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STATCON 8/8

Read

1 A Study Guide in Statutory Construction: Cases and Materials

by Atty. Jose Jesus G. Laurel (1990 ed.)

Read Ch 7

2 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

(2009 ed. )

Unless page numbers are indicated, read the entire section listed.

4.01- verba legis (plain meaning rule)

- intent of the legislature is expressed in the language of the statute. If a statute is clear and

unambiguous, it muse be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.

- inidex animi sermo - language is the insex of intention

- verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of the statute there should be no departure

4.02 - dura lex sed lex (the law may be harsh, but it is the law)

- if the law is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard or

harsh.

4.04 - ratio legis (interpretation according to the spirit of the law)

4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given theinterpretation that accomplishes its purpose.

5.17 - noscitur sociis (when a particular word or phrase in itself is ambiguous, its construction may be

made clear by the words accompanying it)

5.18 - example: the use of the word suspension can be understood as punitive and not a preventive

measure since it is associated to words that are to be understood as punitive.

5.19 - ejusdem generis (general words are given their full, natural, generic sense; UNLESS they are used

in association with specific words or phrases)

- Requisites:

(1) a statute containing an enumeration of particular or specific words, followed by a general word or

phrase

(2) the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind

(3) enumeration is not merely by example

(4) no indication of legislative intent to give general words a broader meaning

5.20 - example: where an act makes the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters and

the like unlawful... And the like does not mean campaign jingles since what is being made unlawful are in

the same class or kind as those specified.

5.21- Limitations of ejusdem generis

(1) the enumeration includes: specific and general terms / the specific have no distinguishable common

characteristic

(2) enumeration of the specific words are exhaustive

(3) use of enumeration is to give example

(4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature. On consideration of the whole law, it can be seen that the

legislature intended for the general word to go beyond the class enumerated.5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all others)

5.23 - negative-opposite doctrine (argumentum a contrario) what is expressed puts an end to what is

implied

5.24 - example: executive powers are vested in the President (only the president has executive power, no

other)

5.25 - limitation of 5.22 expressio unius est exclusio alterius (it cannot be used to deter the plainly

indicated purpose of the legislator)

5.26 - casus omissus (what is omitted in the enumeration is presumed to be omitted intentionally)

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5.27 - doctrine of last antecedent (generally, words only modify those that are immediately associated)

7 Villanueva v. Commission on Elections, 140 SCRA 352 (1991)

Facts:

- Narciso Mendoza Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon on the last

day of filing. On the same day, he withdrew his candidacy through an unsworn letter in his own

handwriting

- petitioner submitted his own certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Mendoza.

- petitioner won by vote, but those votes were not counted since his name was not on the certified list of

candidates of COMELEC.

- respondent Lirio was announced as the elected vice-mayor

- COMELEC dismissed petitioner's petition since Sec. 28 which the petitioner invoked only allows

substitution if the withdrawal of the candidate who withdrew was under oath. Since Mendoza's withdrawal

was not under oath, it had no legal effect.

Issue:

whether or not COMELEC erred in its dismissal of the petition

Held:

- COMELEC denying petitioner's certificate of candidacy based on his name not being in the certified listof candidates should be rejected. There was not enough time to put petitioner's name on the list, but

through COMELEC law manager's advice, petitioner circularized to the chairmen of election committees

of his candidacy

- the fact that Mendoza's withdrawal is not sworn is but a technicality. In Guzman vs. Board of

Canvassers, it stated that once the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be

defeated by the fact that the candidate had not sworn his certificate of candidacy.

- COMELEC not allowing due process due to technicality does not follow the spirit of the law, which

allows substitute candidates even up to the midday of an election in case of death or withdrawal etc.

STATCON Principle:

7.32 - election laws should be liberally construed to achieve its purpose: effectuate and safeguard the will

of the people

2 Matabuena v. Cervantes, (1971)

Facts:

- Felix Matabuena, husband of defendant, owned a parcel of land.

