The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating - Asanga Tilakaratne

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< 목 차 >

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. What do the texts say?

Ⅲ. Eating meat in monastic context

and beyond

Ⅳ. The last meal of the Buddha

Ⅴ. Conclusion

The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating

Asanga Tilakaratne*

* Professor of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo Sri Lanka.

78 佛敎學報第50輯

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Ⅰ. IntroductionDebates and disputes over the practice of meat eating have been

continuous in the history of Buddhism. In a multi‐religious context with

divergent views and practices, it was necessary for the Buddha to clarify

his position regarding this issue from the very beginning. In particular,

extreme form of non‐violence adopted by Jainism, the main Sramana rival

of Buddhism during the time of the Buddha, necessitated the Buddha to

articulate his position clearly. With the advent of Mahayana with its clear

‐cut negative position on meat eating, in particular by the monastic

disciples of the Buddha, Buddhists were clearly divided into two sides.

More recently with advanced ideas and attitudes toward protecting and

preserving nature there has been renewed interest on both vegetarianism

in itself and the environment including all living beings who inhabit the

planet. In this new perspective Buddhism has been viewed as an

enlightening philosophy due to its emphasis on non‐violence and its world

‐view which encompasses all sentient beings. Contrasted with religions

believing in Creation Buddhism does not have a man‐centred world‐view

according which all other living were created for the sake of man. Nor

does it hold a view of supremacy of human being which allows him to

exploit the environment for his own gain. The idea of dependent co‐

origination portrays reality as inter‐dependent and inter‐connected. With

these enlightening and nature‐friendly characteristics one would expect

Buddhism to be naturally advocating vegetarianism. But the dilemma is

that it has not been so. Although the later Mahayana adopted

vegetarianism the early schools have not been quite clear on the issue.

The challenge is to understand this apparently contradictory situation

found in early Buddhism. In the present paper I will try to understand the

position adopted in the early phase of Buddhism including Theravada on

meat eating. It is hoped that a study of the early standpoint may

contribute to understand the later developments in the practice.

The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating 79

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Ⅱ. What do the texts say?In trying to understand the early Buddhist position regarding meat‐

eating we need to examine evidence form the basic canonical texts

attributed to the Buddha himself. (1) The Jivaka‐sutta of the Majjhima‐

nikaya (55) is the locus classicus of the Buddha’s most direct explanation

on the question of meat eating. According to this discourse, Jivaka, the

physician, asks from the Buddha whether or not the rumour is true that

the Buddha would knowingly eat meat of animals killed specifically for

him. The Buddha says that the rumour is not true and then explains his

position on the matter:

Jivaka, I say that there are three instances in which meat should

not be eaten: when it is seen, heard, or suspected [that the living

being has been slaughtered for oneself]. I say that meat should not

be eaten in these three instances. I say that there are three

instances in which meat may be eaten: when it is not seen, not

heard, and not suspected [that the living being has been

slaughtered for oneself]. I say that meat may be eaten in these

three instances (bhikkhu Nanamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi: 1995/2001

p.474).

From this explanation it is very clear that the Buddha does not reject

the possibility of eating meat altogether. In fact it admits that there are

conditions under which meat eating is permissible. The Buddha does not

give a categorical answer for Jivaka’s question. Of the four modes of

answering questions1) the Buddha in this context seems to have adopted

the method of answering a question by analyzing it (vibhajja‐

vyakaraniya= to be answered having analysed [the question] ). Without

categorically prohibiting the practice the Buddha provides a conditional

answer. Any meat meeting the three conditions given has been described

1) The other three being, questions to be answered directly (ekmasa vyakaraniya), questions

to be answered by asking a question (patipuccha vyakaraniya) and question to be set

aside (thapaniya). The four modes are mentioned in the Anguttara‐nikaya II, p.46.


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in the Vinaya as ‘fish and meat purified in three corners’ (tikoti parisuddha

maccha‐mamsa) (Vinaya II. P.197).

In the discourse the Buddha further explains how meat cleared from

these three perspectives is found by a monk. It is important to note that

the monk described here is one who is practising loving kindness (metta)

to all beings. He is described in the following words:

Here Jivaka, some bhikkhu lives in dependence upon a certain

village or town. He abides pervading one quarter with a mind

imbued with loving kindness, likewise the second, likewise the third,

likewise the fourth, so above below around and everywhere, and to

all as to himself, he abides pervading the all encompassing world

with a mind imbued with loving kindness (Bhikkhu Nanamoli &

Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995/2001, p.474).

