest o the Canary Parliament (number 125, 2007: 26).Compiled by the authors.

19. In 2006, the number o unaccompanied and undocumented minor immigrants under the

care o the Canary Government had almost quadrupled, with a signicant increase in the

numbers o those rom sub-Saharan Arica -like Senegal and Mali- arriving by sea, in com-

parison with the traditional but reduced infux o minors rom Morocco by rat. Duringthat year, the CAME and CAI centres were lled to capacity, resulting in the emergency

adaptation o new centres: Agimes and Arucas, in Gran Canaria; Tegueste and El Rosario,

in Tenerie. Some o these housed more than a hundred minors, according to a report

published by the Parliament o the Canaries in its ocial digest o March 2007 (number

125). This pattern o arrivals continued, though to a lesser extent, during 2007 and the rst

months o 2008.


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35Nmero 17, 2008

Although the available resources have increased gradually (especially

on the island o Tenerie, which in 2007 had 550 places), in excess eveno the quantities agreed to by the Island Councils in proportion to theirmeans and to immigration patterns, the constant inlux o minors, everpresent in the arriving vessels - albeit in small numbers -, has exceededthe orecasts made a ew years ago, especially in light o the considerableinlux produced in 2006: 928 minors, 2.9% out o the total number oimmigrants received by sea that year. The number or 2007 was lowerbut its percentage out o the total was higher (459 minors, 3.9%).

The minors usually stay in the Archipelago due to problems with theirrepatriation or transer to other Autonomous Communities. It was pos-sible to relocate about 500 to the Peninsula in 2006 and 2007, in mostcases resulting in the tutelage passing rom the Canary Governmentto the Ministry o Labour and Social Aairs (Ministry o Labour andImmigration ater the ormation o the latest Government in Spain). Aso June 2008, sources rom the Canary Government reported that the28 centres subsidized and run by the Island Councils were housing some

1,200 children20

.

20. The typology o all the available resources intended or minors is ample, and indicativeo how complex it is to manage and cope with this group o immigrants: Aid Centres

or Foreign Unaccompanied Minors (CAME, in Spanish), Emergency Services or Foreign

Unaccompanied Minors (DEAMENAC), Immigrant Processing Centres (CAI), Residences,

Houses, Flats designed to ease the transition to an independent lie, supervised housing,

rehabilitation centres or problem children, centres or disabled minors. A small raction o

the minors are serving time in centres run by the Canary Government.


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Graph 5. Distribution by percentage according to the origin of the foreign

unaccompanied minors under tutelage in the Canaries onDecember 31, 2006

Source: Oicial Digest o the Canary Parliament (number 125, 2007: 26).Compiled by the authors.

The plight o unaccompanied oreign minors parallels the phenomenono the arrival by sea o undocumented individuals. Until recently Moroccanchildren, especially rom the southern part o that country, comprised themajority o this group, but now most o the newcomers are rom sub-SaharanArica, mainly Senegal and Mali. Their purpose or migrating, and that otheir amilies which oten und their voyage, is to work and send remittances,that is, to contribute to supporting the amily back home. In interviews con-

ducted by the Tenerie Immigration Observatory in Tenerie CAMEs in 2005,as part o the research on illegal immigration, the minors maniested theirdispleasure at being held in these centres, since this was contrary to their pur-pose or emigrating (Barranco et al., 2007). The situation o the minors in theCAME and in other centres is at times troubled, especially when individuals odierent nationalities are housed together.Regarding this latter pointthere havebeen recurrent denancements by various human rights organizations, includ-


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37Nmero 17, 2008

ing international ones, this being one o the most heated topics o discussion

in the Archipelago.In act, the issue o minors is a source o constant conrontation between

the local and central governments. The ormer seeks more assistance, as wellas greater resolve on the part o the State to transer the minors to otherAutonomous Communities, which are expected to show more solidarity,understanding that the Canaries are only a transit point or the bulk o thenewcomers. The Canaries have even threatened to return jurisdiction in thismatter to the State. In any case, this issue is causing growing discontent on the

islands, with minor incidents o xenophobia being reported, and all this ontop o the previously mentioned reports o abuse and mistreatment by inter-national organizations or the protection o minors and human rights.

