Susan Hekman -Gadamers Hermeneutics

HUMAN STUDIES 6, 205-224 (1983)

From Epistemology to Ontology:Gadamer's Hermeneutics

and Wittgensteinian Social Science'SUSAN HEKMAN

Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Texas at Arlington

In what has been characterized as the "post-behaviorist" or "post-positivist"era in political science and, more generally, throughout the social sciences, anincreasing number of methodological approaches to the social sciences have beenproposed as altematives to the discredited positivist paradigm. The list of anti-positivist methodologies that have been advanced is by this time quite lengthy. Itincludes phenomenology, ordinary language analysis (or what has come to beknown as "Wittgensteinian social sciences"), structuralism, critical theory, andethnomethodology, as well as several offshoots of these approaches. Also in-cluded in most of these lists of antipositivist approaches is that of hermeneutics.In recent years, in fact, interest in hermeneutics has enjoyed a revival of sorts.But the hermeneutics that is currently receiving attention among social andpolitical theorists is quite different from the hermeneutics that Dilthey advocatedas an altemative to positivist social science at the tum of the century. Thehermeneutics referred to in contemporary discussion is most commonly the ap-proach rooted in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, an approach that represents asignificant departure from traditional hermeneutics. And although the traditionalhermeneutics of Dilthey and Schleiermacher have not received much attention inrecent years, Gadamer's work has aroused new interest in hermeneutics becauseit raises a set of issues particularly relevant to contemporary discussions in themethodology of the social sciences,

Gadamer's work has come to the attention of the social scientific communityprimarily as a result of the heated debate between Gadamer and Jtirgen Haber-mas, a debate that has been a staple of German intellectual life for many years, •This debate has provided the context for the discussion of hermeneutics amongthe Anglo-American social scientists as well,2 But although the Gadamer-Haber-

* Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to: Susan Hekman, Department ofPolitical Science, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019.

'The principal works in the Gadamer-Habermas dispute are Gadamer (1975); Habermas (1970);and the collection of essays in Apel (1971).

^Two books have been most influential in introducing hermeneutics to the English-speakingworld: Bauman (1978) and Bleicher (1980).

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mas debate has performed a valuable function in introducing Gadamer's work tothe Anglo-American social scientific community, it has also had the negativeeffect of restricting discussion of hermeneutics among Anglo-American theoriststo comparisons between Gadamer and Habermas, As a result the broader signifi-cance of Gadamer's work for the social sciences has been largely overlooked.^ Itis the intention of this essay to begin to move the discussion of Gadamer'shermeneutics and its relevance for the social sciences beyond the confines of thisdebate. The following discussion will attempt to reveal the broader relevance ofGadamer's work by considering the relationship between his approach and thatwhich has been advanced by the followers of Wittgenstein in the social sciences.These two approaches exhibit a number of strong affinities as well as a number ofequally strong differences. Consideration of these differences and similaritieswill serve to highlight the relevance of Gadamer's approach for several issuescentral to contemporary methodological disputes in the social sciences, particu-larly the relationship between the natural and the social sciences, and the role oflanguage in social theory. Although these issues have been raised in the Gada-mer-Habermas debate, they have only been discussed in the necessarily parochialcontext of their relevance to critical theory.

The comparison of the two approaches will be divided into three principalsections. In the first section the basic tenets of Gadamer's approach will beoutlined. The second section will explicate the similarities and differences be-tween Gadamer's approach and that of Wittgensteinian social science. The thirdsection will attempt to draw some conclusions with regard to the relative advan-tages of Gadamer's approach for contemporary social theory. It will be arguedthat, in comparison to Wittgensteinian social science, Gadamer's approach offerssome definite advantages because it sidesteps a number of issues that have beenparticularly problematic for the Wittgensteinians. But it will also be argued thatthe broader significance of Gadamer's position rests in the fact that it demon-strates that an antipositivist approach to the social sciences can avoid the objec-tivism of positivism without seeking an absolute foundation for social thought orretreating into the extreme relativism of the Wittgensteinian position.

GADAMER'S "METHODOLOGY"

The Universality of Hermeneutics

In Truth and Method, Gadamer advances a definition of hermeneutics thatsets his approach apart from the epistemological and methodological concems ofSchleiermacher and Dilthey: Hermeneutics is the study of the universal phe-nomenon of human understanding. Thus, on Gadamer's definition, hermeneutics

accounts that do move outside the context of the Gadamer-Habermas debate are Gunnell(1979) and Giddens (1976).

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cannot be defined solely as a methodological approach to the human sciences.Rather, tiie method of hemieneutics must be a universal one because its subject isuniversally applicable. Gadamer's task in Truth arui Method is to establish thehistorical and philosophical groundwork for this claim of the universality ofhermeneutics and to state its major implications. At the outset, however, it mustbe clearly stated that although Gadamer's thesis has profound implications forthe human sciences and, particularly, for their definition vis-a-vis the naturalsciences, it is not Gadamer's intent to offer a specific methodology for the humansciences. He insists repeatedly that to interpret his work in methodological temisis to conceive of it too narrowly. His goal, rather, is to study human understand-ing, a phenomenon encompassing the human sciences but not exclusively of theirdomain,

Gadamer establishes his thesis by developing two lines of argument. The firstis historically oriented. He contends that the principal errors of contemporaryphilosophy can be laid at the feet of the Enlightenment, and defines the centralerror of Enlightenment thought as the identification of all tmth with the "objec-tive knowledge" produced by the scientific method. Enlightenment thinkers, andKant in particular, were the first to clearly articulate the epistemological modelof "objective knowledge" that has become the hallmark of subsequent philo-sophical thought. This model excludes from the realm of "tmth" all humanexperience not produced throught adherence to the scientific method. Thus it isKant's identification of tmth with method that sets the stage for Gadamer'sanalysis:

Kant's transcendental analysis made it impossible to acknowledge the claimto tmth of the [humanist] tradition. (1975, p. 38)

Gadamer's identification of the central error of Enlightenment thought iscrucial not only to the definition of his project, but also to an understanding of hisdeparture from both the 19th century tradition of hermeneutics, and, more gener-ally, to the humanist tradition that arose in response to the Enlightenment.Gadamer's principal argument is that the hermeneutic and humanist traditionsboth accepted, without question, the validity of the epistemological model of"objective knowledge" formulated by Kant. More specifically, he argues thatDilthey and Schleiermacher, because they implicitly accepted the Kantian for-mulation, necessarily conceived of the method of the social sciences in opposi-tion to the method of the natural sciences. They thus had no recourse but toattempt to fit the social sciences into the epistemological model provided by thescientific method ofthe natural sciences. It was for this reason, Gadamer argues,that the 19th century's debates over method were too narrowly conceived, andhence doomed to failure (1975, p, 18).

This historical analysis explains the importance of the second argumentGadamer advances in Truth and Method—^the aesthetic argument. Although

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Gadamer's discussion of aesthetics precedes his detailed analysis of the errors ofDilthey and Schleiermacher, in an important way it completes that argument.Because his historical argument concludes that the status of the human sciencescannot be cast in narrow methodological terms, and certainly not in terms of itsopposition to the methods of the natural sciences, it is incumbent on Gadamer toprovide a broader scope for the consideration of the status of the human sciences.This is established in his description of an "experience of tmth" wholly distinctfrom the objective knowledge of the natural sciences: the aesthetic experience.Rhetorically, he asks:

Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain aclaim to tmth which is certainly different from that of science, but equallycertainly is not inferior to it? (1975, p. 87)

In his analysis of the aesthetic experience Gadamer focuses on two dimen-sions of the experience of tmth that offer a contrast to the model provided by thescientific method. TTie first is that tmth is an experience in which the knower is aconstitutive element of the knowledge attained. In contrast to the scientific modelof objective knowledge which depicts the knower as a passive recipient ofknowledge and removed from its object, Gadamer's analysis of the aestheticexperience reveals the knower as an active participant in the process. Second,Gadamer's analysis reveals that in the aesthetic experience, tmth has an ontologi-cal dimension. The scientific model describes the act of knowing as strictlyepistemological, that is, concemed solely with the constitution of the object ofknowledge. But Gadamer's analysis reveals that knowledge involves the grasp-ing of an object that is simultaneously revealing itself to the knower. In hiswords, ontology precedes epistemology; the act of knowing entails that being isrevealed.

Both the historical argument and the examination of the aesthetic experienceof tmth lead Gadamer to the same conclusion: the inadequacy of the epis-temological model of objective knowledge provided by the scientific method.His analysis reveals that this model is not, as its proponents have claimed, themodel of all possible knowledge. Restricting ' 'tmth'' to tbe products of scientificmethod denies the validity of tmth claims, such as that of the aesthetic experi-ence, that do not fit the scientific model. But, as Gadamer is well aware, thiscritique of the scientific model cannot, alone, establish his thesis. Rather, hemust tum to the more positive task of examining the fundamental nature ofhuman understanding and identifying its various manifestations. It is at this pointin his analysis that Gadamer's reliance on Heidegger comes to the fore. Heideg-ger provides Gadamer with the distinctive orientation that sets him apart from the19th century hermeneutics: the concem with ontology. Like Heidegger,Gadamer defines understanding in ontological terms:


Understanding is the original form of the realization of There-being (Da-sein), which is being-in-the-world. (1975, p. 230)

Heidegger's description of the "fore-stmcture" of understanding providesGadamer with the two central elements of this theory of understanding: ' 'preju-dice" and "effective-historical consciousness" (Wirkungsgeschichtliches Be-wusstsein). At the outset Gadamer identifies prejudice as an integral part of hisdefinition of hermeneutics.

This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudicegives the hermeneutic problem its real tmth. (1975, p. 239)

He goes on to identify the Enlightenment's failure to grasp the process of humanunderstanding in terms of their failure to understand the nature of prejudice. Heargues that

the fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the prejudice againstprejudice itself. (1975, pp. 239-40)

Since much misunderstanding has arisen with regard to the significance ofGadamer's "advocacy" of prejudice, it is important to specify precisely what heis not saying about prejudice. Although prejudice is seen as unavoidable,Gadamer is not arguing that it should be accepted in any form without question.Nor is he arguing that the acceptance of prejudice entails the abandonment ofreason. Rather, through his analysis of prejudice he is attempting to establish twopositive points with regard to the nature of understanding. First, althoughGadamer insists that understanding inevitably involves prejudice, his point is thatunderstanding necessarily involves the examination of prejudice. He speaks fre-quently of the "tyranny of hidden prejudice" and the need to overcome thistyranny (1975, pp. 239-240). Second, Gadamer is attempting to show that theopposition of reason and prejudice that led the Enlightenment to reject prejudiceis itself erroneous. For the Enlightenment reason represented the universal; prej-udice the local and particular. Against this Gadamer argues that both reason andprejudice are historically grounded:

Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, i.e., it is not its ownmaster but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances inwhich it operates. (1975, p. 245)

Gadamer's description ofthe role of prejudice in understanding is also cmcialto his definition of his departure from 19th century hermeneutics, Gadamer'sunderstanding of prejudice entails that the interpreter's prejudice cannot be neat-ly set aside in the act of interpretation. It is, rather, a necessary part of that act.When Dilthey and Schleiermacher define interpretation as placing oneself

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"within the writer's mind", however, they necessarily presuppose this removalof prejudice. It is this aspect of 19th century hermeneutics, Gadamer claims, thatis fundamentally in error. (1975, p. 261) Interpretation, on Gadamer's account is"the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter(1975, p. 261) It is, in other words, a dialectical process. Comparing this processto the dialectic of question and answer, Gadamer asserts that there are no pre-constituted "objects" in the human sciences. Rather, the objects of humanscience emerge through the juxtaposition of the question posed by the inquirerand the answer anticipated in the text (1975, p, 253).