Now such a monk is invited by a householder for a meal, and when he

visits the householder he is offered with ‘good almsfood’. Upon receiving

this almsfood the monk does not become overjoyed by this offering, does

not generate desire to receive such almsfood in future but consumes it

“without being tied to it, infatuated with it, and utterly committed to it,

seeing the danger in it and understanding the escape from it”. The Buddha

asks from Jivaka, whether such monk in doing so would be doing

something harmful for oneself, the other or both oneself and the other.

Jivaka answers in the negative. The Buddha asks from Jivaka whether or

not such a monk sustains himself with blameless food on that occasion.

To this Jivaka responds by admitting that such a food is blameless. Then

the Buddha goes on to show that the same applies to a monk who

practices the rest of the sublime mode of living (brahma‐vihara), namely,

compassion (karuna), altruistic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha).

In concluding the discussion the Buddha identifies five stages in which

one accrues much demerit if one were to slaughter a living being for the

Buddha or his disciple. The five stages are: in saying “go and fetch that

living being” one accrues demerit in the first instance; the second instance

is when the living being experiences pain on being led along with a neck

‐halter; the third is when he orders someone to slaughter the living


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being; the fourth is when that living being experiences pain and grief on

being slaughtered; and the fifth instance is when he provides the Buddha

or his disciple with that unwarranted food. The discourse is concluded

with Jivaka being satisfied that the monks sustain themselves with

permissible and blameless food.

<Discussion1>Although this discourse is the key place where the Buddha discusses the

delicate issue of meat eating we have to remember that the discourse

addresses only a limited context, namely that of the monastic life. In this

sense the Discourse is not a discussion of the general issue of meat‐

eating applicable to both lay and monastic groups. The Discourse views

the problem from a point of view of a monastic follower. Even that

follower, according to the Discourse, is not an ordinary one but an

exemplary person who is so developed as to pervade the four sublime

states to the entire universe without any limit. For such a person eating is

only for the sustenance of life. He does not generate any of the desires an

ordinary person is bound to generate on food. He eats it with

understanding the dangers associated with it and with an eye for escape

from the samsaric existence which requires one to engage in manifold

activities including eating food. Now for such a person what he eats

cannot have any special significance. It would not really matter whether he

eats a meal with meat or without meat; a splendid meal or ordinary meal.

This part of the discussion suggests that not only the meal has to be

cleared of three corners but also the one who consumes it has to be

endowed with exemplary qualities of monastic life.

The attitude toward food articulated in the Jivaka‐sutta has been the

general attitude adopted by the monastic community throughout its history.

In the Theravada monastic life monks are expected to do what is called

‘reflection’ (paccavekkhana) when one uses the four requisites of life,

namely, clothes, food, lodging and medicine. The idea is that a monk must

always have in his mind that he uses these requisites only to satisfy the

basic needs that they are meant to satisfy. Accordingly, the clothes are

only for the protection of the body from external influences, and for


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covering oneself. Food is only for the sustenance of life. The lodging is

only for the protection and for seclusion. And the medicine is only for the

cure of illnesses. The particular formula to be used in reflecting on food

runs as follows:

Having reflected wisely I consume this food. This food is not for sport,

not for intoxication, not for beautification, not for adornment. I take this

food only for the endurance and continuance of this body, for ending

discomfort, and for assisting the holy life, considering: ‘Thus I shall

terminate old feelings without arousing new feelings, and I shall be

healthy and blameless and shall live in comfort’2).

The idea is that when a person takes food from the perspective as

described above the quality or the type of food one eats seems to have

not much significance. The situation emerging is not that of: ‘people give

and I eat [I do not have a responsibility] which is easy. But it is the

following: ‘people give; I have not seen or heard that it was killed for me

and I have no suspicion that it was killed for me; so I eat’.

In monastic life it is difficult to separate the issue of eating meat from

the attitude toward food prescribed by the Buddha for the monks and

nuns. In addition to the above‐discussed ‘wise reflection’ this attitude has

been forcefully articulated in the Discourse on the Simile of Son’s Flesh

(putta‐mansupama‐sutta3)). In order to explain the attitude toward gross

food (kabalinkara‐ahara) that a monk should adopt, the Buddha brings out

the parable of parents who ate their own son’s flesh in order to survive a

deadly desert. The Buddha asks from the monks:

What do you think, bhikkhus? Would they eat that food for

amusement or for enjoyment or for the sake of physical beauty and

attractiveness?

“No, venerable sir”

Wouldn’t they eat that food only for the sake of crossing the

desert?

2) This formula in the first person has been adopted from the early discourses such as the

Sekha‐sutta of the Majjhima‐nikaya (53) where the Buddha describes moderation in

eating (bhojane mattannuta) to be practiced by a monk.