The management o the inlux o undocumented persons in its variousstages and settings, despite their small numbers, albeit with huge mediaimpact, has led to a continuing conlict at dierent administrative levels,especially between the governments o the State and the AutonomousCommunity, both in the deployment o their jurisdictions and in the

competition to assume responsibility as appropriate or each. The con-tinuous inlux o rats and ishing boats, including the sporadic news onthe preparation and/or arrival o junk boatsaboard which a signiicantnumber o people travel, serve to keep those resources intended to dealwith them in a state o constant alert, and to keep the whole o Canarysociety in one o uncertainty, very much inluenced by the media cover-age o this issue and by the attention it receives in political debates.

The current situation o international economic uncertainty, which

also aects the archipelago, can introduce changes into the dynamics othe immigration patterns in question. In any case, i conditions do notimprove in the countries o origin, or even worsen, such lows may wellremain in place in the context o immigration to the Canaries, althoughin constant transormation due to the dierent strategies used or theircontrol. The externalization o the problem, shiting the border to thecoastal areas o origin countries, and even opening detention acilities


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in those countries with which agreements are reached or managing

this immigration, are only partial measures. Moreover, although theattractiveness o the archipelago or this inlux appears to be limitedbecause it is made up o islands and the consequent lack o territorialcontinuity, the Canaries remain an appealing platorm or entry into theEuropean Union, given the growing impassability o other transit areasacross the Mediterranean and the tightening immigration restrictionsin most countries in southern Europe. But strategies can change, whichmakes it all the more important to better understand this phenomenon,

especially as concerns the root cause or these migrations.The challenge is to achieve a more eicient and less politicized management

o this aspect o immigration, one that deals with those persons who havereached the islands by sea and arrive without documentation, ensuring thattheir stay is under the best possible conditions, be it short or long, as is the caseo minors. A goal which is yet to be realized, because o the particular situa-tion o their internment, is the utilization o the time available during theirretention or working closer with these immigrants, especially by changing the

structure o the centres adapted to house them to allow or more luid contactwith local resources, so these can put their expertise at the service o managingthis mobility, being as they are closer to its protagonists.

Conclusions

The maritime borders o the Canaries generate an environment o increas-ing complexity in terms o the geographical mobility o the population,

although the most intense movement o persons is comprised by those wish-ing to access and settle in the Islands -or visit them on a temporary basis aspart o a broader migration plan- and who arrive through its airport bordercontrol system. Transit through these borders is high because the region basesthe bulk o its economy on tourism, relecting an annual low o more than12 million visitors passing through its airields, most o them open to inter-national traic and with direct connections with some o the main gateways


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39Nmero 17, 2008

to immigration in Europe. This is the main way or documented tourists to

enter under alse pretences, especially on the islands that oer greater labouropportunities. The ailure o some o these people to meet with the legalrequirements or remaining in Spain, as speciied on the visas and permitspresented upon arrival, account or the recent upward trend in illegal immi-gration (Zapata et al., 2007: 151).

The reduction in the permeability o borders along the Mediterraneanhas placed the Canaries, at least temporarily, as a migration gateway andtransit point toward the south o the European Union. Despite the low

appeal o the archipelago, at least initially, as a transit point or illegalimmigration, the year 2006 saw an extraordinary inlux o immigrantsin rats and ishing boats, which in turn triggered the redoubling oeorts by the Spanish State and the EU Frontex task orce to monitora growing area o the waters separating the islands rom the Aricancontinent. This greater control, along with the collaboration o someArican countries in preventing emigration, has contributed to reducingthe mobility since then, changing again the relative appeal o the Canary

Islands as an entry point compared with other alternative routes.The overall impact o this kind o mobility on the immigration received bythe islands is low, since the sea route used by illegal immigrants results in ewchanges to the resident population in the Canary Islands, despite being thepreerred object o media coverage and political and social debate, which usu-ally swing between humanitarian and xenophobic points o view. Moreover,it overshadows the development o immigration policies aimed at immi-grants who have managed to settle in the region and integrate themselves

into the host society, policies which, in this case, are developed within theramework o those competencies speciic to the Autonomous Community.More emphasis is placed on border control, and less attention paid to theeect o the migratory phenomenon on the various aspects o regional reality.And this acet needs increased attention rom the Administration, especiallyas regards the progress o the integration process and the management omobility that can acquire an increasingly positive meaning in the current eco-


38/80



nomic and social context, even i the weaknesses in the existing immigration

control system do not yet seem to oer suicient guarantees or its properincorporation.

