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DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors. They are in no manner an official position of the French Defence Ministry.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CIVIL-MILITARY

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE

Dr. CéCile WenDling

PREVIUS PUBLICATIONS:

1 – ACtion extérieure et Défense : l’influenCe frAnçAise à Bruxelles

2 – l’Axe Du moinDre mAl : le plAn oBAmA-mCChrystAl pour l’AfghAnistAn

3 – strAtégie opérAtionnelle et AspeCts Civils De lA gestion Des Crises : quelle «DoCtrine» pour le volet Civil De lA pesD ?

4 – le pArlement européen DAns lA psDC

5 – quelle strAtégie D’influenCe en Appui Aux opérAtions militAires ?

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the irsem reports

The IRSEM Reports are the successors of the collections published by the centres which merged on 1 January 2010 to create the Institut de recherche stratégique de l’Ecole militaire, i.e. the publications by the CEHD, the C2SD, the CHEAR and the Cerem. Their objective is to disseminate some results of the Institute’s in-house research which may be direct (works by its researchers; results from workshops organised within the Institute) or indirect (works by the Institute’s associate researchers). We hope that our readers who previously appreciated the publications of the centres which have now merged, will find in the Irsem Reports a tool for explaining and understanding contemporary strategic challenges.

The Irsem focuses its activities on strategic thinking in order to renovate the approaches and analytical tools needed to renew strategic thinking. The objective is to make the principal contemporary strategic challenges of interest to France comprehensible and at the same time propose original thinking in these areas.

The Irsem covers eight areas of study: new conflicts, strategic thought and new concepts, armament and proliferation, European and transatlantic security, comparative regional security, defence and society, history of defence and armament, legal challenges for the defence.

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THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT


SYNOPSIS

Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordina-tion of civilian and military, international and local actors, the com-prehensive approach concept has appeared both within internatio-nal organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US,France, the UK etc). The issue concerns restoring security, gover-nance and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial oreven an inter-organisational approach.

The present study identifies the dilemmas of the comprehensiveapproach (the neutrality of humanitarian intervention versus the ar-med commitment of states, the explicit cooperations between inter-national organisations versus implicit cooperation, etc). It antici-pates the consequences of the comprehensive approach, foremost astrengthened position for the European Union and Nato, wieldingmanagement capabilities for civil and military crisis management,and the quest for legitimacy within Nato and the African Union. Itqualifies the French position towards the concept. It analyses theoperational impact of the comprehensive approach for the military.Finally, it reinforces the academic thinking on the comprehensiveapproach and presents new research topics in security studies.

ON THE AUTHOR

Dr. Cécile Wendling is a research fellow at the Irsem (Institut derecherche stratégique de l’École militaire). Before joining the Irsem,she was a visiting fellow at the Centre de Sociologie des Organisa-tions (CNRS-Sciences-Po Paris). She also worked as a consultant forseveral multinational companies (McKinsey & Co, Berlin, KPMG pu-blic sector and CM International, Paris). She holds a PhD in politicaland social sciences from the European University Institute (Flo-rence, Italy). In addition, she has a Master’s degree from ESCP Eu-rope (Paris-Oxford-Berlin) and a Research Master degree (compara-tive social and political studies, Europe) from Sciences-Po (Paris).

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Previous publications:

Wendling, C. (2010): “The impact of the Afghan crisis managementon Nato’s future”, in Perruche, J.P. (editor): Nato: continuity or rup-ture?”, Irsem Study, October 2010.

Wendling, C. (2010): “Explaining the Emergence of Different Euro-pean Union Crisis and Emergency Management Structures” in: Jour-nal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 18, No 2, June2010.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Liste of abbreviations..............................................................................7

Introduction...............................................................................................9

On the origins of the comprehensive approach................................12

The theoretical level..............................................................................13

The holistic approach and the systemic approach at the origins ofthe comprehensive approach...............................................................13

Human security and societal security...................................................13

The links between civilians and the military.......................................14

Organisational issues in public policy..................................................15

Peacebuilding and peacekeeping........................................................16

Nation building or stabilisation............................................................17

Neo-institutionalist studies on international organisations and theirinteractions – the challenges of task-sharing.......................................17

History.....................................................................................................18

Some historic trends..............................................................................19

Crisis as a catalyst...................................................................................19

Reforms as accelerators.........................................................................20

The role of multinational experiments (MNE).....................................21

On the military level...............................................................................21

On the origins of the American and British doctrines: the links withEffects based operation (EBO) and the Effects based approach tooperation (EBAO)...................................................................................21

On the origins of the French military conception: the concept ofglobal maneuver and the military tradition of Lyautey......................24

On the political and institutional level..............................................24

On the technological level.....................................................................24

Conclusion on the origins of the comprehensive approach...............25

An overview of the use of the comprehensive approach byinternational organisations..................................................................26

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The use of the comprehensive approach by the European Union....26

Establishing the concept.......................................................................27

The European concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)..........28

The role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and itsCrisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)...............................30

The Commission’s capabilities in terms of the comprehensiveapproach..................................................................................................31

The EU comprehensive approach as coordination with other externalactors........................................................................................................32

The comprehensive approach in the European Union on the ground:

the Atalante example.............................................................................34

The challenges........................................................................................36

The use of the comprehensive approach by the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (Nato)................................................................................39

Implementing the concept....................................................................39

The lack of consensus on the comprehensive approach withinNato..........................................................................................................41

The difficult relationship between Nato and the UN..........................42

The Nato comprehensive approach on the ground: the Afghanexample...................................................................................................43

Challenges...............................................................................................45

The use of the integrated approach by the United Nations..............49

Implementing the UN concept..............................................................49

Organisational change related to the implementation of theintegrated approach...............................................................................49

The UN integrated approach and its opening towards otherinternational actors.................................................................................51

The UN integrated approach on the ground: the case of Liberia......51

The use of the comprehensive approach in other internationalorganisations...........................................................................................57

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation for security andcooperation in Europe (OSCE)..............................................................57

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The integrated approach within the African Union (AU).....................58

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation for economiccooperation and development (OECD)...............................................59

Conclusion on the positioning of the international organisations onthe comprehensive approach...............................................................60

The use of the comprehensive approach by states: the cases ofFrance, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States......62

The global response in France..............................................................63

The French concept of civil-military crisis management ascomprehensive approach......................................................................63

Some limitations and criticisms............................................................65

The absence of a French model for Provincial ReconstructionTeams.......................................................................................................67

The comprehensive approach in the United Kingdom......................68

The British concept relies on the Stabilisation unit............................68


PRTs within the British tradition of counterinsurgency.......................70

The comprehensive approach in Germany..........................................70

The German concept focused on reconstruction challenges.............70


Provincial reconstruction teams working for development................72

The comprehensive approach by the United States..........................72

The American concept predominantly internally in theUnited States..........................................................................................72


The Americans at the origin of implementing ProvincialReconstruction Teams............................................................................73

Conclusion on the positioning of states in terms of thecomprehensive approach......................................................................74

The comprehensive approach and the NGOs...................................75

A critical positioning towards the comprehensive approach.............75

Humanitarian principles and their limits.............................................75

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Are the positionings different towards the UN, Nato and the EU?. . .77

Consequences of the comprehensive approach on the ground forthe NGOs: increasing insecurity?..........................................................78

Some NGOs are more exposed than others........................................78

An easier humanitarian-military rapprochement in the case ofnatural disaster interventions...............................................................79

Conclusion on the positioning of non-governmental organisations..79

Future challenges for the use of the comprehensive approach.....81

Organisational challenges linked to the comprehensive approach. .81

Cultural change linked to the comprehensive approach...................82

Between humanitarian neutrality and armed commitment...............83

The opposition of the judges................................................................84

Financial challenges...............................................................................84

Interoperability and information sharing.............................................86

Using the comprehensive approach in a non-western state..............87

The comprehensive approach and influence......................................89

The comprehensive approach and global commons..........................89

Conclusion...............................................................................................91

Better identify the dilemmas of the comprehensive approach.........91

Anticipating consequences of the comprehensive approach............92

Qualifying the French position..............................................................94

Analysing the operational impact.........................................................95

Reinforcing academic thinking..............................................................96

Bibliography............................................................................................98

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU African Union

Ana Afghan National Army

CA Comprehensive approach

CICDE Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations

Cimic Civil-military cooperation

CMCO Civil Military Cooperation

CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate

CRCT Crisis Response Coordination Team

DfID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)

DG ECHO Office of humanitarian aid, European Commission

Dime Diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements

Dimefil Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement elements

DPA Department for political affairs

DPKO Department for peacekeeping operations

EBAO Effects based approach to operations

EBO Effects based operation

EEAS European External Action Service

EISF European Interagency Security Forum

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

Eunavfor European Union Naval Force Somalia

Fias Force international d’assistance à la sécurité

FCO British Foreign Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)

HTT Human Terrain Team

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ICPF International Community Planning Forum

MAEE Ministère des affaires européennes et étrangères

Midlife Military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and economic

MNE Multinational Experiment

MoD Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)

MoU Memorandum of understanding

MSF Médecins sans frontières

Nac North Atlantic Council

Nato North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OECD Organisation for economic cooperation and development

OSCE Organisation for security and cooperation in Europe

PRT Provincial reconstruction teams

SRSG Special representative of the secretary general

SSR Security sector reform

UE Union européenne

UNDP United nations development programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commission on Refugees

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

UN OCHA Office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

WGA Whole of government approach

WHO World health organisation

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INTRODUCTION

Both states and international organisations (the European Union,Nato, the UN, the African Union etc) make extensive use of the“comprehensive approach” since the early 2000s, including theterms “multidimensional approach”, or “integrated approach1”, andthese expressions largely sum up the idea of a better harmonisationand coordination of international, local, civilian and military actorswhen crises occur. In parallel, there is also talk of the “whole of go-vernment approach” (WGA or WHOGA), of “interagency approach”,of “networked security”, “multifunctional approach” and of “3Dconcept (diplomacy-development-defence)”, amongst others. Al-though the idea behind all these expressions conveys the idea thata one-dimensional approach proves counterproductive in tacklingcomplex crises, it proves to be very difficult to find a single defini-

1. DE CONING, Cedric, “Civil-military relations and UN peacekeeping operations”, World Politics Review, 19 May2010, available online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/5553

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tion for the concept of comprehensive approach. Further, a numberof acronyms are currently employed such as “Dime” (“diplomatic, in-formational, military and economic elements2”) or “Dimefil” (“diplo-matic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence andlaw enforcement elements) or “Midlife” (“military, intelligence, di-plomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and economic ele-ments3”).

In all of these instances, the issue concerns combining civilianand military efforts to best manage a situation by including interna-tional and local actors. This multiple use of terms and acronymsmakes it difficult to see clearly, as each actor will use them different-ly according to the context and its historical background. Also, someactors in crisis management use the comprehensive approach wi-thout naming it: “There is no single, coherent, or commonly agreedCA model. Moreover, strategies and model scans signify de facto acomprehensive approach without using the term. This complicatescomparisons and creates terminological confusion. Besides, whilemost actors today acknowledge the necessity for better coordinationand cooperation, their approaches diverge significantly regardingpriorities, means and suggested end-states of crisis management4.”

According to de Coning and Friis, several reasons explain whymany actors take interest in the comprehensive approach even ifthey use different labels to describe it5. Among these are the searchfor greater efficiency in crisis management in times of budgetaryrestrictions, a greater coherence in the actions of all in a commonspace (especially as some crises pose problems, such as Afghanistantoday), an improved legitimacy of action for some actors (e.g. Nato),the ambition to reduce the number of failed states (such as Somalia)which represent a security threat today, and the political urgency forconflict settlement linked to the fact that citizens are increasingly

2. SCHNAUBELT, Chistopher M., “Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments”,dans SCHNAUBELT, Christopher M., (ed.) Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissiveenvironments, Rome, Nato defence college, Research division, June 2009, p. 7.3. KERN, Jack, “Understanding the operational environment: the expansion of the Dime”, University of militaryintelligence, available online: http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us, viewed on 18 June 2010.4. MAJOR, Claudia, MOELLING, Christian, “More than wishful thinking? The EU, UN, Nato and the comprehensiveapproach to military crisis management”, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 2009, pp. 21-28.5. DE CONING Cedric, FRIIS, Karsten, “How to conceptualize comprehensive approach” dans FRIIS, Karsten,JARMYR, Pia (ed.), Comprehensive approach: challenges and opportunities in complex crisis management, Nupireport, Security in practice, N°11, 2008, pp. 2-9.

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unwilling to accept military casualties for extended periods of time.

There is a debate on the historical foundations of the expression.Some put the origin of the term in UN documents written in the late1990s and present Kofi Annan as one of its promoters6. Others men-tion a Danish influence in Nato, presented as the organisation ha-ving defined the expression, notably at the Bucharest summit in2008.7 To some military representativess but also some humanitarianpersonnel8, this is a new popular label to describe the links betweencivilians and the military which have always existed. We may for ins-tance find historical references to “global action”, or “global maneu-vers” at the source of the concept “comprehensive approach”. Toothers this is a new element that needs to be further conceptualisedto fit into the doctrine. This process is underway in France in 2010within the Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expéri-mentation (CICDE) to present a concept to the Army Chief of Staffbut also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where a task force is dedi-cated to establishing a “global response” by France in the manage-ment of complex crises. What is surprising, when looking at theseconcepts that are subject to debate in government ministries andwithin international organisations, is the scarcity of academic publi-cations dealing directly with the topic. Although think tanks9, NGOs10

etc. are working to develop their vision of the comprehensive ap-proach, few academic books and articles11 are actually analysingwhat is currently happening around this fashionable concept on apractical level. It thus seems essential to delve further into the is-sue.

This study is divided into five chapters. The first examines thefoundations of the comprehensive approach. It looks at the originsof the concept from a theoretical, historical but also a doctrinal, poli-tical and technological angle. The second part focuses on internatio-

6. Colloque : L’approche globale, un outil conceptuel en construction, École militaire, Paris, 6 May 2010.7. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm8. Care International UK, available online : http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we17.htm9. Cf. the Nato defense college in Italy or Nupi in Norway.10. Oxfam international, Care international.11. An issue of Studia Diplomatica discussed the issue of the comprehensive approach from the inter-organisationalangle, but no other academic journal has published on the topic to date. The Unisci department of the ComplutenseUniversity (Madrid) has published articles on the comprehensive approach, but very few universities have taken astance on the issue.

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nal organisations and their use of the concept (the EU, Nato, the UN,the OSCE, the AU, the OECD). It stresses that the European Unionand the UN are the only organisations able to benefit from a dualcompetency in managing civilian and military crises. The third chap-ter presents the use of the comprehensive approach by states, usingfour examples: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Uni-ted States. It focuses on the disparities in institutionalising theconcept. The fourth chapter deals with the critical positioning ofNGOs towards the introduction of the comprehensive approach. Thefifth chapter concludes the study on the challenges linked to thisnew approach, both political, organisational and cultural, and at-tempts to formulate useful recommendations for the use of the com-prehensive approach in future crisis management.

On the origins of the comprehensive approach

There is no universal comprehensive approach. Therefore it be-comes important to revisit the origins of the comprehensive ap-proach to understand where this persistent blur comes from and thedifferent positions of the actors involved. In order to recreate theorigins of the comprehensive approach several aspects will be exa-mined: the theoretical origins, the historical origins (including theanalysis of past events which may have triggered the concept’s at-traction), the origins linked to the military doctrine (EBAO, globalmaneuver capability) and finally the origins at the more political le-vel of the approach (“whole of government approach”) and the moretechnological designs of the approach (integrated computer systemswith layer and filter). This will enable in conclusion of the first chap-ter to offer a definition of the comprehensive approach within theframework of the study.

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The theoretical level

A review of the literature shows the difficulty of finding academictexts on the comprehensive approach, whereas ministries,international organisations and think tanks are very active on thesubject. Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach refers tonumerous related fields of the literature that seem important tomention here before examining the other theoretic origins of theconcept.

The holistic approach and the systemic approach at theorigins of the comprehensive approach

The documents presenting a theoretical approach of the conceptin the chronological format sometimes put the comprehensive ap-proach at the introduction of the holistic approach (notably in socio-logy, represented by Durkheim in France) and the systemic ap-proach (mainly in the 1950s in the United States in economics, ma-nagement studies, etc). Moreover, the appearance of the compre-hensive approach in hard sciences is sometimes mentioned, in par-ticular in ecology already in the 1980s12. The objective here is not togo that far back to establish the origins of the concept, nor to includethe hard sciences in the concept history, but to focus on the use ofthe concept in crisis management in the sense of conflicts in uns-table states or major catastrophes – natural or industrial – or eventerrorist attacks. Although some actors (e.g. in France) would like torestrict the comprehensive approach challenges to crises in failedstates, others look upon the concept as a tool which may be used incrises such as major disasters (the UN) or in terrorism (the OSCE).

Human security and societal security

At the theoretical level when looking at the field of crisis manage-ment, there is first a link between the comprehensive approach andthe development of the concept of human security13. Indeed, withthe change of security paradigm and the birth of the security-de-fence continuum, crisis management is no longer seen as a lethal

12. CHATRE, Baptiste, Approche globale-évolution d’un concept, Note, IHEDN, Paris, 2010.13. GLASIUS, Marlies, KALDOR, Mary, A human security doctrine for Europe, project, principles, practicalities,Routledge, 2006.

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battle to conquer a territory, but as the confrontation of partners-ad-versaries who have to find a means to restore peace. It is not onlyabout intervening on ceasefire, but also integrating human aspectsfor returning to good governance, an administration, police struc-tures and ensuring economic development. There is thus a link bet-ween the concept of human security and establishing the compre-hensive approach14.

In this context we may also examine the links between societalsecurity and the comprehensive approach. Indeed, the comprehen-sive approach may be seen as a form of “securisation” of the phaseof restoring political institutions and the return to an adequate levelof development beyond the ceasefire aspect of crisis management.By integrating the poverty level, or the absence of justice in so-cal-led societal threats, governments and international institutionswhich use the comprehensive approach securise (in the sense of theCopenhagen School15) dimensions of the crisis that until then wereonly politicised16. In other words, they introduce challenges into thesecurity agenda which formerly were in political platforms. This maybe interpreted as a seizure by some governments or internationalorganisations of new dimensions of actions which by their “securisa-tion” get more attention in the public arena and therefore greaterpublic financing. It may also be a way for these actors to legitimisetheir existence, as we shall see.

The links between civilians and the military

Another theoretical link may be established with the literaturedealing with the relationship between civilians and the military. Ho-wever, it often views civil-military in the sense of Cimic more thanfrom the perspective of the comprehensive approach17. But the Ci-mic aspects which are more restricted to the operational frameworkof crisis management, should not be confused with the comprehen-

14. H a r v a r d P r o g r a m o n H u m a n i t a r i a n P o l i c y a n d C o n f l i c t R e s e a r c h :http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/bibliography.pdf15. The Copenhagen school developed around authors like Buzan and Weaver. It focuses on security issues with aconstructivist approach.16. Cf. BUZAN, B., WEAVER, O., Regions and Power: The structure of international security, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003.17. On Cimic, cf. ROLLINS, J.W. “Civil-military cooperation (Cimic) in crisis response operations: The implicationsfor Nato”, International peacekeeping, Vol. 8, N°1, Printemps 2001, pp. 122-129; GORDON, Stuart, “Understandingthe Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (Cimic)”, The Journal of Humanitarian assistance, 2001, availableonline: http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm, viewed on 1 July 2010.

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sive approach which represents a wider and more recent philoso-phy. The Cimic label corresponds to the arrangements implementedby the armed forces to obtain the neutrality of the population in acrisis area. This means first doing everything necessary on the mili-tary level to enable the best possible interaction. Conversely, thecomprehensive approach is much more proactive and does not dealexclusively with the theatre of operations. It targets not only theneutrality of the population, but aims at winning the hearts andminds of the inhabitants of the theatre. It is about seducing the localpopulation by rebuilding and restoring governance. Further, ups-tream from capitals or in international structures it is about desi-gning an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or inter-organisational logicto best manage crises as they occur. The literature on organisationalissues will therefore be included to comprehend the challenges lin-ked to the comprehensive approach (cf. infra).

Although the comprehensive approach thus is removed from theCimic approaches, we may nevertheless draw an important lessonfrom the literature on these aspects, namely what it has yielded onthe issues occurring between civilians and the military in working to-gether. A major difficulty brought up by the literature on the rela-tionship between civilians and the military is that the latter are oftendisconcerted by the multitude of possible interlocutors on the civi-lian side, as they are used to precise and clear hierarchic lines ofcommand. This makes the exchange between civilians and the mili-tary very complex and implementing the comprehensive approachthus becomes very tortuous18. Another aspect of the Cimic literaturewhich may certainly apply to the comprehensive approach is the is-sue of cultural differences between actors from civil society andthose of the military.

Organisational issues in public policy

Organisational issues connected to the comprehensive approachare partly broached in the literature on public policy in terms of co-ordination challenges. There are indeed links between public policyworks on the coordination between services and ministries and the

18. “Insights and best practices: interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental coordination”, Focus paper,N°3, July 2007, available online: http://jko.cmil.org/interagency-intergovernmental-nongovenmental-coordination-paper-3-july-2007, viewed on 11 July 2010.