3) Samyutta‐nikaya II, pp.97～100.


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“Yes, venerable sir”

It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment edible food

should be seen4).

Eating is only for the survival and for nothing else. In particular food is

not meant for increasing one’s desire for sensory gratification. The attitude

advocated, no doubt, is for those who have renounced their worldly life.

(2) The next important canonical discussion on the issue of meat eating

occurs in the Vinaya Cullavagga‐pali (Vinaya II. P.197). Here Devadatta,

who is known in the Buddhist tradition for being the enemy of the

Buddha, is seen as making five requests from the Buddha, namely, that

the monks should live their entire life in the forest, on alms‐food (panda

‐pata), wearing rag‐robes, dwelling at the root of trees, and that they

should never eat fish or meat (macha‐mamsam na khadeyya).In

presenting these five proposals Devadatta reminds the Buddha that the

latter praises so much the simple and contended life with less wants and

these request are conducive for the development of such virtues. The

Buddha’s response to Devadatta was that the monks should observe the

first four of these practices on their own discretion, and the fifth on fish

and meat eating is permissible provided that it satisfies the three

conditions (mentioned already)5).

<Discussion2>The context of the present episode too is monastic life. Devadatta’s

requests are not for all the followers of the Buddha but only for the

monastic followers. Inclusion of meat eating in the list of requests

suggests that fish and meat were considered as part of ‘good meal’ (panita

bhojana). But as we found in the above discussion whether it is splendid

or ordinary would not matter for one who eats his food with wise

reflection.

(3) The Discourse on carrion‐smell (aamagandha‐sutta) of the Sutta‐

4) Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), p.598.

5) Tikotiparisuddham macchamamsam adittham asutam aparisankitam = fish and meat

purified in three corners, not seen, not heard, and not suspected. Vinaya II, p.197.


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nipata (239‐252) contains an interesting discussion where fish and meat

eating has been given a figurative interpretation. The Discourse, according

to the commentary, is presented as the response of the former Buddha

Kassapa to a question posed by the Brahmin named Tissa. The present

Buddha is said to have quoted it when a Brahmin named Amagandha

(smell of raw‐meat!) questioned him on the appropriateness of meat

eating. The question put to the Kassapa Buddha: What is ‘raw meat smell’

in your opinion? The question is prefaced with the information that while

virtuous religious people consume food prepared by various kinds of grain,

some consume foul smelling meat. To this the Buddha answers first by

describing what ‘smell of raw meat’ is. The smell of raw meat is not

eating meat but such vices as destroying life, torture, mutilation of limbs,

tying, stealing, falsehood, fraud and deceit, study of worthless teachings,

adultery, being unrestrained in sensual pleasures, being greedy, wicked,

backbiting, treacherous and the like. The discourse presents a long list of

vices that are considered as true foul smell of raw meat, and reiterates

that meat eating itself is not ‘foul smell of raw meat’. The explanation is

concluded with statement emphasizing the uselessness of adhering to rites

and rituals:

Not abstaining from the eating of fish and flesh, not fasting, nakedness,

shaving of the head, matted hair,, layer of dirt (on the body), or rough

antelope skins, not the tending of the sacrificial fire, the many austere

forms of penance in the world, incantations, oblations, sacrifice, observance

of seasonal penances (can) purify that mortal who has not overcome his

doubts.

One shall fare guarded in the streams (of the senses) and with (full)

comprehension of the faculties, standing firm in the truth and delighting in

rectitude and gentleness, going beyond clinging and with all ills eliminated,

he that is wise is not sullied by what is seen and heard (Jayawickrama

2001: p.98).

<Discussion3>In the discourse the Buddha Kassapa is addressed by the interlocutor,

Tissa, the brahmin, as ‘relative of Brahma’ (brahma‐bandhu) indicating

that he too belonged in the Brahmanic caste. The commentary in fact


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confirms that the Buddha Kassapa was of Brahmin origin. Thus the

