Rethinking Reform: A Reappraisal of German East African History

Taylor BaljonESHCC

Erasmus University #360346

Taylor.Baljon@Gmail.comGijsbert Oonk

Karin Willemse

Table of Contents

I. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 3

II. The Political Context……………………………………………………………………. 15

III. The Economic Context…………………………………………………………………. 26

IV. The Social Context……………………………………………………………...……… 39

V. The Settler Problem……………………………………………………………...……… 49

VI. Conclusion………………………………………………………...…………………… 57

Bibliography……………………………….………………………………….……………. 60

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Chapter I: Introduction

This study is designed as a reappraisal of the history of German East Africa. Though

there have been a number of different attempts at reassessment of various aspects of the

period of German rule in modern day Tanzania, this study is by no means superfluous.1 The

point of contention brought up in this particular study differs from others in the object of its

reassessment. While others have focused on various aspects of the period under German rule,

including economic and social policies of the state and their subsequent effects, this paper

takes a somewhat broader view. The goal is not to examine a specific area of German East

Africa, but rather a wide-ranging analysis of several aspects of the colony in order to

undermine the currently accepted periodization and plot structure of the history of the colony

as a whole.

In particular, this study has been organized to debunk one segment of the history of

German colonial rule in East Africa. The segment in question is what is known in the history

of German East Africa as the Dernburg reform era. The nomenclature comes from the period

in office of the Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg. The idea of the reform period stems

from older sources; most of these date from the late colonial period.2 In this older version of

the history, the year 1906 is taken as the decisive turning point. After two serious colonial

rebellions in the years up to that point, there was a serious political crisis, centering on the

colonies, and criticism thereof. As the crisis escalated, a fresh new face, Bernhard Dernburg,

was brought in as Colonial Secretary to clean out the Augean stables. Following a successful

election campaign, Dernburg set about reforming and reorganizing the colonial

administration and policy. This period of “scientific colonization,” or a studious betterment

of the colonial process through European technology and science, brought benefits to both the

metropole and to her colonial subjects in a manner fitting of a civilizing imperial power,

according to early European sources. In this way, the year 1906 represents in the older

versions of the history a drastic break between the excesses and abuses of an earlier period

and the peaceful era of prosperity and reform which was to follow.

1 John Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. Cambridge. 1969. Juhani Koponen. Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884 – 1914. Helsinki. 1995. Jan-Georg Deutsch. Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884–1914. Oxford. 2006. Tetzlaff, Rainer. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas 1883-1914. Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Vol. 17. Berlin: Duncker und Humbolt. 1970. 2Mary Evelyn Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire 1884 – 1918. New York. 1930., W.O. Henderson. German East Africa 1884 – 1918.

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This summation of events relies on four major premises. The first of these points

asserts that the colonial crisis of 1906, seen in an upsurge in public debate over the colonies

generally, and their rise to prominence as a national issue, was caused by previous immorality

within the German administration. It was the cruelty and thoughtlessness of the previous

officials that led to the two large rebellions in Africa, rather than any sort of native African

initiative. This idea leads to a second conclusion, that it was the public outcry in Germany

against the immorality of the colonial administration that led to major reforms. The third

premise of the argument continues that as this was a German response to a German

immorality, the initiative for reform lay firmly in the hands of Colonial Secretary Dernburg.

Dernburg’s program of enlightened imperialism, which he outlined during his election

speeches, then swept away the abuses of the previous administration. After Dernburg’s tenure

in office, the colony had been successfully reformed and worked to the benefit of all, a

veritable example of the civilizing mission for the entire world to see. The proof of this, the

fourth point, lies in the statistical rises in economic production, and especially in the absence

of rebellion between 1907 and 1914.3

That interpretation, however, has not been without its critics over the years. The

illustrious Cambridge professor, John Iliffe, wrote one of the earliest and best-known

critiques, especially within English language historiography.4 Writing in the early

postcolonial period, Iliffe sought to rectify many of the biases of previous authors in regard to

the so-called ‘era of reform.’ To this end, and after thorough research, Iliffe created his own,

more nuanced version of the later history of German East Africa. Iliffe’s history centers on a

number of basic points, many of them directly contradicting the above established version.

First, posits Iliffe, there were “very real changes… in East Africa after 1906.”5 These

changes, he continues, were not devised due to moral outrage among the German public, but

were rather a European response to the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-7, an African initiative.

The second point, explains Iliffe, is that the reforms were not the work of an incredibly gifted

colonial secretary, forcing his will on Germany’s East African possession. Instead, they

derive from conflict and compromise between Colonial Secretary Dernburg, the governor of

East Africa, and the Reichstag in Berlin. His third point continues that the reform program

was opposed and ultimately reversed by the growing white settler community in the colony.

Despite this, he concedes in his fourth point, German East Africa was remarkably peaceful

3 Townsend. Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire 1884 – 1918. 4 John Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule.5 Ibid. 7.

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after 1907. He denies however, that this fact was due to any European initiative, but rather to

changes happening at the time within African societies. Iliffe then adds a fifth point,

extending somewhat the timeline of the reform period. He suggests that there was an “age of

improvement” towards the end of German rule in Tanganyika involving economic and social

advances.6 However, Iliffe then goes on to explain that this period should not been seen in

the light of the “era of reform,” but rather as the beginning of a new period of conflict

between Africans and Europeans. In this way, Iliffe contradicts many of the points and

problems of the older version of German East Africa’s history, but stops short of a

straightforward denial of the idea of a reform period.

Where Iliffe stops is essentially where the argument of this paper picks up. This study

intends to critique the historiography of German East Africa in a new light. This new critique

goes further than Iliffe, for despite his admirable work in uncovering biases and

misconceptions within previous histories, his acceptance of the idea of a period of reform

leaves much to be said. The main argument of this work is that the reform period, as it is

known, should not be labeled, or even perhaps periodized as such. Guiding this claim is a

wealth of scholarship on the German rule in East Africa that has been produced since Iliffe’s

1969 study.7 Many of these works deal with specific aspects of colonial rule, including

slavery, cotton production, labor, and systems of exploitation, but none has come out

definitively debunking the myth of the reform period. To this end, this study advances its

own system of points in much the same fashion as Iliffe to conclusively deny the existence of

a reform period.

The first of these points revolves around the concept of a reform period, and how that

idea was developed during the 1907 Reichstag elections. In the aftermath of the large

rebellions in the German colonies of South-West and East Africa, there was indeed, as the

older version of the history suggests, an outcry among the German public at the brutality and

expense, in both financial and human costs, of the uprisings. Such was the extent of the

scandal and the ensuing crisis that the government dissolved itself and new elections were

called. In the run-up to these elections, Dernburg, the new colonial secretary, was sent around

electioneering for the parties of order, explaining how the colonies would be reformed and

how they would eventually benefit both Germany and the natives. His speeches at this time

have become the basis of his historical legacy, in that the substance of reform has often been

6 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 8.7 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklungund Ausbeutung. Koponen. Development for Exploitation. Sunseri. A Social

History of Cotton Production in German East Africa, 1884-1915.

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overlooked in favor of election promises. Starting from this point, this paper will show how

this particular misreading of events occurred, and why exactly the misunderstanding proved

so durable.

The second point of this study is that the economic growth of the colony, seized by

both the older interpretation and Iliffe’s own as evidence, was to a large degree overstated. If

Dernburg’s proposed program is taken as anything like a yardstick for the success or failure

of these so called reforms, then in economic terms, the reforms were lackluster at best. This

point will be advanced particularly in regard to the raw materials that Dernburg was so keen

on producing in the colonies for use in German industry. If one looks at the larger picture,

rather than simply examining the rising production numbers, this point becomes clear.

The third point that this paper advances is that, much as the colony did not become

the reformed booming producer of raw materials the Dernburg intended, its progress in social

terms was equally dismal. Recent studies on exploitation in the colony by Juhani Koponen

and the continuation of slavery under colonial rule, especially in the reform period, by Jan-

Georg Deutsch, help to illustrate this point.8,9 As both their studies, and further research has

shown, very little success occurred in regard to bettering the position of the natives, and

where progress was made, it was often not because of, but despite the interference of the

supposedly reform minded state.10

The last major point of the argument flows from Dr. Iliffe’s third point, that the white

settlers were able to oppose and ultimately reverse the policy of reform in the colony. If this

settler community was so successful in quickly opposing and reversing reforms, and these

reforms never came in effect, why then would one bother to apply the label of reform to the

period? Instead, as this paper will argue, the settlers represent a force of continuity over

change, which will be expanded upon below as the nucleus of a different periodization of

German East African History. It is the hope of the study that the new periodization will

provide a better vantage from which to view the admittedly short span of German Rule in

East Africa, and provide a definite break with the biased historiographies of the colonial

period.

8 Juhani Koponen. Development for Exploitation: German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884 – 1914. Helsinki. 1995.9 Jan-Georg Deutsch. Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884–1914. Oxford. 2006. 10 Ibid. 168.

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Methodology & Sources

This study is based on two types of source material: German accounts of the period, in

the form of published memoirs and speeches of colonial officials and colonial activists, as

well as documents collected in the Berlin – Lichterfelde department of the Bundesarchiv, and

the collected works of secondary sources on various subjects surrounding German rule in

East Africa. The idea behind this approach is straightforward. Through a combination of

official pronouncements, as well as statistics and letters from the colony itself, it is possible

to grasp, granted without perfect accuracy, an idea of the differences between the statements

of the government and the situation on the ground in German East Africa. This approach is

complimented by the large corpus of literature from other authors on the political, economic,

and social areas which have been designated as the major points of argument, as well as

discussions of the settler community which ultimately provides the new structure through

which to examine the colony. The statistics and insights that other authors have provided in

their research have been especially helpful in this endeavor, and I will not shy away from

admitting that in my efforts I am standing on their shoulders. To grasp the importance of the

other authors and their work, however, necessitates a detailed discussion of the

historiography of German East Africa, an explanation of how these works have influenced

my own views, and placement within the structure of my ultimate argument in debunking the

myth of reform in that colony.

The first of the categories of secondary literature useful to the study at hand involve

the political context of the supposed reform era. That is to say, these works involve

themselves, though not always in their entirety, with the situation in the Reichstag and the

elections to that body in 1907. This is important, for it was during this period that the idea of

a reform era first came about. Without discussing the implications of this election, any

progress on removing the aura surrounding the Dernburg reforms would be severely

hampered. That said, though there are many works on this subject, three in particular have

been especially useful in linking the importance of the colonies to the 1907 elections, and the

importance of the elections to German East Africa especially.

The first of these books, rather surprisingly, is a somewhat ancient tome on the

elections themselves. George Dunlap Crothers wrote his The German Elections of 1907 in

1941, well within the scope of the old colonial version of the reform period.11 Nevertheless,

and probably owing in part to the dearth of later literature on the subject, Crothers largely 11 George Dunlap Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. New York. 1941.

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narrative account of the elections remains the best English language summary of the events

and reasons behind what was to be known as the Hottentot election. Crothers begins with a

discussion of the reasons for the colonial crisis that forms the major reason for the later

elections. This, as should be noted, had much more to do with Germany’s colony in South

West Africa, rather than its Eastern possession on which this study is centered. He then

continues with an explanation of the nature of the German Reichstag in 1906 and the more

powerful parties, including detailed accounts of their motives and agendas. Two of these

motivations are especially important, and lucidly described. The first of these is that of the

German center, and confessional catholic party, the Zentrum, which was attempting to gain

control of the purse strings of government through a blockage of colonial bills.12 The second

important motive discussed is that of the Chancellor, von Bülow, who, more than anything

else was concerned with his own job security. The main thrust of the book, however, is its

assertion that the 1907 elections represent a distinct surge in national and imperial enthusiasm

that was not to wane until after the First World War.13 Unfortunately that point, though well

articulated, is not directly relevant to this study.

The second book of note in describing the political context of the development of the

idea of a reform period was written much more recently. Woodruff D. Smith’s German

Colonial Empire is another narrative account, but much broader in scope, covering the entire

span of German colonial history.14 Within this all-encompassing trajectory are two chapters

of impressive clarity and substantial use to this study. Of most importance is Smith’s account

of Colonial Secretary Dernburg’s appointment to his position as an integral part of the

campaign conducted by the parties of order. The value of this argument is its link between the

demands of an election campaign and Dernburg’s election speeches. In the next chapter,

Smith goes on to explain the Dernburg era. While critical of the eventual outcome of the

reform period, Smith still labels it as such, and uses it as a definitive break in his

periodization of the German Colonial Empire. Unlike many of the other sources surrounding

German rule in East Africa, this book centers almost exclusively on the political and

administrative aspects of the empire. While this makes for a rather one-sided narrative of

German rule, it suits this paper’s needs admirably.

The third book of use in understanding the political context of the reform period has

already been described in part above. John Iliffe’s definitive work on German East Africa,

12 Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 75. 13 Ibid. 11 – 12. 14 Woodruff D. Smith. German Colonial Empire. Chapel Hill. 1978.

8

while devoted in large part to the idea of the reform period, also contains a useful chapter on

the political context.15 Iliffe begins with a description of the colonies position within the

German government, and their importance to it. He then goes on to describe the colonial

crisis of 1906 and the reasons for it. Unlike Crothers and Smith, Iliffe is much more vocal

about the reasoning behind the Reichstag dissolution of 1906, stating, unequivocally that the

root of the crisis was, “the government’s determination to reverse socialist gains.”16 Iliffe then

goes on, much in line with Crothers, to describe the motives of the various parties involved,

though owing to the limited scope of his chapter, in far less detail. He explains the

appointment of Dernburg, and Dernburg’s aims for the colonies. He is rightly suspicious of

Dernburg’s reform agenda, but ultimately concludes his remarks on the political context of

the reform period by suggesting that, “Dernburg’s term of office as Colonial Secretary was an

era of genuine reform.”17 This might seem strange in light of his previous criticism, but he

holds that line through the rest of the work. That is of course, ultimately this paper’s problem

with Iliffe’s book, but does not dilute the usefulness of his several incisive points on the

political context of the reform period he set out to describe.

The second of the relevant categories of historiography pertaining to this study is that

which brings in the more tangible realities of the so-called reform period, with reference to

the claims of its theoretical leader, Dernburg. As will be discussed below, the major aspects

of Dernburg’s intended reforms can be grouped into economic and social categories,

themselves making up the more empirical part of the research contained within this paper.

Many of these topics overlap, and it has therefore been useful to combine the two into one

section of historiography, producing a more coherent structure.