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“whole of government approach”, the more restricted but verypresent “inter-agency” or “inter-organisational” concepts when theorganisational aspects of the comprehensive approach are discus-sed19. The comprehensive approach often collides with rival ser-vices. Christian Schnaubelt writes the following in his chapter onoperationalising challenges of the comprehensive approach: “Turfbattles and protection of personal and organisational prerogatives,as well as legitimate policy differences at the national and grandstrategic levels, are certainly part of the explanation for the bureau-cratic wrangling20”. Case studies have been conducted, but mostlyon the level of a ministry or the minister’s staff to understand theproblems involved in implementing the comprehensive approach atthe organisational or inter-organisational level21. We will adopt not a“micro” positioning – as is the case in these studies – but a “macro”positioning on the phenomenon.

Peacebuilding and peacekeeping

It is equally possible to make a link on the theoretical level withpublications dealing with peacebuilding and peacekeeping, but thisfield goes well beyond the strict comprehensive approach chal-lenges, by studying issues such as the efficiency of such operations.However, among the criteria identified in this type of literature, onemay find the ambition to take a “comprehensive approach” and a“comprehensive evaluation”, which may be interpreted as premisesof the comprehensive approach22. Morever, it would seem that thecomprehensive approach also revolutionises the field, for with thisnew concept there is no longer a strict separation between peace-keeping and peacebuilding, as was often the case for this literature.Also, the comprehensive approach very much dissolves the distinc-tion between conflict and post-conflict management actions23.

19. Cf. HUDSON, Bob, HARDY, Brian, HENWOOD, Melanie, WISTOW, Gerald, “In Pursuit of Inter-AgencyCollaboration In The Public Sector: What is the contribution of theory and research?”, Public Management Review,Vol. 1, N°2, 1999, pp. 235-26020. SCHNAUBELT, Chistopher M., “The challenges to operationalizing a comprehensive approach”, dansSCHNAUBELT, Christopher M., (ed.) Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments,Rome, Nato defense college, Research division, June 2009, p. 36.21. US National Security Council: SAID, Sami, HOLT, Cameron, “A time for action: the case for interagencydeliberate planning”, S t ra t eg i c s t u d i e s q u a r t e rl y, F a l l 2 0 0 0 8 , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e :http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Fall/said&holt.pdf22. FAST, Larissa A., NEUFELD, Reina C., “Envisioning success: building blocks for strategic and comprehensivepeacebuilding impact evaluation”, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 2, N°2, 2005, p. 33. 23. Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, Europen Interagency security forum (EISF), Paris, le 30 June 2010.

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Nation building or stabilisation

Another concept which is hard to leave aside when discussing thecomprehensive approach is that of stabilisation, a concept which ap-peared in the extension of the literature on nation building24. Thestudies are based mainly on the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in at-tempting to find factors of success and failure25. Among key successfactors are again the unity of efforts between civilian and military ac-tors, implementing multilateral actions bringing together internatio-nal and local actors, reconstruction operations and training the localpopulation (police forces, etc). There is thus a direct link betweenthe works on the stabilisation concept and implementing the com-prehensive approach. For this reason, this literature will be moreabundantly used for reference in this study than others.

Neo-institutionalist studies on internationalorganisations and their interactions – the challenges oftask-sharing

Some elements of the literature on international organisationsand their role in crisis management may also be taken into accountwhen they study inter-organisational challenges and issues relatedto the effectiveness of multilateralism26. As indeed the comprehen-sive approach has the objective of bringing together different actorsaround a common goal of complex crisis management, the compre-hensive approach poses the question of the links between interna-tional organisations when they intervene on a common territory, asin Afghanistan where Nato, the UN and the EU are present together.Within the institutionalist school in international relations, there areseveral authors writing on the relationship between the UN, the EUand Nato in implementing the comprehensive approach, e.g. Bier-mann or Hofmann27. The literature is more comprehensive on the

24. DOBBINS, James, McGINN, John G., CRANE, Keith, JONES Seth G., LAL Rollie, RATHMELL, Andrew,SWANGER Rachel M., TIMILSINA? Anga R. , America’s role in nation building, RAND, 2009.25. CARAFANO, James Jay, Principles for stability operations and state-building, Heritage Lectures No. 1067, TheHeritage Foundation, Washington DC, 2008; VAN DER MEER, Sico, Factors for the success or failure ofstabilization operations, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ May 2009.26. KOOPS, Joachim A., “Effective multilateralism in peacekeeping, capacity-building and crisis management”, Focus01/2010, available online: www.effectivemultilateralism.info, viewed on 30 June 2010; TARDY, Thierry, “Buildingpeace in post-conflict environments : why and how the UN and the EU interact”, paper presented at the workshop“improving effectiveness of peacebuilding and state-building through EU-UN cooperation”, organized by theDepartment of Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Kiel, on 29-30th March 2010, in Berlin.27. BIERMANN, Rafael, “Towards a theory of inter-organizational networking. The Euro-Atlantic security institutionsinter-acting”, The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 3, N°. 2, 2008, pp. 151-177. BIERMANN, Rafael,

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Nato-EU relationship than on for instance that between Nato andthe UN, reflecting the current level of cooperation between these or-ganisations. This theoretical field of international relations will alsobe used to enable a macro-level study incorporating both the indivi-dual positioning of the actors, but also their interaction on the inter-national stage.

In addition, these issues of interaction between international or-ganisations bring us back to the challenges of task-sharing in acontext of globalised governance28. Given that numerous actors posi-tion themselves on the issue of peacekeeping and peacemaking, thechallenge is to establish which actor is best suited for leadership inmanaging a complex crisis, but also how tasks ought to be distribu-ted to ensure optimal efficiency on the ground. What about coordi-nation between actors? This implies taking into account financial,technical and logistic concerns (on interoperability issues).

To conclude, no single theoretical academic field dedicated tothe comprehensive approach may be found; instead the concept isat the intersection of several fields which will have to be consideredin this Irsem study. The following section will delineate the historicalcontext of the emergence of the comprehensive approach concept.

History

Historically, the origins may be traced to the first links developedbetween diplomatic and military circles, and during the 20th centuryin certain states with the end of conscription after the end of thecold war. Further, some major crises acted as a catalyzing force of thecomprehensive approach (Bosnia, Kosovo). Finally, the currentcontext of reform implementation – following the Lisbon Treaty andthe new Nato strategic concept – reinforces the implementation ofthe comprehensive approach in official texts, within the new struc-tures and on the ground, when crises occur.

HOFMANN, Stephanie, Cooperation among international organizations – a catalyst for agency slack? , Paperpresented at the annual conference of the American Association of Political Science, 29 August 2008.28. McFarlane, Neil, S., Weiss, Thomas, G., “The United Nations, regional organizations and human security: buildingtheory in Central America”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, N°2, 1994.

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Some historic trends

Some authors (e.g. Schnaubelt) situate the birth of the compre-hensive approach at the early relationship between the military anddiplomats as early as the late 17th century29. They view the exchangebetween military and diplomatic personnel and the consideration ofeconomic aspects as an embryonic integrated approach during mili-tary campaigns. Others prefer to quote Clausewitz who already citedthe importance of the trinity uniting government, the military andthe population30.

Without going back as far, among the more recent elements men-tioned by people interviewed for this study is notably the end ofconscription.31 With the nascent perception of a partner-adversaryrelationship, armies had to rethink their links to civilian actors, inparticular since as conscription disappeared they were no longermade up of civilian actors with multiple abilities, but of professionalmilitary staff in need of links with civilian actors with diversifiedcompetencies. This is at least the conclusion drawn by active Frenchmilitary staff. In terms of reserve officers, they view the comprehen-sive approach as a means of being useful to the army by puttingtheir dual military and civilian competencies at its disposal.

Crisis as a catalyst

Among the hallmark crises which have contributed to implemen-ting the comprehensive approach, the Kosovo crisis is often cited bythe people interviewed. When this occurred, Nato both providedbombing of the territory and refugee camp management, which wasa primer for humanitarian workers who were relieved of their habi-tual work, as it were32. For the first time Nato and NGOs were opera-tional on similar battlegrounds. Thus occurred the issue of their po-tential coordination. Further, the crisis in Kosovo offered the oppor-tunity to publish official documents mentioning directly the compre-hensive approach. This is the case for instance in UN Resolution

29. SCHNAUBELT, Chistopher M., “Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments”,dans, SCHNAUBELT, Christopher M., (ed.) Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissiveenvironments, Rome, Nato defense college, Research division, June 2009, p. 8.30. CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von, De la guerre, Les éditions de minuit, 1959; CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von, On war, London,1873.31. Interview, Ministère de la défense, Paris, May 2010.32 Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.

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1244 adopted on 10 June 1999 (article 17).The issue was predomi-nantly to implement a greater degree of coordination between theUN, Nato, the EU and the OSCE.

Other crises are also brought forward, mainly Bosnia but also An-gola, Somalia and Mozambique, which allegedly contributed in thelate 1990s to make the UN aware of the necessity to design an inte-grated approach33.

The 9/11 attacks also played a role, since they accelerated the mi-litary perception that western NGOs could be instrumental in impro-ving world security and fighting terrorism. Considerable US financingfuelled humanitarian action, complementing military actions. In fact,NGOs then started to respond extensively to government calls fortender (e.g. in the US) and from international institutions to carry outmissions to fight the development of terrorism in unstable zones.Thus was increasingly posed the problem of interaction between theagents of security, development and good governance in failed orunstable states34.

Reforms as accelerators

Internal reforms within some organisations around key texts, suchas the recent EU Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and the new strategicconcept of Nato (November 2010) catalyzed the introduction of thecomprehensive approach in official documents. In parallel, govern-ments themselves started to insert the comprehensive approachinto their doctrine. The concept seems to travel from one state toanother, from one international organisation to the next. Alreadypresent in UN documents by the late 1990s, it appears within Natoand the EU. Thus a pendulum movement may be observed, as weshall see, between ad hoc attempts on the ground using the com-prehensive approach in times of crisis (in Liberia for the UN, in Af-ghanistan for Nato) and doctrinal attempts to formalise the conceptin documents adopted by the headquarters of international organi-sations or by state governments.

33. EIDE, Espen Barth, KASPERSEN, Anja Therese, KENT, Randolphe, von HIPPEL, Karen, “Report on integratedmissions: practical perspectives and recommendations”, Independent study for the expanded UN ECHA core group,May 2005, p. 10.34. Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, Paris, 30 July 2010.

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The role of multinational experiments (MNE)

International experiments within the MNE framework played arole in the mid-2000s. Through this means of exchange, the compre-hensive approach concept was disseminated among numerous ac-tors of the Atlantic alliance. This is one outcome of the study carriedout by the FRS and US CREST on the new military concepts35. It un-derlines the birth of a community of interests around the compre-hensive approach.

In conclusion, historically speaking, there has been a conver-gence of several phenomena: the end of conscription on one hand,and the lessons learned from major crises on the other (Kosovo, Mo-zambique). This produced reforms within international institutions(EU,Nato) and new concepts progressively introduced on the go-vernment level (primarily in the United States and in Europeancountries). The MNEs certainly contributed to the creation of a fo-rum of exchange on the comprehensive approach, and to the emer-gence of a community of interests. The next section details the doc-trinal origins of the comprehensive approach concept in Anglo-Saxon countries with the EBO, and the EBAO in France through thecolonial experience.

On the military level

The origins of the comprehensive approach may be found on thedoctrinal and military level on one hand through the Effects basedoperation (EBO) and the Effects based approach to operation(EBAO) mainly developed in the United States and in the UK, andon the other hand through the “global maneuver” essentially deve-loped in France in the context of colonisation.

On the origins of the American and British doctrines: thelinks with Effects based operation (EBO) and the Effectsbased approach to operation (EBAO)

On the doctrinal and military level, some works associate Effects

35. GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX, Nicole, KOVACS, Anne, « Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans les nouveauxconflits », Rapport final, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, US Crest, 2010.

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based operation (EBO36) developed in the United States with thesystems analysis, the Effects based approach to operation (EBAO37)developed in the UK and by Nato, and the comprehensive approachas used by the United States, the United Kingdom or Nato38. Indeed,both the EBO, the EBAO and the comprehensive approach are ba-sed on systemic methods of analysis attempting to integrate thecomplexity of crisis management. Reading for instance the officialdefinition of the EBAO within Nato as stated in the Military Commit-tee position paper (June 2006), there are some rather close links tothe current definitions of the comprehensive approach: “The EffetsBased Approach to Operations is the coherent and comprehensiveapplication of various instruments of the Alliance combined with thepractical cooperation with involved non-Nato actors, to create ef-fects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately theNato end-state39”.

Further, by distinguishing “kinetic” from “non-kinetic” aspectswhile bringing them together in texts conceptualising the EBO andthe EBAO, progressively the need for a better cooperation betweencivilians and the military appears in the background, divided into“kinetic” actions for the military and “non-kinetic” actions for the ci-vilians. An example of this link between the EBO, the EBAO and thecomprehensive approach may also be found in many documentspresenting the comprehensive approach. For instance, the Finnishconception of the comprehensive approach is presented in directconnection with the EBAO40. It thus seems that the use of the EBOand the EBAO has helped to launch the comprehensive approach onthe doctrinal and military level41. But although the EBAO is conside-red a tool, the comprehensive approach is more presented as a phi-losophy both in the Nato Defence College documents and in Britishmemoranda on the issue42. Finally, it should be noted that although

36. The EBO concept initiated by the US Air Force in the early 1990s aims at better targeting for more results duringoperations. This concept quickly became interarmy and developed at the time by the USJFCOM, under the influenceof Warden and Deptula.37. COQUET, Philippe, « Opérations basées sur les effets, rationalité et réalité », Focus stratégique n°1 1, Ifri, 2007.38. DEMORTIER, Marie-Christine, « Débats intellectuels et enjeux politiques autour du concept d’approche globalede crise », Note d’étape n°3, Ministère de la défense, 13 December 2009.39. In: “Military committee position on an effects based approach to operations”, MCM 0052-2006, 6 June 2006.40. P IETILAINEN, Ka r i , E B A O T h e f i n i s h a p p r o a c h, A v a i l a b l e o n l i n e :se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/97044/ichaptersection.../en/3.pdf viewed on 8 June 2010.41. Theo FARRELL, Department of War Studies, King's College London, available online:http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we20.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.42. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for

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the EBO and the EBAO are presented as having originated the com-prehensive approach, these concepts are rather on the decline43.

On the origins of the French military conception: theconcept of global maneuver and the military tradition ofLyautey

In the French context, a first parallel may be made on the doctri-nal and military level between the concept of “global maneuver”and that of “comprehensive approach”. The expression global ma-neuver exists on the tactical level. It concerns the conception of anoperation on the ground when a crisis occurs in terms of the civilianorganisations present. It is also about maintaining good relationswith local authorities. Unlike the so-called “classical” maneuver, a“global maneuver” tries to integrate more immaterial actions such asactions of influence44. Army officers often make a link between thecomprehensive approach and the kind of approach practised by ge-neral Lyautey45, and conceptualised under the name of “global ma-neuver”. We may quote the writings of Marshall Lyautey on his ope-ration from 1903 to 1906: “It is necessary that very soon the entire re-gion feels it is in our hands, materially and morally; materiallythrough the shining action of our mobile forces, morally by havingour domination accepted by all the groups that have to enter it46”.General Lyautey then lists activities such as ensuring delivery ofseeds to the local population, reopening markets, setting upschools, etc. French officers questioned mention the Cimic as havingtaken form in this colonial context47; and being today downscaledwith the comprehensive approach, as in the Afghan example. Finally,when questioned French military often make the link between thecomprehensive approach as currently developed and the inter-

I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e : h t t p : / / w w w. p a r l i a m e n t . t h e - s t a t i o n e r y -office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we03.htm , viewed on 27 May 2010.43. The Americans abandoned the EBO by 2005.44. A collective CDEF article, « Au niveau tactique, la manœuvre globale : agir tous en cohérence, viser le mêmeobjectif et appliquer des effets », Doctrine tactique, Revue d’études générales, Ministère de la Défense, Armée deterre, N°19, 2010, pp. 8-10.45. The military interviewed explain that, beyond the contributions by Marshall Lyautey, the French colonisationexperience was very close to what may be found today under the label comprehensive approach.46. LYAUTEY Marechal, « Vers le Maroc, lettres du sud oranais, 1903 à 1906 ».47. The British also mention among the origins of their comprehensive approach the role played by their experience inMalaysia from 1948 to 1960. The British colonial heritage thus also confronted them to the links between civiliansand the military (cf. the works by Robert Thomson and Frank Kistson in : VALEYRE, Bertrand, Gagner les cœurs etles esprits, origine historique du concept et application actuelle en Afghanistan, CDEF, 2010.)

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-arms, inter-army, inter-allied and inter-agency approaches that haveprogressively emerged over the past decades. For instance, Francehas developed since the early 2000s an inter-army group for “civil-military actions”. Based in Lyons, the specificity of this group is theability to establish multidisciplinary teams for operating in close co-operation with local populations in crisis areas.

In terms of military conception, two schools may be distinguished atthe origin of the comprehensive approach: the Anglo-Saxon version ba-sed on the EBO and the EBAO, and the French one based on generalLyautey and the global maneuver. This allows both Anglo-Saxon andFrench actors to legitimise their present stance by presenting them-selves as the originators of the comprehensive approach.

On the political and institutional level

On the national level the term “whole government approach”(WGA) is used for a state and the “whole of organisation approach”for an organisation such as the European Union. In both instances,the issue is to avoid duplication within a government or an institu-tion between various services or ministries that make up the whole,thus contributing to the comprehensive approach on the political le-vel. The objective is also to increase the information flow betweenvarious actors, civilian or military, to make them work more in syner-gy in times of crisis (typically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mi-nistry of Defence, the Development Ministry, names being differentdepending on the country). Finally, all actors involved must focus onthe objectives and the end result, which implies links between civi-lian and military actors. This concept has been developed in parti-cular by the OECD48. The WGA concept is used within Security Sec-tor Reform (SSR). But it may also progressively be found in texts onthe comprehensive approach, especially on the European level.

On the technological level

Technological aspects should not be neglected in order to un-derstand the evolving military strategies, as technical progress im-

48 OECD, “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States”, DAC Guidelines and reference series, A DACreference document, OECD, 2006.

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pacting them models the organisation and structure of forces, etc49.But in fact, some publications view recent technological develop-ments as one of the causes of the comprehensive approach, sincethey enable greater information sharing among actors in crisis envi-ronments. The ability to create collaborative computer tools hasbeen key to concretising the comprehensive approach and pre-viously the EBO and the EBAO50. The new tools of information sys-tems (notably those allowing for including multiple data layers) en-able various civilian and military actors to access data while maintai-ning confidential information through the use of filters.

Conclusion on the origins of the comprehensive approach

The comprehensive approach “travels” a lot, according to Sartori’sexpression51. Its significance is so vast, its origins so diverse and itsmeanings so varied that there is a risk of wanting to compare the useof the concept in its widest sense, without paying attention to thespecific context in which it is implemented. To avoid the risks of“concept stretching” as defined by Sartori, it thus seems importantin each case examined below to take into account the particular na-ture of the European, Nato and UN concepts as well as the nationalconcepts. In this sense, rather than being a comparative study, it willbe a panoramic view of the various meanings given to the conceptby international actors, but also the different ways in which they useit to position themselves on the international stage.

In summary, we will study how international organisations, statesand NGOs use or position themselves against the comprehensiveapproach as an attempt to establish greater cooperation betweeninternational and local, military and civilian actors, in order to im-prove the efficiency of their action in times of crisis by combiningthree levers: security, governance and development.

49 VENNESSON, Pascal, Les chevaliers de l’air. Aviation et conflits au XXe siècle, Paris, Presse de Sciences Po,Fondation pour les Etudes de défense, 1997, pp. 26-27.50 HUNERWADEL, J.P., “The effect based approach to operations: questions and answers”, Air and space powerjournal, Spring 2006, available online:http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/hunerwadel.html, viewed on 27 July 2010.51 SARTORI, Giovanni, “Concept misformation in comparative politics”, The American Political Science Review, Vol.64, No. 4., December 1970, pp. 1033-1053.

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The issue at stake is to identify how various actors have mobili-sed the concept for their own purposes, but also to analyse the pro-blems raised by the establishment of the comprehensive approach.The study will combine an analysis of the emergence and the use ofthe concept within organisations, as well as in their bilateral rela-tions. The issue of the incidence of the concept in headquarters andon the ground will be the focus of the case studies.

An overview of the use of the comprehensive approachby international organisations

Although the comprehensive approach consists of the rapproche-ment of the military and civilians in crisis management, each inter-national organisation, state and NGO involved develops its own de-finition of the term. Behind the actors’ various postures on the com-prehensive approach, hidden political and strategic issues have tobe analysed. This second chapter will present the comprehensiveapproach of various international organisations: the EuropeanUnion, Nato, the UN, the OSCE, the AU and the OECD.