- Felix executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant which was done during the time defendant and

Felix were not yet married, effective immediately

- Felix died. Plaintiff claims the land since she is the nearest collateral relative of the deceased. Her

argument is that the deed of donation is null and void since it was done during the common-law

relationship

Issue:

whether the ban on a donation between spouses during marriage applies to common law relationship

Held:YES. The ban also applies to a common-law relationship. As applied in the Court of Appeals case:

Buenaventura vs. Bautista, it was provided that the interpretation of a similar provision from the old Civil

Code is to "prohibit donations in the favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear and

undue pressure upon the donor". Therefore, "there is every reason to apply the prohibition to persons

who are living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

If any other interpretation is to be applied, it will defeat the purpose of the statute. Apply STATCON

Principle. Therefore, ruling of the lower court is reversed. However, the land is still split between appellant

and defendant.

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STATCON Principle:

4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given the

interpretation that accomplishes its purpose.

6 Duncan v. CFI of Rizal (Branch X), (1976)

Facts:

- The natural mother of the child was a client of Atty. Velasquez, who gave Velasquez the child in order

for Velasquez to look for a couple to adopt the child.

- the mother after giving the child to Velasquez no longer gave support to the child.

- A foreign couple residing in the Philippines decided to adopt the child that was under the care of the

principal witness, Atty. Corazon Velasquez.

- Velasquez gave the consent for the adoption

Issue: whether Velasquez has the authority to give consent for the adoption

Held:

- YES. Velasquez is authorized. She is recognized as the guardian after the fact that the child is

illegitimate and her mother has abandoned her.

- the lower court tried to cover their decision under the shield of dura lex sed lex. However, that should

not hold be considered. The purpose is to endorse adoption for the benefit of the child. Apply STATCONPrinciple.

STATCON Principle:

4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given the

interpretation that accomplishes its purpose.

8 Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil. 44 (1948)

Facts:

- the appellant was an opposing candidate to the appellee for the governorship of Leyte.

- appellee was one of the three disqualified members of the provincial board of canvassers. They were to

be replaced by the division superintendent of schools, the district engineer, and the district health officer

as appointed by COMELEC.

- during the initial canvassing of votes, the division superintendent of schools and the district engineer

were not present. The chief clerk in the office of the superintendent and assistant civil engineer were the

ones who took the place of those not present. They proclaimed the appellee as governor-elect

- two days later, a canvassing was again done by the board. This time, the superintendent and the district

engineer took part. Again, declaring the appellee as the governor-elect.

- appellant filed a motion of protest, but the lower courts dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was

filed out of time, if the first canvassing of votes is considered.

Issue:

whether or not the trial court erred in using the first canvassing.

Held:

- YES. The trial court erred since it was the date of the second canvassing that should be considered,

since it was the legitimate canvassing.- the lower court reasoned that the chief clerk and the assistant civil engineer were qualified since it would

be absurd if the superintendent and the district engineer could not be represented by their assistants.

- The Supreme Court applied the STATCON Principle in finding error to the lower court's reasoning. The

revised election code provides those that can replace members of the board if any of the members are

found unqualified. The election code did not provide that the replacements can be the assistants of those

appointed. Allowing such replacement will take away the power vested in COMELEC to appoint the

members of the board.

- it was also found the replacements cannot be seen as de facto officers since that would entail a service

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in the said office for a length of time that would lead one to presume that the said officer was actually

appointed.

- in addition, the second canvassing does not validate the mistake made. It was found by the SC that the

canvassing was made prematurely since all district election returns have not yet arrived

- the court also held that the initial canvass cannot be validated since the two replacements are

disqualified, resulting in a lack of quorum.

STATCON Principle: 5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all

others)

10 City of Manila v. Lyric Music House, Inc. (1935)

Facts:

- defendant sells music goods. The plaintiff instituted an action to recover from the defendant license fees

and penalty of 525php. The lower court held that the defendant should pay the license fees on the

grounds that Ordinance 1925 applies to the defendant.

Issue:

whether or not ordinance 1925 applies to the defendant.

Held:

- YES. Ordinance 1925 applies since the defendant is considered a general merchandise store.- Ordinance 1925 states that establishments selling items not enumerated in the ordinance (rice, textile,

hardwares, etc.) are considered general merchandise stores.

- General merchandise stores are to pay license fees as indicated in the amendment in sections of the

administrative code: which give the authority to the Municipal Board of Manila to tax and fix the amount of

license fees.

- the contention of the defendant that the board stretched the definition of "general merchandise" cannot

be given consideration following STATCON Principle (1).

- in addition, the contention that there were certain businesses expressly mentioned means those not

mentioned are to be excluded cannot be applied due to STATCON Principle (2)

- the defendant further contends that the tax is excessive, however, taxation is under the discretion of the

legislature which the courts do not normally question.