The first of the useful sources regarding social and economic change during the

reform era in German East Africa has been described, but it is worth noting John Iliffe’s work

again, in respect to its usefulness to later chapters. While also describing the political

background of the reform era, Iliffe also discusses at length the economic and social changes

that occurred within German East Africa. To be fair, Iliffe’s work does not fit newer

interpretations of the reform period, but is useful in many ways. While Iliffe claims that

social changes formed a large part of the reform period, he does not cite them very clearly,

and ultimately admits that many of these policies changed or were eventually reversed by the

rise of the settler community. He also describes economic changes within the colony, but

15 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. 30 – 49.16 Ibid. 40. 17 Ibid. 49.

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again, is forced to explain that those same settlers halted most of these changes. This seeming

paradox between Iliffe’s claim of a period of “genuine reform,” and later admission of that

reform’s failure in sense sows the seeds of this paper’s argument for a new historical

periodization and trajectory.18 Despite this, Iliffe’s work is still very insightful, and provides

ample detail of the historical processes at work during the reform period.

A second valuable work in terms of both social and economic change in German East

Africa during Dernburg’s tenure in office is the Finnish scholar, Juhani Koponen’s book,

Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884 –

1914. This much more modern book, published in 1995, is admittedly tilted towards a

description of the economics of the colony than social issues, and spans the entire length of

German rule, rather than a select period like Iliffe’s. However, Koponen’s work is much

more critical of the reform period than Iliffe, and should his work have been a narrative rather

than a concerted attempt to show that German East Africa was developed primarily to be best

exploited, rather than to help the natives or even civilize them, it might have made this

particular study unnecessary. As it stands though, Koponen’s lengthy work contains

invaluable chapters describing the social and economic changes in the colony during the

supposed reform period with a rightfully critical eye. Thomas Sunseri, however, harshly

criticizes his book, for its over-focus on economic matters as the driving force of history, and

its ignorance in regard to the perspective of the average African native.

This brings up the third work of note that proved useful in an assessment of he

empirical results of the reform period in German East Africa. Thomas Sunseri’s Ph.D.

dissertation, A Social History of Cotton Production in German East Africa 1884 – 1915,

published in 1993, provides another useful modern perspective dedicated solely to German

East Africa. Where Koponen focused primarily on economic issues, Sunseri has largely opted

for a social approach. Though Sunseri is quite critical of Koponen’s work in a review on the

topic, in practice the works can be seen as complimentary.19 Whereas Koponen is ultimately

critical of the efficacy of the economic development of the colony, Sunseri is equally critical

of the aspects of social reform claimed to have been carried out by the German authorities.

On the whole, however, while Sunseri claims that Koponen has focused too much on

economic issues, it would seem instead the Sunseri’s work is the more lopsided of the two.

This of course, does not detract from its overall value to the study.

18 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 49. 19 Thomas Sunseri, Review of Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania,

1884 – 1914. By Juhani Koponen. African Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 382 (Jan., 1997), pp. 145-147.

10

A fourth useful source on what we might call the situation on the ground in German

East Africa is Jan-Georg Deutsch’s work, Emancipation without Abolition in German East

Africa c. 1884 – 1914. Like Sunseri’s study of cotton production, Deutsch’s book focuses

mostly on social issues within the colony. Being the most recent publication of the sources,

dating from 2006, it also unsurprisingly takes one of the harsher views on the idea of the

reform period. Deutsch outlines the development of slavery in East Africa before the German

occupation, and then explains, with excellent archival evidence, the continuation of slavery

under German rule. Deutsch rather boldly asserts that slavery ultimately did not decline

because of, but rather in spite of German efforts. This of course, is extremely helpful in this

study’s attempt to debunk the myth of the reform period in German East African history.

Much like Koponen, if Deutsch’s work had been a complete narrative of German rule, rather

than a selective study, it might have rendered this study of little use. Given the circumstances,

however, a combination of the two works provides an excellent reappraisal of German rule in

a broader context than either of the two authors attempted themselves.

Besides English language examples, there is also an abundance of German language

material on German East Africa. This paper centers itself mainly on a reappraisal of the

English language history of German East Africa, which is largely less critical of the reform

era than its German counterparts. However, German language sources have proved useful on

their own, and two examples in particular provide a good viewpoint. These are Rainer

Tetzlaff’s Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung: Wirtschafts – und Sozialgeschichte

Deutsch – Ostafrikas 1885 – 1914, and Detleff Bald’s Deutsch – Ostafrika 1900 – 1914.

These works, published within a year of each other in 1971 and 1970 respectively, offer a

general context of the German literature with which to compare to English language sources.

Tetzlaff’s account is a combined social and economic approach, achieving much more

balance in his argument than any of the previously mentioned authors. He moves from a

general discussion of the failure of the initial colonial enterprise in the 1890’s to a more

detailed discussion of the social and economic failures of the so called reform period. More

than any of the English language authors, Tetzlaff is very concerned with the idea of

rethinking the reform idea during the Dernburg era. He quite convincingly points out many of

that theory’s failings, which have been quite useful in this work. Unfortunately, much of his

analysis has not carried over into English language sources. In Detleff Bald’s work, he

conforms to a much older line of historical analysis. While his is more narrative, and actually

adheres in its periodization more to a settler-based model of historiography, Bald does not

draw such a conclusion. Instead he is much less critical of the reform idea, and actually fairly

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sympathetic to figures like Dernburg and Rechenberg. The contrast between the two mirrors

in miniature the same debate that occurs within the English language historiography.

Continuing with the idea of literature that is sympathetic to the idea of a reform era is

the work of Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of German Africa, 1884 – 1914. Published in

1977, this work perhaps more than any other shows the pitfalls of adherence to a reform idea.

While Rulers suggests definite social advances during the Dernburg era, they seem distinctly

shy about citing their sources on these claims, and equally so about the serious use of archival

sources. This detracts substantially from the credibility of their work. They do, however, do a

good job showing the economic changes and advances during the period, and document these

quite well. However, they lose the forest for the trees in their attempt, missing the point that

substantial economic growth in the German African colonies, though impressive, was from

such a low base as to render it ultimately irrelevant to the metropole, the whole point of

reforming the colony. That this happens despite charts describing colonial trade as a

percentage of all German trade is strange to say the least. Nevertheless, the book is useful in

much of its economic data, and perhaps even more so as a counterpoint to this argument.

Lastly, it has been useful to include sources on the role of Indian traders within the

German colony, their part in economic growth, and in regard to social changes within the

colony. This role has been largely filled by the work of Robert Gregory, in his work India

and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire 1890 – 1939. As the

title suggests, this book is of only limited relevance to the thesis as a whole. However, its

discussion of German policy towards the Indian population is indeed insightful. It also allows

for comparison to British standards at the same time, which has been surprisingly useful

during the course of the research that allowed for this study.

A third category of relevant secondary literature in the production of this paper has

been on the development of a vocal and politicized settler population in German East Africa

that was ultimately to change the situation there dramatically. There has been lively debate

on this point within secondary literature as to whether German East Africa was moving

towards a model of colonialism that looked more like British South Africa than anything else.

As usual, John Iliffe’s Tanganyika under German Rule was again extremely useful in

defining the rise of the settler community in the colony, describing its often bitter relationship

with the administration of Governor Rechenberg in lucid detail. Iliffe was the first to advance

the idea that German East Africa was moving towards a settler-dominated “white man’s

country.” Though this study disagrees with many of his ultimate conclusions, in regard to the

direction the colony was moving his argument is coherent and sound.

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Another author previously mentioned, Juhani Koponen, weighed in his opinion on the

rise of the settler community in his much more recent work. Despite much criticism of Iliffe

in his book, Koponen ultimately comes to the same conclusion as Iliffe in regard to the

development of German East Africa as a white man’s county. As he puts it plainly, the aim

was not a German East Africa, but rather an East African Germany. Along with Iliffe,

Koponen also describes in detail the rise of the settlers, their importance, and gives a more

highly documented and well-cited version of Iliffe’s original argument. In this way, this

study’s ultimate conclusions in regard to a new periodization of German East African history

are heavily indebted to the arguments of these two scholars.

A third valuable source on the settler community has been the German historian,

Rainer Tetzlaff. While he does not commit himself to the particular model of Iliffe and

Koponen, he does explain the rise of the settlers and their influence clearly, and provides in

his work much more quantitative methods of this rise, with much better graphs and tables that

have been immensely helpful in visualizing the process of change.

Of course, all of the secondary literature would not be sufficient on its own to produce

a study such as this, and so it is also important to note the necessary primary sources that

have been of great use in the production of this work. Much of the primary sources have

come from the Bundesarchiv in Lichterfelde, Berlin, and more specifically within the files of

the Reichskolonialamt that were so readily available there. The sources are generally

composed of correspondence that helped to flesh out the details of changes occurring in the

colony, both social and economic. It was also useful to check on the files that previous

scholars had cited, to gain a better understanding of their argumentation. Most useful, and

vital to my argument, however, are the speeches of Dernburg, published in the same year they

were given, on his ideas for reform. While it might have seemed prudent to define reform in a

very theoretical and technical sense, it is through Dernburg’s own claims of what he saw as

reform, and what his reform would entail that this paper is able to judge the existence of the

reform era.

Given the nature of the primary sources used, this paper leaves itself in some ways

open to criticism, especially in regard to a pro-government bias. Indeed, all of the primary

sources used in this paper come in one way or another directly from Germans in Germany or

in East Africa. In that sense, while this paper intends to get a degree of understanding about

the realities on the ground in German East Africa, it is by no means comprehensive, in that it

lacks African voices entirely. This situation is the case for a number of reasons. Firstly, given

that this is a master’s thesis, and not a PhD dissertation, my ability to travel to different

13

archives was severely limited. Had it been possible to visit the national archives in Tanzania,

the paper would be much more balanced for it, but would still have major problems. This

brings up the second issue, a distinct lack of input from Africans. While many modern

historians seek to use a bottom-up approach to history, the resources available from this

period simply do not allow so broad an attempt. Instead, source material is largely limited to

what the Germans produced. This has been considered in the course of the research, but on

the whole, given that this is an assessment of the German government rather than an attempt

to tell the story of the Africans there, the bias inherent in the sources does not seem to have

been seriously damaging to the overall results. Having reviewed the various sources, and the

method by which I have used them, it is now possible to enter into the actual discussion of

the reform period, and the new periodization which this paper intends to suggest for the

history of German Colonial East Africa.

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Chapter II: The Political Context

The intention of this study is to debunk the myth of the reform period in German East

Africa. However, before any serious discussion of the successes and failures in Africa that

might lead to a positive or negative assessment of that myth, it is first important to launch

into an explanation of how the idea of a reform period came to be in the first place. To

understand that development, an understanding of the basic mechanics of the German

government and the colonies in that system, as well as an understanding of the relationship

between the Reichstag and the colonies is necessary. This must necessarily be followed by a

discussion of the nature of the Reichstag, and the parties that comprised it in 1906 during the

run up to the colonial crisis, as well as the ambitions and motives of these different actors.

Only then can an explanation of the crisis itself be undertaken. It is then through an

explanation of the crisis, the following dissolution of the Reichstag, and the election

campaign in which Dernburg’s colonial reform agenda played a major role, that the creation

of the idea of the reform era can be understood. This chapter then, seeks to examine each of

these aspects of the development in turn, with the goal of that greater understanding.

Structure of the Colonial Empire

The first step in understanding the idea of the reform period is to understand the

governmental structure from which it sprang, and especially the unique position of the

colonies in Germany’s constitutional structure as compared to other countries. This is not a

new idea, and has been articulated in several other writings on the topic, most notably in

Iliffe’s work on the reform period.20 The peculiar position of the colonies within this

framework is largely a product of the way the imperial German government was formed in

the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war. Due to the insistence of the Prussian authorities

that no non-Prussian body should wield serious influence over the internal workings of that

state, many powers were devolved on the various German states, leaving comparatively little

for the imperial government, and therefore the elected Reichstag, to control. There were

notable exceptions, including the newly acquired state of Elsaß-Lothringen, limited control

over social insurance, and more importantly the fledgling German navy, which at that time

was more of a pipe dream, but which had larger implications later on. In these, and a few

20 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912.

15

other areas, the Reichstag was able to amend and even veto budgets, giving it a considerable

degree of control. Any new imperial projects also fell under the financial supervision of the

Reichstag, should they require funding. This is where the colonies came into play.

When the colonies, which had not been considered at the time of German unification,

came into existence, Bismarck attempted to avoid this annoying interference in his affairs on

the premise that the colonies would be able to fund themselves. This would be possible

through a system of concessionary companies, one for each of Germany’s new colonial

possessions. However, by and large, these companies turned out to be dismal failures. None

could raise adequate capital to invest and exploit the resources of its own colony, and

eventually the German government was forced to take over the administration of the entire

colonial empire. This meant though, that the budgets of these colonies would now come

under the direct budgetary authority of the Reichstag. This direct control of the budget was

different from, for example, British colonies, where the House only had control over grants-

in-aid.21 In the German case, the Reichstag was able to examine and change virtually any

aspect of the colonies funding. Furthermore, it had the time to closely scrutinize such

budgets, given the limited scope of its power within the Empire.

It was this peculiar nature of Reichstag control over the colonies, and the time and

reason to use that control that led the colonies to come to such prominence. In order to pass

colonial or naval bills, in a sense to conduct the foreign policy that Wilhelm II was insistent

upon, the Chancellor was forced, in practice, to attempt to form a semi-permanent majority,

in other words a coalition that would survive multiple elections, within the Reichstag that

would support his budgets. A Chancellor, himself directly responsible to the Kaiser, would

not last long if he was not able to do so. The peculiar nature also implied that, given the high

degree of authority the Reichstag wielded in regard to colonial policy, the composition of that

body could have a major effect on the direction of colonial policy. This was true especially

in regard to the right-wing coalition that came into power in the wake of the 1907 elections.

That influence, while important later on, is of less concern at this point in time. It is in this

way, due to the unique constitutional position of the colonies in Germany, and the peculiar

degree of control which the Reichstag wielded over them, that the colonies were to become

such a contentious issue. Given that, it becomes necessary to explain the nature of the

Reichstag which was to have such an important effect on the colonies, and eventually on the

development of the idea of a reform period.

21 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. 37.

16

The Reichstag in 1906

While a full discussion of all the parties in the Reichstag and their motives would be

necessary to give a complete view of the situation in 1906, this paper will limit itself to a

discussion of three distinct groups, their ambitions, their fears, and their motives in relation to

the colonial crisis which was to come to a head in that year. Two of these groups are parties

themselves, namely the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, henceforth SPD, the

socialist party, and the Zentrum, or center party, which was in actuality a catholic

confessional party. The third grouping represents a number of parties, including the

Deutschkonservative Partei, the conservatives, the Deutsche Reichspartei, the party of the

empire, and the Nationalliberale Partei, the national liberals. These parties can be grouped

coherently as the parties of order, that is to say, pro-government and anti-socialist. In the

aftermath of the previous Reichstag elections in 1903, the SPD had made massive gains,

becoming for the first time the second largest party in the Reichstag, behind the catholic

center party, and a serious force to be reckoned with. For that reason, this discussion will start

with that new powerful bloc.