The use of the comprehensive approach by the EuropeanUnion

The European Union is often presented as the actor with thegreatest ability to develop and enforce the comprehensive ap-proach. Indeed, the European Union combines the military and civi-lian components of crisis management with the possibility of milita-ry intervention in crisis management since the European Council ofCologne in 199952 and the possibility of civilian missions in crisis ma-nagement (police, justice, civil administration and civilian protec-tion) adopted by the Council of Feira in 200053. Moreover, it is a fo-rum of exchange between states, but also with NGOs, for instancethrough the Office of humanitarian aid of the European Commission(DG ECHO) and with other international organisations with a posi-tion on the subject (UN, Nato).

52. European Council, “Declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence”,Cologne, 1999.53. European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency”, Feira, 2000.

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Establishing the concept

Historically, the European concept of comprehensive approachallegedly took form under the UK presidency in 2005, although theissue of improved civil-military cooperation in EU operations hadbeen raised in the form of CMCO54. Even though there is no officialdefinition in the EU of the comprehensive approach, there seems tobe a consensus on the following spelling-out of the concept: “it (theCA) implies the pursuit of a methodology aimed at commonly un-derstood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the li-kelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes in the political, diplo-matic, security, economic, development, rule of law and humanrights dimensions of international engagements in pursuit of a com-mon goal both within and beyond the EU55”. After discussing withpeople working on these issues within the Council secretariat, it isclear that the EU uses the 3D concept when attempting to make thecomprehensive approach explicit: defence, development and diplo-macy (and for diplomacy the 3Cs: common strategy, common mis-sion statement, common understanding of the strategy, mission sta-tement and modus operandi). The principles considered central forthe European comprehensive approach are: the development of lo-cal capabilities in the failed state (“strengthening local ownership”),the importance of politics for peacekeeping (“political primacy”), le-gitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation and regionalcommitment.

Further, studying the texts promoted recently by the EuropeanUnion, one may note a wide reference to the comprehensive ap-proach in several fields. This applies to the legislative texts from theCommission concerning migration56 or drug traffic57 for instance. Italso applies to texts issued by the Council such as “Towards a com-prehensive approach – the operating implications58” (March 2010)54. GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX, Nicole, COSTE, Frédéric, KLEIN Michel (ed.) : Les nouveaux concepts militairesdans les nouveaux conflits, rapport de la fondation de recherche stratégique, 2010, p. 126.55. Definition communicated by an official of the EU Council secretariat, featured according to him in internalworking documents to explicate what the EU means by comprehensive approach. 56. Cf. for instance: Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil, au Comité économique etsocial européen et au Comité des régions du 8 October 2008 – Renforcer l’approche globale de la question desmigrations: accroître la coordination, la cohérence et les synergies [COM(2008) 611 final – Non publiée au JournalOfficiel].57. Cf. for instance: Le développement d’une approche globale pour lutter contre la drogue au niveau européen:http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/drugs/fsj_drugs_intro_fr.htm, viewed on 4 June 2010.58. Council of the European Union, “Towards a Comprehensive Approach – the operational implications, EUMS paperfor the EUMC”, Brussels, 9 March 2010.

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following the first two texts conceptualising the EU comprehensiveapproach: “Military implications of a comprehensive approach”(MICA) and “Operating implications of a comprehensive approach”(OICA) while consolidating them59. This situation with an increasinglystrong presence of the comprehensive approach on the EU level,both in the Commission and in the Council, is today reinforced withthe adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, creating the European ExternalAction Service and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate(CMPD) which bring together the civilian and military componentsaround the CMCO concept (civil-military cooperation). The latterseems to be one of the most visible material outcomes of the ambi-tion to develop a comprehensive approach within the European ins-titutions.

The European concept of Civil-Military Coordination(CMCO)

In the context of the European Union, reference is made to theinstitutional efforts aiming at close collaboration of civilians and themilitary under the acronym CMCO (civil-military coordination). Theofficial definition is as follows: “Civil Military Co-ordination in thecontext of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordinationof the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning andsubsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis60”. Theacronym started to spread during the Danish and Greek presiden-cies and the importance of the CMCO development was underlinedin the paper of 6 November 200361. The objective was to implementthe necessary institutional reforms within the EU to allow for a ge-nuine coordination between civilian and military actors. In addition,the paper stressed the importance of a coordination culture thatought to create a new organisational routine of coordination. By itsinstitutional and cultural impact, the CMCO was presented as a pre-requisite to the implementation of a European-style crisis manage-ment, under the direction of the Political and security committee(PSC). It is indeed the PSC which may reflect upon all available Eu-ropean options (civilian and military) when a crisis occurs in order tocoordinate them appropriately as needed. Through the crisis mana-59 Documents absent from the bibliography (restricted distribution).60. "Civil Military Co-ordination", EU Military Staff, Doc. 14457/03, 2003.61. Council of the European Union, “Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO)”, Brussels, 7 November 2003.

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gement concept and common action, the PSC then sets the frame-work of the mission in a coherent and coordinated manner. In 2003,the Lisbon Treaty was not yet in place, but there was talk of creatinga “Crisis Response Coordinating Team” (CRCT) to implement thecomprehensive approach within EU crisis management. In the samemanner, as early as 2003 it was thought that a special representativecould coordinate EU actions in a comprehensive way. Operation Ar-temis62 in 2003 also confirmed this need.

Beyond the CMCO concept, an expression belonging to the Euro-pean political and institutional context, Brussels texts also containthe term Cimic which is frequently used by the military to describethe relationship between civilian and military personnel on theground63. On the European level, the definition of the Cimic is thefollowing: “Cimic is referring to a support function to military mission64”.How then should the links between the CMCO and the Cimic beunderstood on the EU level? Cimic, which existed as an acronym onthe government level to describe the links between the military andcivilians to support ongoing military operations, has also been usedin Brussels referring to relations between civilians and the military incrises managed by the EU in an operational framework. Thisconcerns exclusively the link forged by the military with civilians onthe ground.

If the Cimic only deals with operational and tactic support issues,the CMCO concerns the civil-military links on the political and stra-tegic level, ie within the EU institutions in Brussels, with the implica-tions this may have in times of crisis. The CMCO includes the civil-military cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy,but equally the links between the community tools for crisis mana-gement and the intergovernmental tools, these being reinforced bythe establishment of the EEAS since the Lisbon Treaty. The idea isto achieve coordination between civilian and military actors in allstages of the crisis management, and in particular already at the

62. Military operation taking place from 6 June to 6 September 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.63. GEBHARD, Carmen, Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation in the Context of the EU’s Crisis ManagementCMCO versus Cimic Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications, National Defence Academy, Institute for peaces u p p o r t a n d c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t , V i e n n e , M a r c h 2 0 0 8 , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e :http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/info_akt_01_08_cimic_vers_cmco_cg.pdfviewed on 4 June 2010.64. Power point presentation by Di Cameranna, EUMS: https://cei.mors.si/esdc_oc/.../CMCO_DI_CAMERANA.ppt,viewed on 4 June 2010.

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strategic planning stage where the role of the various instruments isdefined.

The concept concerns both Brussels, the theatre and the link bet-ween the two. We will therefore study the CMCO, the key com-ponent of the European comprehensive approach, and not deal withthe EU Cimic in the restricted sense. Therefore it seems useful tounderstand how the CMCO is incarnated by the new actors introdu-ced by the Lisbon Treaty in the context of developing the Europeancomprehensive approach: the European External Action Service(EEAS) and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD).

The role of the European External Action Service (EEAS)and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)

In the context of the CFSP the comprehensive approach was ex-pressed in an ad hoc fashion, well before the first conceptualizedtexts. As remarked by Frédéric Ramel, already by 2001 EU communi-cation on conflict prevention mentioned the need for combining alarge array of interventions in complementary fields, e.g. democracydevelopment, restoring security etc.65. More accurately, there arethree types of cases where the European comprehensive approachhas been expressed ad hoc. First this may be found in the frame-work of the expanded Petersberg Tasks, as recently validated by theLisbon Treaty. Originally the Petersberg Tasks were defined by theWEU in 1992, then included in the EU Treaty at the Amsterdam sum-mit in 199766 to include peacemaking and peacekeeping. Second,the comprehensive approach was expressed ad hoc in the missionsof civil crisis management following the Feira summit: this concernsabove all restoring the police, justice, administration and in somecases civilian protection. Finally, it may also be found in civil-milita-ry operations, e.g. the Aceh Monitoring Mission. These three optionsare found in the reference text formalising the the EU comprehen-sive approach: “Towards a comprehensive approach”. Indeed, it ismentioned that “When appropriate the EU may deploy a civilianmission, with assistance from the military, or a military operation

65. RAMEL, Frédéric, « L’Union européenne et la sortie des conflits armés : des actions au service d’une culturestratégique », in: ALIGISAKIS Maximos (ed.), Europe et sortie des conflits, Institut européen de l’Université deGenève, Genève,2005, pp. 25-58.66. Article 17 of paragraph V.

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with participation or assistance from the civilian components. In acomplex scenario, the EU may choose to deploy both a civilian mis-sion and-or a military operation where a wide range of instrumentsare available, possibly for an extended period67”. Until 2007, most ofthe civilian missions were planned by or with the help of the milita-ry, as in the case of Aceh, an intervention very extensively plannedby the military.

The new structure incorporating the CMCO today is the CMPD, adepartment of the new European External Action Service. The objec-tive is to integrate civilians and the military into the various stagesof crisis management, from strategic planning to crisis management,including training and exercises. Documents exist to help civilianand military actors during a crisis, mainly the Crisis ManagementConcept (CMC), the Crisis Management Procedure (CMP) and theGuidelines for Joint Fact Finding Missions and the Guidelines for EUCrisis Response Information Activities68. These documents serve asbasic guides for civilians and the military and are regularly updatedto include all essential data for comprehensive crisis management.Before the CMPD, the CRCT never really worked because of the ins-titutional and human difficulties in making the various organisationswork together (the military and civilians of the Council secretariatand the representative of the European Commission). The civil mili-tary cell of the Operation centre created in 2005 within the EU Chiefof Staff never received the necessary support from the DG E of theCouncil and the Commission.

The Commission’s capabilities in terms of thecomprehensive approach

Beyond the CMCO used in the framework of the Common ForeignSecurity and Defense Policy within the EEAS, the comprehensiveapproach may also be found in the services of the European Com-mission. This has led to discussions on the appropriate location forthe civilian dimension of the crisis management within the Europeaninstitutions, between Council and Commission69. Among the Com-

67.Council of the European Union, “Towards a Comprehensive Approach – the operational implications”, EUMSpaper for the EUMC, Brussels, 9 March 2010.68. Documents absent from the bibliography (restricted distribution).69. PFISTER, Stéphane, « Le volet civil de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense : ambiguïtés et

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mission’s instruments conducive to the comprehensive approachare: the stability instrument, humanitarian aid, the community me-chanism for civilian protection, programs for reconstruction and de-velopment, economic support measures and all that pertains to ca-pacity building (especially the role of DG Justice and Home Affairs).

However, documents presenting the comprehensive approach is-sued by the EU Military Committee do not include the humanitarianand development aid aspects managed by the European Commis-sion in their actions. The humanitarian aspects in effect implemen-ted by the NGOs are managed separately from the military aspectsso as not to violate their principles of independence, neutrality andautonomy. This separation between humanitarian, development se-curity and government issues within the European institutions posesthe question of the limits of the European comprehensive approach.The UN for instance includes the three pillars in its integrated ap-proach. We may ask whether this European distinction will prevail orprogressively disappear within the European External Action Ser-vice. However, this distinction is precious to preserve the establish-ment of humanitarian principles. This may be concluded from inter-views conducted with NGO members. They fear the rapprochementbetween the DG ECHO and the EEAS, for instance.

The EU comprehensive approach as coordination withother external actors

The comprehensive approach also means for the European Unioncreating partnerships and agreements with other international ac-tors. Already with the European Security Strategy (200370) the EU un-derlined the importance of developing an efficient and effectivemultilateral approach, including improved collaboration with theUN, the OAU, Nato, etc.

potentialités du concept de “gestion civile des crises” », Politique européenne, Vol. 3, N° 22, 2007, pp. 175-195.70. European Council, A secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003.

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In terms of the EU-UN relations, we may mention the two JointDeclarations (2003, 2007) and the creation of the UN-EU SteeringCommittee. The European Commission has also signed partnershipagreements with UN agencies (UNDP, WHO, UNHCR etc). Further, insome operations, as in Kosovo, the EU was in charge of the integra-ted approach as reported by Cédric de Coning71. Last but not least,the Commission finances numerous UN actors. Between 2001 and2008, 37 per cent of European aid dedicated to peacekeeping wastransferred to UN programmes. In parallel, a third of the EU stabilityinstrument finances UN actions. Through these various interactions,we may perceive the establishment of an institutionalised EU-UNpartnership in the civilian crisis management. It remains to be seenwhether this could extend to partnerships including military aspects,within the comprehensive approach. Attempts have been made,such as the EUFOR Chad. But when talking to actors on the groundthe perception is that there is stronger political reticence when themilitary are involved. This seems to make the EU-UN cooperationmore delicate72. To this should be added that the UN may not un-dertake coercive military operations. It seems that the more the twoinstitutions try to formalise their partnership, the more it creates co-ordination problems. This element is explained by Joachim Koopswho shows that the creation of the EU-UN Steering Committee hasnot allowed for a better coordination by institutionalisation73.

Concerning the EU-Nato coordination, we may mention the roleplayed by the Berlin + arrangements74. Yet here again, an institutio-nalised partnership has not enabled to entirely simplify the interac-tion between the two institutions, according to Koops, on the contra-ry. Moreover, the situation is politically blocked, which prevents atrue utilisation of the comprehensive approach on the strategic levelto capitalize on the civilian component of the EU and the more de-veloped military means of Nato. Indeed, the conflict between theRepublic of Cyprus and Turkey is detrimental to the existence of anin-depth strategic dialogue between the two organisations, as Tur-

71. DE CONING, Cédric, “Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in United Nationsand African Union Peace Operations” Nupi Working Paper 766, Security in Practice 6 , 2009, p. 11.72. Interview, Ministry of Defence, Paris, June 2010.73. KOOPS, Joachim A., “Effective multilateralism in peacekeeping, capacity-building and crisis management”, Focus01/2010, available online: www.effectivemultilateralism.info, viewed on 30 June 2010, p. 3. 74.The so-called Berlin + agreements adopted at the Washington summit in 1999 governs the availability of means andcapabilities from Nato during EU operations when the Alliance is not directly concerned.

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key refuses to let the Republic of Cyprus participate in the PSC-CANmeetings and the respective military committees75. Beyond this Tur-kish-Cypriot issue, there is strong competition between the EU andNato in crisis management, as may be seen in concrete examples.Nato intervened in Darfur a year after the EU. When the EU relievedNato in Bosnia, Nato stayed on. Nato intervened against piracy offthe Somali coast whereas the EU was already present. Still, the EU-Nato partnership might have good chances to develop beyond thisgeopolitical conflict, as both Nato and the EU are in a context of“asymmetric” resources, in particular in terms of civilian crisis mana-gement resources. But according to Koops, the more the resourcesare asymmetrical between international organisations, the more co-operation is clear and simple76.

Finally, there is also the African Union-European Union partner-ship. The EU supports AMIS77, the EURO-RECAMP78 and the AfricanPeace Facility79, among others. It should be stressed that the EU isprimarily in contact with other international organisations such asthe African Union as principal funder. The issue is then the positio-ning of the European Union in relation to these institutions. How todevelop collaboration beyond the financial issues in order to deve-lop the European comprehensive approach? What may be the Euro-pean Union’s influence through funding? What are the EU interestsin this kind of partnership agreement?

The comprehensive approach in the European Union onthe ground:

the Atalante example

Launched in December 2008, the Atalante-Eunavfor Somaliacontributes to deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy actsand armed robbery off the Somali coast80. This operation takes place

75. Cf. on the Cyprus issue: REYNAUD, Oriane, « L’impact du différent turco-chypriote sur l’avenir de la relation UEOtan », Cahier de l’Irsem n°3 – Otan continuité ou rupture, September 2010.76. KOOPS, Joachim A., “Effective multilateralism in peacekeeping, capacity-building and crisis management”, Focus01/2010, available online: www.effectivemultilateralism.info, viewed on 30 June 2010, p. 2. 77. African Union Mission in Sudan.78. A European initiative with French origins: it is an instrument of the EFSP for Africa under the control of the PSC.79. A European fund allocated in the EU-AU partnership. 80. Union européenne, Opération navale de l’UE contre la piraterie, Factsheet, June 2010, available online :http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100614%20Factsheet%20EU

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within the European Union’s comprehensive approach, as it includesmilitary, security, humanitarian and political components. The EUdeploys in fact 1 800 troops on site, primarily with a navy focus. Interms of security, the EU has implemented transfer agreements toenable the restitution of prisoners captured by the military to the ju-dicial authorities, for instance in Kenya or the Seychelles. The EU isworking on implementing sustainable judicial solutions. In terms ofdevelopment, the strategy document for Somalia concerning theperiod 2008-2013 has allocated 215,8 million euros from the 10th Eu-ropean Fund for development. This concerns three main coopera-tion sectors: governance, education and rural development. In thisway the EU hopes to work towards long-term stabilisation in the re-gion. The EU has contributed politically to the settling in of the newgovernment through the election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed. Thelatter will be in charge of implementing democratically elected poli-tical institutions by August 2011.

Atalante is one of the first official examples of using the compre-hensive approach by the European Union in an unstable zone. It isdifficult to make a detailed assessment of the experiment as of to-day. However, based on interviews with people returning from thesite we may note that obstacles and difficulties remain81. For ins-tance, regional cooperation projects initiated mainly on the judiciallevel remain fragile. Some prisons, as in the Seychelles, are repletewith pirates. Thus it would seem that the comprehensive approachcreates some short term management problems on the ground bet-ween EU and local actors. In addition, there is relatively little com-munication by the EU on this intervention, which makes its compre-hensive approach little known among its citizens and politically littlevisible.

Further, the Atalante operation does not necessarily draw on thelessons of the previous operations in Bosnia and in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. At the time the expression comprehensive ap-proach was not in use, but the EU was already attempting to bringtogether civilian and military components in ad hoc crisis manage-ment operations. Studies published on the issue are rather critical

%20NAVFOR%20Somalia%20-%20version%2019_FR.pdf, viewed on 10 July 2010.81. Discussion with members of the piracy working group at Irsem.

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of the implementation on the ground of good cooperation betweencivilian and military actors82. Among the difficulties mentioned inthese two examples are the lack of exchange between the Commis-sion and the Council, to facilitate the civil-military cooperation onthe political level, the cultural differences between the military andthe police on the ground, and the complexity of implementing localleadership. Marco Overhaus underlines that the addition of civilianand military competencies does not mean coordination. Finally, onelast limitation of Atalante is that it focuses more on the conse-quences than on the origins of piracy83.

In the following section we will present the challenges of imple-menting the EU comprehensive approach.

The challenges

Having presented the European concept of comprehensive ap-proach, it seems useful to present the challenges and the major dif-ficulties.

Civilian committee and military committee: Brusselsdisagreements

It remains delicate to make the civilian and military committeeswithin the Council work together. For instance, there was disagree-ment on the text adopted recently on the comprehensive approach,starting with a debate on the terms to be used84. Some would like tosee the word “mission” and others prefer that of “operation”: thefirst has a civilian connotation and the second a military. Negotia-tions on the texts demonstrate to what extent it is complex to make

82. ASSEBURG, Muriel, KEMPIN, Ronja, (ed.), « Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen », Die EU als strategischerAkteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Eine systematische Bestandaufnahme von ESVP-missionen und-operationen, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009, p. 165 et OVERHAUS, Marco, “Zivil-militarischesZusammenwirken in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU, Operative Erfahrungen, Defizite,Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten », SWP Studie, Berlin, May 2010, p. 25.83. Beyond Atalante, the EUFOR Chad operation (March 2008-March 2009) is also presented as an example ofcomprehensive approach by the EU. An effort of multidimensional integration was carried out to better integratecivilian and humanitarian actors. This engendered a debate on a possible political manipulation of the aid. Finally, theoperation focused on civilian protection (notably through police operations). Cf. POUYE, Raphaël, « EUFOR Tchadet la protection des civils », available online : http://www.afri-ct.org/IMG/pdf/AFRI_2010_-_Pouye.pdf, viewed on 5October 2010 ; POUYE Raphaël, « L’EUFOR Tchad-RCA, une opération européenne de protection à l’épreuve dupolitique », in : COULON, Jocelyn (ed.) Guide du Mayntien de la Paix, Athena Editions, Montréal, 2009 ; SEIBERT,Björn H., “African adventure ? Assessing the European Union’s military intervention in Chad and Central AfricanRepublic”, MIT Security Studies Program Working Paper, 2007 ; MATTELAER, Alexander, “The strategic planningof EU military operations – The case of EUFOR Tchad-RCA”, IES Working Paper, n°5, 2008 ; HELLY, Damien“EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, in European Security and Defence Policy : the First 10 Years (1999-2009). ISS Book, 2009.84. Telephone interview, the EU Council, June 2010.

