The EU: The Next Ten YearsWhat is the EU—really?

Establishing credibility as Nostradamus 2

• On August 23rd 2000, I said in the Bulgarian press:

• приети, а в същото време да нямат никакви гаранции, че това ще стане. Убеден съм, че най-разумното и стабилизиращо кандидатките решение ще е Брюксел да оповести примерно, че през 2007 всички, изпълнили критериите, ще бъдат приети. Това ще създаде по-висока и конкретна цел, което ще е допълнителен тласък и мотивация, включително и в България.

How to Predict the Future?• Sam Goldwyn said: “Prediction is a difficult

business, especially where the future is concerned.”

• The most conventional way is to project the current trends, and see where they take you.

• Then, identify critical points along the way that would probably require some form of change.

• Change, by the way, is an accelerating process and there is little time to adapt.

I see many new and terrible taxes

Trends: 1. Geopolitics• Geopolitics.

• There is only one superpower in the world, and that is the USA, since the end of the USSR.

• Europe does not counterbalance the US because (a) it has no military structure, (b) it has no unified foreign policy, (c) it operates through multilateral institutions, which the US may use, or not use, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Trends. 1. Geopolitics• Why does this weakness exist?• First, the EU is not a state, though it

behaves like a state in some ways. The US is.

• Second, the military power of the EU members is embedded in NATO. But NATO is not a European institution.

• The US, typically, has been paying 80% of the costs of NATO, and controls the air power. NATO ends up with the Peace-Keeping missions, “doing the dishes.”

Trends 2: The State in Denial• To understand this we must look at the

origins of the EU• It was designed to prevent war in Europe

and has been remarkably successful. France and Germany had been to war three times in the 80 years before the EU was created.

• The mission was described as (a) an “ever-closer union,” (b) to remove the “barriers to trade,” and (c) to provide a “shared vision.”

• None of these things was ever explained, which is probably why it survived.

Trends 2: The State in Denial• However, the Treaty of Rome (1957)

contained two strange elements:

• The first was the free movement of labor, since it takes away immigration control.

• The second was the establishment of a parliament. When did a free-trade area ever have a parliament? Why is it there?

• The effect of both these things was to de-emphasize national borders

Trends 2: The State in Denial• But, this was done under the heading of

“standardization,” and “removing the barriers to trade.”

• This all sounds technical and harmless.• But it isn’t. That is how we got the Euro,

and the nations lost fiscal control. That is how labor laws, taxation and many other areas of national policy were transferred to Brussels.

• Today, >60% of legislation comes from the EU, not the national governments.

Trends 2: The State in Denial• In that case, it is a very good thing that they

remembered to create a parliament, so we have elected legislators.

• Well, they are elected, but they don’t legislate anything. So, who does?

• The Commission—the all-powerful civil service; which is neither elected, nor accountable.

• How could the democracies ever allow this to happen?

Trend 3: Closing the Democratic Deficit• This curious state-of-affairs came about,

not because of any conspiracy theory, but because the states of Europe can only make the EU democratic by giving up national authority and transferring sovereign power to the EU Parliament.

• The Constitution of May 2005 was supposed to help this process along. It was rejected by France and the Netherlands, leaving the EU with no “Plan B,” and a big mess.

Trend 3: Closing the Democratic Deficit• We have reached the end of the pretense of

“standardization,” and have reached the point where all future decisions are political.

• In Bulgaria, we may ask: “Why did we make the reforms of 1989/90, if we are now handing a growing part of those rights over to people we don’t elect?” Good question.

• This is the most basic question for the next ten years. The EU is already a political institution. To make it democratic, you have to strengthen the power of the Parliament at the expense of the member states.

Trend 4: Expansion• Another very difficult issue.

• So far, there have been no serious questions about the entrants, other than “are they ready?”

• The crucial test is Turkey. The central point is “Is It European?” Giscard-d’Estang said definitely not.

• From now on (except for the Western Balkans) the issue will be “What is European about the EU?”

Trend 4: Expansion• This is not just a geographical question

because all and any new members are entering a political system, not a free-trade area.

• My prediction is that Turkey will be offered some sort of “associate” deal that will not include the free movement of labor.

• Ukraine will be admitted• Russia has no interest in being admitted,

and the EU does not want a border with North Korea.

Trend 4: Expansion• So, the EU has about reached its limits,

though many other countries may be expected to apply.

• There will be a fringe of “associated states” around the Mediterranean, but the links will be trade-based only.

• We will see the growing sense of a European identity built around labor mobility, the Bologna process, the continuing standardization, and most of all, a common second language.

Level of Support• The people of Europe generally strongly

support their country’s membership of the EU.

• The population of Europe is aging, and in many places declining, and set to decline faster.

• This raises issues over who will support the elderly, and how does this relate to internal and external migrants.

Key Question: Where is Bulgaria in this?

• On the issues we have discussed, Bulgaria is in the same position as all the others.

• What are the special conditions of Bulgaria?

• First: is its geographical remoteness from the economic heart of the EU. Bulgaria has always been on the fringes of someone else’s interests

• Second, it is small and has a fast-declining population forming a small critical mass.

Key Question: Where is Bulgaria in this?

• But…• Bulgaria has a tradition of democratic

change of government, no inter-ethnic violence, mature foreign policy (Macedonia), stability—it hardly sounds like a Balkan country.

• Bulgaria is not on the edge of anything; it is the bridge between the EU, and the rich and fast-growing economies of Central Asia and Turkey. If Turkey does not get into the EU, where do you think they will invest?

Key Question: Where is Bulgaria in this?

• Bulgaria needs a proactive foreign policy building economic, cultural and other links with the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and, most definitely, Turkey

• Bulgarians were the middle men between the Ottoman Empire and Central Europe, which is how the people of Kotel and Kuprivshtitsa became rich. They can do it again.

• It requires a strong program of bridge-building and a setting away of the past. The Balkans is too mired in the past. It’s the future we have to worry about.

Key Question: Where is Bulgaria in this?

• This is not an “either or” situation• Bulgaria has long-standing cultural links with

Russia, and those should be developed too, though the lack of a border is clearly some constraint.

• Bulgaria can do much to broker peace in the Balkans because of its record since 1990.

• The future of Kosovo could well lead to pressures for a “Greater Albania,” which could well result in the breakup of Macedonia. Bulgaria could easily be the “honest broker” in the middle of that. All the Balkans must be in the EU in 5 years.