The SPD in 1906 had been growing in the Reichstag steadily since the 1880’s, but

now reached a new prominence with 81 of the 397 seats in that body. This turned them, from

the government’s perspective, from a mere nuisance into a more serious threat. Of all the

serious political parties, that is to say excluding the obstructionist Poles, Alsatians, and

Danes, only the SPD was consistent in its opposition to all national policies. This position

was natural, given that they felt national policies only served to perpetuate the capitalist

system, to which they were obviously against. The position of the SPD on national policies is

perhaps best summed up by Crothers in his work on the 1907 elections, saying that, “their

basic syllogism was simple: capitalism is evil; the German army, navy, and colonies are

instruments of capitalism; ergo, they are evil.”22 For that reason, the socialists were a thorn in

the government’s side whenever it tried to pass colonial, navy, or army budgets. The SPD’s

opposition to colonialism and imperialism was somewhat conflicted. On the one hand, they

denigrated these activities as capitalist adventures, designed to profit the few at the expense

of the many. However, they were also concerned for the welfare of the exploited Africans in

the colonies, and given prevailing thought at the time in regard to the white man’s burden to

civilize and help the natives, they were not opposed to a colonialism whose purpose was to

spread civilization, rather than capitalism. Despite this reservation, in practice the SPD 22 Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 55.

17

rejected nearly all colonial budgets as a matter of course.23 In that sense, the motives of the

SPD in the coming crisis are by far the most obvious, and do not require much analysis.

On the opposite end of the political spectrum were the parties of order, supporting

generally the policies of Prinz Bernhard von Bülow. Given that the government (read Bülow)

could normally count on the support of these parties, it is not so much their motives that are

relevant to this study, but rather the motives of Bülow, who they assiduously supported.

However, among them the parties of order occupied 160 seats in the Reichstag, and when

combined with the 25 seats of the less supportive radicals fell just short of a majority.

Bülow’s motives in the Reichstag are complex and complicated. Most authors, however, tend

to condense his goals into two coherent categories, which will suffice for this study. Of the

two categories, the first was the most often expressed and most obvious. As was stated

earlier, one of the major goals of any Chancellor was the creation of a semi-majority in the

Reichstag which would smooth the passage of budgets and legislation. This made Bülow’s

position in 1906 rather tenuous, without majority support the passage of bills was often

slowed and eventually, during the crisis to come, stopped. To combat this challenge, Bülow

aimed to follow a policy of Sammlungspolitik, that is, a majority coalition of the parties of

order aligned against the obstructionist socialist threat.24 Some authors argue further that in

fact Bülow had few other principles than determined opposition to socialism.25 On the other

hand, perhaps of larger consideration to Bülow, was his own job security. During this time

the German Chancellor was only responsible to the Kaiser, not the Reichstag, and ultimately

it was his job to get the Reichstag to go along with the Kaiser’s wishes. But Bülow’s relations

with Kaiser Wilhelm had gone sour recently, for a number of reasons.26 On the one hand,

Bülow had dismissed out of hand the Kaiser’s plans for a Franco-Russian-German alliance.

Perhaps more importantly, Bülow’s plans for an exploitation of the French position in

Morocco for other colonial gains had failed spectacularly in what is now known as the First

Moroccan Crisis, which strengthened the alliance between France and Great Britain and

served to isolate Germany diplomatically. With rumors abounding that he would be replaced

due to the Kaiser’s ill feelings towards him, Bülow could not afford to appear weak in the

crisis that was to follow, and therefore neither would his supportive parties of order.

23 With the important exception of the 1904 colonial bill for the suppression of the Southwest African revolt.24 Prince Bernhard von Bülow, ‘Memoirs’ 2:292-3, in Smith. The German Colonial Empire. 186.25 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. 40.26 Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 67.

18

Holding the balance between these two blocs was the largest and most powerful party

in the Reichstag, the Zentrum. The Zentrum was a catholic confessional party, created to

prevent discrimination against the large catholic minority in a German Empire dominated by

protestant Prussia. Due to its desire to protect catholic interests, which were often the

preserve of smaller states within the empire, the party also became one of states’ rights

against the encroachment of the central government. This meant that, though the party was

often a supporter of order and the government, it could not always be relied upon. In the

public eye, this anti-national element was augmented by nominal homage to the foreign Pope

in Rome, making the Zentrum doubly suspicious in regard to its patriotism. As a half-hearted

supporter of the government, the Zentrum would usually agree to pass controversial budgets,

but only after pulling certain concessions from the government. For example, the navy could

be expanded, but only if that was accompanied by an inheritance tax, and a reduction of

indirect taxes.27 Support for colonial budgets, on the other hand, was often tied to their value

in terms of souls for catholic conversion. This tentative support would end in 1906, however,

as will be discussed below. Complicating the Zentrum’s position on government support, and

especially on colonial issues, was a fundamental divide within the party itself. The catholic

party tied together very different groups, from landed aristocrats in Silesia to catholic laborers

in the Rhineland. This left the party divided into a more conservative wing, led by Peter

Spahn, and a radical, left-leaning wing which would come to be led by Matthias Erzberger.28

The differences between these two sides would accelerate during the colonial crisis. As the

Zentrum held the balance in the Reichstag in 1906, the question of which wing would come

into ascendancy would essentially decide whether or not the government could pass bills

according to the wishes Bülow and through him, the Kaiser. Given all this information, it is

now possible to move into a discussion of the colonial crisis itself, and through that, the rise

of Dernburg and the idea of the reform period.

The Colonial Crisis

27 Hansgeorg Fernis, ‘Die Flottennovellen im Reichstag, 1906 – 1912’ in Crothers. The German Election of 1907. 28. 28 The youngest member of the Reichstag in 1906, Erzberger eventually would be the man to sign the armistice ending the First World War, for which he was assassinated as a traitor by a right-wing group in 1921.

19

While the motivations for the escalation of the colonial crisis in 1906 were contained

within the motivations of the various parties, the real root of the problem stemmed from the

revolt in German South West Africa that began in 1904. Suffice it to say that the African

revolt against the settler community became much more expensive in both human and

financial terms than anyone had predicted. This caused outrage both over budgetary matters

and also in a moral sense. However, during the course of the revolt, the Reichstag, for the

most part, continued to support increasingly large colonial budgets. This was also true of the

Zentrum, though its support of the budgets became increasingly tenuous. This was to change

in September of 1905, when the Zentrum, on which the government had previously counted

for its majority of support, suddenly changed tack.

The change in tack had everything to do with the split that had developed inside the

Zentrum, between conservative and radical wings. The rising star of the radical wing,

Matthias Erzberger, began a virulent attack on an assortment of colonial scandals. His

anonymous sources in the colonies revealed, for example, the huge amounts of money that

were being spent on Southwest Africa, and the minimal returns on those investments. They

also exposed the inefficiencies of the colonial administration there and certain cases of

corruption. His attacks were not limited to that, however, and also included discrepancies in

regard to railway concessions in German Cameroon.29 Soon, large segments of the Reichstag

joined in the clamor, especially the SPD and the radicals, building to a climax in January and

February of 1906. Though the leaders of the Zentrum, and specifically Spahn of the

conservative wing rebuked Erzberger as having gone to far, the majority of the party began to

follow Erzberger’s line.30 By May of that year, and the close of the Reichstag session, the

Reichstag was no longer approving colonial budgets, and a showdown in that body loomed.

Before the Reichstag reopened in November of 1906, Chancellor von Bülow had

surprised everyone with his choice of the new head of the colonial department. Given the

uproar over the situation in the colonies, which had also been taken up in the German press, a

strong message was necessary. The man that Bülow appointed for this purpose was the young

banker, Bernhard Dernburg. His appointment fulfilled two major purposes. The first of these

concerned Dernburg’s background. Known as a shrewd businessman, it was asserted that this

kind of man would be able to turn around a bloated and ineffectual administration,

streamlining it and removing serious inefficiencies. On this point, it was not all show, for

between September when he was appointed and November when the Reichstag opened,

29 Smith. German Colonial Empire. 127.30 Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 35.

20

Dernburg did indeed make some necessary changes, cancelling for example the worst of the

inefficient and basically bankrupt monopoly contracts in the colonies.31 In the process,

importantly, Dernburg came across efforts by Erzberger and his colleague Hermann Roeren,

to protect certain missionaries and catholic officials. However, showing a degree of change

was not Bülow’s only purpose in the appointment of Dernburg. Dernburg’s previous

association with the radicals was bait to which they would later rise, and join the

government’s position on colonial issues. In this way, Dernburg’s appointment, far from

simply an honest attempt to reform, was a political ploy that would ultimately prove very

successful.32

With the radical wing of the Zentrum in the ascendant, it was becoming clear that the

party would not support the government in its coming attempts to pass a colonial budget.

Merely a few days into the new session of the Reichstag, Dernburg set out to explain his

minor changes to the colonial system. The first two speakers for the Zentrum responded in

remarkably cordial tones, Erzberger included. The third, however, Roeren, launched into a

spectacular assault on colonial policy. He cited brutalities in Togo, which he had ostensibly

learned from his missionary contacts there, and went on to accuse the government of

protecting colonial officials from justice, even under Dernburg’s own short period in office.

Roeren then suggested that the entire colonial system should be abolished and not a “single

penny” more should be given to it.33 Dernburg, however, given his recent forays into the

efforts of Erzberger and Roeren to protect catholic officials, was more than prepared to

respond. Having lost patience with Roeren at the MP’s insinuation of his own complicity in

colonial scandals, Dernburg fired back with accusations of Roeren’s shady dealings with the

colonial department in his efforts to protect catholic officials. At this point, the dialogue

became truly nasty. Dernburg claimed to be exposing Roeren, to which Roeren retorted that

Dernburg was too young and unqualified to do so. Dernburg’s response devolved into a direct

attack on the Zentrum generally, and its interference in colonial affairs was “an abscess

which had to be lanced.”34

This is the point at which Dernburg’s importance in the idea of the reform period

begins to take shape. Though previously largely apolitical, the information Dernburg had

found in regard to Zentrum interference in colonial affairs, and those same people’s

subsequent personal attack on him, caused a marked shift in Dernburg’s position. His 31 Ibid. 73. 32 Smith. The German Colonial Empire. 186.33 Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 4094. In Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 79.34 Freisinnige Zeitung, (No. 436, Dec. 6, 1906) in Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 80.

21

scathing attack on the Zentrum transformed Dernburg suddenly into a government attack-

dog, a role he was to continue through the coming elections. The game changed in other

fundamental senses at this same time. In the wake of the vitriolic attacks of Dernburg on

Hermann Roeren and the Zentrum, that party, with its aforementioned problems in regard to

patriotism and national sentiment, now seemed distinctly anti-national. As the press led an

attack on the Zentrum’s obstructionism, and interference in colonial issues, the door was

open for the true mastermind of the 1907 elections, Chancellor von Bülow.

It has been mentioned earlier that Bülow had two main motives at this time, one being the

creation of an anti-socialist majority through Sammlungspolitik, as well a concern for his

personal prestige and job security.35 Bülow saw the chance for an election based on national

policies, with the colonies as the centerpiece. In a single stroke, Bülow would be able to bring

together the parties of order, smash the SPD, and regain his favor at court and with the

Kaiser. The Chancellor was quick to make his move. Even while Reichstag debates on the

colonies continued, Bülow secretly began the procedures necessary with the members of the

Bundesrat and the Kaiser to dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections.36 When the

colonial budget came up for a vote a few days later, Bülow was prepared, carrying his notice

of dissolution in the wrong folder to disguise his intentions. Unaware of the danger, the

Zentrum voted down the colonial bills, expecting that they would be able to ask for

amendments and concessions before begrudgingly accepting the government’s plans. Instead,

the Reichstag was shocked by the sudden announcement of its dissolution in the wake of the

no vote. Bülow could now have his national election dominated by the issue of the colonies,

and at the center of it all would be Dernburg.

Given that the election of 1907 was ostensibly about the colonies, rather than Bülow’s own

personal prestige and search for a workable parliamentary majority, it was natural that as

colonial director, Dernburg would lead the campaign. This was especially possible given his

recent attacks on the intrigues of the center, and his small though noticeable reforms to date.

To this end, Dernburg devoted considerable energy, launching a serious of campaign

speeches across the county, on which historical reputation is largely based.37 It is precisely

because Dernburg’s speeches at this point are the basis of that reputation that they have so

much bearing on the development of the idea of reform during his tenure as Colonial

35 Though it seems foolish to condense any man’s ambitions and motives into two goals, all of my secondary sources, and the memoirs they are in turn based on, agree with this conclusion. See especially Koponen, Iliffe, Smith, and Crothers.

36 Crothers. The German Elections of 1907. 88. 37 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. 4.

22

Secretary.38 In many cases, it seems as though historians have confused Dernburg’s claims

during these speeches, full of often hopeful and overly optimistic assessments as can be

expected during an election campaign, for his actual accomplishments during the supposed

reform period.39 By looking at the speeches themselves, this paper will make the argument,

articulated over the next few chapters, first, that the understanding of the reform period as

seen in the colonial interpretation of the period is based on the claims made in these speeches,

second, that the reform period cannot be honestly called such, given the lack of change in the

way that Dernburg explained himself, and third, that the trajectory of German East African

history should instead avoid the pitfall of the reform period with a new periodization based

more on continuation during this time, rather than change. Given that, the speeches

themselves and the election that produced them must now be closely examined.

The Election and Campaign of 1907

The elections of 1907 were the only time during the Second Reich that Germany’s

colonies became an issue of serious national importance.40 This is, however, not surprising

for two reasons. The first of these was the actual deterioration of the situation in the German

colonies, especially Southwest and East Africa. However, the problems in the colonies would

have never become so important were it not for the reality that colonial issues were merely

proxies in a political game that Erzberger had begun.41 Erzberger’s attempt to use the colonial

scandals to gain greater control over Reichstag finances had failed though, and now Bülow

had his chance to do away with the need for the Zentrum entirely. The election was framed in

terms of a national question. As the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung put it on the day the

Reichstag was dissolved, the election and the proper financing of the colonies was, “a great

test of whether Germany is capable of developing from a European into a World Power or

not.”42

It was in this context that Dernburg was sent out campaigning, to explain to the

German people the value of their colonies, to frame the financing of these colonies as an 38 The change from Colonial Director to Colonial Secretary reflects a reshuffle in the German

administration, by which the colonies were given their own department, separate from the Foreign Office. In practice, however, there was not much difference between the positions, aside from simple terminology. Certain proponents of Dernburg as an authoritarian force of change, such as Mary Townsend, of the older colonial interpretation, do not share this view however.

39 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912. 4.40 Smith. The German Colonial Empire. 183. 41 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 265.42 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, December 13, 1906.