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civilians and the military work together, as both sides fear being su-bordinated by the other. However, the idea on the European levelwould be to have united political leadership of EU interventionswith the military and civilians. Behind this unified leadership is thequestion of the best adapted organisation modes (for instance ma-trix organisation, network management, implementation of a coordi-nation board) but also the revision of operational planning docu-ments following the implementation of the comprehensive approachby the political leadership.

What contr ibut ion from member countr ies to thecomprehensive approach?

A second significant challenge is to establish whether memberstates will adopt the whole of government approach, and if they arepreparing to contribute to the EU comprehensive approach. SomeEU states have implemented or are thinking of introducing thewhole of government approach by developing inter-agency or inter-ministerial operational modes in crisis management. But this is notalways the case; thus there are gaps on the national level. Moreover,if the EU wants to institutionalise the European comprehensive ap-proach, member countries also must be able to contribute to it, forinstance by making civilian personnel available. This poses thequestion of the states’ reactivity to give the EU the means to deve-lop its comprehensive approach. In summary, it is thus difficult toestablish a connexion between the national intergovernmental sys-tems and multinational organisations such as the EU.

Implementing a European civilian reserve?

A third challenge is then to have a sufficient reserve of civiliansavailable for missions with the necessary competencies. How tomake these complementary resources available for implementingthe comprehensive approach, on the ground and in headquarters?At this moment a database of available experts is being elaboratedon the EU level. Each state must contribute names of experts. Howe-ver, the general trend is a lack of deployable civilian personnel. Al-though these experts are found in the EU database, they are oftenalso listed in the Nato database. What happens then to their de-ployability in case of crises where the EU and Nato would be mobili-

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sed? If it is difficult for states to make personnel available, shouldthe EU take care of it in its budget?

Financing the comprehensive approach of the European Union

Behind this question looms of course the larger issue of financingthe comprehensive approach: will the states or the EU budget as-sume the additional budgetary effort85 ? To what extent? How willfunds be distributed among various European actors? Among thevarious crisis areas? According to what criteria? Following the inter-views carried out, it appears that national actors count on Europeanfinancing to develop the comprehensive approach and the Euro-pean actors count on financing from the member states. Hence fi-nancing needs are very substantial on both sides, whereas thecontext of budgetary restrictions means that the comprehensive ap-proach benefits from no funding in many states, including France.

Creating a European hub for comprehensive crisismanagement on the ground?

To optimise harmonisation of the planning by civilian and milita-ry actors on site, one idea circulating is to establish a European hubof sorts on the scene of the crisis. This hub could become the focalpoint for planning operations, but also perhaps for their implemen-tation or for support and logistics functions. This would also allow forcompensating the lack of continuity on the ground, due to staff tur-nover, mainly the military. The issue of these constant turnovers hassharpened in zones where a good knowledge of local culture is ne-cessary to be operational within the comprehensive approach. Final-ly, the hub could be used for improving staff management on site byallowing for the long-term implementation of a common system forcivilians and the military.

Information-sharing on the European level

Another issue concerns a common computer system for Europeancivilian and military actors, but also the question of information sha-ring on site. The comprehensive approach requires the develop-ment of computer tools to serve it: tools capable of integrating the

85. Telephone interview, the EU Council, June 2010.

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diversity of military and civilian users (e.g. network enabled capabi-lities, computer network defence, and its civilian equivalent etc).What about the type of tools to be used on the European level andtheir interoperability with Nato tools or with other national tools?

Having distinguished the challenges linked to the developmentof the comprehensive approach by the European Union, let us nowturn to another organisation looking to position itself in terms of thecomprehensive approach: Nato.

The use of the comprehensive approach by the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato)

It is more difficult for Nato than for the EU to position itself in re-lation to the comprehensive approach, on one hand because Natoholds no civilian means to deploy, on the other because there is noconsensus so far on the manner in which Nato should deal with thisnew concept. The situation in Afghanistan is revealing in this res-pect.

Implementing the concept

One of Nato’s difficulties is the fact that the Alliance internallydoes not really benefit from deployable civilian capabilities. Like-wise, the organisation culture, procedures and doctrines are fore-most military and currently leave little room for a civilian approach.This makes cooperation with institutions of a civilian nature moredifficult, because of the cultural shock which may exist between mili-tary habits of Nato actors and the practices of other actors. However,already at the Riga summit in 2006, Nato put the question of havingrecourse to the comprehensive approach. According to Brooke Smi-th-Windsor86, the Danes are behind the concept entering Nato’s vo-cabulary in the spring of 200687. Seven countries then allegedly pre-sented a “non-paper” on civil-military interaction to optimise Natoplanning and crisis management operations: Denmark, Canada, Hun-gary, Norway, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Slovakia88.

86. SMITH-WINDSOR, Brooke, “Hasten slowly Nato’s effects based and comprehensive approach to operations,making sense of the past and future prospects”, Research Paper, Nato Defense college, Rome, N°38, July 2008, p. 5.87. The original acronym was CPA for “Concerted Planning and Action”. The challenge was to make Denmarkpromote better coherence between civilians and the military during crises and during post conflict periods.88. GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX Nicole, COSTE Frédéric, KLEIN Michel (ed.), Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans

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They were then supposedly joined by the United States and theUnited Kingdom which were working to promote the concept withininternational exercises, e.g. MNE5 and 6, in the framework of the ex-perimental program devised by the USJFCOM89.

These exercises served as a platform to develop theconcept on the transatlantic level, primarily by contributing tothe development of a common vocabulary90. Since April 2008and the Bucharest summit, the allies agree on an action planwith proposals for a Nato contribution to the comprehensiveapproach. The term thus stresses that Nato is not in itself thecarrier of the comprehensive approach as it does not havecivilian capabilities to deploy. Instead, the organisation wouldlike to contribute by working towards a better coordinationbetween civilian and military actors. The idea is to improverelations between Nato and other organisations surrounding itduring crisis management. This Nato position was restated atthe Strasbourg Kehl summit in 200991: “Experience in theBalkans and Afghanistan demonstrates that today's securitychallenges require a comprehensive approach by theinternational community, combining civil and militarymeasures and coordination. Its effective implementationrequires all international actors to contribute in a concertedeffort, in a shared sense of openness and determination,taking into account their respective strengths and mandates.We welcome the significant progress achieved, in line with theAction Plan agreed at Bucharest, to improve Nato's owncontribution to such a comprehensive approach, includingthrough a more coherent application of its crisis managementinstruments and efforts to associate its military capabilitieswith civilian means. Progress includes Nato's active promotionof dialogue with relevant players on operations; thedevelopment of a database of national experts inreconstruction and stabilisation to advise Nato forces; and the

les nouveaux conflits, Rapport final, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Paris, 2010, p. 127.89. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is one of the combative ten commandments to come out of the USDefence department and has played a key role in transforming American military activities. 90. DEMORTIER, Marie-Christine, « Débats intellectuels et enjeux politiques autour du concept d’approche globalede crise », Note 3, 13 December 2009, pp.7-9.91. Otan, “Proposal on a way ahead on comprehensive approach”, C-M(2008)0029-CORI, 2 April 2008 et Otan,“Implementation of the action plan on proposals to develop and implement Nato’s contribution to a comprehensiveapproach”, AC/119-WP(2008)0009(SPC), 4 June 2008.

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involvement of selected international organisations, asappropriate, in Nato crisis management exercises".

Nato’s explicit objective is to work for a better planning and im-plementation of operations by giving more consideration to the in-terface with civilian actors operating on the same theatre during cri-sis management operations. To strengthen cooperation with otherpartners, various fields are identified, primarily debriefings, trai-nings, exercises and information-communication.

The lack of consensus on the comprehensive approachwithin Nato

Ever since the concept of comprehensive approach was raised inNato, we may note that there is not yet any consensus within the Al-liance on the subject. Among the disagreements is firstly the issue ofcivilian competency. Does Nato go too far by trying to better inte-grate civilian aspects into the military aspects? Does it go beyondits mandate? To some allies, it is necessary to focus on the Alliance’sbasic missions and not seek to spread out, as the concept of com-prehensive approach could indicate. To some allies who are bothmembers of Nato and the EU, the role sharing must also be clearbetween the two organisations. This means that Nato must not inter-vene in civilian aspects of crisis management until now handled bythe EU which holds civilian crisis management capabilities alreadyinstitutionalised within the organisation. A second point of discordwithin Nato linked to the use of the comprehensive approach (pri-marily in Afghanistan) remains the financial issue.92 Having recourseto the comprehensive approach has very considerably increased theNato budget. By building roads and hospitals etc, Nato finances verycostly reconstruction activities in a context of internal financial crisis.There are also discussions on the way to position the EBAO in rela-tion to the comprehensive approach. Although the Secretary Gene-ral tends to take an all-encompassing and politically strategic viewof the comprehensive approach, others try to maintain a clear dis-tinction between the EBAO and the comprehensive approach, usingthe EBAO as an internal Nato concept and the comprehensive ap-proach as an international concept to which Nato may contribute. In

92. Interview, Ministère de la défense, Paris, May 2010.

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raising this point, Brooke Smith-Windsor hints that government ac-tors within Nato are manipulating the concept to influence the deve-lopment of the Alliance to further their own interests93.

The difficult relationship between Nato and the UN

Although Nato develops its comprehensive approach, the Secre-tary General deplores the lack of coordination with the UN on theseissues94. This is due in part to the fact that some states, e.g. Chinaand Russia with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, do nottake kindly to the rapprochement between the UN and an Alliancewhich seems to serve American interests rather than their own. Toillustrate this position: when the joint UN-Nato declaration was to besigned on 23 September 2008, the ceremony had to be postponedseveral times and be done without cameras, as Russia found that theUN Secretary General exceeded his mandate by signing such a do-cument95. To this must be added tensions between Nato and the UNwhich appeared after Nato interventions without a UN mandate. Fi-nally, there is a certain defiance within the UN towards Nato which isseen as an actor potentially capable of crowding out the UN in crisismanagement, while imposing a US-centric world view. One way toimprove UN-Nato relations within the comprehensive approachwould certainly be to work for a better mutual knowledge of theother. In addition, Nato and the UN could consider working togetheron pre-assessments. This means that they could exchange upstreamon planning issues to better establish on what grounds they couldintervene and already reflect on how to share their vision of the si-tuation in sensitive areas96. However, these possible axes of impro-vement currently remain difficult to explore, as the UN actors do notwant to be seen as corroborating Nato’s approach and analyses.

93. SMITH-WINDSOR, Brooke, “Hasten slowly Nato’s effects based and comprehensive approach to operations,making sense of the past and future prospects”, Research Paper, Nato Defense college, Rome, N°38, July 2008, p. 6.94. Cf . speech by Nato Secre ta r y Genera l a t the Univers i ty of Chicago , 8 Apr i l 2010:http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62510.htm, viewed on 20 April 2010.95 VIGGO JAKOBSEN, Peter, “Right strategy, wrong place – why Nato’s comprehensive approach will fail inAfghanistan?”, UNICSI Discussion Papers, N°22, January 2010, p. 87.96 WENDLING, Cecile, “UN-Nato collaboration in times of crises: Could the comprehensive/integrated approach be away to bring the two organizations closer together?”, Paper submitted for the International Research Symposium “TheUN and Nato: Forward from the Joint Declaration” – New York, USA, 21 October 2010.

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The Nato comprehensive approach on the ground: theAfghan example

Cooperation between various civilian and military actors is oftenmore concrete on the operational level on the ground than in organi-sation headquarters. It thus seems relevant to analyse the conse-quences of Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach in crisismanagement operations. The example chosen is Afghanistan.

First of all, the integration of international and local actors to im-plement the comprehensive approach goes via training activities es-pecially for the police force and the Afghan army troops. The goalset on 3 February 2010 was to train 134 000 soldiers of the AfghanNational Army (Ana) and 82 000 Afghan policemen97. Apparentlythese figures have been revised, some sources indicating some 240000 military staff trained by 201498. In this context Nato supplies sup-port in terms of equipment to the Ana. Concerning the difficulties intraining local actors, it should be noted that severe corruption pro-blems remain99. There are also problems linked to drug abuse andilliteracy among the people in training.

Further, Nato’s contribution to the comprehensive approach in Af-ghanistan is made concrete by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRT). Initially introduced by the United States to undertake civil-military reconstruction activities in non-securised environments al-ready in 2002100, these were progressively adopted by other coun-tries doing ISAF missions in Afghanistan. In effect, by taking overcommand of the ISAF, Nato found itself in charge of a growing num-ber of PRTs. Germany, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Hungary, Ita-ly, the UK etc have had the opportunity to conduct PRTs on theground101. In July 2009 there were 26 PRTs under ISAF jurisdiction102.One problem is that there is no “normalised” Nato PRT model:

97 TAYLOR, Claire, “Military campaign in Afghanistan”, House of Commons Library, international affairs anddefence section, SN/IA/5227, 3 February 2010.98 GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “The Afghan national army, unwarranted hope?”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, N°6,December 2009, pp. 36-42.99 HOUSTON, Andrew Scott, “A new strategy for Afghan policy reform”, RUSI newsbrief, 13 May 2009.100 RINGSMORE, Jens, DAHL THRUELSEN, Peter, “Nato’s counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan: areclassical doctrines suitable for alliances?”, Unisci Discussion Papers, N°22, January 2010, p.68.101 GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX, Nicole, KOVACS, Anne, Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans les nouveauxconflits, Rapport intermédiaire, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, US Crest, 2010.102 SLOAN, David S., “Nato in Afghanistan”, Unisci Discussion Papers, n°22 (January 2010), pp. 34-55.

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“There is still no established model for PRTs, some were civiliancontrolled, others military-run, but all were attempting to fulfill thegoals of the UN mandate. Most US PRTs were composed of 50-100military personnel, civilian government officials (both American andAfghan) and many had staff to train Afghan security forces103”. ThePRTs are presented by Nato and ISAF in their 2009 Afghanistan Re-ports as having very diverse activities, ranging from agricultural de-velopment to education and training activities, as well as restoringlocal police forces. PRTs have often had very localised actions, lea-ving other zones without assistance104. This has contributed to rein-force regional disparities. Moreover, in parallel to the PRTs managedby Nato (through the PRT Executive Steering Committee), other civi-lian actions take place on the ground, which does not make for a glo-bal view and a precise steering of the civil-military priorities of theforces in Afghanistan. Although there is now a Nato Handbook onPRTs, this is not yet a concept integrated in the Alliance doctrine.

New structures have emerged in Afghanistan as a result of Natohaving recourse to the comprehensive approach. For instance, forthe first time since Nato was founded a high representative for civi-lian issues was nominated in Afghanistan in parallel to the militarycommand105. Currently, ambassador Mark Sedwill of the United King-dom occupies this position. This follows the initiative of SecretaryGeneral Rasmussen who wanted a representative of his own on site.Little by little, the latter has taken charge of the comprehensive ap-proach process. His task is to liaise between Nato and other local orinternational actors present in Afghanistan (especially the EU andthe UN). He then informs Nato headquarters and may issue recom-mendations106. However, many allies are opposed to implementingsuch a civilian chain of command, in particular because this couldcreate risks of duplication between Nato and the EU. For all thesereasons, Afghanistan illustrates the difficult positioning of Nato interms of the comprehensive approach.

103 SLOAN, David S., “Nato in Afghanistan”, Unisci Discussion Papers, N°22, January 2010, p. 37.104 CORDESMAN, Anthony : “Sanctum FATA”, The National Interest, N°101, May-June 2009, p. 31, also availableonline: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21292, viewed on 19 April 2010.105 The nomination took place in October 2003.106 http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/topics_50096.htm, viewed on 1 October 2010.

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Challenges

In short, what are then the challenges linked to Nato’s recourse tothe comprehensive approach?

Transformation challenges of military activities with increasedrecourse to the comprehensive approach

One challenge for Nato is to figure out how the military may inte-grate the comprehensive approach. Do they only need to stop theshooting in order for civilians to get on with their job? Or do theyhave to, for instance, contribute to reconstruction operations? Thiskind of operation is already implemented to obtain a positive psy-chological impact on the populations, or because rebuilding is ne-cessary for good working conditions on site. But do they really haveto do more, as is the case in for instance Afghanistan with the PRTs?There may have to be an upstream definition of what Nato can in-deed include in its comprehensive approach and what should be ex-cluded, and better distinguish the limits between civilian and themilitary which have to be preserved. Another alternative is to workon a case by case basis according to operations, but this may revivetensions during ongoing interventions and thus prevent the normalfunctioning of allied operations.

There is also the issue of integrating new civilian structures intoNato within the development of the comprehensive approach. Da-vid McGregor Pursley considers for instance the introduction of acommittee of civilian security107. Christa Meindersma mentions thepossibility of institutionalizing civilian actors of reconstruction withinNato, or using arrangements with the European Union such as Berlin+ in reverse. Thus Nato could if needed use EU civilian staff for ma-naging complex crises108. France is not favourable to developing civi-lian capabilities properly speaking within Nato, as she does notwant the organisation to develop at the expense or in duplication ofthe European Union. But France cannot hide that the issue of civilianexpertise within Nato becomes very important in the context of sta-

107 McGREGOR PURSLEY, David, “Nato’s organizational evolution: the case for a Civil Security Committee”, NatoDefense College, Research division, November 2008.108 MEINDERSMA, Christa, “A Comprehensive Approach to State Building” in: Gelijn Molier and Eva Nieuwenhuys(ed.), Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization: the Integrated Security Approach viewed from aMultidisciplinary Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009 , pp. 181-205.

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bilization and reconstruction operations, such as in Afghanistan. Ac-cording to the Ministry of Defence, it seems that France would liketo be in favour of a civilian planning capability within Nato, but verylimited and which could be mobilized on an exceptional basis ifother actors were not in a position to act because of a too hostile en-vironment.

Civilian experts would therefore be integrated at Nato headquar-ters for instance, so that the North Atlantic Council is better infor-med of what other civilian actors are up to on a given theatre of ope-ration. A small task force could then act on the political level to bringtheir experience and contacts. Similarly, France would be preparedto consider the presence of an advisor at the Saceur surrounded bya dozen civilian experts to help the military take into account civi-lian challenges during the planning stage. Finally, during an opera-tion a military command could also be supported by a restrictedteam on the civilian planning aspects. The idea would be to have anexchange on PRT best practices for instance, and better synchroniseNato activities with those of other actors.

The question also concerns the implementation of a Nato doc-trine around its use of the comprehensive approach. For the mo-ment Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach only appearsin summit declarations, but is not translated by an official doctrinespecifying the terms of planning consequences and operation mana-gement, human resources, etc. It is hard to say whether the PRTs orthe use of the comprehensive approach are here to stay or if theirutilization is but temporary.

Finally, conducting reconstruction operations and monitoringtheir efficiency also means for Nato military personnel attending alarge number of meetings with civilians, completing numerous as-sessment documents for reconstruction and assistance operations,etc. The opportunity cost of the comprehensive approach shouldthus not be neglected. That is to say, all the things that the militaryno longer have time to do when they invest their time into the deve-lopment of the comprehensive approach.

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Nato interaction with civilian organisations (NGOs …)

The comprehensive approach poses the question of Nato’s inter-action with civilian organisations. Should Nato for instance organisejoint-training or joint-lessons learnt sessions with civilian actors,such as NGO members? This could indeed contribute to exchangesof best practices on close and long-term interactions with local po-pulations. It could also increase the level of trust between civilianactors and Nato by creating interpersonal relations and mutualknowledge. It could create a sense of common effort. On the otherhand, there is a risk that this is perceived as a Nato ambition tocontrol NGO actions. What degree of interaction should be develo-ped to encourage mutual synergies and respect? This is certainly aquestion that Nato has to face if the recourse to the comprehensiveapproach is amplified. Until now NGOs stressed that they apprecia-ted Nato because it only dealt with the military aspect. This attitudemay change with a possible Nato push towards more civilian actions.

The division of labour between Nato and the UN

The link between Nato and the UN is another challenge for Nato’srecourse to the comprehensive approach. Indeed, the UN develo-ped the “integrated approach” and the UN is often present on thesame theatres of operation as Nato. In the case of Afghanistan, twocoordination structures for the comprehensive approach actions in-cluding the two organisations: the PRT Executive Steering Commit-tee and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). In bothcases, Nato actions and UN representatives were present. But as un-derlined by William Butcher109 the outcome of the coordination bet-ween the two organisations is rather limited. There is also the issueof leadership. Should one of the two organisations take command ofthe operations in order to improve the effective enforcement of thecomprehensive approach? This remains a delicate question, as theUN insists on keeping a distance with a military alliance that tendsto expand the scope of its competencies.

109 BUTCHER, William C. “The incomprehensive approach, adding structure to international cooperation inAfghanistan”, in : SCHNAUBELT, Christopher M., (ed.) Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments, Rome, Nato defense college, Research division, June 2009, pp. 151-171.