dialogue is between two Brahmins. This Brahmanic connection may have

to be understood as a way of responding to Brahmins who adhered to

vegetarianism and looked down upon the followers of the Buddha who

consumed fish and meat. Here the Buddha is giving an ethical

interpretation, which is quite new, to meat eating. Nothing is mentioned

about meat eating in the discourse. The very terminology “the fowl smell

of raw meat’ or ‘carrion smell’ as Jayawickrama translates it, is a term

lauded with assumptions. The very terminology says that eating meat is

unacceptable. The metaphor of smell makes more sense in the context of

Brahmins who were obsessed with physical purity and observed many

rites and rituals associated with symbolic purity. Here the Buddha is seen

to be attributing a totally new meaning to the term and saying that what

really matters is not any physical smell caused by eating meat but

impurity or bad smell caused by evil behaviour. This manner of giving

new interpretation to old concepts is not unfamiliar in the discourses of

the Buddha. Some well known examples are the Wasala‐sutta redefining

who an outcaste is, the Vasettha‐sutta (of the Majjhima‐nikaya and the

Sutta‐nipata) redefining true Brahmin, and the Sigalovada‐sutta (of the

Dighanikaya) reinterpreting the act of worshipping directions. The reason

why the discourse has been attributed to the former Buddha Kassapa may

be to give the discussion an added historical significance by suggesting

that the standpoint regarding meat eating is not something new or

arbitrary on the part of the Buddha Gotama who belonged in the Worrier

caste, but to Kassapa the Buddha who belonged in the Brahmin caste.

Ⅲ. Eating meat in monastic context and beyondIt is interesting to note that there is hardly any discussion in the

Theravada on meat eating outside the monastic context. Instead what has

been really discussed is harming and killing of life and how bad such an

act morally is. The first precept in the sila (morality) is to abstain from

killing. In the five‐precept formula it is given as ‘pana‐atipata’ or killing

of life. The term ‘pana’ (life) refers to life; but does not specify which


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kind of life. But the context and elaborations found in discourses show

that what is meant is all living beings, human beings, birds, beasts,

reptiles, insects etc. The texts do not allude to plant life in this context.

The positive aspect of this precept is described in the following manner:

Abandoning the taking of life, he dwells refraining from taking life,

without stick or sword, scrupulous, compassionate, feeling for the welfare

of all living beings6).

The first precept has been traditionally understood, in its positive

manifestation, as involving active practice of kindness towards all living

beings. The well‐known Karaniyametta‐sutta too can be considered as

an elaboration of the positive implementation of the same precept.

Although meat‐eating is not specifically mentioned the Discourse stresses

that one must love all being as a mother would love her only son (mata

yatha niyam puttam‐ayusa ekaputtam anurakkhe evampi sabbabhutesu –

manasam bhavaye aparimanam). Among the five prohibited trades for the

lay people, selling meat is one. Thus in a true Buddhist society nobody

will kill animals, birds, fish or any other living being and nobody will sell

such meat. If this situation obtains there cannot arise a question of meat

eating for there is none such to be eaten.

But it is clear that this ideal situation does not obtain. One way to

explain how meat is there to be bought is that the entire society at any

given context has never been totally Buddhist or full of true Buddhists

who follow the Path flawlessly. Fishing and killing animals and birds for

food have been there always in societies though it is imaginable in a

Buddhist society such livelihood might not have been encouraged. The

whole idea of ‘meat purified in three corners’ assumes that such meat for

the killing of which one is not directly responsible is available. The idea

of personal responsibility at issue here has to be understood correctly. It

looks like that what the early discourses and the Theravada tradition take

as responsibility is one’s direct personal responsibility. The indirect

responsibility, which is implicit in ‘meat purified in three corners’, does not

seem to have been acknowledged in the tradition at all. As the popular

argument correctly shows the demand and supply theory is at work here,

6) Samannaphala‐sutta, Dighanikaya 2.


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and in this sense no one who eats meet cannot escape the indirect

responsibility for encouraging killing living beings. But to my knowledge

this argument has never been recognized in the discourses. What instead

one finds in the discourses is the attention for the direct personal

involvement. For example, if the meat has been produced specifically for x

then x is guilty if he were to consume it knowing that it has been

specifically prepared for him. It would be appropriate to quote the

commentarial explanation of ‘meat purified in three corners’ in this context:

In ‘seen’ etc. seen means to have seen that animals and fish etc. being

killed for the sake of monks. ‘Heard’ means to have heard that animals

and fish etc. have been killed for the sake of monks. “Suspected’ is

threefold as suspected by seeing, suspected by hearing, and suspected

freed from both (seeing and hearing). The all‐encompassing judgment in

this matter is as follows: Here the monks see people leaving village or

going about in the forest carrying nets, baits etc.; on the next day in their

alms‐round in the village monks receive food with fish and meat; then

the monks become suspicious owing to seeing that this food must have

been prepared for the sake of monks; this is ‘suspected by seeing’ and

such food is not good to accept. Food not suspected in this manner is

good to accept. If people were to ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’,

and monks were to say why, and if people were to respond by saying

that the meat or fish was not prepared for the sake of monks but it was

prepared for their own use or the use of royal officers then it is good to

accept. Even if the monks did not see but they heard that people left

village or went around in the forest with nets and baits etc. and in the

next day if they were to receive food with fish and meat and the monks

become suspicious owing to hearing that this food must have been

prepared for the sake of monks, this is ‘suspected by hearing’ and such

food is not good to accept. Food not suspected in this manner is good to

accept. If people were to ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’, and

monks were to say why and if people were to respond by saying that the

meat or fish was not prepared for the sake of monks but it was prepared

for their own use or the use of royal officers then it is good to accept.