23

issue of national honor, and to explain how the colonies would be reformed in response to

previous criticism from the left and center. Dernburg gave several of these speeches in the

month before the election, and, like a good politician, he tailored these speeches to his

specific audience. This separates the speeches nicely for the purposes of this paper, in terms

of Dernburg’s social and economic plans, as will become apparent in further chapters below.

Two speeches in particular, given just a few days apart in Berlin are of special importance. In

the first, given to an audience of scholars, academics, artists and authors on the eighth of

January, outlines Dernburg’s original plans for social reform in the colonies. He was keen,

first of all, to describe to this learned audience the benefits that German rule would bestow

upon the natives in Africa. He asserted that Germany had begun this great civilizing mission

by ending slavery in its colonies, a claim that interestingly was absolutely false.43 The speech

went on to paint a picture of improving conditions for the African subjects, as they slowly

saw the tangible benefits of German rule, and were drawn into the money economy. This was

of course only possible because of the (false) previous abolition of slavery that had freed the

workforce for production of cash crops for the German market as well as plantation work for

the white settlers. As Dernburg put it, “where one colonized with destructive means in the

past, one can colonize with preserving means today, which including the missionary, the

doctor, the train, the machine, and advanced theoretical and applied science in all fields.”44

This quote, perhaps more than any other, is of paramount importance in the later development

of the reform idea. It is from this phrase that Mary Townsend was to devise the idea of

“scientific colonialism,” which was to inform the entire story of Dernburg’s reform agenda in

the colonial interpretation.45 After explaining these rather intangible benefits to a responsive

audience, Dernburg continued by explaining that the colonies cost relatively little in terms of

the German budget. As far as he was concerned, it was a small price to pay for he honor of

the role as a civilizing power. At the same time, he implied that the Reichstag had been

hindering this national obligation by not supporting the colonial bills, cleverly taking a pot-

shot at the center.

The second of the two speeches discussed here was given only three days later in the

same city, but to a very different audience. During this second campaign speech, Dernburg’s

audience consisted of various trading interests, and therefore its content was also very

different. Whereas a few days before he spoke of the cultural benefits of the colonies, and the

43 Dernburg. Zielpunkte des Deutschen Kolonialwesens. Berlin. 1907. 6.44 Ibid. 9. 45 Mary Townsend. The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire 1884 – 1918.

24

minor cost that such a venture would entail, he now changed tack entirely, and explained the

material benefits. One by one, he moved through the various raw materials which the

colonies would produce for the benefit of the fatherland. Copper, rubber, oil, rice and coffee

all played major roles in his plan, but it was cotton that he stressed the most.46 This involved a

detailed discussion of the overly optimistic predictions he had for the various colonies, the

type of cotton that would be produced, and how it would benefit the metropole. Cotton

production in East Africa especially, he argued, would break the Anglo-American duopoly in

that market, and make German industry more competitive. Soon, he projected, most of

Germany’s cotton needs could be sustained by its colonies. The crux of his speech, however,

was a four-part explanation of the most important benefits of the colonies to the homeland.

First, they secure German jobs, and high standard of living for German workers. Second, they

provide the raw materials needed for German industry. Third, the colonies secure cheap

prices for raw materials, allowing German industry to thrive. Fourth, through the cheap

production of all of Germany’s needed raw materials, they allow for a positive trade

balance.47 Finally, Dernburg brought the speech full circle, to suggest that this protection of

trade, as well as German jobs, was “a national issue of the highest rank,” that every good

patriot should support.48

In this way, Dernburg, through a proposition of colonial reform, made support of the

government position a national issue as Bülow had intended. The result was a massive

electoral success. While the Zentrum retained its strong position, the SPD was crushed at the

polls, losing half of its seats. At the same time, Bülow and his parties of order had gained a

solid majority, and would no longer have to compromise. This would have serious

implications for the colonies, and for the trajectory of attempts at reform. More important for

now, however, is that the correlation between Dernburg’s electoral speeches and Bülow’s

political machinations have been shown, as well as the context of the rise of the reform idea.

It is now possible to move on to a case based study of the efficacy of the reform period, and

whether indeed it should be called such.

Chapter III: The Economic Context

In this first of two largely quantitative chapters analyzing the efficacy of Dernburg’s

supposed reform period, this study will look at the economic results of the program, in light

46 Dernburg. Zielpunkte des Deutschen Kolonialwesens. 36 – 40.47 Ibid. 49 – 50.48 Ibid. 51.

25

of Dernburg’s claims during his election campaign speeches. To do this, the colonial

secretary’s plans must be broken down into their constituent parts, namely, his plans for the

production of raw materials in the colonies for the benefit of Germany, and the massive

building schemes that would make such ventures both possible and profitable. As far as East

Africa was determined to be a desirable location for the production of raw materials for

German industry, this was not a new idea created by Dernburg. Rather, Dernburg elaborated

on already existing ideas of the value and usefulness of the colonies, and especially East

Africa. Before launching into discussions of the successes and failures of the various raw

materials production schemes, it is first important to understand the development of the idea

of colonies as sources of these materials to Germany, and the way in which Dernburg

changed the emphasis and direction of this idea.

The idea of the colonies as a resource base from which to supply German industry

dates back to their very founding. While the colonies were being acquired for the still nascent

German Empire, Bismarck, the engineer of these acquisitions was already framing their

importance in terms of raw materials. As he put it at the time, “Just consider if a part of the

cotton… which we import could be grown on German soil, wouldn’t that be an increase in

the national wealth? Presently we buy all our cotton from America, and we’re bound by a

certain American monopoly… If we could… cultivate cotton in… the African equatorial

areas with the same intelligence as the Americans plant and work their cotton, … that would

be an advantage for our national prosperity, whereas now the money which we expend for

cotton… [is] completely lost from our wealth.”49 This is the basic crux of the idea. Cotton,

above all, was a product which for a number of reasons was essential to German industry, and

needed to be secured for it at a reasonable price. The reason that cotton was so important at

this time was that it was the major resource for the large German textile industry, which itself

was part of a larger chain of production involving numerous other areas of German industrial

might. The importance of the price and sourcing of the cotton that drove much of Germany’s

industrial development was made abundantly clear during the American civil war. At this

time, Germany, as well as much of the rest of the industrialized world, was unable to find

enough cotton to keep its textile industry operational due to the Union blockade of the

Confederacy, from which most of the world’s cotton supply was sourced. Even after this

problem was made obvious, Germany still imported 70% of its cotton from America, and the

rest mostly from the British Empire, as other sources of this commodity were simply not

49 Stenographische Berichte, vol. 66, 13 March 1884, 1798. In Thaddeus Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production in German East Africa, 1884-1915. University of Minnesota. 1993. 47.

26

available.50 While there were no more stoppages of American production, speculation and

the near US monopoly on cotton created a situation of severely fluctuating prices that was

detrimental to the German economy. At the same time, safety regulations and rising industrial

wages were bringing up the costs of textile production. Furthermore, the dependence of

industrial workers on the textile industry, and the wages they gained there, made cotton a

national issue. Even the SPD, which was on principle against all colonial enterprises, saw the

value of cotton production within the German Empire as a means for securing German jobs.

In much the same way that the colonies themselves became a national issue in the elections of

1907, the sourcing of cotton had become an issue of national importance much earlier.

Dernburg was to seize upon this and expand it in his agenda for colonial reform.

Where most industrialists had thought primarily in terms of cotton, Dernburg greatly

expanded the scope of benefits to the German economy and German industry that could be

provided by its colonies. Many of the products he was concerned with did not directly

involve German East Africa, for instance petroleum in Kamerun and copper in Southwest

Africa, and therefore do not deserve specific mention here.51 What Dernburg did have in

mind for German East Africa were agricultural products that could not be produced in

Germany. Foremost among these was naturally cotton, but he also explained the value of

sisal, rubber, and coffee. He suggested that these products could be produced in such vast

quantities in these areas that Germany would be self-sufficient. This was a significant

departure from Bismarck, for example, who had suggested that production of even a fraction

of the raw materials needed by the metropole would be considered a victory.52 Dernburg’s

optimistic assessment of the potential of the colonies in this respect would be a major factor

in the eventual rise of the idea of a reform era, for where he promised growth, indeed there

was often much growth, but as will be explained below, the growth in those areas was

deceptive, and hardly amounted to anything that could be realistically called a reform period.

Sisal

It would perhaps be logical to start with one of the more successful of Dernburg’s proposed

raw material benefits to the metropole. This was the crop known as sisal. Sisal, to those who

might not be familiar with it, is a type of agave native to the Yucatan Peninsula, which

50 Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 40. 51 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 40 – 41.52 Stenographische Berichte. Session 27, 1889. 622. In Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 48.

27

provides strong and durable fibers useful in the production of rope, much like hemp was used

at that time. In fact, in Dernburg’s own speech he refers to the product of the sisal plant as

hemp.53 Dernburg’s suggestion here was that this fibrous plant could eliminate German

reliance on Russian and Italian hemp in the rope, paper, and upholstery industries.

Eventually, though demand for the fiber of the sisal plant was now low, it would come to

occupy a more important role that Germany would be able to supply.

The production of sisal was remarkably successful in German East Africa. Of all the

cash crops grown on a large scale in the colony, it was the only one to provide continuous

year on year growth. In fact, the growth of the sisal crop, both in absolute terms, and in terms

of total revenue was truly impressive. From a starting point before Dernburg’s tenure in

office of 1,397 tons of sisal, with a total value of 1.1 million marks in 1905, production rose

by 1913 nearly twentyfold, to 19,698 tons and a total value of 10.3 million marks.54 This is

consistent with Dernburg’s own calculations during his election speech, in which he

suggested that production of sisal in the colony could be expected to reach 20,000, and a total

worth of 16 million marks.55 Had the value of sisal remained the same during the period, his

estimation would have been extraordinarily precise, unlike many of his other overly

optimistic claims. At the time of these increases, many fields originally producing other, less

hardy and climatically adapted crops switched to the production of sisal. So valuable was the

crop, that at the period of highest prices the investment on a field of sisal could be recouped

in only two years.56 Dividends of fifteen to twenty percent on investments in sisal production

were not unusual.57 The high value of sisal, and the conversion of many other plantations to

sisal production led the amount and value of the sisal crop to rise spectacularly. By 1913,

sisal was the largest and valuable export of German East Africa, accounting for 30% of the

worth of all exports.58 These successes were largely made possible by two factors. Firstly, the

building of railroads, also strongly supported by Dernburg in his scheme, were hugely

important in transporting a very heavy crop from the interior to port, which would not have

possible with the previous caravan system. Secondly, the arrival of large scale German

capital keen to make a quick profit allowed for the import of the machinery necessary for the

labor intensive process of sisal preparation to proceed unhindered.

53 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 44.54 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklungund Ausbeutung. 118.55 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 44 – 45.56 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 550.57 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 122.58 Ibid. 118.

28

However, the successes of sisal during Dernburg’s supposed reform period hide major

flaws in terms of his overall plans. The rise in sisal production was accompanied, from 1908

onwards, by a concurrent decline in value as the market was saturated and overproduction

began to become a problem. At the time, surprisingly, German East Africa was actually

producing six times more sisal than was imported by the metropole, as the demand for sisal in

the paper and upholstery industries never materialized as Dernburg had envisioned.

Eventually, a major use for sisal was found in the production of agricultural equipment in the

1930’s. However, by this point, when sisal production in German East Africa had surged past

100,000 tons, and German imports of it reached 60,000 tons, the colony had been

surrendered, and Germany was importing yet another industrial raw material from the British

Empire. Therefore, Dernburg’s intention to make German industry independent in hemp

production, which was largely the point of growing the crop, ultimately failed, but at the

same time had other important consequences. Sisal, more than any other cash crop in German

East Africa, was entirely dependent on both machinery and a large supply of labor. This

meant that sisal production also entailed a rise in European owned plantations in the colony.

With their large labor demands, these enterprises could not coexist with the kind of native-

enriching peasant production schemes that Dernburg had intended for his social agenda in the

colonies. That is to say, the labor intensive interests of the plantations were eventually to

combine with settler interests to push back much of Dernburg’s social reform agenda,

resulting in the widespread use of coercive and forceful methods of manpower acquisition in

the colony. That point, however, will be discussed further below. At present, it is most

important to highlight the fact that, while the growth of sisal production was impressive, and

fairly accurately predicted by Dernburg, it did not develop in such a way as to help his reform

agenda, but rather hindered it in the long run.

Rubber

Before sisal overtook it in the final years of German East Africa, rubber had been the

most important and most valuable export of the colony. In fact, it held this position from

1899 to 1912. On the surface, this would seem to suggest a success story similar to that seen

29

with sisal. Indeed, as with sisal, rubber production in German East Africa increased

dramatically, from 326 tons in 1905 to 1,367 tons in 1913; a more than fourfold rise.59 This

boom allowed for the fulfillment of one of Dernburg’s promised ideals, namely that the

movement from a form of destructive colonization to one of preservation.60 Indeed, during his

time as colonial secretary, the rise in global rubber prices allowed for cultivated rubber to

overtake wild rubber, which was prone to abuses most spectacularly shown in the well-

publicized case of the Belgian Congo.61 By 1913, only 6% of the rubber exported from

German East Africa came from wild sources.62 The price of rubber rose dramatically during

the ostensible reform era, and might have been seen as a successful justification of the reform

idea, but in the end, the crop was to be one of the reform period’s most dubious failures.

To understand the history of rubber in German East Africa during this time, it is

important to view it in the context of the global rubber boom that peaked between 1903 and

1912. Before this time, rubber was largely collected in the Amazon rainforest of Brazil, but

was not widely used. Suddenly, however, around the turn of the century, new technologies

like electric cables, cars, airplanes, and bicycles that all needed rubber expanded

dramatically. Production in Brazil proved unable to keep up with massively growing demand

for rubber, and the price rose accordingly. Soon speculation became rampant, and new

sources of rubber were sought after voraciously. German East Africa became wrapped up in

this excitement, but with one very important qualification. Whereas the rubber produced in

the Amazon came from the sap of the rubber tree, Hevea brasiliensis, the rubber produced in

German East Africa was actually not the same product that had been known the world over,

but rather came from an entirely different plant, related to the cassava, known scientifically as

Manihot glaziovii. This was a new type of crop, first used in plantations in German East

Africa, and was more drought resistant than normal rubber, allowing for its cultivation in

areas previously thought impossible for rubber production. Given the current global boom,

settlers in German East Africa were quick to turn to this new and highly profitable crop. They

succeeded in a manner that the colony’s governor, Rechenberg, who had been advocating a

peasant production policy as the only reasonable course, was completely unprepared for.