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The allied states and their commitment to use thecomprehensive approach

Finally, the implementation of the comprehensive approach hasalso given rise to divergent views among the allies in Afghanistan.A typical example concerns the positioning towards drug traffick-ing. “The coalition is struggling in this field because the ap-proaches are very diverse among different nations. Many of themconsider indeed that it is not ISAF’s task to conduct or participatein operations targeting crops.”110 Therefore, using the comprehens-ive approach may be a relevant means of ending armed conflict,but it may also create unexpected tensions among the allies, inparticular concerning the fields to include in the comprehensiveapproach (adopting or not PRTs, implementing or not actionsagainst drug trafficking within military operations, etc). This mayalso reinforce geographical disparities between various zones ofintervention. But as Nato Secretary General Rasmussen under-lined in his Chicago speech, the Alliance needs a comprehensiveapproach in the future, not only in Afghanistan but also in 16 otherconflicts where the Alliance is involved. “We need what we call acomprehensive approach. And that is the first lesson of this mis-sion (in Afghanistan). The days when the military could defeat theenemy, then hand the baton off to the civilians and go home, arepast us. And Afghanistan is not unique. There are 16 major armedconflicts underway today. All of them are within, rather thanbetween states. In many cases, it is the basic pillars of society thatneed to be rebuilt. This means that the military and civilians needto work much more closely than they have in the past.”111

We may thus underline the uncertainty existing within Nato todayas to the positioning towards the comprehensive approach. It is thusimportant that Nato seizes the opportunity of the new strategicconcept to clarify how it wants to contribute to the implementationof the concept. Should the Alliance remain exclusively focused onmilitary security aspects? Or should the Alliance instead develop ci-vil-military links internally and externally (in particular with the UN)?To date, Nato has progressed on the issues of recourse to the com-

110Assemblée Nationale, Rapport parlementaire de la mission d’information sur la situation en Afghanistan desmessieurs Lamy et Lellouche, 29 October 2008.111 S p e e c h by N a t o S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l a t t h e U n iv e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o , 8 A p r i l 2 0 1 0 :http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62510.htm, viewed on 20 April 2010.

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prehensive approach (PRTs, etc) and its relations to other organisa-tions (e.g. Nato). On the other hand, Nato has not yet developed atraining strategy specific to the comprehensive approach.

The use of the integrated approach by the United Nations

Implementing the UN concept

Within the framework of peacebuilding and peacekeeping opera-tions, the United Nations is moving towards the implementation ofan integrated approach. The UN official vocabulary uses the expres-sions “integrated approach” and “integrated missions”, referring inparticular to examples from the African context. It is specificallyabout having “shared evaluations” and “shared programs” as explai-ned by Kofi Annan: “An integrated mission is based on a commonstrategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and typesof programmed interventions that need to be undertaken at variousstages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, theUN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countriesemerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a co-herent and mutually supportive manner.”112 One of the first texts tomake the “integrated missions” approach official is the UN “Reportof the panel on United Nations peacekeeping”, better known as theBrahimi Report (after the diplomat directing the panel), commis-sioned after the failures and difficulties experienced in Bosnia andRwanda, published on 20 August 2000. The report mentions theneed to create an “integrated mission taskforce” so as to have acomprehensive vision of UN actions during a crisis. Behind this re-port, there is a nascent ambition to avoid frictions within various UNdepartments, and to improve their efficiency through coordination.

Organisational change related to the implementation ofthe integrated approach

Since the 1990s and the implementation of the integrated ap-proach, the UN has enlarged its scope of action during crises, andmodified its organisation structure in consequence. From havingmainly focused on ceasefire upheld by the Blue Helmets, the UN

112 UN Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 2000.

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has gone from an approach integrating new tasks, such as the secur-ity system reform (SSR) to disarmament, demobilisation and rein-tegration (DDR), election monitoring, human rights enforcement,among others. All these new functions assumed by the UN have en-tailed organisational change, primarily creating new units or func-tions, new procedures, new training for the staff. In terms of func-tions within an integrated mission, the leadership is in the hands ofthe special representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), assistedby a deputy special representative of the Secretary General whohenceforth is the common executive for functions formerly carriedout separately, i.e. the humanitarian coordinator (HC) for the human-itarian aspects, and the resident coordinator (RC) for developmentaspects. In parallel, the integrated approach goes together with im-plementing an integrated planning ensured by a single structure,the integrated mission planning process. According to the depart-ment of peacekeeping operation this structure includes all actors in-volved during a crisis, both on the local level and at UN headquar-ters. In practice this structure rests on two pillars: the integratedmission task force as recommended by the Brahimi Report, and theintegrated missions planning team. Memoranda of Understanding(MoU) are signed between various entities of the UN system to en-able them to work together in a more systematic and coherent man-ner. This is the case for instance in the memorandum signedbetween the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights andthe Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). NewGuidelines have been produced to enable the implementation ofintegrated approach procedures internally, for instance the DPKO’sintegrated mission guidelines. To implement the integrated ap-proach, the UN has primarily put forward its senior staff with experi-ence in multidimensional approaches.113 New types of training mod-ules have also been developed. We may thus say that the integratedapproach was progressively institutionalised at the UN headquarterlevel during the 2000s.

113 EIDE, Espen Barth, KASPERSEN, Anja Therese, KENT Randolph, VON HIPPEL Karen, Report on integratedmissions: practical perspectives and recommendations, independent study for the expanded UN ECHA core group,May 2005.

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The UN integrated approach and its opening towardsother international actors

The UN works with numerous institutions in the context of its in-tegrated approach which themselves develop their own comprehen-sive approach. The idea is to have a more coherent approach toavoid unnecessary duplication between the concerned internationalinstitutions. Beyond, the issue is to recognise that as security, deve-lopment and good governance are intimately linked in conflict reso-lution operations, it is not possible to keep these three aspects se-parate and at the same time obtain efficient results in terms of res-toring and maintaining peace. The EU-UN and the Nato-UN relation-ships have already been dealt with in previous sections on the EUand Nato respectively. We will not revert to this topic here, but it isimportant to remember that these links also contribute to imple-ment the UN integrated approach.

A key element in the opening of the UN to international actors inits integrated approach: the ambition to rely on regional entities ba-sed on chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This is not devoid of difficul-ties, in particular to decide which type of organisation should be in-cluded or excluded from the eligible regional entities for a close col-laboration on the basis of chapter VIII. Another key element: the UNdoes not use the comprehensive approach concept, but that of inte-grated approach. The overall objective is to distinguish the organisa-tion from Nato in offering a unique multidimensional approach,thanks to the number of actors it includes. The UN therefore is ope-ning up to international actors, but remains wary of Nato.

The UN integrated approach on the ground: the case ofLiberia

The UN remains the international organisation with the longestexperience of the multidimensional approach through its integratedapproach. The first lessons from its use were learned from its inter-vention in Liberia in 2003. This operation was carried out on a largescale involving 16 000 civilian and military participants. In Liberiathe UN merged for the first time under a single political leadershipall its action levers, i.e. the humanitarian and the political-military

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elements. Thus the UN was able to closely direct the operationconducted in Liberia, targeting all the programs implemented onsite according to the political objectives established. On the ground,this change entailed the closing of the UN-OCHA and leadership bythe UNMIL. This did not occur without protests from NGOs whichviewed in the implementation of the integrated approach the risk ofcreating injustices in the treatment of different zones in terms of hu-manitarian action. The NGOs feared that some zones would be ei-ther abandoned or strongly supported according to political ratherthan humanitarian needs.114 The closing of the UN-OCHA also desta-bilised the links of this organisation with local actors on site.

The following chart describes how the integrated approach wastranslated in the case of Liberia:

Source: HULL, Cecilia, Integrated missions: a Liberia case study, FOI,Swedish research defence agency, August 2008

As may be seen in this chart, the military are entirely integrated.Thus, there is no longer any unity as such to manage the links bet-ween civilians and the military, but indeed a comprehensive struc-ture where different functions (humanitarian, development etc) are114 Telephone interview with Oliver Behn, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.

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integrated, as underlined by Cecilia Hull. Also, there is a single lo-gistics unit to serve civilian and military actors. Similarly, there is aunit to integrate intelligence coming from the military and civilians –the police, etc. Finally, we may also note that the integrated ap-proach in Liberia tried to remain as close as possible to the popula-tions by implementing Country Support Teams (CSTs).

The implementation of the integrated approach followed a pro-cess where ad hoc actions were formalised to allow for a greater co-ordination between civilians and the military. In parallel, numerousconcepts elaborated by UN headquarters could not really be ap-plied on the ground. This is also clearly stated in Cecilia Hull’s re-port: “The experience of UNMIL shows that while integration at field-level has either been institutionalized or informally improvised, ithas at the headquarters and planning level mainly been absent. Atthis level, when theory has proven impractical the UN has relied onfall-back strategies and traditional approaches not always consistentwith the IM concept. At the strategic level the implementation of IMhas so far failed to capitalize on the potential of the United Nationsas a broad and inclusive wide-ranging organisation in creating a fullycomprehensive peace operation, leaving a great divide between theIntegrated Missions concept and practice.”115 We may thus observe agap between theories elaborated internally and their practical ap-plication on the ground. Moreover, some NGOs on site expressedtheir opposition to implementing the integrated approach. They hadthe impression that this meant integrating all actions at the DPKOlevel, and not to treat all UN entities that applied the comprehens-ive approach as equals.

What is at stake

Nato internal tensions

A first evaluation report published in 2005 mentions internal ap-proval of the changes to enable implementation of the integratedapproach.116 However, this has brought about internal tensions in

115 HULL, Cecilia, Integrated missions: a Liberia case study, FOI, Swedish Research Defence Agency, August 2008,p. 8.116 EIDE, Espen Barth, KASPERSEN, Anja Therese, KENT Randolph, VON HIPPEL Karen, Report on integratedmissions: practical perspectives and recommendations, independent study for the expanded UN ECHA core group,May 2005, p. 16.

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two departments: the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and theDepartment for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Each of thesewould like to take charge of the integrated missions within the im-plementation of the comprehensive approach.117

On the ground these tensions also occur between the UN countryteam and the envoys of the DPKO. The DPKO representatives arri-ving take charge of operations under the auspices of the SRSG, whe-reas the people of the UN country team on site have for a long timefelt excluded from the planning phase of the integrated mission.Conversely, the DPKO staff dispatched have the impression that lo-cal UN staff are not adapting to the new procedures of the integratedapproach.118

UN decision-making procedures

The UN meets some obstacles in implementing the integratedapproach because of its decision-making process. For instance, oncedecisions have been made in the Council after long negotiations, UNheadquarters is not as such in charge of operations conducted onsite. Direct links between the theatre and UN headquarters are rare.It is the SRSG who on site coordinates civilian and military issues.This means that the UN integrated approach is more operationalthan strategic, the links between the DPKO and the SRSG being es-sentially technical. It should be added that many UN agencies areindependent, which prevents the UN General Secretariat from moni-toring their activities in the context of a complex crisis.

Linking UN and non-UN humanitarian actors

The total integration of UN actors leads humanitarian UN actors toserve first the political interests of the organisation, and not those ofthe humanitarian actors nor their first guiding principles (i.e. neutra-lity, autonomy, independence). This appears very clearly from criti-cal comments by NGO officials. Beyond the cultural differences bet-ween the military and civilian officials who do not facilitate coordina-

117 MAJOR, Claudia, MOELLING, Christian, “More than wishful thinking? The EU, UN, Nato and thecomprehensive approach to military crisis management”, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, N°3, 2009, p. 24.118 EIDE, Espen Barth, KASPERSEN, Anja Therese, KENT Randolph, VON HIPPEL Karen, Report on integratedmissions: practical perspectives and recommendations, independent study for the expanded UN ECHA core group,May 2005, p. 18.

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tion, strong tensions are present between pro-UN activists and hu-manitarian workers.

The UN role in civil-military rapprochement for catastrophes

Through its humanitarian affairs office (UN-OCHA), the UN partici-pated in the implementation of the Oslo guidelines related to civil-military relations in disaster management. The text was issued in1994 and then amended in 2001 and 2004. It was completed by ano-ther reference text, Civil-military relations in complex energies.Through these texts the UN positioned itself on the internationalstage by imposing a specific vocabulary: the term is henceforth Civil-military coordination or CMCoord. The texts mentioned above settlethe civil-military coordination on particular issues such as the use ofmilitary escorts and the use of defence instruments in case of majordisasters. Thus we may see that the integrated approach appliesalso to natural disasters when facing a risk (natural or industrial) andfurther in terms of a deliberate threat (armed conflict). This firstnuance should be stressed, for in some cases the comprehensiveapproach is only implemented in case of weak or failed states, andnot in order to react to a disaster. This is the case for instance in theFrench approach of the concept.

Further, the texts stress that humanitarian aid is neutral and im-partial, but especially that the military may only intervene in the lastresort when all other options prove insufficient to manage the disas-ter. The text has also given rise to stormy debates on this point. Forinstance, the European Commission intervenes in major disasters bysending civilian protection forces. As these are sometimes military(depending on the countries participating), the UN-OCHA text led toexcluding them from assistance operations in disaster situations, al-though this is the primary mission of emergency teams for civilianprotection.

Intense discussions occurred between European Commission of-ficals working on the unity of civilian protection as the text was nego-tiated. This illustrates the tensions existing between the definitionof so-called civilian and military actors. The example of non-armedcivilian protection forces under military status demonstrates to what

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extent limits are sometimes blurred and make situations more com-plex. Although the Oslo guidelines deal with interactions betweencivilians and the military in disaster situations, no text settles the is-sue of civil-military interactions in peacekeeping operations. This si-tuation is typical of the confusion around the issue, but also of thetensions between military and humanitarian actors in the crisis ma-nagement of weak or failed states.

The UN role in managing the civil-military rapprochement inconflicts

The UN positions itself as counting on the emergence of regionalorganisations to be potentially used to best manage conflicts andrestore peace. In this context the UN counts in particular on the Afri-can Union, the European Union or the OSCE. In relying directly onthese organisations and no longer on states, the UN modifies thedeal by betting on closer interactions directly on the level of the or-ganisations, instead of their members.119 This however is not withoutdifficulties. The UN positions itself as a global actor, relying on regio-nal instances, whereas the latter do not always consider themselvesas strictly regional actors in the UN sense. Speaking of the integra-ted approach, the UN positions itself above the crowd, integratingthe action of regional actors whereas these are not necessarily readyto be suject to such arrangements. They develop their own docu-ments and try to conceptualise what their relationship with the UNshould be.

For instance, the EU has defined four major principles to be usedin relating to other international organisations: added value, inter-operability, visibility and autonomy in decision-making. For the EU,there is not one single way of interacting with other players in mana-ging crises; many configurations are possible depending on the si-tuations. Nato endeavours to do as much by currently conceptuali-sing its contribution to the comprehensive approach.

119 TARDY, Thierry, “Building peace in post-conflict environments : why and how the UN and the EU interact”, paperpresented at the workshop “improving effectiveness of peacebuilding and state-building through EU-UNcooperation”, organized by the political science department, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Kiel, Berlin,29 et 30 March 2010.

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The use of the comprehensive approach in otherinternational organisations

It is not possible within the scope of this study to make a com-plete presentation of the use of the comprehensive approach in allthe international organisations involved. Having said that, to give acomprehensive overview not limited to the EU, Nato and the UN,some data are put forward here on the OSCE, the African Union andthe OECD. Other international actors could have been included,such as the World Bank, the IMF etc. They are not because they aremore of financial institutions than political actors in the sense of theinternational organisations mentioned here.

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation forsecurity and cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE developed historically on the concept of “comprehen-sive security”.120 The latter is concerned by the “comprehensive ap-proach” through three major dimensions: the political-military ap-proach, the human approach but also the economic-environmentalapproach. The “comprehensive approach” specific to the OSCE istherefore broader than the EU, Nato or UN versions for it includesenvironmental changes. In the reference document OSCE Strategy toAddress Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Cen-tury121 the comprehensive approach appears through the expression“global security”, i.e. the OSCE relies on a very wide securityconcept including respect for basic liberties, the rule of law, imple-menting democratic institutions but also socio-economic and envi-ronmental factors. One specific element of the OSCE is to presentthe comprehensive approach above all as a lever to counter terroristthreats since 2001, but also corruption in the widest sense. The ob-jective is to bring together the OSCE member states to produce uni-ted action against increasing terrorism and corruption. A secondspecificity: the OSCE promotes a comprehensive approach to en-able not only conflict resolution, but to anticipate conflicts throughan early warning system.

120 Email exchange, OSCE, August 2010.121 Document available online: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2003/12/4175_en.pdf.

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The OSCE played a leading role in implementing thinking aboutthe comprehensive approach within its member states, for instanceby organising numerous conferences such as the one on the compre-hensive approach and cyber-security held in April 2010 in Lille inconnection with the fight against terrorism. In addition, the OSCEworks in partnership with other institutions to implement the com-prehensive approach. The OSCE works predominantly with the UN.This was the case with the peacekeeping operations in Georgia(UNOMIG) and in Tajikistan (UNMIT). The cooperation is most deve-loped and constant with the UN both in terms of intervention andexchange of ideas and views on the institutional level.122 There isalso an OSCE-Nato partnership. On the operational level, the coope-ration between the OSCE and Nato takes place above all in conflictprevention, crisis management and post-conflict recovery. It is parti-cularly dynamic in the western Balkans. Further, in November 2007the OSCE decided during its ministerial meeting in Madrid to inter-vene in Afghanistan. This opened the door to a new form of collabo-ration with international actors in Afghanistan within the frameworkof a comprehensive approach, such as Nato.123 The OSCE also main-tains a link with Nato in the sense that the Alliance adopts some ofits concepts inspired by OSCE norms.124

The integrated approach within the African Union (AU)

The African Union integrates the following dimensions in its com-prehensive approach: security, humanitarian assistance, political go-vernance, socio-economic reconstruction and development, humanrights and justice, and gender issues. The AU talks of a multidimen-sional conflict resolution process, and relies predominantly on theconcepts of human security and sustainable development.125 TheAfrican Union has adopted the same terminology as the UN in theframework of its African Standby Force Doctrine, i.e. the “integrated

122 NOVOSSELOFF, Alexandra, “La coopération entre l’organisation des Nations-Unies et les institutionseuropéennes de sécurité : principes et perspectives”, in: Annuaire français des relations internationales, vol. 2, 2001,pages 594-612.123 “Les relations Otan et OSCE”: http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-82AB1637-111FD560/natolive/topics_49911.htm,viewed on 3 August 2010.124 GRAEGER, Nina, NOVOSSELOFF, Alexandra, “The role of the OSCE and the EU”, manuscript received duringthe interview with Alexandra NOVOSSELOFF.125 AFRICAN UNION, Report on the realization of a framework document on post conflit reconstruction anddevelopment, 2006; AFRICAN UNION, Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of theAfrican Union, 2003.

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approach”.126 It would seem that the AU tries to position itself in theline of the UN attempts to develop the comprehensive approach onthe ground during crises. It would therefore be in its strategic inter-est to adopt the UN vocabulary.127

Although the vocabulary stems from the UN, the AU relies mostlyon the EU for financing the management of complex crises. In addi-tion, a security and development instrument has been implementedbetween the EU and the AU through the Joint AU-European Commis-sion monitoring mechanism, reinforced by the new EU strategy forAfrica adopted by the Council in December 2005. A new step was ta-ken in 2007 with the idea of going beyond the simple financial linkbetween the EU and the AU by establishing a common project onsecurity, governance and development issues. Eight partnershipprograms were then created to link security and development.128

We may thus observe the formation of a long-term trio UN-EU-AUfor improved conflict management in Africa. Numerous imitationprocesses are also taking place between the EU and the AU on com-prehensive approach issues, in particular on the structural level.

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation foreconomic cooperation and development (OECD)

In terms of the comprehensive approach the OECD has mostlypositioned itself on the Whole of government approach (WGA orWHOGA) in failed states through its international network onConflict and fragility bringing together the Network on Conflict,Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) and its Fragile StatesGroup (FSG).129 It concerns the government actors working on securi-ty and development issues to ensure good coherence in the use offunds allocated for the reconstruction of failed states. The OECD haselaborated its own position through this concept, but works in colla-boration with Nato and the UN for its implementation.

126 L’African standby force is a permanent force of five regional multidimensional brigades including military, civilianand police components.127 Interview, Ministère de la défense, Paris, July 2010.128 Council Conlusions on “One year after Lisbon: The AU-UE Partnership at work”,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-AfricaDialogue103904.pdf, viewed on 3 Aout 2010.129 OECD, “Whole of government approaches to fragile states”, 2006, available online:http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf viewed on 4 Aout 2010.

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Conclusion on the positioning of the internationalorganisations on the comprehensive approach

By studying the use of the comprehensive approach concept bythe international organisations, we may observe a kind of internalstruggle where each tries to impose her own policy and her ownnorms of crisis management. Each international organisation studiedhere produces a large number of official documents available onlineto promote its model of the comprehensive approach, namely itsown conception of post-cold war human security. Also, numerous se-minars and conferences are organised to this end.130 The goal is touse one’s own interpretation to influence others, or to move towardsothers. Typically, the fact that the African Union has adopted the UNvocabulary is a way to position itself as a kind of UN in Africa, for ins-tance.

