The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 28 | Number 1 | Article ID 3966 | Jul 14, 2013

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The Re-Branding of Abe Nationalism: Global Perspectives onJapan 安倍ナショナリズムの再ブランド化 　グローバルな視点からの検討

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

In 2010, the Australian Broadcasting Company(ABC) launched a highly successful TV showcalled The Gruen Transfer. The title refers tothe disorienting psychological effects producedon consumers by the architecture of shoppingmalls, whose dazzle and noise are deliberatelydesigned to mesmerize: on entering, “our eyesglaze over, our jaws slacken... we forget whatwe came for and become impulse buyers”.1 TheABC’s Gruen Transfer explored the weird,wonderful and disorienting effects produced bythe advertising industry. Its most popularelement was a segment called “The Pitch”, inwhich representatives of two advertisingagencies competed to sell the unsellable to theshow’s audience - creating gloriously sleekvideos to market bottled air, promotethe virtues of banning religion, or advocategenerous pay raises for politicians.

I have been reminded of The Gruen Transfer inrecent months, as sections of the media inJapan, and even internationally, have gone intooverdrive to sell an equally challengingmessage: the message that Japanese PrimeMinister Abe Shinzo is not a nationalist.2 Thisparticular pitch has been running for sometime. It began with the inception of Abe’s firstshort-lived prime ministership in 2006, whenJapanese Foreign Affairs Deputy PressSecretary Taniguchi Tomohiko devotedconsiderable energy to persuading a USaudience that Abe was “almost the polaropposite” of a nationalist.3 The right-of-centreSankei Newspaper took up the challenge with

enthusiasm: its Washington correspondent,Komori Yoshihisa, published numerous articles,including an opinion piece in the New YorkTimes, which aimed to refute the “nationalist”tag. Far from being a hawkish nationalist,Komori argued, Abe had “merely been shapedby democracy”, and his real aim was to bringJapan back from the “post-war extreme towardsthe center”.4 But these pronouncements hadonly limited impact on international opinion,and by early 2007 one prominent Japanesemarketing consultant was lamenting, in thepages of the Yomiuri newspaper, that thegovernment needed a far more effective foreignmedia strategy to rescue Abe from the “hawk”and “nationalist” labels.5

The issue has resurfaced with renewed vigorsince the advent of the second Abe regime inDecember 2012 . In May 2013 , a USCongressional Research Service paperdescribing Abe as a “strong nationalist” evokeda surprisingly querulous response from pro-government media in Japan, and even fromPrime Minister Abe himself. Abe hit back with astatement in parliament, expressing hisunhappiness that “the ideas of our country”were being misunderstood by foreigners. Hewent on to call for measures to “actively collectand spread information so that we will becorrectlyunderstood”.6

The prime minister’s sensitivity to the“nationalist” label seems curious, since he is onrecord as arguing with considerable passionthat there is nothing wrong with nationalism:“nationalism as I think of it is a sense of

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belonging to the nature, ancestors, family andthe local community where one was born andbrought up and with which one has becomefamiliar. This sense of belonging is notsomething that we are told to have, but iscompletely natural and spontaneous...”7; inwhich case, the label “strong nationalist”should presumably be taken as a compliment.

Georgetown University professor Kevin Doakalso claims that Abe has been internationallymisunderstood. Rather than denying theJapanese prime minister’s nationalism, though,Doak argues that Abe-style nationalism belongsto a brand distinct from the bad nationalisms ofwartime Japan, or (apparently) of other Asiannations. Doak’s argument rests on thedistinction between two quite different types ofnationalism, “ethnic nationalism” and “civicnationalism”. He associates the first with theJapanese term minzoku - the equivalent of theGerman “Volk” - and the second with the termkokumin - which simply means “people of thenation”, and can be given a wide range ofnuances depending on context (though Doakquestionably chooses to translate it as “civicnation”).8

“Ethnic nationalism,” writes Doak, “has alsobeen positioned as ‘Asian nationalism’ at leastsince the 1955 Bandung Conference; incontrast, civic nationalism has from its verybeginning in modern Japan and throughoutEast Asia been seen as the favorite of pro-Western governments, Christian minorities andintellectuals thought to be tainted by Westernways of thinking”. The mistake of outsideobservers, he tells us, is that they have takenAbe to be an ethnic nationalist, whereas in facthe is “one of the leaders in t h e currentrenaissance of civic nationalism in Japan”.