The second concept central to Gadamer's theory is "effective-historical con-sciousness." Effective history, he states, is the demonstration ofthe effectivityof history within understanding itself (1975, p. 267). The application of effectivehistorical consciousness involves the recognition that understanding is "a kind ofeffect and knows itself as such" (1975, p. 305). Through his concept of effectivehistorical consciousness, Gadamer wishes to emphasize that our consciousnessof both the present and the past involves an awareness of the infiuences that pastevents have had and that our interpretations of these events will be effected byprevious interpretations of them. Understanding, in other words, is refiexive; itinvolves an openness to tradition that permits the tradition to speak. The "histor-ical consciousness" of 19th century hermeneutics and historicism, in contrast,lacked this openness. Their approach was one-sided in that it encompassed onlythe historicity of the text to be interpreted. But these thinkers overlooked the factthat the historicality of understanding extends to the interpreter as well as thetext. What occurs in the process of understanding, then, can most accurately bedescribed as a "fusing" of two "horizons"— that of the interpreter and that ofthe text:

The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the processof understanding, and does not become solidified into the self-alienation of apast consciousness, but is overtaken by our present horizon of understand-ing. In the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of hori-zons which means that as the historical horizon is projected it is simul-taneously removed. We described the conscious act of this fusion as the taskof the effective-historical consciousness. (1975, p. 273)

Gadamer's discussion of the openness involved in the process of interpreta-tion is of particular importance to the concems of this examination because itprovides him with a powerful critique of the "objective knowledge" identifiedby the scientific model. Central to this model is the assumption that the aim ofscientific thought is to close experience, to remove the historical element from it,and thus to objectify it (1975, p, 311), From this it follows, at the very least, thatthe scientific method and the objectification it entails is an inappropriate methodfor the interpretation of texts. The scientists' closed, ahistorical approach has theeffect, quite literally, of destroying the object of the interpreter's inquiry. But


Gadamer's position on this issue also points to a thesis of broader significance.His analysis reveals that the objective knowledge of the scientific model is ahighly unusual form of the experience of tmth. The implication of Gadamer'sanalysis, then, is that the closed, ahistorical "tmth" ofthe scientific model, farfrom representing the universal form of all knowledge, is appropriate to only avery narrow range of situations.

The Ontology of Language

In the last section of Truth and Method, Gadamer tums to the question of theinterface between hermeneutics, ontology, and language. It is Gadamer's con-cem with language that provides the most explicit connection between histhought and that of Wittgenstein and, thus, will be the focus of the followingcomparison to Wittgensteinian social science. In the last section of Truth andMethod and in a number of other works that are devoted exclusively to a discus-sion of language, much of what Gadamer has to say has a distinctly Wittgenstein-ian ring. To begin, Gadamer's reasons for tuming to an examination of languageparallels that of Wittgenstein, The stated goal of Gadamer's hermeneutics is toexamine the nature of human understanding, and, he declares, since all under-standing is linguistic, the focus of this examination must be language itself,Gadamer arrives at his analysis of language through a discussion of the nature ofinterpretation. Since all interpretation is linguistic and all understanding is in-terpretation, it follows that "all interpretation takes place in the medium oflanguage (1975, p, 350), And further, that:

Linguistic interpretation is the form of all interpretation, even when what isinterpreted is not linguistic in nature. . . We must not let ourselves beconfused by these forms of interpretation which are not linguistic but in factpresuppose language. (1975, p. 360)

Several of the key aspects of Gadamer's analysis of the role of language alsodirectly parallel the account given by Wittgenstein. Like Wittgenstein, Gadameremphasizes that language entails a way of living ("form of life") that is uniqueto the human animal. He also asserts that language is not simply a tool exclusiveto human beings that, like other tools, can be set aside after use. Rather, heinsists that human beings are enclosed in language; that all of our knowledge ofourselves is encompassed in language. Furthermore, Gadamer, like Wittgen-stein, describes language as a "game" because, like a game, language is some-thing we enter into; an activity that we share (1975, p. 446; 1976b, pp, 62-63,210-211),

Although these similarities between the accounts of language offered byGadamer and Wittgenstein are significant, the differences between them areimmediately apparent. The first difference that can be identified is one of particu-lar importance to the social sciences: the approach to the possibility of mediation

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between language games. Because Gadamer's theory of language is rooted in atheory of interpretation, a central aspect of his approach is an analysis of thenature and function of mediation. The interpreter is, of course, unavoidablyinvolved in translation between languages, Gadamer defines the task of theinterpreter, and, hence, of hermeneutics itself, as the bridging of personal orhistorical distance between minds (1976b, p, 95). Wittgenstein, in contrast, hasvery little to say about this issue, a silence that has not gone unnoticed by hiscritics (Apel 1981, p, 249).

