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The Taiping RevolutionThe Taiping Revolutionary Movement by Jen Yu-wenReview by: J. Y. WongModern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1975), pp. 557-566Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312085 .

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REVIEWS 557Indian readerswas published as Spontaneousevolution:The QuitIndiaMove-ment, he title of this versionindicates a subtle shift of emphasis; while a chap-ter on 'The Future of Revolutions' has been omitted with its categorization ofQuit India as the manifestation of a spontaneousand irresistiblerevolutionarysituationwhere the government had lost its power to govern.The precise evidence of events in 1942-3 presented here is nonetheless ex-tremely valuable. The author has investigated many of the newly availablegovernment sources for this period, and the Gandhi, Nehru and A.I.C.C.papers. Particularly important is the light these shed on government policyand tensions between London and Delhi in policy-making, on the attitude ofGandhi himself, and on the regional variations in the movement. Tables onpp. 230-2, forexample, give statisticsby province of the extent andmanifesta-tions of the movement from the Government of India's Home Political files.Yet out of a total of eleven chapters only one deals with the actual rebellion:in this regrettably small space there is no room for more than a panoramicsurvey. A picture is clear of uncoordinated local outbreaks, but we still needanalysisof these local ebullitions, and particularly of possible correlations be-tween them and events in I930-4 and I920-2 and even earlier outbreaks. Itmay be that there is a degree of continuity of local action in areas like Biharthat has gone unrecognized by historians focussing on the development ofnational consciousness and activity, and drawing evidence from the careersand comments of Indians and Britishwho saw politics in continental terms,rather than from those of more illusive provincial and district figures whoseperceptions and actions were the blocks from which any national movementhad to be built.The evidence arrayed here raises other significant questions about India'spolitical experience under imperial rule. For example, Quit India andGandhi's recognition of the role he could play compared with I930 or I920underline the constraints within which a national leader had to operate. Italso suggeststhe circumstances n which Gandhian civil disobedience is viableas an anti-imperial technique, providing a fruitfulcomparisonwith the otherall-India campaigns Gandhi instigated, and his local yet arguably moreeffective ones in Kaira or Bardoli. Readers of India'sRevolution ill certainlyfind it provocative; but they may well consider its value lies in the questionsraised by its evidence and angle of approach rather than in the answers itseeksto provide.UniversityfManchester JUDITH M. BROWN

TheTaipingRevolutionThe Taiping RevolutionaryMovement.BYJEN YU-WEN. Yale University Press:New Haven and London, I973. Pp. xxiii, 6I6. ?Io.oo.Jen Yu-wen's The TaipingRevolutionary ovements the English version of hisT'ai-p'ingt'ien-kuo h'iian-shihHong Kong, I962). The latter is the result of

REVIEWS 557Indian readerswas published as Spontaneousevolution:The QuitIndiaMove-ment, he title of this versionindicates a subtle shift of emphasis; while a chap-ter on 'The Future of Revolutions' has been omitted with its categorization ofQuit India as the manifestation of a spontaneousand irresistiblerevolutionarysituationwhere the government had lost its power to govern.The precise evidence of events in 1942-3 presented here is nonetheless ex-tremely valuable. The author has investigated many of the newly availablegovernment sources for this period, and the Gandhi, Nehru and A.I.C.C.papers. Particularly important is the light these shed on government policyand tensions between London and Delhi in policy-making, on the attitude ofGandhi himself, and on the regional variations in the movement. Tables onpp. 230-2, forexample, give statisticsby province of the extent andmanifesta-tions of the movement from the Government of India's Home Political files.Yet out of a total of eleven chapters only one deals with the actual rebellion:in this regrettably small space there is no room for more than a panoramicsurvey. A picture is clear of uncoordinated local outbreaks, but we still needanalysisof these local ebullitions, and particularly of possible correlations be-tween them and events in I930-4 and I920-2 and even earlier outbreaks. Itmay be that there is a degree of continuity of local action in areas like Biharthat has gone unrecognized by historians focussing on the development ofnational consciousness and activity, and drawing evidence from the careersand comments of Indians and Britishwho saw politics in continental terms,rather than from those of more illusive provincial and district figures whoseperceptions and actions were the blocks from which any national movementhad to be built.The evidence arrayed here raises other significant questions about India'spolitical experience under imperial rule. For example, Quit India andGandhi's recognition of the role he could play compared with I930 or I920underline the constraints within which a national leader had to operate. Italso suggeststhe circumstances n which Gandhian civil disobedience is viableas an anti-imperial technique, providing a fruitfulcomparisonwith the otherall-India campaigns Gandhi instigated, and his local yet arguably moreeffective ones in Kaira or Bardoli. Readers of India'sRevolution ill certainlyfind it provocative; but they may well consider its value lies in the questionsraised by its evidence and angle of approach rather than in the answers itseeksto provide.UniversityfManchester JUDITH M. BROWN