Once again, Dernburg’s plans for social betterment of Africans would be thwarted by the

59 Heinrich Schnee. ed. Das Buch der deutschen Kolonien. Leipzig. 1937. 426 – 428. In L. H. Gann & Peter Duignan. The Rulers of German Africa, 1884 – 1914. Stanford University Press. Stanford. 1977. 261.

60 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 9.61 See, for instance, Adam Hochschild. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in

Colonial Africa. New York. 1999.62 Wirtschaftlicher Verein vom Meru to Government, 11 October 1913, Tanzanian National Archive.

G8/176, 21 ff. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 433.

30

success of the white settlers and their cash crops. But the new growers were in for a shock.

The problem with the Manihot glaziovii, as compared to Hevea brasiliensis is that the rubber

produced by Manihot glaziovii was of a much lower quality than that derived from Hevea

brasiliensis. In fact, some experts considered rubber from Manihot glaziovii to be the worst

rubber in the world.63 Therefore, when British plantations in Southeast Asia started producing

large quantities of rubber from their newly planted Hevea brasiliensis trees in 1913, and the

price of rubber consequently collapsed, the plantations in German East Africa were left not

only with a crisis of overproduction, but also a crisis of quality. Suddenly the rubber that the

colony was producing was basically worthless, and companies involved suffered enormous

losses when the rubber bubble burst. Most companies and settlers then switched their lands to

produce sisal instead of rubber, explaining the later importance of that crop. What is

important to gather from all this, is that another one of Dernburg’s schemes to make the

colonies into beneficial resource bases for Germany’s industry had failed, despite growth on

paper.

Coffee

Compared to the gradual success of sisal and the spectacular failure of rubber,

coffee’s history during the reform era is a much blander story. Attempts to grow coffee

started early in German East Africa, largely in the North around the Usambara Mountains.

These attempts largely failed, however, for a number of reasons. First of all, the soil

conditions were wrong. More importantly however, was, as Tetzlaff calls it, “nature’s

revenge.”64 During the founding period of the colony, the area around the Usambara

Mountains was heavily deforested, leading to dramatic erosion, which rendered previously

acceptable patches of soil unusable. Still, settlers and certain German companies persisted in

their efforts. Dernburg mentioned these, and their lack of success to date in one of his

campaign speeches, suggesting that, “the rising price [of coffee] gives us hope that the coffee

plantations in East Africa, which had become unprofitable in 1902 and 1903 will again regain

their purpose.”65 This however, was not to be, and despite their best efforts. Even the largest

company involved, the DOAG, or German East Africa Company, only managed to make a

profit in three of its sixteen years of operation.66 Most producers however, just as Dernburg 63 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 140.64 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 130. 65 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 45.66 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 132.

31

was making his speeches, were switching to sisal, similar to the situation seen above with

rubber.67 At the same time, new areas were being opened up for the growth of coffee, which

would ultimately prove much more successful. The type of growth in these two areas was

remarkably different, and had very little in either case to do with central government

planning. In the first instance, around 1907 settlers began planting coffee in earnest on the

slopes of Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro. This was combined with missionaries who

suggested that the native Chagga people begin coffee cultivation as well. Both groups were

quite successful, as the average coffee bush on Kilimanjaro’s fertile slopes produced five

times as many beans as those from previous plantations in the Usambara Mountains.68 Here

can be seen one of few examples of Dernburg’s idea of enriching the African peasantry at

work, and by the end of German rule, it was said that the Chagga were cultivating somewhere

in the area of 80,000 coffee bushes.69 It might seem as though this would, in some small way,

validate Dernburg’s reform program, but the distribution of coffee seeds to the natives was

undertaken by catholic missionaries, not the government, which was unwilling to take a

position on the Chagga coffee growers. On the other side of the colony on the shores of Lake

Victoria coffee was also being grown with marked success, but in a very different way. In

Bukoba, the German resident came up with his own scheme for coffee production without

interference from the central government of the colony. Steumer, the German resident,

embarked on a top-down approach, by which he convinced the local rulers to coerce their

unfree subjects into planting coffee. This, though running totally in the face of Dernburg’s

ideas concerning African peasant production, was extremely successful. Between 1905 and

1912, while Steumer was resident, the value of coffee for export increased fifteen fold, and

by then accounted for a third of German East Africa’s coffee exports.70 However, these

successes, as is universally the case with raw materials produced in the colony, never made a

serious dent in the home market. This is made abundantly clear by statistics which show that

the thousand tons of coffee exported by German East Africa in 1913 barely made up half of

one percent of Germany’s annual coffee imports.71 Granted, Dernburg was correct in the long

run that coffee would become important in German East Africa, considering that modern day

67 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 69.68 Ibid. 68.69 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 436.70 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 170.71 Heinrich Schnee. ed. Das Buch der deutschen Kolonien. Leipzig. 1937. 426 – 428. In L. H. Gann & Peter

Duignan. The Rulers of German Africa, 1884 – 1914. Stanford University Press. Stanford. 1977. 261.

32

Tanzania’s top export is in fact coffee. Nevertheless, on the whole, any pretense of correcting

Germany’s balance of payments on coffee was ultimately a failure.

Cotton

Last, but certainly not least of the raw materials designated to help transform German

East Africa from a liability to the metropole into a valuable asset was cotton. As mentioned

before, much of the reasoning behind the colonial effort in the first place centered on cotton,

and it was here without a doubt that the government made its greatest efforts to promote

cultivation for export. However, an analysis of the effectiveness of the Dernburg period in

transforming the nature of cotton production in German East Africa is complicated for a

number of reasons. Foremost among these, is the diverse nature of schemes created to

promote cotton production. Whereas many other crops were limited to specific areas, cotton

production was attempted many different areas, and under many different circumstances. It is

therefore hard to make generalizations about its effectiveness. Because of this, it is necessary

to compartmentalize cotton production. Two major groups with subgroups can best serve this

purpose. On the one hand, there was European-led, white production, which can be split into

large-scale commercial efforts, and smaller settler plantations. On the other side were efforts

at African cultivation, and these can be broken down into those that were largely benign, and

those that were by nature more coercive. However, to understand any of this, it is first

important to understand the background of cotton production in German East Africa, which

started well before Dernburg’s term in office. The process can be said to begin with the

establishment of the Colonial Economic Committee, or KWK, in 1896. With support from

the cotton industry, colonial interest groups, and some state support, the KWK sought to open

up the German colonies to cotton production. Its efforts did not get off the ground in German

East Africa though, until around 1904, under the tenure of Governor von Götzen. At that

time, KWK became a semi-governmental entity in the colony, effecting government policy,

and attempting to create suitable conditions of cotton cultivation. In their words, “mild

compulsion” would be necessary to get cotton production going.72 The format needed to

make this happen was already in place, the communal shamba, or plot of land given over in

each town to production of export crops, by order of the government. When the KWK

became involved, all of these shambas were converted to cotton production, which was to

72 Supf. Koloniale-Baumwolle. Bericht II. 6 – 7. In Koponen. Development through Exploitation. 226.

33

become a Volkskultur.73 Many historians have cited these shambas as the major reasoning

behind the Maji-Maji uprising which followed closely after their establishment, most notably

John Iliffe.74 Given the perceived failure of these coercive measures to produce effective

African cultivation, new methods were sought after in the aftermath of the Maji-Maji

uprising.

One of the two newer methods of cotton production advocated was a European-led

variety. The most obvious of this new form was the large, industrialized plantation.

Following Dernburg’s claims that with German technology and expertise, the colonies could

be transformed into the producers of Germany’s industrial cotton demand, several large

enterprises were set up to put the ideas into practice. Two of Germany’s largest textile

interests set out to produce the majority of their cotton needs in German East Africa, one

under the leadership of a millionaire by the name of Otto, and the other as a project of the

Leipzig Cotton Spinners. Both efforts failed spectacularly. In both cases, millions of marks

were poured into the effort to produce cotton in the colony, with little to no result. The Otto

plantation sought to bring in steam-driven plows, which cut too deeply into the soil,

effectively ruining it. The company continued to try to produce until the advent of the First

World War, but about the only thing it ever produced in quantity were losses. The Leipzig

Cotton Spinners’ plantation succumbed to recurrent cases of disease, and was abandoned

entirely in 1911 after equally astounding losses.75 These well-publicized failures effectively

scared future large enterprises off.

The other area of European run schemes for cotton production was that run by the

growing settler community. The settlers themselves are described below in detail, but suffice

it to say that they were a very vocal community, and largely antagonistic to the efforts of the

government and the KWK during Dernburg’s term in office. The settlers were indeed able to

settle and cultivate the land, mostly in the area around the Usambara Mountains and inland

from there to the peaks of Kilimanjaro and Meru. However, they were not able to do so

without help, for the most part. The major concern of these plantation owners was labor

supply, and how they were to procure it. The settlers sought to secure a pool of cheap labor to

work their fields, which generally run counter to the government and for that matter the

KWK’s plans for the development of African sources of production. Simply put, if the white

settlers were to be using the Africans on their own fields, the natives would not be free to

73 Tetzlaff. Kolonial Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 137.74 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 23.75 Ibid. 99 -100.

34

produce the cotton that German industry so desperately craved. Furthermore, there was the

issue of how the labor supply would be secured. Generally speaking, the settlers sought to

move the government to allow them to either coerce the natives into laboring in their fields,

or else to create tax incentives that would force the natives into a financial situation whereby

they would have to work in those fields. During Dernburg’s term in office, the efforts of the

settlers largely failed, and they needed loans and support to get by.76 In short, without

coercive measures from the central government, the settler population did not constitute an

effective force for the large-scale production of cotton for export.

On the other side of the spectrum of cotton cultivation efforts were those that saw

African cultivation, rather than any European enterprise, as the best hope for the creation of a

cotton resource base in German East Africa. This idea was strongly supported both by the

governor of the colony, Rechenberg, and the KWK. The idea, as far as the governor and the

KWK were concerned, was to convince natives, without force, to produce cotton for their

own material enrichment. Rechenberg was very anxious about any use of force, for in his

understanding it had been the excessive force used in the communal shambas that did not

economically benefit the natives under his predecessor, von Götzen, that had led to the Maji-

Maji uprising.77 To affect this sort of change, the government and the KWK passed out

increasing large amounts of cotton seed freely to African peasants. From 1,500

hundredweight of cotton seed passed out in the first year of Dernburg’s term in office, the

number tripled by the time he had left.78 In certain areas, mostly along the coast in Rufiji and

Lindi, the practice was moderately successful. How successful though, is extremely hard to

estimate, given the dearth of statistics on African peasant cultivation. It is also difficult to

determine how much if any coercion was used in these peasant production schemes, for it

was clearly happening in some cases under the rather innocent sounding name of “repeated

stimulation and encouragement.”79 Out of all the areas of cash crop production, and in all its

forms, this attempted stimulus of peasant agriculture was by far the biggest step the

government took. However, given the tenuous nature of evidence on the productiveness of

these non-coercive schemes, it would be unwise to come to rash conclusions. What can be

said, at any rate, is that those that did use coercion were often the most successful.

Using a coercive method to force the natives into producing cotton seems counter-

productive, given the previous experience in the colony with Götzen’s communal shamba 76 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 149.77 Rechenberg to Reichskolonialamt. 15 July 1907. Reichskolonialamt 1056 48 – 56.78 Reichskolonialamt. Baumwollbau. 36 – 37. 103 -111.79 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 430.

35

policy. However, in some areas, these practices were essentially revived, and in some cases

with great success. We have already seen one such example, that of Resident Steumer and his

method for coffee production in Bukoba. In the district neighboring his, Mwanza, a new

district commissioner named Gunzert arrived in 1907, at the start of the Dernburg era.

Gunzert ignored the government’s orders not to use coercion, and much like Steumer in

Bukoba, set about forcing the chiefs to have their peasants produce cotton, under threat of

brutal punishment.80 Despite the violent nature of his methods, Gunzert’s plans proved very

successful; starting from nearly no cotton production in 1907, production rose by the end of

his time as commissioner to account for 20% of the colony’s cotton exports.81 This had a

surprising catalytic effect. Seeing that the cotton that had been forced on certain chiefs was

actually quite profitable, other headmen began to ask for seed of a crop they previously

despised and would actively resist planting. Gunzert himself explained that though ultimately

the Africans would need economic incentives to continue production in the long run, this

process was best started by force.82 In this way, the ends justified the means, and again

Dernburg’s social program was sacrificed for the sake of the creation of a raw materials base

in the colonies. Ultimately, this meant that both policies were doomed to failure, since the

cotton produced in German East Africa never even amounted to half of one percent of the

cotton needed by German industry, whereas Dernburg had claimed it would be producing all

of Germany’s cotton needs.83

Railways

Key to his program of reform was Dernburg’s idea that the growth of the colonies as

providers of raw materials would be ensured by a simultaneous program of railroad

construction. Railroads, like cotton, had long held a place of importance in the ideal of

German colonization. They were seen as signs of civilization and of true commitment to the

colonial effort. At the same time, it was widely agreed, even by those on the left wing of the

political spectrum that the colonies would remain worthless without integrated railroad

networks.84 Indeed, railroad construction had already begun in German East Africa before

Dernburg’s term in office, although at the time there were a paltry 129 kilometers of track.

80 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 431.81 Teztlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 152.82 Theodor Gunzert. “Baumwolle in Muansabezirk 1910/11.” Der Pflanzer. 1911. 539. 83 Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 154.84 Barth. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 303.

36

This was massively expanded under Dernburg and afterwards, so that by the First World War

there were 1,500 kilometers of railroads stretching across the entire colony. This was one of

the major successes of the supposed reform era, and though this study criticizes the notion of

such a period, the vast expansion of rail in the colony, and the changes that were

implemented to allow for it do constitute actual reform in this case. This is because Dernburg

created an entirely new system of financing in order to pay for the railroad scheme he had in

mind. Whereas the Reichstag had previously balked at the idea of paying for capital-intensive

railroad construction, Dernburg, using his previous expertise as a banker, came up with a

clever trick to make it possible. By applying for loans in German capital markets that the

colony would service on its own, the specter of massive government payouts to the colonies

was mitigated. The railroads, following the proven example to the north in Uganda, would

open new markets, and bring new tax revenues into the colonial government’s purse, thus

accounting for increased expenditures that resulted from interest payments on the loans.85 In

other words, the system of railroad growth would largely support itself. Surprisingly, this

process generally worked in practice, unlike so many other schemes.