Abe’s identity as a civic nationalist can bedemonstrated (says Doak) by a reading of hisbest-selling book, Towards a Beautiful CountryUtsukush i i Kun i e: “throughout the book, Abeconsistently renders the Japanese nation askokumin (civic nation) not as minzoku (ethnicnat ion) , a d ist inct ion made not onlyconceptually but also through his description of

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how democratic nationalism functions inpractice.”9Doak’s depiction of the civic anddemocratic Abe is in dramatic contrast to hisdepiction (in a recent Sankei newspaperinterview) of “emotional South Korea”, which(apparently in toto) “links Japan bashing toethnic pride minzoku puraido”. 10

This re-labeling of Abe’s nationalism raisesseveral problems. First, it assumes that thephenomenon of nationalism can be neatlyseparated into an “ethnic” and a “civic” variant,with the second being morally superior to thefirst. But “the manichean view that there aretwo kinds of nationalism, a good, civic kind anda bad, ethnic kind”11has been very effectivelycriticized by many scholars, who point out thatthe notions of race, culture, tradition andcitizenship bound up in nationalism are far toocomplex to be isolated and captured in thiseasy formula. 12The identification of ethnicnationalism as “Asian” (or at least “non-Western”) and civic nationalism as “Western”or “pro-Western” has come in for particularcriticism. As sociologist David McCrone puts it,the distinction “does lend itself to caricature -why can’t they be more like us?”13 Historyshows that, even in nations seen as exemplarsof civic nationalism (such as the US andFrance), the ethnic undercurrents ofnationalism can all too easily surge to thesurface, as they did in the US following 9/11.

A second problem is that, in the context ofAbe’s political rhetoric, Doak’s distinctionbetween minzoku-based and kokumin-basednationalism simply does not stand up toscrutiny. It is not correct to state (as Doakdoes) that Abe “directly rejects ethnicnationalism”, or to imply that Abe does not usethe term minzoku. Though the word kokuminoften appears in Abe’s speeches and writings,he also uses the term minzoku, and indeed usesthe two terms interchangeably - as in: “whenpeople come from foreign countries, surely theyget a sense that Japanese are a minzoku, akokumin, of high quality; they get the

impression that even if we are poor, we are acountry of culture...”14 Abe’s vision of a nationalidentity rooted in nature and tradition isevident in statements like: “the Japanese areoriginally an agricultural minzoku, a minzokuwho produced rice by sharing water, so I thinkthat from the beginning we have had a sense ofmutual cooperation built into our DNA”;15 or,more recently, “in the case of Japan, inparticular, we are an agricultural minzoku. Thisis the ‘land of rice’. We firmly retained thetraditions and culture of this Japan. ForJapanese to be Japanese, it is necessary thatagriculture be the basis of our country”.16

This vision is also reflected in Abe’s central rolein a range of political groups which proclaim aunique national character grounded in timelesscultural tradition. For example, as of 2012 Abeheaded the liaison group of parliamentarianscooperating with the Shinto Association ofSpiritual Leadership, a body that aims torestore traditional Japanese spiritual valuesweakened by postwar prosperity, promote thecentral place of the imperial house in Japaneselife and create a new constitution built onJapanese national character.17

A third problem with the “civic nationalist”label is that “civic nationalism” is frequentlyassociated with liberalism, particularly respectfor the r ights o f the indiv idual , andcommitment to equality and human rights.18 If

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there is one thing that Abe Shinzo definitely isnot, that is a liberal in the sense of commitmentto human rights. The two books in which hemost clearly sets out his political credo bothbegin with warnings of the dangers ofliberalism (indeed, the first is subtitled “TheChoice for Anti-Liberalism”).19 In the US, Abecautions, the term “liberal” has come to referto people whose ideas are “socialist, or close toit... Revolutionaries and left-wingers areincluded in this category”.20 By contrast, Abefirmly identifies himself as a conservative.Though he intermittently expresses hisadmiration for the British conservative party,his conservatism is really in a distinctlyJapanese mold. His political hero is hisgrandfather Kishi Nobusuke, a key architect ofJapanese economic policy in prewar Manchuriawho went on to be a profoundly controversialpostwar Japanese prime minister, famous inparticular for his very divisive role in rammingratification of the 1960 Security Treaty with theUS through the Japanese parliament.21