TheTaipingRevolutionThe Taiping RevolutionaryMovement.BYJEN YU-WEN. Yale University Press:New Haven and London, I973. Pp. xxiii, 6I6. ?Io.oo.Jen Yu-wen's The TaipingRevolutionary ovements the English version of hisT'ai-p'ingt'ien-kuo h'iian-shihHong Kong, I962). The latter is the result of


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'some forty years of study and research';1 the former, that of 'over fifty'.2Naturally, the new book is a matter of great interest in the academic world,which is anxious to know how it is differentfrom the old.The old version is a three-volume work of about 2,400 pages of smallChinese print. It gives a detailed account of the Taiping Revolution from thebeginning to the end. It was written over a period of about twenty years, withthe author researching and writing his book in sections, and publishing theparts either as monographs or serials in journals. His researchincluded fieldwork in the birthplace of the Taiping leader Hung Hsiu-ch'tian in Kwang-tung, and a prolonged visit to Kwangsi where the revolution began. He alsoran ajournal, first in Shanghai and later in Hong Kong, 'inducing readersto find and send Taiping material for publication'.3 A life-long devotionmaterialized in a reconstruction of the historic upheaval in graphic detail.

For thefirsttime; historians are providedwith a full account of the revolution.After the hard work of unearthing information, the next stage ought to beone of analysis and interpretation. Few are as well qualified asJen Yu-wenhimself to undertake such a task. He has collected the data, judged theirauthenticity, and assimilated them into a narrative history of the revolution.His command of details, together with his long experience in dealing with thesubject, puts him in an unrivalled position. Of course there are other special-ists. Kuo T'ing-i has compiled a chronology of the movement;4 Tang Ssu-yiihas written numerous monographs;5Franz Michael has contributed to the'history and documents' ;6 Vincent Shih has examined its ideology,7 to men-tion only a few. ButJen Yu-wen stands out as the scholar who was invited towrite about Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and the Taipingswhen the Nationalistgovern-ment in Taiwan compiled the History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, following thefashion of earlier dynastic histories.This may be taken as recognition of theman as the leading historian in this field by the authorities in Taiwan. Natur-ally, the academic world has high expectations of a book published, inwhatever language, eleven yearsafter the first.Regrettably, the new book falls far short of such expectations. It is merelya condensation of the first. Worse still, it excludes 'the elaboration and argu-mentation that was [were?] possible' in the first, retaining 'the verifiable fac-tual record in great enough detail to let the reader draw general conclusionsfor himself.'8This raises the question of who the author expects his reader toThis article is written in the congenial environment of St Andrew's College in theUniversity of Sydney. I am grateful to the Vice-Principal, ProfessorR. Spann, forhaving read and commented on the manuscript.1Jen Yu-wen, Ch'iian-shih,:iv, Forewordby F. S. Drake.2 Jen Yu-wen, Movement,iv, ForewordbyJ. D. Spence.3 Ibid.,xix.

4 T'ai-p'ingt'ien-kuohih-shihjih-chichTaipei, reprinted, I965).5 Historiographyf theTaipingRebellionCambridge,Mass., I962).NewLight n heHistoryftheTaiping ebellionNewYork,reprinted,1966).TheTaipingRebellion nd heWestern owers Oxford, I97I ).6 TheTaipingRebellion:HistoryandDocumentsSeattle and London, 1966).7 TheTaipingdeology;tsSources,nterpretationsnd nfluenceSeattle, 967).8 Jen Yu-wen, Movement,xxi.