STATCON Principle:

(1) 5.21- Limitation of ejusdem generis (4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature. On consideration of

the whole law, it can be seen that the legislature intended for the general word to go beyond the class

enumerated.

(2) 5.25 - limitation of 5.22 expressio unius est exclusio alterius (it cannot be used to deter the plainly

indicated purpose of the legislator)

16 Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Social Security Comm. (1961)

Facts:

- petitioner requests that they be exempt from the Social Security Law of 1954 on the grounds that it is a

labor law and it does not cover religious or charitable institutions and is limited to businesses organized

for profit. The Social Security Commission denied the request.Issue: whether or not the petitioner should be exempt from the Social Security Law

Held:

- NO. Petitioner is under Social Security Law by definition of employer.

- as provided in the Social Security Law, the Commission can compel any employer who has gone

beyond 2 years of existence to become a member of the System. The system is then compulsory to the

employees 16 to 60 who have have been in service to an employer for at least 6 months.

- as defined in the law, employer means any domestic or foreign, natural or juridical person carrying a

trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind. The contention of the petitioner that

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ejusdem generis should be applied cannot be given consideration due to STATCON Principle (1)

- in addition, if the legislature did intend to for the religious to be exempt, they would not have provided

the specific exemption to the government. Therefore, STATCON Principle (2) applies.

- in addition, the contention of the petitioner that the Social Security Law is a labor law cannot also be

given consideration. The law is to provide social security system that is suitable to the needs of the

people. It is therefore a social legislation and cannot be limited to labor only

- in addition, it is not unconstitutional to give the public funds allocated to the System to priests since the

funds are given not because they are priests but because they are employees.

STATCON Principle:

(1) 5.21- Limitations of ejusdem generis (4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature.

(2) 5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all others)

18 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties (1994) [main opinion only]

Facts:

- PAGCOR wanted to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro. Due to this, they leased a portion of a building

belonging to respondents

- the Sangguniang Panglungsod promulgated two ordinances, the first being that all current existing

business permits enabling casinos to be cancelled. The second ordinance imposed an administrative fineto those who violate the first ordinance.

- the respondents along with PAGCOR questioned the validity of the ordinances, to which the CA decided

the ordinances are invalid.

Issue:

whether or not the ordinances promulgated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid

Held:

- NO. The ordinances are not valid on the grounds that they limit PAGCOR's power to establish and

operate casinos.

- in their defense, the SP invoked the local government code saying that it gave them the power to

suppress gambling AND other prohibited games of chance. Since the local government code did not

distinguish what sort of gambling is to be prevented they invoked STATCON Princinple (1)

- the local government code is also a later enactment as compared to PD 1869 which gave power to

PAGCOR to establish and operate casinos. Therefore, the petitioners defend that the local government

code impliedly repealed PD 1869. Invoking STATCON Principles (2) and (3). In addition, it was mandated

that they pass an ordinance preventing gambling both legal and illegal since the word used was "shall"

invoking STATCON Principle (5)

- However, the SC found that the forms of gambling that the local government code can prevent are those

that are illegal applying STATCON Principle (4), which means gambling is associated with other

PROHIBITED games of chance. Since gambling in casinos is legal under PD 1869, it cannot be

prevented by the LGU.

- in addition, the implied repeal cannot be considered since there is no clear intention on the part of the

legislature that they wanted to repeal PD 1869. Since there is no clear intention, any conflicting statutes

should not be pitted against each other but harmonized.- in addition to being mandated to pass an ordinance the SC invoked the EXCEPT clause of STATCON

Principle (5)

STATCON Principle:

(1) ubi lex non distinguit, nos ditinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, courts should not

distinguish)

(2) 7.28 - local government unit codes vs. national statutes should be construed liberally in favor of the

LGU and against the national government

(3) 7.26 - general welfare statutes (to uphold social justice) are to be construed liberally in favor of those

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whom the law seeks to benefit

(4) 5.17 - noscitur sociis (when a particular word or phrase in itself is ambiguous, its construction may be

made clear by the words accompanying it)

8.06 - use of "shall" or "must"

- directory in nature to confer that what is to be done is mandatory

- EXCEPT when the legislative intent was to use it as merely directory. In order to ascertain if it is

mandatory and not merely directory is when non-compliance means the act is null.