Abe’s core goal, inherited from Kishi, clearlyset out in Towards a Beautiful Country, andechoed in the manifestos of groups like theShinto Association of Spiritual Leadership, is to“escape from the postwar regime”: that is, toreverse the political reforms introduced toJapan during the allied occupation. In his view,these reforms undermine Japan’s traditions,which are centred on the figure of theEmperor. What Abe’s nationalist vision meansin practice is best understood by examining hisparty’s far-reaching proposals to rewrite thepostwar Japanese constitution. The proposedchanges include removing the reference to“respect for the individual” and making itconstitutionally impossible for foreignpermanent residents to be given national orlocal voting rights. Freedom of expression andfreedom of association would not be protectedwhere these “have the purpose of harming thepublic interest or public order”. The sameformula would be used to limit the right ofcitizens to “life, liberty and the pursuit of

happiness”. The revised constitution preparedby the Liberal Democratic Party contains noguidelines as to how, and by whom, “publicinterest” and “public order” would be defined,leaving an alarmingly large loophole for therepression of civic freedoms by the state. A newarticle would also be added to the constitutionto give the state sweeping powers to declareprolonged states of emergency, during whichconstitutional rights could be suspended.22 Withthe prospect of an LDP super-majority inparliament for the next two to three years,there is a strong likelihood that the ruling partywill push forward with an attempt to carry outthese changes: changes so profound that theyshould probably be described, not as plans forconstitutional revision, but rather as plans for anew constitution.

This artwork appeared in an exhibitionentitled "the Constitution and Peace"which opened in a public art space inFukui Prefecture in May. The workconsists of several sections of the currentconstitution written out in attractivecalligraphy and coloured ink on Japanesepaper. Soon after the exhibition opened, itwas removed on the orders of the companywhich manages the art space for the localgovernment on the grounds that "itspolitical content might offend the feelingsof some viewers".

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T h e c u r r e n t p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e A b eadministration in no way reflects publicenthusiasm for these grand political designs. Itis, instead, a response to the government’seconomic stimulus package, and to Abe’s skillin making optimistic statements, which conveya sense of leadership to a population weary ofpolitical uncertainty and economic malaise. Inthe end, the Abe government’s performanceshould and will be judged, not on any politicallabels, but on the impact that it has onJapanese society and on Japan’s relations withits region and the world. It is possible that Abemay yet choose to focus on the vital tasks ofcreating a basis for a strong Japanese economicfuture and improving relations with Japan’sneighbours, rather than pursuing theideological agendas of anti-liberalism and“escape from the postwar regime”.

In the meanwhile, though, those who careabout the future of Japanese society should notallow the dazzle of verbal juggling to induce apolitical version of the Gruen Transfer. Theprime minister’s ideology may be re-brandedfor the global market, but the old adageremains: buyer beware.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki is Professor of JapaneseHistory in the Division of Pacific and AsianHistory, College of Asia and the Pacific,Australian National University, and a JapanFocus associate. Her most recent books areExodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan'sCold War, Borderline Japan: Foreigners andFrontier Controls in the Postwar Era and To theDiamond Mountains: A Hundred-Year JourneyThrough China and Korea.

Recommended Citation: Tessa Morris-Suzuki,"The Re-Branding of Abe Nationalism: GlobalPerspectives on Japan," The Asia-PacificJournal, Volume 11, Issue 28, No. 1, July 15,2013.

REFERENCES

1 See the Gruen Transfer website.

2 For example, J. Berkshire Miller and TakashiYokota, “Japan Keeps its Cool: Why Tokyo’sNew Government is more Pragmatic thanHawkish”, Foreign Affairs, 21 January 2013; J.Berkshire Miller and Takashi Yokota, “TheTwisted Truth about Tokyo”, Japan ForeignPolicy Forum, March-April 2013.

3 Taniguchi Tomohiko, “Japan’s DiplomacyUnder the New Abe Cabinet”, address to theBrookings Institution Center for NortheastAsian Policy Studies, 27 October 2006.