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be. The time when academics could comfortablyclaim to be sinologistswith-out knowing Chinese is gone and probably will never return. Nowadays, it isdifficult to find even graduate students without some competence in the lan-guage. Seriousscholarsshould and would consult the Chinese original insteadof the English condensation. If the book is meant for undergraduatestaking acoursein general Asian History, one wonders if they will not be overwhelmedby 545 pages of personal names, place names and intricate details of cam-paigns. In a way, the Taiping movement is similar to the Yangtze River,along which the revolutionariesat firstfought downstream towardsNankingto establish their Heavenly Capital, and for the control of which they con-tinued to fight thereafter.Wave upon wave of revolutionaryleaders as well asgovernment officers continued to rise and perish. Perhaps the only namewhich appears at the beginning of the book and which the reader is still ableto recognize towards the end is that of the hero Hung Hsiu-ch'iian himself.If the book makes difficult reading even for interested scholars,9one wondersif the 'non-specialists'will find it at all enticing. But Jonathan Spence sug-gests in the Foreword that the book was designed to meet the needs of the'non-specialists'.This is not to deny the value of the book. Its details are very useful. Nor isthis to say that books should not be translated. Indeed, Jen Yu-wen's tomeought to be made available to scholarsother than sinologistsfor comparativestudies, and generally, for a better understanding of China. This article doesquery two things, however. The first is whether or not the author could havedone a greater service to scholarship by using his time, effort and resources,and of coursehis knowledge and experience, to write an interpretativehistoryof the Taipings, leaving the translation to others. The second is whether ornot the way in which the book has been condensed is necessarily the bestmeans of communication with the reader. While leaving the second (includ-ing format, style and the bibliography)10to other reviews, this paper con-centrates on the first.

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No doubt, many will share the frustrationof reading a new book which isno better than the first.Many important questionswith regardto the TaipingRevolution remain unanswered. The first concerns the leader Hung Hsiu-ch'iian. It is generally agreed that he conceived the rebellion. On pages9 I may be a slow reader.AlthoughI had previously eadJen'sCh'iian-shihndotherbookson theTaiping,I hadto spendonewholeweekofuninterrupted eadingto finish en'snewbook.Admittedly,havingto make notesas I went alongdid nothelp myspeedeither.10I should like to remarkbriefly that the book is divided into 3 parts, 23 chaptersand a totalof 544headings,which is not a badwayof dealingwithexcessivedetails.

However, t isa mistake, think o divide hebibliographynto7sectionsand16sub-sections,with thecontents f eachsubsectionrrangednalphabetical rder.Sinceonecanneverbe absolutely ertain nto whatcategorya book alls,particularly roman-izedname of a Chinesebookwhichappears n a footnote,one will experiencemuchfrustration henusing hebibliography.

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560 REVIEWS26-28, Jen gives a cogent exposition of how Hung coalesced his ideas into 'atheoretical basis for the religious-nationalistic-political revolution . .'. Butthe rest of the sentence quoted poses problems. It reads: 'that was his life'swork'. Hung must have played a leading role in the formative years of themovement to remain its head and subsequently become 'king of the futurekingdom... as a result of a formal election' by the other leaders (p. 43).Once the troops were mobilized, however, there is little evidence of his activeparticipation in war. It was always his generals or 'sworn brothers' who foughtand died. Nor is there much evidence of initiative on his part in planningthe campaigns or indeed the future of the rebellion. When the Taipings hadinvaded Hunan and found 'the overall situation' discouraging, 'some leaderssuggested that the whole army return to Kwangsi. Of the top command EastKing Yang Hsiu-ch'ing alone refused to consider the idea' (p. 96). This is anastounding observation which makes one doubt if the Heavenly King knewwhere he was leading the revolution.His record after the establishment of the Heavenly Capital in Nanking iseven poorer. He did not head the Northern Expedition against Peking, des-pite his professed nationalistic-revolutionary zeal. Nor did he participate ona single occasion in the bitter struggle for the control of the Yangtze River.Sitting at Nanking, he could not even claim to be co-ordinating the variousbattlefields, as this responsibility fell successively on the shoulders of YangHsiu-ch'ing, Shih Ta-k'ai and Hung Jen-kan. Far from being useful, his roleas a sitting target at Nanking constantly impeded the progress of the move-ment. In March 1856, for example, Shih Ta-k'ai had manoeuvred TsengKuo-fan into the 'critically dangerous position of being trapped in an almostundefended city cut off on all sides from help. Shih was about to finish histask when he had to abandon it. Nanking had been threatened by a largebody of government troops and Shih was recalled to defend it by 'strict mili-tary order' (p. 256). Tseng Kuo-fan was to be the person who eventuallycrushed the Taipings. Such was the fatal consequence of establishing a sittingtarget.