Epilogue

The boat ound abandoned on the beach o Roque de las Bodegas(North Tenerie), and which was appropriated by the residents o thisplace until it was removed rom the location shown, as evidenced

by an inscription on its hull that said property o the neighbours oTaganana, is one o many testaments to a human traic as relected inthe irst hal o the nineties, but which, in all likelihood, goes urtherback and is linked with the relationship traditionally established betweentwo shores separated by a narrow stretch o sea, where the borders werenot as sharp as today.

Image: Abandoned boat in Roque de las Bodegas (Taganana, Santa Cruz de Tenerie).


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41Nmero 17, 2008

This human mobility has gone through many stages over the past ourteen

years, remaining silent and poorly known at irst, both inside and outsidethe region. Its recent prominence, due to the expansion o the areas o originand embarkation o the expeditions, has placed the Canaries at the oreronto international news on the impact o migration. It has aected both con-sciences and diverse interests in the archipelago, and in so doing led us toorget that a phenomenon o this magnitude can only be addressed throughthe cooperation o all involved, to include increased ties and collaborationbetween the points o origin and arrival. Working together, here and there,

spurred on by the memory o all these people who have let their body at seaand their spirit bridging both shores.

In memory o the men, women and children who have remained at sea try-ing to cross a vast and exhausting blue rontier to reach our small islands

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ASN CABRERA, Mara Asuncin. Menores extranjeros no acompaa-dos. RAMOS QUINTANA, Margarita (dir.) Comentarios al Reglamentode Extranjera [1st ed.]. Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2007. Pp. 561-569. ISBN

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JANDL, Michael. Irregular Migration, Human Smuggling, and the Eastern

Enlargement o the European Union. International Migration Review.XLI, No. 2 (2007). Pp. 291-315.LPEZ SALA, Ana Mara. Pasar la lnea. El Estado en la regulacin

migratoria desde una perspectiva comparada. Revista Internacional deFilosoa Poltica. No. 27 (2006). Pp. 71-100.

NARANJO NOBLE, Jos Cayucos [1st ed.]. Barcelona: Debate, 2006. P.164. ISBN 978-84-8306-709-3.

NDOYE, El Hadji Amadou. La inmigracin subsahariana hacia Canarias y

la Pennsula. Inmigracin en Canarias: contexto, tendencias y retos [1sted.]. Santa Cruz de Tenerie: Fundacin Pedro Garca Cabrera, 2007. Pp.121-126. ISBN 84-611-6326-7.

PARDELLAS SOCAS, Juan Manuel Hroes de bano [1st ed.]. Santa Cruzde Tenerie: Ediciones Idea, 2004. P. 136. ISBN 84-96407-75-6.

SOS RACISMO Inorme anual 2008 sobre el racismo en el Estado espaol [1sted.]. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, 2008. P. 227. ISBN 978-84-7426-991-8.


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ZAPATA HERNNDEZ, Vicente Manuel et al. Geograa de la inmigracin

irregular. GODENAU, Dirk and ZAPATA HERNNDEZ, Vicente Manuel(coords.) La inmigracin irregular en Tenerie [1st ed.]. Santa Cruz deTenerie: rea de Desarrollo Econmico del Cabildo de Tenerie, 2007.Pp. 135-177. ISBN 978-84-690-6546-4.

Documentation

Estudio sobre la inmigracin irregular proveniente del Magreb y el rica

subsahariana en la provincia de Las Palmas. Diputado del Comn(2001).

II Plan Canario para la Inmigracin 2006-2008. Consejera de Empleo yAsuntos Sociales del Gobierno de Canarias.