4 Komori Yoshihisa, “Who’s Afraid of ShinzoAbe”, New York Times, 30 September 2006;see also Komori Yoshihisa, “Nashonarizumu noKyojitsu”, Sankei Shinbun, 11 February 2007.

5 Satō Kumi, “Kaigai Media Senryaku: Shushōwa Chijarazuyoku Gutairon Katare”, YomiuriShinbun (Tokyo morning edition), 23 February2007.

6 The report in question is Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, William H. Cooper andIan E. Rinehart, “Japan-US Relations: Issues forCongress”, Congressional Research Service, 1May 2013; Prime Minister Abe’s response wasgiven in a debate in the Budget Committee ofthe Lower House of the Diet, 13 May 2013.

7 Prime Minister Abe addressing the LowerHouse of the Diet, 2 October 2006.

8 Kevin Doak, “Japan Chair Platform: ShinzoAbe’s Civic Nationalism”, Center for Strategicand International Studies, 15 May 2013; seealso Komori Yoshihisa, “Yasukuni Sanpai waKokoro no Mondai”, Sankei Shinbun, 8 June2013.

9 Kevin Doak, “Japan Chair Platform: ShinzoAbe’s Civic Nationalism”, Center for Strategicand International Studies, 15 May 2013,

10 The quotation on South Korea comes from

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0742554422/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/0742554422/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/0521864607/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/0521864607/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205032/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205032/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/1442205032/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.abc.net.au/tv/gruentransfer/theshow.htmhttp://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/archive/no13/000412.htmlhttp://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/archive/no13/000412.htmlhttp://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-shinzo-abes-civic-nationalismhttp://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-shinzo-abes-civic-nationalismhttp://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-shinzo-abes-civic-nationalishttp://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-shinzo-abes-civic-nationalis

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Doak’s recent interview with the Sankei’sKomori Yoshihisa about the issue of Japanesepoliticians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, wherehe depicts Japan as being at the mercy ofunreasonable criticisms from “atheist China”which seeks to “justify its communistdictatorship” and from “emotional South Koreawhich links Japan-bashing to ethnic pride”(Nihon tataki o minzoku puraido ni tsunagerujōjoteki na Kankoku) - Komori, “YasukuniSanpai”

11 Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptionsin the Study of Nationalism”, in John Hall ed.,The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and theTheory of Nationalism, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998, pp. 272-306, quotationfrom p. 298.

1 2 For example, Brubaker, “Myths andMisconceptions”; Stephen Shulman,“Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and East/WestDichotomies in the Study of Nationalism”,Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 5,June 2002, pp. 554-585; Bernard Yack, “TheMyth of the Civic Nation”, in Ronald Beiner ed.,Theorizing Nationalism, New York, StateUniversity of New York Press, 1998, pp.103-118.

1 3 Dav id McCrone , The Soc io logy o fNationalism, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 9.

14 Prime Minister Abe, addressing the UpperHouse Special Commission on the Basic Law onEducation, 22 November 2006.

15 Abe Shinzo addressing the Lower HouseCabinet Committee, 14 April 2006.

16 Prime Minister Abe responding to a questionin the Lower House Budget Committee, 18March 2013.

17 See the homepage of the Shinto Associationof Spiritual Leadership; on Abe’s position ashead of the Association’s parliamentary liaisongroup, see here.1 8 S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , D a v i d B r o w n ,Contemporary Nationalism, p. 49.

19 Kurimoto Shinichirō, Abe Shinzō and EtoSeichi, “Hoshi Kakumei” Sengen: AnchiRiberaru e no Sentaku, Tokyo, Gendai Shōrin,1996; see particularly the first chapter, writtenby Abe: “Watashi no ‘Hoshu Seijika Sengen’”.

20 Abe Shinzō, Utsukishii Kuni e, Tokyo, BungeiShinjūsha, 2006, p. 17.

21 Abe, Utsukishii Kuni e, particularly pp. 18-23.

22 See the full text of the Liberal DemocraticParty’s current proposal for constitutionalreform on the Party’s website.

http://www.sinseiren.org/shinseirentoha/shinseirenntoha.htmhttp://www.sinseiren.org/shinsai_top/24.3.10ireisai.pdfhttp://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-109.pdf