Nanking was again threatened by the government forces in June I863.Hung Hsiu-ch'iian 'urgently despatched messengers, one day as many asthree, to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, then directing the campaign at Sung-chiang andShanghai, pleading for his immediate return' (p. 518). If one looks up therecords of previous dynastic founders, one finds that 'The great emperors ofCh'in and Han Lacking literary brilliance, Those of T'ang and Sung Havingbut few romantic inclinations,'l were nevertheless courageous militaryleaders. Why was Hung's performance so poor in comparison ?Jen Yu-wen has offered an explanation of Hung's behaviour in one sen-tence. Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had encouraged Hung Hsiu-ch'ian to 'dedicatehimself to religious, literary and other pursuits-a stratagem made possibleby the Heavenly King's progressive retreat from reality since his early psycho-logical illness' (p. 289). One only wishes that the author had elaborated onthis assertion. Hung's legendary illness occurred in 1837, an illness which JenYu-wen alleged to be a nervous breakdown (pp. I5-I9). If he began to re-

1 Poem by Mao Tse-tung, translated by Jerome Ch'en in his Mao andtheChineseRevolutionOxford, London and New York, 1965), p. 340.


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REVIEWS 56Itreat progressivelyfrom reality thereafter, it is difficult to imagine how in1847 he was still able to go to Kwangsi for a second time and to remain thereorganizing a massive rebellion, which came into the open in 185I. It is evenmore difficult to understand why he should be elected Heavenly King. In thepolitical and military realities of a large-scale rebellion, Hung's religiousclaims might have won him a place as chaplain to the forces, but not as thehead of the movement if he had not also possessed some outstanding personalqualities. One can only make conjectures about Hung's physical and mentalcondition in the I850's (Theodore Hamberg has given a fascinating accountof Hung's 'visions',12 but that was a story of the I830's). In the absence ofsolid evidence, Jen Yu-wen's explanation cannot be regarded as anythingmore than an interesting speculation. In any case, Hung was still sufficientlyrealistic in I856 to extricate himself from the trap Yang Hsiu-ch'ing laid forhim in that year (pp. 290-I). Furthermore, Hung remained as inactive asever even after Yang's abortive coup, when he was no longer encouraged byanyone to 'dedicate himself to religious, literary and other pursuits'. Itshould be added, however, that Jen Yu-wen's attempt at explanation here ismuch more measured than his original references to Hung's folly and incom-petence (huen-kueihu-t'u).13This paper does not aspire to provide an answer to this intricate problem.It seeks merely to indicate an important, but so far ignored, aspect of theTaiping Revolution. In view of the fact that Hung Hsiu-ch'iian is generallyidentified with the Revolution, almost to the point of saying that Hung wasthe Revolution, a proper assessment of his role is necessary. The exaggerationis probably the result of over-glorification of Hung by Dr Sun Yat-sen and hisfellow revolutionaries. Sun Yat-sen even called himself 'Hung Hsiu-ch'iianthe second' (p. 545). It is understandable that Sun Yat-sen and his comradesshould spare no efforts in building up a legend about Hung and the Taipingsin order to spread the word of revolution against the Manchus. However,almost three-quarters of a century has elapsed since the collapse of the Manchuregime. Historians of this age should be able to study Hung Hsiu-ch'iian andthe Taiping Rebellion in a more detached manner.The next aspect to be considered is the strategy of the Taipings. Since theiravowed purpose was to overthrow the Manchus, naturally their ultimategoal was to capture Peking. The question which was bound to arise was howthe rebels could most effectively achieve their aim. This involves the prob-lems of terrain, recruits, supplies and armament. As Jen Yu-wen is a nativeof Kwangtung, and covered extensive areas during his visit to Kwangsi, hemust know that there is a branch of the Pearl River system called the WestRiver. This river begins in the highlands of northern Kwangsi. It flowsroughly south-east across the topographically slanting province into Kwang-tung, passes the rich city of Canton and the Pearl River delta before entering

12 Hamberg, T., The Visionsof Hung-siu-tshuen,nd Origin of the Kwvang-sinsur-rection(New York, Washington and London, reprinted, I969). Hamberg was aSwedish missionary,who worked among the Hakkas and learnt their dialect. Signifi-cantly, both Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and his cousin HungJen-kan were Hakka. Hamberg'sbook is an account of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's early careeras told by HungJen-kan.13 Jen Yu-wen, Ch'iian-shih,I: I353.