There were, however, deep-seeded problems and choices inherent in the construction

of railroads. The problem was complex; there were two basic railroad plans in competition,

each representing a different idea of the future development of the colony. It was doubtful as

to whether both railroad plans could be funded simultaneously, and therefore important

choices had to be made.86 On the one hand was the central line. This was to lead from the

coast at Dar es Salaam deep into the interior of the colony, allowing for natives to be drawn

into cash-crop production for export, and also in a sense civilizing them through the merits of

capitalism. This was the idea trumpeted by the colonial governor Rechenberg as well as

Dernburg. Working together, the two men were able to convince the Reichstag to allow the

new loan scheme, and in this way pushed the railroad inland. The settlers in the colony,

supported by the new right-wing majority in the Reichstag, had other plans. They sought a

northern line that would serve the area where their plantations were based. While the first

scheme was viable in that it would open up new areas to taxation and the export of

commodities in quantity, the second scheme was not. Rechenberg attempted to thwart the

construction of this line, but was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts. Dernburg,

succumbing to the will of the Reichstag, went back on his own reform ideals, and supported

the project in the end. The process will be elaborated further below, but it is important to

85 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 305.86 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 75.

37

recognize this as one of the major steps in the rise of the settler ascendency. For now, it

should be noted that even though both projects were attempted simultaneously, they were

both able to be financed by the government, and though not all railroads were profitable, this

can be seen as a major instance of actual reform under Dernburg, and a vindication of some

of his electoral campaign speeches. At the same time, however, the change in policy

represented an ominous development that would ultimately doom any hope of the reform

period coming to be. Ultimately then, this was certainly not a period of total economic

transformation. The bright and optimistic speeches of Dernburg during 1907 largely came to

naught as far as the economics of the colonies and their worth to the metropole were

concerned. This is best shown by a last statistic; even by the First World War, despite

exponential growth in some sectors, the combined worth of all of the exports and imports of

all of the German colonies in Africa amounted to one half of one percent of the value of all

German trade.87 Clearly, despite the best efforts of a reform minded politician, the colonies

remained economically irrelevant to the metropole.

Chapter IV: The Social Context

Whereas the first of the two chapters describing the effectiveness of the supposed reform

period was largely quantitative, an analysis of the results of the social transformation that

87 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. In Gann & Duignan. The Rulers of German Africa. 259.

38

Dernburg envisioned in his speeches must necessarily be more qualitative, that is to say there

is less hard numerical evidence to point to in this case in debunking the idea of the reform

period. As has been mentioned earlier, Dernburg saw in the German occupation of its

colonies a chance for colonization by means of preservation, rather than destruction.88 This

was elaborated into a system of raising the natives and civilizing them, and can be seen in the

context of the international idea of the white man's burden. Like the idea of making the

colonies more of an economical asset than a burden on the metropole, this was hardly a new

idea, it was merely well and energetically articulated by Dernburg to a larger audience than

had been previously the case in Germany. In order to get an idea of the efficacy of the social

changes that Dernburg promised, it is again useful to break these changes into categories to

show the successes and failures of each part of his policy in turn. Some of these themes come

directly from Dernburg's speeches, while others are more peripheral, but certainly must be

included in any discussion of the relative progress of the civilizing mission. As such, the

social progress of the reform period will be discussed in terms of medical and educational

advances, the decline of slavery and its relation to labor recruitment, and finally the treatment

of non-native populations within German East Africa. Throughout this process, the focus, as

was the case with economic analysis, will remain on the supposed reform period, and the

changes that did or did not occur in that period in the context of larger scale changes with

earlier beginnings in order to get a precise idea of the nature of that period. This will show,

on the one hand, the many obvious failures, as well as successes that do not fit into the 1907-

1910 periodization espoused by proponents of the reform period thesis.

Disease Prevention

One of Dernburg’s major points in regard to social progress in the colonies was

disease prevention. While the ideas he espoused mainly covered human diseases, it also

covered vaccinations against animal diseases, most notably rinderpest, although that was

mostly relevant to German Southwest Africa, and therefore will not be discussed here. As for

human diseases, three were stringently fought by the German authorities in German East

Africa; malaria, sleeping sickness, and smallpox. Of these, Dernburg highlighted malaria and

sleeping sickness as major targets for eradication during his tenure in office. These were

explained by Dernburg as the, “most dangerous enemies,” of whites and blacks respectively.89

88 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 9.89 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 9 – 10.

39

The first of these two diseases, malaria, being a greater problem for whites, and

therefore of greater relevance to his audience in Berlin, provides a good example of German

eradication efforts before, during, and after Denburg’s term in office. The disease represented

one of the largest problems for colonial development in the tropics, and had been recognized

as such essentially since European colonization began. Therefore, there were already known

methods for combatting the disease, represented largely by quinine, which, though not in its

pure form, had been known as effective against the disease since at least the seventeenth

century. It is not clear if Dernburg meant quinine when he suggested that, “the German

doctor has succeeded… in taming malaria,” but in any case this was simply not true.90

German attempts to combat the disease began in earnest in 1901 with expeditions against

malaria in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, with the goal of identifying all carriers of malaria and

subjecting them to quinine treatment.91 This was largely unsuccessful among the African

population, although with limited bright spots among the European population, with rates of

malaria among white children falling, for example. In Tanga, however, seven years into the

program no noticeable change had actually occurred.92 Besides quinine, which though

ineffective among the general population, had proven effective among soldiers, larval control

of the mosquitos that carry the disease was also attempted. This process began just before

Dernburg’s tenure as colonial secretary, in 1905, at which point it was becoming apparent

that large-scale quinine prophylaxis was impracticable. While these efforts started with

promising beginnings, they were largely given up as too expensive while Dernburg was still

in office. At least in regard to malaria then, Dernburg’s claims of social progress were not

realized, and even afterwards real attempts at eradication were not restarted, because, as

Koponen puts it, “after all, the German efforts were not undertaken for the health of the

Africans, but for the exploitation of the colony.”93

The second disease mentioned by Dernburg, sleeping sickness, was a much larger

problem on the whole, and was much more of an issue of prevention among Africans as

compared to whites; in some senses an opposite scenario to malaria. The disease itself started

to spread out of the Congo basin at the end of the century, leaving massive devastation in its

wake, though Dernburg’s claim that it had killed 300,000 people in 1906 is a bit outlandish.94

90 Ibid. 9. 91 Meixner. “Gesundheitsverhältnisse in Deutsch-Ostafrika im Jahre 1902/03”. Arbeiten aus dem

Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte. 21 (1904). 569 – 572. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 487.92 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 488.93 Ibid. 489.94 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 9.

40

At any rate, the disease was a serious threat, spreading into German East Africa first along

the coasts of Lake Victoria from Uganda. It was not, however, recognized as such at first in

the German colony, but by 1905 the reports from field doctors became increasingly severe,

with suggestions that many were going to die, and that immediate defense against the disease

was necessary.95 These efforts that were attempted against sleeping sickness came in two

forms, one medical, and one more physical. Medical efforts included especially

chemotherapy, but this was in any case quite ineffective, with suggestions that only twenty

percent of patients were cured, while most endured serious pain, and blindness occurred in

others.96 As was the case with malaria, when curing the disease proved impractical, other

methods were attempted. However, given the much greater seriousness of sleeping sickness

as compared to malaria, the costs were actually born, and the countermeasures were quite

intense. For example, in multiple cases the sick were rounded up and placed in concentration

camps, though it is very important not to confuse these with the later holocaust variety.97 This

sort of draconian measure was naturally resisted by the natives, who attempted to run from

the disease screening agents. In one particular case in Bukoba, on Lake Victoria, two villages

were entirely abandoned when they heard about the medical experts coming, fleeing with all

of their possessions and their cattle across the British border into Uganda.98 This acceleration

in the campaign followed Dernburg’s promised, and indeed picked up during his tenure in

office, the two cases above being from 1909. The draconian containment policies continued

afterwards, by the time Dernburg left office in 1910, multiple villages were being forcibly

depopulated and burned.99 Even afterwards, efforts to control the Glossina palpalis variety of

tsetse fly that was understood to spread the disease remained stringent, with reports of 10,000

natives working to clear forests along the shores of Lake Tanganyika that were known tsetse

breeding grounds.100 All of these attempts to control the disease were only mildly successful.

While the catastrophic accounts of Dernburg were certainly not realized, and in places where

the most strict, and in some cases inhumane methods were used to combat the disease, like

Shirati and Bukoba, the incidence of sleeping sickness declined during Dernburg’s term in

95 Feldmann to Götzen. September 26 1905. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 5895 93 – 95.

96 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 480.97 Kleine to the Government. February 15 1909. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt

5900 17.98 Ibid. 17.99 Wach to the Government. July 3 1910. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 5905 59.100 Kleine to Governor Schnee. 24 June 1912. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 5892

134.

41

office by ninety-nine percent.101 However, at the same time, cases along Lake Tanganyika

actually doubled, and new outbreaks of the disease were being recorded in the south of the

colony, along the Ruvuma River. So, while the disease was far from contained, it did not

cause the horrible devastation that it was capable of in Uganda, for example, where between

1896 and 1908 it is estimated that 200,000 people died of sleeping sickness.102 In that light,

the fight against the disease under Dernburg can and has been considered a general success,

unlike malaria. Indeed, as claimed, the German doctor was coming to the rescue of the

natives.

A third major disease that was combatted with serious resources in German East

Africa during this time was smallpox, although it was not specifically mentioned as a target

by Dernburg in his campaign speeches. Like malaria and unlike sleeping sickness, smallpox

had been a serious problem for centuries, and by one estimate, every second African had the

telltale pock-marked complexion.103 Large-scale campaigns to vaccinate natives began in

1898, with something like 200,000 vaccinations given by 1904. This process was scaled up

massively during Dernburg’s time in office, with suggestions of nearly four million

vaccinations between 1909 and 1914.104 This would suggest that fully half of the population

of German East Africa had been vaccinated by 1914. These campaigns, as was seen with

sleeping sickness, did not necessarily run smoothly, and often the natives would run from the

doctors in fear or rise in revolt.105 The statistics, however, are impressive, to say the very

least, and would certainly indicate the sort of authoritarian cleansing of the Augean stables

that the colonial thesis on the Dernburg reform era suggests, were it not for a minor quirk. As

was mentioned before, Dernburg did not actually suggest that he was going to seriously

combat smallpox, and furthermore, the massive rise in vaccinations was not due to any sort of

official intervention or pressure, as was certainly given in regard to sleeping sickness.

Instead, it was a medical advance that occurred in 1909, during the supposed reform period,

namely the ability to produce the lymph that was needed for the vaccine, which made total

vaccination cheap and effective. In this way, disease prevention under Dernburg was

somewhat of a mixed bag. While there were definite successes, and conditions for the natives

in the colony did improve, it was not all the colonial secretary’s doing, and it would be wrong

101 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 482.102 Ibid. 475.103 Becker in Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte. 1897. 19. In Koponen. Development for

Exploitation. 471.104 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 473.105 Dempwolff. “Kampf gegen die Pocken.” Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 5830 6.

42

to see his term in office as any serious turning point in the fight against diseases in the colony

generally. More importantly perhaps, is the reason that Dernburg needed to fight diseases in

the first place. If the colonies were to be productive resource bases of the German Empire, the

African labor that would make it so certainly could not be dying off. As will be seen in the

rest of this chapter, all social improvements were in one way or another linked to the larger

goal of labor creation for what can be seen as Dernburg’s clearest aim, a primary resource

producing colony. This does not imply that this sort of change is not reform in the sense that

Dernburg meant it, but it does run counter to the notion of raising the native.

Education

While Dernburg does not give any serious details about his intentions in regard to

educating the natives, it was definitely an important part of German policy in their East

African colony, not least because of the importance of missions and mission schools to the

Zentrum. However, the importance of education under the supposed Dernburg reform period

is its position in the historiography. Oftentimes, education is taken as one of the examples of

the successes of the reform period, and especially a success that grew out of the definitive

shift in policy after Dernburg came into office as colonial secretary. This is best illustrated in

Iliffe’s work, Tanganyika under German Rule, in which he posits that in the “age of

improvement” which followed Dernburg’s appointment, the most important form of

improvement was western education.106 Iliffe’s argumentation runs that this provided social

mobility to Africans, but in practice all that seems to be shown are minor groups advancing to

dominate others through education, largely as part of the German administration.107 Given

that he describes his age of improvement as one of Africans improving their societies, the

exchange of one set of rulers for a new European-educated set can hardly be considered as a

serious gain.108 Granted, there was a rise in education in the later part of German rule, as

evidenced in British reports on widespread literacy in the colony.109 But this rise is more

complicated than improvement during and after Dernburg’s time in office. Rather,

improvements that did happen began earlier, and at any rate were not generally designed to

particularly raise the African native.

106 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 171.107 Ibid. 187.108 Ibid. 166.109 Gann & Duignan. The Rulers of German Africa. 213.

43

Education began early in German East Africa, but it was complicated in that it came

from two sources that were working essentially at cross-purposes. On the one hand were the

missions, whose goal was unsurprisingly maximum conversion, of which education was seen

as an integral part, especially in learning and disseminating the word of god. On the other

hand was the government, which due to its serious financial constraints, needed to train an

adequate body of underlings within the colonial society that might be able to work and

function for them. As was the case in colonies across Africa with large Islamic populations,

the administration and missions came into conflict over many aspects of policy, for while the

administration was content to take the easiest route and rule through the Muslim elites, the

missions were attempting to break down the societies they encountered in order to

Christianize and civilize them.110 The animosity was clearly evident, for example in the

outcry caused by the placement of a Muslim teacher in the government school at Tanga by

missionary groups, which eventually forced the government to remove the teacher in

question.111 Whereas the disconnect between the government and its missionaries caused

problems in many colonies, that problem was solved by an extensive compromise between

the government and the missions on the issue of education, known as the Benedictine

agreement. This informal agreement, which was reached between the government and certain

mission groups in 1900, meant that they would collaborate rather than compete within the

colony. The essence of the agreement was that missions would henceforth expand their

curriculum in order to promote the creation of workable colonial officials, while cutting back

on their activities along the mostly Islamic coastal areas, where their work often caused

conflict. For its part, the government would not found schools in areas already occupied by

missions, and would give financial support to schools which helped raise colonial officials.112

This compromise situation was far from perfect, and some missionaries complained that

should they follow the government’s suggestions on curriculum, there, “would be no more

room in [their] lessons for the most important subject, religion.”113 These problems could be

overcome in with local compromises however, as in one case where Governor von Götzen

offered fifty rupees for each suitable official that a missionary school produced.114 This

110 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 500.111 “Praktische Negererziehung.” Kölnische Zeitung. November 19 1903. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde.

Reichskolonialamt 990 111 – 112.112 Niesel. Kolonialverwaltung. 169 – 172. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 509.113 Karl Nauhaus to the government. July 30 1901. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt

990 83.114 Götzen to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial-Abteilung. June 13 1901. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde.

Reichskolonialamt 990 45.