It is another aspect of Gadamer's theory of language, however, that representsthe most significant contrast between his approach and that of Wittgenstein.Following Heidegger, Gadamer defines language in ontological terms. He con-curs with Heidegger's central thesis that language is the "House of Being" andthat "being that can be understood is language." Both Heidegger and Gadamerargue that it is through language that the being of the world is revealed and, thus,that it is only through language that we can be said to "have" a world. Therelationship between language and world, furthermore, is reciprocal: the worldcomes to being in language and language has its being in the fact that the world isrepresented in it. Language "discloses" the world to us. This is why animals,who lack language, also lack a "world." It is in language, furthermore, that theinterface of hermeneutics and ontology is expressed. Hermeneutics is concemedwith language, and language is the fundamental mode of operation of our beingin the world. It is the medium through which consciousness is connected tobeing. "The nature of things" and "the language of things," Gadamer claims,have the same meaning (1975, pp, 401-411). By studying one we study theother.

It is not difficult to identify how this view of language is in confiict with thecentral thmst of Wittgenstein's theory. Although both Gadamer and Wittgensteinsee language as the central fact of human life, constitutive of the form of life weknow as human, and although both characterize language as a game, a sharedactivity that we enter into and are encompassed by, nevertheless Gadamer'sontological definition of language provides a sharp contrast to Wittgenstein'sapproach, Wittgenstein's theory of language is, at root, a strictly epistemologicalone. His interest in language is dictated by the thesis that we can know nothing ofthat which is beyond language because it is a realm about which we cannotspeak. And, although Gadamer would not dispute Wittgenstein's epistemologi-cal point, his interest in language is dictated by an ontological position: we studylanguage because it reveals being. This contrast can best be illustrated by thedifferent ways in which Gadamer and Wittgenstein define the concept "languagegame," Wittgenstein refers to language as a game in order to emphasize thatlanguage is constitutive of human activity; that human beings "do things withwords," Gadamer's position, however, can best be characterized with the state-ment, "words do things with us ," He uses the game analogy to point out that itis not the case that we play games, but rather, that games play us. He argues thatthe same is tme of language:


Strictly speaking, it is not a matter of our making use of words when wespeak. Though we 'use' words, it is not in the sense that we put a given toolto use as we please. Words themselves prescribe the only ways we can putthem to use. One refers to that as proper 'usage'—something which does notdepend on use, but rather we on it, since we are not allowed to violate it.(1976a, pp. 3, 69-76)

The major task of the following discussion will be to assess the significance ofthese contrasting views of language for the methodology of the social sciences.

GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS AND WITTGENSTEINIANSOCIAL SCIENCE^

Similarities

Despite the fact that Gadamer states unequivocally that it is not his intentionto offer a methodology for the social sciences, an analysis of his position cannevertheless proceed from the methodological implications of his thought asoutlined above. This outline indicates that, on the face of it, a "Gadamerianmethodology" for the social sciences would have a number of elements incommon with the Wittgensteinian position. Because of his opposition to bothpositions, Habermas has correctly identified the basis ofthe underlying similaritybetween Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians. Habermas criticizes both Gadamerand Wittgensteinian social science on one central point: failure to provide thesocial theorist with an "Archimedean point" outside the social actors' lin-guistically constituted world by which that world can be assessed. By concentrat-ing exclusively on lingistic understandings, he insists, both Gadamer and Wit-tgenstein deny the reflective element that is a necessary component of socialscience. Albrecht Wellmer has summarized Habermas' point on this issue verysuccinctly:

Hermeneutic and linguistic philosophers have denied the (epistemological)possibility of developing a theory which would allow us to reconstmcthistorical developments and social changes by systematically transcendingthe self-interpretation of a society and its individuals. They have denied,i.e., the {X)ssibility of reconstmcting historical processes taking place "inthe back" of individual agents who systematically deceive themselves abouttheir mutual social relations and about the meaning of their own action.(1976, p. 253)

In his reply to this criticism, Gadamer, like the Wittgensteinians, freely admitshis "failure" in this respect. His rebuttal, furthermore, has much in common

'*The understanding ofthe "ordinary language methodology" for the social sciences used in thisdiscussion is taken primarily from Wittgenstein (1958), Winch (1958), Louch, (1966), Pitkin, (1972)and Bernstein, (1976).

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with the replies of the Wittgensteinians to similar attacks. Like Wittgenstein,Gadamer claims that the limits of language are the limits of our world, Haber-mas' claim that the social actors' "linguistically articulated consciousness" mustbe supplemented with an analysis of the realities of work and domination is asmeaningless to Gadamer as it is to the Wittgensteinians. Gadamer's principalargument against Habermas is simply to ask for the justification of this claim to"reality" transcending the actors' concepts. Specifically, he argues, first, thatHabermas has failed to show how work and domination can be said to be ' 'real,''and second, that what we encounter in language is every bit as "real" as the"objective framework" to which Habermas appeals. In short, Gadamer arguesthat Habermas' claim to a reality outside the linguistic realm is "absolutelyabsurd" (1975, p. 495; 1976b; p, 31; 1971, pp. 68-70, 292).^

This fundamental agreement between Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians thatwe live in a linguistically constituted world has a number of important implica-tions for the methodological positions entailed by both approaches. First, sinceboth Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians insist on the linguisticality of the socialworld, it follows that both define analysis in the human sciences as exclusivelylinguistic analysis. The insistence that, as Winch puts it, language and socialrelations are two sides of the same coin, has elicited strong objections in thesocial scientific community. A "Gadamerian methodology," should it ever bearticulated, however, would logically adopt the same position. Second, bothGadamer and the Wittgensteinians explicitly reject the quest for the naturalscientist's definition of "objective knowledge" in the social sciences and denythat the model offered by the natural sciences is appropriate to inquiry in thesocial sciences. The arguments that Gadamer offers in support of his position,furthermore, are remarkably similar to those of Wittgensteinians. Gadamer'sattack on the Enlightenment's transcendental definition of reason has much incommon with Wittgenstein's point that logic is not a "gift of God." AndGadamer asserts, along with Winch, that the distinction between the natural andsocial sciences rests on the fact that the objects of these sciences are constitutedin radically different ways (Gadamer 1975, pp, 245-253; Winch 1958, p. 133).