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the sea. The Taipings had been active in the south-eastern cornerof Kwangsi,in the area where the West River flows into Kwangtung. Once they had begunan open rebellion, they could not remain in Kwangsi and hope that theManchu regimewould collapse by itself. They had to go and topple it.To do so, they could sail or march downstream along the West River intoKwangtung, occupy Canton, and use the resources of the rich Pearl Riverdelta to finance a northern expedition along the lines of the Kuomintang ex-pedition some seventy years later. Alternatively, they could fight uphill alonga tributary of the West River into the highlands in northern Kwangsi, andcrossthe treacherous mountain ranges into the highlands of southern Hunan.From there they could descend on the Yangtze River in the north along oneof its tributaries. Once they were on the Yangtze River, they might sail down-stream into the rich Yangtze delta. There, they would find themselves in aposition similar to that in Canton. As it turned out, the Taipings took thesecond and far more difficultroute, ending in Nanking.It has been generally assumed that from Kwangsi the Taipings went northinstead of east as a matter of course, because Peking was in the north. Onewould have serious doubts about such an assumption when one recalls whathappened at Wuchang in February I853. By this time, the Taipings hadtaken the second route and had sailed down the Yangtze as far as Wuchang.There, they had to determine whether they should march north on Peking,or east on Nanking. They decided on the east (pp. I07-8). The question is,why did the Taipings not go eastin the first nstance,fromKwangsi to Canton ?There were many reasons in favour of going to Canton. The question ofterrain has been noted. If the Taipings had decided to go east, Feng Yiin-shang might not have died near the border between Kwangsi and Hunan,and the army suffered a devastating ambush shortlyafter (pp. 86ff). Instead,the journey might have been much easier, and far less perilous. It is difficultto exaggerate the far-reaching consequences of Feng's tragic death. He hadheld a delicate balance of power among the rival groupswithin the Taipings.His death set the stage for the bloody coup of i856, from which the Taipingsnever recovered (Cf. p. 92, but the more important details may be found inCh'ian-shih, I: 1349-50).On the question of future recruits, one must remember that Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and Feng Yiin-shan were natives of Kwangtung. Since they were de-termined to rebel, they were bound to realize that they had many potentialsympathizers in the local secret societies. These numerous undergroundorganizations had one thing in common. Their ideal was to overthrow theManchu Dynasty. Time was to show that once the Taipings had establishedtheir capital at Nanking, thousands upon thousands rose in Kwangtung inresponse.14Many of these later marched north en masse o join the Taipings(pp. 254-5). One must not forget, either, about the branch of the God-wor-shippers in Kwangtung. Ling Shih-pa had been converted by Hung Hsiu-ch'uian n Kwangsi. He went back to Kwangtung for recruits.By the time theTaipings began their open rebellion he had already gathered a very large fol-lowing. Both for strategic and fraternal reasons, the Taipings should have

14 The chapteron rebellions n Kwangtung n thisperiodhas beenomittedfromtheCh'iian-shihhenthe authorwascondensing iswork.

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REVIEWS 563gone to meet and incorporate this force. They did in fact send a detachmentto meet Ling's group of 'over ten thousand' (p. 73). This shows that theywere aware of these arguments.