Pacto Canario sobre Inmigracin. Gobierno de Canarias, Coalicin Canaria,Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol, Agrupacin Herrea de Independientes(December 2002).

Plan Canario para la Inmigracin 2002-2004. Consejera de Empleo y

Asuntos Sociales del Gobierno de Canarias.Plan Conjunto de Actuacin en materia de inmigracin entre laAdministracin General del Estado y la Comunidad Autnoma deCanarias 2005-2007. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales y Gobiernode Canarias (June 2005).

Plan de Accin de la Comunidad Autnoma de Canarias para la acogida yla integracin de inmigrantes. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales yGobierno de Canarias (April 2005).

Pronunciamiento del Foro Canario de la Inmigracin sobre las actualespolticas migratorias a raz de la intensifcacin de la llegada de inmi-grantes indocumentados por va martima. Foro Canario de la Inmigracin(2006).

Relexiones sobre la actual inmigracin aricana en cayucos. Grupo deproesores/as de las universidades canarias (October 2006).


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4545

The Case of the Italian Southern Sea Borders:

Cooperation across the Mediterranean?

Polo Cui

At the end o 2007 Italian government leaders emphatically announcedthat the number o migrants apprehended by Italian authorities in the Straito Sicily or immediately ater landing in Sicilian territory (also including theisland o Lampedusa) had dropped rom 21,400 to 16,875 that year. They

said the decrease was the result o increased controls by the Italian governmentand strengthened cooperation with NAMCs (North Arican Mediterraneancountries). As an example o the latter they presented the new police coope-ration agreement with Libya o 29 December 2007, providing or Italian-Libyan joint patrolling in Libyan territorial waters. They also stressed that thenew agreement would help both saving lives at sea and combating criminalorganisations.

They did not mention the act that in the same year the number o migrants

arriving by sea to Sardinia rom Algeria, and to Calabria rom Egypt (andpartly rom Turkey), had increased rom 91 to 1,548 and rom 282 to 1,971respectively, while the number o casualties in the Strait o Sicily (includingdead bodies ound and missing persons) had risen rom 302 to a record 556(FORTRESS EUROPE, 2008). And they did not know yet that in the irsthal o 2008 the number o arrivals to Lampedusa would double, while thenumber o casualties would reach a record 311, and no joint patrolling actionswould be carried out in Libyan national waters in spite o the new agreement

and a

6.2 million allocation rom the Italian government or this purpose.In act, many actors play a role in the dynamics o both migration andmigration controls, and the plans and choices o migrants and reugees can beas unpredictable as those o a North Arican dictator who knows how to takeadvantage o Italian requests or cooperation.

Particularly in the last decade, ater Italy implemented the Schengenagreements (abolishing controls at internal borders between the signa-


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Paolo Cuttitta


tory states) in 1997, Italian governments have been multiplying eorts

to stem irregular immigration by sea. Since arrivals rom Albanian toApulian coasts have strongly decreased, the southern ront has becomethe weak point o the Italian sea border regime (see table 1).

Table 1. Illegal immigrants apprehended at Italian sea borders

Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Apulia28,458

(74.58%)46,481

(92.96%)18,990

(70.81%)8,546

(42.43%)3,372

(14.21%)137

(0.95%)18

(0.13%)19

(0.08%)243

(1.10%)61

(0.30%)

Calabria 873(2.29%) 1,545(3.09%) 5,045(18.81%) 6,093(30.25%) 2,122(8.95%) 177(1.24%) 23(0.17%) 88(0.38%) 282(1.28%) 1,971(9.63%)

Sardinia - - - - - - -8

(0.04%)91

(0.42%)1,548

(7.57%)

Sicily8,828

(23.13%)1,973

(3.95%)2,782

(10.38%)5,504

(27.32%)18,225

(76.84%)14,017

(97.81%)13,594

(99.70%)22,824

(99.50%)21,400

(97.20%)16,875

(82.50%)

Total38,159

(100%)

49,999

(100%)

26,817

(100%)

20,143

(100%)

23,719

(100%)