Even if the monks did neither see nor hear, but became suspicious when

they received food with fish and meat from the village and, then it is

called ‘suspected freed from both (seeing and hearing)’. If people were to


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ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’, and monks were to say why and

if people were to respond by saying that the meat or fish was not

prepared for the sake of monks but it was prepared for their own use or

the use of royal officers, or they were to say that the meat was natural

and hence proper (for monks to accept) then it is good to accept7).

The commentary in its subsequent analysis lays much stress on the

‘knowledge factor’ involved in the process. A monk cannot accept meat or

fish if he knows that it was prepared for him or for the Sangha. If he did

not know then such food is no harm. If some monks knew but some

others did not know it and if those who did not know were to eat they

would not be guilty, but those who knew would be guilty if they ate.

Here again this emphasis made of knowing or not‐knowing makes guilt

purely dependent on psychological factors. The commentary brings up the

hypothetical situation of a particular monk receiving food with meat or fish

and knowing that it was specifically prepared for him would give that

food to another monk who would eat it trusting the giver and asks ‘who

is guilty’. The question is answered by saying that neither is for the one

who accepted did not eat and the one who ate did not know. The

knowledge‐factor involved may be articulated in the following manner:

either one should know for sure that the killing was not done for oneself

or the community, or one should not know that the killing was done

specifically for oneself or the community. These two conditions are

different from each other although they may look alike. While the first is

not guilty owing to his knowledge the other is not guilty for his ignorance

of the true situation. (It is according to this that a monk who accepts

meat or fish specifically killed for him but assured by donors that it was

not so is not guilty.)

Although the knowledge factor is decisive in determining the guilt of

one who eats what is prepared specifically for him, with the improper

kinds of meat even if one were to not know that the meat is improper

one would be guilty if one were to eat it. Therefore the commentary

advises that one should always inquire about the kind of meat before one

eats it. The improper kinds of meat have been listed in the Vinaya. The

7) Majjhimanikaya‐atthakatha II, pp.47～48. (The translation is mine.)


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first in the list is human flesh. The story of pious female disciple Suppiya

who gave her own flesh to a sick monk caused this prohibition. The rest

of prohibited meats include that of elephants, horses, dogs, snakes, lions,

tigers, leopards, bears, and hyenas8). In this context the Buddha cautions

the monks not to eat meat without having carefully discerned (na ca

bhikkhave apptivekkhitva mamsam paribhunjitabbam9)). Two important

considerations emerge from the discussion: the guilt or otherwise of meat

eating depends on knowledge or lack of it of the fact that it was prepared

specifically for oneself or the Sangha and the appropriateness of the kind

of meat offered. In other words, a monk is allowed to eat meat if he

knows that it was appropriate meat not specifically prepared for him or if

he knows that it was appropriate meat but does not know that it was

prepared specifically for him.

The question of appropriate meat is not applicable to lay society. At

least the Buddha did not intend this classification for the lay society.

Although the idea of ‘meat purified in three corners’ too has been

articulated in the context of monastic life it seems applicable to society at

large. At least this is how the Buddhist society in general has interpreted

this idea. Accordingly there has been some kind of uneasy existence of

fishermen and butchers within Buddhist societies. In a way they seem to

have provided with a valuable service to the rest of Buddhist community

including the monks and nuns who wished to have it both ways!

Nevertheless the social attitude toward these groups of people has always

been one of disdain and dissociation. Understandably, in many Theravada

Buddhist countries, including Sri Lanka, initial converts to theistic religions

naturally came from among fishing folks from maritime regions. Even

among the Buddhists who continue to be fishermen there seems to have

developed certain traditions and conventions which are meant to mitigate

the bad karma produced by killing. For example, it is reported that a

fisherman would be quite vary of killing any living being other than fish

or killing outside his profession.

8) Vinaya I, pp.216〜220.

9) Ibid. p.218.