Another argument for going to Canton lay in the prospect of buyingsuperior foreign arms, which, needless to say, could play a very importantrole in their bid for power. Canton had a long history of foreign trade. Itbecame one of the so-called five treaty ports as a result of the Treaty of Nan-king, I842. Should the Taipings succeed in gaining control of the area, therevenue from the customs house was more than sufficient to meet the cost offoreign weapons. They might even find the necessarymoney, techniques andpersonnel to build a fleet to accompany a northern expedition.15The strate-gicvalue of suchadditional mobility cannot be underestimated.After they hadreached the Yangtze delta, the Taipings finally decided to attack Shanghaiand actually occupied Ningpol (pp. 433ff), two of the five treaty ports otherthan Canton. This shows that they were conscious of the importance of pos-sessinga trading port.If the Taipings had captured Canton at the beginning, it might even havebeen possible for them to establish diplomatic relations with the powers andhence undermine the legitimacy of the Manchu government. The powerswere not without interest in the new movement. They repeatedly sent repre-sentatives to assessthe situation once the Taipings had establishedthemselvesat Nanking (pp. 267-77). Yang Hsiu-ch'ing's insolent behaviour towardsthese envoys has been noted. This is because Yang had by this time amassedsupreme power. He also displayed his arrogance towards the other Taipingleaders, including the Heavenly King himself. Had the Taipings taken thefirst route, Feng Yiin-shan might not have died, and the balance of powernot been so hopelessly upset in favour of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing. It is possiblethat the steady Feng Yiin-shan might have been put in charge of thenegotiationsat Canton. It is also possiblethat HungJen-kan would have beenable tojoin the Taipings at this stage, and his superior diplomacy might haveproved more successful (Cf. pp. 35iff). Even if Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had beenchosen for the task, he could not have been as supremely powerful as he wasin Nanking, and his behaviour might have been more sensible. This is not tosuggest that the Taiping would have made important concessions in returnfor foreign military aid, as the Manchus later did (Cf. pp. 478ff). But theymight at least have forestalled their enemy. As the powers were responsiblefor the final collapse of the Taipings,16 his point is worth stressing.However, the Taipings would be denied all these opportunities of buyingforeign arms, building a navy, and coming to an understanding with thepowers,should they take the second route, which is land-bound.

15Cf. the tremendousechnicaland financialdifficultiesTseng Kuo-fanexperi-encedwhenhe triedto construct fleet forhisHsiangArmy.Withgreateagerness e'soughtouteveryKwangtung avalofficer .. forsystematic uestioning n theprac-tical aspectsof ship-building' (p. 224).16 This isnot to saythatthepowersactuallysuppressedhe rebellion.By the timethey intervened,Tseng Kuo-fanhad gained the upper hand and the fall of theTaipingswasonly a matterof time. Foreign ntervention,however,accelerated hedownfall.


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Moreover, Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and Feng Yiin-shan had lived in bothKwangtung and Kwangsi. They were bound to realize that Kwangtung wasfar richer, and that people in the northern highlands of Kwangsi lived inalmost primitive conditions.17They might not have read Sun Tze, but it iscommon sense that soldiers have to be fed, and northernKwangsi was not theplace to find food. After the Taipings had reached northernKwangsi and hadgone east into the highlands of southern Hunan, Jen Yu-wen remarks that'the overall situation was discouraging and some leaders suggested that thewhole army return to Kwangsi' (p. 96). The author does not go on to accountfor the dismay. The difficult terrain, the sparse population and the shortageof supplies, must have been important factors. For these revolutionaryleaders to suggest retracing their steps, when their ultimate goal was Peking,the situation must have been desperate.To elaborate further on the significance of Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and FengYiun-shan being natives of Kwangtung, they most probably found goinghome triumphantly a much more attractive idea than venturing into theunknown north. It is difficult to see why the other leaders, born in Kwangsi,should have objected to going east. They had been living in the south-easternpart of Kwangsi, where the West River flows into Kwangtung. The area hadclose economic ties with Kwangtung. The West River was the most signifi-cant, if not the only, outlet for local produce. It also brought numerous com-modities from Kwangtung and even overseas. These Taiping leaders hadprobably heard more about Kwangtung than any other place in the world.An important piece of evidence has recently emerged, which indicates thatHung was in fact seriouslyconsidering going to Canton. In about 1850, HungHsiu-ch'ian despatched a spy, who was very close to him, into Kwangtung.He was captured by the Governor, Yeh Ming-ch'en. In his deposition, thespy alleged that Hung had sent him to Kwangtung to gather intelligence, inpreparation for an invasion of the province. He further deposed that Hunghad wanted to fight back to his native land to set up his Eastern Capitalthere, while making his base in Kwangsi the Western Capital.18The con-tinued absence of his spy must have alarmed Hung considerably. He wouldhave to concede eventually that his plan had been exposed.Furthermore,the Taipings were not the only people who wanted to controlKwangtung. At this time, there were numerous rebel groups in Kwangsi.The Taipings were only one of them. In May I850, a large group of insur-gents made their way from Kwangsi down the West River into Kwangtung.They were dispersed. In August of the same year, 4,ooo rebels avoided theWest River and successfully invaded the northern districts of Kwangtung.This encouraged another 3,000 Kwangsi rebels to cross the border and jointhem. However, Yeh was quick to crush them. More than 6,ooo were eitherkilled or dispersed. None of the rebel leaders managed to escape. Variousgroups of rebels had also avoided the West River and entered the southerndistricts of Kwangtung. Again, they were swiftly dealt with, their leaders

17 See Ch'ien Chia chti, Kuang-hsi-shenghing-chi ai-k'uangThe economic situationin Kwangsi) (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 1-22.18 Canton Archive 253.3.99. Deposition of a captured Taiping spy (I850). Seenext note.