44

collaboration coincided with a rise of compulsion in education that the government no longer

feared now that the missions were teaching a more useful curriculum. Part of the reason for

this cooperation was the growing need among all sectors to produce viable workers for the

plantations that were growing in number to produce the raw materials needed by the

metropole before Dernburg came into office. As Koponen puts it, the Africans were to be

“educated for work,” not educated for the sake of lifting the natives.115 In fact, Dernburg

implies in his speeches exactly that, or rather that the over-education of the Africans in

America had been a serious policy mistake.116 Now, this is not to say that the education

program that occurred under German rule did not benefit the Africans to some degree. As has

been noted, literacy did rise impressively, and by the end of German rule, Africans no longer

needed compulsion to attend school, but in some cases demanded it after seeing the social

benefits it bestowed on them within the colonial setting.117 The point then is that the rise in

the efficiency of the educational system in German East Africa began much earlier than the

supposed reform period, and had very little to do with Dernburg himself.

Slavery

Another way in which to analyze the reform period, in terms of raising the condition

of the natives, would naturally be the presence of slavery in German East Africa. Dernburg

boasted in his speeches that, “slavery – God be praised – has been abolished.”118 The fact that

this statement was blatantly false opens up the reform period to a line of attack that has only

been made recently possible by modern scholars. The problem with previous works, and

notably that of Iliffe, is that they are largely silent on the issue of slavery under German rule,

seeing it as declining along with the general decline of the Arab slave trade in the area.119 In

some respects, this gap in early histories helps to show why the period might be seen as one

of reform. The fact is though, that unlike the British and the French, the Germans never

actually abolished slavery in its entirety.120 To be fair, slavery did decline substantially under

German rule in East Africa. According to some estimates, the institution comprised as many

as 400,000 people in 1900 to 150,000 in 1914, representing a proportional drop in the

115 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 500. 116 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 8.117 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 501.118 Dernburg. Zielpunkte. 6.119 Iliffe. A Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge. 1989. 131-132.120 Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 91-92.

45

population of slaves from ten to four percent of the total population of the German colony.121

Furthermore, under German rule there were definitive steps taken against slavery. These

came in the form of three particular ordinances. The first of these was set out in 1891. This

ordinance stated that slaves could be ransomed free, but only with the right German

government documents, and that those that did not have said documents would be returned to

their masters. It also protected the rights of the slaves, to a certain degree, but in large part

upheld the rights of the masters.122 There are several reasons for this, as can especially be

seen in the writings of the governors of the colony. While an early governor, Schele, claimed

abolition was impracticable due to the economic consequences it would have, Liebert, one of

his successors, cited the political support that was needed from the slave-owners.123 Even by

the time of Götzen, just before Dernburg’s time as colonial secretary, Götzen claimed that

slavery could not be abolished until after the central railway had been built and the colony’s

economy developed.124 Instead, under Götzen, another ordinance was released in 1901. This

new law stated that now all slaves had the right to apply for their own ransom that they might

work off. This law was followed by another more important step in 1904, also under Götzen.

This last ordinance on slavery essentially stated that all slaves born in 1905 and beyond

would be free.125 That is to say, the law stopped well short of abolishing slavery, although it

was assumed that it would of course die off in time without an influx of new slaves. In fact,

colonial policy-makers did not envisage total abolition as being possible until 1930 or

1940!126 Ransoming of slaves into freedom did occur during this period, but there was no

significant rise in this policy during the supposed reform period; only a few thousand slaves

were emancipated with German government documents each year.127 The total drop in the

slave population therefore has much more to do with slaves running away and manumissions

than with government policy. In this light, Dernburg’s claim that slavery had already been

abolished seems downright preposterous, if not simply disingenuous. The fact was that the

government’s policy on slavery went hand in hand with its policy on labor creation. One of

121 Deutsch. Emancipation without Abolition. 165.122 Landesgesetzgebung. Ordinance Concerning the Ransom of Slaves. September 4, 1891. No. 111a. 329-

331. In Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 92.123 Schele to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial-Abteilung. October 30, 1893. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde.

Reichskolonialamt 1003 168.124 Götzen to Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial-Abteilung. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt

1006 69.125 Gann & Duignan. The Rulers of German Africa 1884 – 1914. 202.126 Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 81.127 Wiedner op cit p. 138; Reichstag Memorandum no. 1395, 1912/14, p. 12. In Sunseri. A Social History of

Cotton Production. 97.

46

the overarching concerns of the colony was labor procurement, and keeping slavery around

helped that process. This is because the reality of work on German plantations was quite

brutal, and it was necessary to have an institution worse than plantation work around for

Africans to sign up to that process.128 As far as the German government in East Africa was

concerned, the process of ransoming slaves out of slavery and into plantation work was

necessary to keep up the labor supply. The fact that this usually only meant the trading of an

African master for a European one was not a serious concern. In fact, this process can be seen

to have continued to some degree even when the British came to Tanganyika, in that they

released the slaves from bondage, but then simply forced them to continue working in the

same place.129 For now though, Dernburg’s obliviousness to the fate of the slave population in

his speeches, and the statistical evidence showing no great leap in slave emancipation during

his tenure in office is certainly damning to anyone seeking to raise the position of the natives

in any substantial manner.

Indians

Also of note, when considering the raising of the natives, is the situation of the Indian

population in German East Africa, though the Indians were not themselves specifically

mentioned by Dernburg in his campaign speeches. This is because of a quirk of German law

in the colony, which left Indians classified for official purposes as natives.130 Indians had a

long history of trade with East Africa, moving back and forth with the monsoon, but did not

start to settle on the East African coast until the late nineteenth century, with the advent of

European rule.131 If Dernburg had indeed been the champion of the natives and reform

generally, then the period should have seen a relaxing of restrictions on Indians and other

natives. Instead, records show precisely the opposite took place. Indians had never been

popular with the Germans, especially the settler population, who saw them as leeches feeding

off business which should have been in European hands. However, the colonial governor,

Rechenberg, saw the Indians differently, and recognized them as indispensable intermediaries

128 Sunseri. A Social History of Cotton Production. 130.129 Ibid. 132.130 Robert Gregory. India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire 1890 –

1939. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1971. 100.131 Gijsbert Oonk. “South Asians in East Africa (1880 – 1920) with a Particular Focus on Zanzibar: Toward

a Historical Explanation of Economic Success of a Middlemen Minority.” African and Asian Studies. Volume 5, no. 1. 2006. 9.

47

between the European businesses and the African natives, which, to be fair, they were.132 At

the same time, he thought that a mixing of Europeans at the native level in business would be

detrimental to the social hierarchy which was necessary in the colony. At first, these views

prevailed on Dernburg, at the beginning of his tenure. For instance, a 1906 attempt by the

colonial settlers to force Indians to do their bookkeeping in either German or Swahili was

swatted down by Dernburg.133 Over time though, Dernburg would vacillate on the issue.

Pressured by colonial supporters in the right-wing dominated Reichstag, Dernburg devised a

number of policies which would have severely limited Indian migration to the colony by

requiring migrants, for example, to be proficient in either Swahili or a European language.134

Where Dernburg, had he been the colonial reformer championed by the reform thesis, should

have been pressing for improved rights, we instead see him curtailing the rights of the natives

with pressure from the settler community. In fact, it was Rechenberg, the colonial governor,

who was responsible for stopping these policies from being enacted. Dernburg was on over

by Rechenberg largely because the Indians were British subjects, and were the Germans to

impede British subjects, they might just close themselves off from their trade in India, which

at the time was worth fifteen times as much as German trade with East Africa.135 It would not

be until after Dernburg left office that the lot of the Indians in German East Africa would

improve. It is important to note in this section the growing influence of the settler community

on both Dernburg and the colony at large. As this study moves into its next segment, the issue

of the rise of the settlers will be discussed in detail.

Chapter V: The Rise of the Settlers

132 Rechenberg to Reichskolonialamt. September 14, 1908. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 28. 121 – 126. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 295.

133 Ibid. 295.134 Gregory. India and East Africa. 101.135 Dernburg. February 26, 1909. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 28. 154 – 155. In

Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 297.

48

Whereas the reasons for economic colonization had long roots, as was especially seen

in the case of cotton, there was a second serious impetus for colonial acquisition and

development. This was the idea of Siedlungskolonien, or settler colonies, which had even

deeper roots than the economic variety. The concept of the creation of colonies for German

settlement can be traced all the way back to the liberal revolutions of 1848 and the Frankfurt

Assembly which met that year in an attempt to foster liberalism and German unification. By

that point, the problem of Auswanderung, or emigration, had become a serious issue. With

the advent of industrialization in Germany, though the full effects were far from complete at

this time, dislocation of earlier forms of production had created a large movement of people

from the German states to new areas, more specifically the Americas. Though it was by no

means a primary topic of debate, the issue of colonies was discussed for a new united

Germany. These colonies would have been located in the Americas, among existing German

settlements, and would ostensibly provide an outlet for Germans to emigrate to without losing

their cultural distinctiveness. At the same time, the colonies would have provided a release

valve that would prevent the rise of a truly revolutionary class.136 This of course was a real

threat in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions across Europe. Though these talks came to

nothing with the overall failure of the liberal revolution, they laid an important foundation for

later thought on the issue of Auswanderung and settler colonization. The issue of settler

colonization lay largely dormant until the time of German unification, with a new wave of

emigration and a coherent foreign policy among the various German states for the first time.

Now, however, settler arguments were combined with economic arguments in a politically

viable package, best laid out by the missionary, Friedrich Fabri, in his paper, “Does Germany

Need Colonies?” This included elements of the industrialist line of raw material security, but

then went on to describe the benefits of the retention of German emigrants within a larger

German Empire.137 This convergence of interests, with lower and middle class support for

settlement, as well as business support for economic colonialism allowed, or possibly

convinced, Bismarck to embark upon his colonial venture in the mid 1880’s, such a potent

political force was it. Dernburg, and through him Bülow, would later tap into this same

dynamic patriotic force in their electoral success in the 1907 Reichstag elections. However, at

the start, the economic, trading model defined the colonies almost entirely. It was only with

the obvious failure of the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (DOAG), or German East

136 Smith. German Colonial Empire. 3 – 4.137 Friedrich Fabri. “Does Germany Need Colonies?” 3rd ed. 1883. 1-6.

49

Africa Company, in 1890 that settlement could truly begin under the cover of more robust

government intervention in the colony.

Development of the Settler Community

Even with the advent of direct government intervention in German East Africa, settler

growth was decidedly slow. Before the governorship of Liebert began in 1896, it had been

limited to exactly two settlers, one of which was killed in the coastal rebellion which ended

the DOAG’s authority, and a second who fled.138 As the colony had not been entirely secured

under German domination, settlement was not yet practical, reasonable, or safe for that

matter. Even under the enthusiastic Governor Schele, who saw the colony as ripe for German

peasant settlement, none actually arrived. The early governors, were not, however, generally

disposed towards settlement, with Soden and Wißmann in fact entirely opposing the idea, and

blocking several efforts at settlement.139 The effective blocking of colonial settlement in

German East Africa was to end with the start of the governorship of Eduard von Liebert in

1896. Liebert, “a racist, radical conservative committed to white settlement,” was to change

colonial policy on settlement drastically.140 From the very beginning of his rule, Liebert made

numerous overtures to prospective settlers, suggesting they base themselves near the coast in

West Usambara, by the old DOAG railhead. He even sweetened the deal, mandating that the

district office in the area should provide each settler with something like ten tax-laborers each

for work in their fields.141 While evidence is scarce as to who exactly was coming into the

colony as settlers in the period of Liebert’s rule, that they did is not in question. Given that

settlement was virtually non-existent under the rule of the first three governors, the fact that

there were 1078 Europeans, the vast majority of them Germans, living in German East Africa

by 1900, towards the end of Liebert’s period in office, indicates a serious takeoff in the

community around the turn of the century.142 This development was to continue under the

next governor of the colony, Götzen. Like Liebert, Götzen was inclined to support Germanic

settlement of German East Africa, and by the end of his rule, and the start of the supposed

138 Kurtze. DOAG. 152. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 157.139 Kayser to DOAG. November 26, 1892. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Deutsch-Ostafrikanische

Gesellschaft Berlin. 14, 160. In Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 156.140 Smith. German Colonial Empire. 104.141 Liebert to Hohenlohe. April 12, 1897. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 78. 44. In

Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 156.142 Amtliche Jahresberichte über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika under der

Südsee. In Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 106.

50

reform period, the European population had more than doubled to 2,465.143 Götzen did not

however support simply any type of colonial development, but was clear that it would be a

difficult venture that demanded considerable capital. Nevertheless, he did claim that, “a

capable man will be able to establish a secure livelihood.”144 At the same time, Götzen

sponsored two rather outlandish settlement schemes, including Boers escaping the conflict in

South Africa, and Volga Germans from the Caucasus.145 Both of these were largely failures,

with many of the Boers moving on to Kenya, and the majority of the Volga Germans never

arriving. Regardless, the growth of the settler community continued apace, and at this point

was irreversible. Less obvious, however, by this point were the implications of the growth of

the settler community. Under Götzen’s rule in German East Africa, the settler community

was not only to grow in numbers, but also consequently in terms of political clout. That the

settler community grew and organized substantially during this period has often been

overlooked, or the importance undervalued, is at least partially responsible for the frequent

division of the history of German East Africa in terms of the reform period.146 The issue of

the growth of the strength of the settler community, and its ultimate reversal of any attempt at

reform must now be discussed as a major proponent of a revised trajectory of German East

African history.

Rise of Settler Influence

Running parallel to, and eventually superseding the growth of the settler population

was a second factor, their growing political power and organization. This process, like the

population growth, was set in motion well before Dernburg’s time in office. Like the overall

growth in population, the power and organization of the settlers began to coalesce under the

welcoming rule of Governor Liebert with his particular interest in supporting German

settlement. While sweetening the proposition for would be settlers with offers of free tax

labor, he also set in motion two major factors for later colonist organization and influence. In

order to help the newly arrived settlers organize themselves in their dealings with the colonial

state, the Pflanzer Verein Tanga, or Tanga Planters’ Union was established on the initiative

143 Amtliche Jahresberichte über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika under der Südsee. In Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 106.

144 “Auskunft für Ansiedler in Usambara und anderen Gebieten von Deutsch-Ostafrika.” January 1902. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 11. 31.

145 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 60 – 61. 146 The de-emphasis of the settler issue can be seen in Sunseri A Social History of Cotton Production in

German East Africa, 1884-1915. And Deutsch. Emancipation without Abolition.