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Ⅳ. The last meal of the BuddhaIn the Mahaparinibana‐sutta of the Dighanikaya (16) where the last

days of the life of the Buddha are described it is said that immediately

before the parinibbana next day early morning the Buddha accepted a meal

prepared by person called Cunda. According to this account the meal

consisted what is called ‘sukara‐maddava’, and the Buddha had taken this

particular meal only by himself and had instructed the donor to throw

away any left over for it may not be digested by anyone else in the

world. The discourse says that after this meal the already weak Buddha

got weaker finally precipitating his demise. In the Buddhist tradition there

has been considerable controversy as to what this particular meal was.

The popular understanding has been that it is some kind of pork. Since

the discourse does not provide us with any clue to determine what exactly

this food is we need to consult the commentarial exegesis to see the

tradition. The commentary to Dighanikaya says thus: ‘sukara maddava’ is

the flesh of single first‐born pig not too young, not too old, which had

been received naturally (sukara‐maddavanti natitarunassa natijinnassa eka

‐jetthaka sukarassa pavatta mamsam10)). Having listed this initial meaning

the commentary lists two other meanings to the term held by ‘certain

others’: a preparation of soft‐boiled rice cooked with five cow‐products;

and a kind of alchemistic mixture described in the science of alchemy. In

addition to these three meanings Dhammapala, in his commentary to the

Udana adds a fourth possibility, namely, that it is young bamboo shoots

tramples by pigs (sukarehi maddita vamsa‐kaliro).

While there is no ambiguity about the term ‘sukara’, ‘maddava’ is open

for debate. It can be derived from ‘mudu’ (mild) and the noun deriving

from this adjective is maddava meaning mildness or softness. It is

according to this that sukara‐maddava is understood as the soft flesh of

a pig. Maddava could also be derived from the verb ‘maddati’ which

means to press or to trample. Alternative interpretation referred to by

Dhammapala, the author the sub‐commentary, seems to derive from this

10) The Sumangalavilasini II, p.568.


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second meaning. Discussing this term in his Milinda‐panha translation

Rhys Davids notices this difficulty and referring to Sanskrit ‘mardava’

which always means tender, he says that this could be even tender

flowers11). In his Dighanikaya translation, which is later than the

translation of the Milinda‐panha, Rhys Davids produces this additional

information:

Dr. Hoey informs me that the peasantry in these districts are still

very fond of bulbous roots, a sort of truffle, found in the jungle, and

called sukara‐kanda. Mr. K.E. Neumann, in his translation of the

Majjhima (1896), p.xx, has collected several similar instances of truffle

like roots, or edible plants, having such names.12)

These interpretations given by both ancient and modern commentators

betray some kind of ambiguity the Theravada tradition itself had on this

issue. But the primary meaning assigned by the commentary is that it is

some kind of pork. The sub‐commentary does not refer to any other

meanings and directly describes sukara‐maddava as ‘soft meat of a wild

bore’ (vana‐varahassa mudu‐mamsam13)). This shows that the tradition

was fairly sure that the meal was some kind of pork.

The discourse itself says that that physical pain of the Buddha

aggravated after he ate this food. Both the commentary and the sub‐

commentary comment on this by pointing out that there was no causal

connection between eating pork and aggravation of the pain. The

commentary says that the Buddha did not have this aggravated pain due

to eating. But in fact the Buddha had less pain because he had this mild

meal. The pain of the Buddha would have been more severe had he not

eaten this, says the commentary14). The sub‐commentary glosses over

this further, and says that one must not think that even the Buddha could

not digest it (which, according to the discourse, the Buddha had claimed

nobody else would be able to digest it). The Buddha in fact digested it,

11) The Questions of King Milinda, p.244 (footnote # 1).

12) Dialogues of the Buddha II 1910/1977. p.137 (footnote # 1).

13) Digha‐atthakatha‐tika I, p.218.

14) The Sumangalavilasini II, p.568.


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and hence the absence of any disturbance and softening of the disturbance

caused due to other conditions, says the sub‐commentary.

This later exegetical urge to dissociate the demise of the Buddha from

his eating pork suggests that by this time the apparent connection

between the two events had been perceived as embarrassing. However,

one cannot get the same feeling when one reads the discourse itself. It

directly links, without any obvious sense of discomfort, aggravation of the

pain which ended in the demise of the Buddha to his last meal. There is

no any evidence that the Theravada tradition was hesitant to acknowledge

the relation between the Buddha’s demise and his last meal of pork. The

sub‐commentary makes it very clear that the donor being a stream‐

winner prepared this food from natural meat (meaning meat not violating

any of the three criteria)15). If the meat was purified with three corners

there is nothing to worry about it. The fact that it aggravated the

situation of the Buddha, who clearly knew what exactly he was doing, and

finally precipitated his demise, is to be understood as a series of events

causally conditioned.