The overall objective is to become legitimate131 in new areas ofintervention. For Nato for instance, there is a trend to seek legitima-cy in actions that are more civilian than military in nature. Throughthe comprehensive approach Nato may justify its role in fighting pi-racy. It can also legitimise its presence in Afghanistan by not positio-ning itself as an occupying power but as a rebuilder. Second, it isabout convincing different categories of actors. For instance, Natomay avoid some rejections of the Afghan intervention by public opi-nion, media and parliamentarians by using its recourse to the com-prehensive approach. It can also get better accepted by local popu-lations. The comprehensive approach contributes indeed to the fa-mous “win hearts and minds” effect. Beyond, the comprehensive ap-proach might enable Nato to send a signal to states which make onlya small contribution in terms of troops, but which could converselycontribute financially or by making civilian personnel available foractions of restoring governance or development actions.

A strategic question for the future of the comprehensive ap-proach is whether the various international institutions presentedhere (EU, Nato, UN, OSCE etc) will succeed in developing synergies

130 Thus Nato is organising several seminars and conferences in 2010 on the comprehensive approach, e.g. theinterallied conference of reserve officers in Stavanger, or a research symposium in New York in October.131 KEOHANE, R.O. “The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism” GARNET Working Paper: No: 09/06,September 2006, available online : http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/0906.pdf, viewedon 5 August 2010.

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beyond their different views. One proposal is currently being stu-died, namely the establishment of an international forum in Brussels(International Community Planning Forum, ICPF) to enable expertsfrom the various organisations involved in the comprehensive ap-proach to meet and exchange on the different modes of crisis mana-gement. This forum would for instance allow for an exchange of bestpractices and feedback.132 This initiative sponsored by the Ameri-cans in the context of a Nato-EU rapprochement is supported bythose who view an opportunity for Nato to move towards the UN andother actors who by nature are less opposed to a rapprochementwith the EU rather than purely with Nato. Conversely, the NGOs arevery critical of this initiative. As for the military, some fear that theenlarged perimeter of the forum will only allow for very limited dis-cussions, as may be currently seen in the Joint Coordination and Mo-nitoring Board (JCMB) in Afghanistan. This forum is so wide in termsof participants that it is presented as an ineffective “talking shop” onAfghan issues. The IFCP will certainly run the same risk.

In any case, it is important to have a double perspective of theimplementation of the comprehensive approach within the interna-tional organisations: first on the conceptualisation in the general se-cretariats and another on the operationalisation of the concept du-ring crises. It would seem that the theory elaborated in headquar-ters is not always translated effectively on the ground. Conversely,some practices underpinning the comprehensive approach developon an ad hoc basis in crisis theatres, as shown by the three examplesstudied above (Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia).

We may finally underscore that the study of the comprehensiveapproach within international organisations reveals that some go-vernment actors have played a decisive role in how some internatio-nal organisations have positioned themselves. Denmark, for ins-tance, is presented as an actor having initiated the inclusion of thecomprehensive approach by Nato. This is why the following chapterwill focus on the implementation of the comprehensive approach onthe national level, using four case studies.

132 MICHEL, Leo, Nato and the EU : Achieving unity of effort in a comprehensive approach, Atlantic Council,http://www.acus.org, viewed on 28 September 2010.

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The use of the comprehensive approach by states: thecases of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and theUnited States

Many states work to implement a comprehensive approach. Thistakes many forms: the objective is sometimes, as in the UK case, topool funding to manage a crisis between civilian and military actors,implementing a team of civilian actors who may be rapidly deployedin areas where the military need their support. In other instances,this includes the establishment of common feedback or even com-mon training seminars. In Germany, this has given birth to the Zen-trum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for internationalpeacekeeping intervention). Sometimes, it is simply about intermi-nisterial meetings organised to keep the actors mutually informed,as in Sweden. In Japan, a system for human resources managementhas been devised to facilitate the implementation of the compre-hensive approach. In Canada and Norway, there is a system for mat-ching the available resources to the needs. The list is not compre-hensive.

In order to depict the diversity of national comprehensive ap-proaches, four case studies will be presented here: France, the Uni-ted Kingdom, Germany and the United States. These countries werechosen for several reasons. As this study is being published inFrance, it seemed important to analyse the French case. Concerningthe United Kingdom and Germany, they are included because theyplayed a role as initiators of the comprehensive approach in Europe,although they each represent a different model. These threeexamples will allow us some comparisons of the way the compre-hensive approach was institutionalised on the national level in dif-ferent EU countries. Finally, the American example seemed para-mount, as the US has had a leading role in developing the concept,albeit more domestically than on the international level.

Three aspects will be compared in these four case studies: theimplementation of the concept on the national level, some limita-tions or criticisms, and finally the issue of the Provincial reconstruc-tion teams in the Afghan context. The PRTs are structures combiningcivilians and the military on the theatre of operation, as in Afghanis-

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tan or Iraq. This enables a comparison of the implementation of thecomprehensive approach both on the political doctrine level and onthe operational level on the ground thanks to the presence of thesefour countries in Afghanistan, although they use the concept diffe-rently – no French PRTs, very different PRTs in the British and Ger-man cases, and the American PRTs as model.

The global response in France

The French concept of civil-military crisis management ascomprehensive approach

Several French actors are in charge of implementing the compre-hensive approach, including the Ministry of Defence and the Minis-try of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA). To understand theFrench approach, these two actors have been consulted through in-terviews and documents produced by these institutions have beenstudied.

The Centre Interarmée de concepts, de doctrines et d’expéri-mentation (CICDE) is in charge of conceptualising the French com-prehensive approach within the Ministry of Defence. Its work is a re-sult of the reports by the prefect Jean Dussourd who underlined thelack of coordination in the civilian crisis management. Its work alsotakes place under the auspices of president Sarkozy’s wishes in the2008 White Paper on security and defence to see the French defencedevelop to better integrate the challenges linked to globalisationand new types of conflicts. “The complexity of international crisesrequires the definition of strategies bringing together the diploma-tic, financial, civilian, cultural and military instruments, both in theprevention stages and in crisis management proper, as in the post-conflict sequences of stabilisation and reconstruction.”133

133 White Paper on defence and security, June 2008, p. 58, available online :http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.html, viewed on 28 July 2010.

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The French concept elaborated by the CICDE rests on the factthat military action alone does not restore peace.134 It only concernsthe crises to be managed in weak or failed states. It consists of im-plementing three conjoined actions: restoring governance, securityand development in the concerned area. To achieve this threemodes of the comprehensive approach are identified: surveillance,containment and intervention. Surveillance consists of sharing infor-mation among the actors concerned by the crisis. This means esta-blishing a surveillance structure which would be interministerial, en-abling the sharing of expertise and a common vision. Containmentequally is about a large prevention action including, beyond securi-ty, governance and development issues. Finally, during the interven-tion the military are present to bring about a ceasefire, but in paral-lel civilians must be able to train local actors for securisation, resto-ring the judicial system, work on development to let the concernedsocieties recover from the crisis in the best possible way. The com-prehensive approach should help to respond to the population’s le-gitimate needs. On the international level, it must also reinforce co-operation between the international organisations, military al-liances, the states and the NGOs.

The definition of the concept in the CICDE documents is the fol-lowing: “The comprehensive approach aims at preventing or settlingdurably and rapidly a crisis through the synergy of actions carriedout by various actors in the fields of governance, security, and eco-nomic and social development. It combines collaboration betweenactors sharing a common final vision and coordination with the otheractors present on the theatre. It requires, as soon as possible, an ap-propriation of the solution by the host nation or the local represen-tatives. It favours conditions conducive to satisfying quickly the legi-timate aspirations of the population. Finally, it seeks to associate re-gional actors with this effort.” The actors met at the French Ministryof Defence do not hesistate to use the expression comprehensiveapproach. The term is also found in the working documents.

At the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the vocabularyused is a different one. Only the expression “global response”135 is134 The presentation of the French concept of comprehensive approach is based on interviews conducted at the CICDEin April and May 2010.135 Or sometimes “démarche globale”.

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accepted (and not comprehensive approach) in order to make a dis-tinction from the Nato or American concepts. It even seems that theexpression “civil-military management of external crises” could pre-vail eventually so as to avoid any too direct link with the compre-hensive approach. Yet the same references may be found in theWhite Paper on defence and national security, and the same idea ofa security, governance, development continuum.136 Beyond this refe-rence, the MFAE also relies on the Dussourd report to underscorethe need to develop an interministerial method. The structure incharge of implementing the global response is made up on onehand of a steering committee at the top level, meeting three times ayear, and a Task Force which is the working group under a doubleauthority, i.e. the political power and the crisis centre of the Ministryof Foreign and European Affairs. Its objective is to elaborate an in-terministerial strategy of external crisis management enabling a glo-bal response. A specific element of the French Task Force comparedto interministerial or interagency structures in other countries is thatit includes the Ministry of Finance.

Some limitations and criticisms

Among the limitations or criticisms targeting the French conceptis the difficulty in establishing an appropriate interministerial struc-ture. Indeed, government ministries are sometimes rival organisa-tions and this limits the structural implementation of the compre-hensive approach. On this point, one may wonder why the GeneralSecretariat of the National Defence has not managed to take a lea-dership role in the interministerial aspects.

It would seem that thanks to its inclusion in international exer-cises, the military are more inclined to adopt a standardised Na-to-EU vocabulary in the form of the expression “comprehensive ap-proach”.137 Conversely and in order to limit British and American in-fluences, the MFEA tries to keep a certain distance by using the ex-pression “global response”. The institutionalisation of the concept atthe Ministry of Defence seems to occur more by imitating internatio-nal norms, whereas the MFEA tries to get away from these. Following

136 Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, July 2010.137 The Multinational Experiments 5 resulted in the publication of a document in September 2007 « L’approcheglobale : un cadre conceptuel pour les MNE5 ».

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the interviews, we may stress that the military personnel is convin-ced of the concept, respecting the chain of command of militaryoperations, i.e. the President of the Republic, the Chief of Staff ofthe armed forces. The question is then how this chain of defencecould be made compatible with a better interministerial coordina-tion in crisis management.

A second critical point concerns resources. To date, there is nobudget for implementing the comprehensive approach. Yet the factthat a representative of the Ministry of Finance sits on the task forcecould indicate a possible introduction of a financing mechanism inthe future, beyond its role for seeking European and international fi-nancing. The people interviewed fear that no funding will be avai-lable for the comprehensive approach, which could lead to the costbeing included in the existing budget, for instance the budget forexternal military operations. The risk is then that the action capabili-ty of the French forces deployed in their purely military action is re-duced. Another fear is that a gap will appear between the financingof crisis management in emergencies, and the funds linked to long-term development. Between the two there is a need for “post-crisis”funding within the framework of the comprehensive approach whichfew actors seem to integrate.138

Finally, the issue of human resources is a delicate one. There arefears in the Ministry of Defence of seeing reserve officers being de-ployed within the comprehensive approach framework and no lon-ger in the army services. But the military personnel interviewedstress that it is already difficult to cover all the needs of the Ministryby using reserve officers in times of crisis. The position of the Minis-try of Defence is then that it is necessary to send civilian personnel(judges, etc) but this should not take the place of reserve officers toassist those in charge of complex crisis management (e.g. legal advi-sors to the commanding officers, etc). As far as the Minister of the In-terior is concerned, the fears concern above all the security of thepersonnel deployed in complex crisis areas.

138 Interview, Ministry of Defence, Paris, September 2010.

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The absence of a French model for Provincial

Reconstruction Teams

Althogh present in Afghanistan and commanding an AmericanPRT, France has not developed any French PRT concept. The peopleinterviewed for this study hint that this may be explained by politicsrather than the situation on the ground. France did not want to alignitself with the US or the Nato model. She would have preferred tounderline her specificity or even her commitment above all to a Eu-rope of Defence. This may also be found in the report by the Fonda-tion pour la recherche stratégique, Les nouveaux concepts militairesdans les nouveaux conflits.139

Yet, if France has no PRT strictly speaking, it is thinking about thelinks between the comprehensive approach and the influence in cri-sis areas. The people interviewed stress that it is essential in com-plex crises, as in Afghanistan, to articulate the comprehensive ap-proach and influence in implementing the concept. This may takeplace through development operations of broadcast radio for ins-tance. In addition, even without the presence of PRTs, Afghanistan isconsidered a successful example of implementing the comprehen-sive approach by the French. For instance, it is to date one of the cri-sis areas where interministerial coordination is the most accompli-shed. People interviewed in French ministries underline that the Af-ghanistan-Pakistan unit could become a model in the future for ma-naging other complex crises on the interministerial level. On theground, training French forces is being recognised in Kapisa and Su-robi, and the expedition of additional gendarmes could occur for thebenefit of a local training centre.

Others like Amaury de Féligonde140 take a more nuanced posi-tion. Although the comprehensive approach has enabled France toimplement the distribution of fertilizer, to launch beekeping and fishcultures, or even agricultural cooperatives for the long term, or totrain hospital staff, the development of this approach stumbles onthe lack of interministerial cooperation.

139 GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX, Nicole, KOVACS, Anne, Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans les nouveauxconflits, Rapport final, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, US Crest, 2010 pp. 115-116.140 DE FELIGONDE, Amaury, “La coopération civile en Afghanistan, une coûteuse illusion?”, Focus stratégique,n°24, Aout 2010.

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The comprehensive approach in the United Kingdom

The British concept relies on the Stabilisation unit

The comprehensive approach as a concept appeared in 2005 inthe British military doctrine, moreover around decision-making is-sues at the highest strategic level. The comprehensive approach de-veloped earlier in the UK than in France. To understand the Britishposition on the concept, the online memorandum on the website ofthe Houses of Parliament was the main source, being one of themost recent documents on the concept in the UK.141 Further, the re-port by the defence committee of the House of Lords which detailsthe British position was also used to establish what might be thespecificity of the British approach.142 An interview was conductedwith a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office(FCO).

To the British, the comprehensive approach is “a philosophy” of-fering a framework that is adaptable to the situations that occur. Thecomprehensive approach does not define “standards” for the modesof action, nor homogenises the operating modes of the various ac-tors. It is more of a common effort to obtain better results thanks toa greater coherence of the actions of the different participants. As inFrance, the context for using the comprehensive approach is that ofstabilisation and conflict prevention. Instead of the three Frenchstages, the British have identified four: engage, secure, hold and de-velop. Since 2007, there is a doctrinal note: Countering Irregular Acti-vity within a Comprehensive Approach (JDN 2/07). As in the case ofthe French text proposed as concept for the CICDE, the first stage isa shared vision of the situation. Between crises, exchanges shouldallow for a better comprehension of the challenges facing the variousactors. What should bring the actors together is a sense of serving acommon objective. The idea is to develop a climate of trust throughclose exchange and networking.

141 Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department forInternational Development, available online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we03.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.142 House of Lords’ Defence committee, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to makea better peace, Seventh report of the 2009-2010 session.

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In the UK, the comprehensive approach concerns the Ministry ofDefence (MoD) and the armed forces, the British Foreign and Com-monwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Deve-lopment (DFID). The Prime Minister holds leadership over the com-prehensive approach and may delegate this aspect as needed toone of the relevant departments. Conversely, the French interminis-terial task force is based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (althoughinitially the plan was to locate it within the General Secretariat of Eu-ropean Affairs (SGAE). Just as the French White Paper stressed theimportance of a multidimensional and interministerial crisis mana-gement, the updated National Security Strategy of June 2009 in theUnited Kingdom underlines the need for a “cross-governmental ap-proach”. To this end the “stabilisation unit” liaises with various Bri-tish ministries concerned by the comprehensive approach in termsof crisis management (DFID, FCO, MoD). Although this unit is basedat the DFID, it is subordinate to the three ministries. The concept ofstabilisation is closely linked to the comprehensive approach, as itcovers the humanitarian, political, military and development as-pects.143


Among the criticisms or limitations concerning the Britishconcept, a first point concerns the link between the national objec-tives and their implementation during operations. Some say it isvery difficult to transpose the concept on the tactical and operatio-nal level, and that sometimes the continuum may be broken.144

Another criticism is that promoting the comprehensive approachin the UK makes the civilian actors fear a potential takeover by themilitary. This has produced strong bureaucratic tensions on the na-tional level. This is why the promotion of the comprehensive ap-proach has undergone a process which is no longer purely domesticbut international. The British strongly support the comprehensiveapproach both within the EU and Nato.145

143 STABILISATION UNIT, The UK approach to stabilization, stabilization unit guidance note, 2008.144 ALDERSON, Alexander, « Comprehensive approaches : theories, strategies, plans and practice”, dans:SCHNAUBELT, Christopher M., (ed.) Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments,Rome, Nato defense college, Research division, June 2009, p. 14.145 GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX Nicole, COSTE Frédéric, KLEIN Michel (ed.), Les nouveaux concepts militaires dansles nouveaux conflits, Rapport final, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Paris, 2010, p.126.

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PRTs within the British tradition of counterinsurgency

The British have conducted three PRTs in Afghanistan: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah and Meymaneh. The British PRTs play a role inupholding the ceasefire, surveillance and reconstruction through theimplementation of civilian projects. They have played a key role incarrying out security systems reform. In addition they participate inthe fight against drug trafficking.

They are part and parcel of the British tradition of counterinsur-gency and in developing the stabilisation unit. In other words, theyare integrated in a dense network of links between civilians and themilitary. They are directly linked to the American PRT model, sincethe British were the first to take over a US PRT in 2003. At the heartof the British PRTs are the Military Observation Teams (MOTs) thatbring together the necessary information for implementing recons-truction projects.

A major problem for the British PRTs is their difficult positioningbetween the central power and the local warlords.146 A second issuebrought up by NGOs and the British and American PRTs alikeconcerns the dress of the military intervening in civilian operations.Some NGOs have mentioned cases where the military were not inuniform during certain actions within the context of PRTs. The NGOsthen stressed their opposition to this kind of practice which accor-ding to them create a confusion between civilian and military wes-tern actors on the ground. This supposedly puts them in danger, asthey are accused of being also under military orders.

The comprehensive approach in Germany

The German concept focused on reconstructionchallenges

“Keine Sicherheit ohne Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung” (No se-curity without reconstruction and development)147 is the Germanmotto, in particular in the context of its commitment in Afghanistan.

146 HETT, Julia, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - Das amerikanische, britische und deutsche Modell,Analyse 04-05, ZIF, April 2005.147 BUNDESREGIERUNG, Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung, September 2008.

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After World War II Germany limited its external operations to partici-pating in UN humanitarian missions, until the decision by the Ger-man Constitutional Court (12 July 1994) which authorised German ac-tions within the framework of a reciprocal collective security systemto uphold peace, for instance by enforcing a UN Resolution148 This iswhy German public opinion and the political class are very sensitiveto the manner in which troops are used in Afghanistan. The compre-hensive approach then appears as a means for Germany to expressits positioning in relation to its military commitment as close as pos-sible to its founding principles since 1949. The overall objective is toreconstruct rather than to wage war. In the context of implementingthe comprehensive approach, the Zentrum für internationale Frie-denseinsätze provides analysis and studies. Yet, in the Afghanexample one may see why it might be difficult for Germany to imple-ment the comprehensive approach.


First, the comprehensive approach is divided among three minis-tries: the Ministry for economic cooperation and development(BZM) which may finance large-scale reconstruction operations; theMinistry of the Interior on the federal level and in the Länder (re-gions) involved in implementing police training in failed states; andfinally the Ministry of Defence which may contribute to complex cri-sis management by sending troups under Nato or UN command.149

Two difficulties are then intertwined, making these three ministrieswork together and making the regional and the federal levels colla-borate.

Second, it would seem that development issues hold the upperhand, with in addition a competency deficit in terms of counterinsur-gency. This makes it difficult to implement the comprehensive ap-proach because of the lack of balance between the three dimen-sions security-governance-development.150

148 On the constitutional restrictions of the use of the Bundeswehr and its consequences on the commitments of theGerman army, cf. von BREDOW, Wilfried, Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland, Springer, 2009.149 NOETZEL, Timo, RID, Thomas, “Germany’s options in Afghanistan”, Survival, Vol. 51, N°5, October-November2009, pp. 71-90.150 MAYER, Rolf, Early recovery in post conflict countries, a conceptual study, Dutch ministry of foreign affairs,2009.

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Provincial reconstruction teams working for development

The German PRTs occurred through overtaking an American PRT,as in the British example described above. However, the GermanPRTs differ from the British ones as they are not part of a counterin-surgency logic. They manage mainly development and good gover-nance projects, although involving a majority of military actors. EachGerman ministry involved in these projects finances its own em-ployees within the PRTs (especially the Ministry of Defence, the Mi-nistry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry ofEconomic Cooperation and Development). Unlike the British model,the German PRTs do not participate in fighting the drug trade. Theyalso have more staff than the British in terms of military and civilianpersonnel. Unlike the British PRTs, they are placed under both mili-tary (Ministry of Defence) and civilian command (often the Ministryof Foreign Affairs). As in the British case, the issue of the link bet-ween PRTs and local warlords proves problematic.151

The comprehensive approach by the United States

The American concept predominantly internally inthe United States

The United States was first in taking an interest in the compre-hensive approach concept in the early 2000s. The use of the compre-hensive approach in the United States is characterised by the deve-lopment of inter-agency coordination, as may be seen restated inthe National security strategy (May 2010). In implementing the com-prehensive approach in the United States, the State Departmentcreated in 2004 an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction andStabilization (S/CRS). The overall objective on the national level isto achieve a greater impact in complex crisis management by ap-plying formalised coordination processes between seven depart-ments (State Department, US Agency for International Develop-ment, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health andHuman Services, Homeland Security and Justice). That which pre-viously existed on an ad hoc basis was institutionalised to enable asynergy betweeen necessary expertise in crisis areas. In Afghanistan,

151 HETT, Julia, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - Das amerikanische, britische und deutsche Modell,Analyse 04-05, ZIF, April 2005.