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REVIEWS 565either killed or executed. If all fellow rebels who attempted Kwangtung, left,right or centre, had failed, it is difficult to see where Hung might try his luck.He did send a spy over, but the spy never returned. It is common sense toavoid the strong and attack the weak. So it seemed logical for the Taipings toshun the formidable Governor of Kwangtung and push into the barrennorth. After the Taipings had reached the highlands of southern Hunan,Hung Hsiu-ch'iPanwas still thinking of invading Kwangtung, this time bydescending on Canton in the south along the North River, another tributaryof the Pearl River system. This probably explains the 'three-month delay inthe southern districts of Hunan', which Jen Yu-wen does not elucidate (p.92). However, few of the agents Hung sent across the border ever returned.Most of the secret societieswho revolted at his request, as part of the plan forinvasion, were crushed. Finally, the Taipings abandoned all hope of takingover Kwangtung. Instead, they descended on the Yangtze River valley in thenorth. When the Kwangtung branch of the God-worshippers led by LingShih-pa was completely wiped out by Yeh Ming-ch'en in I852, Hung Hsiu-ch'iian, apart from mourning the deaths of several thousand brethren, musthave secretlycongratulatedhimselfon having kept clear of Yeh.19Thus, an entirely new aspect of the Taiping Revolution has emerged. Hadthere not been a Yeh Ming-ch'en, the Taipings might have captured Kwang-tung. Feng Yiin-shan might not have died in the treacherous mountains ofnorthern Kwangsi, the bloody coup of 1856 might not have happened, andShih Ta-k'ai might not have deserted the revolution with 200,000 men, leav-ing 'the Heavenly Kingdom [Capital?] almost literally with "no soldiersandno generals" and constituted one of the most demoralizing calamities thatbefell the Taiping regime' (p. 304). Instead, there might have been a Taipingfleet and a Taiping army equipped with advanced weapons, going north sideby side. There might have been friendship, instead of hostility, from foreignnations. In short, the whole history of modern China might have been quitedifferent.

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The foregoing pages have dealt with two aspects of the Taiping Revolu-tion, the role of Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and his early strategy. It is hoped thatJenYu-wen and other specialists may explore the first,and may also care to com-ment on the second. These two examples may also offer some clues as to whatJen Yu-wen might have done with his new book. He could have given moreof his views, analysis and interpretation, only including such details as werenecessary to support his argument. At least he could have asked more ques-tions and provided academic circles with more food for thought. The follow-ing are a few of the questions which the present author finds particularlyintriguing, and might have attempted to answer if it were not for lack ofspace.

19A more detailed description and analysis of these events may be found in myforthcomingbook, entitled InnerDiscord,OuterThreat.TheLife and Timesof reh Ming-ch'en, 807-59 (CambridgeUniversity Press).


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What is the nature of the Taiping Revolution ?Jen Yu-wen has denied out-right that it was a peasant rebellion.How did the Taipings indoctrinate their followers? and how effectively?Jen Yu-wen maintains that the old God-worshippersfrom Kwangsi had ahigher level of morale than their recruitsin the Yangtze River area. He evenblames these recruits for the 'erosionof the Taiping reputation' (p. 9 ), imply-ing that they should not have been taken at all. But does not a revolution neednew blood if it is to grow and succeed? It is up to the old revolutionaries toteach the new.