A second major similarity between the position of Gadamer and that taken bythe Wittgensteinian social scientists can be identified as their common refusal todiscuss subjective intentionality. This refusal is, for both positions, rooted in theassumption that "understanding" does not entail reference to mental events.Gadamer makes his position on this issue very clear in Truth and Method. He

^Several commentators have argued that Habermas' embracing of hermeneutics is a positive signfor the social sciences because it involves bridging the gap between two major philosophical camps(Misgeld, 1976, p. 165; Apel 1971, p. 311). It has even been argued that there is no fundamentalmethodological difference between the two (Bubner 1975, pp. 337-352). The present analysis,however, leads to quite a different conclusion: Habermas denies Gadamer's basic thesis of theuniversality of hermeneutics. There seems to me to be no way of resolving such a fundamentalopposition.


defines his break with 19th century hermeneutics and historicism in terms of hisrejection ofthe notion that "understanding" means "getting inside the author'smind." He insists, against Dilthey and Schleiermacher, that understanding a textis the product of the dialectical interplay of the interpreter's question and thetext's answer. In another conte)i!t he summarizes this point very neatly:

When we understand a text we do not put ourselves in the place of the other,and it is not a matter of penetrating the spiritual activities of the author. . .The meaning of hermeneutical inquiry is to disclose the miracle of under-standing texts or utterances and not the mysterious communication of souls.Understanding is a participation in the common aim. (1979, p. 147)

The position that the meaning of a text is not dependent on the subjectiveintention of the author has become a hallmark of Gadamer's hermeneutic theory(Palmer 1969, p. 185), And it is likewise a hallmark of the Wittgensteinianposition. One of the principal theses of the works of both Winch and Louch istheir insistence that subjective mental events cannot be intelligibily discussed,and thus are not a possible subject matter for the social sciences. The basic thesisof their approach to social analysis is that what Weber labelled "subjectivemeaning" is publicly available data expressed in the ordinary language conceptsof the social actors. Initially, this position was articulated in opposition to theverstehen tradition of Dilthey and Weber (Winch 1958, pp. 111-120). Today itis more likely to be cast in terms of opposition to Schutz's social phenomenologyor ethnomethodology (Roche 1973).^ This position is, furthermore, one of themost distinctive and controversial aspects of the Wittgensteinian approach.

It can also be argued that, in the context of contemporary social theory, therefusal to discuss subjective intentionality represents an important commonalitybetween Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians. The significance of this com-monality can best be illustrated by reference to the ongoing debate betweenGadamer and Eric Hirsch on the role of authorial intention. Hirsch objects toGadamer's position on the grounds that, by rejecting the author's intention as thebasis for textual interpretation, Gadamer obviates the possibility of the objectiveinterpretation of texts. He claims that Gadamer's theory, which he labels "se-mantic autonomy," makes it impossible to judge one interpretation "better"than another. Instead, on Gadamer's view, critics rather than authors becomeparamount, Hirsch's counter to Gadamer centers on the distinction betweenmeaning and significance. He defines the meaning of a text as what the authormeans to say; its significance as the relationship between that meaning and a

It should be noted that although those in the Wittgensteinian tradition frequently engage indiscussions of intentionality, they define this concept in a fundamentally different way than do theHusserlians. For the Wittgensteinians, as Roche points out, intentions are publicly available data thatdo not entail recourse to subjective mental events.

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person, conception, or situation. Thus, although Hirsch claims that the meaningof a text is fixed and "objective" because it is determined by the author'sintention, its significance may vary depending on specific conditions or ques-tions of interpretation (Hirsch 1967, pp, 4-10).

From the perspective of Gadamer's theory of understanding outlined above,Hirsch's position is hardly a new one, Hirsch, like the historicists, fails to seethat the determination of what he calls the "meaning" of a text is a dialecticalprocess. Rather, he assumes that the interpreter can discover the author's inten-tion from a position of objectivity free from the historical infiuences of his/herculture. The importance of Hirsch's criticism in this context, however, lies not inits novelty, but rather in the fact that it highlights the commonality betweenGadamer's approach and that ofthe Wittgensteinians. Although Hirsch's notionof intentionality is, as David Hoy points out, philosophically unclear, it cannevertheless be asserted that what Hirsch seems to be arguing is that the deter-mination of authorial meaning entails recourse to subjectivity and consciousness(Hoy 1978, p 29)" Appealing to Husserl's distinction between "inner" and"outer" horizons, Hirsch argues that "objectivity in textual interpretation re-quires explicit reference to the speaker's subjectivity" (1967, pp. 224-237).