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the S/CRS is present as is its civilian response corps, advising theISAF Regional Commands and the Nato Senior Civilian Representa-tive on site. Also, the United States has provided a special fund tofinance the comprehensive approach during complex crises, theSection 1207 Funds.


The comprehensive approach has become a keyword in the Uni-ted States in many fields, as in fighting drug trafficking, protectingrefugees, etc. There is at the same time a kind of dilution of theconcept in all these areas and a standardisation of the inter-agencyapproach. Therefore, expectations on the allies and their use of thecomprehensive approach are strong, whereas the concept is muchless institutionalised in these countries than in the United Statescurrently. This makes for frustration among relevant American actorswho have the impression that they cannot count sufficiently on theirallies within Nato to make the comprehensive approach operationalon the ground.

In terms of the civilians recruited in the United States to partici-pate in the comprehensive approach, numerous difficulties havematerialised, such as their training and education. Also, in terms ofthe Civilian Response Corps there is a gap between the real figures– 1 000 people since the summer of 2010 – and those intended topermit the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Further,the figures include active staff and stand-by personnel, which meansthat in practice few staff are deployed. Thus, albeit far advanced onthe comprehensive approach, the Americans also encounter the lackof deployable civilian experts. The ability to deploy massively andrapidly civilian personnel in crisis theatres will thus be a major chal-lenge in the future.

The Americans at the origin of implementing ProvincialReconstruction Teams

Originally the PRT concept comes from the experience of imple-menting Coalitions humanitarian liaison cells during the operation En-during Freedom in 2002. The objective was to establish links with the

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UN AMA and the NGOs on site by conducting restricted reconstructionprojects. As these cells grew in importance, the United States movedto the PRT model. There is a standard US PRT model152 including onecolonel assisted by 82 troops or civilian staff. To this come onemember of the Afghan ministry of the interior and Afghan interpre-tors. The civilians within the PRTs usually come from the State De-partment, USAID and the Department of Agriculture. The PRT at-tempts to work in partnership with local leaders have frequentlyproven difficult. This is why progress in terms of governance hasbeen slower than in reconstruction (building hospitals, schools, etc).Thanks to substantial financing, the PRTs have progressively beenable to move from very short-term to long-term projects. However,evaluating the impact of the PRTs remains delicate without a stan-dardised gauge of their efficiency. Also, as some American PRTS sub-sequently passed to the control of other countries via the ISAF, it isdifficult to distinguish the exact role played by the American modelfrom that of the following model. Finally, it is hard to evaluate theimpact of the PRTs, as often behind the benefits of the projectsthere are latent negative impacts. Thus, rebuilding a road which isbeneficial to the populations has also sometimes led to newconflicts linked to expropriation, etc.153

Conclusion on the positioning of states in terms of thecomprehensive approach

There is no consensus on the comprehensive approach concept.The level of integration varies from one state to another as we haveseen, and the enforcement via PRTs is very varied as underlined bythe Afghan example. The study of the comprehensive approach asorganised within states raises more questions than it offers answers.Each state stresses different elements (more organisational thancultural, more on the bureaucratic procedures or on the means, etc).Should the concept be more normalised on the international level?Or should one focus more on the added value of national specifici-ties? Should one rely more on practical experiences on the ground,and the ad hoc implementation of the comprehensive approach or

152 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, The US experience with provincial reconstruction teams inAfghanistan, available online: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr152.pdf viewed on 20 September 2010.153 DE FELIGONDE, Amaury, “La coopération civile en Afghanistan, une coûteuse illusion?”, Focus stratégique,n°24, Aout 2010, page 14.

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conversely adopt a top-down approach to make newly written com-prehensive approach concepts operational?

A future issue: the question of mobilising civilian experts de-ployable on crisis theatres will become strategic. Behind this issueis also that of using private businesses within the comprehensiveapproach. It would seem that the Americans and the British havemanaged to associate the private sector with their comprehensiveapproach. We may ask whether it would not be in France’s intereststo think strategically on the positioning of its business sector withinits comprehensive approach.

Moreover, other issues concern the integration on the national le-vel of non-state actors such as the NGOs which are also present incrisis areas. The following chapter will therefore analyse NGO posi-tioning in terms of the comprehensive approach.

The comprehensive approach and the NGOs

The NGOs are very critical of the implementation of the compre-hensive approach. The comprehensive approach could also in somecases put them in a position of increased insecurity.

A critical positioning towards the comprehensiveapproach

Humanitarian principles and their limits

To the NGOs the development of the comprehensive approach isa potential danger. Above all it endangers their basic principles. TheNGOs fear they will lose their neutrality, autonomy, impartiality andindependence if they work hand in hand with the military who bydefinition intervene under a flag, be it national or multinational (UN,EU, Nato).154 They would like above all to proceed with their own ob-jectives, separate from those of the military. Concerning help to po-pulations through troops, the humanitarian organisations are there-fore mostly against, because it jeopardises their principles of action.Other arguments are also advanced, such as the fact that the military

154 Cf for instance the UK Red Cross, available online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we16.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.

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supposedly are less cost-efficient for this type of action. Further,their actions are too occasional to have a positive impact, accordingto the NGOs. They are also culturally less used to interact with localsthan are aid workers. It may be seen however that these argumentsare progressively less valid as the comprehensive approach evolvesand the military in fact become better trained to interact with localpopulations.

Although NGOs are rather wary of the development of the com-prehensive approach, they cannot uphold this principled discourseon certain aspects. First, being financed to a large extent by thesame governments that send troops during major crises, this criticalstance has limits when NGOs participate in partnerships for financialreasons.155 And this often happens, as they largely depend on thesesubsidies. Further, in the case of some major natural disasters, theNGOs restrict their attacks against the military since they recognisethat the latter may play a supportive role in the first stages of emer-gency relief.156 The means made available by the military most indemand are then medical assistance, air support for transportationin areas difficult to access, and all that has to do with logistics andcoordination. The NGOs consulted for this study (Care, Save theChildren, MSF for instance) stress the fact that they sometimes havea hard time being critical of the comprehensive approach, for it isdifficult to oppose better coherence of actions on the ground, a bet-ter inclusion of local civilian populations, etc. Yet according to theseorganisations, this military discourse hides a future takeover in crisisareas, or even a possible supremacy. Even in cases where the milita-ry would like civilian actors to take the lead (e.g. natural disasterslike the Haiti earthquake), civilian actors like aid workers stress thatin fact they control most of the indispensable means and resources,which pushes them to take the brunt of the leadership on theground.157

155 Telephone conversation with Oliver BEHN, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.156 WIHARTA Sharon, HAMAD, Hassan, HAINE Jean-Yves, LOFGREN Josephina, et RANDALL Tim, TheEffectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2008, p.9.157 Telephone interview with Kerry Smith, Save the children, Paris, 24 August 2010.

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Are the positionings different towards the UN, Nato andthe EU?

Concerning the integrated missions in the UN context, someNGOs like Oxfam oppose the integration of humanitarian impera-tives in political negotiations. “Political negotiations should not in-corporate humanitarian provisions that are contingent on politicalactions or agreements.”158 Yet the perception of the UN integratedapproach by the NGOs is not altogether negative. The need for co-herence between the various UN agencies is underlined159.

In terms of rapprochement between aid workers and the militaryin the context of the comprehensive approach within operationssuch as Nato’s in Afghanistan, most humanitarian workers opposebeing included into exercises to win hearts and minds.160 Oxfam In-ternational has published a note on its positioning in multidimen-sional military missions in which the organisation states its opposi-tion to being integrated in this kind of operation: “Oxfam interna-tional will distinguish itself from, and remain outside, the directmanagement of multi-dimensional military mission and opposestructural association between humanitarian and military entities inmulti-dimensional missions.”161 Nato’s recourse to the comprehens-ive approach is very contested.

It would seem that the opposition towards the EU is less strongthan against Nato and the UN, because of the very substantial finan-cial assistance provided by the EU to NGOs. There are also somerather strong personal links between the staff of the DG ECHO andhumanitarian organisations that seem to share common values andpractices. “The EU should use financial and in-kind support to sus-tain efforts for the protection of civilians and support institu-tion-building measures in fragile states, in particular in the area ofsecurity-sector reform.”162 On the other hand, a possible rapproche-

158 OXFAM International, “OI Policy compendium note on United Nations integrated missions and humanitarianassistance” January 2008, p. 3.159 Telephone interview with Kerry Smith, Save the children, Paris, 24 August 2010.160 OXFAM International, “OI Policy compendium note on United Nations integrated missions and humanitarianassistance” January 2008.161 Idem, p. 4.162 OXFAM International, “OI Policy compendium note on the European Union’s role in protecting civilians”, May2007, p. 5.

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ment of the DG ECHO and the ESEA could create new tensionsbetween NGOs and the EU. The NGOs support the EU comprehens-ive approach as long as there is a strict separation between DGECHO and the ESEA with distinct budget lines.163

To sum up, the European Union has a card to play in terms of thecomprehensive approach. It may be a preferred actor and this moreeasily since Nato does not have any civilian means to deploy and isnot viewed as a possible partner by the NGOs.

Consequences of the comprehensive approach on theground for the NGOs: increasing insecurity?

Some NGOs are more exposed than others

The NGO issue should not be addressed without distinguishingseveral types of organisations and thus several positionings in termsof the comprehensive approach. On one hand, there are “multi-man-date” NGOs with very wide activities, from major emergency man-agement to long-term reconstruction. According to their field ofactivity, they are more or less inclined to being integrated into thecomprehensive approach on the political and strategic level. On theother, there are NGOs that rely on local partners for specific mis-sions. These are mostly concerned by the comprehensive approachon the ground when they intervene in the same areas as the PRTs,for instance. Finally, there are NGOs working directly and officiallywith international organisations such as the UN and which are veryclosely linked to the latter. These are recognized and listed as validinterlocutors for international organisations.

Through these links, one may observe a very considerable pro-fessionalisation of the NGOs and an interaction with governmentsand international organisations, which is increasingly institutional-ized. Although the development of the comprehensive approach issupposedly a useful process of rationalization in times of budgetaryconstraint, it is difficult to ignore that this puts them on the politicalplaying field. In Afghanistan for instance, some NGOs very close tothe UN are seen as working for the Afghan government. By working

163 Telephone interview with Kerry Smith, Save the children, Paris, 24 August 2010.

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close to political actors like Nato and the UN, some NGOs then be-come targets for terrorist attacks, reprisals or kidnappings. The factthat they are becoming more professional and receive a lot ofmoney from such donors has increased the number of kidnappingsof humanitarian workers from NGOs. The conclusions of a study fromCare International stress this mounting insecurity.164 In summary, andas remarked by Frerks, it is necessary to distinguish different NGOpositionings towards the comprehensive approach and also varyinglevels of insecurity for these organisations. As detailed in his study,even within one single NGO positionings may be different in termsof the comprehensive approach, the people at the head office oftenbeing more reticent than those working on the ground.165

An easier humanitarian-military rapprochement in thecase of natural disaster interventions

NGOs working in partnership with the military in natural disasterareas are less endangered than NGOs working alongside the militaryin failed states such as Afghanistan. As Quarantelli analyses, there isa difference between natural disasters which tend to unite all actors,and other types of crisis which are sources of discord. A seeminglydiscriminating factor is the fact that in failed states during complexcrises, as in Afghanistan, NGOs feel more manipulated by the milit-ary, in particular for information gathering and in being used as act-ors of influence among local actors. They may then be seen by thepopulations as instruments used by the military to infiltrate society.

Conclusion on the positioning of non-governmentalorganisations

NGOs do not share the same cognitive references, principles andobjectives as governments and international organisations wherethe comprehensive approach is concerned. They do not want theconcept of comprehensive approach to give the impression thatthey could work hand in hand with them. This clearly came forth atthe symposium of the interallied confederation of reserve officers of

164 Cf. memorandum by Care International UK for a summary of this study: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we17.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.165 FRERKS, Georg, “Civil-military cooperation: a balancing act under precarious conditions”, in: Gelijn Molier andEva Nieuwenhuys (ed.), Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization: the Integrated SecurityApproach viewed from a Multidisciplinary Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 207-223.

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Stavanger in August 2010 on the comprehensive approach. Both MSFand the Red Cross insisted on underlining that their actions couldnot be included in the framework of the comprehensive approach.

In consequence, other alternatives could be outlined for govern-ments and international organisations: having recourse to privatedevelopment and reconstruction businesses which are ready foranything as long as they are being paid for their work on the ground.In the future, one could imagine a competition between large NGOsand private reconstruction actors. The two types of organisationscould respond to calls for tender from the EU or Nato, for instance.

A possible card to play in order to avoid too strong a tilt towardsprivate reconstruction agencies at the expense of NGOs would be toaim at a strong role for the EU in implementing the comprehensiveapproach.

The last chapter of this study will list the strategic challenges toconsider in the future for the comprehensive approach.

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Future challenges for the use of the comprehensiveapproach

Organisational challenges linked to thecomprehensive approach

Be it in the United States (inter-agency aspects) or in France andthe United Kingdom (interministerial aspects), the issue remainsthat of making actors work together whose interests do not necessa-rily converge. As the British memorandum well explains: “It involveslearning to understand and accommodate the different prioritiesand expectations of partners across government and beyond.”166 Thesame process may be observed within the international organisa-tions. For instance, some UN staff do not necessarily appreciate theinternal organisational change linked to the integrated approach,nor the fact that increasing pressure is put by Nato for a better col-laboration between UN and Nato personnel on the outside. Thecomprehensive approach also means the ability to mobilise civilianpersonnel on external complex crisis theatres. This requires nationalstructures enabling the management of such deployable civilians,and frequently databases for handling them in liaison with the inter-national organisations that mobilize them. The EU as well as Natodevelop databases that list civilians who may be deployed in crisisareas. It may be observed that implementing these databases inparallel can cause organisational problems should the same expertbe called in by both organisations. One future challenge for the com-prehensive approach will thus be the successful implementation oforganisational change moving towards increased inter-agency, inter-ministerial and inter-organisational solutions.

Several points may be raised to facilitate this organisationalchange. First, the possibility for the relevant services to exchangestaff (sending one member of the Defence staff to the ministry ofForeign Affairs, for instance). Another solution consists of informa-tion exchange as far upstream as possible to enable the two entitiesto best anticipate necessary change. The comprehensive approachimplies a transaction cost, as it requires numerous meetings, long

166 FRERKS, Georg, “Civil-military cooperation: a balancing act under precarious conditions”, in: Gelijn Molier andEva Nieuwenhuys (ed.), Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization: the Integrated SecurityApproach viewed from a Multidisciplinary Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 207-223.

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negotiations, significant information exchange, etc. A political incent-ive to cooperate would thus be necessary to make the actors realizesome advantages beyond the directly foreseeable nuisances.167

However, this proves difficult for there are few long-term strategicvisions encompassing the different political, security, humanitarianand development dimensions or formulating clear priorities. Thedoctrines often have not yet officially integrated the comprehensiveapproach, which remains frequently on the declaration level.

Cultural change linked to the comprehensive approach

By its implementation the comprehensive approach contributesto the meeting and mingling of national and international organisa-tion cultures, the UN and Nato cultures, civilian and military culture,diplomatic or military culture168 to offer some examples. This createsfrictions and the need to get to know the other culture in order tobetter adapt to it. The military for instance believe they can easilymake evaluations of the return to security (number of casualties andinjured) and complain about the lack of reliable evaluations on thecivilian side. On the other hand, it is sometimes more difficult forthem to assess development or good governance. They also have adifferent planning culture, and different terminologies and vocabu-lary.169 The list could be extended further.

To implement the comprehensive approach in this context of cul-tural shock, it therefore seems important to recommend the devel-opment of trainings and common feedback processes so that theactors (civilian and military, international and local) learn to ex-change and thus develop practices for mutual understanding.Through the development of interpersonal links, this would make itpossible to overcome some cultural tensions typical of the imple-mentation of the comprehensive approach (in particular betweenNato and the UN).170

167 RINTAKOSKI, K., AUTTI M. (ed), Comprehensive approach, Trends, Challenges and Possibilities forCooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management Based on the Comprehensive Approach seminar, seminarpublication, Helsinki, 17 June 2008, p. 19.168 RINTAKOSKI, K., AUTTI, M. (ed), Comprehensive approach, Trends, Challenges and Possibilities forCooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management Based on the Comprehensive Approach seminar, Seminarpublication, Helsinki, 17 June 2008, p. 19.169 HAUGEVIK, Kristin, DE CARVALHO, Benjamin, “Civil-military cooperation in multinational and interagencyoperations”, Nupi report, Security in practice, n°2, 2007, p. 10.170 WENDLING, Cecile, “UN-Nato collaboration in times of crises: Could the comprehensive/integrated approach bea way to bring the two organizations closer together?”, Paper submitted for the International Research Symposium

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Between humanitarian neutrality and armed commitment

Human aid workers generally oppose the development of thecomprehensive approach if this makes them participate in politicalor military strategies contrary to the principle of neutrality of theircommitment. One future challenge of the comprehensive approachis therefore to establish the limit between constructive cooperationand destructive collaboration between humanitarian workers andthe military. In other words: how far should cooperation and coordin-ation between civilians and the military go to remain beneficial forboth? It seems that many exchanges of knowledge and practicestake place with the comprehensive approach. Some aid workersnote that their method of interacting with local populations is beingstudied by the military. Yet beyond these practices, ethical andphilosophical thinking on the interaction between aid workers andthe military is necessary, as well as safeguarding the action prin-ciples of the two categories.

One could imagine setting up a working group on the internatio-nal level composed of staff from the UN, Nato, the EU, the AU, theRed Cross, Médecins du monde … for instance. Its objective wouldbe to write a Memorandum of Understanding to clarify the links bet-ween NGOs and the military that should prevail in complex crisisareas, in parallel with the existing work on interactions between themilitary and humanitarian workers in case of major disasters. Ano-ther solution would be to settle the issue of interaction between thetwo in case of major complex crises on a case-by-case basis accor-ding to the crisis context, with upstream meetings of the internatio-nal actors involved on the ground. This solution could be preferred,as cooperation always seems easier between people on the groundthan between actors at headquarters and general secretariats. Allthe people interviewed stress that links are often easier to developpragmatically at the operational level than politically on the strate-gic level.

“The UN and Nato: Forward from the Joint Declaration” – New York, USA, 21 October 2010.

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The opposition of the judges

Similarly, as explained by general Henri Bentégeat, former chair-man of the EU military committee, the comprehensive approachruns into opposition from the judges because of the culture of theindependence of magistrates.171 The separation of legislative, exec-utive and judicial powers is indeed often presented by the magis-trates as being contrary to the implementation of a comprehensiveapproach that would introduce a mix-up. This opposition is also inthe statement by Eva Joly, president of the development commis-sion in the European Parliament, who opposes such a confusion offunctions.172 On the other hand, legislation and best practices tendto move towards enlarged possibilities of development for the com-prehensive approach, despite the opposition of some judges. Forinstance, the texts regulating private reconstruction and securitybusinesses are open to their inclusion and integration in crisis con-texts. This is criticized by some magistrates who fear an increasedintervention of private actors, supposedly more inclined to trans-gressions on the ground than the military.

It would seem that this opposition has not been sufficiently takeninto account by the other actors in crisis management. Yet without acommitment from the judges, it will be difficult to carry out a trulycomprehensive approach. In order to defuse these tensions, itwould be wise to conduct a working group including judges andother actors from crisis management. Its objective would be to iden-tify how magistrates could participate without jeopardizing the sepa-ration of powers in crisis areas. It seems that the ministry of justicehas not been sufficiently included in the thinking about the imple-mentation of the comprehensive approach. Yet sending members ofits civilian staff could be a key factor in some crisis areas to rebuildthe local judicial system.

Financial challenges

Financing is key in the comprehensive approach. As actors con-cerned by the comprehensive approach multiply, there are multiple

171 Speech by the general Henri Bentegeat: L’approche globale, un outil conceptuel en construction, Ecole militaire,Paris, 6 May 2010.172 Interview with Eva Joly on 3 May 2010: http://www.regards-citoyens.com/article-eva-joly-il-faut-eviter-la-confusion-des-genres-entre-aide-au-developpement-et-politique-exterieure-49703715.html, viewed on 4 June 2010.

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zones of “duplication of effort” and thus redundant financing amongactors which damage the efficiency of international crisis manage-ment.173 This is why the comprehensive approach aims at rationaliz-ing expenditure related to crisis management among internationalactors (Nato, the UN, the EU, etc).