Jen Yu-wen assertsthat the Taipings were incapable of dealing with 'thetreaty powers as the Manchus knew how to' (p. 396). Many will disagree. Acomparative study of their respective views on foreign relations will be animportant contribution to scholarship.20Why did the Northern Expedition from Nanking to Peking fail ?Jen Yu-wen and all other historianssimply state that it did not receive supplies andreinforcementsfrom Nanking. If the original Taiping army could fight fromwest to east towards Nanking without much difficulty with provisions andrecruits, why should the expedition fighting from south to north towardsPeking have such troubles? Furthermore, the expedition should have had agreater nationalistic appeal because it was marching directly on the head-quartersof the Manchus.What is the relationship of land and population to the Taiping Revolu-tion ?Jen Yu-wen denies that any such relationship exists. Significantly, the

relevant works of neither Lo Erh-kang nor Ho Ping-ti appear in the biblio-graphy.21Significantly too, a chapter of 'Conclusions' is conspicuously absent fromJen Yu-wen's new book.Universityof Sydney J. Y. WONG

Authority,Participationand CulturalChangein China. Edited by STUARTSCHRAM.Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1973. Pp. 350.?5-50-

It is often difficultto review the collections of essaysthat are produced by con-ferences,as they cover a wide range of disparate subjectswith little in commonand are often of a very uneven standard. I am glad to say that this book is an20 Cf. the uncompromisingttitudeof Yeh Ming-ch'enas described n the bookmentioned n thepreviousnote. Seealso theintransigencef theemperorn myforth-comingarticleentitled 'SirJohn Bowringand the Questionof TreatyRevision nChina',Bulletinfthe ohnRylands niversityibraryfManchesterprobablyn vol. 57,no. 2, I975).21 Lo, Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing 'ien-kuoe-mingh'ien ejen-k'oua-p'owen-t'i' Theproblemof over-populationprior to the Taiping Revolution),Chung-kuohe-huiching-chi hih chi-k'an(Journal of Chinese social and economic history), 8, i, 20-80(I949); Ho Ping-ti, StudiesonthePopulation f China,1368-I953 (Cambridge, Mass.,I959).

What is the nature of the Taiping Revolution ?Jen Yu-wen has denied out-right that it was a peasant rebellion.How did the Taipings indoctrinate their followers? and how effectively?Jen Yu-wen maintains that the old God-worshippersfrom Kwangsi had ahigher level of morale than their recruitsin the Yangtze River area. He evenblames these recruits for the 'erosionof the Taiping reputation' (p. 9 ), imply-ing that they should not have been taken at all. But does not a revolution neednew blood if it is to grow and succeed? It is up to the old revolutionaries toteach the new.

Jen Yu-wen assertsthat the Taipings were incapable of dealing with 'thetreaty powers as the Manchus knew how to' (p. 396). Many will disagree. Acomparative study of their respective views on foreign relations will be animportant contribution to scholarship.20Why did the Northern Expedition from Nanking to Peking fail ?Jen Yu-wen and all other historianssimply state that it did not receive supplies andreinforcementsfrom Nanking. If the original Taiping army could fight fromwest to east towards Nanking without much difficulty with provisions andrecruits, why should the expedition fighting from south to north towardsPeking have such troubles? Furthermore, the expedition should have had agreater nationalistic appeal because it was marching directly on the head-quartersof the Manchus.What is the relationship of land and population to the Taiping Revolu-tion ?Jen Yu-wen denies that any such relationship exists. Significantly, the

relevant works of neither Lo Erh-kang nor Ho Ping-ti appear in the biblio-graphy.21Significantly too, a chapter of 'Conclusions' is conspicuously absent fromJen Yu-wen's new book.Universityof Sydney J. Y. WONG

Authority,Participationand CulturalChangein China. Edited by STUARTSCHRAM.Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1973. Pp. 350.?5-50-

It is often difficultto review the collections of essaysthat are produced by con-ferences,as they cover a wide range of disparate subjectswith little in commonand are often of a very uneven standard. I am glad to say that this book is an20 Cf. the uncompromisingttitudeof Yeh Ming-ch'enas described n the bookmentioned n thepreviousnote. Seealso theintransigencef theemperorn myforth-comingarticleentitled 'SirJohn Bowringand the Questionof TreatyRevision nChina',Bulletinfthe ohnRylands niversityibraryfManchesterprobablyn vol. 57,no. 2, I975).21 Lo, Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing 'ien-kuoe-mingh'ien ejen-k'oua-p'owen-t'i' Theproblemof over-populationprior to the Taiping Revolution),Chung-kuohe-huiching-chi hih chi-k'an(Journal of Chinese social and economic history), 8, i, 20-80(I949); Ho Ping-ti, StudiesonthePopulation f China,1368-I953 (Cambridge, Mass.,I959).

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