14,331

(100%)

13,635

(100%)

22,939

(100%)

22,016

(100%)

20,455

(100%)

Tunisian and Libyan coasts have been serving as springboards or migrantsrom the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Arica and (to a smaller extent) some Asian

countries since the 1990s. Arrivals rom Tunisia decreased notably ater 2004,as a consequence o tighter controls carried out by Tunisian authorities. Mostthird country nationals and many Tunisians were thus diverted to the Libyanroute, and Libya became the main country o departure by ar: 22,591 mi-grants arrived rom Libyan coasts in 2005 and 20,907 in 2006, that is nearly allthose who reached Sicily and its minor islands in that period. At the same time,entry restrictions and intensied coastal patrolling in Libya caused an increas-ing number o migrants to set o rom Egyptian and Algerian coasts.1

1. Although most o the migrants are Egyptians and Algerians respectively, arrivals rom Egypt

to Calabria and Sicily also include citizens rom Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey, while arrivals rom

Algeria to Sardinia also include Tunisians and Moroccans. These routes may be ollowed by

migrants o other nationalities in the uture.


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The Case o the Italian Southern Sea Borders: Cooperation across the Mediterranean?

47Nmero 17, 2008

The main outcome o increased controls seems thus to be the dier-

entiation and diversication o migration routes, rather than the reduc-tion o irregular migration and the deeat o criminal organisations. Thismeans that routes become longer and more dangerous, resulting not onlyin an increase o casualties but also in higher expenses or migrants andhigher revenues or smuggling gangs.

Too Little an Invasion?

The word invasion has been oten used to describe the arrival o irre-gular migrants by sea. In 2004 the minister o Interior Pisanu spoke oan assault on Italian coasts. In 2008 the vice-minister o Interior Palmaspoke o an aggression.

In act the number o people entering or trying to enter Italy irregularly bysea is much smaller than it is generally perceived. Twenty thousand is a smallnumber i we relate it to the nearly 4 million oreigners residing regularly inItaly. It becomes smaller i we compare it with the demand or oreign wor-

korce in the Italian labour market: Italy allowed the legal entry o 1.6 millionoreign workers within the rame o regular immigration quotas in the tenyears period rom 1998 to 2007; since 1995, in addition to legal immigra-tion quotas, regularisation programmes granted urther 1.1 million permitso stay to oreigners who were residing (and working) irregularly in Italy. Thenumber o people arriving irregularly by sea rom North Arica becomes evensmaller i we relate it to the whole surace and population o the EU (Euro-pean Union), or only a little part o the migrants entering Italy irregularly

wish to remain in the country, while the others (70-75% according to anestimate made by the Italian ministry o interior in 2004) aim at reachingother European countries.

Indeed, only a small percentage o the oreigners who reside irregularlyin Italy has entered the country irregularly by sea, while most o them(between 51% and 75% in the period 2000-2006) are overstayers (peoplewho enter the country regularly and remain beyond the expiry date o


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49Nmero 17, 2008

reasons, most political parties propaganda includes the engagement or

strengthening southern sea border controls and reinorcing cooperationwith NAMCs.

Since the mid-1990s all Italian governments have been carrying outa process o delocalisation and externalisation o border controls. Aterthe centre-let governments had ostered cooperation with NAMCs andsigned the rst cooperation agreements in the late 1990s, the centre-rightgovernment amended Italian legislation in the summer o 2002, with theaim o making rejections at the borders and expulsions more eective.

Navy ships were allowed to board vessels suspected o transporting illegalimmigrants also outside Italian territorial waters. Dozens o patrol boats,naval ships and aircrats, and thousands o people, are now deployed orthe surveillance o the Mediterranean. The new centre-let cabinet ap-pointed in 2006 did not resume deportations to Libya (which had beencarried out by the previous government since 2004), but it strengthenedcooperation with Libya in order to stop migrants beore they could leaveLibyan coasts. Now, in the early summer o 2008, the newly-appoint-

ed cabinet has started again immediate rejections rom Lampedusa toEgypt, and premier Berlusconi has met colonel Ghada in Libya in orderto discuss urther cooperation.