The fact that both Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians eschew reference to thespeaker's subjectivity leads them to assume two common positions of consider-able importance for the methodology of the social sciences. First, it entails thatboth approaches avoid the error of assuming that the social actor's subjectiveintentions are the "objective facts" of the social sciences that parallel those ofthe natural sciences. Thus, they also avoid the error of mimicking the methods ofthe natural sciences by searching for these objective facts" that would makesocial science tmly "scientific," Hirsch, on the contrary, makes this error in themost blatant way. Having argued that the author's subjective intention providesthe social sciences with their objective data, he concludes:

The identity of genre, pre-understanding, and hypothesis suggests that themuch-advertized cleavage between thinking in the sciences and the human-ities does not exist. The hypothetico-deductive process is fundamental inboth of them, as it is in all thinking that aspires to knowledge. (1967, p. 246)

'Hirsch's confusion on this point is indicated by the fact that at one point he explicitly states thatthe author's intention is not to be defmed as a "mental process" (1967, p. 32). But he freely refers tothe subjective intention of the author and insists that the verbal meaning of a text is a "willed type"that an author expresses by linguistic symbols and can be understood by another through thosesymbols (1967, p. 49). I think that it can be concluded that Hirsch fails to see the importance of thedistinction between viewing the author's intention as a subjective mental event that is translated intolanguage and viewing language and thought as indistinguishable. It should also be noted in thiscontext that Gadamer argues in reply to Hirsch that the semantic autonomy of a text does not precludea fixed meaning for a particular historical period. The tradition (prejudices) of a particular time fix atext's meaning for that time.


The second common position dictated by the rejection of subjective inten-tionality, however, is equally significant. By emphasizing the essentially inter-subjective nature of understanding, both Gadamer and Wittgenstein place thehuman sciences squarely in the common world of human practices rather than inthe shadowy private world of individual subjectivity. Gunnel has noted, alongwith Wittgenstein, that Gadamer is part of a movement in the human sciencesaway from seeing discourse as representing ideas and thoughts of speakers.These thinkers, on the contrary, see the distinction between language andthought as untenable (1979, pp. 116-117).

This comparison between the methodological implications of Gadamer's the-ory and Wittgensteinian social science, then, has revealed two fundamentalsimilarities: an insistence on the linguistic constitution of the social world, and arejection of any discussion of subjective intentionality. In the context of contem-porary issues in social theory, these similarities are significant because bothissues have been disputed at length in recent discussions. It has been argued thatthe agreement of Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians on these issues leads them toassume a number of similar methodological stances. The methodological con-vergence between Gadamer and the Wittgensteinians, furthermore, can be tracedto their basic agreement on the definition of language: both define language aspublic discourse rather than the translation of inner discourse. It is this agreementbetween Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the public nature of language that, morethan any other factor, accounts for the fact that the approaches to the socialsciences generated by their theories exhibit significant similarities.^

Divergences

Although Gadamer's concem with language provides the basis for the com-monality between this approach to the social sciences and that of the Wittgen-steinians, it is also the source of the most serious opposition between the twoapproaches. It was noted above that Gadamer's ontological approach to the studyof language diverges from the Wittgensteinians' epistemological approach. Whatmust now be examined is the implications of Gadamer's ontological tum for hisapproach to the methodology of the human sciences, and how this approachdiffers from that of the Wittgensteinians. The first item to be considered is anissue that is fundamental to the basic argument that Gadamer presents in Truthand Method: the proper relationship between the natural and the social sciences.One of Gadamer's principal goals in Truth and Method is to remove what mightbe termed the "inferiority complex" ofthe social sciences. The negative side ofthis argument was discussed in the first section of this paper: the error of theEnlightenment's identification of knowledge with scientific method. There is a

this point see Hacking (1975.)

218 HEKMAN

positive side to this argument as well, Gadamer asserts that the goal of hisinquiry is to explore the phenomenon of understanding, a phenomenon that isprior to all methodological discussions. In the introduction to Truth and Methodhe states:

The question I have asked seeks to discover and bring into consciousnesssomething that methodological dispute serves only to conceal and neglect,something that does not so much confine or limit modem science as precedeit and make it possible. (1975, p. xviii)

Gadamer's argument with regard to the priority of the phenomenon of under-standing has two important implications for his approach to the human sciences.First, it entails that he defines the objective knowledge ofthe scientific method asa special case of knowing rather than the universal model of all knowledge. Heargues that the "objective situation" ofthe natural sciences is unique because,unlike all other forms of understanding, it seeks to remove all subjective ele-ments from the cognitive process (1975, p. 411). For the natural sciences theuniversal fact of the linguisticality of our experience of the world, and conse-quently, the inescapability of prejudice, is seen as an inconvenience that must beovercome. The goal of the human sciences, in contrast, is to examine this basicontological fact of human existence. Gadamer puts this point very succinctly inhis discussion of Husserl's concepts of the Lebenswelt:

His analysis ofthe 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) and of this anonymous constitu-tion of all meaning and significance which forms the ground and texture ofexperience, showed definitively that the concept of objectivity representedby the sciences exemplifies but a special case. (1979, p. 129)

The second implication of this position, however, is of even greater signifi-cance. Gadamer asserts that because the subject matter of the human sciences,human understanding, is a precondition for all knowing, the human sciences arelogically prior to the natural sciences:

If Verstehen is the basic moment of human in-der-Welt-sein, then the humansciences are nearer to human self-understanding than the natural sciences.The objectivity of the latter is no longer an unequivocal and obligatory idealof knowledge.

