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Space, Spectrum and CyberspaceOpportunities and Obligations(?) for Australia
Presentationby
Brett Biddingtonto
Association of Old Crows ConventionAdelaide April 2012
Background1970s BA(Hons) politics
diplomatuniversity lecturer
1980-2002 RAAFintelligencesecuritycapability development ($2bn portfolio of projects with associated R&D sponsorship)
2002- 09 joined Cisco – “internet in space” team1 of a team of 16 world-wide, Canberra-based
Now Biddington Research Pty Ltd – Space & Cyber Security
Other: Chair – Space Industry Association of AustraliaMember – Space Industry Innovation CouncilAstronomy governanceBoard member, Kokoda FoundationAdjunct Professor at ECU
Fragile Environments
Space
Nat. sec.dominates
Spectrum
Cyber
Antarctica
Readily disturbed/denied/destroyed- Space debris- Turn off the power- Spectrum is finite
Difficult/impossible (?) to regulate and police- Hard to grasp- Sovereignty means?- Rules and norms? Made by?- Customary international law and
treaties
- tight system coupling – catastrophic failure vs graceful degradation
Driveseconomies
Enables society
Space Junk: SSA
4
US spy satellite de-orbit
Iridium/Cosmos collision
Chinese ASAT test
Current Regulatory Mechanisms
Space
Treaty Regime for the 1960s/70s
UN COPUOSUN CDMTCR
Bilateral agreementsSpace and non-proliferation
co-mingled
Mechanisms not coping as space becomes contested
and congestedCodes of conduct
Cyber (the 1s and 0s)An environment of
human creation
High level technology standards (eg IPv4 to IPv6)
Local laws (eg. anti child porn)
(Mostly) informal international agreements to
detect and defeat cyber crime
Spectrum
The International Telecommunication Union
National regulatory authorities
(ACMA in Australia – poacher and game-keeper)
Mechanisms incapable of dealing with the “internet of things” – ubiquitous mobility
Increasing inter-dependencies
Space
Time and locationGPS
and similar systems
Comms to remote users
Geo-spatial information and awareness
Cyber
The internet of things
Displays and records time and location
Changing the way we “live, work and play”
BYODThe Cloud
national borders are irrelevant
Spectrum
Ubiquitous connectivity
Already beyond the capacity of regulators to control
ITU too slow
Watch for the outcome of Light squared vs GPS
Inside 10 years, we will simply take what we need
Disruption in the Space, Cyber and Spectrum DomainsSome principles:1. The offense is favoured – nimble, tiny footprint, attribution hard to impossible
(you can’t hit back unless you know who to hit)2. Disruption is profoundly asymmetric – defending takes disproportionate
resources and still provides no guarantees3. The three environments are tightly coupled - disturb one environment and all
are affected (the computer is down, war stops)4. Norms based behaviours in the three domains are beyond the capacity of
defence forces, intelligence agencies and the broader national security community to introduce, embed and enforce
5. Increasingly real and virtual critical infrastructure is in private hands – incentives to make this infrastructure more resilient will not work until they manifestly benefit owners and shareholders
Language and Organisation • International discussion is largely within a linguistic and cognitive framework that comes
from Washington• Characterised by superpower optimism, hubris and exclusivity (eg. “full spectrum
dominance”, “space dominance and control” and “Asian space race”)
• Substantial progress unlikely to be made until other frameworks of understanding are admitted to exist and allowed onto the negotiating table
• eg. China is being asked to abide by norms in which it had no part in making. Can this work?
• Concept of the “rational actor”
• There is a disturbing orthodoxy, certainly in Australia, that management of the space and cyber domains is above all a question for the national security community to resolve (spectrum has broken loose – somewhat - because Government has sniffed a quid)
• Is cyber space a mere extension of traditional SIGINT or something larger? Agencies such as DSD are heavily invested in the SIGINT potentials of cyber space but are they best capable of dealing with complexities beyond the intelligence domain? I’m not sure.
Middle Power Challenges and Opportunities• Australia will find it increasingly difficult to keep up with the US – simply a question of
scale (a note about ADAC)
• This implies some tough choices, especially in force structure, and will depend, above all, on how we conceive our national strategy in coming years
• Globalist, Regionalist (strategy based on ideas like ‘order’) or Continentalist (strategy based on ‘geography’) - Rod Lyon (ASPI)
• In the electronic domain – how does Australia achieve a balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ capabilities – what are the variables to be taken into account?
• Regarding space, Australia may have an opportunity to provide leadership to the space dispossessed nations. Building on experience with Antarctica and Law of the Sea, there may be an opportunity (obligation?) to put ourselves between China (esp) and India and the US to help to build confidence and eventually new norms in this the Asian Century.
Space disadvantaged nations: dependent but without significant influenceImplications for cyber and spectrum?
2.3 billion111 countriesAv pop 20m
4.7 billion82 countriesAv pop 60m