51

of Governor Liebert in 1898.147 While this move helped the settlers organize themselves, they

were also given a large degree of control and influence under the Kommunalverband, or local

commune system. These systems, established in 1899 under the guidance of Liebert, were

designed as local executive organs of government.148 They had the power to tax the locals,

and to use fifty percent of the revenue for local projects. In this way, it was hoped that the

central government in East Africa would be able to avoid local micromanagement, but the

implications and the amount of power that was being handed over to the colonists were not

yet obvious to the government, and these communes would later become the flashpoint of a

clash between the central government and the colonists. As the settler population grew under

the governorships of Liebert and Götzen, they became more assertive, and began asking for

more rights, in the German tradition of Selbstverwaltung, or self-administration. Götzen

would be the first governor to confront these demands, but he was more than willing to go

along. Accordingly, in 1903, Götzen created what was known as the Governor’s Council, in

which a combined body of official, (meaning government-employed,) and unofficial, (which

normally meant from the settler community,) Germans would be able to express their

interests and demands, as well as advise the governor. On paper, this mere advisory power

does not sound overly intimidating, but in practice going a against the council meant that the

governor was putting his own neck on the line in regard to whatever issue the council had not

supported, and would be held personally responsible in Berlin.149 Therefore, it was not long

before the council was able to begin forcing its demands on Götzen, starting with the removal

of all non-Germans from the local communes, on the pretext that they would not be able to

follow German conversations well enough.150 This meant that the communes were now more

specifically the main organ of settler control, in which they could use government revenue

directly to support their own interests. At the same time, under Götzen, the settler community

was beginning to organize even more than it had previously outside of the governmental

structures. New groups of planters began making their own unions, which would later come

together to form a very influential force in the German colony. All the while, the settler

community continued to grow, not even seriously hindered by the massive Maji Maji

rebellion, as the settlers never completely lost control of the situation. This point is reflected

in government statistics on population, which though our only source, do not seem to lend

147 Liebert to Tanga. November 12, 1897. Tanzanian National Archive VIII/J/19/I. In Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 84.

148 Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 220 – 221.149 Ibid. 257.150 Ibid. 258.

52

themselves to any sort of bias.151 By the time the colony received a governor who was

generally opposed to settlement by Europeans, the power of the settler community had

become entrenched, and could not be reversed. Instead, in the clash to follow, it would be the

governor’s own ideas that would suffer.

The Settler Ascendancy

From the beginning of their times in office, which began almost simultaneously at the

end of the Maji Maji rebellion, both Dernburg and Rechenberg were opposed to the settler

community in general terms; a one hundred and eighty degree turn from the positions of

Liebert and Götzen. Both envisioned an African colony in which the natives would produce

the raw materials needed in Germany of their own accord. Dernburg was generally silent on

the issue of settlement in his election speeches, focusing more on the economics of the

colonies. Had he spoken out, he might have endangered the national cause that the colonies

had become, and the support that the parties of order garnered from the upsurge of popular

support. Later however, he was much clearer, claiming, “I have become convinced, that the

East African economy cannot depend on the work of settlers and plantations.”152 Given that

Rechenberg was even more clear in his opposition to settlement, it is surprising that the two

men working in tandem proved unable to change the course that the colony was already

moving on. The failure of Dernburg and Rechenberg was not, however, for lack of effort.

Their time on office represents a long struggle between the settlers and the bureaucracy,

which the settlers would ultimately win. The struggle began with Dernburg’s plans for

railroads. If the colony were to become the African based economy that Rechenberg sought,

then it would need railroads to penetrate the interior and stimulate the growth of capitalism.

The scheme, however, was impossible without the destruction of the local communes, which

would waste the money necessary for construction themselves, and furthermore prevent the

government from recouping its investment through tax revenues. Sensing a threat against

their interests, the settler unions that had previously existed joined together in 1907 to form

the Northern League, which effectively represented all of the settler interests. It was from this

league that the settlers made their first real attempt to thwart government policy. While

Dernburg and Rechenberg were in Berlin, pushing their budget, including provisions for a

151 Amtliche Jahresberichte über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika under der Südsee. In Tetzlaff. Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 106.

152 Dernburg to Paul Voith. December 31, 1907. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 120. 15.

53

central railroad line and the dissolution of the communes, through the Reichstag, a challenge

arrived from East Africa in the form of a petition for the Northern League. It claimed that, “a

native policy is to be pursued in German East Africa which considers only colored interests,

and neglects German business as against them: a policy which will make German East Africa

merely a negro and Indian trading colony, with European plantations a secondary

consideration.”153 This was of course, generally speaking what Rechenberg and Dernburg had

planned for the colony, though they would not have admitted such publicly. The motion

might have been halted, were it not for the fact that the petition devolved into a personal

attack on the Colonial Secretary and the governor. The attack was seen as having been in

poor taste, and was largely ignored. The settlers, however, had shown that they were capable

of over-reaching the colonial government. After this point, the settlers changed tactics.

Regrouping as the Territorial League, the settlers found new ways to have their demands

heard, and became more and more effective in their efforts. This effect can be seen in a

number of different areas, some of which have already been elaborated to a certain degree

above. The reason for the success of the settlers lay in their use of politics in Berlin to

advance their own interests. As Dernburg was beholden to the right-wing coalition then in

power in the Reichstag, he was forced to listen to the demands of the settlers when presented

through members of his coalition. When, for instance, Rechenberg attempted to protect the

interests of the Indians against the settlers, Dernburg instead first listened to the settlers, and

attempted to block Indian immigration into the colony. Rechenberg ultimately thwarted him

in this effort, but he had already shown his vacillating tendency. Later, when Rechenberg was

advancing his plans for the central railroad, Dernburg again caved to settler demands

presented to him in Berlin, and despite reasonable claims that it was not financially feasible,

agreed that the colony would finance extensions to both the central and northern lines, the

northern line being key to settler interests.154 Dernburg furthermore took the settler’s position

against Rechenberg in regard to labor laws, refusing to curb brutality within the system.155

This hardly supports Dernburg’s supposed goals of raising the position of the natives, and the

tendency to compromise disqualifies any sort of reform agenda, not to mention any sense of a

strong willed politician that would be necessary to reform a system. The best example,

however, of the settlers’ effect on colonial policy was in regard to their own power in the

colony. Rechenberg, having already moved against the local communes, now sought to

153 Petition to Reichstag. Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde. Reichskolonialamt 120. 119.154 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 103. 155 Ibid. 106.

54

destroy the power base of the settlers in the governor’s council, which was becoming a thorn

in his side. He did so by packing the council with his own supporters, to defeat the unofficial

element within that body. The Territorial League, however, immediately protested to its

friends in the Reichstag. At the next meeting of the Reichstag, Dernburg was forced to make

concessions to the settlers. The council would now have a majority of election non-officials.

This meant that the settlers would have an effective check on the governor henceforth, and

that Rechenberg’s efforts had not only failed, but backfired miserably.156 Not only that, but

where Rechenberg thought he had previously succeeded, his hopes were dashed. Dernburg

was to compromise once again, this time on the issue of local taxation, the second major

source of power of the settlers. While he agreed to end the local communes, he allowed new

district councils, composed mostly of settlers, to take twenty-five percent of the tax revenues.

This essentially defeated the point of removing the communes in the first place, much to

Rechenberg’s chagrin. Eventually, though, Dernburg’s balancing act in the Reichstag proved

untenable. In May 1910, he was forced to resign over a fight with another settler community,

this time in German South-West Africa. His replacement, Lindequist, was entirely pro-settler,

and it was obvious to all that the settlers had won the day.

Towards the South African Model

The distinction has already been made in this paper between the two different types of

colony possible: a trading colony on the West African model, or a settlement colony of a

South African design. In the period during and after Rechenberg and Dernburg, the colony

moved substantially in the direction of the South African model, which can be seen as the

new definition of the colony generally, had it not been for the First World War.157 The

process had become entrenched under the so called reform period of Dernburg, and continued

after he resigned. In his wake, A distinctly pro-settler governor, Lindequist, was appointed, as

well as an ambivalent governor, Schnee, who while attempting not o favor any one model

over the other, ultimately did not try to hamper settler efforts in establishing their own rules

and power. On all the major issues that Dernburg and Rechenberg had attempted to stand

firm, the regime now definitively caved in to settler pressure. In regard to Indians,

immigration was curtailed, and their rights to acquire land were restricted. The northern rail,

156 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 112. 157 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 201. Koponen. Development for Exploitation. 250. Tetzlaff.

Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. 289.

55

which Rechenberg had attempted to block as uneconomic, was now continued deep into the

hinterland as far as Mount Kilimanjaro. Labor laws, furthermore, did not change, but

remained friendly towards settler interests. Perhaps most importantly, the power of the

governor’s council, that main organ of settler control, was set to increase, with proposals on

the table by the time of the First World War that would have given the council decisive

power over European agriculture and labor laws.158 This was the case in German South-West

Africa, which had already become a colony on the South African model, dominated by

settlers, rather than trading interests. The point then, here, is that German East Africa was,

from the beginning of settlement, moving inexorably towards a settlement model. It was

simply too difficult for a German administration to ignore the complaints of its own citizens

in East Africa for the benefit of the natives, who did not have a voice. Instead, as the settler

growth and influence in the Reichstag increased, concessions to settler demands became

unavoidable. Therefore, rather than seeing the Dernburg period as one of reform, it is

necessary to see it as a time of defensive moves, ultimately futile, against a growing settler

tide.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

158 Iliffe. Tanganyika under German Rule. 204.

56

Over the course of this research paper, much has been clarified about the so-called

Dernburg reform period. Several historians have seen it, mostly in the past, but also

significantly in modern popular literature, as just such a reform period under the authoritarian

guidance of a visionary colonial secretary. 159 This paper has sought to clarify what that

reform period actually was, and how the idea of it came about. As such, it was first explained

that the idea of the Dernburg reform period was born out of the Reichstag elections of 1907.

Dernburg made a great many claims about how East Africa, and the German colonies in

general would become vital resource production areas, and at the same time the natives

would be lifted from their squalor through the wonders of the German civilizing mission.

These claims, articulated largely to gain support for the right-wing coalition that Bülow was

building in the Reichstag, did not reflect reality. Despite that, they have managed to confuse a

number of historians.160 The election, and Dernburg’s term in office, did not represent a

serious shift in the dynamics of the colony, but rather a revived interest in the colony

generally, as befit an issue of supposed national importance. The facts on the ground help to

support this case. This has been seen, on the one hand, in terms of economic growth and

change in the colony. Whereas Dernburg made grand claims about the value of the colony

and its possible exports to Germany, with the exception of sisal, these claims failed to

materialize. The planting of these crops had begun under governor Götzen, and merely

continued and attracted more investment under Dernburg’s watch. Furthermore, the increases

that did occur, (this paper does not deny that there was exponential growth in cash crop

production,) were from an extremely low base level, and never came close to meeting the

needs of German industry. Rather, the entire trade value of the colony only ever managed to

become one half of one percent of Germany’s total trade; far less than Germany’s trade with

other nations’ colonies. Where the colony did seriously improve in economic terms was in its

value as a whole, with the growth of railroads. However, efforts to make these railroads

economic failed in large part over the necessity to meet the settlers’ demands and also build

an unprofitable northern line. While the colony did not become the economic powerhouse

that Dernburg envisioned, it also failed to move forward substantially in social terms. While

certain diseases, like smallpox, were certainly rooted out to a large degree, this represented a

lone area of serious progress, despite failures in curbing malaria, and merely the ability to 159 Earlier academic historians include Townsend, Iliffe, and Bald, and more recently Gann & Duignan, while a good modern day example can be seen in Thomas Pakenham’s the Scramble for Africa. 160 See above works for examples.

57

check the spread of sleeping sickness. Education, though increasingly prevalent, did not

seriously improve the lot of the natives, but rather was intended to Christianize them, and

prepare intermediaries for work in the German administration. Statistics that might show a

general rise in literacy are non-existent, as this was not a major policy concern. Slavery

continued in the colony in this period, despite Dernburg’s claims that it had already been

abolished by his time in office, and in spite of his suggestion that it was morally

reprehensible. At the same time, labor laws against the natives were not substantially altered,

and a certain brutality continued to tinge German occupation as compared with British rule in

Kenya to the north. Lastly, persecution of Indians began during this supposed reform period,

and was codified in the aftermath thereof. What the failure of the colony in economic terms,

and the failure of the colony in terms of social advancement have in common is their root

cause, what can be seen as the primary historical development during German rule in East

Africa: the rise of the settlers. Between 1899 and 1914, the population of settlers increased

dramatically, from essentially none to over five thousand Europeans. As their population

grew, so did their authority and influence on colonial affairs. They prevented the ideas that

Dernburg and Rechenberg held for the colony, as one of African freedom and production for

the benefit of the German Empire, from coming into being. They did this largely through

their supporters in the Reichstag, and in the process they managed to divert the resources of

the colony into the promotion of European settler plantations using African labor, rather than

Africans working of their own accord. They diverted railroads to advance their own interests,

and effectively blocked any worthwhile social reforms, except for perhaps disease

prevention, which also of course was to their benefit. By the end of German rule in East

Africa, the settlers were coming to dominate the affairs of the colony in more obvious ways,

and this trend seems unlikely to have changed were it not for the First World War.

This paper argues then, that the period between 1907 and 1910, when Dernburg was

in office, should not be taken as a period of reform, or for that matter as the defining

watershed in German East African history. While most modern scholars have moved away

from explaining the period as one of reform, in the line of John Iliffe, they remain beholden

to the old colonial periodization of that history. As such they use the Maji Maji rebellion, and

the subsequent colonial crisis which was followed by Dernburg’s appointment, as the major

break in the history of the colony. However, having seen that the colony did not seriously

reform during Dernburg’s time in office, nor develop as a worthwhile economic factor in

German industry or trade, this periodization seems misguided. While there is an increased

interest in the colony after the Maji Maji rebellion from Imperial Germany, the situation there

58

did not change enough to warrant a dramatic historical break. Rather, this paper argues, the

time that Dernburg was in office should be seen in a larger context. There was certainly an

attempt in some ways at reform, if not in social terms, there was a definite attempt to make

the colony profitable to the empire. But this attempt at reform only represents a minor period

of backlash against the rising settler tide. Instead of breaking the history in the middle of the

period of settler growth, the entire twentieth century portion of German rule should be seen as

a coherent entity. As the colony developed during this period, it moved further and further

towards a distinctly South African model; a colony designed to benefit the settler community

there. Given the power of colonial and patriotic societies in Germany, and the support that the

colonists received from the right wing of the political spectrum, this was unavoidable. In both

of the German colonies with substantial European populations, that is to say German East

Africa, and German South-West Africa, the settlers came to dominate, whereas the others

remained trading colonies. In the context of this new periodization with the dominant

historical thread begin the rise and eventual dominance of the settler community, stretching

from 1899 to 1914, the period between 1907 and 1910 is therefore not seen as a period of

reform, but rather as an attempt to push the colony back onto a trading model trajectory. It is

precisely because the primary historical trend of settlement colonization began several years

prior to this effort, that the attempt to reform the colony failed. The precedence of German

settlers over African natives was not a situation that could be altered within the German

Empire, and therefore the presence of settlers in large numbers ultimately determined the

historical trajectory of the colony.

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