Because the human sciences contribute to human self-understanding eventhough they do not approach the natural sciences in exactness and objec-tivity, they do contribute to human self-understanding because they in tumare based in human self-understanding. (1979, p. 106)

On the face of it, it may seem that this view is not noticeably different from thatespoused by the Wittgensteinians, Like Gadamer, the Wittgensteinians take greatpains to distinguish the social from the natural sciences. But the Wittgenstein-


ians' position differs from Gadamer's in a number of important ways. Althoughthe Wittgensteinians clearly reject the view that the social sciences must mimicthe model ofthe natural sciences, they, like Dilthey, implicitly accept the modelof "objective knowledge" employed by the natural sciences. Both Winch andLouch devote a significant portion of their analyses to proving that this model isnot an appropriate one for the social sciences (Louch 1966, p. 163). Theiranalyses, however, do not go beyond this negative point. Gadamer argues thatthe "understanding" that is the subject matter of the human sciences precedesand makes possible the special form of knowledge characteristic of the naturalsciences. He thus effectively tums the tables on the natural sciences by showingthat the social sciences are logically prior to them. Winch and Louch, in contrast,do not move beyond the narrow methodological point that the method of thenatural sciences cannot be utilized in the social sciences. They fail, in otherwords, to provide a positive basis for the social sciences because they remaincaught in the methodological disputes characteristic of 19th century hermeneu-tics, the disputes so stemly castigated in Truth and Method.

It should be emphasized in this context, furthermore, that Gadamer's positionon this issue is firmly rooted in ontology. His basic argument, and the source ofhis divergence from the Wittgensteinians, is that the human sciences are prior tothe natural sciences because they investigate the ontological condition of man inthe world, I would now like to argue that this ontological approach to thedefinition of the human sciences provides Gadamer with a position that avoidssome of the central criticisms that have been raised against the Wittgensteinianapproach. A wide range of objections to Wittgensteinian social science havebeen advanced, but three basic lines of criticisms can be identified: first, theimplicit relativism and nominalism of the Wittgensteinian approach; second, themonadic character of language game analysis; and, third, the ahistorical nature ofWittgensteinian analysis. It can be shown with regard to each ofthese issues thatGadamer's ontological definition of the human sciences offers a refutation ofthese criticisms not available to the Wittgensteinians.

The charge that the Wittgensteinian approach to the social sciences results inthe "total relativism" of social science has been most vehemently and elo-quently stated by Emst Gellner. Gellner declares that for most philosophersrelativism is a problem, but for Wittgenstein and Winch it is a solution (1974,pp. 19-49). His argument is simply that the Wittgensteinian approach is un-avoidably relativistic and thus an unacceptable basis for investigation in thesocial sciences. The nominalism ofthe Wittgensteinian approach also draws hisfire. Analysis in the social sciences, he claims, cannot be limited to the examina-tion of "mere words," It must, on the contrary, be concemed with the "reality"of social relations.

The Wittgensteinians' reply to these charges has been to argue the epis-temological point that words form the boundary of what can be intelligiblydiscussed and, thus, to posit a realm of "reality" beyond that which is lin-

220 HEKMAN

guistically constituted is to posit a reality about which we cannot speak. And,although Gadamer would agree with this argument, his ontological perspectivesupplies him with more substantive arguments against the charges of relativismand nominalism. First, and most importantly, Gadamer argues that relativism,or, in his words, prejudice, is not a "problem" or be "solved," but is, rather,the ontological condition of man in the world. By clearly revealing the error ofidentifying objective knowledge with freedom from prejudice, Oadamer revealsthat Gellner's criticism is fundamentally misconceived. His approach also sup-plies a refutation of the charge of nominalism. For Gadamer language is centralto understanding because being is revealed in language. The charge that thehuman sciences study "mere words" thus becomes meaningless because thestudy of language is the study of being itself,^

The second criticism, the charge that Wittgenstein sees language games asmonadic entities not subject to translation, is one that has figured prominently inHabermas' work, and can best be approached by referring to his comparativecritique of Wittgenstein and Gadamer, Habermas argues that Gadamer's positionis less relativistic than that of Wittgenstein because Gadamer emphasizes the"porousness" of language games. While Gadamer's hermeneutic analysisfocuses on the mediating function of language games, Wittgenstein, in contrast,defines language games as untranslatable (1970, pp. 252ff; Apel 1980, pp.23-33). Habermas uses this contrast between the two positions to argue for thesuperiority of Gadamer's view. But although Habermas has identified a validdifference between the positions of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, his argumentmust be carefully qualified. Although pointing to the monadic character of Witt-genstein's language games has become a stock criticism of his approach (Gellner1974, p, 24; Maclntyre 1974, p, 71; Wellmer 1971, p. 30), it should be notedthat this position has been attributed to Wittgenstein largely on the basis of hissilence on this issue. Nowhere does Wittgenstein explicitly reject the possibilityof translation between language games; the question simply never comes up.And altfiough in some of his work Winch seems to deny the possibility oftranslation between language games, his position on this issue is less thanclear.^° Gadamer, of course, deals explicitly with the problem of translationthroughout his work. The analysis of how translation or interpretation occurs is,in fact, the comerstone of his theory of hermeneutics. But the reason for hisinterest in this issue should be clear. His approach to the human sciences emergesfrom the hermeneutic tradition of the translation of texts; his is, thus, intimatelyconcemed with the problems raised by this issue. It can be argued, then, that the

^In this Gadamer sees his view in conflict with that of Wittgenstein. He explicitly states that therelationship between being and language obviates the nominalism implicit in Wittgenstein's approach(1976b, p. 75).

i 'In his discussion of this issue Hacking makes the point that Winch does not derive his positionfrom that of Wittgenstein (1975, p. 153).


difference between Gadamer and Wittgenstein on this issue represents less anexplicit contrast between the two positions than a difference in emphasis rootedin the different traditions from which each position derives.