To this must be added the current context of financial crisis oftenaccompanied by budgetary crises, as in the case of Nato followingthe onerous operations undertaken in Afghanistan. The financial cri-sis and restrictions of military budgets push the actors to think moreextensively on what their core profession should be, and what couldbe delegated to others. It then becomes easy for the military tohave civilian actors carry the cost of the comprehensive approach, assome civilians say anonymously. The Afghan operation for instanceis far beyond the planned budgets, as the army pays for the PRTs,etc. Defending a comprehensive approach more inclusive of civilianactors means an attempt to distribute the financial burden of resto-ring peace in Afghanistan through security, development and gover-nance on other actors involved. The same applies on the internatio-nal level, for instance between the EU and the UN, and this goesbeyond the purely financial issue, at the level of financial manage-ment culture.

Catriona Gourlay174 mentions frictions between the EuropeanCommission and the UN concerning their approach of financial is-sues. The Commission indeed attempts to keep a very strict admin-istrative control of budgets allocated to development or humanitari-an aid, whereas UN actors with strong financial backing from the EUallow themselves more time in providing expenditure justifications.Beyond the financial issues, there is the question of monitoring ex-penditure, between institutions but also internally. A reform is cur-rently taking place in Nato to improve monitoring of budget lines.

The resource issue is also considerable on the national level, asworking with an inter-agency or inter-ministerial approach alsomeans providing the necessary budget lines, sometimes with un-

173 KOOPS, Joachim A., “Effective multilateralism in peacekeeping, capacity-building and crisis management”, in:Focus 01/2010, available online: www.effectivemultilateralism.info, viewed on 30 June 2010.174 GOURLAY, Catriona., « Civil-Civil co-ordination in EU crisis management”, in: Nowak, Agnieszka (ed), “civiliancrisis management: the EU way, Chaillot paper 90, EU institute for security studies, Paris, June 2006.

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equal contributions from participants. In the United States a discus-sion thus occurred on the balance of resource allocation between ci-vilians and the military. Some US military resent that their contribu-tion is rising, for instance for agriculture in Afghanistan taken out ofthe defence budget, whereas the Department of Agriculture whichwould have more appropriate resources, has not made any contribu-tion.175

The issue of financing sources is paramount to actors such as theWorld Bank, the European Investment Bank, etc. It is vital to obtainfunding to rebuild civilian capabilities, the police, etc. The UN esta-blished a peacebuilding fund in late 2006, and the revision of the re-ference terms shows the growing importance of this fund as the com-prehensive approach develops. But the challenge of finding donorsremains. The OECD underlines that there are geographical gaps interms of available funds. Apart from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Re-public of Congo, which are very favoured financially, there are aidorphans, i.e. countries receiving little money in the context of thecomprehensive approach.176 It seems that these financial imbalancesare not sufficiently considered in the current thinking on the com-prehensive approach.

Interoperability and information sharing

One of the apparently positive aspects of the comprehensive ap-proach is certainly the development of greater interoperability andinformation sharing between actors of crisis management. However,behind this some undesirable effects may be seen. This tends forinstance to promote the large NGOs which respond to calls for ten-der by international organisations and governments, whereas NGOsthat are smaller or less networked with large international organisa-tions decline, because their bigger colleagues get the funding butalso because the latter have developed routines reinforcing the in-teroperability and information sharing. Eventually, the aspects of in-teroperability and information sharing developed to reinforce effi-ciency could entail a concentration of humanitarian actors in a few

175 GOURLAY, Catriona., « Civil-Civil co-ordination in EU crisis management”, in: Nowak, Agnieszka (ed), “civiliancrisis management: the EU way, Chaillot paper 90, EU institute for security studies, Paris, June 2006.176 Cf. “Recovering from war: gaps in international action, a report by the NYU center on international cooperation”,New York University.

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large NGOs, while others disappear. Yet this diversity allowed formaintaining various levers of action on site when crises occurred. Itwould seem that the restructuring of the field of NGOs connectedwith the implementation of the comprehensive approach has notbeen studied to date. But this could have an impact eventually oncomplex crisis management if some smaller NGOs can no longer sur-vive and thus intervene in particular areas which are sometimes lesswell-known by the large NGOs.

Using the comprehensive approach in a non-westernstate

The comprehensive approach prides itself of being as close aspossible to the culture of the country in crisis. The actors who use itoften stress that they do not seek to impose a western model intheir intervention. The idea is to let the local population take owner-ship of reconstruction, the return to peace and the rule of law. Thelocal population is therefore often presented as a full partner, atleast in official declarations. All actions, military or civilian, must in-clude the inhabitants of the area in question. In Afghanistan, the mil-itary sometimes switched tactics by informing local populations inadvance of their operations instead of taking them by surprise.177

Similarly, the NGOs on site inform and work closely with the localpopulations. The official discourse on the comprehensive approachis thus different from the typical discourse of “liberal peace” whichsought to promote western democratic values with the return topeace.178 As mentioned by some French soldiers returning from thefront, the issue in Afghanistan is not to promote western values, suchas making girls go back to school, but instead to integrate local cul-ture into the comprehensive approach.

177 Presentation by Lt Col d’ODEYER, “Témoignage de terrain “, colloque Quelle stratégie d’influence en appui auxopérations militaires, Ecole Militaire, Paris, 15 June 2010.178 TARDY, Thierry, “Building peace in post-conflict environments : why and how the UN and the EU interact”, paperpresented at the workshop « improving effectiveness of peacebuilding and state-building through EU-UNcooperation », organised by the Department of Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Kiel, on29-30th March 2010, in Berlin, p. 11.

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A first challenge is therefore relaying action to local actors,empowering them to appropriate and construct the return to peace.This takes place through intensive training of police forces, thejudiciary, etc. This entails numerous problems. It is for instancesometimes necessary to train illiterate people. Another problem isthat local staff is sometimes corrupt, or consumes alcohol or drugs.179

A second challenge concerns adapting to local culture. Usingthe comprehensive approach requires a very fine knowledge oflocal customs and habits. It also requires taking into account thefact that populations are not homogeneous, but often belong tosubgroups with their own rules and values. Thus Human TerrainTeams bringing in anthropologists and sociologists were forinstance created in Afghanistan. But this is not without difficultyeither. The academics are often wary of being associated with themilitary on the ground.180 A third challenge is that the interests ofthe local populations are not necessarily those of the internationalactors. Some local actors may pretend to work to restore peacewhile pursuing other hidden agendas. This is clear fromtestimonies by soldiers returning from conflict areas, especially inAfghanistan and Somalia. It stresses the anomalies linked to theestablishment of western aid (corruption, manipulation). A fourthchallenge in implementing the comprehensive approach in stateslike Afghanistan or Somalia is that their social structures are notadapted to a western-style centralized approach where onecentral government runs the country. Conversely, western actorsare confronted to tribal areas. But because it is often easier fordiplomats to negotiate with one single partner for the wholecountry, transition governments have been established which donot correspond to the realities on the ground and which have greattrouble in finding their legitimacy.181 Adopting a “whole ofgovernment approach” in a country like Afghanistan or Somaliathus seems hardly compatible with the idea conveyed by theadvocates of the comprehensive approach, i.e. adapting to localculture. This is why it seems useful to add a cultural instrument to

179 GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “The Afghan national army, unwarranted hope?”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 154, N°6,December 2009, pp. 36-42.180 Intervention d’ OLSSON, Christian, “Human Terrain System et la transformation du renseignement dans laCOIN”, lors de la conférence Se préparer aux opérations d’influence, Ecole militaire, Paris, 16 June 2010.181 Presentation by GUIZIOU, François, “L’opération Atalante”, Groupe de travail Piraterie, Irsem, Paris, 3 June 2010.

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the panoply of security, governance and development in order tobe more closely associated with local populations and thus makean impact on stabilization in crisis areas. This remark stems frominterviews. For instance, Olivier Entraygues who recentlypublished on Afghanistan and asked about the comprehensiveapproach, mentions the importance of further integrating thecultural pillar, as would have Commander Hoggard in the past.182

The comprehensive approach and influence

One challenge of the comprehensive approach is also related toits use as factor of influence. The goal is to better control local popu-lations to avoid them supporting insurgents. In this sense, the com-prehensive approach is part and parcel of military strategies aimingat populations and winning their hearts and minds. This is all aboutpersuasion. The comprehensive approach therefore is closely linkedto communication strategies (establishing local radio stations, etc).

Although local populations have frequently been duly conside-red, for instance in Afghanistan, it seems that populations of thecountries deploying troops in complex crisis areas are sometimesforgotten. The populations of countries involved also need to beconvinced to make the comprehensive approach possible. As it isboth costly and political, the comprehensive approach requires thesupport of public opinion. But it is difficult to find the right tone andmeans of communication to achieve this objective. As an example,compared to US public opinion, Europeans are less concerned bystrategic issues in Afghanistan or the implementation of the compre-hensive approach and its implications.

The comprehensive approach and global commons

The nascent debate, especially within Nato, on the securisationof global commons (“common strategic spaces”) stresses that bothin terms of air, space, oceans or cyperspace, it is no longer possibleto ensure the protection of vital flows withou intensive coordinationon the international level. Beyond the use of the comprehensive ap-proach in crisis management, this must be anticipated to maintain

182 Cf. ENTRAYGUES, Olivier, Afghanistan 2010, chroniques pour comprendre, la plume avant l’épée, 2010.

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the perennial functioning of our shared strategic spheres. It lookslike the UN could be brought to play a political role in this area. Yetit is essentially Nato through ACT which to date is leading the think-ing on this new concept. It is therefore relevant to follow the devel-opments of elaborating the concept of global commons. And itwould be wise to accompany this thinking. Among the points to ex-plore is the relevance of the comprehensive approach in terms ofmanaging the cyberspace.

Beyond is the urgent need for a world governance to counter thesurge of new threats (climate change, nuclear proliferation etc). Civi-lian and military actors should increasingly work jointly on these newchallenges.

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CONCLUSION

The comprehensive approach has gained importance recently inthe context of complex stabilisation operations conducted primarilyin Iraq and Afghanistan. Although this concept is undergoing “doctri-nisation” and therefore remains blurred and imprecise, some largetrends have been identified in this study, in particular organisationaland cultural changes. What come out of the implementation of thecomprehensive approach are the dilemmas, which the internationalcommunity must deal with.

Better identify the dilemmas of the comprehensiveapproach

First of all, there is a dilemma concerning the cooperation bet-ween international actors. The UN, the EU or Nato do not share thesame interests. In fact they are often rivals in crisis management.Whereas the comprehensive approach concept is supposed to facili-tate coordination and links between international organisations, itseems that all the discussions taking place on the concept and itsblurred nature underline to what extent each and everyone is tryingto pull in his own direction, using it to increase his legitimacy or visi-bility, at the expense of others.

Second, there is a neutrality and independence dilemma lin-ked to the humanitarian workers, the judges or academics (in-volved in the Human Terrain Teams). The humanitarian workerswant the assistance to the populations to be neutral and auto-nomous, and the judges want to remain independent whereverthey are sent, whereas the political and security challenges ofthe comprehensive approach are often linked to commitmentsduring conflicts which are outside of strict neutrality and inde-pendence. The development, security and governance objec-tives are therefore not always easy to reconcile in the minds ofmilitary and humanitarian actors, judges or politicians intervie-wed. If development or good governance becomes a political orsecurity instrument, this goes beyond the framework of thegrand principles that prevailed before, and this creates difficul-ties for the foundation of the actions and their implementation

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on the ground (e.g. mounting insecurity for humanitarian wor-kers who are increasingly targeted in kidnappings or attacks).

A third dilemma is the empowerment of the local actors, whereasthe international actors are still very present in the crisis manage-ment, and even more so with the comprehensive approach whichmakes them handle all the dimensions of the situation in an integra-ted manner. A number of examples of crises where the comprehen-sive approach is applied as in Afghanistan or Somalia, demonstratethat it is difficult to hand over to local actors because of corruption,drug use, illiteracy, etc. Also, it is sometimes complex to rely on theestablishment of a provisional central government in very decentra-lized countries. Beyond this issue it is sometimes delicate to pro-mote peace and human rights while relying on local representativeswho are not necessarily the right people to guarantee their enforce-ment. How then can you be present without giving the impression ofimposing practices, which are not the local ones, and at the sametime train the population? How can you be sure that the actions un-dertaken will allow for an orderly and secure withdrawal of troops?

The comprehensive approach seems to gain importance becausemore and more actors are involved and more and more money is atstake. Yet because of this situation, it becomes more and more del-icate and burdensome to manage in terms of budget and to monitorin terms of impact. A kind of inertia then appears especially in meet-ings including a large number of international organisations whichthemselves rely on rather considerable bureaucracies.183 Whereasthe comprehensive approach was supposed to bring greater ration-alization for improved efficiency.

Anticipating the consequences of the comprehensiveapproach

How will the comprehensive approach evolve? What will be theconsequences on the civil-military crisis management by internatio-nal and local actors? Will there be a kind of normative appropriationof the concept? Will we witness the birth of a formalized comprehen-

183 KUEHNE, Winrich, Peace Operations and Peacebuilding in the Transatlantic Dialogue – Key Political, Military,Police and Civilian Issues –, Analyse 08-09, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, August 2009,page 34.

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sive approach or will it remain more informal, not being integratedin texts in the form of a doctrine? It seems that this will dependabove all on the results observed from its implementation, both inIraq and in Afghanistan. The lessons will primarily be learned on theground. This will also depend on the great government powers butalso on the major international organisations (the UN, Nato, the EU,the OSCE, the OECD and the AU). Depending on their respectivepositioning, we may see one or the other form of the concept appear(e.g. a comprehensive approach circumscribed to crisis managementin failed states, or a comprehensive approach including natural di-sasters, etc). Finally, it will be contingent on the positioning of civilsociety (humanitarian workers, judges, public opinions). Its impor-tance should not be underestimated. Media coverage of crises maypush civil society to influence national governments, or even to lob-by international organisations.

For the moment, the emerging picture makes it possible to dis-tinguish first the actors holding the high ground: the UN and the EU.They benefit from the fact of having already structures integrating ci-vilian and military actors in crisis management. They might rely onthis comparative advantage to act as civil-military stabilizers and in-vest in their specificity. On the other hand, there is a category thatcould gain legitimacy by using the comprehensive approach: Nato,the AU and private security actors. By contributing to a better re-construction, they may obtain a kind of moral status that they some-times did not enjoy previously. Finally, one group of actors seemsrather threatened by the comprehensive approach: the humanita-rian workers (and to some extent the judges). One issue raised inthis study is indeed the beneficiaries of the comprehensive ap-proach. Could one say that the comprehensive approach is benefi-cial today to some international organisations, to some private busi-nesses? Considering regional disparities, can one say that it benefitsa certain geographical area, or one segment of the population? Theissue of the announced target and that which finally benefits fromthe actions, but also the issue of cooperation strategies which masklatent corporatist or institutional conflicts often remains taboo instudies, because it is politically delicate. When one speaks of a pos-sible repositioning of the actors through the comprehensive ap-proach, the issue concerns the institutions to be preferred. Should

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so-called “universal” institutions like the UN have more space, orshould one aim for the commitment of regional instances? Is a gene-ralist approach to be preferred to integrate all types of actions by alltypes of organisations (from development to governance, via securi-ty) or on the contrary targeted and specialized actions, where eachactor focuses on what he does best? Because of the implicit compe-tition between the actors involved, these issues are not addressedand everybody makes the most of the situation, politically and prag-matically on the ground, without analyzing in a purely functionalmanner if he is best suited to respond to the needs of the compre-hensive approach.

Qualifying the French position

To conclude more precisely on the French case, we may observethat on the ground France does not attempt to adopt the Anglo-Saxon concept of PRT, while developing however a comprehensiveapproach. By claiming an origin in the French colonial experienceand the texts by Lyautey on the global maneuver, the French armypositions itself as a forerunner and makes it easier for its troops toaccept the concept. Thus we may note that the military have indeedintegrated the notion and try to have a good knowledge of the hu-man environment before intervening. They rely on the three mainlevers: security, governance and development. In the capital, the im-plementation of the task force within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,and the writing of the concept by the CICDE at the Ministry of De-fence seem to indicate that the concept and its organisation will beformalized shortly.

But to date, we may not speak of institutionalization for a numberof obstacles remain for a solid implementation of an inter-ministerialapproach (lack of resources, bureaucratic rivalry, leadership issues).We may stress here that nobody currently impersonates the conceptin France, whereas often new concepts only become official throughfigureheads (Warden or Deptula for the recent cases of the institu-tionalization of new military concepts in the United States).

Finally, it remains to be seen if in the wake of the thinking initia-ted by general Abrial, France will reflect on the use of the compre-

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hensive approach in protecting the global commons, or instead pre-fer a restrictive interpretation of the concept limited to complex cri-sis management. The question is especially relevant as increasinginterdependency in many other fields could require more of thecomprehensive approach in securisation processes.

Analysing the operational impact

Among the operational aspects emanating from this study thatmay interest the military, five aspects may be underlined: first, theissue of leadership. Knowing who should assume leadership is es-sential in managing a crisis, but especially how to transfer it as nee-ded from civilian actors to the military and vice versa, depending onthe situation and the context. For instance, the French Constitutionincludes provisions for a state of emergency, which exceptionally en-tails greater powers for the president in direct connection with thearmed forces. One could imagine that during a complex crisis lea-dership is handed to the military for a short period of great instabili-ty, and then returned to the civilian government, and vice versa.

The second issue concerns the chain of command. On some as-pects such as logistics for instance, it is possible to have an integra-ted vision including the military and civilians for a given crisis area.Conversely, on planning issues each and everyone must be able toretain his own methods of planning and rules of commitment.

Third, it is indispensable to take into account that numerous in-ternational organisations now have a security role, but that the latterdiffers a lot from one actor to another. This makes interaction deli-cate and poses the question of interfaces to implement between in-ternational security instances to allow for a better management ofcomplex crises. It seems necessary to think about reinforcing liaisonfunctions and conjoined committees, taking care to let these func-tions enable more than just information exchange.

Fourth, the space for the national dimension within multinationaldesigns for crisis management remains an open question. As wehave seen, there is great divergence between PRTs of differentstates. The comprehensive approach thus needs to strike the right

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balance between multinational integration and national specificities.Lest we forget that at the end of chain of command in a multinatio-nal operation, it is always the nations that commit their troops.

Finally, we have to understand how the centre of gravity shouldbe positioned between civilian and military actors.

Reinforcing academic thinking

To finish, in revisiting the theories used in this study, we maynote that the comprehensive approach is revealing of the impact ofnew security concepts (human security, societal security, etc). In thissense, it addresses new questions to researchers in security studies:to what extent may the comprehensive approach translate intotransformation of military strategies?184 Another open question ishow far the comprehensive approach should extend. To what extentshould cultural actions (theatre, music) or educational actions be in-cluded, but also legal actions (putting insurgents before internation-al criminal courts) or purely financial issues (allocation of interna-tional aid)? What implications could this have on the new types ofactors to be considered in security studies? For instance, the Inter-national Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the European Invest-ment Bank could be studied as security agents, since for severaldecades they have provided funding for post-conflict reconstruction.Their arbitrations could be analysed to evaluate through a compar-ative study the impact of financial measures of reconstruction andreturn to good governance.

Other issues: to what extent does the comprehensive approachrequire a rethinking of the temporality of crisis management? Thisconcerns reflecting on the temporal discontinuities between short-term civil-military actions and long-term development processes.The objective here is to study the means of developing gangwaysbetween the emergency and the long term, between the actors ofcrisis management and those who will stay on the territory.

184 PFISTER, Stéphane, Stratégie opérationnelle et aspects civils de la gestion des crises : quelle « doctrine » pour levolet civil de la PESD, Cahier de l’Irsem, n°3, October 2010 ; PFISTER, Stéphane, La gestion civile des crises : unoutil politico-stratégique au service de l’Union européenne, Dissertation presented at the department of economic andsocial sciences, University of Geneva, 2008.

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Finally, we may ask whether the comprehensive approach shouldquestion the construction of security “sectors”. The theoretical fielddeveloped by “sectors”, a terminology, which may be found in manyexpressions, such as security sector reform. But the comprehensiveapproach is in fact about opening up sectors. It is no longer about fi-nance, health, justice or education but about a “unity of effort”, orgoing further in decompartmentalisation, about the “whole of go-vernment approach”. But for the practitioners of the comprehensiveapproach as for its theoreticians, path dependency mechanisms of-ten make this decompartmentalisation difficult. The researchers stu-dying the comprehensive approach must be able to go beyond theframework of sector or organisation expertise (Nato, African Union,etc). They must also be capable of crossing various literary fields,depending on the crisis studied (operations against piracy, restoringthe rule of law, emergency operations following natural disasters,etc).

The author would like to thank all those who accepted to be in-terviewed for this study, but also those who read and commented onthe first drafts of the manuscript: professor Frédéric Charillon, pro-fessor Frédéric Ramel, general Jean-Paul Perruche, colonel Jean-LucLefebvre and Guillaume Lasconjarias. Thanks also to Milena Dieck-hoff, Julie Guillaume and Marie-Hélène Houssin for their precioussupport and help in formatting and copy editing of the text.

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