The tradition has taken tremendous effort to exonerate the donor from

any wrong doing or any reproach from the posterity. It is said that the

Buddha exalted this last meal and the very first meal he had immediately

before his enlightenment as the highest acts of alms‐giving. In a later

period this tradition has come under scrutiny of King Milinda who

questioned from Nagasena how this could be since the last meal “turned

to poison, gave rise to disease, put an end to the period of his [the

Buddha’s] then existence, took away his life”. The latter provides the

following explanation:

It was not because of it that any sickness fell upon the Blessed One,

but it was because of the extreme weakness of his body and because

of the period of life he had to live having been exhausted, that the

disease arose, and grew worse and worse – just as when, O King, an

ordinary fire is burning, if fresh fuel be supplied, it will burn up still

15) Digha‐atthakatha‐tika, p.218.


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more or as when a stream is flowing along as usual, if a heavy rain

falls, it will become a mighty river with a great rush of water or as

when the body is of its ordinary girth, if more food be eaten, it

becomes broader than before. So this was not, O King, the fault of the

food that was presented, and you can not impute any harm to it16).

This explanation is essentially a continuation of the tradition of denying

any causal relation between the two events and exonerating the donor.

Although the latter purpose may have been served, whether or not the

explanations of this sort are effective in denying the direct relation this

food had with aggravating the situation of the Buddha remains uncertain.

Ⅴ. ConclusionThe mainstream Mahayana tradition has advocated vegetarianism, and

consequently meat‐eating has come under severe criticism in the

Mahayana literature. The eighth chapter of the Lnakavatara‐sutra contains

a scathing attack on meat‐eaters. Scholars such as Kalupahana think that

the connection of the Sutra to Lanka, which has been the main centre of

Theravada, and its attack on meat‐eating are not accidental17). The target

of Lankavatara could well be the Theravada tradition which thrived in Sri

Lanka since the 3rd century B.C.E.. What would be the Theravada position

on meat eating? It is clear that the position is not at all an outright

prohibition. Nor is the position an unconditional approval. The three criteria

established surely limit one’s direct involvement in killing beings for food.

The three criteria have been given for the monks and nuns. A community

of people who depended on others for their livelihood does not seem to

have much choice in this regard. It is very appropriate for them to choose

houses; nor is it appropriate for them to look for preferences in food.

Discussing vegetarianism in Buddhist monastic life Damien Keown makes

the following observations:

16) The Questions of the King Milinda I (Tr.) Rhys Davids (reprinted) 1977. pp. 244～245.

17) Kalupahana (1992), pp.241～246.


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The earliest sources depict the Buddha as following a non‐

vegetarian diet and even resisting an attempt to make vegetarianism

compulsory for monks. Many take this as confirmation that the Buddha

had no objection to meat‐eating, but it may equally well have been

the case that since meat‐eating was a wide‐spread and accepted

practice in the Buddha’s time, accepting meat in alms was allowed for

practical purposes18).

Furthermore, one could argue that if food was consumed ‘reflecting

wisely’, as we discussed above, what one eats or whether what one eats

is exquisite or ordinary would not matter. Seyfort Ruegg highlights some

additional considerations regarding the Theravada (early Vinaya) position:

…as an almsman the Bhikkhu was not only dependent on the offerings

he received on his begging rounds, but that as a person to be honoured

(dakkhineyya) and a “field of merit” (punnakkhetta) he was morally bound

to accept any alms offered in good faith by a pious donor and that if he

failed to do so he was interfering with the karmic fruit and just reward

that the donor was entitled to expect. Finally since in Buddhist thought it

is the intention with which an act is accomplished that determines its

moral and karmic quality, the Bhikkhu’s accepting and eating meat in the

conditions specified above cannot be dismissed as necessarily a mere

subterfuge allowing him to circumvent some share of responsibility in a

series of acts involving vihimsa at an earlier stage19).

All these are clearly meant for the monastic community. What about

meat‐eating as a practice in society at large?

In the five precepts (panca‐sila) the first being abstaining from taking

life vegetarianism seems almost a corollary of it. This is further supported

by prohibition of selling meat as a livelihood for the followers of the

Buddha. But as found earlier in this discussion the Buddha has not

discussed the specific problem of meat eating as applicable to the whole

society. What we have in the Theravada tradition in this regard is not a

well‐articulated theory or a principle, but some attitudes and practices.

18) Damian Keown (2005), pp.48～49.

19) Seyfort Reugg (1980). p.239.