Much the same point can be made with regard to the third issue, also afrequently noted difference between Gadamer and Wittgenstein: the fact thatGadamer, unlike Wittgenstein, stresses the historicality of language, and, conse-quently, understanding, Habermas, again, makes much of this difference, prais-ing Gadamer for his "dialectical" account of tradition (1970, pp. 261ff), It canbe argued, however, that the difference between Gadamer and Wittgenstein onthis issue has been exaggerated, Gadamer's emphasis on the historicality ofunderstanding does, as Habermas claims, add an important dimension to lan-guage analysis. Although this dimension is, strictly speaking, lacking in manyordinary language discussions, it is not by any means in confiict with the basicassumptions of the approach. Winch and Louch have been frequently criticizedfor adopting an ahistorical approach. But the work of others whose perspectivecan, broadly, be defined as Wittgensteinian suggests that a historical dimensionis quite compatible with Wittgensteinian social science.'' The difference be-tween the two approaches, once more, is one of emphasis rather than incompat-ibility.

My point with regard to the issues of translation and historicality, thus, istwofold. First, I wish to emphasize that the differences between the two positionson both issues has been overrated. Secondly, I want to stress that Gadamer'sconcems with translation and the historicality of understanding represent aspectsof his approach that are particularly wellsuited to the necessities of social scien-tific analysis. They also represent, unfortunately, aspects that have been largelyignored by Wittgensteinian social scientists. The fact that the Wittgensteinianapproach has been accused of ignoring these issues, furthermore, has stood in theway of its acceptance as a viable methodology for the social sciences.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis establishes, then, that Gadamer's tum to ontology offersan advantage to the social sciences because it obviates some of the centralproblems of Wittgensteinian social science, Gadamer's position on the relation-ship between the natural and social sciences, relativism, nominalism, translation,and historicality provides the social sciences with a more viable approach thanthat espoused by the Wittgensteinians. In each case the advantage of his positionis dependent on his move to ontology. Although Gadamer makes it clear that hismove to ontology is central to his approach, because he is not specificallyconcemed with the social sciences or methodological questions, he does not offeran explicit argument for his ontological position. He relies on Heidegger's analy-

" I am thinking here particularly of J. G. A. Pocock (1971).

222 HEKMAN

sis of the necessity of ontology rather than developing his own position. Follow-ing Heidegger his position is simply that ontology precedes epistemology. InTruth arui Method his position is supported primarily by an analysis of thecontemporary problems of the human sciences, Gadamer argues that the empha-sis on epistemology and the rejection of ontological issues in these disciplines isthe cause of their current lack of direction. In a commentary on Gadamer's work,Hwa Yol Jung expresses this point very succinctly. Epistemology presupposesontology, Jung argues, because "how to know human action must be based onwhat human action is" . To deny this results in "methodolatry," the worship ofmethod to the exclusion of substance (1979, p. 59),'^

Although Gadamer's view is significant in the specific sense that it avoids theproblems incumbent on the Wittgensteinian view, his position also has widerimplications for contemporary social theory. By avoiding the relativism, nomi-nalism, and ahistoricism of the Wittgensteinian approach, Gadamer's positiondemonstrates that all anti-positivist approaches to social scientific methodologydo not, as some critics have noted, necessarily encounter these problems.Gadamer, unlike Habermas and a number of other anti-positivist critics in thesocial sciences, does not reject the objectivism of positivism only to seek anabsolute foundation for the social sciences in another sphere. Rather, like Witt-genstein, he seeks to develop an approach that has as its task the understanding ofhuman life and thought, not the uncovering of its absolute foundations. It shouldbe emphasized, then, that despite the differences between Gadamer and Wit-tgenstein, there is yet an important commonality between them: antifounda-tionalism.'^ In contrast to Habermas, both Gadamer and Wittgenstein reject notonly the positivist approach but, specifically, its search for the absolute founda-tions of thought. Although Gadamer's move to ontology allows him to avoid theextreme relativism of the Wittgensteinian position, it is nevertheless the case thatGadamer, like the Wittgensteinians, rejects the Habermasian search for absolutesas "totally absurd,"

Finally, it can be argued that this significant commonality between Gadamerand the Wittgensteinians also extends to what can be identified as the greatestadvantage of Gadamer's approach: establishing the priority of the human sci-ences vis-a-vis the natural sciences. Even though neither Wittgenstein nor hisfollowers in the social sciences have developed such an argument, it can beargued that this position is implicit in Wittgenstein's approach. The Philosophi-cal Investigations can be interpreted as offering an epistemological argument forthe priority of ordinary language understanding. Karl-Otto Apel, in his commen-tary on Wittgenstein, argues that Wittgenstein overcomes the methodological

'^Anthony Giddens, in his treatment of this same point, rather cavalierly dismisses Gadamer'smove to ontology as mistaken because it falls prey to the "fundamental error of existential phe-nomenology" that truth inheres in being (1976, p. 62).

this point see Rorty (1979).


solipsism of the Tractatus in his later philosophy by adopting the position that theunderstanding implicit in the everyday language of social actors is the a prioricondition of all human understanding (1980, p, 251), It follows that all systemsof thought, including that ofthe natural sciences, must presuppose this everydayunderstanding, and hence, that the subject matter of the human sciences (ordi-nary language) is the ground of the natural sciences.

Although this position can be imputed to Wittgenstein, its implications havenot been developed in any coherent way. And it is in this regard that Gadameroffers a clear advantage. His move from epistemology to ontology allows him tooffer an explicit argument for the priority of the subject matter of the humansciences. In so doing he rescues the social sciences from the inferior position towhich they are relegated by the positivist program. This is no mean feat, andGadamer's success in this regard should insure that his position will be takenseriously by the social sciences and have a significant impact on contemporarysocial scientific methodology.

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Wilson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Gellner, E. 1974. Concepts and society. In Rationality, ed. B. Wilson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Misgeld, D. 1976. Critical theory and hermeneutics: The debate between Habermas and Gadamer.

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Susan Hekman -Gadamers Hermeneutics