Cooperation across the Mediterranean

In the last ten years, not only did Italy strengthen surveillance inand over international waters, but it also requested EU participation

in the protection o southern EU Mediterranean borders. Patrols com-posed o border guards rom dierent EU member states patrolled the Straito Sicily within the Neptune project rom September 2003 to 2005.Since 2006 EU member states have cooperated or short periods inoperation Nautilus under the coordination o FRONTEX (EuropeanAgency or the Management o Operational Cooperation at the Exter-nal Borders o the European Union).


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Paolo Cuttitta


In the same ten-year period, Italy also requested NAMCs to: a) Cooper-

ate with Italian police against irregular migration and organised smuggling,and engage in signing ormal police cooperation agreements or this purpose;b) Readmit irregular immigrants (including their own nationals as well asthird country nationals setting o rom their coasts), and engage in signingormal readmission agreements or this purpose; c) Strengthen regulations onthe emigration o their citizens and on the immigration and stay o oreigncitizens; d) Strengthen surveillance at their land borders (in order to preventthe infow o would-be transit migrants rom neighbouring countries) as well

as on their coastlines (in order to prevent the departure o migrant boats to-wards Italy); e) Extend controls not only all over their territories (in order toapprehend irregular immigrants and expel them) but also over internationalwaters (in order to take back migrants departed rom their coasts); ) Improvelegislation and capacity in the eld o asylum and protection.

These requests have been at least partly met.All NAMCs have signed and implemented police cooperation agree-

ments (see table 2) and have been carrying out cooperation activities

with Italian authorities, such as exchange o inormation, joint investiga-tion and joint patrolling actions. Liaison ocers rom the Italian minis-try o Interior have been dispatched to all NAMCs in order to coordinatepolice cooperation activities.

New laws on emigration, immigration and the stay o oreigners havebeen passed in all NAMCs, introducing penalties or irregular migrantsand acilitators.

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt now cooperate in the readmis-

sion o their citizens who cross the Mediterranean irregularly (Cuttitta,2008a).4 Tunisia and Libya have also readmitted third country nation-

4. These countries have all signed readmission agreements with Italy, but readmissions have

oten been carried out even beore the agreements were signed or came into orce.


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51Nmero 17, 2008

als rom Italian territory (readmissions to Libya were carried out in the

absence o an ocial readmission agreement).

Table 2. Agreements signed with North African countriesCountry Type of Agreement Place and date of signature

Algeria Police cooperation Algiers, 22 November1999Algeria Readmission Rome, 24 February 2000Algeria Executive agreement Rome, 9 October 2000Egypt Police cooperation Cairo, 18 June 2000

Egypt Readmission Rome, 9 January 2007Libya Police cooperation Rome, 13 December 2000Libya Police cooperation Tripoli, 3 July 2003

Libya Police cooperation Tripoli, 29 December 2007Morocco Readmission Rabat, 27 July 1998Morocco Executive agreement Rome, 18 June 1999Tunisia Readmission and police cooperation Rome,6 August 1998Tunisia Police cooperation Tunis, 13 December 2003

Tunisia, Libya and more recently also Algeria and Egypt have strength-ened surveillance over their coastlines according to Italian requests, and theyalso seize boats and take back migrants rom both national and international

waters. Actions on the high seas have been carried out also in cooperationwith Italian authorities. On several occasions since 2003 Italian authorities,ater apprehending migrants in international waters, handed them over toTunisian patrols that returned them to Tunisia.

Raids against irregular immigrants all over the national territories (par-ticularly in the districts o larger cities where irregular immigrants live,or in inormal camps set up by migrants in border regions) have becomedaily work or police orces o NAMCs. The Jamahiriya News Agency

(JANA) announced on 16 January 2008 that Libyan authorities woulddemolish huts and cottages that shelter illegal residents and immedi-ately gather all oreigners illegally residing in Libya or immediate de-portation. Indeed, Libya has been an immigration country long beorebecoming also a country o transit, and oreigners were occasionally sub-ject to deportations long

Documents

Sobre la entrada de inmigrante irregulares en España