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There are Jataka stories detailing the dangers of being addicted to meat‐

eating. Dharmadvaja Jataka (219) refers to a king who resorted to

cannibalism when he could not find any meat for his meal. In the opposite

direction, a child is eulogized in the Sri Lanka commentarial literature for

not killing an animal even to save his mother’s life. In the recorded

history some of the earliest examples of kindness to animals are available

from the ancient Sri Lanka. Devanampiya Tissa, the first king to be

converted to Buddhism, declared the reservoir called Abhaya a sanctuary

for the fish in there. Many subsequent rulers in Sri Lanka enacted a

public decree called ‘ma‐ghata’ (don’t kill!) in the entire country or in

limited areas. This does not necessarily mean that they adopted

vegetarianism. Nonetheless, they seem to have understood the teaching of

the Buddha as advocating restraint in food including meat‐eating.

Emperor Asoka who followed the teaching of the Buddha refers to non‐

violence (ahimsa) in many of his edicts. In particular, in his first rock

edict he says that the number of animals and birds killed for the royal

kitchen has been reduced to three and that even that number will come to

stop very soon.

All these instances point to a very humane and kind attitude toward

beings killed for food. As the well‐known statement in the Karaniya‐

metta‐sutta says one should wish for the well‐being of all beings

(including those that are killed for food). The optimum state is one

without any being killed for food. But the Buddha never made this a law.

In particular he did not make regulations for the lay people (simply

because the lay society was beyond the jurisdiction of the Buddha).

Therefore the Buddhist position toward meat‐eating as applicable to

society at large is characterized by moderation, restraint and non‐

addiction, steps which could lead ultimately to complete abandoning of food

‐related desire including that for meat.


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<Reference>(All Pali works referred to are Pali Text Society (PTS) editions. They

will not be listed specifically here. Please see below for

their translations.)

Bodhi, Bhikkhu. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: Wisdom

Publications, Sommerville, MA. 2000.

Davids, Rhys. Dialogues of the Buddha II(PTS edition, 1910/1977): The

Questions of the King Milinda (reprinted) 1977.

Jayawickrama, N.A. Suttanipata: Text and Translation(Colombo:

Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies,

2001).

Kalupahana, David J. A, History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities

and Discontinuities(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,

1992).

Keown, Damien. Buddhist Ethics A Very Short Introduction(Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2005).

Nanamoli, Bhikkhu & Bodhi, Bhikkhu. The Middle Length sayings of the

Buddha(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995/2001)

Ruegg, D.Seyfort, “Ahimsa and Vegetarianism in the History of

Buddhism” in Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola

Rahula, ed. Somaratne Balasuriya et al(London: Gordon

Frazer, 1980).

Walshe, Maurice. Thus Have I Heard: The Long Discourses of the

Buddha(London: Wisdom Publications 1987).


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Abstract

The Theravada Standpoint on Meat

Eating

Asanga Tilakaratne

This paper examines the issue of meet‐eating in the Theravada

tradition. The paper discusses three key textual instances relevant for the

issue. The first is the discussion, occurring in the Jivaka‐sutta of the

Majjhima‐nikaya, between Jivaka, the Buddha Buddha’s physician, and the

Buddha. Here the Buddha comes up with the idea of ‘fish and meat

purified in three corners’ (ti‐koti parisuddha maccha‐mamsa). The

discussion shows that it is no harm for a bhikkhu to consume fish or

meet provided that he has not seen, heard or suspected that the killing

was done specifically for him. The second instance discussed is from the

Vinaya where Devadatta, who went against the Buddha, requests the latter

to impose vegetarianism on the Buddhist monastic followers. The Buddha

rejects this demand and leaves it for disciples themselves to determine.

The third instance discussed is the Amagandha‐sutta of the Sutta‐nipata

in which the Buddha defines what the real ‘foul smell’ is.

Subsequently, the paper discusses the issue of meet‐eating as a

general ethical problem from a Theravada point of view. The Buddha’s

last meal, allegedly contained pork, is discussed as a part of this

discussion. The paper shows that the Buddha has not discussed meet‐

eating as a general problem of ethics; he has discussed it only in the

context of monastic discipline. What the Buddha said with regard to his

monastic followers who always depended on others for their survival and

who were expected to eat merely for the sake of safeguarding their life,

may not be applicable for society as a whole. But what the Buddha said

by way advising his monastic followers may only be taken as providing a

very broad and general approach to the issue. The paper ends by

highlighting that the general Theravada attitude toward meet‐eating is


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gradual reduction and complete avoidance ultimately.

*Key words

meet‐eating, vegetarianism, killing, food, Theravada, Vinaya.

논문접수일: 2008년 11월 29일, 심사완료일: 2008년 12월 2일,

게재확정일: 2008년 12월 22일

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The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating - Asanga Tilakaratne